1. Aratuc vs.

COMELEC

FACTS:
The instant proceedings are sequels of the Courts decision in GR no. L-48097 wherein
Aratuc et al sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by the respondent Board
in Cotabato City.
The petitioners in the instant case filed complaints re allege irregularities in the election
records in the voting centers in the whole of Lanao Del Sur, Marawi, parts of Lanao del Norte,
Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat. Before the start of the hearings, the canvass was
suspended but after the supervisory panel presented its report, COMELEC filed its order of
suspension and directed the resumption of the canvass to be done in Manila. The petitioners
presented their objection with supporting handwritten report of finger print experts.
Soon after, the COMELEC rendered its resolution declaring the final result of the canvass.
Hence, this instant case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

RULING:
NO. Under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978, the Commission on Elections
shall have direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers. Also, it was stated under
administrative law that a superior body or office having supervision or control over another may do
directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done. The petition is hereby dismissed
for lack of merit.

2. Fabian vs, desierto

FACTS:
PROMAT participated in a government bidding including that of FMED. Also, private
respondent entered into an amorous relationship with the petitioner. Later on, misunderstanding
and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties when petitioner tried to terminate their
agreement, causing the petitioner to file an administrative case against him. Soon, Graft Investigator
Eduardo Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondents guilty of grave misconduct. The
case was then elevated into an appeal before the Ombudsman who inhibited himself and
transferred the case to the Deputy Ombudsman which then rested in favour of Agustin and the
Order exonerated the private respondents from administrative charges. Fabian then elevated the
case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the supreme court.

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RULING:
NO. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize on appeal to this Court. From decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman on administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
prescription in Sec. 30, article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate
jurisdiction of this court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such
disregard of the constitutional prohibition which was intended to give this court a measure of
control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment
of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily hinder the court.

3. Torres vs. specialized packaging

FACTS:
The petitioners came to be employees of the Specialized Packaging Development
Corporation (SPDC). In three separate complaints, they charged SPDC and the alleged labor
recruiters with illegal dismissal, non-payment of premium, overtime, 13th month pay and night
differential. The cases were then consolidated and assigned to Labor Arbiter Nambi who later on
rendered a decision in favour of the petitioners due to the failure of the respondents to file their
position paper before the deadline.
Soon after, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was appeaed by the SPDC to the NLRC, which
set aside the ruling and ordered the case to be remanded to LA Nambi for further proceedings. The
LA then issued a second decision finding petitioners employment to be illegally terminated. The
case was appealed to the CA who then dismissed the case finding the verification and certification
against forum shopping to be either effective or insufficient.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the verification and the certification against forum shopping executed by
only two of the 25 petitioners have already satisfied the requirements under section 4 and 5 of Rule
7.

RULING:
The requirement for verification has been substantially complied. The two signatories are
unquestionably real parties in interest, who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to
swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition. However, for petitions for certiorari, a
certification against forum shopping is required under section 3 of Rule 46 of the rules of Court. The
lack of a certification against forum shopping is generally not cured by its submission after the filing
of the petition.

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4. G. R. NO. 147678-87, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, versus EFREN MATEO y
GARCIA, Appellant, July 7, 2004

FACTS:

Ten (10) informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac against appellant
Efren Mateo alleging that he did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means
of force and intimidation have carnal knowledge with said Imelda C. Mateo in their house against
her consent. The trial ensued following a plea of not guilty entered by appellant to all the charges.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court a quo issued its decision, finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape. However, the Solicitor General assails the factual
findings of the trial court and recommends an acquittal of appellant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of
express provision in the constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or death.

RULING:
The case was REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal
cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but
involving offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave
rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

x x x x x x x x x

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in

character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power,
from adding an intermediate appeal or review in favour of the accused.

In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a
marked absence of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some
are convinced that the evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the
recommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e.,
the determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had

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to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the
direct mandate to review factual issues.

5. G. R. No. UDK-13384 The People of the Philippines versus Rodolfo Bunaladi, October 18, 2004

FACTS:
Accused Bunaladi was charged with the crime of rape before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 13. The trial court rendered its Decision on 5 May 2004, convicting the
accused and imposing upon him the penalty of death by lethal injection. Accused timely filed a
Motion for Reconsideration assailing the factual findings of the trial court, and at the same time
praying that in the event the judgment of conviction is not set aside, the penalty of death be not
imposed in view of the age of the accused who was more than seventy (70) years old at the time of
rendition, of the trial court's judgment. Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, the trial
court, in its Order dated 2 June 2004, partly reconsidered its decision and lowered the penalty from
death to reclusion perpetua. In the same Order, the trial court also directed the transmittal of the
records of the case to this Court "for automatic review."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the instant case deserves to be dismissed.

RULING:
The case was dismissed. Section 3(d), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that no notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the
Regional Trial Court and that the same shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court as
provided in Section 10 thereof. In this case, however, the penalty imposed by the trial court after
reconsidering its decision is reclusion perpetua. Under Section 3(c) of Rule 122, an appeal to the
Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court
is reclusion perpetua is duly interposed by filing a notice of appeal. A review of the records of the
case shows that no notice of appeal was filed by the accused. Hence, the Court has not acquired
jurisdiction over the case.

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11. ALTRES vs. EMPLEO (December 10, 2008; 573 SCRA 583)

FACTS: In July 2003, Mayor Quijano sent notices of numerous vacant career positions in the city
government to the CSC. The city government and the CSC thereupon proceeded to publicly
announce the existence of the vacant positions. Petitioners and other applicants submitted their
applications for the different positions where they felt qualified.

Toward the end of his term, Mayor Quijano issued appointments to petitioners.

The SangguniangPanglungsodthen issued Resolution No. 04-242[3] addressed to the CSC Iligan City
Field Office requesting a suspension of action on the processing of appointments to all vacant
positions in the city government until the enactment of a new budget.

The SangguniangPanglungsod subsequently issued Resolution No. 04-266[4] which, as per its
policy against midnight appointments, directed the officers of the City Human Resource
Management Office to hold the transmission of all appointments signed or to be signed by the
incumbent mayor.

Respondent city accountant Empleo did not thus issue a certification as to availability of funds for
the payment of salaries and wages of petitioners hence the CSC Field Office for Lanao del Norte
and Iligan City disapproved the appointments issued to petitioners.

On appeal by Mayor Quijano, CSC Regional Office No. XII in CotabatoCity,dismissed the appeal, it
explaining that its function in approving appointments is only ministerial.

Petitioners thus filed with the RTC of Iligan City a petition for mandamus against respondent
Empleo or his successor in office for him to issue a certification of availability of funds. Branch 3 of
the Iligan RTC denied petitioners petition for mandamus.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration in which they maintained only their prayer for a writ
of mandamus which the trial court also denied.

Without giving due course to the petition, the Court required respondents to comment thereon
within ten (10) days from notice, and at the same time required petitioners to comply, within the
same period.

Petitioners filed a Compliance Report and Respondents duly filed their Comment, alleging
technical flaws in petitioners petition.

Respondents assail as defective the verification and certification against forum shopping attached
to the petition as it bears the signature of only 11 out of the 59 petitioners, and no competent
evidence of identity was presented by the signing petitioners. They thus move for the dismissal of
the petition.

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ISSUE:Whether or not Petitioners certification against forum shopping is defective since it was not
signed by all the petitioners and the insufficiency of personal knowledge by the party executing
the same.

RULING:The signing of the verification by only 11 out of the 59 petitioners already sufficiently
assures the Court that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of
the imagination or a matter of speculation; that the pleading is filed in good faith; and that the
signatories are unquestionably real parties-in-interest who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge
and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition.

With respect to petitioners certification against forum shopping, the failure of the other
petitioners to sign as they could no longer be contacted or are no longer interested in pursuing the
case need not merit the outright dismissal of the petition without defeating the administration of
justice. The non-signing petitioners are, however, dropped as parties to the case.

12. UNITED PARAGON MINING vs. CA (August 4, 2006; 497 SCRA 638, 647 - 648)

FACTS:Respondent Cesario F. Ermita (Cesario) was a regular employee working as a foreman of

petitioner United Paragon Mining Corporation (UPMC).

Cesario received a termination letter, informing Cesario that his employment as foreman is
terminated effective thirty days after his receipt of the letter. The termination was on account of
Cesarios violation of company rules against infliction of bodily injuries on a co-employee, it being
alleged therein that Cesario inflicted bodily injuries on a co-employee, as well as for unlawfully
possessing a deadly weapon, a bolo, again in violation of company rules.

As a result of the termination, the matter was brought to the grievance machinery as mandated
under the Collective Bargaining Agreement existing at that time between UPMC and the United
Paragon Supervisors Union. Having failed to reach a settlement thereat, the parties agreed to
submit the dispute to voluntary arbitration.

The Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision in Cesarios favor, stating that although the
procedural requirements in the termination of an employee had been complied with, the
termination of Cesario was unjustified because it was arrived at through gross misapprehension of
facts hence ordered Cesarios reinstatement.

UPMC moved for a reconsideration of the decision but the Voluntary Arbitrator denied the desired
reconsideration stressing that UPMCs management misapprehended the facts.

UPMC, thru its Personnel Superintendent Feliciano M. Daniel,elevated the case to the CA on a
Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctionasserting that

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the Voluntary Arbitrator committed grave abuse of discretion, erroneous interpretation of the law
and denial of substantial justice.

The CA, without going into the merits of the petition, dismissed the same on grounds that(1)the
petition for certiorari was not the proper remedy in order to seek review or nullify decisions or
final orders issued by the Labor Arbiter and (2) that petitioner's ground of grave abuse of
discretion, erroneous interpretation of the law and denial of justice are actually dwelling on the
appreciation of facts, which cannot be entertained in a petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition after finding that the
proper remedy should have been a PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI and not a PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI;

2.Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition after finding that the
petition lacks merit because it dwelled on the appreciation of facts which is NOT PROPER in
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.

RULING:

The recourse must have to be DENIED, no reversible error having been committed by the CA in its
challenged decision.

Being not a real party-in-interest, Daniel has no right to file the petition on behalf of the
corporation without any authority from its board of directors.

Given the reality that the petition was filed by Daniel in behalf of and in representation of
petitioner UPMC without an enabling resolution of the latters board of directors, that petition
was fatally defective, inclusive of the verification and the certification of non-forum shopping
executed by Daniel himself.

13. HEIRS OF SOFIA NANAMAN LONOY vs. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM

(November 27, 2008; 572 SCRA 185)

FACTS:

Action for Reversion of Title

Spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and HilariaTabuclin (Hilaria) were the owners of a
parcel of agricultural land situated in Tambo, Iligan City, upon which they likewise erected their

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residence. Living with them on the subject property were Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio),Gregorios son
by another woman.

When Gregorio died, Hilaria administered the subject property with Virgilio.Hilaria and Virgilio
executed a Deed of Saleover the subject property in favor of Jose C. Deleste (Deleste).

Upon Hilarias death, Juan Nanaman (Juan), Gregorios brother, was appointed as special
administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses Gregorio and Hilaria (joint estate).Edilberto
Noel (Noel) was appointed as the regular administrator of the joint estate.

The subject property was included in the list of assets of the joint estate. However, Noel could
not take possession of the subject property since it was already in Delestes possession. Thus, Noel
filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI),an action against Deleste for the reversion of title over
the subject property to the Estate, docketed as Civil Case No. 698.

Through the years, Civil Case No. 698 was heard, decided, and appealed all the way to the
Supreme Court in Noel v. Court of Appeals. The Court rendered its Decision in Noel, affirming the
ruling of the Court of Appeals that the subject property was the conjugal property of the late
spouses Gregorio and Hilaria, such that the latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share therein to
Deleste. Consequently, the intestate estate of Gregorio and Deleste were held to be the co-owners
of the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in the same.

Petition for Nullification of the Emancipation Patents (Heirs of Deleste)

Deleste passed away sometime in 1992.The Heirs of Deleste, filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a petition seeking to nullify private respondents
Emancipation Patents (EPs).

The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) rendered a Decisiondeclaring that the EPs
were null and void in view of the pending issues of ownership and the subsequent reclassification
of the subject property into a residential/commercial land.

On appeal, the DARAB reversed the ruling of the PARAD in its Decision. The DARAB held, that
the EPs were valid, since it was the Heirs of Deleste who should have informed the DAR of the
pendency of Civil Case No. 698at the time the subject property was placed under the coverage of
the Operation Land Transfer Program. The Heirs of Deleste filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the aforementioned Decision, but the Motion was denied by the DARAB in its Resolution dated 8
July 2004.

Petition for Prohibition

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 A Petition for Prohibition, Declaration of Nullity of Emancipation Patents Issued by DAR and
the Corresponding [Original Certificates of Title] Issued by the [Land Registration Authority],
Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) was filed by petitioners with the
Court of Appeals. Arguing that they were deprived of their inheritance by virtue of the improper
issuance of the EPs to private respondents without notice to them, petitioners prayed that a TRO
be forthwith issued, prohibiting the DAR Secretary, the Land Registration Authority (LRA), the
DARAB, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), as well as the RTC, from enforcing the EPs and
OCTs in the names of private respondents . Petitioners further prayed that judgment be
subsequently rendered declaring the said EPs and the OCTs null and void.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition.

ISSUES:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HASTILY DISMISSING THE
PETITIONERS PETITION FOR PROHIBITION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, LRA, AND DARAB
ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN REVIEWING [AND] OVERRULING
JUDICIAL DECISIONS CONSIDERING THAT THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER ACTS OF
THE EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATIVE BRANCH BELONGS TO THE JUDICIARY AND NOT VICE
VERSA.

RULING:

Prohibition is a legal remedy, provided by the common law, extraordinary in the sense that it is
ordinarily available only when the usual and ordinary proceedings at law or in equity are
inadequate to afford redress, prerogative in character to the extent that it is not always
demandable of right, to prevent courts, or other tribunals, officers, or persons, from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law.

The writ of prohibition, is one which commands the person to whom it is directed not to
do something which, by suggestion of the relator, the court is informed he is about to do. The only
effect of a writ of prohibition is to suspend all action and to prevent any further proceeding in the
prohibited direction.

In this case, the Petition for Prohibition filed by the petitioners reveal that the same is
essentially more of an action for the nullification of the allegedly invalid EPs and OCTs issued in the

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names of private respondents. The writ of prohibition is only sought by petitioners to prevent the
implementation of the EPs and OCTs. Such EPs and OCTs had become indefeasible and
incontrovertible by the time petitioners instituted their Petition for Prohibition, and may no longer
be judicially reviewed.

Private respondents EPs were issued in their favor and their OCTs were correspondingly
issued and subsequently registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Petitioners directly
went to the Court of Appeals, instead to the Regional Trial Court almost four (4) years after the
issuance and registration thereof. Petitioners failed to vindicate their rights within the one-year
period from issuance of the certificates of title as the law requires.

After the expiration of the one-year period, a person whose property has been wrongly or
erroneously registered in anothers name may bring an ordinary action for reconveyance, or if the
property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, Section 32 of the Property
Registration Decree gives petitioners only one other remedy, i.e., to file an action for damages
against those responsible for the fraudulent registration.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. No costs.

14.VICAR INTERNATIONAL vs. FEB LEASING (April 22, 2005; 456 SCRA 588)

FACTS:

A Complaint for unjust enrichment and damages, filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati by petitioner, Vicar International Construction, Inc. (Vicar), against Respondent FEB Leasing
and Finance Corporation (now BPI Leasing Corporation) and the Far East Bank and Trust Company.
In turn, FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation filed a Complaint against Vicar,Carmelita Chaneco
Lim and one John Doe, for a sum of money, damages and replevin.

These Complaints stemmed from loans obtained from FEB by Vicar, a corporation engaged
in the construction business, for the purchase of certain heavy equipment. In obtaining the loans,
Deeds of Absolute Sale with a lease-back provision were executed by the parties. In those Deeds,
Vicar appears to have sold to FEB the equipment purchased with the loan proceeds and, at the
same time, leased them back. For the total loan of P30,315,494, Vicar claims to have paid FEB an
aggregate amount of P19,042,908 in monthly amortizations.

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 Nevertheless, FEB maintains that Vicar still had an outstanding balance of about
P22,000,000, despite the extrajudicial foreclosure of sixty-three (63) subdivision lots. These lots, in
Calamba, Laguna, were used by the corporation as additional collateral. As a consequence, the
auction sale produced P17,000,000 which, Vicar claims, should have been applied to its loans.

In the course of the second (replevin) case, the trial court issued several Orders pertaining
to the possession/custody of eight (8) units of the subject equipment. In an Order dated August 2,
2002, the regional trial court (RTC) quashed the property counterbond filed by Vicar and denied
the latters Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, which was grounded on forum shopping. In an Order
dated September 30, 2002, the RTC denied the corporations Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of the trial judge.

On October 3, 2002, Vicar filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, to
stop the implementation of the Writ of Replevin issued against the subject equipment.

The Petition was, however, dismissed by the CA because the Verification and the
Certification against forum shopping had been executed by Petitioner Carmelita V. Lim without
any showing that she had the authority to sign for and on behalf of petitioner-corporation.

The day after receiving its copy of the Resolution, Vicar filed an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and for Admission of the Attached Secretarys Certificate but the CA denied the
Omnibus Motion.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in summarily dismissing the Petition for Certiorari.

RULING:

The present Petition for Review is meritorious.

Petitioners assert that Carmelita V. Lim was duly authorized to execute, for and on behalf
of Vicar, the Verification and Certification against forum shopping. Attached to the Petition and
signed by Petitioner Lim was the Verification/Certification, in which was explicitly stated the
authorization and affirmationwas supported by Vicars board of directors, who unanimously
approved a Resolution dated October 2, 2002.

Petitioners merely missed attaching to their Petition a concrete proof of Lims authority
from Vicar to execute the said Verification/Certification on its behalf. The latter, however, lost no
time in submitting its corporate secretarys Certificate attesting to the fact that, indeed, Petitioner
Vicars board of directors had unanimously approved a Resolution on October 2, 2002, authorizing

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its president and general manager, Carmelita V. Lim, to file the Petition and to execute and sign
the verification and certification against forum shopping.

The Certificate was submitted to the CA on the day right after it had denied the Petition.
Such swiftness of action indicates that the Resolution -- authorizing Petitioner Lim to file the
Petition and execute the Verification and the Certification against forum shopping on behalf of
Petitioner Vicar -- did exist at the time the Petition was filed.

The Court stresses once more that technical rules of procedure should be used to
promote, not frustrate, justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective,
the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal. Rules of procedure are but tools
designed to facilitate, not obstruct, the attainment of justice.

Petition is GRANTED, and the appealed Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, which is directed to continue the proceedings.

15. UY vs. WORKMENS COMPENSATION (April 28, 1980; 97 SCRA 255)

FACTS:

Ki Lam Uy, also known as Vicente Uy, was killed by robbers at the farm house (bodega) of
private respondent Lucy Perez.

Claimants-petitioners filed a Notice and Claim for Compensation in Death Cases before the
Department of Labor seeking to recover death compensation benefits for the death of their father,
Ki Lam Uy, from private respondent, Lucy Perez.

A copy of the claim was sent to private respondent, Lucy Perez, by the Chief of the
Workmen's Compensation Unit of the Department of Labor, requiring the said private respondent
to submit to said office the enclosed Workmen's Compensation Form No. 3, Employer's Report of
Accident or Sickness.

For failure of private respondent to accomplish the required Employer's Report, the Acting
Chief of the Workmen's Compensation Unit, after processing the claim and the supporting

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evidence submitted by claimants-petitioners, issued an Award, granting death compensation
benefits to claimants-petitioners.

Private respondent's counsel filed a motion for extension of time to file his motion for
reconsideration alleging that the cause of the death of the deceased was not work- connected.

Private respondent filed the motion for on the grounds that the respondent did not fail to
controvert the instant claim for compensation; that the Hearing Officer gravely erred in not giving
the private respondent an opportunity to present evidence to rebut claimant's claim after
reception of the latter's evidence and thereby violating the constitutional mandate of due process.

The Acting Chief of the Workmen's Compensation Unit of the Department of Labor issued
an order granting the motion for reconsideration in view of the absence of an opposition thereto
and set the case for hearing on the merits until terminated and with no postponements.

After several hearings conducted, a decision was rendered which states among others,
"that although the respondent has failed to controvert the claim within the period provided for, a
hearing of the case, with notice to all the parties was conducted to determine the compensability
of the claim".

A motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondent, thru counsel. Subsequently,
an order denying said motion for reconsideration was issued and likewise ordering the elevation of
the entire records of the case to the Workmen's Compensation Commission for review.

The respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission rendered a decision reversing the

decision of the Hearing Officer on the ground that the deceased, Ki Lam Uy was not an employee
of private respondent, thereby absolving herein private respondent from any liability.

A petition for review was filed by the petitioners.

Private respondent in her answer to the instant petition claims that the petition, not being
verified by the petitioners but by their counsel, is fatally defective.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for review is defective since it was not verified by the petitioners.

RULING:

The claim has no merit. In the past, it has been the constant rulings of this Court that lack
of verification is merely a formal defect.

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 The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is simply intended to secure an
assurance that what are alleged in the pleadings are true and correct and not the product of the
imagination on a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The
requirement regarding verification of a pleading is a formal, not a jurisdictional requisite.

16. In-N-Out Burger, Inc. vs. Sehwani Inc., et. al

Facts:

Petitioner IN-N-OUT BURGER, INC., is a business entity incorporated under the laws of California. It
is a signatory to the Convention of Paris on Protection of Industrial Property and the TRIPS
Agreement. It is engaged mainly in the restaurant business, but it has never engaged in business in
the Philippines.

Respondents Sehwani, Incorporated and Benita Frites, Inc. are corporations organized in the
Philippines. Sometime in 1991, Sehwani filed with the BPTTT an application for the registration of
the mark IN N OUT (the inside of the letter O formed like a star). Its application was approved
and a certificate of registration was issued in its name on 1993. In 2000, Sehwani, Incorporated
and Benita Frites, Inc. entered into a Licensing Agreement, wherein the former entitled the latter
to use its registered mark, IN N OUT.

Sometime in 1997, In-N-Out Burger filed trademark and service mark applications with the Bureau
of Trademarks for the IN-N-OUT and IN-N-OUT Burger & Arrow Design. In 2000, In-N-Out Burger
found out that Sehwani, Incorporated had already obtained Trademark Registration for the mark
IN N OUT (the inside of the letter O formed like a star). Also in 2000, In-N-Out Burger sent a
demand letter directing Sehwani, Inc. to cease and desist from claiming ownership of the mark IN-
N-OUT and to voluntarily cancel its trademark registration. Sehwani Inc. did not accede to In-N-Out
Burgers demand but it expressed its willingness to surrender its registration for a consideration.

In 2001 In-N-Out Burger filed before the Bureau of Legal Affairs an administrative complaint
against the Sehwani, Inc. and Benita Frites, Inc. for unfair competition and cancellation of
trademark registration.

Issue;

Whether or not the Intellectual Property Office (an administrative body) have jurisdiction of cases
involving provisions of the IPC (e.g. unfair competition).

Held:

Yes, the IPO (an administrative body) has jurisdiction in cases involving provisions of the IPC (e.g.
unfair competition) due to the following reasons:

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 Section 10 of the Intellectual Property Code specifically identifies the functions of the Bureau of
Legal Affairs, thus:

Section 10. The Bureau of Legal Affairs.The Bureau of Legal Affairs shall have the following
functions:

10.1 Hear and decide opposition to the application for registration of marks; cancellation of
trademarks; subject to the provisions of Section 64, cancellation of patents and utility models, and
industrial designs; and petitions for compulsory licensing of patents;

10.2 (a) Exercise original jurisdiction in administrative complaints for violations of laws involving
intellectual property rights; Provided, That its jurisdiction is limited to complaints where the total
damages claimed are not less than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000): Provided, futher,
That availment of the provisional remedies may be granted in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Xxx

Xxx

(vi) The cancellation of any permit, license, authority, or registration which may have been granted
by the Office, or the suspension of the validity thereof for such period of time as the Director of
Legal Affairs may deem reasonable which shall not exceed one (1) year;

Xxx

(viii) The assessment of damages;

Unquestionably, petitioners complaint, which seeks the cancellation of the disputed mark in the
name of respondent Sehwani, Incorporated, and damages for violation of petitioners intellectual
property rights, falls within the jurisdiction of the IPO Director of Legal Affairs.

Based on the foregoing discussion, the IPO Director of Legal Affairs had jurisdiction to decide the
petitioners administrative case against respondents and the IPO Director General had exclusive
jurisdiction over the appeal of the judgment of the IPO Director of Legal Affairs.

17. Pajuyo vs CA G.R. No. 146364 June 3, 2004 COLITO T. PAJUYO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and EDDIE GUEVARRA, respondents.

FACTS

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: Petitioner Pajuyo paid P400 to a certain Pedro Perez for the rights over a lot, where Pajuyo
subsequently built a house. In 1985, Pajuyo and private respondent Guevarra executed a
Kasunduan wherein Pajuyo allowed Guevarra to live in the house for free, on the condition that
Guevarra would maintain the cleanliness and orderliness of the house. Guevarra

promised that he would vacate the premises upon Pajuyos demand.

In 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need of the house and demanded that the latter vacate
the house. Guevarra refused. Pajuyo filed an ejectment case against Guevarra before the MTC.
Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no valid title over the lot since it is within the area set aside for
socialized housing. MTC rendered its decision in favor of Pajuyo, which was affirmed by RTC. (MTC
and RTC basically ruled that the Kasunduan created a legal tie akin to that of a landlord and tenant
relationship). CA reversed the RTC decision, stating that the ejectment case is without legal basis
since both Pajuyo and Guevarra illegally occupied the said lot. CA further stated that both parties
are in pari delicto; thus, the court will leave them where they are. CA ruled that the Kasunduan is
not a lease contract, but a commodatum because the agreement is not for a price certain.

ISSUE:

Can the decision of the Regional trial court be appealed to the Court of appeals.

HELD:

Decisions of the RTC in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction are appealable to the Court of
appeals by petition for review in cases involving questions of facts or mixed questions of facts and
law while their decisions involving pure questions of law are appealable directly to the supreme
court by petition for review.

18. KENNETH ROY SAVAGE/K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING, owned and managed by GEMMA
DEMORAL-SAVAGE vs. JUDGE APRONIANO B. TAYPIN, Presiding Judge, RTC-BR. 12, Cebu City,
CEBU PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Region VII,
Cebu City, JUANITA NG MENDOZA, MENDCO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ALFREDO SABJON
and DANTE SOSMEA

G.R. No. 134217, May 11, 2000

FACTS: Petitioners Savage, seek to nullify the search warrant issued by respondent Judge
Aproniano B. Taypin of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12 Cebu City, which resulted in the seizure of
certain pieces of wrought iron furniture from the factory of petitioners located in Biasong, Talisay,
Cebu.

16
The complaint was lodged by private respondent Eric Ng Mendoza, president and general manager
of Mendco Development Corporation (MENDCO), alleging that Savages products are the object of
unfair competition involving design patents, punishable under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended. Savage contends however, that there was no existence of offense leading to the
issuance of a search warrant and eventual seizure of its products.

Issue: Whether the respondent judge had authority/jurisdiction to issue the said searchwarrant

HELD:

YES, respondent judge has authority (Note: the search warrant issued was,however, NOT
valid).The authority to issue search warrants was not among thosementioned in the administrative
orders. But the Court has consistently ruled that asearch warrant is merely a process issued by the
court in the exercise of itsancillary jurisdiction and not a criminal action which it may entertain
pursuant to itsoriginal jurisdiction. The authority to issue search warrants is inherent in all
courtsand may be effected outside their territorial jurisdiction. In the instant case, thepremises
searched located in Talisay, Cebu, are well within the territorial jurisdictionof the respondent
court.Petitioners apparently misconstrued the import of the designation of Special Courtsfor IPR.
Administrative Order No. 113-95 merely specified which court could "try anddecide" cases
involving violations of IPR. It did not, and could not, vest exclusive jurisdiction with regard to all
matters (including the issuance of search warrants andother judicial processes) in any one court.

19. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES V. FASAP

Facts:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court presents a recurring
question regarding the Courts requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping.

Petitioners Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) and Manolo Aquino, Jorge Ma. Cui, Jr. and Patricia Chiong,
in their capacity as Executive Vice-President Administration and Services, Manager International
Cabin Crew and Assistant Vice-President Cabin Services, respectively, are before the Court seeking
the reversal of the resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. SP-56850, dated January 31,
2000, dismissing their appeal and the resolution of May 11, 2000, denying the motion for
reconsideration.

The facts on the conflict between PAL and respondents Flight Attendants and Stewards
Association of the Philippines (FASAP) and Leonardo Bhagwani are not necessary for the Courts
resolution of the petition. It is enough to state that on May 14, 1997 FASAP and Leonardo
Bhagwani filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against

17
petitioners before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision holding that PAL committed unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal
of Bhagwani and, consequently, ordered the payment of damages. The NLRC later modified the
decision by setting aside the finding that PAL was guilty of unfair labor practice, but affirming the
rest of the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition has merit.

HELD:

The petition is without merit.

The necessity for a certification of non-forum shopping in filing petitions for certiorari is found in
Rule 65, Section 1, in relation to Rule 46, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. These provisions require
it to be executed by the corresponding petitioner or petitioners. As no distinction is made as to
which party must execute the certificate, this requirement is made to apply to both natural and
juridical entities.[1] When the petitioner is a corporation, the certification should be executed by a
natural person. Furthermore, not just any person can be called upon to execute the certification,
although such a person may have personal knowledge of the facts to be attested to.[2]

This Court has explained that a corporation has no power except those conferred on it by the
Corporation Code and those that are implied or incidental to its existence. The exercise of these
powers is done through the board of directors and/or duly authorized officers and agents. Given
these corporate features, the power of a corporation to sue in any court is generally lodged with
the board of directors. The board, in turn, can delegate the physical acts needed to sue, which may
be performed only by natural persons, to its attorneys-in-fact by a board resolution, if not already
authorized under the corporate by-laws.

20. ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS. QUITAIN

315 SCRA 150 (1999)

Facts: P filed a complaint for eminent domain against D. Instead of filing an answer, D countered
with a Motion to Dismiss, alleging, among other things, that the choice of property to be
expropriated was improper.

Issue: Whether the Motion to Dismiss should prosper.

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Held: No. The issues raised by D are affirmative defenses that should be alleged in an answer,
since they require presentation of evidence aliunde. Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that
if a defendant has any objections to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any
objection or defense to the taking of his property, he should include them in his answer.
Naturally, these issues will have to be fully ventilated in a full-blown trial and hearing. Dismissal of
an action upon a motion to dismiss constitutes a denial of due process if, from a consideration of
the pleadings, it appears that there are issues that cannot be decided without a trial of the case on
the merits.

21. MARANAW HOTELS VS. CA

FACTS: In 1955, Sheryl Oabel began working with Maranaw Hotels in one of the latters hotel
branches. In 1996, Maranaw Hotels contracted the services of Manila Resource Development
Corporation (MANRED), a manpower service provider. Maranaw Hotels transferred Oabel to
MANRED. Oable later filed a petition for regularization against MANRED and MANRED thereafter
dismissed her. Oabel filed a labor case against Maranaw Hotels, MANRED intervened deporting itself
as the real employer of Oabel. She lost in the labor arbiter but the NLRC reversed the decision of
the arbiter. Maranaw Hotels appealed before the Court of Appeals but the latter court dismissed
the petition because apparently Maranaw Hotels failed to append the board resolution authorizing
their counsel to file said petition before the Court of Appeals. Maranaw Hotels filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with an appended Certification of Non-Forum Shopping and board resolution but
the CA denied the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition filed by Maranaw Hotels should prosper.

HELD: No. There is no substantial compliance in this case. The filing of a subsequent MFR appended
by the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping and the board resolution did not cure the defect. It
negates the very purpose for which the certification against forum shopping is required: to inform
the Court of the pendency of any other case which may present similar issues and involve similar
parties as the one before it. The requirement applies to both natural and juridical persons.

A lawyer acting for the corporation must be specifically authorized to sign pleadings for the
corporation. Specific authorization could only come in the form of a board resolution issued by the
Board of Directors that specifically authorizes the counsel to institute the petition and execute the
certification, to make his actions binding on his principal, i.e., the corporation.

22. Vda de Melencio vs. CA

FACTS: The subject property is a 30,351 square meter parcel of land particularly denominated as Lot
No. 3368, located at Suba-babas, Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, and part of total area of 30,777

19
square meters covered by TCT No. 20626 in in the name of the late petitioner Go Kim Chuan. The
entire property was originally owned by Esteban Bonghanoy who had only one child, Juana
Bonghanoy-Amodia, mother of the late Leoncia Modia and petitioner Amodias. The entire property
was brought under the operation of the Torrens System. However, the title thereto was lost during
the Second World War.

On July 10, 1964, the Amodias allegedly executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed
of Absolute Sale whereby they extra-judicially settled the estate of Esteban Bonghanoy and
conveyed the subject property to respondent Aznar Brothers Realty Company for a consideration of
P10,200.00. On August 10, 1964, the said Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of
Absolute Sale was registered under Act 3344 as there was no title on file at the Register of Deeds of
Lapu-Lapu City. Thereafter, AZNAR made some improvements and constructed a beach house
thereon.

On February 18 1989, petitioners executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute Sale,
conveying the subject property in favor of Go Kim Chuan for and in consideration of P70,000.00.
Aznar then filed a case against petitioners Amodias and Go Kim Chuan for Annulment of Sale and
Cancellation of TCT No. 20626 alleging that the sale to Go Kim CHuan was an invalid second sale.

ISSUE: Whether there is a valid certification and verification by only one of the plaintiffs.

HELD: Yes, the Court reiterated the ruling in the case of Iglesia Ni Cristo, 505 SCRA 828, that
Commonality of interest is material and crucial to relaxation of the Rules. The Rules may be
reasonably and liberally construed to avoid a patent denial of substantial justice, because it cannot
be denied, that the ends of justice are better served when cases are determined on the merits -
after all parties are given full opportunity to ventile their causes and defenses - rather than on
technicality or some procedural imperfections.

The same liberality should likewise be applied to the certification against forum shopping. The
general rule is that the certification must be signed by all plaintiffs in a case and the signature of
only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed in a number of cases that the
rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of
justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect
to the contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the
provisions merely underscored its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether
dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.

23. Sheker vs. Estate of Alice

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FACTS: Alice Sheker died and her estate was left under the administration of Victoria Medina. Alice
left a holographic will which was admitted to probate by the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City. The
trial court issued an order for all creditors to file their claims against the estate. In compliance
therewith, Alan Joseph Sheker filed a contingent money claim in the amount of P206,250.00
representing the amount of his commission as an agent for selling some properties for Alice; and
another P275k as reimbursements for expenses he incurred.

Medina moved for the dismissal of Alan Shekers claim alleging among others that the money claim
filed by Alan Sheker is void because the latter did not attach a certification of non-forum shopping
thereto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that the certification of non-forum shopping is required
only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. In the case at bar, the probate proceeding was
initiated NOT by Alan Shekers money claim but rather upon the filing of the petition for allowance
of the Alice Shekers will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters
of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are
mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims;
otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.

A money claim in a probate proceeding is like a creditors motion for claims which is to be recognized
and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. And as a
motion, its office is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising
in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or
remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question
that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the
principal remedy.

24. Five Star Bus Company vs. CA

FACTS: One night in November 1991 at about 11pm, Ignacio Torres, while driving a bus owned by
Five Star Bus Company collided with a mini-van driven by Samuel King Sagaral II. Sagaral filed a civil
action for damages against Five Star Bus Company and Torres. The civil case dragged for four years
by reason of the bus companys lawyers repeated request to reset the hearing of the case. Until the
trial court issued an order which considered the case submitted for resolution. The bus companys
lawyer filed for a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

The bus companys lawyer then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals but the
latter court summarily dismissed the petition because said petitions affidavit of non-forum
shopping was not signed by the plaintiff or any of its representatives but rather it was signed by the

21
lawyer. The lawyer explained that his signing was an oversight and that he was in a haste to submit
the petition at the earliest possible time in order to protect his clients interest.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition filed by Five Star Bus Company should prosper.

HELD: No. Circular No. 28-91 issued by the Supreme Court requiring that the affidavit of non-forum
shopping should be executed and signed by the plaintiff is a strict requirement. Circular No. 28-91
has its roots in the rule that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies
in two different tribubals, for such practice works havoc upon orderly judicial procedure. Forum
shopping has been characterized as an act of malpractice that is prohibited and condemned as
trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It constitutes improper conduct which tends to
degrade the administration of justice. It has also been aptly described as deplorable because it adds
to the congestion of the already heavily burdened dockets of the courts.

But the Supreme Court has relaxed this rule several times prior to this case when there is substantial
compliance, why is it not relaxed in this case?

It is true that said Circular requires that it be strictly complied with but such merely underscores its
mandatory nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded,
but it does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable
circumstances. In the case at bar however, the reasons provided by Five Stars lawyer are flimsy and
frail. Further, the case has been dragging on for years and such delay is mostly attributed to Five
Stars lawyer.

25. Docena vs. Lopesura

FACTS: Casiano Hombria, private respondent, filed a complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land
against his lessees, petitioner-spouses, Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The spouses claimed
ownership of the land based on the occupation since time immemorial. The petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial judge in issuing orders and that of the sheriff in issuing the writ of demolition. CA dismissed
the petition on the ground that the petition was filed beyond the 60-day period provided in the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and that the certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto
was signed by only one of the petitioners.

ISSUE: WON it is sufficient that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of
the petitioners.

HELD: In view of the property involved which is a conjugal property, the petition questioning the
writ of demolition thereof originated from an action for recovery brought against the spouses and
is clearly intended for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and the wife as point out was in the
province of Samar whereas the petition was prepared in Metro Manila, a rigid application of the

22
rules on forum shopping that would disauthorize a husbands signing the certification in his behalf
and that of his wife is too harsh.

In the previous court rulings, certificate of non-forum shopping should be sign by all the petitioners
in a case. However, in the case at bar, such certificate signed by Antonio Docena alone should be
deemed to constitute substantial compliance with the rules. The two petitioners in this case are
husband and wife and their residence is the subject property alleged to be a conjugal property.
Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and
wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both
spouses is required, joint management or administration does not require that the husband and
wife always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject
to the intervention of the court in proper cases.

Hence, petition is granted and the case is remanded to CA for further proceedings.

26. TIBLE and TIBLE COMPANY VS ROYAL SAVINGS 550 SCRA 562

FACTS: In 1977, Tible & Tible Company, Inc. (TTCI) obtained a loan amounting to P1.5 million from
Royal Savings and Loan Association. The loan matured however TTCI was not able to pay hence
Royal savings sued TTCI. TTCI later entered into a compromise agreement with Royal Savings but
again TTCi was not able to comply with it.
In 1981, the properties of TTCI were awarded to Comsavings via a public auction sale where
Comsavings was the highest bidder. It, however, took ten years for the Deed of Sale to be issued in
favor of Comsavings.
Upon issuance of the Deed, TTCI filed an action for Annulment of Deed of Sale. This was eventually
dismissed. TTCIs Motion for Reconsideration was also dismissed.
In 2002, TTCI filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the petition
on the ground that, among others, that the Verification Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping was
signed by one Almabella Menla Vda. de Tible, but there is no Special Power of Attorney, Board
Resolution nor Secretarys Certificate was attached thereto authorizing said signatory to sign the
Verification and Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping in behalf of the other petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition shall prosper.
HELD: No. The petition is defective. The signature of the widow in the verification and affidavit of
non-forum shopping of the petition for certiorari was not ratified by any special power of attorney,
board resolution nor secretarys certificate executed by her co-petitioners authorizing her to sign
for and in their behalf.
But in the Motion for Reconsideration which TTCI filed after the CA denied the Petition, TTCI have
already complied with the requirement (theres now a special power of attorney executed in favor
of the widow), will this cure the defect?

23
The subsequent compliance with said requirement does not excuse a partys failure to comply
therewith in the first instance. In those cases where this Court excused the non-compliance with the
requirement of the submission of a certificate of non-forum shopping, it found special
circumstances or compelling reasons which made the strict application of said Circular clearly
unjustified or inequitable.
The Supreme Court noted that there are two pre-requisites for the relaxation of the rules on the
attaching of the Certification of Non-Forum shopping:

1. justifiable cause or plausible reason for non-compliance; and

2. compelling reason to convince the court that outright dismissal of the petition would
seriously impair the orderly administration of justice.

27. MARANAW HOTELS VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:In 1955, Sheryl Oabel began working with Maranaw Hotels in one of the latters hotel
branches. In 1996, Maranaw Hotels contracted the services of Manila Resource Development
Corporation (MANRED), a manpower service provider. Maranaw Hotels transferred Oabel to
MANRED. Oable later filed a petition for regularization against MANRED and MANRED thereafter
dismissed her.
Oabel filed a labor case against Maranaw Hotels, MANRED intervened deporting itself as the real
employer of Oabel. She lost in the labor arbiter but the NLRC reversed the decision of the arbiter.
Maranaw Hotels appealed before the Court of Appeals but the latter court dismissed the petition
because apparently Maranaw Hotels failed to append the board resolution authorizing their counsel
to file said petition before the Court of Appeals. Maranaw Hotels filed a Motion for Reconsideration
with an appended Certification of Non-Forum Shopping and board resolution but the CA denied the
same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition filed by Maranaw Hotels should prosper.
HELD: No. There is no substantial compliance in this case. The filing of a subsequent MFR appended
by the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping and the board resolution did not cure the defect. It
negates the very purpose for which the certification against forum shopping is required: to inform
the Court of the pendency of any other case which may present similar issues and involve similar
parties as the one before it. The requirement applies to both natural and juridical persons.
A lawyer acting for the corporation must be specifically authorized to sign pleadings for the
corporation. Specific authorization could only come in the form of a board resolution issued by the
Board of Directors that specifically authorizes the counsel to institute the petition and execute the
certification, to make his actions binding on his principal, i.e., the corporation.

24
 28. BPI LEASING VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: For the calendar year 1986, BPI Leasing Corporation, Inc. (BLC) paid the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR) a total of P1,139,041.49 representing 4% "contractors percentage tax" then
imposed by Section 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), based on its gross rentals
from equipment leasing for the said year amounting to P27,783,725.42.

On November 10, 1986, the CIR issued RR 19-86. Section 6.2 thereof provided that finance and
leasing companies registered under Republic Act 5980 shall be subject to gross receipt tax of 5%-
3%-1% on actual income earned. This means that companies registered under Republic Act 5980,
such as BLC, are not liable for "contractors percentage tax" under Section 205 but are, instead,
subject to "gross receipts tax" under Section 260 (now Section 122) of the NIRC. Since BLC had earlier
paid the aforementioned "contractors percentage tax," it re-computed its tax liabilities under the
"gross receipts tax" and arrived at the amount of P361,924.44. BLC filed a claim for a refund with
the CIR for the amount of P777,117.05, representing the difference between the P1,139,041.49 it
had paid as "contractors percentage tax" and P361,924.44 it should have paid for "gross receipts
tax."

The CTA dismissed the petition and denied BLCs claim of refund and held that RR 19-86, may only
be applied prospectively such that it only covers all leases written on or after January 1, 1987. The
CTA ruled that, since BLCs rental income was all received prior to 1986, it follows that this was
derived from lease transactions prior to January 1, 1987, and hence, not covered by the RR.

A motion for reconsideration of the CTAs decision was filed, but was denied. BLC then appealed the
case to the Court of Appeals. BLC submits that the Court of Appeals and the CTA erred in not ruling
that RR 19-86 may be applied retroactively so as to allow BLCs claim for a refund of P777,117.05.
Respondents, on the other hand, averred that the petition be dismissed on the ground that the
verification and certification of non- forum shopping was signed by the counsel of record and not
BLC, which is in violation of SC Circular 28-91.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari substantially complies with SC Circular 28-91.

HELD: The SC agrees with the respondents contention that the petition should be dismissed
outright for failure to comply with SC Circular 28-91, now incorporated as Sec2, Rule 42 of the Rules
of Court. The court emphasized that lawyers must be specifically authorized in order to sign the
Certification for BPI Leasing Company. Specific authorization must come in the form of a board
resolution issued by the board of directors.

29. CAGAYAN VALLEY DRUG VS COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

FACTS: Petitioner filed with BIR a claim for tax refund of the full amount of the 20% sales discount
it granted to senior citizens for the year 1995. BIR inaction prompted petitioner to file petition for
review before CTA in order to forestall the 2-year prescriptive period. CTA dismissed/rejected
refund as discount extended to Senior Citizens in granted as tax credit and not refund. CTA
reasoned that while petitioner may be qualified for a tax credit, it cannot be so extended on

25
account of its net loss in 1995. CA dismissed petition on the ground that the person who signed
the verification and certification of absence of forum shopping failed to adduced proof that he was
duly authorized by the board of directors to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners president can sign the subject verification and certificate
without the approval of its Board of Directors.

HELD: Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court on Verification and Section 5, Rule 7 on Certification
against forum shopping are silent as to who are the authorized signatory should be. But in one
case decided by the Supreme Court, it held that only individuals vested with authority by a valid
board resolution may sign the certification on behalf of the corporation.

30. MACTAN- CEBU INTERNATIONAL VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On April 16, 1952, the Republic, represented by the CAA, filed an expropriation proceeding
to the CFI of Cebu on several parcels of land in Lahug, Cebu City, which included Lot 941, for the
expansion and improvement of Lahug Airport.
In 1953, appellee Chiongbian purchased Lot 941 from its original owner, the original defendant in
the expropriation case. Subsequently, a TCT was issued in her name
Then in 1961, judgment was rendered in the expropriation case in favor of the Republic which was
made to pay Chiongbian an amount for Lot 941. Chiongbian did not appeal therefrom.Thereafter,
absolute title to Lot 941 was transferred to the Republic under a TCT.

Then, in 1990, Republic Act No. 6958 was passed by Congress creating the Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to which the assets of the Lahug Airport was
transferred. Lot 941 was then transferred in the name of MCIAA under a TCT.

In 1995, Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of Lot 941 with the RTC of Cebu, alleging,
that sometime in 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC) ventured to expand the Cebu
Lahug Airport. As a consequence, it sought to acquire by expropriation or negotiated sale several
parcels of lands adjoining the Lahug Airport, one of which was Lot 941 owned by
Chiongbian. Since she and other landowners could not agree with the NACs offer for the
compensation of their lands, a suit for eminent domain was instituted, before the then CFI of Cebu
against 45 landowners, including Chiongbian, entitled Republic of the Philippine vs. Damian
Ouano, et al. It was finally decided in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

Some of the defendants-landowners appealed the decision to the CA which rendered a modified
judgment allowing them to repurchase their expropriated properties. Chiongbian, on the other
hand, did not appeal and instead, accepted the compensation for Lot 941 upon the assurance of
the NAC that she or her heirs would be given the right of reconveyance for the same price once
the land would no longer be used as (sic) airport. Consequently, the TCT of Chiongbian was

26
cancelled and a TCT was issued in the name of the Republic. Then, with the creation of the
MCIAA, it was cancelled and a TCT was issued in its name. However, no expansion of the Lahug
Airport was undertaken by MCIAA and its predecessors-in-interest. Thus, the purpose for which
Lot 941 was taken ceased to exist.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent Chiongbian and MCIAA was ordered to
restore to plaintiff the possession and ownership of the property denominated as Lot No. 941
upon reimbursement of the expropriation price paid to plaintiff. The RD is therefore ordered to
effect the Transfer of the Certificate Title from the defendant to the plaintiff.MCIAA appealed the
decision to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision. MR was denied hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not it complies with the requirement of a certification of non- forum shopping
laid down on the Rules.

HELD: We are not persuaded by CHIONGBIANs claim that the Verification and Certification against
forum shopping accompanying MCIAAs petition was insufficient for allegedly having been signed
by one who was not qualified to do so. As pointed out by the MCIAA, Colonel Cordova signed the
Verification and Certification against forum shopping as Acting General Manager of the MCIAA
issued by the General Manager of MCIAA. Colonel Cordova did not sign the Verification and
Certification against forum shopping pursuant to his appointment as assistant General
Manager of the MCIAA, which was later disapproved by the Commission on Appointments.

27
 36. Young v. Keng Seng

Facts:

John Keng Seng filed a complaint for accounting of general agency, injunction, turning over o f
properties, and damages, with the RTC (branch 5), Bacolod City against the
h e r e i n petitioners Emilio and Tita Young.

The Youngs filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action. RTC Bacolod dismissed the case.

Months after, Keng Seng filed another complaint against Emilio Young for accounting and damages
with the RTC (branch 44), Bacolod City.

Young again filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complainant fa iled to
state go o d , v a l i d a n d / o r w o r t h w h i l e c a u s e o f a c t i o n a s a g a i n s t t h e
d e f e n d a n t , w h i c h t h e c o u r t denied. Young filed an MR, adding the following grounds - that
Keng Seng had fatally failed to comply with the rule against forum shopping, as he had in
fact deliberately submitted afalse certification under oath as contained in the complaint in the
present suit.

The MR was granted and the case was dismissed. Keng Seng filed an MR, but the presiding judge
inhibited himself from hearing the case, so it was re-raffled to branch 54.

Presiding Judge Magallanes of RTC Branch 54 issued an order finding that Keng Seng had not violated
the rule on forum shopping. Young filed an MR but were denied.

CA also ruled that Keng Seng did not violate the rule on forum shopping - the first case was dismissed
in March 1997, while the second case was filed only in June 1997.

Issues:

1. WON petitioner can still raise the alleged violation of the rule on non forum shopping, even if h e
failed to cite it as a ground in his motion to dismiss the Second Case.

2. WON the CA erred in holding that respondent had not violated the rule on forum shopping.

Rulings:

1. NO, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections
then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed.

Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that defences and objections not pleaded in a
motion to dismiss or in an answer are deemed waived. However, courts shall nonetheless dismiss
the claim when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that (1) the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) there is another action pending between the same parties

28
for the same cause, (3) the action is barred by prior judgment, or 4) the statute of limitations has
been crossed.

Applying these principles to the instant case, we hold that petitioner is barred from raising the
ground of forum shopping in the Court of Appeals and in this Court. If only for his failure to invoke
such ground at the first opportunity in his Motion to Dismiss filed in the trial court, his appeal should
have been given short shrift and denied outright.

2. NO. It is said that forum shopping is committed by a party who, having received an adverse
judgment in one forum, seeks another opinion in another court, other than by appeal or the special
civil action of certiorari. More accurately, however, forum shopping is the institution of two or more
suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on
the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs. It is an act of
malpractice that is prohibited and condemned because it trifles with the courts and abuses their
processes. It degrades the administration of justice and adds to the already congested court
dockets.

37. Philippine Nails and wires v. Malayan Insurance

Facts:

Petitioner filed on July 28, 1993 a complaint for recovery of the contractual liability of herein
respondent under its Marine Cargo Policy No. LP-0001-08287 and its Endorsement No. LP-0001-
91399. Sought to be recovered therein was the sum of P2, 698,637.00, representing the insured
value of the lost or undelivered 377.168 metric tons of Prime Newly Hot Rolled Steel Billets,
including attorneys fees and costs.

Against the complaint, respondent filed a motion to dismiss dated August 10, 1993, on grounds of
failure to state a cause of action and improper venue. On August 16, 1993, petitioner filed its
opposition to the said motion.

On September 8, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to admit its amended complaint, which the
respondent court granted. Meanwhile, the respondent court, presided over by the Honorable
Aurelio Trampe, denied respondents motion to dismiss. On October 18, 1993 respondent filed a
motion for extension of time to file an answer on account of a pending motion to dismiss. The
respondent court granted the motion for extension, and gave respondent a non-extendible period
of ten (10) days from receipt of said order within which to file its answer. On the theory that
respondents period to file a responsive pleading had expired, petitioner sought to have respondent
declared in default. Whereupon reception of petitioners evidence ex parte followed on November
9, 1993.

The respondent Branch Sheriff served on respondent-insurers bank a notice of garnishment on

February 22, 1994. On February 23, 1994, respondent filed the instant petition for certiorari. On
March 2, 1994, it filed with respondent court motion to stay the execution, and to approve the

29
supersedeas bond. On March 7, 1994, this court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
petitioner and the RTC from implementing the impugned February 4, 1994 order.

Issue:

WON respondent is guilty upon failure to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping and a
statement showing the material dates.

Rulings:

The Petition before the CA was in fact filed within the prescribed period. In this light, we hold that
the failure to state the material dates was merely a procedural lapse that could be waived by the
other partys failure to raise the matter at the proper time.
We likewise hold that respondent is not guilty of forum-shopping. The test to determine whether a
party violated the rule against it is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether
a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.

Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is identity of parties, rights
or causes of action and reliefs sought. While there is an identity of parties in the appeal and in the
petition for review on certiorari filed before this Court, it is clear that the causes of action and reliefs
sought are unidentical, although petitioner may have mentioned in its appeal the impropriety of the
writ of execution pending appeal under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. Clearly, there
can be no forum shopping where in one petition a party questions the order granting the motion
for execution pending appeal, as in the case at bar, and, in a regular appeal before the appellate
court, the party questions the decision on the merits which finds the party guilty of negligence and
holds the same liable for damages therefor. After all, the merits of the main case are not to be
determined in a petition questioning execution pending appeal and vice versa. Hence, reliance on
the principle of forum-shopping is misplaced.

38. Employees Compensation v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

On November 19, 1988, the deceased was infront of the Office of the Criminal Investigation of the
Mandaluyong Police Station and was talking with another policeman, PFC. Ruben Cruz, when
another policeman, Pat. Cesar Arcilla, who had just arrived, immediately got off the car holding his
service firearm and approached the deceased and without saying any word, he fired three
successive shots which sent him slumped to the ground. The deceased, however, although critically
wounded, drew his side firearm and fired back, twice hitting fatally Cesar Arcilla. Both fell, fatally
wounded, and were rushed to the Mandaluyong Medical Center, but Sgt. Alvaran was pronounced
dead upon arrival. Cesar Arcilla, died in the same hospital, the day after.

30
Previous to that shooting incident, it was learned that the same, stemmed from a family feud,
wherein Sgt. Alvaran's son, stabbed the patrolman's nephew, a day before (November 18,
1988). Such quarrel was aggravated when the latter fired shots on the air and uttered defamatory
words before the relatives of the former.

The appellant subsequent filed a claim for compensation benefits under PD 626, as amended. The
System [GSIS] denied the claim on the ground that at the time of the accident the deceased was
supposed to be at the Pasig Provincial Jail as 2nd Shift Jailer and with a specific duty to perform.

Appellant requested a reconsideration of the respondent's [GSIS] ruling saying that the contingency
happened in the police station where her husband is a member although at that time of the
contingency her husband was assigned at the Pasig Provincial Jail.

Respondent [GSIS], nonetheless, took a firm stand prompting appellant to elevate her case to this
Commission for review.

On July 31, 1991, petitioner Commission affirmed the holding of the GSIS that the death of private
respondent's husband is not compensable under P.D. 626, as amended. On appeal, respondent
Court reversed petitioner Commission via its assailed Decision.

Issue:

Did petitioner engage in "forum-shopping" in filing this petition?

Rulings:

Petition should be denied. Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendencia are present
or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res adjudicata in the other.

There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, as well as identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the identity on
the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless
of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the
requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.

The test therefore in determining the presence of forum-shopping is whether in the two (or more
cases) pending, there is identity of (a) parties, (b) rights or causes of action and (c) reliefs sought.

31
39. Coca-cola Bottlers v. Social Security

Facts:

Petitioner Company and Dr. Climaco entered into a Retainer Agreement for one year, with a monthly
compensation of P3, 800.00. In the contract, is the provision that no employee-employer
relationship shall exist between the company and Dr. Climaco while the contract is in effect. In case
of its termination, Dr. Climaco shall be entitled only to such retainer fee as may be due him at the
time of termination.

Meantime, Dr. Climaco inquired with the DOLE and the SSS whether he was an employee of the
company. Both agencies replied in the affirmative. As a result, Dr. Climaco filed a complaint before
(NLRC). In his complaint, he sought recognition as a regular employee of the company and
demanded payment of his 13th month pay, bonus and all other benefits.

During the pendency of the complaint, the company terminated its Retainer Agreement with Dr.
Climaco. Thus, Dr. Climaco filed another complaintfor illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter, in each of
the complaints, ruled in favor of Petitioner Company.

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Arbiter disposition. On petition for review before the CA, the NLRC
ruling was reversed. The appellate court ruled that using the four-fold test, an employer-employee
relationship existed between the company and Dr. Climaco. Petitioners elevated the case through
a petition for review on certiorari.

On April 12, 1995, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Dr. Climaco opposed the motion.

In view of the statements of Dr. Climaco in his opposition to the companys motion to dismiss,
petitioners again, on March 1, 1996, moved for the dismissal of Dr. Climacos complaint, this time on
the grounds of forum shopping and litis pendentia

Issue:

1. WON respondent Climaco is guilty of forum shopping, which thereby called for the outright
dismissal of his petition before the Social Security Commission.

2. WON the petition should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendencia as there are other actions
pending between the same parties for the same cause of action.

Rulings:

1. Petitioners posit that since the issues before the NLRC and the SSC are the same, the SSC cannot
make a ruling on the issue presented before it without necessarily having a direct effect on the issue

32
before the NLRC. It was patently erroneous, if not malicious, for Dr. Climaco to invoke the
jurisdiction of the SSC through a separate petition. Thus, petitioners contend, Dr. Climaco was guilty
of forum shopping.

The grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two (2)
competent tribunals of two (2) separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous litigants, taking
advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora
until a favorable result is reached.

2. The elements of litis pendentia are absent. Petitioners contend that the petition of Dr. Climaco
before the SSC is defective because there were pending actions between the same parties and
involving the same issues in different fora.

For litis pendentia to exist, there must be (1) identity of the parties or at least such as representing
the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
founded on the same facts; and (3) identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless
of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.

In the case under review, there is no litis pendentia to speak of. As previously explained, although
the parties in the cases before the NLRC and the SSC are similar, the nature of the cases filed, the
rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for in each tribunal, are different.

40. Ao-As v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

The Lutheran Church in the Philippines (LCP) is a religious organization duly registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 8, 1967.

During the 1976 LCP national convention, a resolution was passed dividing the North Luzon district
(NLD) into two districts: the NLD Highland District (NLHD) and the NLD Lowland District (NLLD),
thereby increasing the number of directors from seven (7) to nine (9).

Since the addition of two or more districts, an eleven (11) member board of directors representing
the five (5) districts managed the LCP without any challenge from the membership until several
years later when certain controversies arose involving the resolutions of the Board terminating the
services of the LCP business manager and corporate treasurer since 1979, Mr. Eclesio Hipe.

Aside from the present case, SEC-SICD Case no. 3556 entitled "Excelsio Hipe, et. al. vs. Thomas
Batong, et. al." and SEC-SICD Case No. 3524, "Domingo Shambu, et. al. vs. Thomas Batong, et. al."
respectively, sought to declare null and void Board Resolution Nos. LCP-BD-6-89 and LCP-BD-7-89;
and SEC-SICD Case No. 3550.

33
On January 23, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion to dismiss alleging again the FORMULA OF
CONCORD. Again, the SEC-SICD denied.

On September 14, 1992, [the Batong group] filed their Motion for Reconsideration which was
subsequently denied.

On September 23, 1992, [the Batong group] filed with the SEC En Banc a Petition for Certiorari with
prayer for a temporary restraining order alleging that the SEC-SIDC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in creating the management committee.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals reversibly erred in ruling that SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 is a case
of forum shopping.

Rulings:

The elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the
same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and the relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.

As the present jurisprudence now stands, forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not
having been resolved yet (litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action
and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (res judicata); and (3) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of
action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata ). If the forum
shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall be dismissed without
prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned above. However, if the forum shopping is willful
and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with prejudice.

The six grounds originally relied upon by the Ao-As group in SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 are entirely
different from the causes of action in NLRC Cases No. 03-01935-90 and 04-01979-90, Civil Cases No.
133394-CV and 131879-CV, and SEC-SICD Cases No. 3556 and 3524. It is true that the causes of
action in the latter cases were included as additional grounds in SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 for the
appointment of the management committee and for accounting "of all funds, properties and assets
of LCP which may have come into their possession during their incumbency as officers and/or
directors of LCP." However, the creation of a management committee and the prayer for accounting
could not have been asked for in the labor (NLRC Cases No. 03-01935-90 and 04-01979-90) and
forcible entry (Civil Cases No. 133394-CV and 131879-CV) cases.

34
41. G.R. No. 89070 BENGUET ELECTRlC COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, PETER COSALAN and BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF BENGUET ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC., respondents. May 18, 1992

FACTS:

COA issued a memorandum to Peter Cosalan, General Manager of Beneco noting that cash
advances received by officers and employees of petitioner Beneco in the amount of P129, 618. 48
had been virtually written off in the books of Beneco. Soon, COA issued another Memorandum, also
addressed to Cosalan inviting attention to the fact that the audit of per diems and allowances
received by officials and members of the Board of Directors of Beneco showed substantial
inconsistencies with the directives of the NEA. The Audit Memorandum once again directed the
taking of immediate action in conformity with existing NEA regulations. Later on, Petitioner Beneco
received the COA Audit Report on the financial status and operations of Beneco which noted and
enumerated irregularities in the utilization of funds amounting to P37 Million released by NEA to
Beneco, and recommended that appropriate remedial action be taken.
Having been made aware of the serious financial condition of Beneco and what appeared
to be mismanagement, respondent Cosalan initiated implementation of the remedial measures
recommended by the COA. The respondent members of the Board of Beneco reacted by adopting
a series of resolutions including one which resulted in the ouster of respondent Cosalan as General
Manager of Beneco and his exclusion from performance of his regular duties as such, as well as the
withholding of his salary and allowances. Aggrieved, Cosalan filed a complaint before the NLRC
challenging the legality of the board resolutions. NRLC rendered a decision reinstating Cosalan as
well as the payment of his backwages an allowances. Respondent Board members appealed to the
NLRC, and there filed a Memorandum on Appeal. Petitioner Beneco did not appeal, but moved to
dismiss the appeal filed by respondent Board members and for execution of judgment. By this time,
petitioner Beneco had a new set of directors. They moved for reconsideration of the NLRC decision,
but without success. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: Whether or not the NLRC had acted with grave abuse of discretion in accepting and giving
due course to respondent Board members' appeal although such appeal had been filed out of time;
and that the NLRC had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
holding petitioner alone liable for payment of the backwages and allowances due to Cosalan and
releasing respondent Board members from liability therefor.

RULING: Yes. There, was, therefore, no reason grounded upon substantial justice and the prevention
of serious miscarriage of justice that might have justified the NLRC in disregarding the ten-day
reglementary period for perfection of an appeal by the respondent Board members. Accordingly,
the applicable rule was that the ten-day reglementary period to perfect an appeal is mandatory and
jurisdictional in nature, that failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period renders the
assailed decision final and executory and no longer subject to review. 7 The respondent Board
members had thus lost their right to appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
should have forthwith dismissed their appeal memorandum.

35
The Court believe and so hold, further, that not only are Beneco and respondent Board members
properly held solidarily liable for the awards made by the Labor Arbiter, but also that petitioner
Beneco which was controlled by and which could act only through respondent Board members, has
a right to be reimbursed for any amounts that Beneco may be compelled to pay to respondent
Cosalan. Such right of reimbursement is essential if the innocent members of Beneco are not to be
penalized for the acts of respondent Board members which were both done in bad faith and ultra
vires. The liability-generating acts here are the personal and individual acts of respondent Board
members, and are not properly attributed to Beneco itself.

42. G.R. Nos. 79937-38 SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J.
WARBY, petitioners, vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents. February 13, 1989

FACTS:

Petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati for the
consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration
of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Subsequently, Private filed a complaint
in the RTC of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment initially against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as
additional defendants for the payment of damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs
of the suit.

Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted
petitioners' counsel to raise his objection which was disregarded by Judge Jose Castro. The
complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for subsequent re-assessments of the
amount of damages sought as well as the corresponding docket fees. The respondent demonstrated
his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. On the other
hand, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the
reassessment of docket fees. The Court of Appeals then rendered a decision dismissing the petition.
Hence this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket
fee has not been paid.

RULING:

Yes. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter
or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment

36
of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. The same rule applies to permissive
counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and
unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within
a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim
not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court,
the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility
of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.

43. G.R. No. 75919 MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON,
GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents. May 7, 1987

FACTS:
A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development Corporation
against City Land Development Corporation to compel the latter to execute a deed of sale in favor
Manchester. The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by
considering the action to be merely one for specific performance where the amount involved is not
capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total amount of damages
sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the complaint
totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee.
When the under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to the attention of
this Court together with similar other cases an investigation was immediately ordered by the Court.
Soon after, the Court issued an order ordering the re- assessment of the docket fee in the present
case and other cases that were investigated and directed the plaintiffs to rectify the amended
complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking for. It was only then that plaintiffs specified
the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00.Still
no amount of damages were specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted. The
other party filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence this case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint should be admitted.

RULING:
No. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original complaint. A case is
deemed filed only upon payment of the appropriate docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing
in court. Here, since the proper docket fee was not paid for the original complaint, its as if there is

37
no complaint to speak of. As a consequence, there is no original complaint duly filed which can be
amended. So, any subsequent proceeding taken in consideration of the amended complaint is void.
Manchesters defense that this case is primarily an action for specific performance is not merited.
The Supreme Court ruled that based on the allegations and the prayer of the complaint, this case is
an action for damages and for specific performance. Hence, it is capable of pecuniary estimation.
Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was already provided in the body
of the complaint. Its omission in the PRAYER clearly constitutes an attempt to evade the payment
of the proper filing fees. To stop the happenstance of similar irregularities in the future, the Supreme
Court ruled that from this case on, all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings
should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but
also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any
case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted,
or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in
the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended
pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is
overturned and reversed.

44. G.R. No. 179878 NEGROS ORIENTAL PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (NOPA), Petitioner, versus
HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC-NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH 52, BACOLOD CITY, and ANICETO
MANOJO CAMPOS, Respondents. December 24, 2008

Facts:

Campos filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract with Damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
99-10773, against NOPA before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros
Occidental, Bacolod City. More than six years after NOPA filed its Answer, NOPA filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of an alleged failure of Campos to file the correct filing fee which was denied
by the RTC. NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was also denied by the RTC. After that,
NOPA filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the Orders of the RTC.
On 23 May 2007, the Court of Appeals issued Resolutions dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT

RULED THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
WHEN PETITIONER FAILED TO ALLEGE IN ITS VERIFICATION THAT THE ALLEGATIONS THEREIN ARE
TRUE AND CORRECT OF HIS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OR BASED ON AUTHENTIC RECORDS AND

38
FAILURE TO ATTACH THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS ON ITS PLEADINGS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 1,
RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

Ruling:

No. A pleading, therefore, wherein the Verification is merely based on the partys knowledge
and belief produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to
be remedied.

The case at bar demonstrates a situation in which there is no effect on the substantial rights
of a litigant. The alleged deficiency in the payment of docket fees by Campos, if there is any, would
not inure to the benefit of NOPA.

Also, there is no substantive right that will be prejudiced by the Court of Appeals exercise
of discretion in the case at bar. While the payment of docket fees is jurisdictional, it is nevertheless
unmistakably also a technicality. There was therefore no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Court of Appeals warranting this Courts reversal of the exercise of discretion by the former.

45. G.R. No. 175914 RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Petitioner, versus HON. PABLO C. FORMARAN III, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court Branch
21, Naga City, as Pairing Judge for Regional Trial Court Branch 22, Formerly Presided By HON.
NOVELITA VILLEGAS-LLAGUNO (Retired 01 May 2006), ROMEO Y. TAN, ROBERTO L. OBIEDO and
ATTY. TOMAS A. REYES, Respondents. February 10, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner obtained a loan in the total amount of P95,700,620.00 from respondents Tan and
Obiedo, secured by real estate mortgages over five parcels of land, all located in Naga City. When
petitioner was unable to pay the loan when it became due and demandable, respondents Tan and
Obiedo agreed to an extension of the same thru a Memorandum of Agreement which was signed
by the parties. Still, the petitioner failed to pay his indebtedness. Respondents Tan and Obiedo
presented the Deeds of Absolute Sale before the Registry of Deeds of Naga City, as a result of which,
they were able to secure TCTs over the five parcel of land in their names.
Petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for declaration of nullity of deeds of sales and
damages. Petitioner paid the sum of P13, 644. 25 for docket and other legal fees, as assessed by the
office of the Clerk of Court which initially considered the case as action incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Consequently, the RTC decreed on the matter of docket fees requiring the petitioner as
well as respondent Tan to pay additional filing fees. Petitioner filed for partial reconsideration which
was soon denied by the Court. Petitioner had not yet conceded, and it filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the CA which thereafter denied the said petition and affirmed the order of the trial court. Hence
this instant case.

39
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a grave and serious reversible error in
affirming the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court which are clearly contrary to the
pronouncement of this Honorable Court in the case of Spouses De Leon v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 104796, March 6, 1998, not to mention the fact that if the said judgment is allowed to stand
and not rectified, the same would result in grave injustice and irreparable damage to herein
petitioner in view of the prohibitive amount assessed as a consequence of said Orders.

RULING:
No. A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees for a real action would
still be determined in accordance with the value of the real property involved therein; the only
difference is in what constitutes the acceptable value. In computing the docket fees for cases
involving real properties, the courts, instead of relying on the assessed or estimated value, would
now be using the fair market value of the real properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration or the
Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof,
the stated value of the same.
In sum, the Court finds that the true nature of the action instituted by petitioner against
respondents is the recovery of title to and possession of real property. It is a real action necessarily
involving real property, the docket fees for which must be computed in accordance with Section
7(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

46. TACAY vs. RTC OF TAGUM (December 20, 1989; 180 SCRA 483)

FACTS:

These were 2 separate cases originally filed by Godofredo Pineda at the RTC of Tagum for
recovery of possession (acciones publiciana) against 3 defendants, namely: Antonia Noel, Ponciano
Panes, and Maximo Tacay.

Pineda was the owner of 790 sqm land evidenced by TCT No. T-46560. The previous owner
of such land has allowed the 3 defendants to use or occupy the same by mere tolerance. Pineda,
having himself the need to use the property, has demanded the defendants to vacate the property
and pay reasonable rentals therefore, but such were refused.

The complaint was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss filed by each defendant alleging
that it did not specify the amounts of actual, nominal, and exemplary damages, nor the assessed
value of the property, that being bars the determination of the RTCs jurisdiction in deciding the
case.

The Motions to Dismiss were denied but the claims for damages in the complaint were
expunged for failure to specify the amounts. Thus, the defendants filed a Joint Petition for
certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and temporary restraining order against the RTC.

40
ISSUE:

Whether or not the amount of damages claimed and the assessed value of the property
are relevant in the determination of the courts jurisdiction in a case for recovery of possession of
property?

RULING:

Determinative of the courts jurisdiction in a recovery of possession of property is the

nature of the action (one of accion publicaina) and not the value of the property, it may be
commenced and prosecuted without an accompanying claim for actual, nominal or exemplary
damages and such action would fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. The court
acquired jurisdiction upon the filing of the complaint and payment of the prescribed docket fees.

47. ORIGINAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION vs. CA (October 15, 1991; 202 SCRA 753)

FACTS:

Original Development and Construction Corporation (ODECOR) sued Home Insurance and
Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), and the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMC) for
breach of contract and for damages. ODECOR accused the two of divesting its customers which
resulted to massive losses for the corporation.

In ODECORs claim for damages it asserted its claim for actual, consequential, exemplary
and moral damages, the amount of which will be proved at the trial; that for actual damages its
claiming P2,272,193.10 but the rest appears to be unspecified amount of damages which the trial
court could not assess. ODECOR paid the docket fee for the claim for the actual damages specified
as well as the docket fees for the unspecified damages.

HIGC then moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over it because of non-payment of the proper docket fees.

The trial court did not order the dismissal of the case but rather directed the Clerk of Court
to issue a certificate of reassessment of the proper docket fee and if there is a deficiency ODECOR
should pay the same. In the assessment, the Clerk of Court determined that the claim for
attorneys fee which was stated in the body of the complaint was not reiterated in the PRAYER of

41
the complaint hence, the docket fees paid by ODECOR could not have included payment for the
fees for the claim of attorneys fee. ODECOR was then ordered to amend its complaint.

In its amended complaint, ODECOR restated substantially all its allegations in the first
complaint except that it specified its claim for attorneys fees as equivalent to 25% of the total
monthly liability and other expenses of litigation and costs of the suit.

HIGC then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals questioning the
jurisdiction of the trial court. The CA ruled in favor HIGC and enjoined the trial court from hearing
the case.

ODECOR then filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

No. The claims for the other damages (other than actual) are vague. The terms used by
ODECOR in its claims i.e. the amount of which will be proved at the trial and the demand for
attorneys fees as equivalent to 25% of the total monetary liability and other expenses of
litigation and costs of this suit are not definite enough to be the basis of the computation of the
proper docket fees.

While it is not required that the exact amounts be stated, the plaintiff must ascertain, in
his estimation, the sums he wants and the sums required to determine the amount of such docket
and other fees. Thus, it is evident that the complaint did not state enough facts and sums to
enable the Clerk of Court of the lower court to compute the docket fees payable and left to the
judge mere guesswork as to these amounts, which is fatal.

48. BELLO vs. UBO (September 30, 1982; 117 SCRA 753)

FACTS:

A land dispute arose between Bello and Ubo. Bello is claiming ownership over the
property that Ubo and her son have been occupying for years even paying taxes therefor. Ubo
and her son (Porferio Regis) claimed that they inherited said land.

Bello then filed a civil suit against Ubo and Regis. Summons were issued by the court.

42
 A certain Patrolman Castulo Yobia served the summons. What he did was go to where Ubo
and her son was residing. Ubo and Regis initially refused to accept the same. But Yobia explained
the nature of the Summons; that there is a civil case filed against them; that they need to find a
lawyer to assist them. Ubo and Regis then reluctantly signed the summons. Thereafter, he
detached the copy of the complaint and handed it to Ubo and Regis. He however took back the
same afterwards; he also held on to the copy of the summons and afterwards returned to his
police station.

Despite signing the summons, Ubo and Regis did not file any responsive pleadings nor did
they appear in court. Eventually, the trial court declared them in default and decided in favor of
Bello.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a proper service of summons in the case at bar.

RULING:

No. A police officer is not one of those enumerated as a person authorized to serve
summons. The list provided in the Rules of Court is exclusive. Yobia was not a sheriff or a court
officer of the province where service was made; and neither was he a person who, for special
reasons, was specially authorized to serve the summons by the judge who issued the same.

Furthermore, even assuming that Yobia could be considered as a proper person to serve
the summons, still there was no valid and effective service since he brought back the summons
with him together with the copy of the complaint. Since there is no valid service of summons, the
trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the persons of Ubo and Regis. Therefore, the ex parte
proceedings that took place as well as the decision favoring Bello is null and void.

49. MONTALBAN vs. MAXIMO (March 15, 1968; 22 SCRA 1070)

FACTS:

August 15, 1958. Plaintiffs commenced suit against Fr. Gerardo Maximo. Plaintiffs' cause
of action for damages sprang from a motor vehicle accident. Paul Hershell Montalban, son of
plaintiffs, suffered injuries. On this same day that the complaint was filed, summons was served on
defendant Fr. Gerardo Maximo at the parish church of Concepcion, Malabon, Rizal, through Fr.
Arsenio Bautista a priest in the same parish church.

43
Fr. Arsenio Bautista sent a letter (dated August 21) to Macario M. Ofilada, Clerk of Court of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, informing him that defendant Fr. Gerardo Maximo left for Europe
on August 7, and "will be back on the first week of November."

The lower court declared defendant in default, on plaintiffs' motion of September 13,
1958.

Upon plaintiffs' evidence, the court rendered judgment sentencing defendant to pay
damages to the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs themselves wrote defendant Fr. Gerardo Maximo, at the Malabon Catholic
Church, informing the latter of the lower court's decision.

Defendant, answered the foregoing letter expressing regret that he could not comply with
plaintiffs' request, because he (defendant) was not aware of the said civil case, and that, in the
criminal action arising out of the same incident, said defendant was acquitted by the Municipal
Court of Manila.

Deputy Sheriff Liberato C. Manalo of Rizal notified defendant of the issuance of the writ of
execution, and demanded payment of the amount set forth therein. The Sheriff's return to the
writ shows that in response to such demand, defendant alleged that he was then "financially hard
up"4 and that the Sheriff found no property that could be subject to execution. An alias writ of
execution was issued. Copy thereof was received by defendant. The Deputy Sheriff attached and
levied on a residential house located in Caloocan City and purportedly belonging to defendant.

The Deputy Sheriff attached and levied on a residential house located in Caloocan City
and purportedly belonging to defendant.

Two years and two months after defendant admittedly learned of the lower court's
decision from counsel for plaintiffs herein, said defendant filed a verified motion in the same case
praying for the annulment of the entire proceedings. His ground is this: Summons was not duly
served upon him "as provided under Sec. 7, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court;" accordingly, the lower
court "did not acquire jurisdiction over his person"; and "the trial and decision by default" are "null
and void."

The court denied this motion and the defendant's move to reconsider was rejected by the
court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not there was a valid service of summons over the defendant;
Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

44
RULING:

A question of transcendental importance which necessarily involves an inquiry into

procedural due process is whether summons in a suit in personam against a resident of the
Philippines temporarily absent therefrom may be validly effected by substituted service under
Section 8, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court. A head-on collision of views becomes inevitable
considering the diametrically opposing positions taken by plaintiffs, on the one hand, and
defendant, on the other. For, plaintiffs make the point that even with defendant temporarily
abroad, substituted service is valid under Section 8 by leaving a copy of the summons "at the
defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein."

The jurisdiction of courts to render judgments in personam was grounded on their de

facto power over defendant's person. Jurisdiction was based on the power to seize and imprison
defendant. If a defendant was absent from the territory, the fact that he was a citizen would not
enable the court's officers to seize him and service could not represent this power. Hence, his
presence within the territorial jurisdiction was a prerequisite to the rendition of a judgment
personally binding against him.

There should be no doubt, therefore, that in suits in personam, courts have jurisdiction
over residents temporarily out of the country.

50. FILMERCO COMMERCIAL CO. vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

(April 9, 1987; 147 SCRA 194)

FACTS:

Filmerco Commercial Co., Inc., (Filmerco) obtained two separate loans from the Bank of
Philippine Islands (BPI). As security for the payment of the obligation stated in the promissory
notes, spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel executed a deed of continuing suretyship wherein the
Miguels bound themselves jointly and solidarily with Filmerco for the payment of the latter's
obligation under the loan-accounts.

The loans remained outstanding even after they became due and demandable. Hence BPI
filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money against Filmerco and spouses Jaime and Ana
Maria Miguel before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Rizal.

Upon motion of the plaintiff, the defendants were declared in default for failure to file an
answer within the reglementary period.

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 The plaintiff filed a motion for execution of judgment before the lower court. This motion
was granted and a writ of execution was issued against Filmerco and the Miguels. Pursuant to the
writ of execution, respondent Sheriff Villapana levied on and attached alleged properties of
Filmerco and the Miguels.

The defendants filed a motion to set aside the decision, writ of execution, notice of
levy/attachment and to restrain the holding of the auction sale. The motion was premised on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the defendants because no valid summons was
served on them. Subsequently, the lower court issued an order denying the aforesaid motion.

The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration and without waiting for the resolution
of the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, the defendants filed with the Intermediate Appellate
Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition, injunction and preliminary restraining order against
the lower court's decision and orders.

The appellate court dismissed the petition. A motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.

The petitioners submit that no valid summons was served upon them. Therefore, they
contend that the lower court had not acquired jurisdiction over their persons thus resulting in the
nullity of its decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners were served valid summons so as to bring their persons
within the jurisdiction of the court.

RULING:

In the case at bar, there is no question that personal service of summons upon the
defendants could not be made because they moved out from their given address and their
whereabouts were unknown as indicated in the sheriff's return. Hence, the court resorted to
substituted service of summons provided for under Section 8, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

... The terms "dwelling house" or "residence" are generally held to refer to the time of
service, hence it is not sufficient "to leave the copy at defendant's former dwelling house,
residence, or place of abode, as the case may be, after his removal therefrom."

The Court found that no valid service of summons upon the defendant spouses was effected
since copies of the summons was left to a proper person.

46
51. Sps. MIRANDA Vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

Luneta Motor Company (hereinafter LMC) filed suit against the spouses Lucila and Pablo D. Java,
et al., with the former Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila, which docketed the same as Civil
Case No. 63117. LMC sought to recover one "Thames" jeep and the sum of P9,403.00, plus interest
and attorney's fees from defendants.

On March 11, 1966, LMC moved to declare the Java spouses in default for failure to file their
answer within the reglementary period, notwithstanding notice. The trial court granted the
motion.

judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff.

ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in annulling the judgment
in Civil Case No. 63117 for want of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

HELD:

In declaring the judgment in Civil Case No. 63117 null and void, the appellate court found from the
Sheriff's Return of Service,8 that summons was served on the spouses Java by substituted service
without effort at personal service. The court a quo held that the said service was invalid and the
lower court never acquired jurisdiction over the persons of defendants (private respondents
herein) in Civil Case No. 63117, thus, the execution sale of the "Thames" vehicle, as well as the sale
of Lot 8015 to LMC, and the subsequent sale by the latter to petitioners were null and void.

the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 28,
1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 20546 is hereby AFFIRMED

52. JOSE V. BOYON

FACTS:

This case arose from a complaint for specific performance against respondents Helen and Romeo
Boyon to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of
controverted sale. The CA held that the trial court had no authority to issue the questioned
Resolution and Orders. According to the appellate court, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over
respondents because of the invalid service of summons upon them. First, the sheriff failed to
comply with the requirements of substituted service of summons, because he did not specify in

47
the Return of Summons the prior efforts he had made to locate them and the impossibility of
promptly serving the summons upon them by personal service. Second, the subsequent summons
by publication was equally infirm, because the Complaint was a suit for specific performance and
therefore an action in personam. Consequently, the Resolution and the Orders were null and void,
since the RTC had never acquired jurisdiction over respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether there was valid service of summons.

HELD:

Petition has no merit.

In a long line of cases, this Court held that the impossibility of personal service justifying availment
of substituted service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards
personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of
summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise, the substituted
service cannot be upheld. It bears stressing that since service of summons, especially for actions in
personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the
resort to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all
subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.

53. VENTURAZA V. C.A

FACTS:

On 22 September 1985, petitioners filed a "Motion to Set Aside Decision and to Declare Past
Proceedings Null and Void for Lack of Jurisdiction," alleging that there had been no proper and
valid service of summons upon them in accordance with either Section 7 or Section 8 of Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court 5 and that the court a quo never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioners, considering that the address where the summons was served is the residence of
Violeta S. Venturanza's father, Augusto Soan, and not the residence or dwelling house of the
petitioners, and that since April 1985, petitioners had been already residing at Aurora Street,
Pasay City. 6 In an order dated 20 October 1985, the court a quo denied the motion, for lack of
merit.

Court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

48
ISSUE:

Whether or not there was valid service of summons.

HELD:

It is further required by law that an effort or attempt should first be made to personally serve the
summons and after this has failed, a substituted service may be caused upon the defendant, and
the same must be reflected in the proof of service.

The substituted service should be availed of only when the defendant cannot be served promptly in
person. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the
defendant personally and the failure of such efforts.

t is only when a defendant can not be personally served with summons within a reasonable time
that a substituted service may be availed of, the same to be effected in the following manner: a) by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendants' dwelling house or residence, with some person
of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office
or regular place of business, with some competent person in charge thereof.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, including a valid service of summons.

54. keister v. Navarro

FACTS:

Special civil action of prohibition to prevent respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal from enforcing his Order dated March 28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 10392 requiring
the petitioner to answer the complaint and from proceeding with the trial of the case, on the ground
that the Court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

On December 1, 1967, the summons, with the complaint attached thereto, was served purportedly
upon petitioner at "c/o Chuidian Law Office, Suite 801, JMT Bldg., Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal." The
receipt of service was signed by one Vicente Basallote, Clerk of said Chuidian Law Office. 4

On December 15, 1967, the petitioner, thru his counsel, filed a special appearance questioning the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of petitioner and moved to dismiss the complaint. It was
asserted that the Court had acquired no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant because the
summons was improperly served at the Chuidian Law Office, Suite 801, JMT Bldg., Ayala Avenue,

49
Makati, Rizal and not at the residence or place of business of the petitioner, contrary to the
requirements of Section 8 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

whether or not jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by the court a quo over the person of the
petitioner.

HELD:

The court finds the petition meritorious.

Service of summons upon the defendant is the means by which the court may acquire jurisdiction
over his person. In the absence of a valid waiver, trial and judgment without such service are null
and void.

The terms "dwelling house" or "residence" are generally held to refer to the time of service, hence
it is not sufficient "to leave the copy at defendants former dwelling house, residence, or place of
abode, as the case may be, after his removal therefrom." 22 They refer to the place where the
person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may
be temporarily out of the country at the time. Similarly, the terms "office" or "regular place of
business" refer to the office or place of business of defendant at the time of service. Note that the
rule designates the persons to whom copies of the process may be left.

55. Cezar V. Ricafort Bautista

FACTS:

Private respondent Specified Material Corp filed a complaint for collection of sum of money
(P1,860,000 plus 3% monthly interest) against petitioner due to the latters failure to pay the
construction materials it purportedly purchased under a credit line from Specified.

Cezar had expressed willingness to pay Specified as long as an inventory is made and the parties
conflicting records as to materials delivered and actual materials used are reconciled. After Cezar
failed to show up in meetings for verification of documents, Specified sent a final demand letter
and later on filed the complaint. Sheriff Marquez served the summons to Robles, an alleged
employee of Cezar.

As Cezar failed to answer the complaint, the respondent judge declared him in default. Specified
filed an amended complaint, raising the obligation to P2,005,000, a copy of the which was
personally received by Cezar. Cezar, by way of special appearance, filed a motion to set aside

50
decision arguing that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person. After RTC denied
the motion, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment and preliminary injunction with CA,
which was dismissed. SC also denied the certiorari due to non-compliance with procedural
requirements.

After SCs resolution became final and executory, Specified moved for execution however the
scheduled hearing on was reset after Cezar filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Re-Set Hearing.

Issue: W/N RTC acquired jurisdiction

Held:

Yes. A court can acquire jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent either through service of
summons or voluntary appearance. The service of summons is intended to give official notice to
the defendant or respondent that an action had been commenced against it.

Whenever practicable, summons must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in
person and he refuses to receive and sign it, by tendering the summons to him.

It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that a
substituted service may be made. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the
efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed in the proof
service. In the case, the sheriffs return is patently defective for failure to state impossibility of
personal service.

However, the defect in service was cured and the RTC acquired jurisdiction by virtue of Cezars
voluntary through his motion for re-setting the courts hearing on the motion for execution.

An appearance in whatever form without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant or
respondent. A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. The defendant
may appear by presenting a motion, for example, and unless by such appearance he specifically
objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person. Petition dismissed, judgment affirmed.

56. Biaco vs. PCRB

FACTS: Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. While employed in the
Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB) as branch manager, Ernesto obtained several loans from
the respondent bank. As security for the payment of the said loans, Ernesto executed a real estate
mortgage in favor of the bank covering the parcel of land which the real estate mortgages bore the
signatures of the spouses Biaco. When Ernesto failed to settle the above-mentioned loans on its due
date, respondent bank through counsel sent him a written demand,however, proved futile.

51
Respondent bank filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the spouses Ernesto and
Teresa Biaco before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Summons was served to the spouses Biaco through
Ernesto at his office (Export and Industry Bank). The RTC ruled against them; a writ of execution was
served on the spouses. Petitioner sought the annulment of the Regional Trial Court decision
contending, among others, that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons were
served on her through her husband without any explanation as to why personal service could not
be made. The CA affirmed RTC decision invoking that judicial foreclosure proceedings are actions
quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential as long as the
court acquires jurisdiction over the res.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner?

HELD: No. The Court ruled that validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in
rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the
court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired
either (1) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual
custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of
the court is recognized and made effective. In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding
instituted by respondent PCRB undoubtedly vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the res. A
judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner is not required, it being sufficient that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the
subject matter.

57. E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd vs. Benito

FACTS: Petitioner is a limited partnership with principal office address at Davao City and with branch
offices at Paraaque, MM and Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Petitioner and private respondent
executed a Deed of Sale with Development Agreement wherein the former agreed to develop
certain parcels of land located at Cagayan de Oro belonging to the latter into a housing subdivision
for the construction of low cost housing units. They further agreed that in case of litigation regarding
any dispute arising therefrom, the venue shall be in the proper courts of Makati. Private respondent,
as plaintiff, filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against petitioner, as defendant,
before the RTC Makati for failure of the latter to comply with its contractual obligation in that, other
than a few unfinished low cost houses, there were no substantial developments therein. Summons,
together with the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its Branch Manager at the
stated address at Cagayan de Oro City but the Sheriff's Return of Service stated that the summons
was duly served "upon defendant E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager Engr. at
their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the signature on
the face of the original copy of the summons. Defendant prayed for the dismissal of the complaint

52
on the ground of improper service of summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. It contends that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons
was improperly served upon its employee in its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City who is not one
of those persons named in Section 11, Rule 14 RoC upon whom service of summons may be made.
plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Declare
Defendant in Default. the trial court issued an Order denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss as well
as plaintiffs Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. defendant, filed a Motion for Reconsideration
alleging that Sec.11, Rule 14 of the new Rules did not liberalize but, on the contrary, restricted the
service of summons on persons enumerated therein; and that the new provision is very specific and
clear in that the word "manager" was changed to "general manager", "secretary" to "corporate
secretary", and excluding therefrom agent and director. Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration
was denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner upon service
of summons on its Branch Manager.

HELD: No. the enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is "restricted, limited and
exclusive" following the rule on statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius and
argues that if the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of
summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Under the new Rules, service
of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized. The designation of persons
or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now
limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of
"secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is
conspicuously deleted in the new rule.

58. Litton Mills, Inc. vs. CA

59. Signetics Corp. vs. CA

FACTS: Signetics was organized under the laws of the United States of America. Through Signetics
Filipinas Corporation (SigFil), a wholly-owned subsidiary, Signetics entered into lease contract over
a piece of land with Fruehauf Electronics Phils., Inc. (Freuhauf). Freuhauf sued Signetics for damages,
accounting or return of certain machinery, equipment and accessories, as well as the transfer of title
and surrender of possession of the buildings, installations and improvements on the leased land,
before the RTC of Pasig (Civil Case No. 59264). Claiming that Signetics caused SigFil to insert in the
lease contract the words "machineries, equipment and accessories," the defendants were able to
withdraw these assets from the cost-free transfer provision of the contract. Service of summons
was made on Signetics through TEAM Pacific Corp. on the basis of the allegation that Signetics is a
"subsidiary of US PHILIPS CORPORATION, and may be served summons at Philips Electrical Lamps,

53
Inc., Las Pias, Metro Manila and/or c/o Technology Electronics Assembly & Management (TEAM)
Pacific Corporation, Electronics Avenue, FTI Complex, Taguig, Metro Manila," service of summons
was made on Signetics through TEAM Pacific Corporation. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person. Invoking Section 14, Rule 14, of the
Rules of Court and the rule laid down in Pacific Micronisian Line, Inc., v. Del Rosario and Pelington
to the effect that the fact of doing business in the Philippines should first be established in order
that summons could be validly made and jurisdiction acquired by the court over a foreign
corporation. The RTC denied the Motion to dismiss. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The
petitioner argues that what was effectively alleged in the complaint as an activity of doing business
was "the mere equity investment" of petitioner in SigFil, which the petitioner insists, had
theretofore been transferred to TEAM holdings, Ltd.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court, had correctly assumed jurisdiction over the petitioner, a foreign
corporation, on its claim in a motion to dismiss, that it had since ceased to do business in the
Philippines.

HELD: YES. Signetics cannot, at least in this early stage, assail, on the one hand, the veracity and
correctness of the allegations in the complaint and proceed, on the other hand, to prove its own, in
order to hasten a peremptory escape. As explained by the Court in Pacific Micronisian, summons
may be served upon an agent of the defendant who may not necessarily be its "resident agent
designated in accordance with law." The term "agent", in the context it is used in Section 14, refers
to its general meaning, i.e., one who acts on behalf of a principal. The allegations in the complaint
have thus been able to amply convey that not only is TEAM Pacific the business conduit of the
petitioner in the Philippines but that, also, by the charge of fraud, is none other than the petitioner
itself. The rule is that, a foreign corporation, although not engaged in business in the Philippines,
may still look up to our courts for relief; reciprocally, such corporation may likewise be "sued in
Philippine courts for acts done against a person or persons in the Philippines" (Facilities
Management Corporation v. De la Osa), provided that, in the latter case, it would not be impossible
for court processes to reach the foreign corporation, a matter that can later be consequential in the
proper execution of judgment. Hence, a State may not exercise jurisdiction in the absence of some
good basis (and not offensive to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice) for effectively
exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem, quasi in rem or in personam.

60. Jose vs. Boyon

FACTS: Petitioners lodged a complaint for specific performance against respondents to compel them
to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. The RTC
issued a summons to respondents. As per return of the summons, substituted service was resorted
to by the process server allegedly because efforts to serve personally to re respondents failed.
Meanwhile, petitioners filed before the RTC an ex parte motion for leave of court to effect summons

54
by publication and the judge issued an order granting the same. The respondents were declared in
default and as a consequence of the declaration of default, petitioners were allowed to submit their
evidence ex parte. Helen Boyon, who was then in United Sates, was surprised to learn from her
sister of the resolution issued by the court. Respondents filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning,
among others, the validity of the service of summons effected by the court a quo. The court issued
an order denying the said motion on the basis of the defaulted respondent supposed loss of standing
in court. Once again, the respondents raised the issue of the jurisdiction of the trial court via a
motion for reconsideration and the same was denied. The petitioners moved for the execution of
the controverted judgment which the judge granted. Thereafter, respondents filed before the CA a
petition for certiorari which held that the trial court had no authority to issue the questioned
resolution and orders.

ISSUE: Whether or not summons by publication can validly serve in the instant case.

HELD: In general, courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of
summons, such service may be done personal or substituted service, where the action is in
personam and the defendant is in the Philippines. However, extraterritorial service of summons or
summons by publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. That is, the action
against the thing itself instead of against the defendants person if the action is in rem or an
individual is named as defendant and the purpose is to subject the individuals interest in a piece
of property to the obligation or loan burdening it if quasi in rem. In the instant case, what was filed
before the trial court was an action for specific performance directed against respondents. While
the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in
issue. Moreover, court has consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an
action in personam. Hence, summons by publication cannot be validly served.

61. PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation under Singapore. Respondent is a corporation organized under

existing Philippine laws, for selling and leasing laboratory instruments. Respondent entered into
an agreement with the Perkin Elmer Instruments Asia PTE LTD appointed respondents as sole
distribution agreement. The respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and
damages. The RTC denied the respondents prayer. Petitioner appealed, but the Court of Appeals
affirms the RTCs decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there is a proper service of summons and acquisition of jurisdiction.

2. Whether or not there is a proper venue for respondents in civil case.

55
HELD:

1. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, while
jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of
summons upon them in the manner required by law or through their voluntary
appearance in court and their submission to its authorit. The proper service of summons
differs depending on the nature of the civil case instituted by the plaintiff or petitioner,
whether it is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. When the case instituted is an action in
rem or quasi in rem, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case
because jurisdiction over the person of the defendants is not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court. Thus, extraterritorial service of summons can be made upon the
defendant. In the case at bar, there is no proper service of summons because the
territorial service of summons was not proper for actions in personam and the attachment
of the property does not constitute or even convert to quasi in rem.
2. It is a proper venue for civil case base on Distribution Agreement, it was stipulated that if
the dispute arise it will be resolved either in Singapore or in the Philippines.

62. OBANA VS COURT OF APPEALS

63. MONTALBAN VS MAXIMO

FACTS: August 15, 1958. Plaintiffs commenced suit against Fr. Gerardo Maximo. Plaintiffs' cause of
action for damages sprang from a motor vehicle accident. Paul Hershell Montalban, son of
plaintiffs, suffered injuries. On this same day that the complaint was filed, summons was served on
defendant Fr. Gerardo Maximo at the parish church of Concepcion, Malabon, Rizal, through Fr.
Arsenio Bautista a priest in the same parish church.

Fr. Arsenio Bautista sent a letter (dated August 21) to Macario M. Ofilada, Clerk of Court of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, informing him that defendant Fr. Gerardo Maximo left for Europe
on August 7, and "will be back on the first week of November."

The lower court declared defendant in default, on plaintiffs' motion of September 13, 1958.

Upon plaintiffs' evidence, the court rendered judgment sentencing defendant to pay damages to
the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs themselves wrote defendant Fr. Gerardo Maximo, at the Malabon Catholic Church,
informing the latter of the lower court's decision.

Defendant, answered the foregoing letter expressing regret that he could not comply with
plaintiffs' request, because he (defendant) was not aware of the said civil case, and that, in the

56
criminal action arising out of the same incident, said defendant was acquitted by the Municipal
Court of Manila.

Deputy Sheriff Liberato C. Manalo of Rizal notified defendant of the issuance of the writ of
execution, and demanded payment of the amount set forth therein. The Sheriff's return to the
writ shows that in response to such demand, defendant alleged that he was then "financially hard
up"4 and that the Sheriff found no property that could be subject to execution. An alias writ of
execution was issued. Copy thereof was received by defendant. The Deputy Sheriff attached and
levied on a residential house located in Caloocan City and purportedly belonging to defendant.

The Deputy Sheriff attached and levied on a residential house located in Caloocan City and
purportedly belonging to defendant.

Two years and two months after defendant admittedly learned of the lower court's decision from
counsel for plaintiffs herein, said defendant filed a verified motion in the same case praying for the
annulment of the entire proceedings. His ground is this: Summons was not duly served upon him
"as provided under Sec. 7, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court;" accordingly, the lower court "did not
acquire jurisdiction over his person"; and "the trial and decision by default" are "null and void."

The court denied this motion and the defendant's move to reconsider was rejected by the court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not there was a valid service of summons over the defendant;
Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
RULING:

A question of transcendental importance which necessarily involves an inquiry into

procedural due process is whether summons in a suit in personam against a resident of the
Philippines temporarily absent therefrom may be validly effected by substituted service under
Section 8, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court. A head-on collision of views becomes inevitable
considering the diametrically opposing positions taken by plaintiffs, on the one hand, and
defendant, on the other. For, plaintiffs make the point that even with defendant temporarily
abroad, substituted service is valid under Section 8 by leaving a copy of the summons "at the
defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein."

The jurisdiction of courts to render judgments in personam was grounded on their de

facto power over defendant's person. Jurisdiction was based on the power to seize and imprison
defendant. If a defendant was absent from the territory, the fact that he was a citizen would not
enable the court's officers to seize him and service could not represent this power. Hence, his

57
presence within the territorial jurisdiction was a prerequisite to the rendition of a judgment
personally binding against him.

There should be no doubt, therefore, that in suits in personam, courts have jurisdiction
over residents temporarily out of the country.

64. MONTEFALCON VS VASQUEZ

FACTS: In 1999, petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for acknowledgment and
support against respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez before the RTC of Naga City. Alleging that her son
Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez, she prayed that Vasquez be obliged to give support to
co-petitioner Laurence Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he signed as father. According
to petitioners, Vasquez only gave a total of P19,000 as support for Laurence since Laurence was
born in1993. Vasquez allegedly also refused to give him regular school allowance despite repeated
demands. Petitioner Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not legally married, and that Vasquez
has his own family. Vasquez was declared in default for failure to answer the service of
summons(substituted). The court ordered Vasquez to acknowledge Laurence and to pay P 5000
monthly. In the same year, Vasquez surfaced. He filed notice of appeal to which petitioners
opposed. Appeal was granted by the court. Before the appellate court, he argued that the trial court
erred in tryingand deciding the case as it "never" acquired jurisdiction over his person. The appellate
court granted Vasquezs contention.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid substituted service of summons on Vasquez to clothe the trial
court with jurisdiction over his person.

HELD: Yes. To acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, service of summons must be
personal, or if this is not feasible within a reasonable time, then by substituted service. It is of judicial
notice that overseas Filipino seafarers are contractual employees. They go back to the country once
their contracts expire, and wait for the signing of another contract.

65. TOYOTA CUBAO, INC VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner Toyota Cubao, Inc., undertook repairs on the car owned by private respondent
Danilo Guevarra. The repair cost of P76,800.47 was paid by means of BPI Check No. 17819, dated
12 March 1991, drawn by Guevarra in favor of Toyota. When presented for payment, the check
was dishonored, i.e., "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (`DAIF')." Petitioner thereupon requested
that Guevarra should make good the check. When Guevarra failed to heed the demand, petitioner
filed a civil case for collection of the unpaid account.

On 07 January 1993, the trial court issued the summons to Guevarra at his address in 29 Burgos
Street, Calamba, Laguna. On 02 February 1993, Process Server Antonio Rimas of the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna, submitted to the trial court a return on the service.

58
On 23 February 1993, petitioner, claiming that Guevarra had failed to file an ANSWER within the
reglementary period, moved to declare Guevarra in default. The trial court rendered judgment in
favor of petitioner. A writ of execution levied on Guevarras Toyota Corolla was served on Guevarra
personally but he refused to sign the receipt thereof, expressed surprise over it, and stated that he
was not aware of any case instituted against him. He filed a certiorari petition (CA-G.R. SP No.
38048) before the Court of Appeals, for the nullification of the ex-parte judgment of 06 January
1994. Guevarra claimed that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because of a
defective service of summons on him. The appellate court, finding merit in the petition, annulled
and set aside the default judgment, the writ of execution, the levy upon execution and the sale at
public auction of the vehicle. It held, in its now assailed decision of 28 June 1996, that the
substituted service of summons effected on private respondent was not valid and that,
consequently, the proceedings had before the trial court were nugatory and without legal effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a proper service of summons.

HELD: The summons must be served to the defendant in person. [Section 7, Rule 14, Revised Rules
of Court.] It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that
a substituted service may be made. [Section 8, Ibid.] Impossibility of prompt service should be
shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts
failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service.

71. Dasmarinas Garments, Inc. v. Reyes

Facts:

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, the American President Lines, Ltd. sued Dasmarias Garments,
Inc. to recover the sum of US $53,228.45 as well as an amount equivalent to twenty-five percent
(25%) thereof as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

In its answer dated December 1, 1987, Dasmarias Garments, Inc. specifically denied any liability to
the plaintiff (APL), and set up compulsory counterclaims against it.

At the hearing, instead of presenting its witnesses, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to
take the depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei, Taiwan and prayed that for this purpose,
a "commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to the consul, vice-consul or consular agent
of the Republic of the Philippines in Taipei. Five days later APL filed an amended motion stating that
since the Philippine Government has no consulate office in Taiwan in view of its "one China policy,"

The motion was opposed by Dasmarias. It contended that (a) the motion was "fatally defective in
that it does not seek that a foreign court examine a person within its jurisdiction;" (b) issuance of
letters rogatory was unnecessary because the witnesses "can be examined before the Philippine
Court;" and (c) the Rules of Court "expressly require that the testimony of a witness must be taken
orally in open court and not by deposition."

59
By Order dated March 15, 1991, the Trial Court resolved the incident in favor of APL. The Court
opined that "the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. being the authorized Philippine representative in
Taiwan, may take the testimonies of plaintiff's witnesses residing there by deposition, but only upon
written interrogatories so as to give defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by
serving cross-examination."

Dasmarias sought reconsideration by motion filed June 25, 1991 but was denied. Dasmarias
instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals to nullify the orders of the Trial
Court, however, it was denied again. Once again Dasmarias has availed of the remedy of appeal. It
has come to this Court and prays for the reversal of the Appellate Court's Decision of September 23,
1992 and Resolution dated December 11, 1992. Once again, it will fail.

Issue:

WON foreign jurisdiction not recognized by the Philippines in view of its 'one-China policy,' before
the AECI, a private entity not authorized by law to take depositions.

Rulings:

Where the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines has no "secretary or
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent," then obviously it may
be taken only "before such a person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters
rogatory.

In the case at bar, the RTC has issued a commission to the Asian Exchange Center thru Director
Roces. It also appears that the commission is to be coursed through the DFA to course all requests
for the taking of deposition of witnesses residing abroad to enable it and the Phil Foreign Service
establishments to act on the matter in a judicious and expeditious manner to avoid delay in the
deposition-taking.

That the deposition-taking will take place in a foreign jurisdiction not recognized by the Philippines
in view of the one-China Policy is inconsequential. What matters is that the deposition is taken
before a Philippine official acting by authority of the Phil DFA and in virtue of a commission duly
issued by the Phil Court, in accordance with the Phil Rules of Court, pursuant to which opportunity
for cross-examination of the deponent will be fully accorded to the adverse party.

Depositions may be used, without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand by the
proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes. These exceptional situations
are governed by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Rules of Court.

(c) xxx or (2) that the witness is out of the province and at a greater distance than 50 kms from the
place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured
by the party offering the deposition xxx.

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72. Sales vs. Sabino

Facts:

In RTC Pasig City, Cyril Sabino filed an amended complaint for damages against, among others, Jowel
Sales, driver of the vehicle involved in the accident which ultimately caused the death of Sabinos
son, Elbert.

Before any responsive pleading could be filed, Sabino, notified the defendants that he will take the
deposition of one Buaneres Corral before the Clerk of Court, RTC- Pasig City.

On Dec. 27, 1995 and resumed on Jan. 3, 1996, the deposition on oral examination of Buaneres
Corral was taken before the Clerk of Court of Pasig, in the presence and with the active participation
of Sales counsel, Atty. Villacorta, who even lengthily cross-examined the deponent. In the course
of trial, respondent had the deposition of Buaneres Corral marked as her Exhibits DD and EE
with submarkings.

Upon conclusion of her evidentiary presentation, Sabino made a Formal Offer of Exhibits, among
which are Exhibits DD and EE. Also offered in evidence as Exhibit BB is a certification from the
Bureau of Immigration attesting to the May 28, 1996 departure for abroad of Buaneres Corral via
Flight No. PR 658.

Sales opposed the admission of Exhs. DD and EE and asked that they be expunged from the
records on the ground that the jurisdictional requirements for their admission under Section 4, Rule
23 of the ROC were not complied with.

The TC admitted, among other evidence, Sabinos Exhibits DD, EE and BB.

Sales MR was denied by the court so he went on certiorari to the CA imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the TC in admitting in evidence the deposition (Exhibits DD and EE).

CA affirmed the TC and effectively denied due course to and dismissed Sales recourse, explaining
that Sales active participation, through counsel, during the taking of subject deposition and
adopting it as his own exhibits, has thereby estopped him from assailing the admissibility thereof as
part of Sabinos evidence. Sales filed this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the requirements of Sec. 4, Rule 24 (now Sec. 3) ROC were satisfied by Sabino
when it presented a certification attesting to the fact that deponent has left the country but silent
as to WoN at the time his deposition was offered in evidence deponent is in the Philippines
2. Whether or not Sales in cross-examining the deponent during the taking of his deposition waived
any and all objections in connection therewith

61
Rulings:

1. YES. While depositions may be used as evidence in court proceedings, they are generally not
meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Stated a bit
differently, a deposition is not to be used when the deponent is at hand. Indeed, any deposition
offered during a trial to prove the facts therein set out, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the
deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground of hearsay. However,
depositions may be used without the deponent being called to the witness stand by the proponent,
provided the existence of certain conditions is first satisfactorily established. 5 exceptions for the
admissibility of a deposition are listed in Section 4, Rule 23. Among these is when the witness is out
of the Philippines.

2. NO. As a rule, the inadmissibility of testimony taken by deposition is anchored on the ground that
such testimony is hearsay, i.e., the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-
examine the deponent at the time his testimony is offered. But it matters not that opportunity for
cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity
for cross-examination must be accorded a party at the time the testimonial evidence
is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing. In fine, the act of cross-examining the
deponent during the taking of the deposition cannot, without more, be considered a waiver of the
right to object to its admissibility as evidence in the trial proper. In participating, therefore, in the
taking of the deposition, but objecting to its admissibility in court as evidence, petitioner did not
assume inconsistent positions. He is not, thus, estopped from challenging the admissibility of the
deposition just because he participated in the taking thereof.

73. Cariaga v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

The accused is an employee of Davao Light & Power Co. Inc., and as such he has access to the said
company, with intent to gain, with grave abuse of confidence and without the knowledge and
consent of the owner, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry
away electrical equipment, supplies and materials totalling P7, 038.96 belonging to the Company.

The Court finds accused Jonathan Cariaga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft, qualified by
grave abuse of confidence, under Article 310, in relation to Article 309, par. 2, of the Revised Penal
Code, as charged, aggravated by the use of motor vehicle which is not offset by any mitigating
circumstance

On appeal by Cariaga, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Court of
Appeals reasoned out that the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga who did not testify in open court
during the criminal proceedings against petitioner is admissible in evidence and properly considered
by the trial court.

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Issue:

WON the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga without
him taking the witness stand since it violates the fundamental right of the accused to meet the
witnesses against him face to face.

Rulings:

The sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga who was not presented in court is inadmissible.
Section 47 of Rule 130 reads: That testimony or deposition at a former proceeding - The testimony
or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence
against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
More specific however is the rule prescribed in Rule 115, Section 1(f) of the Rules of Court in respect
of the admissibility in evidence in a criminal case of the previous testimony of unavailable witnesses
which reads: Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial - In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be entitled: f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may
utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot with due
diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another
case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the
adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

74. Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan

Facts:
Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier disclosed to his chief, Projecto Tumagan, the existence of a group
responsible for the pilferage of mail matter in the post office. Among those mentioned by Merete
were Arnold Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the Printed Matters
Section, and Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter. Merete likewise described the modus operandi of
the group.
For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the NBI in apprehending the group responsible for mail
pilferage in the Makati Post Office.
At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in front of the Esguerra
Building. The passengers of the postal delivery jeep were Arnold Pasicolan, Jacinto Merete, and the
driver. Pasicolan alighted from the jeep bringing with him a mail bag. Merete stayed inside the
jeep. Pasicolan gave the mail bag to two persons, who were later identified as Ronnie Romero and
petitioner Lito Marcelo. The latter transferred the contents of the mail bag to a travelling bag. The
two then secured the bag to the back of their motorcycle. At that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles
Vela arrested the two accused and brought them to their headquarters.

63
Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes of the
letters. They did so in the presence of the members of the NBI Administrative and Investigative Staff
and the people transacting business with the NBI at that time.
Court finds the three accused, as principals, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified
theft
Issue:
WON Respondent Honorable Court erred in admitting as evidence of petitioners guilt the letters
signed by the accused during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel, in utter
disregard of his constitutional right.
Rulings:
The petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in admitting in evidence the letters signed by
him because he was asked to sign them during custodial investigation without the assistance of
counsel. The following provisions of the Constitution are invoked by petitioner:

Article III, 12(1). - Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Petitioners counsel says that the signing of petitioners and his co-accuseds names was not
a mere mechanical act but one which required the use of intelligence and therefore constitutes
self-incrimination.
To the effect that the prohibition against compelling a man to be a witness against himself extends
to any attempt to compel the accused to furnish a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of
comparing it with the handwriting in a document in a prosecution for falsification. Writing is
something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely
mechanical act because it requires the application of intelligence and attention.

75. DBP v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Irene Canadalla obtained a loan of P100,000 from petitioner Development Bank of

the Philippines (DBP) for purposes of financing her piggery business. As security,
Canadalla executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over two parcels of land

64
covered by TCT No. T -7609 and OCT No. P -4226. On 10 August 1 979, Canadalla
procured another loan in the amount of P150,000, which was secured by a
mortgage over the same two parcels of land and a third parcel covered by OCT No.
P-6679. Since the piggery business allegedly suffered strong reverses, Canadalla
failed to comply with her obligations to the DBP. DBP extrajudicially foreclosed
the mortgages. Properties were sold at public auction to the DBP, which emerged
as the only bidder.

Canadalla was able to redeem the foreclosed property covered by TCT No. T -7609.
As to the propertie s covered by OCT Nos. P -4226 and P -6679, she had six years to
redeem the same.

Subsequently, she allegedly assigned her right to redeem her properties to her
daughter, Rosalinda A. Canadalla -Go. Go offered to redeem the properties
for P526,882.40. In resp onse, the DBP adv ised Go that the acceptable redemption
price was P1,814,700.58. When Go failed to redeem the properties, the DBP
consolidated its titles over the subject pro perties and new certificates of title
were issued in its nam e.

Go filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City a Supplemental
Complaint for the Exercise of Right of Redemption and Determinatio n of
Redemption Price, Nullification of Consolidation, Annulment of Titles, with
Damages, Plus Injunction and Temporary Restraining O rder. Thereafter, the DBP
filed its Comment.

During the hearing, Go objected to the Comment reasoning that it was not under
oath as required by Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, and that it failed to
state the reasons for the admissio n or denial o f matters for which an admission
was requested.

Issue:

WON matters requested to be admitted under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court which
are mere reiterations of the allegatio ns in the complaint and are specifically
denied in the answer may be deemed implie dly admitted on the ground that the
response thereto is no t under oath.

Rulings:

We have held in Po v. Court of Appeals that a party should not be compelled to

admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and to make a second
denial of those al ready denied in his answer to the complaint.

Under Section 1 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Co urt, the scope of matters that a party
may request the adversary to admit are (1) the genuineness of any material and

65
relevant document described in and exhibited with the request; and (2) the truth
of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. The rule
authorizing a party to call on the other party to make an admission implies the
making of demands for admission of relevant and material matt ers of facts and
not for admission of matters of law, conclusions, or opinions.

Since the afore -quoted allegations are matters of law or opinion, they are
improper matters and cannot therefore be deemed impliedly admitted under
Rule 26.

76, 78, 79 (CONSOLIDATED CASES)

G. R. N0. 102390. REY LANADA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ROGELIO and ELIZA
HEMEDEZ, respondents. February 1, 2002

G. R. No. 102404. NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. and FRANCIS SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and SPS. ROGELIO and ELIZA HEMEDEZ, respondents. February 1, 2002

FACTS:
The Union of Filipro Employees (UFE) declared a strike on account of alleged unfair labor
practices committed by Nestle Philippines, Inc. (Nestle) and put up a picket line in front of the
companys Cabuyao, Laguna factory. NLRC issued a TRO enjoining the UFE to desist from blocking,
barricading and obstructing the points of ingress and egress from Nestles Cabuyao plant. To
enforce the TRO, Nestle sought the assistance of the Philippine Constabulary and the fire brigade of
Cabuyao.
Seeking to transfer its products from the Cabuyao factory to its warehouse in Taguig during the
strike, Nestle hired 6 cargo trucks from brothers Constancio and Jesus Alimagno. Alexander Asinas
of the UFE and Francis Santos of Nestle agreed to constitute a panel to discuss said transfer of
products, as the matter was not covered by the TRO. However, in bad faith, Santos instead ordered
the PC to disperse the strikers at the barricades in front of the plant gate so that the trucks can get
out of the plant. The PC and the fire brigade began hitting the strikers with truncheons and water
cannons. With gate cleared, the cargo trucks began leaving the compound.
Meanwhile, Dr. Vied Vemir Garcia Hemedez was on his way home. He arrived at the Nestle
factory while the dispersal was ongoing so he stopped his car. At that time, one of the cargo trucks,
driven by Pacifico Galasao, was leaving the Nestle compound at full speed. To avoid stones being
thrown at his direction, the truck driver drove in a crouching position. However, he lost control of
the truck and bumped the car of Dr. Hemedez resulting to his death.
. Spouses Rogelio and Eliza Hemedez, parents of Dr. Hemedez, sued Nestle, Jesus Alimagno,
Francis Santos, Pacifico Galasao, and PC/Capt. Rey Laada for damages. After defendants filed their
answers to the complaint, the Hemedez spouses served the defendants a request for admission of
the truth of the facts set forth in their complaint and the genuineness of each of the documents

66
appended thereto. Through their respective counsel, defendants filed their verified answer to the
request for admission. The Hemedez spouses moved to strike out said answers and to declare the
matters sought to be admitted as impliedly admitted, contending that defendants themselves and
not their counsel should personally answer the request for admission. TC denied the spouses
motion as well as the MR. Hence, the instant consolidated petitions for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the counsel of a party to whom a written request for admission is addressed
under Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, answer such request for his client?

RULING:
No. Section 21 of Rule 138 states that an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to
represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize
him to appear in court for his client. Petitioner has not shown that the case at bar falls under any of
the recognized exceptions as found in Art. 1878 of the Civil Code which enumerates the instances
when special powers of attorney are necessary, or in Rule 20 of the Rules of Court on pre-trial where
the parties and their attorneys are both directed to appear before the court for a conference; so
that for counsel to appear at the pre-trial in behalf of his client, he must clothe the former with an
adequate authority in the form of a special power of attorney or corporate resolution. On the other
hand, Section 23 of Rule 138 provides that (a)ttorneys have authority to bind their clients in any
case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters
of ordinary judicial procedure.

77. G.R. No. 131466. CRISTINA DIMAN, CLARISSA DIMAN, GEORGE DIMAN, FELIPE DIMAN and
FLORINA DIMAN, petitioners, vs. HON, FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, LAS PIAS, BRANCH 255; HEIRS OF VERONICA V. MORENO LACALLE, REPRESENTED
BY JOSE MORENO LACALLE, respondents. November 27, 1998

FACTS: The heirs of Veronica Moreno filed before the RTC of Las Pinas a complaint for "Quieting of
Title and Damages" against Cristina Diman, Clarissa Diman, George Diman, Felipe Diman and Florina
Diman. After joinder of the issues, the Dimans served a request for admission of the truth on several
matter. However, there was no response on the part of the other party. The Dimans then filed with
the Court a Manifestation with Motion to Require Plaintiffs to Answer Request for Admission as well
as a Motion for Summary Judgment which was denied by the trial court. The Dimans moved for
reconsideration and submitted a supplement to motion for reconsideration. Again the Trial Court
rebuffed the Dimans. Aggrieved, the Dimans commenced a special civil action of certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition in the Court of Appeals. But once again their efforts met with failure.
Hence, this instant case.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.

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RULING: YES. A Trial Court has no discretion to determine what the consequences of a party's refusal
to allow or make discovery should be; it is the law which makes that determination; and it is grave
abuse of discretion for the Court to refuse to recognize and observe the effects of that refusal as
mandated by law. Particularly as regards request for admission under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court,
the law ordains that when a party is served with a written request that he admit : (1) the
genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request, or
(2) the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request, said party is bound
within the period designated in the request, to file and serve on the party requesting the admission
a sworn statement either (10 denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or
(2) setting forth in details the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters. If
the party served does not respond with such sworn statement, each of the matters of which an
admission is requested shall be deemed admitted.
It is also the law which determines when a summary judgment is proper. It declares that
although the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues of fact -- e.g., there are denials of, or a
conflict in, factual allegations -- if it is shown by admissions, depositions or affidavits, that those
issues are sham, fictitious, or not genuine, or, in the language of the Rules, that "except as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the Court shall render a summary judgment for the
plaintiff or the defendant as the case may be.
Considering these circumstances, including the outlandish grounds of opposition advanced by
the Heirs against the Dimans' motions for summary judgment and for demurrer to evidence, no less
than the obviously mistaken grounds cited by the Trial Court for denying said motions, this Court
has no hesitation in declaring that it was indeed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Trial
Court to have refused to render a summary judgment or one on demurrer to evidence. In no sense
may the Trial Court's errors be considered, as the Court of Appeals did in its judgment of September
9, 1997, as mere errors of judgment correctible by appeal, untarnished by any capriciousness or
whimsicality.

80. G.R. No. 172175 SPS. EXPEDITO ZEPEDA AND ALICE D. ZEPEDA, petitioners, vs. CHINA
BANKING CORPORATION, respondent. October 9, 2006

FACTS:

Spouses Expedito and Alice Zepeda filed a complaint for nullification of foreclosure
proceedings and loan documents with damages against respondent Chinabank before the RTC of
San Jose, Camarines Sur. They alleged that they obtained a loan in the amount of P5,800,000.00
from respondent secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T- 23136. Petitioners subsequently encountered difficulties in paying
their loan obligations hence they requested for restructuring which was allegedly granted by
Chinabank. However, they were shocked when the respondent bank extrajudicially foreclosed the
subject property where it emerged as the highest bidder.

68
 Respondent bank filed a motion to dismiss but it was denied by the trial court. As a result,
it filed an answer with affirmative defences and counterclaim which was denied by the trial court
for lack of merit. Aggrieved, respondent bank filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which was
granted by the Court of Appeals ruling that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing its
orders. It ruled that compelling reasons warrant the dismissal of petitioners complaint because they
acted in bad faith when they ignored the hearings set by the trial court to determine the veracity of
Chinabanks affirmative defenses; they failed to answer Chinabanks written interrogatories; and
the complaint states no cause of action. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was
later on denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: (1) Whether the complaint states a cause of action; and (2) Whether the complaint should
be dismissed for failure of petitioners to answer respondents written interrogatories as provided
for in Section 3(c), Rule 29 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:

(1) Yes. The Court found out that the allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action
for nullifying the foreclosure of the mortgaged property. The fact that petitioners admitted that they
failed to redeem the property and that the title was consolidated in respondent banks name did
not preclude them from seeking to nullify the extrajudicial foreclosure. Precisely, petitioners seek
to nullify the proceedings based on circumstances obtaining prior to and during the foreclosure
which render it void.

(2) Yes. In the instant case, petitioners refused to answer the whole set of written interrogatories, not
just a particular question. Clearly then, respondent bank should have filed a motion based on
Section 5 and not Section 3(c) of Rule 29. Section 5 of Rule 29 reads:

SEC. 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers. If a party or an officer or managing agent of a
party willfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with
a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25 after proper
service of such interrogatories, the court on motion and notice, may strike out all or any part of any
pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment
by default against that party, and in its discretion, order him to pay reasonable expenses incurred
by the other, including attorneys fees.

Due to respondent banks filing of an erroneous motion, the trial court cannot be faulted for ruling
that the motion to expunge was premature for lack of a prior application to compel compliance
based on Section 3.

69
86. GARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS (June 11, 1992; 209 SCRA 732)

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Garcia filed an action for damages against private respondent spouses,
William and Ma. Jajorie Uy, before the RTC for padlocking the commercial stalls rented by
petitioner from private respondents at Virra Mall Shopping Center, Greenhills, San Juan.

Private respondents failed to file their answer within the reglementary period. Private
respondents filed an appearance with motion for extension of time to file answer. The trial court
denied the motion for having been filed out of time. Subsequently, petitioner moved to declare
the former in default and for reception of his evidence ex-parte. The trial court granted
petitioners motion and set the reception of evidence and a copy of the order was served on and
received by private respondents.

Petitioner presented his evidence ex-parte and the trial court issued a judgment of default
against private respondents. Petitioner then filed an ex-parte motion for execution pending appeal
which the trial court granted and accordingly issued the writ upon petitioners filing of a bond.

Private respondents appealed to respondent Court of Appeals, challenging the validity of

the writ of execution because it was granted without proper notice to them and without hearing.

Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting private respondents petition for certiorari
and set aside the order of the trial court granting the writ of execution. A motion to reconsider
thedecision was denied hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a defendant declared in default regains ipso facto his standing in court as
to be entitled to notice of proceedings subsequent to a final judgment or order rendered
against him.
Whether or not a party who has been declared in default entitled to notice of a motion for
execution pending appeal of a judgment by default.

RULING:

The Supreme Court found the petition devoid of merit.

The Court holds that a party declared in default is entitled to notice of the motion for
execution pending appeal. This interpretation is consistent with the nature and effects of being in
default as well as with what has been jurisprudentially laid down with respect to executions
pending appeal.

70
 "The remedy of the defaulted party is to file a motion to set aside the order of default if no
judgment has been rendered yet. If there is already judgment, the defendants recourse is to file a
motion for new trial, or a petition for relief from judgment, or appeal the judgment, or file a
special civil action for certiorari. This is the reason why a defaulted defendant is entitled to notice
of final orders or judgments.

Consistent with this right to notice of final order or judgment is the right to notice of the
motion for execution pending appeal of the default judgment. Without such notice, the various
recourses available to the defaulted party after judgment would be rendered illusory.

87. MALANYAON vs. SUGA (May 7, 1992; 208 SCRA 436)

FACTS:

Private respondents, filed a Petition for Annulment of Proceedings, Injunction with

Application for Preliminary Injunctions and Restraining Order with the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, against petitioner Jaime Malanyaon and Emma Perfecto.

After filing said petition, respondent judge issued a corresponding restraining order
against petitioner which led the latter to file an urgent motion to disqualify respondent judge from
further sitting in judgment that there is a client-lawyer relationship between said judge and
private respondent's counsel Atty. Vicente de Lima as shown by the latter's appearances in Special
Proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte.

Petitioner was personally served in his office a notice of hearing on the pre-trial and
contempt proceedings. However, petitioner felt chilly and went to see his doctor who ordered him
to stay in bed for a couple of days as he had just been released from Mother Seton Hospital where
he was confined. Thereafter, petitioner immediately sent a letter to the respondent judge
requesting for the deferment of his appearance on the scheduled hearing but said letter was not
filed on time due to the stormy weather.

Upon petitioner's failure to appear at the hearing of he was declared in default and
ordered arrested. Petitioner's counsel filed a motion to lift the Order of Arrest against his client
which was denied. Thereafter, petitioner was airlifted and confined at the Veterans Memorial
Medical Center where he was operated for a gall bladder dysfunction.

Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion to Lift his Order of Arrest, to set aside the order
of default and to reset the hearing on account of his illness and subsequent surgical operation.

71
 Respondent judge lifted the Order of Arrest of the petitioner but denied his motion to set
aside the order of default and the resetting of the scheduled hearing. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
Petitioners motion to lift the order of default in spite of the fact that the former had already lifted
the order of arrest against the latter after finding petitioner's absence in the hearing excusable
due to the Petitioner's illness as supported by the affidavit of the his physician stating the severity
of his illness which caused the him not to attend the scheduled hearing.

RULING:

The respondent court's act of ordering petitioner's arrest is patently illegal. There is
nothing in the Rules which authorizes the trial court to order the arrest of the party in default. A
party declared in default merely loses the right to be notified of subsequent proceedings and the
right to take part in the trial, 11 until the order of default is lifted.

The failure to appear at the pre-trial hearing was uncontrovertedly due to illness, the
default order may be set aside on the ground of accident over which petitioner had no control as
in the case at bar. Inasmuch as the respondent judge had already lifted the order of arrest after
finding petitioner's absence excusable, it therefore follows that said judge should have also set
aside the order of default. Thus, the basis for lifting petitioner's order of arrest should also apply
to the order of default since both orders were issued on petitioner's non-appearance.

88. CIRCLE FINANCING CORPORATION vs. CA (April 22, 1991; 196 SCRA 166)

FACTS: Spouses Roberto Jurado and Fortunata Jurado executed a deed of mortgage over real
property belonging to them in favor of Tacing Regoso as security for a loan obtained from the
latter. The promissory note evidencing the obligation stipulated payment thereof by the Jurados in
eighteen (18) monthly installments.

With the spouses' consent, Tacing Regoso assigned all his rights and interests over the
promissory note and the deed of mortgage in favor of Circle Financial Corporation.

Circle Financial Corporation (Circle) sent a letter to the Jurado spouses, together with a
statement of account, demanding payment of P12,186.00, alleged to be the balance of their
obligation. A subsequent letter, from Circle's attorney, also demanded payment in the amount of
P11,752.90.

72
 The letters having gone unheeded, Circle requested the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan to
extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage constituted over the Jurado's land. The Sheriff scheduled
the auction sale and notice of the sale was received by the Jurados. The spouses sent a letter to
the Provincial Sheriff, advising them that the loan secured by the mortgage had already been paid.
A copy of the letter was given to Circle.

The extrajudicial foreclosure sale nevertheless proceeded as scheduled, and the property
was awarded to Circle as the lone bidder. The Jurado spouses thereupon filed a complaint in the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for the annulment of the foreclosure sale, and for recovery of
damages. Circle filed an answer with counterclaim.

The Trial Court set the case for pre-trial and notices were sent to the parties and their
counsel by registered mail. On the day appointed for the pre-trial, there was no appearance by
Circle or its co-defendants or any of their counsel. Consequently, they were declared in default
and evidence of the Jurado spouses were received ex parte. Thereafter, the Trial Court rendered
judgment against all the defendants.

Respondents filed a "Verified Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default and Judgment,"
alleging that it had not received notice of the pre-trial and drawing attention to what it claimed to
be valid defenses set forth in its answer.

But the motion was peremptorily denied as "not meritorious". Circle appealed to the
Court of Appeals but the verdict of the Court of Appeals went against Circle.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the Trial Court's refusal to set
aside the declaration of default entered against Circle and the default judgment thereafter
rendered.

RULING:

The Court declares correct the pronouncement of both the Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals that Circle's motion for new trial was defective, not only because it failed to allege either
by separate affidavit or in the body of the motion itself, the particular facts claimed to constitute
the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence entitling it to relief, but also because it failed
to demonstrate with any degree of persuasiveness, by affirmative averments, either in its
aforesaid motion or in any other pleading, that it had in its favor a meritorious defense to the
action for annulment of the foreclosure sale on the ground that the mortgage debt had been fully
paid.

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89. ALEX LINA vs. CA (April 9, 1985; 135 SCRA 637)

FACTS:

Private respondent Northern Motors, Inc. filed with the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Pasig) a case for sum of money with damages. Petitioner Alex Lina was served with
summons together with a copy of the complaint. When no answer or motion to dismiss was filed
by petitioner, private respondent Northern Motors, Inc. filed a motion to declare him in default.
Thereafter, the motion was set for hearing.

Petitioner filed his opposition to the aforesaid motion inviting attention to the fact that he
had filed a motion for extension of time to file responsive pleading within the reglementary
period. Respondent judge issued an order declaring defendant (herein petitioner) in default and
allowing plaintiff (herein private respondent) to adduce its evidence ex parte.

Defendant (petitioner) filed his answer to the complaint. Subsequently, respondent court
rendered its decision in favor of plaintiff (herein private respondent). Petitioner filed a motion to
set aside decision. Thereafter, respondent judge issued an order denying petitioner's motion to set
aside decision.

Petitioner filed with the then Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari/prohibition, which
was denied in its decision.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the order of default was issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
Whether or not certiorari is proper in a case where judgment by default was rendered
without an order of default being furnished petitioner and where meritorious defenses
exist, which are for the trial court to evaluate and which evaluation was not done in this
case.

RULING:

The Supreme Court agrees with respondent appellate court's affirmance of the questioned
order of the trial court. The granting of additional time within which to file an answer to a
complaint is a matter largely addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

Under the Rules of Court, there are remedies available to a defendant in the Regional Trial
Court [Sec. 3, Rule 18; Section 1 (a) of Rule 37; Section 2 of Rule 38; and Sec. 2, Rule 41]

74
 Petitioner in this case did not avail himself of any of the above remedies. Instead, he went
to the appellate court on certiorari/prohibition.

90. AKUT vs. CA (August 10, 1982; 116 SCRA 213)

FACTS:

Respondent Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. as plaintiff filed a complaint against herein
petitioners as defendants in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental claiming ownership of
a parcel of land and to declare as null and void the Original Certificate of Title issued in the name
of petitioners-defendants Heirs of Saturnina Akut.

Petitioners were served with summons, and after the expiration of the 15- day
reglementary period for petitioners to file their answer, respondent Insular Life filed a motion to
declare petitioners in default. The next day, petitioners filed their answer.

Petitioners filed a motion to set the hearing of respondent's motion to declare them in
default and another motion asking the trial court to accept and give due course to their answer.

The trial court issued an order declaring petitioners "in default for their failure to file
answer within the reglementary period and without further standing in the case, " denying their
motion to admit answer, and ordering that the case "be calendared for the ex-parte reception of
evidence for the plaintiff at the next available [calendar] date." The trial court denied
reconsideration ruling that "the denial of a motion to lift order of default is merely interlocutory,
there being no judgment rendered as yet." But petitioners timely perfected their appeal to
respondent Court of Appeals from the default orders by record on appeal. In its resolution,
respondent appellate court however, motu proprio, dismissed the appeal, "it appearing that the
appeal in this case being from an order declaring appellants in default which is interlocutory and
not appealable ... " The motion for reconsideration was denied per its Resolution; hence the
present petition to set aside respondent appellate court's dismissal of their appeal and to set aside
the order of the trial court declaring them in default for failure to file their answer within the
reglementary period and to restore their original standing in the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring petitioners
in default and in denying their motion to set aside the order of default.

RULING:

The Court finds merit in the petition.

75
 In their motions which were duly supported by affidavit of merits, petitioners aver that
their failure to file their answer to the complaint within the 15-day reglementary period was due
to accident, mistake or excusable negligence citing as reasons their failure to get the services of
counsel on time and the fact that two of the petitioners were then sick. Petitioners further
maintain that they have a valid and meritorious defense since the property in litigation was
registered in their name under Original Certificate of title, that they have been in actual and
continuous possession of the land since time immemorial and that the subsequent sale of said
property and the issuance of the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Titlein favor of their co-
petitioner is valid and legal.

Under these undisputed circumstances, the Court finds petitioners to be entitled to relief
from the order of default and to have their full day in court, which they seek now instead of asking
petitioners to needlessly wait until the trial court shall have rendered a default and ex-parte
judgment against them, as illogically contended by respondent in its comment.

91. Matute v. Court of Appeals

26 SCRA 768G.R. No. L-26751, G.R. No. L-26085, G.R. No. L-26106January 31, 1969(L-26751)

Facts:

On August 20, 1965 when Carlos S. Matute, one of the Matute heirs and a full-blood brother of both
the petitioner and the herein respondent Matias S. Matute, filed in Special Proceeding (settlement
of the Matute estate) a petition praying for the removal of Matias as co-administrator and his
appointment in such capacity. Carlos alleged that for a period of more than two years from the date
of his appointment, said Matias S. Matute has neglected to render a true, just and complete account
of his administration and that he is not only incompetent but also negligent in his management of
the estate under his charge consisting of five haciendas. The respondent Matias opposed the
allegation that it is completely without basis and false. Records show that he made an accounting
and the same was submitted to the court. That his competence to act as administrator has been
established to the satisfaction of the court. It appears that during the reception of evidence
conducted on December 29, 1965 by the probate court, Carlos S. Matute and the other heirs
submitted their respective lists of exhibits in support of their motion to ousts Matias. On January 8,
1966 Matias filed a written objection to the admission of the movants exhibits on the ground that
the same were hearsay, self-serving, irrelevant and/or mere photostatic copies of supposed
originals which never properly identified nor shown in court. four days later, the Counsel for Matias
filed with leave of Court a Motion to Dismiss and/or Demurrer to Evidencewhich avers that there
is no sufficient evidence on record to justify and support the motions for the removal of the herein
co-administrator Matias S. Matute. The probate court issued an order removing Matias S. Matute

76
as co-administrator. Hence, the certiorari. The respondent contends that the disputed order
removing him as co-administrator is a patent nullity. Upon the other hand, the petitioner advances
the reason in support of the order of removal that the probate judge accorded the respondent all
the opportunity to adduce his evidence but the latter resorted to dilatory tactics such as filing a
motion to dismiss or demurrer to evidence.

Issue: Whether or not Rule 33 regarding judgment on demurrer to evidence is applicable to special
proceedings such that its disregard by the probate court amounts to grave abuse of discretion.

Held: Yes. Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that in the absence of special provisions,
the rules provided for in ordinary civil actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special
proceedings. The application of the above cited Rule in special proceedings, like the case at bar, is
authorized by the Rules. Instead of resolving the foregoing motion, the probate judge issued the
controverted order removing the respondent as co-administrator without giving him the
opportunity to adduce his own evidence despite his explicit reservation that he be afforded the
chance to introduce evidence in his behalf in the event of denial of his motion to dismiss and/or
demurrer to evidence. The Court view that the above actuation of the probate judge constituted
grave abuse of discretion which dooms his improvident order as nullity.

92. Continental Cement corporation V. C.A

FACTS:

The Municipality of Norzagaray filed a complaint for recovery of taxes against the petitioner in the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan. Before the expiration of the 15-day reglementary period
to answer, the petitioner filed two successive motions for extension of time to file responsive
pleadings, which were both granted. The last day of the second extension was May 28, 1985. On
May 25, 1985, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of the plaintiffs
lack of capacity to sue and lack of a cause of action. The motion was denied on July 16, 1985, "both
for lack of merit and for having been improperly filed." On July 25, 1985, the plaintiff moved to
declare the petitioner in default for having filed only the motion to dismiss and not a responsive
pleading during the extension granted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the order of default is proper.

77
HELD:

Accordingly, the court held that in issuing the order of default before the expiration of the period
for the filing of its answer, the trial court deprived the petitioner of the opportunity to be heard in
its defense. The judgment by default thereafter rendered, on the basis only of the evidence of the
plaintiff, was therefore also invalid.

93. DENZO (Phils.)inc. v. intermediate appellate court

FACTS;

A fire broke out at the Nippondenso Building at Pasong Tamo Ext., Makati, Metro Manila. The
building was owned by the Kayamanan Development Corporation (hereafter, simply referred to as
KAYAMANAN), and was then under lease to Denso (Phils), Inc. (hereafter, simply DENSO). The fire
caused extensive damage. A year or so later, KAYAMANAN instituted an action against DENSO in the
Regional Trial Court at Makati.

Summons was served on DENSO on June 10, 1985. It would seem, however, that the summons
(together with the accompanying copy of the complaint) was not referred by DENSO to its counsel
until June 22, 1985. This prompted the latter to file on June 25, 1985 a "MOTION FOR EXTENSION
OF TIME TO FILE ANSWER," pleading the late referral, the need to attend to other legal work of
equal importance, as well as the time requirement for study of the factual and legal points involved
in the action, and praying, in consequence, for an additional period of 15 days from June 25 within
which to present the requisite responsive pleading.

ISSUE: whether or not the order of default was proper.

HELD: NO

Petitioner's motion for extension of time to file answer was, therefore, improperly denied for lack
of proof of service on the respondent, said motion having been seasonably filed and, as already fully
shown, there being no impediment to its being heard ex-parte. No pretense is made that the motion
was denied as having been filed merely for delay, but even if that ground were read into the
otherwise clear terms of the order of denial which do not even hint thereat, it would still be belied
by the fact that what was sought was only an extension of the original reglementary period as well
as that prima facie meritorious reasons were pleaded for the desired extension.

78
94. JOESTEEL CONTAINER V. COMMONWEALTH FINANCING.

FACTS:

The Commonwealth Financing Corporation filed an action against the Joesteel Container
Corporation before the City Court of Manila for the recovery of a certain amount of money, as
deficiency on the proceeds of an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage executed by the defendant
in favor of the Plaintiff. The summons, which ordered the defendant to answer the complaint and
enter into trial on August 12, 1965, and a copy of the complaint were served upon the defendant
through its General Manager on July 13, 1965. On the date set for the hearing of the case, or on
August 12, 1965, counsel for the defendant appeared before the court and asked for an extension
of time to answer the complaint, but the motion was denied. Then, on motion of the plaintiff, the
defendant was declared in default and the Deputy Clerk of Court was commissioned to receive the
evidence. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had 20 days from service of summons on July 13,
1965, within which to file an answer to the complaint and the period expired on August 2, 1965. On
August 13, 1965, the defendant filed a motion to lift the order of default, but his motion was denied.
On August 21, 1965, a judgment by default was rendered against the defendant. The defendant
appealed, but the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the petition for relief.

Considering that the defendant had up to the date set for trial of the case within which to file an
answer to the complaint or on August 12, 1965, (Zenith Films, Inc. v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-26619,
March 27, 1971. 38 SCRA 120), on which day the defendant filed a motion for extension of time
within which to file an answer, so that the City Court gravely abused its discretion in declaring the
defendant in default, the Court RESOLVED to SET ASIDE the order of default and the judgment
rendered by the City court of Manila in Civil Case No. 137730, entitled: "Commonwealth Financing
Corporation, plaintiff, versus Joesteel Container Corporation, defendant," and to REMAND this case
to the court of origin for further proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in declaring defendant in default.

HELD:

CASE AT BAR. Where defendant had up to the date set for trial of the case within which to file an
answer to the complaint or on August 12, 1965, on which day the defendant filed a motion for
extension of time within which to file an answer, the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
declaring defendant in default, and the order of default and judgment rendered by the said court in
the case should be set aside and the case remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.

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95. NAGA DEVELOPMENT V. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Several days before the date of the aforesaid agreement, or, on July 21, 1962, the Pacific already
made deliveries to the job site at Naga City of roofing materials to be used in the construction of the
mentioned Naga City public market. The total value of the materials delivered plus the cost of
installation from July 21, 1962 to October 19, 1962 amounted to P250,312.76.

On July 19, 1963 the Pacific filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a complaint against the
Naga (docketed as civil case 54547), alleging in essence that only P107,030 of the total obligation of
the Naga refused to pay the balance thereof in the amount of P143,282.76.

On August 5, 1963 the Naga filed a motion with the trial court requesting for an extension of 15
days, to expire on August 20, 1963, within which to file its, answer, counsel stating that The
inability to prepare and finalize defendant's answer on time is due to the burden of other equally if
not more urgent professional work on the part of the undersigned counsel. The said motion was
granted. On August 16, 1963 the Naga filed another motion for an additional, extension of 10 days
within which to file its responsive pleading, counsel alleging this time that the extension . is
requested for the reason that counsel is presently verifying certain material facts and information
relative to the transaction.

The court a quo however, denied the foregoing motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of default was proper.

HELD: YES

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the questioned orders of the trial
court declaring the Naga Development Corporation in default and denying its motion to set aside
the said default order, is hereby affirmed.

The judgment by default, rendered by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
ordering the Naga Development Corporation to pay the Pacific Merchandising Corporation the
amount of P143,282.76 is hereby affirmed, with the qualification that the Naga Development
Corporation shall be allowed to prove, during the process of execution of the said judgment,
whatever payments it had made to the Pacific Merchandising Corporation, either before or after
the filing of the complaint, which constitute a proper deduction from the principal sum ordered to
be paid.

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96. Alpine Lending Investors vs. Corpuz

FACTS: A complaint for replevin was filed by respondent against Alpine Lending Investors (Alpine)
and Zenaida Lipata. The complaint alleges that Zenaida was respondents former neighbor who
pretended to help respondent in securing a Garage Franchise from the Land Transportation Office
(LTO). Zenaida then used respondents registration papers and mortgaged the vehicle to Alpine.
Thereafter, Zenaida disappeared with the vehicle. The LTO showed respondent the Chattel
Mortgage Contract bearing her forged signature. Forthwith, respondent informed Alpine about the
spurious mortgage and demanded the release of her vehicle. Alpine promised to comply with her
request on condition that Zenaida should first be charged criminally. Respondent then caused the
filing with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City complaints for falsification of private
document and estafa against Zenaida. Alpine when informed, still refused to turn over the vehicle
to her. Instead of filing an answer to respondents complaint, Alpine submitted to the RTC a motion
to dismiss on the ground that it is not a juridical person, hence, not a proper party in the case. The
RTC denied Alpines motion to dismiss. RTC denied Alpines MR and then directed respondent to file
her amended complaint within ten (10) days. However, respondent filed her Amended Complaint
with an accompanying Motion to Admit Amended Complaint two (2) days late. RTC admitted the
amended complaint. Alpine filed a Motion to Expunge respondents motion to admit amended
complaint on the ground that the latter motion was not accompanied by a notice of hearing. RTC
denied Alpines motion to expunge for lack of merit. Alpine moved for a reconsideration, but this
was denied.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in admitting respondents amended complaint.

HELD: The trial court was correct in admitting respondents amended complaint.
As earlier mentioned, what petitioner Alpine filed in Civil Case No. C-20124 was a motion to dismiss,
not an answer. Settled is the rule that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes
of Section 2, Rule 10. As no responsive pleading had been filed, respondent could amend her
complaint in Civil Case No. C-20124 as a matter of right. Following this Courts ruling in Breslin v.
Luzon Stevedoring Co., considering that respondent has the right to amend her complaint, it is the
correlative duty of the trial court to accept the amended complaint; otherwise, mandamus would
lie against it. In other words, the trial courts duty to admit the amended complaint was purely
ministerial. In fact, respondent should not have filed a motion to admit her amended complaint. It
has always been the policy of this Court to be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings in order
that the real controversies between or among the parties may be presented and cases be decided
on the merits without delay.

97. de Dios vs. Bristol Laboratories

98. Fortune Motors vs. CA

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FACTS: In 1981, Joseph Chua and Edgar Rodrigueza executed separate surety agreements in favor
of Fortune Motors (Phils.) Corporation to cover obligations incurred by Fortune Motors whether
they be enforced or thereafter made (from the time of said surety contracts). In 1982, Fortune
Motors secured cars from Canlubang Automotive Resources Corporation (CARCO) via trust receipts
and drafts made by CARCO. These were assigned to Filinvest Credit Corporation. Later Filinvest,
when the obligation matured, demanded payment from Fortune Motor as well as from Chua and
Rodrigueza. No payment was made. A case was filed. Rodrigueza averred that the surety agreement
was void because when it was signed in 1981, the principal obligation (1982) did not yet exist.

ISSUE: Whether or not the surety agreement is void.

HELD: No. Future obligations can be covered by a surety. Comprehensive or continuing surety
agreements are in fact quite commonplace in present day financial and commercial practice. A bank
or financing company which anticipates entering into a series of credit transactions with a particular
company, commonly requires the projected principal debtor to execute a continuing surety
agreement along with its sureties. By executing such an agreement, the principal places itself in a
position to enter into the projected series of transactions with its creditor; with such suretyship
agreement, there would be no need to execute a separate surety contract or bond for each financing
or credit accommodation extended to the principal debtor.

99. United Overseas Bank vs. Rosemoore Mining

FACTS: Rosemoore Mining & Development Corporation (Hereon Rosemoor) in order to secure a
credit facility amounting to 80Million executed a mortgage agreement with United Overseas Bank
Phils. (Hereon Bank) which covered six (6) parcels of land all registered under Rosemoor. Rosemoor
defaulted which caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties. The bank was the highest
bidder in all of the properties. Hence the filing of the case by Rosemoor before the Manila RTC and
Malolos RTC. (The issue of the case, filing of 2 actions in 2 different courts).

Manila RTC: (Personal Action) Rosemoor filed an action to receive the remaining proceeds of the
loan. However, the bank filed a motion to dismiss the case because it contends Rosemoor is violating
forum shopping, having initiated a case in Malolos RTC. However the motion to dismiss was denied,
likewise it was dismissed by the CA holding that there was no forum shopping.
Malolos RTC: (Real Action) Rosemoor second action was filed her to restrain the foreclosure of the
properties mortgaged to secure the loan which was not due yet. As it here, the bank filed a motion
to dismiss the case due to violation of forum shopping but the likewise it was denied by the RTC and
CA.

Issue: Whether the venue of the filing of the cases resulted to forum shopping.

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HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Rosemoor, and affirming the ruling of the lower courts
that there was no violation of forum shopping. The Malolos case was filed for the purpose of
restraining the Bank from proceeding with the consolidation of the titles over the foreclosed Bulacan
properties because the loan secured by the mortgage had not yet become due and demandable.
While the right asserted in the Manila case is to receive the proceeds of the loan, the right sought
in the Malolos case is to restrain the foreclosure of the properties mortgaged to secure a loan that
was not yet due. Moreover, the Malolos case is an action to annul the foreclosure sale that is
necessarily an action affecting the title of the property sold. It is therefore a real action which should
be commenced and tried in the province where the property or part thereof lies. The Manila case,
on the other hand, is a personal action involving as it does the enforcement of a contract between
Rosemoor, whose office is in Quezon City, and the Bank, whose principal office is in Binondo, Manila.
Personal actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiff
resides, or where the defendants or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the
plaintiff. It was subsequent to the filing of the Manila case that Rosemoor and Dr. Pascual saw the
need to secure a writ of injunction because the consolidation of the titles to the mortgaged
properties in favor of the Bank was in the offing. But then, this action can only be commenced where
the properties or a portion thereof, is located. Otherwise, the petition for injunction would be
dismissed for improper venue. Rosemoor, therefore, was warranted in filing the Malolos case and
cannot in turn be accused of forum-shopping.

100. Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. vs. CA

FACTS: Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. and Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. entered into a
Dealership Agreement for Sales and Services of the former's products in Samar and Leyte Provinces.
The Dealership Agreement contained a stipulation that All suits arising out of this Agreement shall
be filed within the proper Courts of Quezon City. Five years later, Unimasters filed an action in the
RTC of Tacloban against Kubota, Reynaldo Go and Metrobank for damages and breach of contracts,
and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order. Kubota filed two motions One for the
dismissal of the case on the ground of improper venue .The other prayed for the transfer of the
injunction hearing its counsel was not available. The court issued an order allowing the issuance of
preliminary injunction and a motion denying the motion to dismiss on the reason that Umimasters
place of business is in Tacloban City while Kubotas principal place of business is in Quezon City. In
accord with the the Rules of Court, the proper venue would either be Quezon City or Tacloban City
at the election of the plaintiff. Hence,the filing in the RTC of Tacloban is proper. Kubota appealed
both orders on the grounds they were issued with grave abuse of discretion in a special action for
certiorari and prohibition filed with the CA. Kubota asserted that RTC of Tacloban had no jurisdiction
was improperly laid. The Court of Appeals decided in favor of Kubota and it held that: the
stipulation respecting venue in its Dealership Agreement with UNIMASTERS did in truth limit the
venue of all suits arising thereunder only and exclusively to the proper courts of Quezon City.

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Subsequently, Unimasters filed a motion for reconsideration but was turned down by the appellate
court.

ISSUE: Whether the venue stipulations in a contract has the effect of limiting the venue to a specified
place.

HELD: No. The Polytrade doctrine was applied in the case at bar. This doctrine enunciated that as
long as the stipulation does not set forth qualifying or restrictive words to indicate that the agreed
place alone and none other is the venue of the action, the parties do not lose the option of
choosing the venue.

101. POLYTRADE VS BLANCO

FACTS: Polytrade filed a case against Blanco in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Blanco
moved to dismiss the case upon the ground of improper venue invoking Section 3, Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court which states that venue may be stipulated by written agreement. According to
Blanco, they agreed to sue and be sued in the courts of Manila. Blanco says that because of such
covenant he can only be sued in the Courts of Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not venue was properly laid.

HELD: Venue was properly laid. An accurate reading of the stipulation the parties agree to sue
and be sued in the Courts of Manila, does not preclude the parties from filing suits in the
residence of the plaintiff or defendant. The plain meaning is that the parties merely consented to
be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that Manila and Manila
alone is the venue is totally absent therefrom.

102. PACIFIC CONSULTANTS VS SCHONFELD

FACTS: Klaus Schonfeld is a Canadian citizen and resident of New Westminster, British, Columbia.
He had been a consultant in the field of environmental engineering and water supply and
sanitation.

PaciCon Philippines, the petitioner, is a corporation duly established and incorporated in

accordance with the laws of the Philippines. The primary purpose of PPI is to engage in the
business of providing specialty and technical services. PCIJ, a Tokyo- based company decided to
engage in consultancy services for water and sanitation in the Philippines. PCIJ employed
Schonfeld as Sector Manager of PPI in its Water and Sanitation Department. Later on, Schonfeld
received a letter from PCIJ informing him that his employment has been terminated for the reason
that PCIJ and PPI was not successful in the water and sanitation sector in the Philippines.

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Schonfeld filed a case against PPI and PCIJ. PPI moved for its dismissal on the ground that venue
was improperly laid and that the respondent is a Canadian citizen .

ISSUE: Whether or not venue is not properly laid.

HELD: The court ruled that the settled stipulations regarding venue is that whle they are
considered valid and enforceable. Venue stipulations in a contract do not as a rule, supersede the
general rules set forth in Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. In this case, they should merely be
considered an agreement on national forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. They are
not exclusive, but rather, permissive.

Further, the application of the principle of forum non conveniens must be rejected. The bare fact
that respondent is a Canadian citizen does not warrant the application of the principle. The court
ruled that Philippine courts may assume jurisdiction over the case if it choose to do so, provided
that the following requisites are met:

1. That the Philippine Courts is the one to which the parties may conveniently resort to,
2. That the Philippine Court is in the position to make intelligent decision as to the law and
the facts, and
3. That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have a power to enforce its decision.

103. LEVITON INDUSTRIES VS SALVADOR

FACTS: Private respondent Leviton Manufacturing Co. Inc. filed a complaint for unfair competition
against petitioners Leviton Industries before the CFI of Rizal (RTC), presided by respondent Judge
Serafin Salvador. The complaint substantially alleges that plaintiff (Leviton Manufacturing) is a
foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York, United States
of America. The defendant Leviton Industries is a partnership organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines with principal office at 382 10th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City; while
defendants Nena de la Cruz Lim, Domingo Go and Lim Kiat are the partners, with defendant
Domingo Go acting as General Manager of defendant Leviton Industries. That plaintiff, founded in
1906 by Isidor Leviton, is the largest manufacturer of electrical wiring devices in the United States
under the trademark Leviton, which various electrical wiring devices bearing the trademark
Leviton and trade name Leviton Manufacturing Co., Inc. had been exported to the Philippines
since 1954; that due to the superior quality and widespread use of its products by the public, the
same are well known to Filipino consumers under the trade name Leviton Manufacturing Co., Inc.
and trademark Leviton; that long subsequent to the use of plaintiffs trademark and trade name in
the Philippines, defendants (Leviton Industries) began manufacturing and selling electrical ballast,
fuse and oval buzzer under the trademark Leviton and trade name Leviton Industries Co.

That Domingo Go, partner and general manager of defendant partnership, had registered with the
Philippine Patent Office the trademarks Leviton Label and Leviton with respect to ballast and fuse
under Certificate of Registration Nos. SR-1132 and 15517, respectively, which registration was
contrary to paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 4 of RA 166, as amended, and violative of plaintiffs

85
right over the trademark Leviton; that defendants not only used the trademark Leviton but
likewise copied the design used by plaintiff in distinguishing its trademark; and that the use
thereof by defendants of its products would cause confusion in the minds of the consumers and
likely to deceive them as to the source of origin, thereby enabling defendants to pass off their
products as those of plaintiffs. Invoking the provisions of Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166,
plaintiff prayed for damages. It also sought the issuance of a writ of injunction to prohibit
defendants from using the trade name Leviton Industries, Co. and the trademark Leviton.

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, drawing
attention to the plaintiffs failure to allege therein its capacity to sue under Section 21-A of
Republic Act No. 166.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff (Leviton Manufacturing) herein respondents, failed to allege
the essential facts bearing its capacity to sue before Philippine courts.

Ruling: Yes. We agree with petitioners that respondent Leviton Marketing Co., Inc. had failed to
allege the essential facts bearing upon its capacity to sue before Philippine courts. Private
respondents action is squarely founded on Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166. Undoubtedly,
the foregoing section grants to a foreign corporation, whether or not licensed to do business in
the Philippines, the right to seek redress for unfair competition before Philippine courts. But the
said law is not without qualifications. Its literal tenor indicates as a condition sine qua non the
registration of the trade mark of the suing foreign corporation with the Philippine Patent Office or,
in the least, that it be an asignee of such registered trademark. The said section further requires
that the country, of which the plaintiff foreign corporation or juristic person is a citizen or
domicilliary, grants to Filipino corporations or juristic entities the same reciprocal treatment,
either thru treaty, convention or law,

All that is alleged in private respondents complaint is that it is a foreign corporation. Such bare
averment not only fails to comply with the requirements imposed by the aforesaid Section 21-A
but violates as well the directive of Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court that facts showing the
capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a
representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a
party, must be averred
In the case at bar, private respondent has chosen to anchor its action under the Trademark Law of
the Philippines, a law which, as pointed out, explicitly sets down the conditions precedent for the
successful prosecution thereof. It is therefore incumbent upon private respondent to comply with
these requirements or aver its exemption therefrom, if such be the case. It may be that private
respondent has the right to sue before Philippine courts, but our rules on pleadings require that
the necessary qualifying circumstances which clothe it with such right be affirmatively pleaded.

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 104. BULAKHIDAS VS NAVARRO

FACTS: Bulakhidas, a foreign partnership, filed a complaint against a domestic corporation,

Diamond Shipping Corporation, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the recovery of
damages allegedly caused by the failure of the said shipping corporation to deliver the goods
shipped to it by petitioner to their proper destination.The complaint alleged that plaintiff is "a
foreign partnership firm not doing business in the Philippines" and that it is "suing under an
isolated transaction." Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
plaintiff has no capacity to sue and that the complaint does not state a valid cause of action
against defendant.

ISSUE: Whether or not a foreign corporation not engaged in business in the Philippines can
institute an action before our courts is already wen settled in this jurisdiction.

HELD: It is settled that if a foreign corporation is not engaged in business in the Philippines, it may
not be denied the right to file an action in Philippine courts for isolated transactions.

The object of Sections 68 and 69 of the Corporation law was not to prevent the foreign
corporation from performing single acts, but to prevent it from acquiring a domicile for the
purpose of business without taking the steps necessary to render it amenable to suit in the local
courts. It was never the purpose of the Legislature to exclude a foreign corporation which happens
to obtain an isolated order for business from the Philippines, from securing redress in the
Philippine courts.

105. ANTAM CONSOLIDATED VS COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: On 9 April 1981, Stokely Van Camp. Inc. filed a complaint against Banahaw Milling
Corporation, Consolidated, Inc., Tambunting Trading Corporation, Aurora Consolidated Securities
and Investment Corporation, and United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (Unicom) for collection of sum of
money. In its complaint, Stokely alleged: (1) that it is a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the state of Indiana, U.S.A. and has its principal office at 941 North Meridian Street,
Indianapolis, Indiana, U.S.A., and one of its subdivisions "Capital City Product Company" (Capital
City) has its office in Columbus, Ohio, U.S.A.; (2) that Stokely and Capital City were not engaged in
business in the Philippines prior to the commencement of the suit so that Stokely is not licensed to
do business in this country and is not required to secure such license; (3) that on 21 August 1978,
Capital City and Coconut Oil Manufacturing (Phil.) Inc. (Comphil) with the latter acting through its
broker Rothschild Brokerage Company, entered into a contract (RBS 3655) wherein Comphil
undertook to sell and deliver and Capital City agreed to buy 500 long tons of crude coconut oil to
be delivered in October/November 1978 at the c.i.f price of US$0.30/lb. but Comphil failed to
deliver the coconut oil so that Capital City covered its coconut oil needs in the open market at a
price substantially in excess of the contract and sustained a loss of US$103,600; that to settle
Capital City's loss under the contract, the parties entered into a second contract (RBS 3738) on 3
November 1978 wherein Comphil undertook to buy and Capital City agreed to sell 500 long tons of
coconut crude oil under the same terms and conditions but at an increased c.i.f. price of
US$0.3925/lb.; (4) that the second contract states that "it is a wash out against RBS 3655" so that

87
Comphil was supposed to repurchase the undelivered coconut oil at US $0.3925 from Capital City
by paying the latter the sum of US$103,600.00 which is the same amount of loss that Capital City
sustained under the first contract; that Comphil again failed to pay said amount, so to settle
Capital City's loss, it entered into a third contract with Comphil on 24 January 1979 wherein the
latter undertook to sell and deliver and Capital City agreed to buy the same quantity of crude
coconut oil to be delivered in April/May 1979 at the c.i.f. price of US$0.3425/lb.; (5) that the latter
price was 9.25 cents/lb. or US$103,600 for 500 long tons below the then current market price of
43.2 cents/lb. and by delivering said quantity of coconut oil to Capital City at the discounted price,
Comphil was to have settled its US$103,600 liability to Capital City; (6) that Comphil failed to
deliver the coconut oil so Capital City notified the former that it was in default; (7) that Capital City
sustained damages in the amount of US$175,000; and (8) that after
repeated demands from Comphil to pay the said amount, the latter still refuses to pay the same.
Stokely further prayed that a writ of attachment be issued against any and all the properties of
Antam, et al. in an amount sufficient to satisfy any lien of judgment that Stokely may obtain in its
action.

In support of this provisional remedy and of its cause of action against Antam, et al., other than
Comphil, Stokely alleged that: 1) After demands were made by respondent on Comphil, the
Tambuntings ceased to be directors and officers of Comphil and were replaced by their five
employees, who were managers of Tambunting's pawnshops and said employees caused the
name of Comphil to be changed to "Banahaw Milling Corporation" and authorized
one of the Tambuntings, Antonio P. Tambunting, Jr., who was at that time neither a director nor
officer of Banahaw to sell its oil mill; 2) Unicom has taken over the entire operations and assets of
Banahaw because the entire and outstanding capital stock of the latter was sold to the former; 3)
All of the issued and outstanding capital stock of Comphil are owned by the Tambuntings who
were the directors and officers of Comphil and who were the ones who benefited from the sale of
Banahaw's assets or shares to Unicom; 4) All of the petitioners evaded their obligation to
respondent by the devious scheme of using Tambunting employees to replace the Tambuntings in
the management of Banahaw and disposing of the oil mill of Banahaw or their entire interests to
Unicom; and 5) Respondent has reasonable cause to believe and does believe that the coconut oil
mill, which is the only substantial asset of Banahaw is about to be sold or removed so that unless
prevented by the Court there will probably be no assets of Banahaw to satisfy its claim. On 10 April
1981, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of attachment in favor of Stokely upon the
latter's deposit of a bond in the amount of P1,285,000.00. On 3 June 1981, Stokely filed a motion
for reconsideration to reduce the attachment bond. On 11 June 1981, Antam, et al. filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Stokely, being a foreign corporation not licensed to do
business in the
Philippines, has no personality to maintain the suit. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order,
dated 10 August 1981, reducing the attachment bond to P500,000.00 and denying the motion to
dismiss by Antam, et al. on the ground that the reason cited therein does not appear to be
indubitable. Antam, et al. filed a petition for certiorari before the Intermediate Appellate Court.
On 14 June 1982, the appellate court dismissed the petition. Antam, et al. filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, they filed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order.

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Issue: Whether Stokely Van Camp, Inc. has the capacity to sue, in light of three transactions it
entered into with Comphil, Antam, etc. without license.

Held: The transactions entered into by Stokely with Comphil, Antam, et al. are not a series of
commercial dealings which signify an intent on the part of Stokely to do business in the Philippines
but constitute an isolated one which does not fall under the category of "doing business." The only
reason why Stokely entered into the second and third transactions with Comphil, Antam, et al. was
because it wanted to recover the loss it sustained from the failure of Comphil, Antam, et al. to
deliver the crude coconut oil under the first transaction and in order to give the latter a chance to
make good on their obligation. Instead of making an outright demand on Comphil, Antam, et al.,
Stokely opted to try to push through with the transaction to recover the amount of US$103,600.00
it lost. This explains why in the second transaction, Comphil, Antam, et al. were supposed to buy
back the crude coconut oil they should have delivered to the respondent in an amount which will
earn the latter a profit of US$103,600.00. When this failed the third transaction was entered into
by the parties whereby Comphil, Antam, et al. were supposed to sell crude coconut oil to the
respondent at a discounted rate, the total amount of such discount being US$103,600.00.
Unfortunately, Comphil, Antam, et al. failed to deliver again, prompting Stokely to file the suit
below. From these facts alone, it can be deduced that in reality, there was only one agreement
between Comphil, Antam, et al. and Stokely and that was the delivery by the former of 500 long
tons of crude coconut oil to the latter, who in turn, must pay the corresponding price for the
same. The three seemingly different transactions were entered into by the parties only in an effort
to fulfill the basic agreement and in no way indicate an intent on the part of Stokely to engage in a
continuity of transactions with Comphil, Antam, et al. which will categorize it as a foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines. Stokely, being a foreign corporation not doing
business in the Philippines, does not need to obtain a license to do business in order to have the
capacity to sue.

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 111. Cokaliong Shipping v. Amin

Facts:

On May 5, 1992, petitioner filed a Complaint for Damages, with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary
Attachment, against Carlos A. Go Thong Lines and Eugenio Manubag, Jr. The case was filed with the
RTC of Cebu. The petitioner alleged that by reason of defendants negligence, a collision took place
on April 3, 1992 between its vessel, the M/V Filipinas Tandag and Go Thong Lines vessel, the M/V
Our Lady of Lourdes.

Defendants filed an Answer with Counterclaim, denying negligence on their part and alleging that
the collision was caused by the faulty, erratic and erroneous maneuvers of petitioners vessel.

On February 1, 1993, private respondent, as insurer of Go Thong Lines, filed a Complaint against
herein petitioner .The case was filed with the RTC of Makati, Branch 135, where it was docketed as
Civil Case No. 93-319.Respondent claimed that it had paid the insured the amount of P2,420,325.59
and, by virtue thereof, had been subrogated to the rights of Go Thong Lines against petitioner.

Petitioner filed on August 3, 1993 a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 93-319 (Makati Case) due to
the pendency of Civil Case No. 11660 (Cebu Case) on the ground that the two cases involved the
same parties, the same causes of action and the same issues. . But petitioners motion was denied
by the trial court which held that there was no similarity of causes of action

Issue:

WON the petition should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendencia as there are other actions
pending between the same parties for the same cause of action.

Rulings:

For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must
concur: (a) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
the identity in the two (2) cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
As regards the first requirement, it is evident that petitioner is a party in both cases, i.e., as plaintiff
in the Cebu Case and as defendant in the Makati Case. Private respondent claims, however, that
since it was not impleaded as a party in the Cebu Case, there is no identity of parties to warrant the
dismissal of its complaint in the Makati Case. This contention has no merit. Private respondent filed
the complaint in the Makati Case as a subrogee of Go Thong Lines.
As to the second requirement, a reading of the allegations of the respective complaints of the parties
shows that the asserted rights are founded on an identical set of facts which gave rise to one basic
issue, that is, whether the collision between the two vessels was due to the negligence of the
employees of one vessel or those of the other vessel. Indeed in the Cebu Case the parties agreed

90
that the only issue to be resolved was whether the collision was due to petitioners negligence or
that of Go Thong Lines. This is the same issue raised in the Makati Case instituted by Go Thong Lines
insurer against petitioner.

112. Suntay v. Aqueous

113. FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes v. Trajano

Facts:

On February 13, 1986, private respondent filed a Petition for Certification Election with The Ministry
of Labor and Employment. The petitioner opposed the petition on the ground that a similar petition
involving the same issues and the same parties is pending resolution before the Supreme Court,
docketed as G.R. No. L-49771.

Private respondent admitted: that as early as May 10, 1976, private respondent filed a similar
petition for certification election with the Ministry of Labor and Employment but the petition was
denied by the MED Arbiter and the Secretary of Labor on appeal, on the ground that the petitioner
was a non-stock, non-profit medical institution, therefore, its employees may not form, join, or
organize a union pursuant to Article 244 of the Labor Code. Private respondent filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court (docketed as G.R. No. L-49771) assailing the constitutionality of
Article 244 of the Labor Code. On May 1, 1980, Batas Pambansa Bilang 70 was enacted amending
Article 244 of the Labor Code, thus granting even employees of non-stock, non-profit institutions
the right to form, join and organize labor unions of their choice; and that in the exercise of such
right, private respondent filed another petition for certification election with the Ministry of Labor
and Employment (NCR-LRD-N-2-050-86).

On April 17, 1986, the Med Arbiter issued an Order granting the petition, declaring that a
certification election be conducted to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of all the
rank and file employees of the petitioner.

Issue:

WON respondent Director gravely abused his discretion in granting the petition for certification
election, despite the pendency of a similar petition before the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 49771)
which involves the same parties for the same cause.

Rulings:

The Petition is devoid of merit. At the time private respondent filed its petition for certification
election on February 13, 1986, Article 244 of the Labor Code was already amended by Batas
Pambansa Bilang 70.

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In order that the pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause may be
availed of as a ground to dismiss a case, there must be, between the action under consideration and
the other action: (1) Identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both
actions; (2) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (3) the Identity on the two preceding particulars should be such that any judgment which
may be rendered on the other action wig, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.

In the instant case, any judgment which may be rendered in the petition for certiorari pending
before the Supreme Court (G. R. No. L-49771) wig not constitute res judicata in the petition for
certification election under consideration, for while in the former, private respondent questioned
the constitutionality of Article 244 of the Labor Code before its amendment, in the latter, private
respondent invokes the same article as already amended.

114. Lamis Ents. v. Lagamon

Facts:

This concerns a Komatsu Bulldozer which was delivered to Neville Y. Lamis Ents. by Santiago
Maningo as evidenced by a Memorandum Agreement. In Civil Case No. 1395 of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Maningo sought, among other things, the payment of the value of the bulldozer
from Neville Y. Lamis Ents. who moved to dismiss on the ground of multiplicity of suits and improper
venue.When the motion was denied, we granted the petition for certiorari and ordered the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 1395.

In granting the petition, We found that Civil Case No. 1395 was a duplication of Civil Case No. 35199
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal which Neville Y. Lamis Ents. had previously filed against
Santiago Maningo. In Our decision We said, among other things, that: "Similarly, the private
respondent's claim for the purchase price of the tractor [the Komatsu Bulldozer] is barred. This claim
should have been set up in Civil Case No. 35199, of which, in one of the causes of action it was
alleged that there was a misdelivery of tractor for which reason the plaintiff therein asks for the
delivery of the tractor specified in the Memorandum Agreement."

In the instant petition, Neville Y. Lamis Ents. complains that Civil Case No. 147 is not only again
duplicitous but it also disregards Our decision in G.R. No. 57250. Hence We are asked to order the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 147.

Issue:

WON Civil Case No. 147 should be dismissed.

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Rulings:

The petition is impressed with merit. It is obvious that tile private respondent is embarked on a
campaign of harrassment by filing suit after suit against the petitioner.

While it is true, as We have said, that the private respondent's claim for the purchase price of the
Komatsu tractor is barred in Civil Case No. 35199 and in any suit for that matter, there is nothing in
Our pronouncement to prevent the Rizal Court of First Instance from deciding the question of
possession in respect of the tractor. Therefore, litigation in any other case of said possession is not
only unnecessary and improper but it is also barred by Our decision in G.R. No. 57250.

115. United Coconut Planters Bank v. Beluso

Facts:

On 16 April 1996, UCPB granted the spouses Beluso a Promissory Notes Line under a Credit
Agreement whereby the latter could avail from the former credit of up to a maximum amount
of P1.2 Million pesos for a term ending on 30 April 1997. The spouses Beluso constituted, other than
their promissory notes, a real estate mortgage over parcels of land in Roxas City, covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-31539 and T-27828, as additional security for the obligation. The
Credit Agreement was subsequently amended to increase the amount of the Promissory Notes Line
to a maximum of P2.35 Million pesos and to extend the term thereof to 28 February 1998.

To completely avail themselves of the P2.35 Million credit line extended to them by UCPB, the
spouses Beluso executed two more promissory notes for a total of P350,000.00.

On 2 September 1998, UCPB demanded that the spouses Beluso pay their total obligation
of P2,932,543.00 plus 25% attorneys fees, but the spouses Beluso failed to comply therewith. UCPB
foreclosed the properties mortgaged by the spouses Beluso to secure their credit line, which already
ballooned to P3,784,603.00.

On 9 February 1999, the spouses Beluso filed a Petition for Annulment, Accounting and Damages
against UCPB with the RTC of Makati City. On 23 March 2000, the RTC ruled in favor of the spouses
Beluso

On 8 May 2000, the RTC denied UCPBs Motion for Reconsideration, prompting UCPB to appeal the
RTC Decision with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. The Court
of Appeals denied UCPBs Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. UCPB thus filed the present
petition

Issue:

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WON the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error when it failed to
order the dismissal of the case because the respondents are guilty of forum shopping.

Rulings:

Rule 16, Section 5 bars the refiling of an action previously dismissed only in the following instances:
SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal. Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting a motion to dismiss based
on paragraphs (f), (h) and (i) of section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same action or claim. (n)

When an action is dismissed on the motion of the other party, it is only when the ground for the
dismissal of an action is found in paragraphs (f), (h) and (i) that the action cannot be refiled. As
regards all the other grounds, the complainant is allowed to file same action, but should take care
that, this time, it is filed with the proper court or after the accomplishment of the erstwhile absent
condition precedent, as the case may be

UCPB, however, brings to the attention of this Court a Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
spouses Beluso on 15 January 1999 with the RTC of Roxas City, which Motion had not yet been ruled
upon when the spouses Beluso filed Civil Case No. 99-314 with the RTC of Makati. Hence, there were
allegedly two pending actions between the same parties on the same issue at the time of the filing
of Civil Case No. 99-314 on 9 February 1999 with the RTC of Makati. This will still not change our
findings. It is indeed the general rule that in cases where there are two pending actions between
the same parties on the same issue, it should be the later case that should be dismissed. However,
this rule is not absolute. According to this Court in Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals.

116. G.R. No. 95223. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HONORABLE ROQUE A. TAMAYO, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132 and EKMAN
& COMPANY, INC., respondents. July 26, 1996

FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,[1] dismissing the petition
for certiorari filed by herein petitioner Allied Banking Corporation to set aside two orders, dated
October 8, 1984 and November 15, 1984, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
132, in Civil Case No. 7500. It appears that on October 8, 1981, private respondent Ekman &
Company Inc. (Ekman & Co.) obtained a loan in the amount of P5,700,000.00 from petitioner Allied
Banking Corporation (hereafter called Allied Bank). Private respondent executed a promissory note,
secured by US$750,000.00 deposited in the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in Hongkong. The
transaction involves what is called in banking parlance as a back-to-back loan.
Allied Bank filed a complaint for sum of money against private respondent Ekman & Co. in the
CFI of Pasig, Rizal. Upon the reorganization of the judiciary in 1983, the case was transferred to the
RTC in Makati. Allied Bank alleged that after applying private respondents dollar deposit to its
indebtedness, there remained a balance of P387,936.08, exclusive of interest and other charges
owing to it but despite demands made on private respondent Ekman & Co., the amount had not
been paid. Thereafter, the case was dismissed by the RTC for failure of Allied Bank to prosecute its

94
case. However, upon petitioners explanation that it did not know that its case had been transferred
to Makati as a result of the reorganization of the courts, the RTC reconsidered its order and directed
that summons be served on private respondent Ekman & Co.
It appears that private respondent itself had filed a complaint against petitioner, for
accounting. The case was also filed in the RTC of Makati. Ekman & Co. alleged that on April 8, 1981,
it had obtained a loan in the amount of P5, 700, 000.00 from petitioner Allied Bank upon the security
of a $750,000.00-dollar deposit which was earning 14.5% interest per annum; that it asked Allied
Bank for a statement of account and the return of its deposit which Allied Bank had applied to the
payment of the loan but Allied Bank refused the demand.
Petitioner Allied Bank moved to dismiss said case but it was denied by the trial court. Its motion
for reconsideration was also denied. Soon after, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court
of Appeals which later on dismissed their petition. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition of Petitioner Allied Bank.

RULING:
The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and Civil Case No. 7500, now pending before
Branch 56 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati is ORDERED CONSOLIDATED with Civil Case No. 649
pending in Branch 136 of same court, the two cases to be heard and decided by the latter court.
In the case at bar, not only was petitioners action in Civil Case No. 649 brought ahead of private
respondents action, it is also the appropriate case for determining the parties rights.Petitioners
action (Civil Case No. 649) is for collection of a sum of money, whereas private respondents action
(Civil Case No. 7500) is simply for a statement of account apparently to enable it to pay its obligation
to petitioner. Private respondents claim is more in the nature of a defense to the action for
collection. As such it should be asserted in Civil Case No. 649 rather than in a separate action.

117. G.R. No. 157557 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (CIVIL AERONAUTICS

ADMINISTRATION), Petitioner, vs. RAMON YU, TEOFISTA VILLAMALA, LOURDES YU and YU SE
PENG, Respondents. March 10, 2006

FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint for reversion of the expropriated property which ws later on
dismissed by the trial court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no res judicata and
remanded the case to the trial court. Hence this petition.

ISSUES: Whether or not the action barred by res judicata?

RULING: Yes. The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and
constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of
action.20Considering that the sale on which respondents based their right to reversion has long been
nullified, they have not an iota of right over the property and thus, have no legal personality to bring
forth the action for reversion of expropriated property. Lack of legal personality to sue means that

95
the respondents are not the real parties-in-interest. This is a ground for the dismissal of the case,
related to the ground that the complaint evidently states no cause of action.

Conclusiveness of judgment clearly exists in the present case, because respondents again
seek to enforce a right based on a sale which has been nullified by a final and executory judgment.
Recall that the question of validity of the sale had long been settled. The same question, therefore,
cannot be raised again even in a different proceeding involving the same parties.

118. G.R. No. 122181. JOSE A. LINZAG and the HEIRS of CRISTOBAL A. LINZAG, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE, Regional Trial Court,Branch IV, Mati, Davao
Oriental, PATRICIO S. CUNANAN, ORLANDO SALVADOR, MANUEL P. BLANCO, JR., JOSE MANUEL
SERRANO and the REGISTER OF DEEDS of Mati, Davao Oriental, respondents. June 26, 1998
FACTS:
At the cadastral proceeding involving Lot No. 1222 before the then Court of First Instance of
Davao Oriental sitting in Mati, Davao Oriental, Cristobal Linzag filed his claim over said Lot. Another
claimant, one Patricio Cunanan, likewise filed a claim. One Orlando L. Salvador filed a motion to
award Lot No. 1222, as an uncontested lot, in his favour. Soon, the cadastral court, on the basis of
the foregoing, issued an Order declaring that Salvador and his predecessors-in-interests had been
in peaceful, open, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession of Lot No. 1222, in concept of an
owner for a period of at least 30 years; that Salvador was the successor-in-interest of original
claimant Patricio S. Cunanan; and that the lot was a non-contested lot. Petitioners filed an action
for annulment of title and reconveyance with damages against private respondents Patricio
Cunanan and Orlando Salvador before the Court of First instance of Mati, Davao Oriental which was
later on dismissed by the trial court. Aggrieved, Petitioners appealed the above decision to the Court
of Appeals which dismissed the appeal on the ground of prescription. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an identity in the causes of action between this petition and Civil
Case No. 571.

RULING: NO. In sum, the Court found that all the requirements for the application of res judicata are
present in this case. This petition should, therefore, be dismissed. The difference in the form of the
actions instituted is immaterial. The petitioners may not escape the effect of the doctrine by merely
varying the form of his [sic] action (Filinvest Credit Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
207 SCRA 59, 63; Sangalang vs. Caparas, 151 SCRA 53; Ibabao vs. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 76, 85).

The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of res judicata is that parties should not be permitted to
litigate the same issue more than once. When a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment
of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in
privity in them in law or estate. It is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to
litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated (Ibabao

96
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, at p. 85; Sangalang vs. Caparas, supra, at p. 59). As this
petition is already barred by the judgment in Civil Case 571, We see no other course of action but
to resolve to dismiss this petition.

119. G.R. No. 156224 HEIRS OF PANFILO F. ABALOS, Petitioners, versus AURORA A. BUCAL,
DEMETRIO, BUCAL, ARTEMIO F. ABALOS, LIGAYA U. ABALOS, ROMULO F. ABALOS, JESUSA O.
ABALOS, MAURO F. ABALOS and LUZVIMINDA R. ABALOS, Respondents. February 19, 2008

FACTS:
The instant case arose when petitioners father, Panfilo, began to execute the said decision
ordering for the partition of the intestate estate of Panfilo. In opposition, respondents, who are
children and in-laws of the now deceased Faustino, filed on January 8, 1986 a case for Quieting of
Title, Possession, Annulment of Document and Damages with Preliminary Injunction. Soon, the trial
court directed the parties to maintain the status quo and later on ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Due to the several proceedings, the controversy was narrowed down to only two (2)
properties, namely: the fishpond located at Linoc, Binmaley, Pangasinan, locally known as Duyao,
and the fishpond located at Canaoalan, Binmaley, Pangasinan, locally known as Pinirat. Eventually,
the trial court rendered is decision partitioning the property to the parties. Both Panfilo and
respondents elevated the case to the CA, assigning the alleged errors of the trial court. The Court of
Appeals rendered a decision declaring the petition unmeritorious. Panfilo moved for
reconsideration of the Decision but was denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA seriously erred in failing to consider the finality of the Decision in Civil
Case No. 15465.

RULING: NO. Even if res judicata requires not absolute but substantial identity of parties, still there
exists substantial identity only when the additional party acts in the same capacity or is in
privity with the parties in the former action. In this case, while it is true that respondents are
legitimate children and relatives by affinity of Faustino it is more important to remember that, as
shown by their documents of acquisition, they became owners of the subject fishponds not through
Faustino alone but also from a third person (i.e., Maria Abalos). Respondents are asserting their own
rights and interests which are distinct and separate from those of Faustinos claim as a hereditary
heir of Francisco Abalos. Hence, they cannot be considered as privies to the judgment rendered in
Civil Case No. 15465. Unfortunately for petitioners, they relied solely on their untenable defense
of res judicata instead of contesting the genuineness and due execution of respondents
documentary evidence.

Moreover, Panfilo erred in repeatedly believing that there was no necessity to implead
respondents as defendants in Civil Case No. 15465 since, according to him, the necessary parties in
a partition case are only the co-owners or co-partners in the inheritance of Francisco Abalos. On the
contrary, the Rules of Court provides that in an action for partition, all other persons interested in
the property shall be joined as defendants. Not only the co-heirs but also all persons claiming

97
interests or rights in the property subject of partition are indispensable parties. In the instant case,
it is the responsibility of Panfilo as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 15465 to implead all indispensable
parties, that is, not only Faustino and Danilo but also respondents in their capacity as vendees and
donees of the subject fishponds. Without their presence in the suit the judgment of the court cannot
attain real finality against them. Being strangers to the first case, they are not bound by the decision
rendered therein; otherwise, they would be deprived of their constitutional right to due process.

Finally, it must be stressed that in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a
declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject properties; and second, the conveyance of his lawful
shares. An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. It is only properties
owned in common that may be the object of an action for partition; it will not lie if the claimant has
no rightful interest over the subject property. Thus, in this case, only the shares in the lots which are
determined to have been co-owned by Panfilo, Faustino and Danilo could be included in the order
of partition and, conversely, shares in the lots which were validly disposed of in favor of respondents
must be excluded therefrom. In this connection, the Court sees no reason to depart from the
findings of fact and the partition ordered by the appellate court as these are amply supported by
evidence on record. Furthermore, the rule is that factual issues are beyond our jurisdiction to
resolve since in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure this Courts
power is limited only to review questions of law when there is doubt or difference as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts.

120. G.R. No. 121534. JUAN M. CASIL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. URBANO
VICTORIO, SR., BRANCH 50, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA; and ANITA U.
LORENZANA, respondents. January 28, 1998]
FACTS:
Private Respondent Anita U. Lorenzana is the lessee of a government property located on
Bilibid Viejo Street, near Quezon Boulevard, Manila. After the building on said land was destroyed
by fire, Petitioner Juan M. Casil and private respondent entered into a written agreement
authorizing the former to develop and administer the property. They also agreed that rentals from
the tenants would be divided equally between them. Thus, buildings, stalls and cubicles were
constructed on the subject property and leased to tenants. Private respondent allegedly found that
the tenants, except for one or two, had been paying their rentals on time, but that petitioner was
not properly remitting her share thereon. Thus, she wrote the tenants informing them that she had
already terminated her contract with petitioner and urging them to pay directly to her. Petitioner
countered by asking them to ignore private respondents letter.
Petitioner then filed a complaint against private respondent for Breach of Contract and
Damages docketed as Civil Case No. 94-72362 before Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
However, before submitting her answer, private respondent filed before Branch 50 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, her own separate complaint against petitioner for Rescission of Contract,
Accounting and Damages. Petitioner countered with a motion to dismiss the Second Case on the
ground of litis pendentia. Subsequently, private respondent filed her opposition to said motion.

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Thereafter, Judge Urbano C. Victorio, Sr. denied the motion. The Court of Appeals subsequently
dismissed the petition for certiorari, thereby affirming the trial courts denial of the said motion.
Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is Litis Pendentia in this case.

RULING: The court sustained the petitioner. In order that an action may be dismissed on the ground
of litis pendentia, the following requisites must concur: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as
representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that
judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res adjudicata in the
other.
In this light, there is identity of subject matter and of causes of action, for the same evidence
presented in the First Case will necessarily be presented in the Second Case, and the judgment
sought in the Second Case will either duplicate or contradict any judgment in the First Case. It is
beyond dispute, therefore, that a judgment in the First Case will constitute res adjudicata to bar the
Second Case.
As a final note, the following guidelines for the dismissal of a complaint on the ground of litis
pendentia laid down by this Court in Allied Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals should be
taken into account. Given, therefore, the pendency of two actions, the following are the relevant
considerations in determining which action should be dismissed: (1) the date of filing, with
preference generally given to the first action filed to be retained; (2) whether the action sought to
be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the later action or to anticipate its filing and lay the
basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues
between the parties. Since the First Case was filed earlier, it will be in accord with jurisprudence to
abate the Second Case.

126. DELOS REYES vs. CA and SPOUSES CAIA (January 27, 1998; 285 SCRA 705)

FACTS:

The Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, dismissed a civil case for recovery of
possession of real property with damages filed by petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
order of dismissal of the lower court.

Petitioners seek the nullification of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals which
affirmed the order of the trial court dismissing the complaint of petitioners herein by imputing to
the Court of Appeals the following errors: (1) in reckoning the 30-year prescriptive period of real
actions as provided under Art. 1141 of the Civil Code from the date of issuance of the questioned
TCT or annotation of the transaction when petitioners' mother, original owner of subject property

99
and when TCT No. 42753 was issued to Rodolfo Caia and Zenaida Caia and consequently holding
petitioners guilty of laches; and, (2) in not applying Arts. 1409, 1410, and 1422 of the Civil Code.

Subject of the controversy is a parcel of land measuring 13,405 square meters originally
owned by the spouses Genaro and Evarista delos Reyes. Evarista delos Reyes sold to spouses
Catalina Mercado and Eulalio Pena 10,000 square meters of the property. The vendees were able
to secure Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26184 covering not only the 10,000 square meters of
land bought by them but also the remaining 3,405 square meters left unsold. In turn, the Pena
spouses sold the whole property to a third party who later conveyed the same whole area to
another party. Eventually, the land was acquired by private respondents herein, Rodolfo Caia and
Zenaida Caia, through a "Deed of Exchange." Later, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42753 was
issued in the name of the Caia spouses who since then exercised full ownership and possession
over the property.

Petitioners, filed an action against respondents for reconveyance of 3,405 square meters
of the property covered by TCT No. 42753 claiming that this portion was invalidly included by the
Pena spouses in the titling of their 10,000 square meters they had bought from Evarista delos
Reyes. However, the case was dismissed by the trial court on the ground of laches. As already
adverted to, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Can an action for reconveyance of real property covered by the Torrens system filed after
more than thirty (30) years prosper against the holder for value?

RULING:

The Supreme Court likewise dismissed the petition. Petitioners argue that their cause of
action still subsists because it accrued either when TCT No. 42753 was issued to Rodolfo Caia and
his sister Zenaida Caia. This is incorrect. A cause of action being an act or omission of one party in
violation of the right of another arises at the moment such right is violated. In the instant case,
petitioners' cause of action accrued when the Pena spouses caused the registration in their name
of the entire 13,405 square meters instead of only 10,000 square meters they actually bought
from Evarista delos Reyes. For it was on this instance that the right of ownership of Evarista over
the remaining 3,405 square meters was transgressed and from that very moment sprung the right
of the owner, and hence all her successors in interest, to file a suit for reconveyance of the
property wrongfully taken from them.

When respondents Rodolfo Caia and Zenaida Caia as fourth transferees in ownership dealt
with the land in question, they were not required to go beyond what appeared in the transfer
certificate of title in the name of their transferor. For all intents and purposes, they were innocent

100
purchasers for value having acquired the property in due course and in good faith under a clean
title, i.e., there were no annotations of encumbrances or notices of lis pendens at the back
thereof. They had no reason to doubt the validity of the title to the property. Therefore it would
be the height of injustice, if not inequity, if a valid transaction transferring the subject property to
them be set aside just to accommodate parties who heedlessly slept on their rights for more than
a third of a century. This is not conducive but anathema to good order.

127. AGNAR vs. BERNAD (May 9, 1988; 161 SCRA 276)

FACTS:

Private respondents, the spouses Nicolas and Redempta Kintanar, as plaintiffs, filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, a civil action against the defendants-spouses, the herein petitioners,
praying for the annulment of a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale, damages, and attorneys fees with
preliminary injunction. The petitioners, timely filed their answer specifically denying the
allegations in the complaint.

The trial court, acting through the respondent Judge, issued an order denying the
petitioners motion. The respondent Judge based his order on a strict or literal construction of
section 2, Rule 9, of the Revised Rules of Court which, in essence, provides that defenses or
objections, except the failure to state a cause of action, if not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in
an answer, are deemed waived.

On appeal by certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the case, as stated at the outset, was
certified to this Court for resolution" Since the instant petition involves a pure question of law on
the correct interpretation of section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the affirmative defense of prescription may be validly set up for the first
time in an amended answer.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious.

Prescription and estoppel cannot be invoked against the State. If the plaintiffs complaint
or evidence shows that the action had prescribed, the action shall be dismissed. Prescription
cannot be invoked as a ground if the contract is alleged to be void ab initio, but where prescription
depends on whether the contract is void or voidable, there must be a hearing.

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128. FERRER vs. ERICTA (August 23, 1978; 84 SCRA 705)

FACTS:

A complaint for damages dated December 27, 1974 but actually filed on January 6, 1975
(Civil Case No. Q-19647) was filed by petitioners against respondents.

It was alleged that defendants Mr. and Mrs. Francis Pfleider, were the owners or
operators of a Ford pick-up car. Said vehicle was allegedly driven by their son Dennis Pfleider, 16
y/o without proper official authority, the vehicle without due regard to traffic rules and
regulations thereby causing physical injuries to plaintiff Annette Ferrer, who was then a passenger
therein, which injuries paralyzed her and required medical treatment and confinement at different
hospitals for more than two (2) years. They prayed that defendants be ordered to reimburse them
for actual expenses as well as other damages.

Defendants put up the affirmative defense that defendant Dennis Pfleider exercised due
care and utmost diligence in driving the vehicle and alleging that Annette Ferrer and the other
persons aboard said vehicle were not passengers in the strict sense of the term, but were merely
joy riders and that, consequently, defendants had no obligation whatsoever to plaintiffs.

At the pre-trial, only plaintiffs-petitioners and their counsel were present. Consequently,
defendants-private respondents were declared in default and the plaintiff petitioners were
allowed to present their evidence exparte.

Private respondents filed a motion to "set aside the order of default and subsequent
pleadings" on the ground that "defendants' failure to appear for pre-trial was due to accident or
excusable neglect." This was opposed by petitioners. In view of this, the motion of private
respondents was denied by respondent Judg. Thereafter, respondent Judge rendered judgment
against private respondents, and ordered them to pay to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs for
actual expenses, hospitalization and medical expenses; for actual expenses for the care, medicines
of plaintiff; for moral damages; for exemplary damages; for attorney's fees; and costs of suit.

Respondents filed an MR of the decision and of the order denying the motion to set aside
order of default, on the ground that case states no cause of action and that the action has already
prescribed, the case being filed only on Jan. 6, 1975, more than 4 years from date of accident on
December 31, 1970", likewise appearing from the complaint and, therefore, the action has already
prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code.

A Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 2 was subsequently filed by defendants-

private respondents on September10, 1975, alleging that their defense of prescription has not

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been waived and may be raised even at such stage of the proceedings.

Respondents filed Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration alleging that their defense of
prescription has not been waived and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings to which the
petitioners filed an Opposition thereto.

On September 23, 1975, respondent judge, without setting aside the order of default,
issued an order absolving defendants from any liability on the grounds that: (a) the complaint
states no cause of action because it does not allege that Dennis Pfleider was living with his parents
at the time of the vehicular accident, considering that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity the mother, are only responsible for the damages
caused by their minor children who live in their company; and (b) that the defense of prescription
is meritorious, since the complaint was filed more than four (4) years after the date of the
accident, and the action to recover damages based on quasi-delict prescribes in four (4) years.

Hence, the instant petition for mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether the defense of prescription had been deemed waived by private respondents'
failure to allege the same in their answer.

RULING:

No. the instant petition for mandamus is DISMISSED.

The Supreme Court sustained the dismissal of a counterclaim on the ground of

prescription, although such defense was not raised in the answer of the plaintiff. Thus, the Court
held that where the answer does not take issue with the complaint as to dates involved in the
defendant's claim of prescription, his failure to specifically plead prescription in the answer does
not constitute a waiver of the defense of prescription. It was explained that the defense of
prescription, even if not raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, is not deemed waived
unless such defense raises issues of fact not appearing upon the preceding pleading.

In the present case, there is no issue of fact involved in connection with the question of
prescription. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-19647 alleges that the accident which caused the
injuries sustained by plaintiff occured on December 31, 1970. It is undisputed that the action for
damages was only filed on January 6, 1975. Actions for damages arising from physical injuries
because of a tort must be filed within four years. The four-year period begins from the day the
quasi-delict is committed or the date of the accident.

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129. CASTILLO vs. HEIRS OF VICENTE MADRIGAL (June 27, 1991; 198 SCRA 556)

FACTS:

Petitioners spouses Mariano Castillo and Pilar Castillo, in their own behalf and in
representation of the heirs of Eduardo Castillo, filed a verified complaint before the Court of First
Instance of Manila for annulment of contract and transfer certificate of title and/or reconveyance
with damages against private respondents heirs of Vicente Madrigal and/or Susana Realty, Inc.
and public respondent Register of Deeds of the City of Manila.

Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that: (a) the complaint states
no cause of action; and (b) the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.

The trial court dismissed the complaint and on appeal to the Court of Appeals, the
decision was affirmed in toto. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES:

Whether or not:

Petitioners' action for annulment of contract and transfer certificate of title and/or
reconveyance with damages is subject to prescription; and
The complaint states a cause of action against private respondents.

RULING:

The action for reconveyance is likewise imprescriptible because its basis is the alleged void
contract of sale.

However, the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land
alleges that some of the defendants bought said land from their co-defendants who had a
defective title thereto but does not allege that the purchasers were purchasers in bad faith or with
notice of the defect in the title of their vendors, there is a failure to state a cause of action.

By reason of this failure, private respondent is presumed to be an innocent purchaser for

value and in good faith, entitled to protection under the law.

Petition is DENIED.

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130. RUIZ vs. CA (October 21, 1997; 79 SCRA 525)

FACTS:

The late Pedro V. Garcia was a businessman with substantial shareholdings in V. C. Ponce
Co., Inc. consisting of shares of stock and real properties. Sometime in 1977, an internal conflict
developed and besieged the company, engendering suits between respondent Garcia and V.C.
Ponce Co., Inc. over the formers funds and assets.

Respondent Pedro V. Garcia engaged the legal services of herein petitioners, Attys.
Vivencio M. Ruiz and Emilio D. Castellanes, and an Agreement denominated as a Contract of
Retainership was executed by them.

Respondent unilaterally terminated the said Contract of Retainership on the alleged

ground that the petitioners, his lawyers, failed to settle amicably his (Garcia) differences with V. C.
Ponce Co., Inc. Petitioners were paid attorneys fees up to the month of July, 1982. Thereafter, the
petitioners Ruiz and Castellanes manifested their withdrawal as counsel for Pedro V. Garcia and
moved that their attorneys lien be put on record, in the cases involved. Such motion was granted
by the trial court.

Petitioners Ruiz and Castellanes brought their action For Collection of Sum of Money and
for Specific Performance.

While the said case was pending before the said lower court of origin, Pedro V. Garcia
died. And so, after notifying the trial court of the demise of their client, counsel moved for the
dismissal of the case, invoking Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

The lower court issued an Order dismissing petitioners complaint.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals handed down its challenged Decision granting the
dismissal of the case and denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent court erred in finding that the instant case for recovery of
attorneys professional fees which had not been adjudicated by final pronouncement is abated by
the death of the defendant-client and should therefore be dismissed in accordance with Section
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

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RULING:

Under the plain language of Section 21, Rule 3 of B.P. 129, it is beyond cavil that if the
defendant dies before the Court of First Instance or the Regional Trial Court has rendered a
judgment, the action is dismissed and the plaintiff is required to file a money claim against the
estate of the deceased. But if the defendant dies after the said court has rendered a judgment and
pending appeal, the action is not dismissed and the deceased defendant is substituted by his
executor or administrator or legal heirs.

The core of petitioners argument is that action should not be dismissed since their
complaint involves not just monetary claim but also real properties, as well.

Petitioners contention is untenable. While they maintain that what they are claiming
include real properties, their Complaint is captioned as For Collection of Money and for Specific
Performance. Obviously, the petitioners themselves, who are lawyers, believed that their cause of
action against the private respondent is in the nature of actio in personam.

Actio in personam is a personal action seeking redress against a particular person.

Personal actions are such whereby a man claims a debt, or personal duty, or damages in lieu
thereof. In the present case, petitioners seek to recover attorneys fees from private respondent
for professional services they rendered to the latter. Attorneys fee is basically a compensation. In
its ordinary sense, the term (compensation) applies not only to salaries, but to compensation by
fees for specific service.

Viewed in proper perspective, an action to recover attorneys fees is basically a monetary

claim, which under Section 21, Rule 3 of B.P. 129 is an action that does not survive. Petition is
DENIED.

131. LANDAYAN V. BACANI

Facts:

Teodoro Abenojar owned several parcels of land located in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and a house and
lot in Manila. He died intestate in Urdaneta. On February 3, 1949, private respondents Maxima
Andrada, the surviving spouse of Teodoro Abenojar, and Severino Abenojar, executed a public
document, entitled "Extra-Judicial Agreement of Partition" whereby they adjudicated between
themselves the properties left by Teodoro Abenojar. Severino Abenojar represented himself in said
document as "the only forced heir and descendant" of the late Teodoro Abenojar.

On March 6, 1968, petitioners herein filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
presided over by the respondent Judge seeking a judicial declaration that they are legal heirs of the

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deceased Teodoro Abenojar, and that private respondents be ordered to surrender the ownership
and possession of some of the properties that they acquired under the deed of extra-judicial
settlement corresponding to the shares of the petitioners and that the said deed of extra- judicial
settlement and the subsequent deed of donation executed in favor of private respondents, spouses
Liberata Abenojar and Jose Serrano, in consequence thereof be declared null and void.

As their affirmative and special defense, the private respondents alleged that the action of the
petitioners had already prescribed, the same having been filed more than 18 years after the
execution of the documents that they seek to annul.

After a preliminary hearing on said affirmative defense, the respondent Judge issued an Order
sustaining the contention that the action is barred by prescription and dismissing the case as a
consequence thereof.

ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the complaint based on prescription is proper.

HELD: The court finds the dismissal of the action filed by the petitioners to be precipitious and
erroneous. Although the principles relied upon by the respondent Judge are legally correct, he had
unqualifiedly assumed the extra-judicial partition to be merely a voidable contract and not a void
one. This question may not be resolved by determining alone the ground for the annulment of the
contract. It requires an inquiry into the legal status of private respondent Severino Abenojar,
particularly as to whether he may be considered as a "legal heir" of Teodoro Abenojar and as such
entitled to participate in an extra-judicial partition of the estate of said deceased.

The Order appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent Judge is ordered to
try the case on the merits and render the corresponding judgment thereon.

132. DULAY V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred
at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the
security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.

Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf
and in behalf of her minor children, filed on February 8, 1989 an action for damages against Benigno
Torzuela and herein private respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc.,
("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of
defendant Torzuela.

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ISSUE: whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of action.

HELD:

The general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action
against the defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon
the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exist if the following elements are
present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the
latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.

The Court finds, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the part of the
defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the
complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that
the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts.

133. PARANAQUE KINGS V. COURT OF APPEALS.

FACTS:

Upon the very face of the plaintiffs Complaint itself, it therefore indubitably appears that the
defendant Santos had verily complied with paragraph 9 of the Lease Agreement by twice offering
the properties for sale to the plaintiff for P15 M. The said offers, however, were plainly rejected by
the plaintiff which scorned the said offer as RIDICULOUS. There was therefore a definite refusal on
the part of the plaintiff to accept the offer of defendant Santos. For in acquiring the said properties
back to her name, and in so making the offers to sell both by herself (attorney-in-fact) and through
her counsel, defendant Santos was indeed conscientiously complying with her obligation under
paragraph 9 of the Lease Agreement.

ISSUE: The legal issue presented before the for resolution is whether the aforequoted complaint
alleging breach of the contractual right of first option or priority to buy states a valid cause of action.

HELD: We do not agree with respondents contention that the issue involved is purely factual. The
principal legal question, as stated earlier, is whether the complaint filed by herein petitioner in the
lower court states a valid cause of action. Since such question assumes the facts alleged in the
complaint as true, it follows that the determination thereof is one of law, and not of facts. There is
a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a

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certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.

134. MERILL LYNCH FUTURES V. COURT OF APPEALS.

FACTS:

Merrill Lynch Futures Inc (MLFI) is a nonresident corporation not doing business in the Philippines
and duly organized and existing under the laws of Delaware. It entered into a Futures Customer
Agreement with Lara spouses. Orders were transmitted to MLFI by Lara spouses through Merrill
Lynch Philippines Inc., a Philippine corporation servicing MLFIs customers. Lara spouses became
indebted to MLFI, which the latter claimed from the Laras. The Laras refused on the ground that the
transactions were null and void, because Merrill Lynch Philippines had no license to operate as a
commodity or financial futures broker. MLFI filed a complaint with the QC RTC for recovery of said
debt. Laras moved to dismiss on the ground that MLFI had been doing business in the Philippines;
hence MLFI is prohibited by law to maintain or intervene in any action. Laras alleged they were not
aware Merrill Lynch Philippines had no license to do business in this country.

ISSUE: Whether or not MLFI may sue in the Philippine Courts to establish and enforce its rights
against Sps. Lara, in light of the undeniable fact that it had transacted business in this country
without being licensed to do so?

HELD:

(YES)

In other words, if it be true that during all the time that they were transacting with ML FUTURES,
the Laras were fully aware of its lack of license to do business in the Philippines, and in relation to
those transactions had made payments to, and received money from it for several years, the
question is whether or not the Lara Spouses are now estopped to impugn ML FUTURES capacity to
sue them in the courts of the forum.

135. RAVA DEVELOPMENT V. COURT OF APPEALS.

FACTS:

This case arose from a contract of leases between Rava Development Corporation (RAVA, for
brevity) and Wheels Distributors, Inc. (WHEELS, for brevity), over a parcel of land with existing
buildings and improvements thereon, situated at No. 3, Aurora Boulevard, Quezon City.

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During the existence of said lease, or on August 1, 1985, RAVA and Frabal Fishing & Ice Plant
Corporation (FRABAL, for brevity) effected a merger for the purpose of strengthening their
economic stability and efficiency (Rollo, pp. 16, 85). As a result of said merger RAVA was absorbed
by FRABAL. Consequently, RAVA transferred the leased premises to FRABAL.

WHEELS filed a complaint against RAVA and FRABAL for specific performance and damages with the
Regional Trial Court. RAVA and FRABAL moved for the dismissal of the complaint, as well as the
lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that the respondent judge has no
jurisdiction over the nature of, or subject matter of, the action.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter.

HELD:

The contention of RAVA and FRABAL is untenable.

The rule is that a defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action
is regarded as having hypothetically admitted all the averments thereof. The test of the sufficiency
of the facts found in a petition as constituting a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the
facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
thereof (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]).

In determining the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may properly
be considered. It is error for the court to take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary
hearings to determine their existence. If the allegations in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by
which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the
defenses that may be assessed by the defendants.

136. Del Bros vs. CA

137. D.C. Crystal vs. Laya

138. Marcopper Mining vs. Garcia

139. Banez Electric Light vs. Abra Electric

140. Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank

FACTS: Samuel Mathay, et.al. were former stockholders of Consolidated Mines Inc. (CMI).Petitioners
filed a case for a class suit against CMI containing six causes of action. Petitioners alleged that in
violation of the Board resolution, the defendants unlawfully acquired stockholdings in the
defendant Bank in excess of what they were lawfully entitled, hence depriving the petitioners of
their right to subscribe at par value, in proportion to their equities established under their respective

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"Pre-Incorporation Agreements to Subscribe" to the capital stock and that the Articles of
Incorporation were fraudulently amended by the defendants. The complaint was dismissed by the
Trial Court on the ground that the class suit could not be maintained because of the absence of a
showing in the complaint that the plaintiffs-appellants were sufficiently numerous and
representative, and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The CA affirmed the ruling,
hence, the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the instant action is a class suit.

HELD: The action at bar is not a class suit.

The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are accordingly: (1) that the subject
matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons, and (2) that such
persons be so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all to the court. The statute
requires that the complaint should allege the existence of the necessary facts, the existence of a
class and the number of members in the said class so as to enable the court to determine whether
the members of the said class are so numerous as to make it impractical to bring them all to court.
The complaint in the instant case failed to state the number of said CMI subscribing stockholders
that the trial court could not infer nor make sure that the parties are indeed so numerous that
they cannot practically appear in court and that the plaintiffs are representative of the other
stockholders. The statute also requires that the subject-matter of the controversy be of common
interest to numerous persons. In the instant case, the interest that appellants, plaintiffs and
intervenors, and the CMI stockholders had in the subject matter of this suit was several, not
common or general in the sense required by the statute. Each one of the appellants and the CMI
stockholders had determinable interest; each one had a right, if any, only to his respective portion
of the stocks. No one of them had any right to, or any interest in, the stock to which another was
entitled.

141. U Dalandan VS Julio

FACTS: On September 24, 1932, during the lifetime of Clemente Dalandan and Victorina Dalandan,
they executed a notarial document whereby said Clemente Dalandan, sold, ceded, and transferred
by way of pacto de retro sale to Victorina Dalandan, fifty (50) plots or "salt beds" (banigan), which
form part of the one hundred and fifty two (152 plots or "banigan" found on six (6) parcels of land,
situated at Las Pias, Rizal subject to the right of Clemente Dalandan to repurchase the said fifty
(50) plots or "banigan" for the same amount of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) within ten (10)
years from September 24, 1932, the date of said pacto de retro sale. Before the expiration of the
expropriation, Clemente and Victorina executed another notarial document waiving the 10 years
period of redemption or repurchase to pay P4000 at anytime without any limitation as to the
period of redemption or repurchase. The document also expressly provided that in the event of

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death of Victorina Dalandan, the redemption price of P4,000.00 shall be paid to Engracio Santos
and Eleuterio Santos (both grandsons of Victorina Dalandan) at P1,500.00 each, and to Victoria
Julio (daughter of Victorina Dalandan), the amount of P1,000.00.

On December 1960, the defendants were notified in writing that the plaintiffs are now ready to
pay the amount of P4,000.00 to them but the defendants (in spite of the fact that they received
the said notice in writing) refused to accept or receive the said amount from the plaintiffs. Due to
the refusal of, the defendants to accept the payment of P4,000.00, the plaintiffs are forced to
consign or deposit the amount of P4,000.00 in court. The defendants, filed a motion to dismiss the
case on the grounds that (1) the complaint states no cause of action; and (2) granting that it stated
a cause of action, it is already barred by the Statute of Limitations and/or laches.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid cause of action.

HELD: As a rule, the complaint should contain allegation of ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff's cause of action.

Neither is it proper to allege in a pleading inferences of fact from facts not stated, or incorrect
inferences from facts stated, for they are not the ultimate facts required by law to be pleaded.
Legal conclusions need not be pleaded, because so far as they are correct they are useless, and
when erroneous, worse than useless. - (I Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court [1957 Ed.] P.
109.)

And to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint and
no other should be considered.

The allegation of nullity of a judgment in a complaint, being a conclusion and not a material
allegation, is not deemed admitted by the party who files a motion to dismiss. (Quiambao v.
Peralta, G. R. No. L-9689, January 27, 1958.)

142. TAN VS DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

FACTS: Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising for public bidding
a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales consisting of 6,420 hectares,
within the former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was
turned over by the US Government to the Philippine Government. Wenceslao Tan with nine others
submitted their application in due form.

The area was granted to the petitioner. On May 30, 1963, Secretary Gozon of Agriculture and
Natural Resources issued a general memorandum order authorizing Dir. Of Forestry to grant new
Ordinary Timber Licenses (OTL) subject to some conditions stated therein (not exceeding 3000
hectares for new OTL and not exceeding 5000 hectares for extension)
Thereafter, Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Feliciano (replacing Gozon)
promulgated on December 19, 1963 a memorandum revoking the authority delegated to the

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Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses. On the same date, OTL in the name of Tan,
was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry, without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released by the Director of Forestry .

Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of ANR praying that the OTL of Tan be
revoked. On March 9, 1964, The Secretary of ANR declared Tans OTL null and void (but the same
was not granted to Ravago). Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner had exhausted administrative remedies available.

HELD: Petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedy in this case. He did not appeal the order of
the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines.
Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the
respondents, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to
exhaust his administrative remedies.

143. SANTIAGO VS PIONEER SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK

FACTS: Emilia Santiago who is the petitioner in this case is the owner of a parcel of land located in
Valenzuela, Manila. On April 7 1983, she executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of
Construction Resources Corporation of the Philippine (CRCP). On April 8 1983, CRCP executed a
Real Estate Mortgage over the Disputed Property in favor of FINASIA Investment and Finance
Corporation to secure a loan of P1 Million. The mortgage contract specifically provided that in the
event of default in payment, the mortgagee may immediately foreclose the mortgage judicially or
extrajudicially. The promissory note evidencing the indebtedness.

On July 29, 1983, FINASIA executed in favor of Pioneer Savings an Outright Sale of Receivables
without Recourse. CRCP failed to settle its obligation and the bank opted for the foreclosure of the
mortgage. The notice of auction sale was scheduled and when this came to the knowledge of
Santiago, she filed a complaint with the RTC of Valenzuela to invalidate the REM. The RTC issued a
TRO enjoining the sale at a public auction of the subject property. The petitioner further assailed
that she was not aware of any REM she had executed in favor of the defendant bank.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a cause of action.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the determination of the sufficiency of a cause of action must
be limited to the facts alleged in the complaint and no other should be considered. In this case,
however, a hearing was held and documentary evidence was presented, not on the Motion to
Dismiss but on the question of granting or denying the plaintiffs application for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. The Counsel for the plaintiff admitted that evidence presented That being
so, the trial court committed no reversible error.

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 144. ASIA BANKING VS WALTER OLSEN

FACTS: February 6, 1920 the defendant Walter E. Olsen & Co., Inc. obtained a loan of P200,00
from the plaintiff for the purpose of purchasing a piece of land in Tondo. After the land had been
purchased, the defendant corporation, Walter E. Olsen & Co., Inc. executed in favor of its
codefendants and of Mr. A. D. Gibbs a promissory note for the amount of P200,00 and a mortgage
upon the land to secure the payment of the P200,000 and a mortgage upon the secure of payment
of the P200,00.

On April 25, 1921, the defendant corporation Walter E. Olsen & Co., Inc. through its president and
treasurer, Mr. Walter E. Olsen, one of the defendants, mortgaged the same land to the plaintiff to
secure the payment of the loan of P200,000.

The complaint prays that judgment be rendered against defendants and each and every one of
them jointly and severally for the sum of P200,000, with interest at the rate of 9 per cent per
annum from November 4, 1920. All the defendants, except Mr. Walter E. Olsen, subscribed a
document wherein they agreed that a judgment be rendered prayed for in complaint. The
judgment appealed form dismisses the complaint as to the defendants Walter E. Olsen John W.
Marker, Louis McCall, B. A. Green and Theobald Diehl, sentencing the defendant Walter E. Olsen &
Co., Inc. to pay the plaintiff within three months the sum of P200,000, with interest at 9 percent
per annum from November 4, 1920.

ISSUE: Whether or not this is error in the judgment of the court.

HELD: Another error assigned by the appellant is the fact that the lower court took into
consideration the documents attached to the complaint as a part thereof, without having been
expressly introduced in evidence. This was no error. In the answer of the defendants there was no
denial under oath of the authenticity of these documents. Under section 103 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the authenticity be deemed admitted. The effect of this to relieve the plaintiff from the
duty of expressly presenting such documents as evidence. The court, for the proper decision of the
case, may and should consider, without the introduction of evidence, the facts admitted by the
parties. The judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant.

145. PELTAN DEVELOPMENT VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: The respondents were applying for a free patent to a certain parcel of land which they
have been occupying, cultivating, planting, staying, and introducing improvements thereon and
neither one of petitioners was in possession thereof. They had the land surveyed but the
processing and approval of their application were held in abeyance despite the absence of any
opposition on grounds that there allegedly existing certificates of title on said land in the name of
Peltan Development. Peltan allegedly obtained their title from spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria
Carlos, however the respondents assail that the title was spurious and fictitious. Prior to their
application for a free patent, the improvements they introduced to the land were bulldozed by
one of the petitioners. They filed a complaint that by virtue of the spurious title produced by the

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petitioners and the illegal destruction of the respondents plants and dwellings, their rights for a
free patent to the land were substantially prejudiced by petitioners and hold them liable to pay for
actual and compensatory damages. Peltan filed a motion for preliminary hearing on affirmative
defense on grounds that the respondents have no cause of action against them and they are not
the real party of interest in the action they sought to assert as they have no subsisting title to
present over the disputed property. Their contention was based on a former jurisprudence that
the government thru the Solicitor General should be the real party of interest to file a motion for
cancellation of the certificate of title. In answer, the respondents re-asserted their cause of action
to their complaint and showed their rights, interest and claims to have been violated thereby
placing them to a status of real party of interest.

The lower court dismissed the complaint ruling that the respondents were not a real party of
interest. This decision was reversed by the court of appeals ruling that the lower court should have
treated the action as accion publiciana to determine which party has the right to possession. The
petitioners now file a petition for review and pray for the cancellation of the notation of lis pendens
on their certificate of title.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are the real party of interest in their action against the
petitioners?

HELD: The SC reversed the decision of the appellate court. It is a well-settled rule that the cause of
action is determined by the allegations in the complaint and to resolve the motion to dismiss based
on failure to state cause of action, only the facts in the complaint must be considered. The court
held that the CA failed to appreciate the fact that the title of the petitioners were validly upheld by
the court in a court proceeding (G.R. No. 109490 and in G.R. No. 112038). Every court should take
mandatory judicial notice to court decisions when resolving motion to dismiss as required by Rule
129, section 1 of the Rules of Court. The CA erred in recognizing the rights of the respondents as
one based on their actual possession of the land and their pending application for a free patent
thereof. It also committed a reversible error to treat the issue as one of accion publiciana since the
decision has already been rendered by the court before upholding the title of the petitioners as valid
and genuine. Therefore, it is no longer an option to treat the case as one.

The respondents are held not as real party of interest since although they were not praying for the
reversion of the land to the government such complaint would still result to the same under the
Regalian doctrine. The respondents have no right over the land as they admit that neither they nor
their predecessors owned the land which is construed that the land in dispute remains to be a
property of public domain. If there is any person with real interest to the land it should be the
government. The SC reversed and set aside the decision of the CA and cancelled the annotation of
lis pendens to the petitioners title.

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 151. Legaspi-Santos v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

In April 1958, Civil Case No. 1692-M, was filed with the CFI of Bulacan, for partition of properties left
by their deceased parents, Fidel Legaspi and Gregoria Cristobal. During the pendency of the case,
Josefa Legaspi-Santos, filed a complaint in intervention claiming a share in the properties involved,
as daughter of Fidel Legaspi before his marriage to Gregoria Cristobal.

In June 1980, after more than twenty (20) years, said Civil Case No. 1692-M, was decided by the trial
court, dividing all the properties left by Don Fidel Legaspi involving more than 50 parcels of land
among plaintiffs and defendants (as children of the second marriage), and dismissing for lack of
merit the intervention of herein petitioner Josefa Legaspi-Santos (only child of his first marriage)

On August 14, 1980, intervenor Josefa Legaspi-Santos filed a motion for extension of time. within
which to appeal the aforesaid decision. The trial court gave her 30 days. On September 15, 1980,
Josefa Legaspi-Santos again moved for another extension of 20 days within which to perfect her
appeal. The motion was granted by the court. On October 8, 1980, Josefa Legaspi-Santos filed
another motion for extension of 20 days within which to perfect her appeal but, this time, the lower
court, in its Order of October 13, 1980, denied it on the ground that the period for perfecting her
appeal had expired on October 7, 1980, in which case there was no more period to extend and the
court had already lost jurisdiction to act on the motion.

Issue:

WON not the appeal interposed by Josefa Legaspi-Santos from the decision of the trial court, dated
June 18, 1980, was perfected on time

Rulings:

It is not denied that the period for appeal expired on October 7, 1980 and that the third motion to
extend the time to perfect petitioner's appeal was filed one (1) day late.

In Galima, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 16 SCRA 140, the rule was laid down that the motion for
extension of the period for filing the record on appeal must be filed before the expiration of the 30-
day period. "The miscomputation by counsel of the appeal period will not arrest the course of the
same, nor prevent the finality of the judgment. Otherwise, the definitive and executory character
of the judgment would be left to the whim of the losing party, when it is to the interest of everyone
that the date when judgments become final should remain fixed and ascertainable."

In the case at bar, our attention is invited by the private respondents that petitioner has not even
filed the notice of appeal and her appeal bond within the period of 30 days from receipt of the
decision. "The petitioner made a motion for extension of time to perfect her appeal without filing
the necessary notice of appeal and appeal bond and it was only as late as January 16, 1981 or one
hundred twenty-one (121) days after her deadline to perfect appeal when she filed them.

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 152. Mangali v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

On August 23, 1974, there is no dispute that Lot No. 2 (one of the nine lots included in O.C.T. No.
12192 of the Bulacan Registry of Property) was sold a retro on October 8, 1929 by the registered
owner Arcadio Mendoza in favor of one Gregorio dela Cruz for P500.00; that Arcadio Mendoza on
May 2, 1935, subsequently, in a deed of absolute sale, sold his 'right to redeem' to Liberate Mangali
for P500.00; and that Liberate Mangali, thru a deed of reconveyance executed by Gregorio dela Cruz
on May 6, 1935, redeemed the property also for the sum of P500.00. These transactions are not
only registered or annotated on the Original Certificate of Title No. 12192.

Court holds that the testimony thereon is vague, uncertain, biased, self-serving and unbelievable.
Besides, why was not a written document executed when after all, the other transactions were all
written and registered.

After this decision was promulgated, it appears that within the reglementary period for appeal
private respondents filed their notice of appeal bond and record on appeal but due to objections on
the part of petitioners, the trial court issued on January 29, 1976 the disputed order.

Purportedly in complaince with the foregoing order, respondents filed on March 1, 1976 their
amended record on appeal. This was Windy 19 days after their having received the said order. In
consequence, on March 15, 1976, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for having been
filed out of time allegedly in violation of Section 7 of Rule 41.

Issue:

WON Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Br. VII, can give due course to their appeal.

Rulings:

Court has repeatedly held that while the rules of procedure are liberally construed, the provisions
on reglementary periods are strictly applied as they are deemed indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.

We reiterated the same ruling in Macabingkil vs. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, thus:
These provisions of the Rules of Court prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done
or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless
delays and to the orderly discharge of judicial business (Alvero vs. de la Rosa, 76 Phil. 428). The time
can be extended only if a motion for extension is filed within the time or period provided therefor.
In the case at bar, no motion for extension was ever filed by petitioner Macabingkil before March
23, 1968, and, as such, the said decision of March 1, 1968 has already become final and executory.
To reiterate, perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not
only mandatory but jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal as required by the Rules has the
effect of rendering the judgment final and executory.

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 153. Valdez v. Ocumen

Facts:

On March 9, 1957, the justice of the peace court, after due hearing rendered a decision in case No.
224 ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the possession of the questioned Lot No.
3005, to vacate its premises, and to pay the costs. Notice of said decision was sent to the parties on
April 30, 1957, defendants receiving their copy on May 24, 1957. On May 29, 1957, defendants filed
with said court a notice of appeal and an appeal bond of P25.00 without, however, paying the
appellate court docket fee of P16.00, as required under Section 2, Rule 40, of the Rules of Court.
Acting upon said notice of appeal, the court, on the same date, issued an order forwarding the
records of the case to the CFI of Isabela but stating therein "without however the docket fee for
appeal". The Clerk of Court of First Instance received the records on July 25, 1957, at 3:30 P.M.
Defendants paid the appellate court docket fee of P16.00 only on the following day, July 26, 1957.

Resolving plaintiff's motion filed on July 29, 1957, to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was
not perfected within the reglementary period (15 days from notice of the judgment) provided in the
Rules of Court, and defendant's opposition thereto, the Court of First Instance on August 28, 1957,
issued an order dismissing the appeal.

Defendant's motion for reconsideration of said order on the ground of its alleged illegality having
been denied, defendants instituted this present appeal.

Issue:

WON the trial judge correctly and properly dismissed said appeal.

Rulings:

Section 2, Rule 40, of the Rules of Court, provides: Appeal, how perfected.An appeal shall be
perfected within fifteen days after notification to the of the party judgment complained of, (a) by
filing with the justice of the peace or municipal judge a notice of appeal; (b) by delivering a certificate
of the municipal treasure were showing that the appellant has deposited the appellate court docket
fee or in charactered cities, a certificate of the clerk of such court showing receipt of the said fee;
and (c) by giving a bond.

Under this provision of the Rules of Court, in order to perfect an appeal from the judgment of the
Justice of the Peace or Municipal Court, an appellant must, within 15 days from notice of the
judgment, (1) file with the justice of the peace or municipal judge a notice of appeal, (2) deliver a
certificate of the municipal treasurer or of the clerk of Court of First Instance in chartered cities,
showing that he has deposited the appellate court docket fee, and (3) give a bond.

In the case under the consideration, while defendants did file with the Justice of Peace of Roxas,
their fee of P16.00. It was only on July 26, 1957, that is, 61 days after filing their notice of appeal

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evidently, beyond the reglementary period of 15 days from notice of judgment as provided under
the aforequoted section of the Rules of Court, that they elected the payment of the same. Their
appeal, therefore, was never perfected in the Court of First Instance of Isabela, and the trial judge
correctly and properly dismissed said appeal, as it acquired no jurisdiction thereon.

154. Alvero v. De La Rosa

Facts:

On June 25, 1945, respondent Jose R. Victoriano had filed a complaint, in the Court of First Instance
of the City of Manila, against petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero and one Margarita Villarica, alleging
two causes of action.

On July 7, 1945, Margarita Villarica filed an answer to said complaint, expressly admitting having
sold said land to Alvero, for P100,000, in December, 1944. On July 13, 1945, Alvero, in answering
said complaint, denied the allegations made therein, and claimed exclusive ownership of the land.
On July 21, 1945, Victoriano filed an answer to said counterclaim, denying Alvero's alleged
ownership.

Judge of the CFI of the City of Manila rendered judgment in favor of Victoriano.

On November 28, 1945, Alvero filed a petition for reconsideration and new trial, which was denied;
On January 8, 1946, Alvero filed his notice of appeal and record on appeal simultaneously in the
lower court, without filing the P60-appeal bond. On January 14, 1946, Victoriano filed a petition to
dismiss the appeal, and at the same time, asked for the execution of the judgment.

On January 15, 1946, Alvero filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss, alleging that on the very
same day, said appeal bond for P60 had been actually filed, and allege as an excuse, for not filing
the said appeal bond, in due time, the illness of his lawyer's wife, who died on January 10, 1946, and
buried the following day.

On January 17, 1946, the respondent judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, ordered the dismissal of the
appeal, declaring that, although the notice of appeal and record on appeal had been filed in due
time, the P60-appeal bond was filed too late. On January 23, 1946, Alvero filed a petition for the
reconsideration of the said order dated January 17, 1946, dismissing his appeal; and said petition
for reconsideration was denied on January 29, 1946. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue:

WON the petition for certiorari filed in this case, should be dismissed.

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Rulings:

Yes. Motions of that kind have been considered as motions pro forma intended merely to delay the
proceeding, and, as such, they cannot and will not interrupt or suspend the period of time for the
perfection of the appeal. Hence, the period for perfecting herein petitioner's appeal commenced
from November 28, 1945, when he was notified of the judgment rendered in the case, and expired
on December 28, 1945; and, therefore, his notice of appeal and record on appeal filed on January
8, 1946, were filed out of time, and much more so his appeal bond, which was only filed on January
15, 1946.

The attorney for petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero could have asked for an extension of time, within
which to file and perfect his appeal, in the court below; but he had failed to do so, and he must bear
the consequences of his act. A strict observance of the rules of court, which have been considered
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy dispatch of judicial
business, is an imperative necessity.

155. FJR Garments Industries v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

The city court of Pasay City on March 11, 1978 rendered a decision ordering Kapisanang
Magkakapitbahay Damayan at Abuluyan, Inc. to vacate the lots and to restore the owner, FJR
Garments Industries, to the possession thereof and to pay the accumulated back rentals.

The decision was served on Kapisanan on July 6, 1978. Nine days thereafter, or on July 15, 1978,
Kapisanan filed a notice of a appeal but it did not pay the docket fee of P20 and the appeal bond of
P50 and post the supersedeas bond of P107,860, as required by sections 2 and 3, Rule 40 in relation
to section 8, Rule 70 and section 5 (12), Rule 141, Rules of Court.

The city court "disapproved" Kapisanan's appeal. Without filing any motion for reconsideration,
Kapisanan filed the next day in the CFI of Pasay City a petition for relief from judgment on the
ground of mistake and excusable negligence consisting of the alleged misinterpretation made by a
member of Kapisanan in paying only the postage stamps for the notice mailed to adverse counsel
instead of the docket fee and appeal bond. However, the lower court dismissed the petition for
relief because of its finding that Kapisanan's failure to appeal was due to its inexcusable neglect.

Kapisanan filed on August 28, 1978 a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals to annul the
lower court's order.

Issue:

WON the lessee should be allowed to pay the docket fee and file an appeal bond after the 15-day
period.

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Rulings:

We hold that the failure of Kapisanan to perfect its appeal was not a pardonable oversight. It is not
entitled to relief from judgment because there was no fraud or excusable neglect which prevented
it from seasonably appealing to the CFI. Moreover, its petition had no affidavit of merits.
Furthermore, its failure to file a supersedeas bond rendered the city court's judgment immediately
executory.

The fact that even before the expiration of the 15-day period the city court declared Kapisanan's
appeal "moot and academic" is of no moment since the fact is that during that period the lessee did
not attempt to pay the docket fee and appeal bond.

Rules of court prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings
taken, are absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy
discharge of judicial business. Strict compliance with such rules is mandatory and imperative.

156. G.R. No. 129718 SANTO TOMAS UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, petitioner vs. CESAR ANTONIO Y.
SURLA and EVANGELINE SURLA, respondents. August 17, 1998
FACTS:
Respondent spouses filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Santo Tomas University
Hospital with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City predicated on an allegation by the spouses
that their son, Emmanuel Cesar Surla, while confined at the said hospital for having been born
prematurely, had accidentally fallen from his incubator possibly causing serious harm on the child.
Petitioner hospital filed a complaint which was soon dismissed by the trial court. Petitioner also filed
before the same court an Omnibus motion seeking for clarification as why the trial court denied his
Reply and Counterclaim. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner which was denied
by the trial court. Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by way of a
special civil action for certiorari under rule 65. Said petition was dismissed by the Curt of Appeals.
Hence, this instant case.

ISSUE: Whether or not a compulsory counterclaim pleaded in an Answer be dismissed on the ground
of a failure to accompany it with a certificate of non-forum shopping.

RULING: The petitioner is entitled to partial relief. A counterclaim partakes of the nature of a
complaint and/or a cause of action against the plaintiff in a case x x x, only this time it is the original
defendant who becomes the plaintiff. It stands on the same footing and is tested by the same rules
as if it were an independent action.
In the case at bar, an appeal from the dismissal of the counterclaim, although not totally
unavailable, could have well been ineffective, if not futile, as far as petitioner is concerned since no

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single piece of evidence has yet been presented by it, the opportunity having been foreclosed by
the trial court, on the dismissed counterclaim which could form part of the records to be reviewed
by the appellate court. The object of procedural law is not to cause an undue protraction of the
litigation, but to facilitate the adjudication of conflicting claims and to serve, rather than to defeat,
the ends of justice.

157. G.R. No. L-26768 FAUSTINO GOJO, petitioner-appellant, vs. SEGUNDO GOYALA and
ANTONINA ALMOGUERA, respondents-appellees. October 30, 1970

FACTS:
Appellee Goyala together with his now deceased wife Almoguera sold to appellant by a
"Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale" a certain parcel of agricultural land having an area of approximately
two and one-half hectares for P750.00, the repurchase to be made, according to the deed, within
one year. About ten (10) years after the execution of the said document, the vendee filed with the
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon the present case against the vendors by way of a petition for
consolidation of ownership of the land described and involved in the "Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale."
The complaint was dismissed for failure to submit amended complaint. Apellant was then declared
in default with respect to the appellee. After he presentation of evidences, the trial court rendered
a decision declaring the deed of Pacto de Retro Sale an equitable mortgage and ordered the delivery
and restoration of the land. Dissatisfied with the decision, appellant appealed the Court of Appeals
which certified the case to the Supreme Court for resolution since said appeal involves a purely
question of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in: (a) declaring the plaintiff in default; (b) deputizing or
commissioning the clerk of court to receive the evidence of the defendant; and (c) rendering
judgment in favour of the respondents.

RULING: YES. The thrust of appellant's argument in respect of the first assignment of error is to the
effect that there is no occasion for the trial court to declare him in default in respect of appellee's
counterclaim in this case, for the reasons that: (a) the said counterclaim "falls within the category
of compulsory counterclaim" which does not call for an independent answer as the complaint
already denies its material allegations; and (b) the dismissal of the complaint in this case without
prejudice carried with it the dismissal of the said counterclaim.

Regarding the dismissal of petitioner's complaint, the Court also ruled, that the trial court
committed reversible error in ordering the same. It is true that under Section 3 of Rule 17, a
complaint may be dismissed for failure to prosecute if the plaintiff fails to comply with an order of
the court, but it is obvious that the said provision cannot apply when the order supposedly ignored
is a void one, as in this case. Here, the trial court ordered petitioner to amend the complaint only
because it was informed that one of the defendants had died, the court directing that the plaintiff
should name the heirs of the deceased as defendants in lieu of said deceased.

Besides, in line with the principle underlying Sec. 2 of Rule 17, it is not proper to dismiss a
complaint when a compulsory counterclaim has been pleaded by defendant. The reason is obvious.
Under the cited provision, the right of the plaintiff to move for the dismissal of an action after the

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defendant has filed his answer is qualified by the clause providing that: "If a counterclaim has been
pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action
shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain
pending for independent adjudication by the court." With this limitation, the power of the court to
dismiss the complaint upon motion of plaintiff, which is usually without prejudice, is not purely
discretionary. The purpose is to avoid multiplicity of suits over the same matter which would
necessarily entail unnecessary expense and, what is worse, possibility of conflict and inconsistency
in the resolution of the same questions. The same considerations would obtain, if the defendant
were the one to ask for dismissal. The best interests of justice require that conflicting claims
regarding the same matter should be decided in one single proceeding. Dismissing the complaint
without prejudice, as the trial court has done in this case, albeit upon motion of the defendant, will
not prevent the undesirable multiplication of suits and reventilation of the same issues in the
subsequent action that may be filed by virtue of the reservation made in the disputed order of
dismissal.

158. G.R. No. L-11647 FLORENTINO NAVARRO and BEATRIZ VINOYA, petitioners, vs. HON. ELOY
BELLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, JUAN CABUANG, FLORENTINA
BAUTISTA, FLORENCIO GALICIA and CONSOLACION BAUTISTA, respondents. January 31, 1958

FACTS:

Petitioners-plaintiffs filed a complaint with the CFI of Pangasinan praying for the annulment
of transfer certificates of title Nos. 15967 and 15968 and the corresponding deeds of sale executed
by respondents Florencio Galicia and Consolacion Bautista in favor of respondents Juan Cabuang
and Florentino Bautista over lots Nos. 20774 and 32540, of the San Carlos Cadastre, claiming
ownership of said parcels of land, and alleging actual possession. Soon after, the court rendered
decision adjudicating the defendant's counterclaim for damages, declaring the respondents owners
of the disputed parcels of land, and dismissing the complaint. As a result, the petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Another motion for reconsideration
was filed but was also denied by the trial court. A notice of appeal was also filed by the petitioners
but it was also denied. Thereafter, a petition for certiorari and mandamus with injunction seeking
the annulment of a decision of the CFI of Pangasinan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint

RULING: The writ of certiorari is granted, and the decision of July 30, 1956 of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan in its case No. 13099 is hereby set aside, and said court is directed to proceed
with the trial of the entire case on the merits.

But in any event, whether or not plaintiffs have answered defendants' counterclaim, they have the
right to prove the averments of their complaint, including their claim that it was by court order that
they secured possession of the parcels in question from defendants. And if plaintiffs are able to

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prove such allegations, then the court must dismiss defendants' counterclaim for damages, since
the illegal usurpation of defendants' possession allegedly committed by plaintiffs, which is the basis
of the counterclaim, would not have been proved. In short, the issues of the counterclaim partakes
of the nature of a special defense which, even if not specifically challenged by plaintiffs in a reply, is
deemed controverted (Rule 11, sec. 1, Rules of Court; Rosario vs. J. Martinez, 92 Phil., 1064; Luna
vs. Apacible, 79 Phil.,8). There was, therefore, no occasion for plaintiffs' default on defendants'
counterclaim, and the order of the court below declaring them in default, as well as the judgment
by default, is improper and void.

Since the ownership of the disputed land was put in issued by the allegations of the complaint and
the special defenses in the answer, the correct procedure, assuming that the declaration of default
was properly entered, should have been for the trial court to set the complaint and answer for the
hearing. The lower court, even in the case of a true default on the counter claim, could not deny the
petitioners-palintiffs the right to be heard and produce evidence in support of their complaint, as
that pleading was valid and had not been stricken from the records. Their having defaulted on the
counterclaim, if they did so at all, did not operate to deprive the plaintiffs from any standing or
remedy in court in connection with their complaint.

159. G.R. No. L-1387 MENA LAMA, petitioner, vs. CONSOLACION N. VDA. DE APACIBLE, and
EUGENIO ANGELES, Judge of First Instance of Batangas, respondents. August 27, 1947

FACTS:
Petitioner seeks the writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in his petition dated
March 24, 1947, praying judgment: (a) revoking the appointment of the receiver in civil case No.
3932 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, with declaration of nullity of the orders issued by
respondent Judge Angeles on January 14, 17, and 21, 1947, as having been issued without or in
excess of his jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion; (b) declaring null and void the proceedings had
before the same judge on March 13, 1947, and issuing a writ of prohibition commanding him to
desist from further proceeding with the case until further orders of this Court; (c) declaring null and
void the order of the same respondent judge made in open court denying petitioner's motion to
declare respondent Apacible in default in that case, and issuing writ of mandamus directing said
judge to enter another order declaring respondent Apacible in default for failure to answer
petitioner's counterclaim and allowing petitioner to present his evidence in support of said
counterclaim; and (d) for general relief.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion.

RULING: NO. The respondent judge committed no abuse of discretion in proceeding, as he did,
commencing the hearing on the merits and postponing its continuation until further assignment as
prayed by the therein defendant himself. In the same way, the court find absolutely no showing of
abuse of discretion on the part of the judge in reserving until after the presentation of evidence on
the merits the resolution of the appointment of receiver. As to the appointment of receivers, it is a
well settled principle that the determination thereof must primarily start from the fundamental and
well-settled principle that the matter of the appointment of a receiver is largely within the discretion
of the court to which the petition is addressed, provided that court is one of those to which the law

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of the rules grant the request power. However, the receiver should be made to file a bond pursuant
to Rule 61, section 5.

160. G.R. No. L-25889 HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF THE PROVINCE OF RIZAL, JAIME E.
LAICO and LUZ LOS BANOS-LAICO, petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE CHIVI
and ANGELINA CHIVI as representative of the deceased MARTA B. CHIVI, respondents-
appellees. Ernesto J. Seva for petitioners-appellants. January 17, 1973

FACTS:

Spouses Isidro Sierra and Antonia Magtaas sold a parcel of land to Marta B. Chivi,
representing to her that the land was not registered either under the Land Registration Act or under
the Spanish Mortgage Law and assuring her that although the land was covered by a pre-war free
patent application, the application had not been approved and no patent had been issued. At the
instance of the Sierras, Chivi filed an application for registration of the land in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. While the application was pending, Chivi sold her rights and interests in the land
to the herein petitioners-spouses Jaime Laico and Luz Los Banos for P25,647.00.Soon, the Laicos
discovered that a free patent title was issued to Sierra.

The Sierras filed a complaint against Marta B. Chivi, assisted by her husband, and the Laicos
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 6184, praying that they (plaintiffs)
be allowed to repurchase the land under the provisions of the Public Land Act. Soon after, the Sierras
and the Laicos, without knowledge to the Chivis, entered into a compromise to amicably settle Civil
Case No. 6184 between themselves. Said agreement was approved by the trial court resulting for
the dismissal of the case. In this regard, the Chivis filed with the Court of Appeal a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. Upon giving due course to the petition the
Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction, restraining the therein respondents from
proceedings with the execution and with the sale at public auction until further order. The CA
rendered a decision declaring all the proceedings, as well as the orders, decisions and processes null
and void. Hence, the instant appeal by certiorari brought by the Laicos.

Issue:

Whether or not the cross-claim in this particular action can stand after the complaint in the
same action was dismissed with prejudice.

RULING:

NO. The cross-claim in this case was purely defensive in nature. It arose entirely out of the
complaint and could prosper only if the plaintiffs succeeded. Hence, under the principle above

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enunciated, it could not be the subject of independent adjudication once it lost the nexus upon
which its life depended.

Under the circumstances above set forth the dismissal of the cross-claim should have followed the
dismissal of the complaint as a matter of course, without further proceeding; and in setting the said
cross-claim for pre-trial and receiving evidence thereon and then rendering judgment against the
cross-defendants the court committed such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction correctible by certiorari.

166. MACARAEG vs. CA (January 20, 1989; 169 SCRA 259)

FACTS:

A case involving an agricultural land was filed over the Court of Agrarian Relations.

The judgement of the Court of Agrarian Relations went in favor of the plaintiffs.

On appeal, the CA (respondent court) affirmed the agrarian court's judgment basing its
decision ground that there is an alleged procedural defect at the pretrial stage that was not raised
by the petitioners, hence, deemed waived.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed an error of law in not applying the principle of res
judicata.

RULING:

The appellate court found that there is no Identity of the parties and the subject matter as
between the present case and a former case docketed as CAR Case No. 2582-T '73. Such identity is
an indispensable requisite of the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court upheld the appellate
court's findings with respect to the non-applicability of the said doctrine in the absence of
substantial evidence to the contrary.

The Supreme Court held that the findings of fact of the court of Appeals are final and
conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court provided they are based on
substantial evidence.

Petition is DISMISSED.

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167. LUCENTA vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BUKIDNON (June 20, 1988; 162 SCRA 197)

FACTS:

This petition originated from an action for recovery of possession instituted by the
petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Bukidnon against the private respondent. At the pretrial,
the issue was reduced to whether or not the property given by the petitioner in exchange for the
private respondent's house consisted of only around 600 square meters or the whole of the
petitioner's lot. Both parties admitted that they entered into an oral contract of barter. Both also
belong to a cultural minority group. Initially, the petitioner insisted that only 600 square meters of
his lot was offered in the barter agreement. After trial, the petitioner filed a memorandum
adopting a different theory of his case. He attacked the legality of the barter itself on the ground
that the same was not made in accordance with Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code
of Mindanao and Sulu. The trial court did not pass upon the issue of the legality of. the barter as
the same was not raised in the pleadings, at the pre-trial and during the trial. Instead, it upheld the
oral contract of barter and ruled that based on the preponderance of evidence presented in court,
what was bartered by the petitioner was his whole lot. Hence, this petition.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, he filed
this petition for certiorari asking us to set aside the decision of the trial court. He contends that
the latter court should have decided and passed upon the validity and legality of the verbal
agreement on the following grounds: (a) the fact that the petitioner and private respondent are
members of the cultural minority and that the exchange made between them involving a parcel of
land was not in writing, are both specifically alleged in the pleadings and therefore, the trial court
should have taken cognizance of the same; and (b) although petitioner did not specifically pray for
the annulment of the verbal agreement of exchange, there was a general prayer in his complaint
upon which the respondent court may grant or decide such issue.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for Certiorari is meritorious.

RULING:

Petition is DENIED for lack of merit

When the petitioner filed his complaint, it was for the recovery of possession of the
remaining area of his lot outside of the 600 square meters which he claimed was the only subject-
matter of the barter. Although he alleged that he and the private respondent are both members of
the cultural minority (in fact, they are brothers), he filed suit not for the purpose of impugning the
validity or legality of the verbal contract, but rather, to give strength to the same as it is more
common for members of cultural Minorities to practice barter as a means of trade and commerce

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than for those who are not. Furthermore, during the pre-trial, the parties agreed that the only
issue to be litigated upon is whether the verbal agreement pertains to the exchange of the house
of the private respondent for the entire land of the petitioner or for only six hundred (600) square
meters thereof. The petitioner is bound by what was agreed upon in the pre-trial.

168. SON vs. SON (December 29, 1995; 251 SCRA 556)

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

169. SESE vs. IAC (July 31 1997; 152 SCRA 585)

FACTS:

Another case involving a land dispute.

In this petition for review, by way of appeal by certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as supplemented by, and in conjunction with, Republic Act No. 5440, the petitioner,
Amancio Sese, impugns the Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution, denying his
Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed. The questioned decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals (formerly Intermediate Appellate Court), set aside and reversed the decision of the trial
court.

The Resolution of the appellate court, curtly denied Sese's motion for reconsideration
saying: "A second review of the records does not yield any cause or reason for a finding favorable
to the defendant-appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in their decision to not affirm the decision of the RTC.

RULING:

There is, indeed, merit to the petitioner's contention that the Honorable Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) erred in holding that the land in question was fully
identified by the private respondents herein; In holding that the private respondents have
successfully proven their title to the land in question; In not holding that the petitioner herein is
the true and absolute owner of the land he bought from his predecessor-in-interest; In not
affirming the decision of the trial court.

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 The first assignment of error involves the question of the Identity of the land while the
second and third focus on the issue of ownership. The resolution of the issue of ownership is
dependent upon the determination of the Identity of the land. We thus endeavored to resolve first
the latter.

As a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be
reviewed on appeal, provided, they are borne out by the record or are based on substantive
evidence. However, this rule admits of certain exceptions.

The rule may be that admissions made by the parties during a pre-trial conference and
incorporated in pre-trial order are binding but this rule is not without exceptions. In order to
prevent manifest injustice, the admissions made by the parties during the pre-trial were
disregarded by the lower court, as in this case, the SC did not hold otherwise. It would be contrary
to the objective of the law if the SC were to constrain to rule that the land subject of this
controversy were the same land being occupied by the petitioner if the evidence negates such
claim. To so hold would unduly prejudice the substantial rights of the petitioner who stands to lose
his property if only because of mere technicality, inaccuracy of language, or plain carelessness.

Thus in order to maintain an action to recover ownership of real property, the person who
claims that he has a better right to the property must prove not only his ownership of the same,
but first, he must satisfactorily prove the identity thereof. In this case, failing to fix the identity of
the real property they claim, the respondents action must fail. And this, in fact, was what the trial
court has decided. And for such failure, the issue of ownership need no longer be passed upon by
us.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution are set asideand the judgment of
the trial court is hereby REINSTATED.

170. VELASCO vs. APOSTOL (May 9 1989; 173 SCRA 228)

FACTS:

Originally sued as defendants were Dominador Santos, Alice Artuz, and Norberto Santos,
with plaintiffs claiming actual, moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees. After an answer
was filed by said defendants, private respondent Maharlika Insurance Co., Inc. was impleaded as a
defendant in an amended complaint filed by the petitioner with an allegation that the N/S taxicab
involved was insured against third party liability with private respondent at the time of the
accident.

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 In its answer to the amended complaint, respondent Maharlika Insurance Co., Inc. claimed
that there was no cause of action against it because at the time of the accident, the alleged
insurance policy was not in force due to non-payment of the premium thereon. It further averred
that even if the taxicab had been insured, the complaint would still be premature since the policy
provides that the insurer would be liable only when the insured becomes legally liable.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff finding that the evidence on the
negligence of defendant Dominador Santos was uncontroverted and the proximate cause of the
accident was his negligence.

Maharlika Insurance Co. was exonerated on the ground that the policy was not in force for
failure of the therein defendants to pay the initial premium and for their concealment of a
material fact.

From the decision of the court a quo, petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court
by a petition for review on certiorari, with the averment that only questions of law are involved.

Petitioners fault the respondent-judge for considering private respondent's defense of late
payment of premium when, according to them, "the same was waived at the pre-trial" hence
private respondent's evidence of late payment should be disregarded supposedly because, as We
understand petitioners' argument, private respondent had thereby admitted that such fact was
not in issue. They theorize that what was stipulated in the pre-trial order "does not include the
issue on whether defendant Maharlika Insurance Co., Inc. is liable under the insurance policy, even
as the premium was paid after the accident in question."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition is meritorious.

RULING:

Petitioners' position is bereft of merit.

When the pre-trial order but was examined the Court found no discernment of any
intimation or semblance of a waiver or an admission on the part of Maharlika Insurance Co., Inc.
Although there is no express statement as to the fact of late payment, this is necessarily deemed
included in or ineluctably inferred from the issue of whether the company is liable under the
insurance policy it had allegedly issued for the vehicle involved and on which petitioners seek to
recover.

A pre-trial order is not meant to be a detailed catalogue of each and every issue that is to
be or may be taken up during the trial. Issues that are impliedly included therein or may be

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inferable therefrom by necessary implication are as much integral parts of the pre-trial order as
those that are expressly stipulated.

It would be absurd and inexplicable for the respondent company to knowingly disregard or
deliberately abandon the issue of non-payment of the premium on the policy considering that it is
the very core of its defense. Correspondingly, the court also cannot but perceive here an
undesirable resort to technicalities to evade an issue determinative of a defense duly averred.

Furthermore, as private respondent correctly points out, evidence to prove such late
payment was introduced without any objection by the adverse party. This lack of objection
amounts to an implied consent conferring jurisdiction on the court to try said issue.

In the petitioners reply to respondents' comment, they categorically stated that

respondents' point regarding the lack of objection to the evidence is well taken, hence they do not
insist on this ground to review respondent court's decision. However, in their amended reply, they
reverted to their original position that it was a mistake for the trial court to have considered the
defense of lack of payment of premium.

The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.

171. YU V. MAPAYO

FACTS:

Facts:

Appellant filed a complaint in the City Court of Davao to recover from defendant Mapayo
the sum of P2, 800, which represented an unpaid balance of the purchase price of an engine (Gray
Marine), sold to defendant. The defendant admitted the said transaction in his answer but he
alleged that the engine had hidden defects causing him to spend the same amount for the repairs
and labor, wherefore plaintiff had agreed to waive the balance due on the price of the engine and
counterclaimed for damages and attorneys' fees.

The Court disallowed the defenses and ordered the defendant to pay plaintiff P2, 500.00
and costs. Defendant Mapayo appealed to CFI and filed an answer that was a virtual reproduction
of his original defenses in the City Court.

The defendant, as well as his counsel, failed to appear and the court scheduled the case for
hearing ex parte on the same day. The Court ordered plaintiff to present his evidence but it failed
to do so. The plaintiff's counsel refused to comply and instead of calling his witnesses, he moved
the Court to present them after the defendant had presented their evidence. The court asked said

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counsel twice whether he would present his evidence for the plaintiff, but said counsel refused to
do so and sticked to his demand that he would introduce his witnesses only in rebuttal.This
prompted the court to dismiss the case on ground of failure of the plaintiff to prosecute, hence
this appeal.

ISSUE: W/N the CFI validly dismissed the case on ground of plaintiff's failure to prosecute

HELD:

NO. The court held that the dismissal in untenable and contrary to law. The defendant was not
able to support his special defenses. The answer admitted defendant's obligation as stated in the
complaint, and pleaded special defenses hence the plaintiff had every right to insist that it was for
the defendant to come forward with evidence in support of his special defenses. Judicial
admissions do not require proof.

172. LOPES V. LIBORO

FACTS:

In the Court of First Instance of Batangas the appellant opposed unsuccessfully the probate of
what purports to be the last will and testament (Exhibit A) of Don Sixto Lopez, who died at the age
of 83 in Balayan, Batangas, on March 3, 1947, almost six months after the document in question
was executed.

Allegedly, the trial court communicated an abuse of discretion in allowing the appellant to offer
evidence to prove knowledge of Spanish by the testator, the language in which the will is drawn,
after the petitioner had rested his case and after the opponent had moved for dismissal of the
petition on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not committed grave abuse of discretion.

HELD:

The do not share the opinion that the trial court communicated an abuse of discretion in allowing
the appellant to offer evidence to prove knowledge of Spanish by the testator, the language in
which the will is drawn, after the petitioner had rested his case and after the opponent had moved
for dismissal of the petition on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It is within the discretion of
the court whether or not to admit further evidence after the party offering the evidence has
rested, and this discretion will not be reviewed except where it has clearly been abused. (64 C. J.,
160.) More, it is within the sound discretion of the court whether or not it will allow the case to be
reopened for the further introduction of evidence after a motion or request for a nonsuit, or a

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demurrer to the evidence, and the case may be reopened after the court has announced its
intention as to its ruling on the request, motion, or demurrer, or has granted it or has denied the
same, or after the motion has been granted, if the order has not been written, or entered upon
the minutes or signed. (64 C. J., 164.)

In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed. After the parties have produced their respective
direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only, but, it has been held, the court,
for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their
original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of
discretion appears.

173. MENESES V. Secretary of agrarian reform

FACTS:

Records show that the complaint for just compensation was first filed in the RTC, but this was
dismissed in the Order dated June 22, 1994, for the reason that the determination of just
compensation must first be filed with the DAR.36 Conformably with said ruling, petitioners filed the
complaint with the DAR, which dismissed the same on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to hear
and decide valuation cases covered by P.D. No. 27.37 Because of said dismissal, petitioners went
back to the RTC for the re-opening of the case. Petitioners' case was obviously thrown back and
forth between the two venues, and with the RTC's second dismissal, they were left hanging and
without any recourse, which, of course, is iniquitous considering that their property has already long
been expropriated by the government and its fruits enjoyed by the farmer-beneficiaries.

On the propriety of the filing of a motion for judgment on the pleadings by the LBP and adopted by
the DAR Secretary the Court finds that the CA erred in sustaining its propriety.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining its propriety.

HELD: Rule 34, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,28 provides that a judgment on the pleadings is proper
when an answer fails to render an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading. The essential question is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. A
judgment on the pleadings may be sought only by a claimant, who is the party seeking to recover
upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim; or to obtain a declaratory relief.29

In this case, the separate Answers filed by the respondents definitely tendered issues, as it made
specific denials of the material allegations in the complaint and asserted affirmative defenses, which
would bar recovery by petitioners. Moreover, it was erroneous for the RTC to require the filing of a
motion for judgment on the pleadings and for the LBP and the DAR Secretary to file the same since

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in the first place, the latter are neither plaintiffs in the case nor counter-claimants or cross-
claimants.

What the RTC obviously meant to be filed was a motion for summary judgment, a procedural device
designed for the prompt disposition of actions, which may be rendered if the pleadings, supporting
affidavits, depositions and admissions on file show that, after a summary hearing, there is no
genuine issue regarding any material fact, except as to the amount of damages, and the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, and which may be applied for by either a claimant
or a defending party.

174. Sps. Hontiveros V. Regional trial court of ilo-ilo

FACTS:

On 03 December 1990, petitioners, spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for
damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson before the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo. Petitioner alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land and also alleged
that they were deprived of income from the said lands consisting of rentals from tenants of the land
and that private respondents withheld possession of the land in bad faith.

In their answer, private respondent Hontiveros denied the allegations and invoked that he and
respondent Ayson were not married. On the contrary, they alleged that the possession of the
subject property had already been transferred to petitioners since 1985 by virtue of writ of
possession.

Moreover, considering the foregoing facts, respondents assert petitioners were receiving rentals
from the lands, hence, the complaint has no cause of action since it did not allege that earnest
efforts towards a compromise had been made, considering that petitioner Augusto and respondent
Gregorio are brothers. On 16 May 1991 petitioners filed an Amended Complaint to insert the
allegation that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made between the parties but the
same were unsuccessful. Respondents answered the Amended Complaint and denied the same.

On 19 July 1995, petitioners moved for a judgment of pleadings on the ground that respondents
did not tender an issue.

On 23 November 1995, the Regional Trial Court denied the petitioners motion and at the same
time dismissed the case on the ground of unverified complaint pursuant to Article 151 of the Family
Code and therefore, it did not believe that earnest efforts had been made to arrive at a compromise.

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 Petitioners moved for a reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this present case.

ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that it does not allege under
oath that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made prior to the filing as required by Article
151 of the Family Code?

RULING:

Yes, the Court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that verified complaint of earnest
efforts to a compromise only because the trial court could not believe the veracity of the allegation.

The Court emphasized that the absence of the verification required in Article 151 does not affect
the jurisdiction of the Court over the subject matter of the complaint. Such verification is merely a
formal requirement intended to secure assurance that matters which are alleged are true and
correct.

Under Article 151 of the Family Code, No suit between members of the same family shall prosper
unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were
in fact made, the case must be dismissed.

Petitioners contention that Article 151 of the FC does not apply to the case is correct since the suit
is not exclusively among the family members. Under the subject provision, the phrase members of
the same family refers to the husband and wife; parents and children; ascendants and descendants;
and brothers and sisters.

Respondent Ayson and Petitioner Hontiveros (Maria) are considered strangers to the Hontiveros
family for purposes of Art. 151, therefore, they are not members of the family. In several
jurisprudence, the Court already decided that whenever a stranger is a party in the case involving
the family members, the requisite showing the earnest efforts to compromise is no longer
mandatory.

175. RIVERA V. SOLIDBANK

FACTS:

Rivera applied for retirement under the Special Retirement Program. Solid bank approved the
application and Rivera was entitled to receive the net amount of P963,619.28. However in 1995
Solidbank discovered that Equitable Bank employed Rivera as Manager of its Credit
Investigation and Appraisal Division of its Consumers Banking Group. Solidbank then informed
Rivera that he had violated the Undertaking and demanded the return of all the monetary benefits

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he received. When Rivera refused to return the amount demanded within the given period,
Solidbank filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money. 963,619.28. He signed an undated
Release, Waiver and Quitclaim, which was notarized on March 1, 1995. Rivera acknowledged receipt
of the net proceeds of his separation and retirement benefits and promised that "[he] would
not, at any time, in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly engage in any unlawful activity
prejudicial to the interest of Solidbank, its parent, affiliate or subsidiary companies, their
stockholders, officers, directors, agents or employees, and their successors-in-interest and will
not disclose any information concerning the business of Solidbank, its manner or operation, its
plans, processes, or data of any kind.

ISSUE: whether the parties raised a genuine issue in their pleadings, affidavits, and documents, that
is, whether the employment ban incorporated in the Undertaking which petitioner executed upon
his retirement is unreasonable, oppressive, hence, contrary to public policy.

HELD:

The petition is meritorious.

A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from
an issue which is a sham, fictitious, contrived or a false claim. The trial court can determine a genuine
issue on the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits or counter affidavits
submitted by the parties. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there
is no real or genuine issue or question as to any fact and summary judgment called for. On the other
hand, where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary
judgment cannot take the place of a trial.[29] The evidence on record must be viewed in light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion who must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences
as can reasonably be drawn from the evidence.

176. Bitanga vs.Pyramid Construction Engineering

FACTS: Pyramid filed with the RTC a Complaint for specific performance and damages with
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the petitioner and wife
Marilyn. Respondent alleged in its Complaint that, it entered into an agreement with Macrogen
Realty, of which Bitanga is the President, to construct for the latter the Shoppers Gold Building
located in Paraaque City. Respondent commenced civil, structural, and architectural works on the
construction project. However, Macrogen failed to settle respondents progress billings. Petitioner,
through his representatives and agents, assured respondent that the outstanding account of
Macrogen would be paid and relying on the assurances made by petitioner, respondent continued
the construction project. Later, respondent suspended work on the construction project since the

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conditions that it imposed for the continuation thereof, including payment of unsettled accounts,
had not been complied with by Macrogen. Respondent instituted with the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission (CIAC) a case for arbitration against Macrogen Realty seeking payment by
the latter of its unpaid billings and project costs. Before the arbitration case could be set for trial,
Pyramid and Macrogen entered into a Compromise Agreement, with petitioner acting as signatory
for and in behalf of Macrogen Realty. Under the Compromise Agreement, Macrogen Realty agreed
to pay respondent the total amount of P6,000,000.00 by installments. Petitioner guaranteed the
obligations of Macrogen Realty under the Compromise Agreement by executing a Contract of
Guaranty in favor of respondent, by virtue of which he irrevocably and unconditionally guaranteed
the full and complete payment of the principal amount of liability of Macrogen. Upon joint motion
of respondent and Macrogen Realty, the CIAC approved the Compromise Agreement. Macrogen
Realty failed and refused to pay all the monthly installments agreed upon in the Compromise
Agreement. Hence respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against Macrogen,
which CIAC granted. The sheriff filed a return stating that he was unable to locate any property of
Macrogen Realty, except its bank deposit of P20,242.33, with the Planters Bank, Buendia Branch.
Respondent then made, a written demand on petitioner, as guarantor of Macrogen to pay the
liability or to point out available properties of the Macrogen within the Philippines sufficient to cover
the obligation guaranteed. It also made verbal demands on petitioner. Yet, respondents demands
were left unheeded. Petitioner filed with the RTC his Answer to respondents Complaint. As a special
and affirmative defense, petitioner argued that the benefit of excussion was still available to him as
a guarantor since he had set it up prior to any judgment against him. According to petitioner,
respondent failed to exhaust all legal remedies to collect from Macrogen the amount due under the
Compromise Agreement, considering that Macrogen Realty still had uncollected credits which were
more than enough to pay for the same. Given these premise, petitioner could not be held liable as
guarantor.

ISSUE: WON petitioner cam avail of the benefit of excussion

HELD: No. Under a contract of guarantee, the guarantor binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the
obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so. The guarantor who pays for
a debtor, in turn, must be indemnified by the latter. However, the guarantor cannot be compelled
to pay the creditor unless the latter has exhausted all the property of the debtor and resorted to all
the legal remedies against the debtor. This is what is otherwise known as the benefit of excussion.

Art. 2060. In order that the guarantor may make use of the benefit of excussion, he must set it up
against the creditor upon the latters demand for payment from him, and point out to the creditor
available property of the debtor within Philippine territory, sufficient to cover the amount of the
debt.

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It must be stressed that despite having been served a demand letter at his office, petitioner still
failed to point out to the respondent properties of Macrogen Realty sufficient to cover its debt as
required under Article 2060 of the Civil Code. Such failure on petitioners part forecloses his right to
set up the defense of excussion.

177. Ontimare vs. Elep

FACTS:

178. Pineda vs. Heirs of Guevara

FACTS: The Guevara Heirs filed an action for the nullification of the certificates of title of a parcel of
land in Marikina. Defendants were the estate of the late Pedro Gonzales, Virginia Perez, Crisanta
Perez,Jose Perez, Roy Guadalupe, Lino Bucad and Florentino Pineda. According to the Guevara heirs,
the defendants illegally claimed ownership and possession over a certain portion of the property.
Defendant Pineda filed an answer with counterclaim, raising the defenses of lack of cause of action,
prescription, laches and estoppel. He averred that he was a buyer in good faith and had been in
actual possession of the land since 1970 initially as a lessor and subsequently as an owner.
Defendants Virginia, Crisanta, and Jose, all surnamed Perez, filed an answer with compulsory
counterclaim and averred that their father, Marcos Perez, purchased the property from the late
Pedro Gonzales and had it declared in Perezs name for taxation purposes. The rest of the
defendants, including the estate of Pedro Gonzales, also filed an answerwith counterclaim, raising
the same defenses of laches and prescription and res judicata. The late Pedro Gonzales allegedly
bought the property from the Municipality of Marikinain a public bidding on 25 April 1966 and had
allowed defendants to occupy the property.They asserted that the Guevara heirs never actually
occupied the property. On 4 December 1995, the RTC set the case for hearing as if a motion to
dismiss had been filed. During the hearing, the parties presented oral arguments and were directed
to file their memoranda. After submission of memoranda, the RTC issued an Order dated 7 May
1996, dismissing the action on the ground of laches. The Guevara heirs appealed the order of
dismissal, claiming the denial of their right to due process. CA set aside the RTCs decision reinstating
the action. The appellate court ruled that a complaint cannot be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1
of the Rules of Court based on laches since laches is not one of the grounds enumerated under said
provision. Although the RTC order of dismissal did not rule on the other affirmative defenses raised
by petitioners in the answer, such as lack of causeof action, prescription and res judicata, the Court
of Appeals discussed them and ruled that none of these affirmative defenses raised were present
to warrant the dismissal of the action.

ISSUES: (I) Whether or not the appeal of the heirs of Guevara was improperly elevated to the Court
of Appeals since, according to them, it raised a pure question of law; and
(II) Whether or not the trial court correctly dismissed the action on the ground of laches without
conducting trial on the merits.

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RULING: On the first issue, Petitioner Pineda had ample opportunity to raise before the Court of
Appeals the objection on the improper mode of appeal taken by the heirs ofGuevara. This, he failed
to do. The issue of improper appeal was raised only in Pinedasmotion for reconsideration of the
Court of Appeals Decision. Hence, this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal, pass upon
this issue. For an issue cannot be raised forthe first time on appeal.

On the second issue, in reversing the RTCs order of dismissal, the Court of Appeals held that "laches
could not be a ground to dismiss the complaint as it is not enumerated under Rule 16, Section 1."
This is not entirely correct.

Under paragraph (h) thereof, where a claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been
paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished, the same may be raised in a motion to dismiss.

The elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he
claims, giving rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the
complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct
as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the
part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right in which he bases his suit; and (4)
injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is
not held barred. Whether or not the elements of laches are present is a question involving a factual
determination by the trial court.

179. Manufacturers Hanover Trust vs. Guerrero

FACTS: On May 17, 1994, Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against Hanover and/or Chemical
Bank (Bank) with the RTC of Manila. Guerrero sought payment of damages for:
a.Illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank
b.A returned check worth $18,000 due to signature verification problems
c.Unauthorized conversion of his account
The Bank answered that by stipulation, Guerreros account is governed by New York law, and such
law does not permit any of Guerreros claims except actual damages. The Bank filed a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (PSJ), contending that the trial should be limited to the issue of actual
damages only. The Walden Affidavit was presented by the Bank to support its Motion for PSJ.
The RTC and CA denied the Banks Motion for PSJ, stating that the Walden Affidavit does not serve
as proof of the New York law and jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support its Motion.

ISSUE: Whether the Walden Affidavit was sufficient proof of the New York law and jurisprudence
relied upon by the Bank in its Motion for PSJ.

HELD: NO. The Walden Affidavit failed to prove New York law and jurisprudence. The SC denied the
Banks petition for lack of merit. The CA considered the New York law and jurisprudence as public

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documents defined in Rule 132 Sec 19 and 24 of the Rules of Evidence, which should be followed in
proving foreign law.

SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are
either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made
by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

180. Evadel and Development vs. Soriano

FACTS: Respondent-spouses as sellers, entered into a Contract to Sell with petitioner as buyer
over a parcel of land which is part of a huge tract of land known as the Imus Estate. Upon payment
of the first installment, the petitioners introduced improvements thereon and fenced off the
property with concrete walls. Thereafter, the respondents discovered that the area fenced off by
the petitioners exceeded the area subject of the contract by 2,450 square meters. A complaint for
accion reinvindicatoria was filed by respondents against petitioner. The trial court, by way of a
summary judgment, ruled in favor of respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue regarding petitioners good faith or bad faith as a builder should
have been peremptorily disposed of by the trial court.

HELD: The petitioner admitted in its Amended Answer that the lot in dispute is covered by the TCT
of respondents. With this admission, petitioner can no longer claim that it was a builder in good
faith. Moreover petitioner, as a real estate developer is presumed to be experienced in business
and ought to have sufficient technical expertise to correctly determine the metes and bounds of the
land it acquires.

181. Estrada vs. Consolacion (June 29, 1976; 71 SCRA 523)

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 182. RIVERA VS SOLIDBANK

FACTS: Rivera applied for retirement under the Special Retirement Program. Solidbank approved
the application and Rivera was entitled to receive the net amount of P 963, 619. 28. He signed an
undated Release, Waiver and Quitclaim, which was notarized on March 1, 1995. Rivera
acknowledged receipt of the net proceeds of his separation and retirement benefits and promised
that he would not anytime, in a manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly engage in any unlawful
activity prejudicial to the interest of Solidbank, its parent, affiliate or subsidiary companies, their
stockholders, officers, directors, agents or employees, and their successors- in interest and will not
disclose any information concerning the business of Solidbank, its manner or operation, its plan,
processes, or data of any kind.

However in 1995 Solidbank discovered that Equitable Bank employed Rivera as Manager of its
Credit Investigation and Appraisal Division of its Consumers Banking Group. Solidbank then
informed Rivera that he had violated the Undertaking and demanded the return of all the
monetary benefits he received. When Rivera refused to return the amount demanded within the
given period, Solidbank filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money.

ISSUE: whether the employment ban incorporated in the Undertaking which petitioner executed
upon his retirement is unreasonable, oppressive, hence, contrary to public policy

HELD: In determining whether the contract is reasonable or not, the trial court should consider the
following factors: (a) whether the covenant protects a legitimate business interest of the
employer; (b) whether the covenant creates an undue burden on the employee; (c) whether the
covenant is injurious to the public welfare; (d) whether the time and territorial limitations
contained in the covenant are reasonable; and (e) whether the restraint is reasonable from the
standpoint of public policy. At first glance, the post-retirement competitive employment ban is
unreasonable because it has no geographical limits; respondent is barred from accepting any kind
of employment in any competitive bank within the proscribed period. Although the period of one
year may appear reasonable, the matter of whether the restriction is reasonable or unreasonable
cannot be ascertained with finality solely from the terms and conditions of the Undertaking, or
even in tandem with the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim. However, a distinction must be made
between restrictive covenants barring an employee to accept a post-employment competitive
employment (restraint on trade) and restraints on post-retirement competitive employment in
pension and retirement plans. A restriction in the contract which does not preclude the employee
from engaging in competitive activity, but simply provides for the loss of rights or privileges if he
does so is not in restraint of trade. The strong weight of authority is that forfeitures for engaging in
subsequent competitive employment included in pension and retirement plans are valid even
though unrestricted in time or geography. The reasoning behind this conclusion is that the
forfeiture, unlike the restraint included in the employment contract, is not a prohibition on the
employees engaging in competitive work but is merely a denial of the right to participate in the
retirement plan if he does so engage. A post-retirement competitive employment restriction is
designed to protect the employer against competition by former employees who may retire and
obtain retirement or pension benefits and, at the same time, engage in competitive employment.
Moreover, the Undertaking and the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim do not provide for the

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automatic forfeiture of the benefits petitioner received under the SRP upon his breach of said
deeds. Thus, the post-retirement competitive employment ban incorporated in the Undertaking of
respondent does not, on its face, appear to be unreasonable. The terms of the Undertaking merely
states that any breach by petitioner of his promise would entitle respondent to a cause of action
for protection in the courts of law.

183. BITANGA VS PYRAMID CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING

FACTS: Pyramid filed with the RTC a Complaint for specific performance and damages with
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the petitioner and wife
Marilyn. Respondent alleged in its Complaint that, it entered into an agreement with Macrogen
Realty, of which Bitanga is the President, to construct for the latter the Shoppers Gold Building
located in Paraaque City. Respondent commenced civil, structural, and architectural works on the
construction project. However, Macrogen failed to settle respondents progress billings. Petitioner,
through his representatives and agents, assured respondent that the outstanding account of
Macrogen would be paid and relying on the assurances made by petitioner, respondent continued
the construction project. Later, respondent suspended work on the construction project since the
conditions that it imposed for the continuation thereof, including payment of unsettled accounts,
had not been complied with by Macrogen. Respondent instituted with the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission (CIAC) a case for arbitration against Macrogen Realty seeking payment by
the latter of its unpaid billings and project costs. Before the arbitration case could be set for trial,
Pyramid and Macrogen entered into a Compromise Agreement, with petitioner acting as signatory
for and in behalf of Macrogen Realty. Under the Compromise Agreement, Macrogen Realty agreed
to pay respondent the total amount of P6,000,000.00 by installments. Petitioner guaranteed the
obligations of Macrogen Realty under the Compromise Agreement by executing a Contract of
Guaranty in favor of respondent, by virtue of which he irrevocably and unconditionally guaranteed
the full and complete payment of the principal amount of liability of Macrogen. Upon joint motion
of respondent and Macrogen Realty, the CIAC approved the Compromise Agreement. Macrogen
Realty failed and refused to pay all the monthly installments agreed upon in the Compromise
Agreement. Hence respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against Macrogen,
which CIAC granted. The sheriff filed a return stating that he was unable to locate any property of
Macrogen Realty, except its bank deposit of P20,242.33, with the Planters Bank, Buendia Branch.
Respondent then made, a written demand on petitioner, as guarantor of Macrogen to pay the
liability or to point out available properties of the Macrogen within the Philippines sufficient to cover
the obligation guaranteed. It also made verbal demands on petitioner. Yet, respondents demands
were left unheeded. Petitioner filed with the RTC his Answer to respondents Complaint. As a special
and affirmative defense, petitioner argued that the benefit of excussion was still available to him as
a guarantor since he had set it up prior to any judgment against him. According to petitioner,
respondent failed to exhaust all legal remedies to collect from Macrogen the amount due under the
Compromise Agreement, considering that Macrogen Realty still had uncollected credits which were

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more than enough to pay for the same. Given these premise, petitioner could not be held liable as
guarantor.

ISSUE: WON petitioner cam avail of the benefit of excussion

HELD: No. Under a contract of guarantee, the guarantor binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the
obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so. The guarantor who pays for
a debtor, in turn, must be indemnified by the latter. However, the guarantor cannot be compelled
to pay the creditor unless the latter has exhausted all the property of the debtor and resorted to all
the legal remedies against the debtor. This is what is otherwise known as the benefit of excussion.

Art. 2060. In order that the guarantor may make use of the benefit of excussion, he must set it up
against the creditor upon the latters demand for payment from him, and point out to the creditor
available property of the debtor within Philippine territory, sufficient to cover the amount of the
debt.

It must be stressed that despite having been served a demand letter at his office, petitioner still
failed to point out to the respondent properties of Macrogen Realty sufficient to cover its debt as
required under Article 2060 of the Civil Code. Such failure on petitioners part forecloses his right to
set up the defense of excussion.

184. JUGADOR VS DE VERA

FACTS: On December 13, 1949, the plaintiff Federico T. Jugador filed a complaint against the
defendant Zacarias de Vera in the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging that in October, 1948,
the plaintiff agreed to construct a residential house at No. 33 Bulosan St., Sta. Mesa Heights,
Quezon City, for the defendant who undertook to pay to the plaintiff the total sum of P18,500
which he fully received to his complete satisfaction on December 1948 but he failed to pay in full
the construction price.

On April 22, 1949, the defendant executed in favor of the plaintiff a certificate of indebtedness
and promised to pay to Jugador Construction the sum of P3,500 as liquidated unpaid balance of
the contract price, P500 on or before May 15, 1949, and to make all sincere and serious effort to
pay P2,000 so as to leave in June, 1949, only a balance of P1,000 payable monthly at P100
beginning August 1, 1949. Notwithstanding the repeated demands, the defendant only made a
partial payment of 900, leaving P2,600 as his balance.

The petitioner filed a complaint and the court issued a writ of attachment to the defendants
property. The defendant averred in his answers that the petitioner did not complete the house in
accordance with the prescribed plans and specifications. As an answer, the plaintiff filed a motion
for summary judgment, on the ground that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,
supported by an affidavit of the plaintiff. The CFI ruled in favor of the petitioner.

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ISSUE: Whether or not there is no legal basis for the rendition of the summary judgment.

HELD: Under section 3 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, a summary judgment "shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admission on file, together with the affidavits, show
that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as to a matter of law."

In the case at bar the court in effect held, as a matter of law, that there was no basis for the
counterclaim for damages, considering the facts appearing in the pleadings and plaintifff's affidavit
in support of his motion for summary judgment, unopposed by any counter-affidavit which the
defendant had the right to present.

185. WARNER, BARNES AND CO VS LUZON SURETY

FACTS: On September 17, 1952, the plaintiffs, Warner, Barnes and Co., Ltd., filed a complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the defendant, Luzon Surety Co., Inc., of
the recovery of the sum of P6,000, plus the costs and P1,500 for attorney's fees. The basis of the
complaint was a bond in the sum of P6,000 filed by Agueda Gonzaga as administratrix of the
Intestate Estate of Agueda Gonzaga. As an administratix, he violated the conditions of her bond
"(a) by failing to file an inventory of the assets and funds of the estate that had come into her
hands, more particularly, the sum of P67,861.22 that she had received form the United States
Philippine War Damage Commission; (b) by failing to pay or discharge the approved claim of the
plaintiff; (c) by failing to render a true and just account of her administration in general, and of the
said war damage payments in particular.

The defendant filed an answer setting up the special defenses that the complaint did not state a
cause of action. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that "the special
defenses relied upon by the defendant in her Answer raise only questions of law, and the plaintiff
believes that said defendant cannot produce counter-affidavits that would raise any 'genuine
issues as to any material facts.'

The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental rendered a summary judgment sentencing the
defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P6,000, P900 for attorney's fees, plus the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the erred in sentencing the defendant.

HELD: The contention is tenable. Under section 3 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, a summary
judgment may be rendered upon proper motion except as to the amount of damages.1wphl.nt

There being no proof regarding the amount of attorney's fees claimed by the plaintiff, no
judgment thereon may be rendered herein. It is, however, argued by the counsel for appellee that
said fees are in pursuance of article 2208 of the Civil Code, providing that attorney's fees cannot
be recovered except "where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim"; and it alleged in the complaint that

144
the appellant had so acted in this case. While the provision cited authorizes the collection of
attorney's fees under the situation contemplated herein, it does not dispense with the effect of
section 3 of Rule 36.

191. People v. Derpo

Facts:

Rhodora Hara was in her fourth grade, accused-appellant offered to shoulder the expenses of her
education. Rhodora's father accepted the offer. She enrolled in Casiguran High School, for which
reason, Rhodora had to stay in the house of the accused, also upon the latter's invitation. On July
16, 1971 she was awakened by the kisses of appellant. Appellant left the room frustrated and with
a warning not to tell anybody what happened and threatened to kill her. Rhodora kept silent about
the incident.

On August 22, 1971, at about midnight, appellant went to her room under the pretext that he would
give a tablet to relieve the pain of a toothache Rhodora was then suffering from. However, after
taking the tablet, Rhodora started to feel drowsy until she fell asleep. When she woke up, appellant
was lying on top of her. Before he left, appellant threatened to kill Rhodora if she would report the
incident to anybody. The incident was repeated on September 30, 1971 and October 3, 1971. Finally,
also at about midnight of November 27, 1971.

Accused was then charged with rape in four separate criminal complaints in Court of First Instance
of Sorsogon (now Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon). The four cases were tried jointly. Thereafter, a
joint judgment of conviction was rendered by the lower court. Hence, this appeal seeking the
reversal of the conviction.

Issue:

WON the lower court erred in denying the accused appellants motion for New Trial.

Rulings:

The lower court did not commit an error in denying the appellant's motion for new trial based on
"newly discovered evidence" for failure to meet the following conditions, namely, (a) that the
evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that such evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence, (c) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment if admitted.

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192. People v. Molina

Facts:

This case arose from the killing of Pedro T. Ong. He succumbed almost instantly to seven bullet
wounds found later to have been caused by a single shot from a 30-centimeter firearm. In due time,
Rosalito Molina was arrested and charged in the Regional Trial Court of Aurora with the murder of
Ong. After trial, the accused was found guilty.

The prosecution relied principally on the testimony of two eyewitnesses, namely, Felicidad B.
Poblete and Rosalinda Libed. Two other witnesses swore to having seen Molina near the scene of
the crime shortly before it was committed. The rest of the witnesses for the prosecution testified
only on events that transpired after the killing except that the victim's wife also suggested the
motive for the crime.

For his part, the accused-appellant offered the defense of alibi and claimed he was in Manila at the
time of the commission of the crime.

The trial court rejected the alibi, describing it as fabricated, and refused to believe the defense
witnesses on the ground that, as relatives of the accused or employees of his cousin who exercised
much influence over them, they had testified only to help Molina. His documentary evidence was
dismissed as "unverifiable."

Issue:

WON accused-appellant was guilty.

Rulings:

The Court is not prepared to affirm the decision not because it is long and convoluted but because
the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The
inherent incredibility of witnesses Poblete and Libed has sown the seeds of suspicion that the
evidence against Molina has been fabricated, and rather awkwardly at that. The convergence of
events in this case is, plainly, too coincidental to deserve belief and the other improbable
declarations of the government witnesses have added to that disbelief. The defense of alibi may be
weak, and perhaps it was really Molina who killed Ong, but the prosecution has failed to prove the
accused-appellant's guilt and so he must go free.

193. People v. Escober

Facts:

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Juan Escober, together with four unidentified people was charged with the crime of Robbery with
Homicide before the RTC of Quezon City in an Information dated December 9, 1982. He entered a
plea of "Not Guilty" with the assistance of counsel Atty. Hipolito de Peralta upon arraignment on
March 2, 1983.

On March 29, 1983, the Information was amended to include accused-appellant Macario Punzalan,
Jr. as one of the accused therein. He, too, pleaded "Not Guilty" during the arraignment on April 22,
1983, assisted by court-appointed counsel, Atty. Benigno Mariano, who at that time had replaced
Atty. Hipolito de Peralta as counsel de parte for Juan Escober.

A joint trial of the accused ensued. Thereafter, accused-appellant Juan Escober took the witness
stand to testify in his defense, as well as Macario Punzalan, Jr.

On January 10, 1984, the decision under review was promulgated. On February 8, 1984, despite his
manifestation in open court immediately after the promulgation of the decision that he was
appealing the same to this Court, Atty. Mariano filed a motion for reconsideration. This was opposed
by the prosecution.

Pending resolution of the motion. Atty. A.E. Dacanay entered his appearance on August 7, 1984 as
counsel for accused Escober, and on August 20, 1984, he filed another motion for reconsideration
for the said accused, which was likewise opposed by the prosecution. After an exchange of pleadings
between Atty. Dacanay and the prosecution, the trial court issued an Order dated November 21,
1984 denying the motions. Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 69658 and the automatic review.

Issue:

WON respondent judge erred in denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of January 10, 1984
decision.

Rulings:

We find merit in this contention. The decision of January 10, 1984 consists of 1-1/2 pages, typed
single-space, with a number of handwritten notations and insertions. The decision falls short of this
standard. The inadequacy stems primarily from the respondent judge's tendency to generalize and
to form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced. Thus, he
concluded that the material allegations of the Amended Information were the facts without
specifying which of the testimonies or exhibits supported this conclusion. He rejected the testimony
of accused-appellant Escober because it was allegedly replete with contradictions without pointing
out what these contradictions consist of or what "vital details" Escober should have recalled as a
credible witness. He also found the crime to have been attended by the aggravating circumstances
of cruelty, nighttime, superior strength, treachery, in band, "among others," but did not particularly
state the factual bases for such findings.

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With the finding that the decision of January 10, 1984 does not conform to the requirements of
Section 9, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, the case should have been remanded to the court a
quo for the rendition of a new judgment. However, since the records of the case, including all
evidence necessary for a determination of the innocence or guilt of the accused- appellants are now
before Us, We deem it wise to render judgment in this case in order to accord the accused-
appellants their right to a speedy disposition of their cases.

194. National Housing Authority v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), owner of Lot 20-A, Block E-74, filed a complaint
for recovery of possession and damages against Gavino Mendiola, alleging that without its
knowledge and consent Mendiola had unlawfully occupied the said lot and on December 23, 1959,
constructed a house thereon, and had refused to vacate the premises and to remove the
improvements despite demands to do so.

In answer, Mendiola admits the ownership of PHHC over the lot in question and the receipt of notice
to vacate, but denied that he is unlawfully occupying the same, claiming that PHHC had caused the
transfer of his house to the lot and approved the sale of Lot 20-A, Block E-74 to him; and that
thereafter PHHC without justification sold the lot to Antonio Ilustre who is not qualified to buy it.
He likewise counterclaimed for damages.

At the pre-trial, the PHHC presented its evidence, all documentary exhibits (A, B, C, D, & E).
Defendant Mendiola likewise marked his evidence (Exhibits "1-5"). Thereafter, upon agreement of
the parties, the Trial Court appointed a commissioner to receive the evidence for the defendant.

On March 1, 1968, the Trial Court rendered judgment against PHHC. On appeal by PHHC, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court's decision. Hence, this petition for review filed by the National
Housing Authority, succeeding to the powers and functions of the now defunct PHHC, by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 757 (1975).

Issue:

WON PHHC committed grave abuse of discretion in awarding Lot 20-A to Antonio Ilustre.

Rulings:

Although, ordinarily, the action of an administrative agency would not be disturbed by the judicial
department, later developments in this case show that on March 23, 1964, even before the present
suit was instituted on November 13, 1964, Antonio Ilustre, an Army Officer, had transferred his
rights to a third party and that Ilustre has since died. Obviously, Ilustre Himself had no real need for
the property. On the other hand, Mendiola, a recognized squatter, has continuously and
uninterruptedly occupied the property since 1959.

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Under the circumstances, we hold that the justice and equity of the situation are with Mendiola. As
opined by Inspector Alfredo T. Baguio, in his undated Memorandum to the PHHC General Manager,
"the award to Antonio Ilustre by raffle was not satisfactorily explained and hardly bears
justification." He then recommended that "Antonio Ilustre should be awarded another lot outside
Block E-74" ( ' Exhibit "5"). Indeed, pursuant to Resolution No. 531 of the PHHC Board (Exhibit "A"),
the subdivision of Block E-74 (Malaya Avenue Subdivision) was intended for "squatters in the Central
Bank Subdivision and Mahabang Gubat area, totalling 72". Mendiola was included in that original
group. Antonio Ilustre, a Major, was not. He was an "outsider". Specially so, with his transferee.
Moreover, the same PHHC Board Resolution "provided further that in case of transfer priority shall
be given to the co-owner under equal circumstances."

195. Leo v. To-Chip

CASE 201

G.R. NO. 114323. JULY 23, 1998

OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION VS COURT OF APPEALS AND PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY,
INC.

FACTS: This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil Judge
of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION and against the
private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INCORPORATED. Petitioner is a foreign
corporation owned and controlled by the Government of India while private respondent is a private
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.

They entered into a contract on February 26, 1983 whereby the private respondent undertook to
supply the petitioner FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (4,300) metric tons of oil well cement. In
consideration therefor, the petitioner bound itself to pay the private respondent the amount of
FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED U.S. DOLLARS ($477,300.00) by
opening an irrevocable, divisible, and confirmed letter of credit in favor of the latter. The oil well
cement was loaded on board the ship MV SURUTANA NAVA at the port of Surigao City, Philippines
for delivery at Bombay and Calcutta, India. However, due to a dispute between the shipowner and
the private respondent, the cargo was held up in Bangkok and did not reach its point of destination.
Notwithstanding the fact that the private respondent had already received payment and despite
several demands made by the petitioner, the private respondent failed to deliver the oil well
cement. Thereafter, negotiations ensued between the parties and they agreed that the private
respondent will replace the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement with Class G cement cost

149
free at the petitioners designated port. However, upon inspection, the Class G cement did not
conform to the petitioners specifications. The petitioner then informed the private respondent that
it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract which stipulates
that he venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun.

The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in favour of the petitioner
setting forth the arbitral award. To enable the petitioner to execute the above award, it filed a
Petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision of the
arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. This was objected by the respondent but foreign
court refused to admit the private respondent's objections for failure to pay the required filing fees.
Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the foregoing order and several demands by the
petitioner for compliance therewith, the private respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged
by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner.

The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City for
the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court. The private respondent
moved to dismiss the complaint. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. The
petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint. In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did
not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties; thus, the foreign court could not validly
adopt the arbitrator's award. The petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and
the private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract.

HELD: The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude
the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.

Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the
fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs
from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. If the procedure in the
foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay
the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the
foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals sustaining the trial court's dismissal of the OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's
complaint before Branch 30 of the RTC of Surigao City is REVERSED.

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 CASE 202

G.R. NO. 81006. MAY 12, 1989

VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO VS. WINAI PERMSKUL AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: An important constitutional question has been injected in this case which started out as an
ordinary complaint for a sum of money. The question squarely presented to the Court is the validity
of the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 in the light of Article VIII,
Section 14 of the Constitution.

On May 21, 1984, Victorino C. Francisco (petitioner) leased his apartment in Makati to Winai
Permskul (respondent) for a period of one year for the stipulated rental of P3,000.00 a month.
Pursuant to the lease contract, the private respondent deposited with the petitioner the amount of
P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid rentals or any damage to the leased premises except when caused
by reasonable wear and tear. On May 31, 1985, the private respondent vacated the property. He
thereafter requested the refund of his deposit minus the sum of P1,000.00, representing the rental
for the additional ten days of his occupancy after the expiration of the lease. The petitioner rejected
this request. He said the lessee still owed him for other charges, including the electricity and water
bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for repainting of the leased premises to restore them to their original
condition.

Winai Permskul sued in the MTC of Makati. The MTC rendered a summary judgment in favor of
Permskul which was affirmed by the RTC of Makati. Defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his
petition for review was denied on September 29, 1987, as so too was his motion for reconsideration,
on December 1, 1987. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court violates Article VIII Section 14 of the Constitution in sustaining the
memorandum decision of the RTC.

HELD:

This provision reads as follows:

Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

Except for the second paragraph, which was introduced only in the present charter, Section 14 has
been in force since the Constitution of 1935. The provision was recast in affirmative terms in the
1973 Constitution but has been virtually restored to its original form in the Constitution of 1987, to

151
apply to all courts, including the municipal courts. The purpose has always been the same, viz., to
inform the person reading the decision, and especially the parties, of how it was reached by the
court after consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of the applicable laws.

Decisions and resolutions of a court in appealed cases shall clearly and distinctly state the findings
of fact and the conclusions of law on which they are based. Such findings may be contained in the
decision or final resolution itself, or adopted by reference from those set forth in the decision, order
or resolution appealed from. This provision of BP 129 authorizes a memorandum decision. This kind
of decision is one rendered by an appellate court and incorporates by reference the findings of fact
and conclusions of law contained in the decision or under review. The reason for allowing the
incorporation by reference is to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower
court in the decision of the higher court. It is also to avoid repeating the findings or conclusions of
the lower court, which are being adopted or approved. To be valid however, such decision must not
simply incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of a lower court by remote
reference. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the
facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in statement attached to the said
decision. In other words, the memorandum decision should actually embody the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to it and made an indispensable part of
the decision.

CASE 203

G.R. No. L-59606. JANUARY 8, 1987

EDMUNDO ROMERO, FELIZA F. ROMERO, JOSE ADORABLE AND GERONIMO CASAES

VS

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS AND TIMOTEO
IBARRA

FACTS: In this petition for review on certiorari of the decision promulgated on January 26, 1982 by
the Ninth Division of respondent Court of Appeals affirming in full the decision rendered on August
31, 1981 by Branch II of respondent Court of Agrarian Relations, Tenth Regional District, Naga City,
petitioners allege violation of their constitutional rights to due process and the equal protection of
the laws.

On March 8, 1979, Timoteo Ibarra (private respondent) filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations an
action for reinstatement with damages against Edmundo Romore, Feliza F. Romero, Jose Adorable
and Geronimo Casaes (petitioners).

152
The agrarian court found and the parties agree that the main issue raised in said case was factual in
character whether or not private respondent was the bona-fide agricultural tenant- farmer (now
agricultural lessee) on the two parcels of agricultural land subject-matter of the complaint. As a
matter of fact, this is the crucial issue because the resolution of all the other issues depends upon
its resolution.

The Court of Agrarian Relations ruled in favor of private respondents that he is the bona-fide tenant-
farmer, now agricultural lessee of the two (2) parcels of land in question. The petitioners appealed
to the Court of Appeals and said Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

No notice of the receipt of the records from the Court of Agrarian Relations was issued by
respondent Court of Appeals. Neither was any notice issued by respondent Court of Appeals that it
was dispensing "with the usual practice of requiring the parties to submit to Us their memoranda in
lieu of briefs."

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether not there is violation of petitioners constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection of laws.

HELD: In addition to alleging violation of their constitutional rights to due process and to equal
protection of the laws, petitioners contend that the findings of fact in the decision of the Court of
Agrarian Relations, as affirmed in toto by respondent Court of Appeals, are not supported by
substantial evidence and the conclusions stated therein are clearly against the law. Petitioners claim
that had respondent Court of Appeals not dispensed with the usual practice of requiring the parties
to submit simultaneous memoranda in the of appeal briefs they could have pointed out to
respondent Court of Appeals which findings of fact in the decision of the lower court are not
supported by substantial evidence and which conclusions stated therein are clearly against the law.

In the case at bar, petitioners had the right to appeal from the decision of the Court of Agrarian
Relations to the Court of Appeals. And since Section 18 of P.D. No. 946 provides, following the
general rule, that "the decisions or orders of the Court of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by petition for review on certiorari only on questions of law," petitioners should be given the
opportunity to correct errors in the findings of fact made by the trial court. And this is particularly
necessary in agrarian cases where no motion for rehearing or reconsideration is allowed in the Court
of Appeals (Section 18, Ibid.)

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that just as important as the intrinsic validity of a decision is
the perception by the parties-litigants that they have been accorded a fair opportunity to be heard
by a fair and responsible magistrate before j judgment is rendered. It is this perception, coupled
with a clear conscience, which enables the members of the judiciary to dispassionately charge the
awesome responsibility of sitting in judgment on their fellowmen.

153
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated by respondent Court of Appeals affirming in full the decision
of the Court of Agrarian Relations is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals to
enable the parties to file simultaneous memoranda within a non-extendible period of fifteen days
from notice, after which respondent Court shall render a decision upon the points raised and
discussed in said memoranda that were not touched upon in the decision of the agrarian court which
was adopted by the appellate court as basis for its original judgment of affirmance.

CASE 204

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2075. OCTOBER 9, 2007

ATTY. UBALDINO A. LACUROM VS JUDGE JUANITA C. TIENZO

FACTS: On the second charge relating to Civil Case No. 4884, complainant alleges that respondent
judge rendered a decision in violation of the Constitutional mandate to state clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based, and Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court echoing the
same requisite.

Complainant further charges that respondent judge issued an order written in English language, and
in fashion that does not benefit an RTC Judge which thereby demonstrates her incompetence and
lack of diligence. However, complainant discloses that the inclusion of the foregoing matter in his
administrative complaint was merely at the behest of his former colleague, Feliciano Buenaventura,
a retired judge of RTC, Branch 27, Cabanatuan City.

In this case, respondent judge ruled in this wise, to wit: After a cursory study of this appealed case
of Unlawful Detainer, this Court finds that the procedural due process has been complied with under
the Summary Procedure. The Decision of the Lower Court cannot be disturbed by this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge rendered decision in violation of the constitutional
mandate to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

HELD: YES.
Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court likewise reflects the foregoing mandate, thus:

SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A judgment or final order determining
the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge,
stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and
filed with the clerk of court.

Although we have sustained the validity of memorandum decisions on several occasions, we laid
down specific requirements for the proper utility thereof:

The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and
the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say

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 that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person
reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be
allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted,
which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other
words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129
should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower
court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.

It is expected that this requirement will allay suspicion that no study was made of
the decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a
proper examination of the facts and law on which it is based. The proximity at least
of the annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has been
undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted should,
to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or
adoption will rectify its violation.

The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should
be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an
additional condition for its validity that this kind of decision may be resorted only in
cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties or easily
determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that
will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision
may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where
the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to
dismiss it.

It is obvious that the decision rendered by respondent judge failed to conform to this requirement.
The cryptic decision simply referenced the appealed decision of the MTCC and forthwith found the
same as compliant with procedural due process under the Rules of Summary Procedure. Nowhere
in the decision does respondent judge make a statement of the facts, which led to the filing of the
appeal. More importantly, the decision does not contain respondent judges factual findings, albeit
affirming those of the MTCC, from which she based her conclusions of law. Ineluctably, respondent
judge transgressed the constitutional directive.

CASE 205

G.R. NO. 81006. MAY 12, 1989

VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO VS. WINAI PERMSKUL AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

**CASE REPEATED

155
 CASE 206

G.R. No. 154037. April 30, 2003

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENJAMIN VERGARA, JONA
SARVIDA, MILAGROS MAJOREMOS, MAJORIE JALALON, MAY JOY MENDOZA (@ May Joy Sandi),
and JOY SABALLA (@ Josephine Saballa),
MABELYN B. VERGARA, RIO SARVIDA, FRANCISCO MAJOREMOS, in their respective behalves and
in behalf of ROY JALALON, ROMMEL MENDOZA and DELFIN SABALLA, petitioners, vs. HON.
FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Ormoc, Branch 12;
SPO3ANGELO S. LLENOS and the CITY JAIL WARDEN OF ORMOC; and ELEUTERIA P. BOLAO

FACTS: Petitioners are the tenants of Berlito P. Taripe on a property located in Dr. A. Santos Ave.,
Paraaque City. On December 24, 2001, they were arrested by Ormoc City policemen by authority of
a Warrant of Arrest dated November 19, 2001 issued by Judge Fortunito L. Madrona in Sp. Proc. No.
3695-0 for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Distribution and Partition pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City (Branch 12).
The warrant of arrest stemmed from a motion filed by respondent Eleuteria P. Bolao, as Special
Administratrix of the estate of the late Anselma P. Allers, praying that petitioners be held guilty of
indirect contempt for not complying with the probate courts order dated October 9, 1999 directing
them to pay their monthly rentals to respondent Bolao.
It appears that pending the settlement of the estate of the deceased Allers, respondent Bolao
included the property leased by Taripe to petitioners in the inventory of the estate. The probate
court issued the assailed Order dated October 5, 1999, portions of which read as follows:

7. Further, the lessees above-cited and listed in the Inventory are directed to pay their respective
monthly rental regularly starting the month of August, 1999, including arrears if any, to the duly
appointed Special Administratrix Mrs. Eleuteria P. Bolao, until further notice.

Five months later, on motion of respondent Bolao, as Special Administratrix, the probate court
issued a writ of execution on March 3, 2000 to enforce the aforesaid order dated October 5,
1999. The Sheriff submitted a return dated August 10, 2000 stating that on June 5, 2000, he met
with petitioners but failed to collect the rentals due on the property as Taripe had already collected
from them three months advance rentals.
On August 4, 2000, respondent Bolao filed a motion to require petitioners to explain why they
should not be cited in indirect contempt for disobeying the October 5, 1999 order of the probate
court. It was granted. Petitioners were cite in contempt and ordered them to pay a fine
of P30,000.00 each and to undergo imprisonment until they comply with the probate courts order
for them to pay rentals. They stated that their failure to attend the May 11, 2001 hearing was due
to financial constraints, most of them working on construction sites, receiving minimum wages, and

156
repeated that the reason why they are freezing the monthly rentals is that they are uncertain as to
whom to remit it.

Upon motion of respondent Bolao, the probate court, per its Order dated November 16, 2001,
issued a warrant of arrest on November 19, 2001. On December 24, 2001, petitioners were arrested.

On December 26, 2001, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus. On January 3, 2002, the appellate court ordered the temporary release of
petitioners. After due proceedings, the appellate court rendered its decision on March 26, 2002
denying the petition for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in not holding that the motion for indirect contempt of court
filed by respondent Eleuteria P. Bolao against the lessees is not the proper remedy and that the
order of the court a quo granting said motion and declaring that the lessees are guilty of indirect
contempt is a reversible error.

HELD: YES.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be validly punished for contempt under Section 8, Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court to wit:

SEC. 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed. When the contempt consists in the refusal or omission to
do an act which is yet in the power of the respondent to perform, he may be imprisoned by order
of the court concerned until he performs it. (7a) because herein subject order is not a special
judgment enforceable, under Section 11, Rule 39, which provides:

SEC. 11. Execution of special judgment. When a judgment requires the performance of any act other
than those mention in the two preceding sections, a certified copy of judgment shall be attached to
the writ of execution and shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom the same is
rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or by law to obey the same, and such party
or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment.

Section 9 of Rule 39 refers to the execution of judgments for money, thus:

SEC. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. (a) Immediate payment on demand.
The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for money by demanding from the judgment
obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful
fees. The judgment obligor shall pay in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee,
or any other form of payment acceptable to the latter, the amount of the judgment debt under
proper receipt directly to the judgment obligee or his authorized representative if present at the

157
time of payment. The lawful fees shall be handed under proper receipt to the executing sheriff who
shall turn over the said amount within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued
the writ.

If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to receive payment, the
judgment obligor shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff. The latter shall turn
over all the amounts coming into his possession within the same day to the clerk of court of the
court that issued the writ, or if the same is not practicable, deposit said amounts to a fiduciary
account in the nearest government depository bank of the Regional Trial court of the locality.

The clerk of said court shall thereafter arrange for the remittance of the deposit to the account
of the court that issued the writ whose clerk of court shall then deliver said payment to the judgment
obligee in satisfaction of the judgment. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment obligor
while the lawful fees shall be retained by the clerk of court for disposition as provided by law. In no
case shall the executing sheriff demand that any payment by check be made payable to him.

(b) Satisfaction by levy. If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash,
certified bank check or other mode or payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall
levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may
be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to
immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the
judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the
personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient
to answer for the judgment.

The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment
obligor which has been levied upon.

When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment
and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy
the judgment and lawful fees.

Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in
either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a
writ of attachment.

(c) Garnishment of debts and credits. The officer may levy on debts due the judgment obligor
and other credits, including bank deposits, financial interests, royalties, commissions and other
personal property not capable of manual delivery in the possession or control of third parties. Levy
shall be made by serving notice upon the person owing such debts or having in his possession or
control such credits to which the judgment obligor is entitled. The garnishment shall cover only such
amount as will satisfy the judgment and all lawful fees.

158
 The garnishee shall make a written report to the court within five (5) days from service of the
notice of garnishment stating whether or not the judgment obligor has sufficient funds or credits to
satisfy the amount of the judgment. If not, the report shall state how much funds or credits the
garnishee holds for the judgment obligor. The garnished amount in cash, or certified bank check
issued in the name of the judgment obligee, shall be delivered directly to the judgment obligee
within ten (10) working days from service of notice on said garnishee requiring such delivery, except
the lawful fees which shall be paid directly to the court.

In the event there are two or more garnishees holding deposits or credits sufficient to satisfy
the judgment, the judgment obligor, if available, shall have the right to indicate the garnishee or
garnishees who shall be required to deliver the amount due; otherwise, the choice shall be made by
the judgment obligee.

The executing sheriff shall observe the same procedure under paragraph (a) with respect to
delivery of payment to the judgment obligee. (8a, 15a) while Section 10 of the same Rule refers to
execution of judgments for specific acts such as conveyance, delivery of deeds or other specific acts
vesting title; sale of real or personal property, delivery or restitution of real property, removal of
improvements on property subject of execution and delivery of personal property.

The order directing the payment of rentals falls within the purview of Section 9 as quoted
above. Until and unless all the means provided for under Section 9, Rule 39 have been resorted to
and failed, imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for civil purposes cannot be resorted
to by the courts. In Sura vs. Martin, Sr., we held that:

Where an order for the arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contempt of court (for failure to
satisfy a judgment for support on ground of insolvency) would, in effect, violate the Constitution.

Thus, petitioners could not be held guilty of contempt of court for their continued refusal to
comply with the probate courts order to pay rentals to the administratrix nor could they be held
guilty of contempt for disobeying the writ of execution issued by the probate court, which directs
therein the Sheriff, thus:

Should lessees fail to pay the aforementioned amounts on rentals, then of the goods and chattels
of said lessees you may cause to be made the sum sufficient to cover the aforestated amounts, but
if no sufficient personal properties are found thereof to satisfy this execution, then of the real
properties you make the sums of money in the manner required by law and make return of your
proceeding under this writ within the reglementary period.

It was the sheriffs duty to enforce the writ.

159
 Under Section 9(b), Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, in cases when the execution calls for payment
of money and the obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or
other mode or payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the
properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of
for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to immediately
choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the
judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties,
if any, and then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the
judgment. The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the
judgment obligor, which has been levied upon. When there is more property of the judgment
obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the
personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees. Real property,
stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal
property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment.

The writ of execution issued by the trial court in this case commanded its sheriff to collect from
petitioners the rentals due from the property, and should they fail to pay, from petitioners
personal/real properties sufficient to cover the amounts sought to be collected. It was not
addressed to petitioners. It pertained to the sheriff to whom the law entrusts the execution of
judgments, and it was due to the latters failure that the writ was not duly enforced.

In fine, the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the Decision dated
November 16, 2001 of the trial court.

CASE 207

G.R. Nos. L-32450-51 June 10, 1971

HONORABLE ARMANDO B. CLEDERA in his capacity as Provincial Governor of Camarines Sur,
MARIANO S. TRINIDAD, in his capacity as Provincial Vice Governor of Camarines Sur, EMILIO C.
TIBLE JR., HILARIO R. ABONAL and NICANOR A. ORINO in their capacities as Members of the
Provincial Board of Camarines Sur; The PROVINCIAL ENGINEER of Camarines Sur; the
PROVINCIAL ENGINEER of Camarines Sur, and the PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE ULPIANO SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Camarines Sur, and PLUTARCO CAMANO, et
al., respondents

160
FACTS: This case is about the order issued by the respondent judge giving due course to and granting
the motion for reconsideration, allegedly defective for want of notice of hearing filed by private
respondents herein as Petitioners. The private respondents herein were employees of the provincial
government of Camarines Sur and paid under the plantilla of personnel of the road and bridge fund
budget. The provincial board of province of Camarines Sur passed a resolution which approved the
road and bridge fund budget of the province for the fiscal year 1968-1969 and abolished the
positions of herein private residents, who as a consequence filed Civil Cases before the respondent
judge sitting at Naga for prohibition and/or mandamus with damages seeking their reinstatement
and payment of back salaries as well as the restoration of their respective positions previously
occupied by them in the plantilla of personnel of the road and bridge fund budget. After the pre-
trial, the parties were given five (5) days from July 14, 1969 or until July 19, 1969 to submit their
respective memoranda, after which the two cases would be deemed submitted for decision Private
respondents filed a motion to re-open the cases and to allow them to present additional evidence
consisting of the budget and plantilla of personnel of the road and bridge fund for the fiscal year
1969-70 to which on July 25, 1969 herein petitioners filed an opposition dated July 24 1969.
Respondent Judge denied the said motion of herein private respondents seeking to reopen the two
cases. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order dated
September 10, 1969, which motion does not contain any notice at all setting the time, date and
place of hearing. Private respondents filed a request addressed to the clerk of court to set for
hearing on November 24, 1969, Respondent Judge issued an order requiring herein petitioners to
submit within five (5) days from receipt their opposition to herein private respondents' motion for
reconsideration of the order dated September 10, 1969, but Assistant Provincial Fiscal Enrique
Amador did not file any opposition to the aforesaid motion for reconsideration.

Respondent judge issued its order, reopened the two cases and allowed them to present their
evidences. The respondent judge rendered a decision in favor of the respondents declaring the
resolution null and void. The Provincial Fiscal as counsel for herein petitioners received a copy of
the aforesaid decision of April 27, 1970. The petitioners, through Assistant Provincial Fiscal Enrique
A. Amador, filed a 15 page motion dated June 6, 1970 for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision
together with a notice of hearing address to the clerk of court. Private respondents filed a motion
for execution on the ground that the decision had already become final since no appeal therefrom
had been interposed and perfected by herein petitioners within thirty (30) days from their receipt
on May 12, 1970 of the aforesaid decision. Petitioner filed their opposition on the ground that they
had complied with Sec. 2 of Rule 37 in connection with Secs. 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Respondent Judge granted herein private respondents motion for execution, relying
on the cases of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Bath Construction, Fulton Insurance Co. vs.
Manila Railroad Co.,Magno vs. Ortiz, in Re Disciplinary Action vs. Atty. Vicente Raul AImacen in L-
27654, Cal ero vs. Yaptinchay, and Sebastian vs. Cabal, et al., where this High Tribunal repeatedly
enunciated that the requirements of Secs. 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are mandatory

161
in relation to See. 2 of Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for
reconsideration of the said order which granted the motion for execution. The branch clerk issued
a writ of execution. The petitioner filed a supplement to their urgent motion. The respondent judge
denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
contending that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in considering the subject motion
for reconsideration a mere scrap of paper, and that "what the law prohibits is not the absence of
previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard" citing Borja
vs. Tan, Duran Embate vs. Penolio and Sun, Un Giok vs. Matusa.

ISSUE: Whether the notice accompanying the motion dated June 6, 1970 and filed on June 8, 1970
for the reconsideration of the decision dated April 27, 1970, complies with the requirements of
Section 2 of Rule 37 in relation to Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court.

HELD: NO, but the deficiency of the notice of hearing in the case was cured when the clerk of court
set the motion for hearing and the court took cognizance of the motion on the date set for hearing
thereof by the clerk of court.

In the 1960 Canonoy case, counsel for the defendants received a copy of the order of dismissal on
October 7, 1955, and on October 31, they moved to reconsider the said Order. The motion for
reconsideration did not contain a notice of hearing, but on December 6, 1956, a motion was
presented asking the clerk of court to set the motion for reconsideration for hearing on December
22. The motion was opposed on the ground that it contained no notice of hearing and therefore
should be considered as a mere scrap of paper, which did not toll the running of the period for the
judgment to become final. Nevertheless, the court reconsidered and set aside its order of dismissal.
It is patent in the Canonoy case that the failure on the part of counsel to set the date of hearing of
his motion was not due to neglect or negligence on his part but because he could not do so as he
did not know the date or the month when the next yearly section of the court in Pagadlian would
take place as there was no showing that at the time he filed his motion the court had already fixed
the date for the next term. It is evident therefore that the circumstances which compelled the court
to regard the notice of hearing in the Matusa case; as having been remedied or which justified the
failure inability of the counsel in the Canonoy case to fix a date for the hearing of his motion, dip
not obtain in the instant case. Here, the clerk of court did not set the motion of herein petitioners
for reconsideration of the decision for hearing on a definite date, much less did the respondent
Judge take cognizance of the said motion for reconsideration. And the respondent Judge holds
hearing every business day throughout the year in Naga City, unlike the Judge in the Canonoy case.
Neither did herein private respondents file an opposition to the aforementioned motion of herein
petitioners for the reconsideration of the decision, so as to bring the case at bar within the purview
of the doctrine in the case of Macasero vs. Saguin; 23 much less were the merits of the said motion

162
for reconsideration of the decision argued. The hearing and argument were limited to the motion
for the reconsideration of the order granting the motion for execution.

To emphasize once more, the directives in Section 2 of Rule 37 and Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 5 of
the Revised Rules of Court are as mandatory as they are clear and simple; and non compliance
therewith is fatal to the cause of the movant, because the mere filing of the motion for
reconsideration, without the requisite notice of hearing, does not toll the running of the period for
appeal. Unless the movant has the time and place of hearing in the notice and serves the adverse
party with the same, the court would have no way to determine whether the party agrees to or
objects to the motion, and if he objects to hear him on his objection, since the rules themselves do
not fix any period within which to file his reply or opposition. The rules commanding the movant to
serve of the adverse party a written notice of the motion (Section 2, Rule 37) and that the notice of
hearing "shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall estate the time and place for the
hearing of the motion" (Section 5, Rule 15), do not provide for any qualifications, much less
exceptions. To deviate from the peremptory principle thus uniformly reaffirmed in the cases
aforecited in, and to exempt from the rigor of the operation of said principle, the case at bar would
be one step in the emasculation of the revised rules and would be subversive of the stability of the
rules and jurisprudence thereon all to the consternation of the Bench and Bar and other
interested persons as well as the general public who would thereby be subjected to such an irritating
uncertainty as to when to render obedience to the rule and when their requirements may be
ignored. We had to draw a line where and did when we promulgated on January 1, 1964 the Revised
Rules of court wherein WE delineated in a language matchless in simplicity and clarity the essential
requirements for a valid notice of hearing on any motion, to eliminate all possibilities of
equivocation or misunderstanding.

CASE 208

G.R. No. L-35858 August 21, 1979

LIBRADA N. FIRME and FLORENCIO FIRME, petitioners,
vs.
ARSENIO REYES, HON. SIMEON M. GOPENGCO, as Presiding Judge of Branch XXV of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, G. A. MACHINERIES, INC., SHERIFF OF MANILA and GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.

FACTS: The procedural issue in this case, which had already been resolved by the Court of Appeals
in a decision from which the petitioners did not appeal, is whether the petitioners' motion for the
reconsideration of the lower court's adverse judgment against them was a mere scrap of paper
because it had no notice of hearing and, hence, the said judgment had become executory.

163
In Civil Case No. 62906 the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision dated March 1,
1971, declaring Arsenio Reyes the owner of a 165-square-meter lot and the house standing thereon
located at 2371 Del Pan Street, Sta. Ana, Manila and ordering the spouses, Librada N. Firme and
Doctor Florencio Firme, to pay Reyes rentals for the use and occupation of the house plus P1,000 as
attorney's fees.

The Firme spouses received on March 27, 1971 a copy of that decision. On April 13, they filed a
motion for reconsideration, which did not contain any notice of hearing. Copies of that motion were
furnished the adverse parties.

Reyes, the winning party, filed a motion dated May 3, 1971, praying that the decision be declared
executory and that a writ of execution be issued. He contended that the motion for reconsideration
was a mere scrap of paper because it was not set for hearing. The Firme spouses opposed the motion
for execution but the Trial Court denied it on August 30, 1971. Hence, the lower courts judgment
was regarded as executory and a writ of execution was issued on October 7, 1972.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration filed by the Firme spouses be given merit.

HELD: NO.

Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for new trial or reconsideration
should contain "a written notice" which should be served on the adverse party. "Notice of a motion
shall be served by the applicant to all parties concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing
thereof." The notice shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion. "No motion shall
be acted upon by the court, without proof of service of the notice thereof, except when the court is
satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected. " (Secs. 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15,
Rules of Court).

In the leading case of Manakil and Tison vs. Revilla and Tuano, 42 Phil. 81, 84, it was held that a
motion for new trial, sans notice of hearing, did not merit any consideration. "It was nothing but a
piece of paper filed with the court. It presented no question which the court could decide. The court
had no right to consider it, nor had the clerk any right to receive it without a compliance" with Rule
15. "It was not, in fact, a motion. It did not comply with the rules of the court." (See Roman Catholic
Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Unisan, 44 Phil. 866 and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117).

The written notice referred to in section 2 of Rule 37 is that prescribed in sections 4 and 5 of Rule
15. The provision in section 6 of Rule 15 that no motion shall be acted upon by the court without
proof of service of such notice is intended to enable the court to find out whether or not the adverse
party is in conformity with the motion and, if he objects to it, to give him an opportunity to file his
opposition (Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad Company, L-24263, November 18, 1967, 21
SCRA 974, 982-983).

164
The trial court may properly decline to act on a motion for the reconsideration of its decision when
such motion lacks the notice of the time and place of hearing (Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
vs. Batu Construction & Co., 121 Phil. 1221).

Without such a notice of hearing, the motion to set aside the judgment does not suspend the
running of the period within which to perfect an appeal (Philippine Advertising Counselors, Inc. vs.
Revilla, L-31869, August 8, 1973, 52 SCRA 246, 257-8)

CASE 209
G.R. No. 70895 May 30, 1986
HABALUYAS ENTERPRISES, INC. and PEDRO HABALUYAS, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO M. JAPSON, Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 36; SHUGO NODA & CO., LTD.,
and SHUYA NODA, respondents.

FACTS: Respondents have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Second Division
of the Court promulgated on August 5, 1985 which granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition
and set aside the order of respondent Judge granting private respondents' motion for new trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the fifteen-day period within which a party may file a motion for
reconsideration of a final order or ruling of the Regional Trial Court may be extended.

HELD: Section 39 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reduced the period
for appeal from final orders or judgments of the Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First
Instance) from thirty (30) to fifteen (15) days and provides a uniform period of fifteen days for
appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court counted from
notice thereof, except in habeas corpus cases where the period for appeal remains at forty- eight
(48) hours. To expedite appeals, only a notice of appeal is required and a record on appeal is no
longer required except in appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and
in other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed. Section 19 of the Interim Rules provides that
in these exceptional cases, the period for appeal is thirty (30) days since a record on appeal is
required. Moreover Section 18 of the Interim Rules provides that no appeal bond shall be required
for an appeal, and Section 4 thereof disallows a second motion for reconsideration of a final order
or judgment.

All these amendments are designed, as the decision sought to be reconsidered rightly states, to
avoid the procedural delays which plagued the administration of justice under the Rules of Court
which are intended to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive administration
of justice.

However, the law and the Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit the filing of a motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment.

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After considering the able arguments of counsels for petitioners and respondents, the Court
resolved that the interest of justice would be better served if the ruling in the original decision were
applied prospectively from the time herein stated. The reason is that it would be unfair to deprive
parties of their right to appeal simply because they availed themselves of a procedure which was
not expressly prohibited or allowed by the law or the Rules. On the other hand, a motion for new
trial or reconsideration is not a pre-requisite to an appeal, a petition for review or a petition for
review on certiorari, and since the purpose of the amendments above referred to is to expedite the
final disposition of cases, a strict but prospective application of the said ruling is in order.

The Court restates and clarifies the rules on this point, as follows:

1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced
that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed
with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate
Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the
court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.

2.) In appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in other cases wherein
multiple appeals are allowed, a motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal may be filed
within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days. (Moya vs. Barton, 76 Phil. 831; Heirs of Nantes
vs. Court of Appeals, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 753.) If the court denies the motion for extension, the
appeal must be taken within the original period (Bello vs. Fernando, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 135),
inasmuch as such a motion does not suspend the period for appeal (Reyes vs. Sta. Maria, November
20, 1972, 48 SCRA 1). The trial court may grant said motion after the expiration of the period for
appeal provided it was filed within the original period. (Valero vs. Court of Appeals, June 28, 1973,
51 SCRA 467; Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 228).

All appeals heretofore timely taken, after extensions of time were granted for the filing of a motion
for new trial or reconsideration, shall be allowed and determined on the merits.

CASE 210
G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005

DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ, FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA
AND DOMINGO
VS
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES

FACTS: Neypes filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance
and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later,
in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had

166
already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal and, on the 15th
day thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another
order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five
days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August
3, 1998. The court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This
was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this
too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus
under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the
appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They
argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this
was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration.
When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were
well within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the
petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998
or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the
appellate court, the order was the final order appealable under the Rules.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is proper to allow a fresh period to file an appeal in lieu of dismissal of the
Motion for Reconsideraiton.

HELD: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity
to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40,
Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to
be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably
filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date
of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not
inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules, which states that the appeal shall be taken within
15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or
signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.

Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within
15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which we
already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration. Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which
shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original
period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance
still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court that rendered the assailed

167
decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify
any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts
become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

**Additional Info only reading purposes**

The Neypes Rule

STATEMENT OF THE RULE

The "Neypes Rule," otherwise known as the Fresh Period Rule, states that a party litigant
may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision
or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration. (Domingo Neypes versus Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524
September 14, 2005)

PURPOSE OF THE RULE

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. (supra)

The raison dtre for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules
and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the
15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-
day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution. (Judith Yu versus
Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 09 Feb. 2011)

THE RULE PRIOR TO NEYPES

Before the Supreme Court promulgated Neypes, the rules mandate that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration interrupts the running of the period to appeal; and that an appeal should be taken
within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. While the period to file
an appeal is counted from the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the appellant does not have
the full fifteen (15) days. The appellant only has the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to
file the notice of appeal. Thus, some rules on appeals are:

168
 Sec. 39. [B.P. 129] Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the
notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided,
however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the
notice of judgment appealed from. x x x

SEC. 3. [Rule 41] Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice
of judgment or final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

SEC. 6. [Rule 122] When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days
from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for
perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is
filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel
at which time the balance of the period begins to run.

IN WHAT CASES APPLICABLE

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal
Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies31 to the Court of
Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.32 The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution. (Neypes, supra)

Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the
decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule
41, Section 3. (Neypes, supra)

The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision
is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any
error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts
become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly. (Neypes, supra)

APPLICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a "fresh

169
period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:

First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no
distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129
categorically states that "[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments,
or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to
recognize any distinction.17

Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the
same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are
concerned the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial
or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why
this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.

Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it
did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the
Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by
certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section
3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. x x x x

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.

xxxx

Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme
Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction)
and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods
to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases
under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the

170
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated differently.

Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it applicable only to the
period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation where
a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case a
situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-
appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property
interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must
emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over time, courts
have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in
law Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege.18 (Judith Yu versus
Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 09 Feb. 2011)

RETROACTIVE EFFECT
The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could retroactively
apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes
was promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that
procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time
of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.17 Amendments to
procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested
rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.18

Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and categorically warrants that Neypes bears the
quested retroactive effect, to wit:

Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order
that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues
they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,
insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an
appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court.
Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to
pending actions, such as the present case.

171
Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will amount to injustice, if not
absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later or in the
year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in
1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders
issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the "fresh period rule" while those later rulings of
the lower courts such as in the instant case, will not.19

Notably, the subject incidents in Sps. De los Santos occurred in August 2000, at the same month as
the relevant incidents at bar. There is no reason to adopt herein a rule that is divergent from that
in Sps. De los Santos. (Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. versus Hon. Marietta Homena J. Valencia, G.R. No.
173942, 25 June 2008)

NOT INCONSISTENT WITH RULES OF COURT

This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the
appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use
of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.33 Hence, the use of "or"
in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined
to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. (Neypes,
supra)

NEYPES RULE NOT APPLIED

Petitioner was charged with and found guilty of perjury. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of 4 months and 1 day to 1 year, a period which is considered as a correctional penalty. Under Article
9 of the Revised Penal Code, light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which
the penalty of arresto menor (one to thirty days of imprisonment) or a fine not exceeding two
hundred pesos (P200), or both are imposable. Thus, perjury is not a light felony or offense
contemplated by Rule 120, Sec. 6. It was therefore mandatory for petitioner to be present at the
promulgation of the judgment.

To recall, despite notice, petitioner was absent when the MTCC promulgated its judgment on 25
August 2009. Pursuant to Rule 120, Sec. 6, it is only when the accused is convicted of a light offense
that a promulgation may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. In case
the accused failed to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation despite notice, and the failure
to appear was without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose all the remedies available in the Rules
against the judgment. One such remedy was the Motion for Reconsideration of the judgment of the
MTCC filed by petitioner on 28 August 2009. Absent a motion for leave to avail of the remedies

172
against the judgment, the MTCC should not have entertained petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. Thus, petitioner had only 15 days from 25 August 2009 or until 9 September 2009
to file his Motion for Probation. The MTCC thus committed grave abuse of discretion when it
entertained the motion instead of immediately denying it. xxx

Petitioner, however, did not file a motion for leave to avail himself of the remedies prior to filing his
Motion for Reconsideration. The hearing on the motion for leave would have been the proper
opportunity for the parties to allege and contest whatever cause prevented petitioner from
appearing on 25 August 2009, and whether that cause was indeed justifiable. If granted, petitioner
would have been allowed to avail himself of other remedies under the Rules of Court, including a
motion for reconsideration. xxx

As a final point, while we held in Yu v. Samson-Tatad that the rule in Neypes is also applicable to
criminal cases regarding appeals from convictions in criminal cases under Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court, nevertheless, the doctrine is not applicable to this case, considering that petitioners Motion
for Probation was filed out of time. (Anselmo de Leon Cuyo versus People of the Phils., G.R. No.
192164 October 12, 2011)

CASE 211
G.R. No. L-28486 September 10, 1981
FRANCISCO MAGNO, ESPERANZA MAGNO, EULOGIO MAGNO, AMELIA MAGNO VASQUEZ,
ULPIANO VASQUEZ, JOSE O. MAGNO, NICANOR P. MAGNO, FELECITAS O. MAGNO, and
LOURDES O. MAGNO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE MARIANO BENEDICTO of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija and DONATO M. VERGARA, respondents

FACTS: A petition for review on certiorari of the judgment of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
December 2, 1967.

Before the Bulacan Court of First Instance, in Civil Case No. 3198- M (Bulacan Case), which was an
action between members of the same family for partition of war damage payments received from
the United States Government, judgment by default was rendered on September 9, 1966 in favor
of petitioners herein, as the plaintiffs in the said case, and against private respondent Donato M.
Vergara and his father-in-law, Meliton Magno, jointly and severally, as defendants therein.
Judgment having become final, the corresponding Writ of Execution was issued and the properties
of private respondent were levied upon and scheduled for sale at public auction.

173
Private respondent resorted to an action for annulment of judgment and of Writ of Execution before
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in Civil Case No. 275 (Annulment Suit) against petitioners
and the Nueva Ecija Provincial Sheriff, as defendants, upon the main contention that judgment in
the Bulacan Case was procured by means of extrinsic fraud committed by petitioner Francisco
Magno against private respondent. Essentially, the extrinsic fraud allegedly consisted in assurances
made by Francisco Magno to private respondent during a confrontation between them that it was
never the intention of petitioners to involve private respondent in the suit and that he would be
excluded therefrom. Convinced, private respondent was lured into inaction only to discover later
that judgment was rendered against him and execution against his properties ordered. Private
respondent also prayed for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to restrain the enforcement of the
judgment and of the Writ of Execution pending the determination of the Annulment Suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations in the Complaint filed before the Nueva Ecija Court constitute
extrinsic fraud as to justify said Court in exercising its jurisdiction to interfere with and set aside the
judgment of the Bulacan Court and to enjoin the execution thereof.

HELD:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the foregoing allegations contain ultimate facts which, if
substantiated, could constitute extrinsic fraud. Extrinsic fraud is one which prevents the losing party
from defending the action brought against him.

We think it sufficiently appears from the testimony of Baker that he was misled by the statement of
Judge Walker, who was the attorney of Craddock and Stotts He had a right to assume from his
version of their conversation that the case would not be taken up without notifying him. It appears
that he thought that the court had no jurisdiction because an attempt was made to foreclose in the
same action a mortgage on real estate which was situated in another district in the same county.
He says it was understood that he should be notifed when the case was to be taken up, and did not
appear at the adjourned term because no depositions had been taken by either party, and he relied
upon his understanding that the case would not be taken up without notice to him. He stated that
Craddock was only present during a part of the conversation that he had with Judge Walker. Judge
Walker was not a witness in the case, and there is nothing to contradict the testimony of Baker. It is
true Craddock contradicted his testimony in regard to some other matters which occurred during
the conversation, but we do not think there is any contradiction of Baker's testimony with regard to
the postponement of the trial. There was no negligence on his part in placing reliance upon the
statements made to him, and, while we do not think that any fraud was intended to be practiced
upon Montague, the result was that Montague was deprived of his right to appear and defend the
action and this constituted a fraud in law. This principle has been recognized in the case of Lawson
v. Bettison 12 Ark. 401. Relief against fraud in judgment and decrees has also ' been recognized as
a ground for equitable jurisdiction Where by mistake or fraud a party has gained an unfair
advantage in proceedings in a court which must operate to make that court an instrument of
injustice, courts of equi ty will interfere and restrain him from reaping fruits of the advantage thus
improperly gained In the application of the principle an injunction will be granted against ajudgment
taken in violation of an agreement to continue the case, where there is a good defense to the

174
action. Beams v. Denham 2 Scam. (111) 58; Sanderson v. Voelcker 51 Mo. App. 328; Brooks v.
Twitchell 182 Mass. 443, 65 N.E. 843, 94 Am St. Rep. 662.

CASE 212
G.R. No. L-22822 August 30, 1968
GREGORIA PALANCA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE AMERICAN FOOD MANUFACTURING COMPANY and TIBURCIO EVALLE, in his capacity as
Director of Patents, respondents-appellees.

FACTS: On May 14, 1958, petitioner-appellant Gregoria Palanca filed with the Philippine Patent
Office, Department of Commerce and Industry, an application to register the trademark, "LION and
the representation of a lion's head," alleging that she had been using the trademark since January
5, 1958 on bechin (food seasoning). The application was opposed by herein respondent-appelee.
The American Food Manufacturing Company, on the ground that petitioner's trademark was similar
to its (respondent's) trademark "LION and representation of a lion" previously adopted and used by
it on the same type of product since August 3, 1953.

After hearing, the Director of Patents, on June 14, 1961, rendered a decision in favor of American
Food Manufacturing Corporation due to prior use. The record shows the petitioner's counsel was
furnished with copy of the decision on June 16, 1961.3 No appeal was taken from the decision of the
Director of Patents within the reglementary period from June 16, 1961.

On December 14, 1961, however, herein petitioner-appellant filed with the Patent Office a petition
to set aside the aforementioned judgment of June 14, 1961, invoking section 2 of Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court, alleging fraud and/or negligence committed by her former counsel, Atty. Bienvenido
Medel, in that the latter failed to file a memorandum before the case was submitted for decision;
that she had been fraudulently kept in total ignorance of the proceedings in the case; that her
counsel had not informed her of the decision thus preventing her from resorting to all the legal
remedies available to her; that she came to known of the decision only about the latter part of
October, 1961, through her friend, Mr. Domingo Adevoso; that she had evidence to disprove the
claim of opposer The American Food Manufacturing Company that it had been using the same
trademark even before 1958; and that she had evidence to show that the bechin that the opposer
sold prior to 1958 were not of the "Lion" brand but of the "Lion-Tiger" brand, another trademark of
opposer.

ISSUE: Whether or not Director of Patents erred in denying the petition to set aside judgment and
resolving that there was no fraud perpetrated against petitioner-appellant, as contemplated under
section 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.

175
HELD: NO.

Section 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment or order entered against a party
through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence may be set aside upon proper petition to
that effect. Not every kind of fraud, however, is sufficient ground to set aside a judgment. This Court
has held that only extrinsic or collateral, as distinguished from intrinsic, fraud is a ground for
annulling a judgment.7 Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the successful party in a
litigation which is committed outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents,
attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly
his side of the case. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party in a litigation during
the trial, such as the use of forged instruments on perjured testimony, which did not affect the
presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case.

The acts complained of by petitioner-appellant, even if assumed to be true and fraudulent, were all
committed by her own counsel, and not by the successful party or opponent in the case. Hence,
petitioner-appellant had not shown extrinsic fraud that would warrant the setting aside of the
decision.

CASE 213
G.R. No. L-8222. June 25, 1956

GREGORIO TARCA and RODOLFO TARCA CASTRO, Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. ANGELES CASON
VDA. DE CARRETERO, Defendant-Appellee.

FACTS: Plaintiffs filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action seeking to annul the
judgment rendered in a registration case (G.L.R.O. Record No. 54794) which was jointly heard with
another case concerning recovery of two of the lots that were the subject of registration (Civil Case
No. 8853), on the ground that said judgment was obtained through fraud. Defendant filed a motion
to dismiss which, as amended, disputed the sufficiency of the complaint on three grounds; (a) that
the court had no jurisdiction of the person of Defendant; (b) that the cause of action was barred by
a prior judgment; and (c) that the complaint states no cause of action.
After Plaintiffs had filed their objection to said motion and Defendant had replied, the court found
the motion to dismiss well taken on the ground that the alleged fraud on which the cause of action
of Plaintiffs is predicated, even if committed, is not extrinsic or collateral to the issues involved in
the former case, but intrinsic or one which should have been raised therein because it was part and
parcel of the defense that the Plaintiffs had set up to protect their interest. Accordingly, the court
dismissed the case.
The facts which, according to the complaint, constitute the alleged fraud on which Plaintiffs base
their cause of action to annul the judgment rendered in the former case, are: (1) the concealment
by Defendant of the true traces of an old sugar mill and of the house of their predecessors-in-
interest by indicating some big stones within the perimeter of lot No. 8 is the ocular inspection

176
conducted by the court, because the truth is that said traces are on the western side of lot 8, located
in another property belonging to Defendant; (2) the refusal of the trial judge to conduct an ocular
inspection of the other side of Cabatuan creek to see for himself the location of the true traces of
said sugar mill and house without any justifiable reason; (3) the mysterious disappearance of the
record of the proceedings concerning the ocular inspection made by the trial judge as above
adverted to.
But it appears on the very face of the complaint that those facts, which allegedly constitute the
fraud on which the action of Plaintiffs is predicated, are matters which have transpired in the course
of the ocular inspection made by the trial judge in the former case and which said trial judge had
already considered and passed upon in his decision. It even appears that when the ocular inspection
was made, both parties were present with their counsel, and the objection of Plaintiffs to the
indication of the traces or remains of the old sugar mill and house determinative of Defendants
possession has been duly noted by the trial judge only that the same was not given due
consideration by him. And it likewise appears that these matters have also been taken up
by Plaintiffs in connection with their appeal to the Court of Appeals but that said court did not
decide them in their favor but instead affirmed the findings of the trial court. It is therefore evident
that the alleged fraud now advanced by Plaintiffs predicated on those facts is not extrinsic or
collateral but intrinsic in the sense that they have not only been raised but were the subject of
adjudication by both the former court and the Court of Appeals and as such it cannot be considered
as sufficient basis for annulling the judgment rendered in the former case.
ISSUE: Whether or not fraud indicated by complainant are sufficient to annul judgment rendered in
the former case.
HELD: Fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment must be extrinsic to the litigations. Were not
these the rule there would be no end to litigation, perjury being of such common occurrence in
trials. In fact, under the opposite rule, the losing party could attack the judgment at any time by
attributing imaginary falsehood to his adversarys proofs. But the settled law is that judicial
determination however erroneous of matters brought within the courts jurisdiction cannot be
invalidated in another proceeding. It is the business of a party to meet and repel his opponents
perjured evidence. (Almeda vs. Cruz, 47 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 1179, 1180.)
It is true, as Plaintiffs claim, that when the former case was appealed to the Court of Appeals they
discovered that the record of the proceedings concerning the ocular inspection made by the trial
court has mysteriously disappeared and for that reason the Court of Appeals could not act
properly on the issues raised concerning said ocular inspection, but why did not Plaintiffs take the
necessary steps in order that the record of said ocular inspection may be located or reconstituted
as required by law? It is preposterous to contend that such disappearance is the result of a
conspiracy between the trial judge and the Defendant. In any event, it was the concern
of Plaintiffs to have the matters investigated in due time, and this they failed to do. But this

177
circumstance alone cannot certainly be the basis of annulment of a judgment duly rendered and
affirmed by the appellate court and which has become final long ago.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against Appellants.

CASE 214
G.R. No. 70443 September 15, 1986
BRAULIO CONDE, RUFINA CONDE, GERARDO CONDE, CONCHITA C. LUNDANG, and ALFREDO
VENTURA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. CESAR C. PERALEJO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch LXVI, Third Judicial Region, Capas, Tarlac, and MARCELO
GUTIERREZ, respondents.

FACTS: On January 16, 1984, the petitioners filed an action to annul the judgment of the Court of
Appeals dated September 23, 1981, which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
ordered the petitioners and/or their successors-in-interest to deliver immediately the ownership
and possession of the property in question to the then plaintiff-appellant Marcelo Gutierrez. In their
complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, the petitioners alleged that through
fraud, Gutierrez was able to make it appear that he was the son of Esteban Gutierrez and Fermina
Ramos and as a necessary consequence of such filiation, was the absolute owner by succession of
the property in question.

On February 27, 1984, the trial court dismissed the petitioners' complaint on the ground that it had
no jurisdiction to annul the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Upon the denial of their motion for
reconsideration, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and a writ of injunction
before the appellate court. The said court in turn, dismissed the petition and a subsequent motion
for reconsideration on the grounds that a Regional Trial Court is without jurisdiction to annul the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and that only the Supreme Court is empowered to review the
judgment of said appellate court. Hence, the petitioners elevated the case before this Court.

On the merits of the petition, the appellate court ruled that the fraud relied upon by the petitioners
is only intrinsic and thus, even on the assumption that it has jurisdiction to decide the case, still the
same has no merit. It dismissed the petition. The petitioners elevated this decision to us.

On June 5, 1985, we resolved to require the respondents to comment on the petition.

Notwithstanding proof that a copy of the petition was served on the respondents' counsel on June
24, 1985, no comment has been filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the fraud mentioned is intrinsic in nature.

178
HELD: Fraud has been regarded as extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the rule 'where it is
one of the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, or real contests, or from presenting
all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself,
but to the manner by which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy.
In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation
which is committed outside of the trial of the case, where the defeated party has been prevented
from presenting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.

The resort to fraud in introducing fabricated evidence is definitely an intrinsic fraud, hence false
testimony being a matter of evidence is definitely intrinsic and not extrinsic. Fraud consisting in
acting fictitious cause of false testimony is intrinsic (sic) (Francisco v. David, 38 CG 714). Intrinsic
fraud takes the form of acts of a party in a litigation during the trial such as the use of forged
instruments or perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did
prevent a fair and just determination of the case (Libudan v. Palma, [S1, 45 SCRA 17]). Intrinsic fraud
is not sufficient to attack a judgment (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971).

Petitioners stand that extrinsic fraud was employed by the respondents, is bereft of any factual
basis, hence, even on the assumption that this court has jurisdiction to decide this issue, still the
petitioners cause of action must fail.

A careful review of the present petition and of the records of the appellate court on this case shows
that even on the assumption that all the facts alleged in the petition are true, the petition should be
dismissed for lack of merit because the fraud allegedly perpetrated by the private respondent in AC-
G.R. SP No. 03301 is only intrinsic in nature and not extrinsic. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic or
collateral where it has prevented a party from having a trial or from presenting an of his case to the
court. (Asian Surety and Insurance Co. v. Island Steel, Inc., 118 SCRA 233, 239; citing Amuran v.
Aquino, 38 Phil. 29). In the case at bar, the fraud was in the nature of documents allegedly
manufactured by Marcelo Gutierrez to make it appear that he was the rightful heir of the disputed
property, Hence, the Intermediate Appellate Court is correct in finding the fraud to be intrinsic in
nature.

CASE 215
G.R. No. 79244 December 10, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MATEO AYLLON SR., (Deceased)
ERLINDA S. AYLLON petitioner- appellant,
vs.
PRIMA A. SEVILLA, PILAR A. SALAZAR, MERCED A. PABELLO MARCOS AYLLON ANGELES A.
SALAMEDA and and VICENTE AYLLON AYLLON ANGELES A. SALAMEDA and VICENTE
AYLLON respondents-appellees.

FACTS: A petition for probate of a holographic last will and testament of Mateo Ayllon Sr. was filed
on 7 November 1977 by the petitioner with the Court of First Instance (Now Regional Trial Court),
Branch VI, of Guiuan Eastern Samar. The case was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 459. In said
will, the testator made disposition of specific properties to the petitioner, as his surviving spouse

179
with whom he had no children, and to the respondents, as his sons and daughters by a first marriage.
The respondents opposed the probate, and so hearings were held until the case was submitted for
decision at about the end of 1981. .

While the case was awaiting the court's decision, the Petitioner, without the aid of a lawyer, entered
into a verbal amicable settlement with the respondents. Relying on the verbal settlement and
believing that she will be given one-half (1/2) of the house and lot situated at Concepcion Street,
Guiuan Easter Samar, in return for her abandoning the rest of the properties willed to her, petitioner
wrote her lawyer a letter requesting the latter to file a motion to dismiss the case. Petitioner's
lawyer complied with her request. On 14 March 1984, the case was dismissed. However, the
respondents apparently did not comply with their verbal agreement with the petitioner. Hence, the
petitioner filed an affidavit with the court on 22 March 1984, asking for the withdrawal of her
motion to dismiss and for revival of the case.

On 7 September 1984, the trial court reconsidered the order of dismissal, and revived the case. But,
on 10 September 1985, the court issued an order recalling the order of 7 September 1984, thereby
reviving the order of dismissal of 14 March 1984, on the grounds that (1) the case was amicably
settled, and (2) the petitioner failed to present three (3) witnesses who could Identify the
handwriting of the testator in the disputed holographic will, as provided under Article 811 of the
Civil Code.

The petitioner files a motion for reconsideration of order of the trial court dismissing the case but it
was denied. Upon petitioner's appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter court required the
petitioner to file a Record on Appeal within Sixty (60) days from notice. The counsel of the petitioner
received the notice on 11 February 1987, so that the last day to file the record on appeal was on 12
April 1987. But, instead of preparing and eventually filing the Record on Appeal, the petitioner's
counsel filed an Appeal Brief dated 28 February 1987, but actually filed through the mails on 17
March 1987. Hence, in a Resolution dated 29 May 1987, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal
on account of failure of counsel of the petitioner to filed a record on appeal, which is required in
appeals in special proceedings, under Section 39 of B.P. Blg. 129, and Section 29 (b) of the Interim
Rules and Guidelines.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals of 29 May
1987. It was denied. Hence, the present petition for certiorari, with the petitioner praying that her
case be revived, and that she be allowed to submit a record on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sixty-day period within which a party may file an appeal already lapsed.

HELD: YES.

Petitioner's counsel failed to file a record on appeal despite due notice and the period of sixty (60)
days given to him to file said record on appeal. Instead of filing the record on appeal, as required,

180
what the petitioner's counsel did was to file an Appeal Brief. And even after petitioner's counsel
received a copy of the respondents' Motion for the Dismissal of the Appeal for failure of the
petitioner to file a record on appeal, nothing was done by petitioner's counsel to correct or amend
the erroneous procedure he had taken. Thus, it is clear that the failure of the petitioner, through
counsel, to file the record on appeal was not inadvertent. In other words, petitioner's counsel
ignored compliance with the requirement of filing a record on appeal, as provided for by the Rules.
Hence, there is no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals, in dismissing petitioner's
appeal.

CASE 216
G.R. No. L-56171 January 31, 1983
NIDA GABA, RODOLFO GABA, NATY A. UY and MARIANO TAN, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, NILO CABANG,
Deputy Sheriff, and PEDRO F. MARTINEZ. respondents.

FACTS: Pedro F. Martinez sued Nida Gaba, Naty A. Uy and Lilian C. Gabriel and their respective
husbands for the recovery of the sums of P20,000 and P3,000 plus damages.

Nida Gaba and the Uy spouses answered the complaint through lawyer Tirso L. Manguiat. Although
duly served with the summons, the Gabriel spouses did not answer the complaint. They pleaded the
defense that they borrowed from Martinez only one amount of P10,000 and not P20,000 and that
all the interests due were deducted in advance.

The trial court set the case for pre-trial and an order was sent to the parties counsels through mail.
At the pre-trial on July 16, where only plaintiff Martinez and his counsel appeared, Gaba and the Uy
spouses were declared in default for their non-appearance. Lilian C. Gabriel was declared in default
for her failure to answer the complaint. The clerk of court was commissioned to hear the evidence.

A copy of the decision was received on August 22, 1980 by registered mail by Manguiat's clerk,
Alfredo Chico. On September 8, 1980, Martinez filed a motion for execution with notice to Manguiat
by registered mail. On that same date, September 8, Manguiat filed an urgent motion to set aside
the order of default with the advertence that the clerk of court should submit the motion for the
immediate consideration by the trial court and, alternatively, that it be set for hearing with notice
to the parties.

Defendant Manny Tan, husband of Naty A. Uy, verified that motion. He alleged that defendants'
failure to appear in court was due to fraud or excusable neglect since no notice of the trial was sent

181
to them and their counsel. A copy of that motion was furnished Martinez's counsel by registered
mail. The trial court in its order of November 12, 1980 denied the motion for lack of merit.

Several months later, or on February 11, 1981, the Gaba, Uy and Gabriel spouses filed the herein
petition for certiorari through another lawyer, Camilo R. Flores. Attached to the petition was the
affidavit of Manguiat, a resident of 2401 Singalong Street, Manila (no longer holding office at the
City Court Compound). The Gabriel spouses, who are abroad, were later dropped as petitioners.
Manguiat alleged that Alfredo Chico, who received copies of the notice of pre-trial and decision, had
ceased to be his clerk in December, 1979, that his other clerk was Chona M. Seminiano and that
Chico did not turn over to him the said papers. Manguiat did not attach any affidavit of Chona.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not petitioners' claim that the amount due from them was unduly inflated by
the trial court.

HELD: Manguiat's claim that he was deceived by his alleged former clerk (Chico) cannot be taken
seriously in the light of the incontestable fact that although his other clerk, Chona Seminiano
received on August 1, 1980 a copy of the order of default, yet it was only on September 8, or thirty-
eight days later, when Manguiat filed a motion to set it aside, He was not conscientious in attending
to his clients' interests.

As to petitioners' claim that the amount due from them was unduly inflated by the trial court, it
should be observed that petitioners Mariano Tan and Nida Gaba -in a letter to respondent deputy
sheriff dated January 6, 1981 asked for a period of fifteen days within which to satisfy the judgment
(p. 95, Rollo). They did not contest the validity of the judgment and the levy.

Since the said judgment had long become final and executory when the petitioners filed on February
11, 1981 their petition for certiorari and as there is no clear showing that they were deprived of due
process or that the said judgment was procured by means of extrinsic or collateral fraud, it can no
longer be set aside. The trial court acted within its jurisdiction and did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion in rendering and enforcing that judgment.

With reference to the alleged irregularities in the execution of the judgment, particularly with
respect to Rodolfo Gaba the same should be first raised in the trial court. The record does not show
that the lower court's attention was called to the alleged improper implementation of the writ of
execution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed with cost,-against the petitioners. The writ of preliminary
injunction is cancelled.

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 CASE 217
G.R. No. L-39373 September 30, 1974
FELIXBERTO W. FERRER, as administrator of the INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE SPOUSES ESTEBAN F.
FERRER, SR. and MIGUELA WENCESLAO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
YANG SEPENG, defendant-appellant.

FACTS: This case was certified to this Court as involving a pure question of law by resolution of
August 2, 1974 of the Court of Appeals

In the action below for recovery of a sum of money, trial on the merits was set for November 8,
1967. At the hearing, plaintiff-appellee and counsel appeared while only counsel for defendant-
appellant was present. The trial proceeded and plaintiff introduced his documentary evidence
supporting his claim against defendant, all of which were admitted without objection by defendant's
counsel. After plaintiff rested his case, defendant's counsel moved for postponement on the ground
that defendant was not present in court. The trial court denied the motion and declared the case
submitted for decision. On the same day, it rendered judgment against defendant.

Three weeks thereafter on December 2, 1967, defendant filed a motion for new trial allegedly on
the ground of "accident, mistake or excusable neglect" in that defendant "early in the morning of
said November 8, 1967 ... had stomach trouble and consequently I was not able to go to the court
for said trial" as per defendant's affidavit annexed to the motion. The trial court denied the motion
on the following grounds:

1. That the alleged stomach "trouble" does not constitute excusable negligence since it is merely
one which could not physically prevent him from appearing in court;

2. That the motion for new trial did not allege any statement of fact constituting the valid defense
which the defendant may prove if given the chance to introduce evidence;

3. Finally, because it is not in dispute that appellant is indebted to the late Esteban Ferrer, Sr. in the
amount of P20,750.00 as set forth in Exhibit A which appellant signed and did not deny as shown by
the fact that appellant in his Answer did not deny the same under oath thereby giving rise to the
presumption that he is deemed to have admitted it (Section 3, Rule 8, Rules of Court).

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial.

HELD: NO.

We find it necessary to tarry on this point of division in the appellate court. Defendant-appellant's
averment of "stomach trouble belatedly presented after three weeks, without any specific

183
statement of its nature and gravity was patently inadequate to show to the trial court's satisfaction
the existence of "accident, mistake or excusable neglect" which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against by reason of which his substantial rights have been materially affected, as required
by the Rules of Court.

But even if it were to be conceded that defendant-appellant did in fact suffer from serious stomach
trouble which physically prevented him from appearing and giving his testimony at the scheduled
trial, his failure to submit in addition an affidavit of merits showing the valid defense which he may
prove as against plaintiffs case in case a new trial is granted is fatal to his cause.

The reason is fundamental and elementary. The rule requires that motions for new trial founded on
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence must be accompanied by affidavits of merits, i.e.
affidavits showing the facts (not mere conclusions or opinions) constituting the valid cause of action
or defense which the movant may prove in case a new trial is granted, because a new trial would
serve no purpose and would just waste the time of the court as well as the parties if the complaint
is after all groundless or the defense is nil or ineffective.

The decisive undisputed fact is that no affidavit of merits to support his motion for new trial as
required by Rule 37, section 2 was submitted by defendant-appellant. Such failure is fatal to his
cause and is decisive on the question of law presented by his sole assignment of error.

CASE 218

G.R. No. L-45885 April 28, 1983

JULIAN MENDOZA, petitioner, vs.
HON. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, BRANCH III,
and SPOUSES RENATO MACAPAGAL and CORAZON MACAPAGAL, respondents.

FACTS: This is a direct appeal by petition for review on certiorari of an order of the respondent Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, dismissing the petitioner's complaint in Civil Case
No. 339-V-76 and of the subsequent order denying a motion for the reconsideration of the order of
dismissal.

In May 1975, the petitioner Julian Mendoza and private respondents, spouses Renato Macapagal
and Corazon Macapagal, entered into a written contract, entitled "Kasunduan Sa Pagpapatayo Ng
Tirahang Bahay" whereby for and in consideration of the sum of P320,000.00, the petitioner
undertook to construct a residential house for the private respondents under the terms and
conditions therein provided for. The construction of the house was attended by some
misunderstandings between the parties, with the petitioner claiming that he is entitled to certain

184
amounts which the private respondents refused to pay, and the latter in turn alleging that the
petitioner should pay them damages for having abandoned the job.

Sometime in March 1976, the petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
against the private respondents and the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. Before
any trial was conducted, however, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that the same does not state a cause of action. The petitioner filed an opposition to
the said motion to dismiss. The Judge granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.

Realizing, perhaps, the weakness of their position in sustaining the order of the respondent Judge
in dismissing the complaint, the private respondents, in their memorandum, resorted to additional
grounds for upholding such dismissal. They now contend that this petition for certiorari may not be
entertained because it is being utilized as a substitute for appeal, and that it was filed out of time.
Neither of these contentions of the private respondents find support in applicable rules.

ISSUE: Whether or not the instant proceeding is a petition for certiorari and whether or not is was
filed out of time.

HELD: NO.

The instant proceeding is not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It is an
appeal by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Republic Act No. 5440. It is illogical,
therefore, to claim that the petitioner is resorting to this proceeding as a substitute for appeal, it
being an appeal in itself.

The contention that the petition was filed out of time is predicated on the claim that the motion for
reconsideration was defective for being pro-forma and for failing to comply with the requirements
of the Rules of Court regarding such a motion. We fail to see how the motion for reconsideration
filed by the petitioner may be considered pro-forma, the same having called the attention of the
trial court to a point which the latter totally ignored in the order dismissing the complaint. The
requirement which the petitioner supposedly failed to observe in filing his motion for
reconsideration was the failure to attach an affidavit of merit to the same. Private respondents
argue that a motion for reconsideration is equivalent to a motion for new trial and, under Section 2
of Rule 37, when the motion for new trial is filed, affidavits of merits should be attached to the
motion. Once again, private respondents misinterpreted the rules. While it is true that a motion for
reconsideration is equivalent to a motion for new trial if based on a ground for new trial (2 Moran,
1970 Edition, p. 222), the so-called "motion for reconsideration" which is not called as such in Rule
37 is the term commonly used to refer to a motion for new trial under subdivision (c) of Section I of
Rule 37. An affidavit of merit is required in a motion for new trial pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 37 if
the motion for new trial is based on any of the causes mentioned in subdivision (a) of Section I of
Rule 37, to wit, fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. No similar requirement is imposed
for a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration under subdivision (c) of the same section.

185
The timeliness of the filing of this petition may not be validly questioned. The order dismissing the
complaint was received by the petitioner on January 25, 1977. The motion for reconsideration was
received on February 1, 1977. The order denying the motion for reconsideration was received by
the petitioner on March 21, 1977. Within fifteen days thereafter or on April 4, 1977, the instant
petition was filed before this Court.

CASE 219

205 SCRA 537 JANUARY 27, 1992

VILLANUEVA VS CA

(CANNOT FIND SA NET UNG FULL CASE)

CASE 220

G.R. No. L-57204 March 14, 1988

FORTUNATO BORRE, ARTURO SANTOS, ALEJANDRO MANALANG, JOSE MANALANG, VIRGINIA
SANTOS, VIRGILIO GALLARDO, FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ, GLORIA DE LA FUENTE, DIONISIO
CASTANEDA, SR., YOLY ANG ESPINA, JACINTO MOLINA, BENIGNO MONDERO, SALUD VIRAY,
DEMETRIO CHICA, CRISANTA BRILLANTES, MILAGROS GALLARDO, FERNANDO ABES, MODESTA
GABEON, AMPARO GARA, RAMON GARA, RAMESES TAMOAN, FELIMON DORADO, FLORENTINA
PERALTA, ADELAIDA ABAYGAR, MARINO ABAYGAR, FIDEL CAYANAN, ABDON SARMIENTO,
ROSARIO SISON, LAURA LUMABI, and RUPERTO TORREFIEL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE ARTEMON D. LUNA, and THE MANOTOK
SERVICES, INCORPORATED, respondents.

FACTS: On August 29, 1979, petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent Manotok
Services, Inc. to recover rentals paid by them alleging that the land leased to them by the company
was actually public land, forming part of the Estero de Sunog-Apo and Estero de Maypajo and did
not belong to the company.

On motion of the respondent company, the trial court dismissed the complaint on November 11,
1980 on the ground that the company's ownership of the property was recognized by the State with
the passage of Pres. Dec. No. 1670.

On December 13, 1980, petitioners moved for reconsideration arguing that respondent company's
titles covered lots which were portions of the Estero de Sunog-Apo and Estero de Maypajo and
therefore should not have been included in those titles because these portions are public property

186
which cannot be appropriated and titled by private persons like the respondent company. The trial
court denied the motion in its order dated December 22, 1980 which was received by petitioners
on January 12, 1981.

A second motion for reconsideration was filed on January 14, 1981 on the ground that a subsequent
survey showed that the lots occupied by petitioners are not covered by respondent company's titles,
and hence, are neither covered by Pres. Dec. No. 1670. In its order dated January 20, 1981, the trial
court denied the second motion. Petitioners received the court order on January 30, 1981.

The next day, January 31, 1981, the last day for perfecting their appeal from the dismissal of their
complaint, petitioners filed by registered mail a notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time
to file the record on appeal. However, they did not file their appeal bond until February 2, 1981 for
which reason the court dismissed their appeal, the thirty-day period for perfecting appeal having
expired.

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari but their petition was dismissed. Hence, this
petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the late filing of the appeal bond of the petitioners was due to "excusable
negligence".

HELD: NO.

This is not the first time that this Court is faced with a question on the timeliness of filing the appeal
bond, a requirement for perfecting an appeal which had been dispensed with by Section 18 of the
Interim Rules of Court. Although this new procedural rule may be given retroactive effect, the extent
of its retroactive application is, however, limited to actions pending and undetermined at the time
of its approval and does not extend to actions which had already become final and executor.

Before the Interim Rules of Court took effect, the 1964 Rules of Court required the filing with the
trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal
bond, and a record on appeal. In the case at bar, although the notice of appeal and the motion for
extension of time to file the record on appeal were filed within the reglementary period, the appeal
bond was filed two days late, or after the period for perfecting an appeal had lapsed. Inasmuch as
the appeal was not perfected on time, the decision of the trial court became final and executory on
January 31, 1981. The trial judge committed no error in dismissing the appeal. This is clearly set
forth in Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court:

187
 SEC. 13.Effect of failure to file notice, bond, or record on appeal. Where the
notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal is not filed within the period of
time herein provided, the appeal shall be dismissed.

There is, therefore, no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. This Court has
repeatedly held that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law
is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. As Justice J.B.L. Reyes has pointed out, "The right to appeal
is not a natural right nor part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law

Unless there is a showing of excusable negligence justifying the failure to file the appeal bond on
time, the period within which to perfect an appeal cannot be extended to accommodate the
appellant. Petitioners' mistake in believing that the Office of the Clerk of Court would be closed on
Saturdays does not constitute "excusable negligence" which would justify a liberal application of the
pertinent rules on the perfection of an appeal. Petitioners' counsel, a practitioner in the Metro
Manila area, should have known or exerted effort to inquire about office hours in courts on
Saturdays instead of assuming that Saturdays are not working days. No abuse of discretion, much
less a grave one at that, as alleged, was committed by respondent Judge in dismissing petitioners'
appeal.

CASE 221

G.R. No. 174536 OCTOBER 29, 2008

ROBERTO Y. PONCIANO, JR., Petitioner
VS.
LAGUNA LAKEDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

CASE 222

G.R. No. 168985 JULY 23, 2008

ACCESSORIES SPECIALIST INC., a.k.a. ARTS 21 CORPORATION, and TADAHIKO HASHIMOTO

VS.

ERLINDA B. ALABANZA, for and in behalf of her deceased husband, JONES B. ALABANZA,

188
FACTS: On September 27, 2002, respondent Alabanza filed a complaint against petitioners Arts 21
and Hashimoto for and in behalf of her husband for non-payment of salaries, separation pay and
13th month pay.

Respondents husband was the Vice-President, Manager and Director of Arts 21 and had
been with the company from 1975 to 1997. He was compelled by the owner, Hashimoto, to file his
involuntary resignation on October 17, 1997 on the ground that Arts 21 allegedly suffered losses.
Respondents husband demanded payment of his money claims upon resignation but was told that
rank and file employees will be paid first and thus waited for his turn. Respondents husband made
several demands but Arts 21 just kept on assuring him that he will be paid his money claims.
Respondents husband died on August 5, 2002 with his claims still unpaid.

Petitioners invoke Art. 291 of the Labor Code and contend that respondents husband
voluntarily resigned in October, 1997, thus the cause of action has already prescribed since the case
was filed in 2002 only, beyond the three-year-period within which money claims should be filed.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering petitioner to pay respondent over P4M.
Petitioners filed an appeal along with a motion to reduce bond, attaching receipts for cash bond
amounting to P290K and appeal fee for P170.00. The motion was denied and petitioners were given
10 days within which to file the required bond. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which
the NLRC denied ordering the dismissal of the appeal for non-perfection thereof due to non-
compliance with the bond requirement. The resolution became final and executory and a writ of
execution was issued by the Labor Arbiter upon motion by respondent. Petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals praying for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary
injunction. The petition was dismissed.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the cause of action of respondent has already prescribed.

2. Whether or not the posting of the complete amount of the bond in an appeal from the
decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC is an indispensable requirement for the perfection of the
appeal despite the filing of a motion to reduce the amount of the appeal bond.

HELD:

1. NO.

Based on the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter, it was petitioner Arts 21 which was responsible
for the delay in the institution of the complaint. When petitioners husband filed his resignation he
immediately asked for the payment of his money claims. However, the management of Arts 21
promised him that he would be paid immediately after the claim of the rank-and-file employees had
been paid. Jones relied on this representation.

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Promissory estoppel may arise from the making of a promise, even though without consideration,
if it was intended that the promise should be relied upon, as in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal
to enforce it would virtually sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice.
The principle of promissory estoppel is a recognized exception to the three-year prescriptive period
enunciated in Article 291 of the Labor Code.

In order to make out a claim of promissory estoppel, a party bears the burden of establishing
the following elements: (1) a promise was reasonably expected to induce action or forbearance; (2)
such promise did, in fact, induce such action or forbearance; and (3) the party suffered detriment
as a result. All the requisites are present in this case. The Court, therefore, finds ample justification
not to follow the prescriptive period imposed under Art. 291 of the Labor Code. Great injustice will
be committed if respondents claims will be brushed aside on a mere technicality, especially when
it was petitioners own action that prevented respondent from interposing the claims within the
required period.

2. YES.

Article 223 of the Labor Code mandates that in case of a judgment of the Labor Arbiter
involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer to the NLRC may be perfected only upon
the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission, in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving

monetary awards from the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

The filing of the bond is not only mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement that must
be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the NLRC. Non-compliance therewith renders
the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and 190xecutor. This requirement is intended to assure the
workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favour upon
the dismissal of the employers appeal. It is intended to discourage employers from using an appeal
to delay or evade their obligation to satisfy their employees just and lawful claims.

The failure of petitioners to comply with the requirement of posting a bond equivalent in
amount to the monetary award is fatal to their appeal. Section 6 of the New Rules of Procedure of
the NLRC mandates, among others, that no motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on
meritorious grounds and upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the
monetary award. The NLRC has full discretion to grant or deny their motion to reduce the amount
of the appeal bond. The finding of the NLRC that petitioners did not present sufficient justification
for the reduction thereof is generally conclusive upon the Court absent a showing that the denial
was tainted with bad faith.

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 Furthermore, appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Parties who
seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it.

CASE 223

G.R. No. L-43252 September 30, 1976

PEOPLE'S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CORAZON JEREMIAS (REMIAS) and GERINIMO PERECHO, defendants. CAPITAL INSURANCE &
SURETY COMPANY, INC., movant-appellant.

CASE 224
G.R. No. 98334 May 8, 1992
MANUEL D. MEDIDA, Deputy Sheriff of the Province of Cebu, CITY SAVINGS BANK (formerly
Cebu City Savings and Loan Association, Inc.) and TEOTIMO ABELLANA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ANDRES DOLINO and PASCUALA DOLINO

FACTS: Private respondents, Spouses Dolino, alarmed of losing their right of redemption over the
subject parcel of land from Juan Gandiocho, purchaser of the aforesaid lot at a foreclosure sale of
the previous mortgage in favor of Cebu City Development Bank, went to Teotimo Abellana,
President of the City Savings Bank (formerly known as Cebu City Savings and Loan Association, Inc.),
to obtain a loan of P30, 000. Prior thereto, their son Teofredo filed a similar loan application and the
subject lot was offered as security. Subsequently they executed a promissory note in favor of CSB.

The loan became due and demandable without the spouses Dolino paying the same, petitioner
association caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The land was sold at a public
auction to CSB being the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was subsequently issued which was
also registered. No redemption was being effected by Sps. Dolino, their title to the property was
cancelled and a new title was issued in favor of CSB.

Sps. Dolino then filed a case to annul the sale at public auction and for the cancellation of certificate
of sale issued pursuant thereto, alleging that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was in violation of
Act 3135, as amended. The trial court sustained the validity of the loan and the real estate mortgage,
but annulled the extrajudicial foreclosure on the ground that it failed to comply with the notice
requirement of Act 3135.

Not satisfied with the ruling of the trial court, Sps. Dolino interposed a partial appeal to the CA,
assailing the validity of the mortgage executed between them and City Savings Bank, among others.
The CA ruled in favor of private respondents declaring the said mortgage as void or the reason that
the mortgagor spouses, at the time when the said mortgage was executed, were no longer the

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owners of the lot, having supposedly lost the same when the lot was sold to a purchaser in the
foreclosure sale under the prior mortgage. This holding cannot be sustained.

Preliminarily, the issue of ownership of the mortgaged property was never alleged in the complaint
nor was the same raised during the trial, hence that issue should not have been taken cognizance
of by the Court of Appeals. An issue which was neither averred in the complaint nor ventilated
during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be
offensive to the basic rule of fair play, justice and due process

ISSUE: Whether or not a mortgage, whose property has been extra judicially foreclosed and sold at
a corresponding foreclosure sale, may validly execute a mortgage contract over the same property
in favor of a third party during the period of redemption.

HELD: It is undisputed that the real estate mortgage in favor of petitioner bank was executed by
respondent spouses during the period of redemption. During the said period it cannot be said that
the mortgagor is no longer the owner of the foreclosed property since the rule up to now is the right
of a purchaser of a foreclosure sale is merely inchoate until after the period of redemption has
expired without the right being exercised. The title to the land sold under mortgage foreclosure
remains in the mortgagor or his grantee until the expiration of the redemption period and the
conveyance of the master deed.

The mortgagor remains as the absolute owner of the property during the redemption period and
has the free disposal of his property, there would be compliance with Article. 2085 of the Civil Code
for the constitution of another mortgage on the property. To hold otherwise would create an
inequitable situation wherein the mortgagor would be deprived of the opportunity, which may be
his last recourse, to raise funds to timely redeem his property through another mortgage.

CASE 225
G.R. No. 102128 November 6, 1992
ABUNDIA ESPINA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DEMETRIA VILAS VDA. DE PINILI, ALFONSO ARTUS and AGUSTINA DELA
RIARTE, respondents.

FACTS: This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that
the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City which dismissed petitioner's action for reconveyance
against private respondents.

The property in dispute is a 744-square meter lot which is a portion of Lot 2723 of the Dumaguete
Cadastre, situated at Taclobo, Dumaguete City, registered on 27 October 1922 in the name of Rufina

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Lazaga under Original Certificate of Title No. 66-A. On 16 February 1939, Geronimo Pinili, deceased
husband of private respondent Demetria Vilas Vda. de Pinili, acquired one-half (1/2) of said Lot 2723,
which contained a total area of 2,402 square meters, as evidenced by TCT No. T-5448 issued in his
name, 2 while the other half was purchased by a certain Alfonso Artus. The 744-square meter lot in
dispute is part of the portion now owned by private respondents.

Petitioner now seeks the reconveyance of the disputed lot as she alleges that the property is owned
by her mother, Maria Lazaga, who had it declared in her name in 1915 for taxation purposes, and
that she and her mother have been in the peaceful and public possession and enjoyment thereof.
She asserts that by means of deceit and fraud, the disputed property was included and made part
of Lot 2723 and subsequently registered in the name of Rufina Lazaga under OCT No. 66-A.
Petitioner claims that she discovered the fraud only sometime in 1985 when private respondents
required her tenants to pay rentals to them.

Private respondents in turn maintain that they are the owners of the land in dispute, which is
registered in their names under TCT No. T-1365, and that petitioner's predecessor-in-interest,
Maria Lazaga, does not even appear to be a survey claimant in Lot 2723 in the 1918 cadastral
proceedings.

The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and held that the land in dispute was
subject of a cadastral proceeding but Maria Lazaga did not file an answer to claim any interest in the
land as required by Act No. 2259, Sec. 9 and the tax declaration presented by petitioner covers a
different land.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in considering an issue which was not raised in the briefs of the
parties.

HELD: A careful study of the petition reveals that it raises factual issues which this Court could have
dismissed outright under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. But We brushed aside technicalities and gave
due course to the petition if only to be satisfied that respondent Court of Appeals did not, contrary
to the petition, misapprehend the facts.

As regards petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals considered ground other than those
touched upon in the decision of the trial court, it is settled that the appellate court may uphold the
judgment of a lower court on grounds other than those relied upon by the trial court. 7 In fact, even
if issues are not formally and specifically raised on appeal, they may nevertheless be considered as
long as they are closely related to the error properly assigned or upon which the determination of
the question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent. 8 The Court of Appeals, in the case
before Us, can hardly be said to have treated issues not brought before the court a quo. What the
appellate court merely did was to make a strict scrutiny of the evidence on record, and that its ruling
that petitioner's Exh. "F" pertains to a different land does not mean it violated the principle that an
issue which has not been raised in the court a quo cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Simply put, all that respondent Court of Appeals did was to take into account a ground or issue
closely related to or intimately interwoven with the error properly assigned.

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