Drd.

Andreea Popescu

Necessitism as a Metaphysical Alternative to Possibilism

Abstract

In this paper I will focus on the problems that arise by adding to Propositional Modal Logic the
rules of Quantified Logic1. The problems result if free logic is not adopted for the rules of Existential
Quantifier and Universal Quantifier Introduction. The resulting formulas considered problematic are
the Barcan Formula (BF), the converse Barcan Formula (CBF), Necessary Existence (NE) and
Necessary Existence( NE). In the first part of the paper, I will present a modal logical system that
validates all these formulas, continuing in the second section by describing the metaphysical
controversies that arise from accepting them and how they are validated in the modal system proposed
by Linsky and Zalta. In the last section, I will present two approaches that try to provide a solution: a
technical approach by means of which their derivation becomes invalid and a metaphysical justification
in order to allow their validation and solve the controversies that surround them. For the BF and CBF
there are two alternatives: a possibilist view and a necessitist view. In this last part, I will also discuss
some of the advantages that necessitism has over possibilism.

1. The simple Quantified Modal Logic

A logical system for Quantified Modal Logic (simple QML) is proposed by Linsky and Zalta in
In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic 2. This system has the feature of validating all the
formulas mentioned ( BF, CBF, NE, and NE). Zalta and Linsky define the system by adding to the
axioms and rules of the Propositional logic ( Propositional tautologies and Modus Pones), the following
modal axioms:
K axiom: ( ) ( )
Rule of Necessitation:

1. In J. W. Garson, [2006], Modal Logic for Philosophers, 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 243, Garson
explains how the system called fS is formed by the addition of the rules of free logic FL to the system of Propositional
Modal Logic.
2. B. Linsky and E. Zalta, [1994], In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic, Philosophical Perspectives 8:
Logic and Language, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero: Ridgeview, 431458, https://mally.stanford.edu/Papers/simple-qml.pdf
, p. 4.
Drd. Andreea Popescu

in order to obtain the propositional modal system K. To obtain a system of Quantified Modal Logic
with identity, they add the following two axioms:

Axiom: x

Axiom: x ( )( x ) , on the condition that x is not free in .

Generalization Rule: x
Axiom: x=x
Axiom: x=y ((x,x) (x,y)), where (x,y) is the result of substituting y for some
occurences of x in (x,x), but not necessarily all, provided that y is substitutable for x at those
occurences3.
The Barcan Formula: x x
The system proposed by Timothy Williamson in Bare Possibilia 4 is LPC=S5, Lower Predicate
Calculus with Identity to which the axioms of S5 are added. This system can be obtained from QML
with some changes. BF is not stated in the definition of the system, and there are two other axioms
added:
Axiom T:
Axiom E:
Regarding the language of LPC=S5, it does not contain any individual constants or function terms.

2. Controversial formulas in simple QML

x x=p in Quantified Logic can be inferred from p=p, where p is a constant whose referent is
Pegasus5. The feature of QL that allows this is the fact that given a non-empty domain D, each constant
is assigned a referent. The same feature is also available for variables, if the theorem is expressed as
6
y y= x . Thus, given the premise that an object p is identical with itself, it can be inferred that
there is an object x such that x equals p. The metaphysical implication is that fictional objects such as
Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes or Hamlet exist.

3. B. Linsky and E. Zalta, [1994 ], In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic, Philosophical Perspectives 8:
Logic and Language, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero: Ridgeview, 431458, https://mally.stanford.edu/Papers/simple-qml.pdf
, p. 4.
4. T. Williamson, 1998, Bare Possibilia, Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 48, No. 2/3, Analytical Ontology, pp. 259, 260.
5. J. W. Garson, [2006], Modal Logic for Philosophers, p. 237.
6. B. Linsky and E. Zalta, [1994], In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic, p. 6.
Drd. Andreea Popescu

Adding the rules of Quantified Logic to Propositional Modal Logic, allows inferring other more
controversial theorems such as BF, CBF, NE and NE. Firstly, I will present the metaphysical
controversial nature of this theorems and afterwards I will present how they are validated in simple
QML7.
8
Starting with BF, the formula states that x x . Thus if it is possible that there is
an object x such that x has a property P, then there is an object x such that x possibly has a property P,
where Px is a substitution instance for . If possibly (where possibly is understood in a metaphysical
sense) there is an object such that it is the son of Queen Elisabeth and Carl I, then there is an object
such that possibly is the son of Queen Elisabeth and Carl I. The controversy regarding this formula lies
in the fact that from the possibility of Queen Elisabeth and Carl I having a son, it is inferred that there
is an object possibly having this property. Where is this object to be found? Not at the actual world,
given that there is no object in the domain of the actual world having this property, thus it is a mere
possible, namely an object that is possible and not actual.
9
Regarding CBF, it is stated that x x . Therefore, if there is an object x that could
have had a property P, then there could have been an object x such that x had property P. If Albert
Einstein could have been a musician, then possibly Albert Einstein is a musician. Einstein can have the
property of being a musician only at those possible worlds at which he exists, however, CBF allows to
have this property even at those worlds at which he does not exist10.
NE states that for any x it is necessary that there is an object y such that y=x :
x y y=x . More precisely, any object necessarily exists. A stronger formula would be:
x y y =x , necessarily everything exists or as Williamson formulates the necessitist
claim:necessarily, everything is necessarily something11. Though, there is no technical problem
regarding the formula, as a metaphysical claim it can be considered difficult to accept.

In the formulation given by Zalta and Linsky of the simple QML, the definition of this system
includes the axiom K, CQT, and the BF12. The latter governs the interaction between the quantifiers and

7 Id., pp. 437-439.

8. T. Williamson, [1998], Bare Possibilia, p. 257.
9. Ibid.
10. B. Linsky and E. Zalta, [1994], In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic, p. 12.
11 T. Williamson, [2013], Contingentism and Necessitism in Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, p.2.
12. In LPC=S5 proposed by Williamson by adding T and E as axioms to the axioms of simple QML, BF is derived with the
help of these further two axioms.
Drd. Andreea Popescu

the modal operators. The other formulas CBF, NE, and NE can be derived given the system's axioms
and rules.
Starting with CBF13, given a CQT axiom x , by RN it is obtained ( x ) ,
by K and MP x , by Gen x ( x ) , by MP and an instance of CQT axiom
x x . CBF can be further used to derive NE either independently or in conjunction
with the thesis of Serious Actualism. Serious Actualism states that ( (x) y y =x) , where is
atomic and x is free in . Thus if a property P is predicated on an object x at a world w, x has to fall
under the range of the existential quantifier from that world, and if is existentially loaded , then x
exists14.
NE15 can be derived given y y= x ( theorem of CQT), by RN we obtain y y=x , and
by Gen x y y=x . RN in this proof can be used because the domain of quantification does not
vary from one world to another. NE can be further obtained by applying RN to NE, thus
x y y =x .

3. Solutions

The problems concerning these formulas can be solved either by imposing further conditions on
simple QML or by providing a metaphysical justification. One of the metaphysical justifications
provided for them is the necessitist thesis. This view tries not only to justify BF and CBF, but also the
other formulas, NE and NE. An alternative would be the possibilist which accepts mere possibilia.
Thus two proposals are taken into consideration, either to state that there are objects that are possible,
but not actual, or to consider that necessarily everything is necessarily something.

Firstly, I will present the technical solutions which consist in imposing further conditions such
that the derivation of these formulas is blocked. Starting with BF and CBF, in Semantical
Considerations on Modal Logic16 , Kripke defines a quantification model structure consisting in the

13. Proof in B. Linsky and E. Zalta, [1994], In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic, p. 438.
14. Given a necessary property P such as being self-identical, then x Px , then by CBF and MP, x Px ,
by elimination , Pa can be obtained, by SA ( Pa y y=a) , by K and MP y y=a , applying Gen,
NE is obtained: x y y=x . Finally NE can by obtaind by an aplication of RN. See B. Linsky and E. Zalta,
[1994], In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic, pp. 10,11.
15. Id., pp. 6, 7.
16. The proof for blocking the derivation of both BF and CBF are given in Kripke, S., [1963], Semantical Considerations
Drd. Andreea Popescu

model structure (G, K, R) and a function assigning to each world H a domain of quantification17.
Thus, it can be seen that an important condition is imposed, namely that the domain of quantification
varies from one possible world to another. This feature of the model structure, allows Kripke to
invalidate both BF and CBF as follows. Considering a quantification modal structure in which a
predicate P such that (P, G)={a} and (P, H)={a, b}, if we assign a to x from Px, then Px since P is
true of a both in G and H. But, a is the only object of G, then x Px . If b is assigned to x, then
x Px is false since P is true of b and not of a, consequently x Px is false in G. Regarding
CBF, consider a quantification model structure in which (P, G)= {a, b} and (P, H)={a}.
Consequently, x Px is true both in G and H. Then, x Px is true in G. However, when b is
assigned to x, Px is false since Px is false of b in H. Consequently, x Px is false in G.
With respect to NE and NE, their derivation depends on accepting y y= x as a theorem
and the application of RN and Gen. However, their derivation can be blocked if y y= x is rejected
and instead free logic and a distinct predicate E for existence are used18. For the introduction of the
existential and universal quantifier the rules state that19:
In In
Ec &Ac EcAc
--------- ----------
x Ax x Ax

Thus, the use of free logic blocks the derivation of y y= x , Gen is rejected and both NE and NE
are invalidated.

The alternative to the technical changes is to try to offer a metaphysical justification for the
problematic formulas derived in simple QML. Two alternatives can be considered: the possibilist view
and the necessitist one.
The possibilist can metaphysically justify all the problematic formulas by considering the
existential quantifier as existentially unloaded and using a distinct predicate to express existence E!.
This predicate can be used for actual objects to express genuine existence, and still validate BF and

on Modal Logic, in Linsky 1971, originally published in Acta Philosophica Fennica 16, 83-94, pp. 67-68.
17. G represents the actual world, K the set of possible worlds, R the accessibility relation (an equivalence relation), H
K, and (H) is the domain of quantification at H.
18. J. W. Garson, [2006], Modal Logic for Philosophers, pp. 240, 241.
19 Ibid.
Drd. Andreea Popescu

CBF by means of accepting mere possibilia20. Quantifying over mere possibilia provides the possiblist
a less inflationary ontology than the one of the necessitist. However, the necessitist comes with a
metaphysical account in which the description for the objects is simpler.

Necessitists21, as possibilists do, reject all the technical changes and choose instead to keep
simple QML and try to justify it metaphysically. The metaphysical claim Timothy Williamson, Edward
Zalta and Bernard Linsky try to justify is that necessarily, everything is necessarily something. This
claim is sufficiently strong in order to validate BF, CBF, NE and NE and to reject the use of free logic
for quantified modal logic. How is this claim to be interpreted? Is any object a necessary existent? For
instance, is Wittgenstein a necessary existent? The necessitist answer is yes, however, there are some
specifications which need to be made in order to interpret the necessitist claim in a manner more
adequate to our intuitions. Firstly, the classical distinction between abstract and concrete objects need
to be adjusted. Secondly, the only theorem governing our understanding of existence should be QL's
2223
y y= y .
I will start with the distinction abstract/concrete object24. Abstract objects are interpreted as
necessary existents possessing only necessary properties. With respect to concrete objects, they are
usually seen as contingent or possible existents. Within this classification, necessitists introduce the
category of nonconcrete objects. The class of nonconcrete objects is composed of the class of all
abstract objects, since the property of being nonconcrete is a necessary property for them, the other
class is composed of those objects which are not necessarily nonconcrete, specifically, they are
contingently nonconcrete25. Thus, the distinction would be established between necessarily nonconcrete
objects and contingently nonconcrete objects. In terms of properties, the distinction is made between
concrete and nonconcrete. Consequently, Wittgenstein is a necessary existent, but not a necessary
concrete existent. Thus, a non-abstract object is not necessarily concrete, meaning concrete in every

20. B. Linsky and E. Zalta, [1994], In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic, p. 7.
21. Timothy Williamson uses the term necessitism, while Zalta and Linsky consider their claim to be a new form of
actualism. Williamson's proposal is a more radical one, namely to replace the debate between actualism and possiblilism and
formulate it in terms of necessitism and contingentism. Given the definition for necessitism, both actualists and possiblists
who reject the thesis that all objects are necessary existents, will be considered contingentists.
22. T. Williamson, [2002], Necessary Existents, in A. O'Hear (ed.), Logic, Thought and Language, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, pp. 233-251, p. 249.
23. The problems regarding the necessitist abstract/concrete distinction and the problem of existence were also presented in
my dissertation in which I have focused on the relation between necessitism and esentialism.
24. B. Linsky and E. Zalta, [1994], In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic, pp.26-27.
25. Id., p. 2.
Drd. Andreea Popescu

world in which it exists.

Regarding existence, the necessitist metaphysical claim depends on a specific treatment of this
problem. This treatment is similar to the one of SA. Namely, if a property can be predicated about an
object, then it exist. In Necessary Existents26 Williamson tries to prove the truth of the sentence
Necessarily, I exist. Within his proof, existence is taken as a precondition of having a property or
having relations27. This is exactly the condition imposed by SA. We have seen that SA in conjunction
with CBF allow the derivation of both NE and NE.
Taken together, the necessitist claim and the definition for existence, validate BF, CBF, NE and
NE. Without this definition for existence and without accepting y y= x as a theorem, NE and
NE cannot be derived. A metaphysical alternative for deriving all these formulas would be to accept
merely possible objects, without considering that all objects are necessary existents. One criterion
which can guide the choice between possibilism and necessitism would be simplicity. Possiblism can
be seen to be simpler because, unlike necessitism, it avoids a multiplication of objects. However,
possibilism rests on a distinction which complicates the metaphysical account, namely, the distinction
which pertains to the nature of actual objects and mere possibles 2829. Together with this distinction
comes the technical one regarding the existential quantifier and the predicate for existence 30. On the
other hand, the only distinction necessitism draws is the one between contingently nonconcrete objects
and necessarily nonconcrete objects. Thus, for necessitism we have an inflationary ontology but a
simpler description for the objects we quantify over.

Thus, keeping a classical quantification theory and using a non-varying domain of

quantification, raises certain problems since formulas with a controversial metaphysical content are
derived. There are two possibilities: to provide the technical tools in order to invalidate them, or to
provide a metaphysical account for them. The two alternatives are: possibilism and necessitism, and the
choice between the two theories can be motivated by the criterion of simplicity. One can be considered
26. T. Williamson, [2002], Necessary Existents, in A. O'Hear (ed.), pp. 233-251.
27. Id., p. 249.
28. T. Williamson argues against this distinction on the basis that it is difficult to offer a definition for what actual or
exists means. Namely, whether the former is defined in terms of existence, then how is existence to be defined? The same
question can be asked if existence is defined in terms of actuality. See T. Williamson, [1998], Bare Possibilia, pp. 257-
273.
29. Zalta's and Linsy proposal is to replace the distinction between mere possibles and actual objects with the claim that all
objects are actual. See B. Linsky and E. Zalta, [1994], In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic, p. 23.
30 Ibid., p.7. A similar and a more extended account regarding this approach can be found in Melvin Fitting, [1997],
Barcan Both Ways, Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 9 (2-3):329-344 (2012) .
Drd. Andreea Popescu

to be simpler in ontology, meaning that it implies the existence of fewer objects, while the other is
simpler in its description for the objects.
Drd. Andreea Popescu

References
Garson, James W., [2006], Modal Logic for Philosophers, 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press,
2013, pp. 226-261.

Kripke, Saul, [1963], Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic, in Linsky 1971, pp 63-72.
Originally published in Acta Philosophica Fennica 16, pp. 83-94.

Linsky, Bernard, and Zalta, Edward, [1994], In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic,
Philosophical Perspectives 8: Logic and Language, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero: Ridgeview, 431
458, https://mally.stanford.edu/Papers/simple-qml.pdf , 10th of May, 2016.

Williamson, Timothy, [1998], Bare Possibilia, Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 48, No. 2/3, Analytical
Ontology, pp. 257-273.
-------------------[2002], Necessary Existents, in A. O'Hear (ed.), Logic, Thought and Language,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 233-251.
-------------------[2013], Contingentism and Necessitism in Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Oxford
University Press, 2013, pp. 1-28.