Critical Perspectives on Accounting (1998) 9, 631]639

Article No. pa980267

HISTORY IS DEAD, LONG LIVE HISTORY

MICHAEL GAFFIKINU
Department of Accountancy, University of Wollongong, NorthFields
Avenue, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia

The aim in this paper is to provide a perspective on the paper by

Merino, Critical Theory and Accounting History: Challenges and Opportu-
nities, in this issue of the journal. The commentary is in general
support of her argument for the advantages that would flow from new
methods of historical discourse. It looks at some arguments in the
mainstream history literature and suggests how these can influence the
development of accounting history. It concludes that these new dis-
courses in accounting history are not only desirable but essential for the
intellectual well-being of the (sub)discipline.
Q 1998 Academic Press

Introduction

Although Stephen J Hawking, in a recent British television programme,

suggested that the chronology projection conjecture1 would keep the
past safe for historians, there are many allusions to the demise of
history. The most well known of these was Fukyamas declaration of the
death of history (1992). Windschuttle (1994) bemoans the killing of
history and, of course, Baudrillard (1989) talks of the end of time.
However, God has survived long after Nietzsche declared him dead so it
is quite likely that history will survive as well. It seems safe to claim
that what these doomsayers were suggesting is that history as it has
been understood has had its day. So, while one monarch is dead we
can look forward to the reign of a new one; or can we?
In addressing the implications of critical research for accounting his-
tory I believe Merino (1997) is adopting a position similar (but not
identical) to that of the advocates of a new accounting history. For
example (paraphrasing her words) both reject rationalistic scientific dis-
course as the certified path to truth. Both recognise the illusion of

Address for Correspondence: Michael Gaffikin, Department of Accountancy, University of

Wollongong, NorthFields Avenue, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia
Received 10 May 1997; revised 6 October 1997; accepted 17 November 1997

631
1045-2354/ 98 / 060631+ 09 $30.00 / 0 Q 1998 Academic Press
632 M. Gaffikin

objectivity it creates. Both require the historian to acknowledge her

(his) theoretical framework} the need for reflexivity. In making their plea
for a new accounting history, Miller et al. (1991) were advocating histori-
cal sociology} study that crosses disciplinary boundaries separating so-
cial theory from substantive historical inquiry (Callinicos, 1995, p. 7; see
also Abrams, 1982; Attridge et al., 1987). Merino, on the other hand, is
seeking new forms of historical discourse: the possibility of describing
the past having looked at it through different lenses. However, both
have similar aims in that they seek different ways of recreating the
past. That is, ways of recreating the past that have not been employed
by the majority of historians as evidenced in the historical accounting
literature. Therefore I have assumed it appropriate to equate her critical
accounting history with what has come to be known as new accounting
history. Thus, my comments are directed to a brief discussion of new
history and its relation to new accounting history and the implications
for Merinos call for new forms of (accounting) historical discourse. She
argues the need for new ways of creating the past: how does new
history suggest these new ways?

What Do Historians Do?

The statement Chance matters when it can be shown not to be

chance (Hawthorn, 1991, p. 9) is simply making the claim that, how-
ever, the world is, or appears to be, it is the historians responsibility to
make it coherent. Understanding is coherence. For

If the historian finds himself considering by a kind of ideal experiment

what might have happened, as well as what the evidence obliges him to
believe did happen, he would find himself becalmed outside the current
of historical thought. (Oakeshott, 1933, p. 93).

because

In so far as history is a world of facts (which will scarcely be denied),

it is a world of ideas, and a world which is true or false according to a
degree of coherence (Oakeshott, 1933, p. 128]129).

In such a history, counterfactuals (other chances} alternatives) cannot

exist, for the historian will explain the causes of all chances and such
cause and effect cannot be used to explain things which might have
happened. Such was the confidence in coherence of Carr, Oakeshott and
many other respectable historians. Even Collingwood believed that His-
tory, then, is experience as a whole, conceived as a system of past
events (Collingwood, 1946, p. 153).
Given the dominating influence of positivist thought on accounting
research over the last 50 years, it is now a little ironic to appreciate
that Collingwood and Oakeshott were rejecting a positivist view of
history that saw history as a series of events external to one another,
 History is dead, long live history 633

each to be apprehended (if indeed anything can be thus apprehended)

in isolation from the rest (Collingwood, p. 153). To many this debate
on history that raged through the 1920s, 1930s and into the 1940s
seems to have little basis. But, what Collingwood was rejecting was the
notion that facts exist independent of the human mind and can simply
be explained in an objective, scientific manner. Although he believed in
a realist world, he was acknowledging that when the historian was
attempting to organise the past he or she was organising his (her)
present consciousness. That is, it is not possible to separate the past
from our interpretations of it. It is through our interpretation that we
make the past coherent. Even Carr says that the facts of history are
always refracted through the mind of the recorder and that when we
take up a work of history, our first concern should be not with the
facts it contains, but with the historian who wrote it (1964, p. 22).
However, Collingwood was not expressing the same scepticism. Rather,
he was arguing against scissors-and-paste history and claiming that
historical facts do not exist before the historian researches but are the
result of her (his) research.

New (Accounting) History?

I believe that Collingwood, in making these claims, was presaging the

basis of what has now been called the new history. The new account-
ing history is not the same as what mainstream historians refer to as
new history but it draws many of its presuppositions from this new
history. The beginnings of this new history is usually associated with
the French Annales school of historians. Burke (1991, pp. 3]9) has
provided a useful summary of the differences between new history and
traditional history on several points.

1. Unlike the traditional, new history is not restricted to political

history; there is the growth of the history of ideas and, more
recently, an awareness of the social and cultural construction of
history} ideas change over time as well as in space. Thus, when
Fukyama (1992) claims the death of history, it can be inferred that
he has associated it with great political movements (or economic
and political ideologies) and so, with the fall of the communist
regimes, in a true Hegelian spirit, he argues there is no further
significance of history. If this interpretation is correct it is clear
that Fukyama is concerned with a traditional view of history.
2. New history is more concerned with the analysis of structures
than a narrative of events. New history represented a move away
from the narrative description of events that revealed themselves
through historical investigation. The concern was now for struc-
tures. Originating in the work of linguist Ferdinand Saussure, struc-
turalism was taken into other disciplines by people such as Claude
Levi-Strauss and Roland Barthes. It was seen to be useful in that
634 M. Gaffikin

it provided those who wished to have a theoretical justification for

their views with just that. In Saussures analysis there are two
aspects to language} the diachronic (or historical) dimension of
speech, and the synchronic (or timeless) dimension of language
(Windschuttle, 1994, p. 22). A structure is a collection of laws or
rules that govern the behaviour of any system.
It is a little ironic that the aspect of structuralism that appealed as
a method of historical analysis was the synchronic modes of
analysis. Many have argued that structuralism provides an ap-
propriate basis for historical analysis (e.g. the Marxist thinkers}
Althusser, Jameson, etc.). However, it seems that post-structuralism
has had considerable appeal to new historians, especially the work
of its two leading protagonists, Derrida and Foucault. It is this
development of new history that has attracted so much recent
attention. It has been welcomed by many (for example, many of
the new accounting historians) but denounced by others (such as
Windshuttle).
3. New historians are concerned with histories from below rather
than the views from above. Historians have moved away from the
history of great men, their books and ideas, to looking at ordinary
people and their experiences with social change. We should not
claim that the Mayan civilisation concluded in the 9th (southern)
or 13th (northern) centuries just because the kings systems
failed} there are millions of Mayans alive today with many of the
traditional beliefs and ideals which they have adapted over time. A
history of the process of adaption is interesting history despite the
struggle being of ordinary people with very little political (or
economic power).
4. There has been a move away from Rankes insistence on limiting
history to the examination of official written records. Evidence can
now be visual or aural. Once again, claims that the Mayan civilisa-
tions ended were based on the fact that the written records
ceased because they were only being maintained to record the
progress of the kings and in that sense they represented official
history. The use of numerical data in official records made possi-
ble the growth of a new form of historical analysis popular in the
1950s and 1960s} cliometrics} which was seen as a way of objec-
tive (statistical) analysis of official records. However, there has
been a reaction away from such quantitative assessment as it
soon became apparent that limiting the data to official statistics
was artificial and too limiting and any hope for objective analysis
was futile. Cliometrics was based on naive empiricism, atomism,
mechanism and determinism all of which have been regarded as
epistemologically untenable.
5. There is now a greater awareness of the need for explanations
that extend well beyond single events} to collective movements as
well as individual actions. Historians formulate their truths from
evidence (archives, etc.). However, this evidence can be used to
 History is dead, long live history 635

relate many truths because the evidence has been carefully se-
lected, distributed and weighed to create a truth; change the
weighting, the selection and the historical truth can change. Recog-
nising this suggests that it is more appropriate to create several
pictures of the past rather than a single one.
6. There is now a recognition that objective explanation is not possi-
ble, or that having explanations from a variety of opposite view-
points (heteroglossia) is desirable. This is not an uncommon claim
and is found in many disciplines. It can be considered at many
different levels involving questions of truth, the narrative and many
other factors which would take the discussion well beyond the
scope of these comments. At an essential level, it is a central
tenet of the new accounting historians (such as Miller et al., 1991).
In this context, the case for the failure of attempts to create an
objective history is well made by Merino.
7. History is provided by many people, not just the professional
historians. There is a popular interest in the past that even very
commercial ventures take advantage of } an increasing commodifi-
cation of history. For example, there are national theme parks
where the past has been recreated for the people to not only view
their history but participate in some activities such as in Old
Sydney Town, Sydney, the Museum of Man, in Ottawa and the
National Heritage Park (Welsh Folk Museum) in Cardiff, Wales.

Openings in new history

The new history described above has provided new avenues for histori-
cal research. Admitting that there is meaningful history beyond political
history is a non-controversial claim and would even be welcomed by
many who believe they are opposed to new history. Obviously, account-
ing history is now possible. However, it seems that the full implications
of this broadening are not fully appreciated} well, accepted, anyway.
Moving beyond political history to the admission of the history of ideas
leads to a greater awareness of the cultural and social contexts of
historical understanding and this is a point well made by Merino. But, it
also admits a relativism that few of those who choose to cling to the
outdated notions of traditional history would be willing to admit.
The claim that history is more concerned with the analysis of struc-
tures than events is a far more controversial claim and subject to
considerable debate. In fact, it is probably one of the major differences
between the contemporary appreciation of the two histories. There is
considerable scope for accounting historians to research in this area.
While the new accounting historians briefly allude to it, there is a need
for a much greater general understanding of the differences and the
significance of a broader social contextual understanding of accountings
636 M. Gaffikin

past. As Armstrong suggests, it is necessary to move beyond the

flat-earth ostensibility of mainstream accounting history (1994, p. 26).
The recognition that there is significance in learning more than just
the great aspects of the past is a refreshing change. It is interesting
and illuminating to learn of the past of ordinary people, ordinary institu-
tions and ordinary events. Besides issues of social justice and concern
for previously ignored large sections of humanity, it provides a broader
base on which to build an historical understanding of more specific
subjects.
The fourth feature of the new history (above) is also non-controversial.
Consistent with some of the other features, an appreciation of things
other than official documents enriches historical understanding. The ex-
amination of the accounting records of individual entities provides clues
to the accounting and management practices of the period. There is
considerable interest in oral history as a legitimate form of historical
analysis. Similarly with an analysis of visual clues from formal works
of art to everyday objects and artefacts. Accounting historians have
already used such evidence in telling their stories, for example, tally
sticks, coins, and inscriptions on buildings to name but a few.
There is now greater recognition that a greater understanding of the
broader context of the past leads to a better understanding of individual
features. To many this seems obvious, however, traditional historians
invariably took a very narrow interpretation of cause and effect. Thus, in
determining the history of a particular event, only those factors that
directly related to the event were examined. However, an appreciation of
accounting practices in 17th century English manufacturing firms is
greatly facilitated by an appreciation of the economic and social features
of that period. This was a central claim of the new accounting histori-
ans (see Miller et al., 1991, or Hoskin, 1994, but see Armstrong, 1994 for
a slightly different perspective).
All the features of the new history are related in some way; the sixth
aspect is especially related to the second. Traditional historians claim to
be able to provide a narrative of facts that are revealed through their
study. Implicit in this claim is not only a realist ontology but a belief in
the existence of facts waiting to be uncovered. The allusion to the
historians such as Collingwood, above, clearly suggests that history is
concerned with ideas and coherence (understanding). Understanding is
always going to be relative} subject to interpretation. Claims for objec-
tivity have been shown in almost all disciplines to be non-tenable, from
the so-called pure sciences to the social sciences and in philosophy.
Understanding comes from explanations from a variety of positions}
heteroglossia. This is not only necessary, it is desirable.
Despite Rankes attempt to create a profession of history at the turn
of the century, it is now realised that many people contribute to histori-
cal understanding. In fact the expansion in the number of those inter-
ested in providing histories has led to the fragmentation of history but
this is a problem not peculiar to history as it is also being encountered
in other disciplines. While this has led to inevitable communication
 History is dead, long live history 637

problems there have been benefits from the interactions. For example,
modern techniques of photographic reproduction have transformed the
history book from the dusty, closely printed, multi-volume work typical
of 19th-century historical texts into an object that is aesthetically pleas-
ing to handle and read (Callinicos, 1995, p. 12).

New historians?

New history has led to increasing numbers of people apparently inter-

ested in the past. Some purists have resented this and there has been
an overreaction. Like all resistances there is some justification in the
traditional historians reactions but there has also been a strong corro-
sive element. At the same time there have been some simplistic and
misguided attempts by those new to history to justify their analysis and
provide a reconciliation of the new with the traditional; this is found in
the accounting history literature. Some of the new historians are not
really historians but nor are some of those who try to defend the
traditional craft. This, mixed with the overzealousness of some traditio-
nal historians to resist change in their discipline has caused some not
inconsiderable unpleasantness; for example, a rather vitriolic onslaught
on new histories by Keith Windschuttle (1994).
How can the seemingly preposterous claim be made that some are
not historians? It is not intended to be made with total prejudice but
from a reading of the relevant literature. It is probably desirable to ask
whether in writing accounting histories we wish to account for the
present by reference to the past or justify the past on the basis of
present evidence. Response would suggest whether we are historical
sociologists or historians. There are some people for whom the past is
extremely important and some for which the past is used to justify a
position. The former are proper historians. It is their passion for
history that has led some to draw boundaries around what they believe
are the proper activities of historians and dismiss that which does not
mention that domain.
One such claim has been that history is a narrative of events. This
belief, held so strongly by many traditional historians, probably arises
with the professional history movement of Leopold van Ranke. It is
interesting to learn that it had been earlier held but was criticised by
an Enlightenment Scottish social theorist, John Millar, who wrote that it
should be viewed as the surface of events which engages the attention
of the vulgar historian (quoted by Burke, 1991, p. 233). Nevertheless, it
is held dearly by traditional historians:

Historians have always written their work in narrative form. This is

because their subject matter has been not just the past but the move-
ment of past events through time. If anything has been central to
history it has been the dimension of time. Historians have believed that,
in incorporating this dimension through narrative they have been reflect-
638 M. Gaffikin

ing the nature of reality itself. So, if you wanted to challenge the very
core of history writing, time and narrative would be the quarry to
pursue. (Windschuttle, 1994, p. 93).

Structuralist historians have challenged this aspect and Paul Ricouer

has spoken of the eclipse of historical narrative in our time. Historians
were more concerned with structures than with the narrative. The same
rejection of the narrative was taken up by the post-structuralists. They
claimed, first, that whereas experience is multidimensional, the narrative
is linear. Secondly, the notion of time adopted is mistaken in that it is
always portrayed linearly which is based on a discredited Newtonian
view of time which ignores the spatial quality of time. Thirdly, the
narrative cannot sustain the claim to be objective and value free.
However, this criticism of narrative is directed to the narrow, traditio-
nal view of the significance of narrative. The narrative is the form in
which historians construct and communicate their knowledge of the past.
White (1975) has demonstrated that this narrative has been taken to
represent the actual content of the past. That is, narrativity has mistak-
enly been treated as an essence shared by both the historical repre-
sentation and the sets of events in the past (Jenkins, 1995, p. 19).
Thus, the narratives are reconstructions of the past} statements put
together by an historian to create a picture of the past. There are other
pictures that can be created of the same past. Narratives are inventions,
are fictive accounts of fragment of the past which can be true or false.
They are not, as White has clearly pointed out, true life stories or
objective accounts of the past. Accounting historians have to be aware
of this and not take the simplistic view that the narratives they create
or read are the real recreations of the past. For example, is it really
desirable to have an encyclopedic history of accounting such that if you
wanted to know about conservatism, there it is all neatly laid out (see
Chatfield & Vangermeersch, 1996, pp. 160]166)?
Acknowledgement of the weaknesses in the traditional narrative ushers
in a new sense of history that incorporates the social and cultural
contexts in which the past must be understood. To not admit the
context in which the past must be understood is to sound the death
knell of history as a meaningful intellectual activity. This, however, does
not sanction the claim by historical sociologists that, in pursuing the
origins and beginnings of social institutions, they are in fact historians.
Nevertheless, Merino is quite correct in asserting the potential of a new
critical accounting history. If we ignore her appeals we will remain
quirky chronologers, intellectually moribund, moving headlong into the
dead world we are attempting to describe.

Notes

1. That time will continue to move forward even when the universe ceases to expand
and starts to contract.
 History is dead, long live history 639

References
Abrams, P., Historical Sociology (Shepton Mallet, Somerset: Open Books, 1982).
Armstrong, P., The Influence of Michel Foucault on Accounting Research, Critical Perspec-
tives on Accounting, Vol. 5, 1994, pp. 25]55.
Attridge, D., Bennington, G. & Young, R., Post-structuralism and the Question of History
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
Baudrillard, J., The Anorexic Ruins, in J. Baudrillard et al., Looking Back on the End of the
World (New York: Semiotext(e) Foreign Agents Series, 1989).
Burke, P. (ed), New Perspectives of Historical Writing (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
Callinicos, A., Theories and Narratives, Reflections on the Philosophy of History (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1995).
Carr, E. H., What is History? (London: Penguin, 1964).
Chatfield, M. & Vangermeersch, R. (eds.) The History of Accounting: An International Encyclo-
pedia (New York: Garland Reference Library of the Humanities, 1996).
Collingwood, R. G., The Idea of History (New York: Galaxy, 1946).
Fukuyama, F., The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, 1992).
Hawthorn, G., Plausible Worlds } Possibility and Understanding in History and the Social Sci-
ences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
Hoskin, K., Boxing Clever: For, Against and Beyond Foucault in the Battle for Accounting
Theory, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 5, 1994, pp. 57]85.
Jenkins, K., On What is History? (London: Routledge, 1995).
Merino, B. D., Critical Theory and Accounting History: Challenges and Opportunities,
Critical Perspectives in Accounting, Vol. 9, 1997, pp. 603]616
Miller, P., Hopper, T. & Laughlin, R., The New Accounting History, Accounting, Organisa-
tions and Society, 1991, pp. 395]404.
Oakeshott, M., Experience and its Modes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933).
White, H., Metahistory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).
Windschuttle, K., The Killing of History (Paddington: Mcleay Press, 1994).