EN BANC

[G.R. No. 93252. August 5, 1991.]

RODOLFO T. GANZON , petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, and LUIS T. SANTOS , respondents.

[G.R. No. 93746. August 5, 1991.]

MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA , petitioner, vs. HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local Government,
NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the
Department of Local Government, and SALVADOR CABALUNA, JR. ,
respondents.

[G.R. No. 95245. August 5, 1991.]

RODOLFO T. GANZON , petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as the Secretary of
the Department of Local Government, respondents.

Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252.

Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746.
Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; LOCAL AUTONOMY, NATURE OF;

LOCAL OFFICIALS REMAIN ACCOUNTABLE TO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. Local
autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not
of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central government in the
manner the law may provide. Autonomy does not contemplate making mini-states out of
local government units. Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding
star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the
Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggests is to wean local
government units from overdependence on the central government. It is noteworthy that
under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self executing, but subject to, among
other things, the passage of a local government code, a local tax law, income distribution
legislation, and a national representation law, and measures designed to realize autonomy
at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places
the local governments under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy
finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions
for removal of local officials, which suggests that Congress may exercise removal powers,
and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the
President.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEW CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PRESCRIBE FEDERALISM. As the
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 Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." The
Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the
national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political
adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy,
however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the
central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of
federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the
Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than
precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CHANGED SUPERVISION CLAUSE DOES NOT EXEMPT LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS FROM LEGISLATIVE REGULATION. The 1987 Constitution provides in
Art. X, Sec. 4 that "[T]he President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over
local governments." It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution,
Art. VII, Sec. 10(1), stating that "[T]he President shall . . . exercise general supervision over
all local governments as may be provided by law." It is the considered opinion of the Court
that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the Charter did not intend
to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by
existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our
opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to
underscore local governments' autonomy from Congress and to break Congress' "control"
over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of
local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in
particular, concerning discipline. The change in constitutional language did not exempt
local governments from legislative regulation provided regulation is consistent with the
fundamental premise of autonomy.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATIONAL AUTHORITY CAN DISCIPLINE LOCAL OFFICIALS. Since
local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and
in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials. In the
case at bar, the Secretary of Local Government, the President's alter ego, in consonance
with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the existing Local Government Code,
can suspend petitioner Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and petitioner
member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod (G.R. No. 93746).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "SUPERVISION" NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH DISCIPLINARY
AUTHORITY. "Supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. As this Court
held in Ganzon vs. Cayanan, 104 Phil. 484, "in administration law supervision means
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER TO SUSPEND LOCAL OFFICIALS MUST NOT BE EXERCISED
OPPRESSIVELY. While the respondent Secretary of Interior, as alter ego of the President,
under the existing Local Government Code, has the Power to suspend the petitioner Iloilo
City Mayor, such power cannot be exercised oppressively. Ten administrative cases have
been successively filed against the City Mayor. The Mayor has been made to serve a total
of 120 days of suspension for the first two cases and the respondent Secretary has issued
another order preventively suspending the former for another 60 days, the third time in
twenty months. We are allowing the Mayor to suffer the duration of his third suspension.
Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department of
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 Local Government, upon finality of this decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same,
subject to the Mayor's usual remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if
warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out further
suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima
facie evidence.

DECISION

SARMIENTO , J : p

The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the
Secretary of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of
the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively. cdasia

The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative

complaints, ten in number, led against him by various city of cials sometime in 1988,
on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct,
disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution,
and arbitrary detention. 1 The personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at
the city health of ce; Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant
City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German
Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pea Redondo, members of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod. The complaints against the Mayor
are set forth in the opinion of the respondent Court of Appeals. 2 We quote:
xxx xxx xxx
In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the City
Health, Office of Iloilo City charged that due to political reasons, having supported
the rival candidate, Mrs. Rosa O. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor, using as an
excuse the exigency of the service and the interest of the public, pulled her out
from rightful office where her qualification are best suited and assigned her to a
work that should be the function of a non-career service employee. To make
matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the Public Services, whose duties
are alien to the complainant's duties and functions, has been detailed to take her
place. The petitioner's act are pure harassments aimed at luring her away from
her permanent position or force her to resign.

In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner handpicked
her to perform task not befitting her position as Assistant City Health Officer of
Iloilo City; that her office was padlocked without any explanation or justification;
that her salary was withheld without cause since April 1, 1988; that when she filed
her vacation leave, she was given the run-around treatment in the approval of her
leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo Villegas and that she was the object of a
well-engineered trumped-up charge in an administrative complaint filed by Dr.
Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B).
On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duty elected Vice Mayor of Iloilo City
and complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong and
Eduardo Pea Redondo are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City
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 of Iloilo. Their complaint arose out from the case where Councilor Larry Ong,
whose key to his office was unceremoniously and without previous notice, taken
by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor Ong had to hold office at Plaza
Libertad. The Vice-Mayor and the other complainants sympathized with him and
decided to do the same. However, the petitioner, together with his fully-armed
security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad. Councilor Ong
denounced the petitioner's actuations the following day in the radio station and
decided to hold office at the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so
many people who gathered to witness the incident. However, before the group
could reach the area, the petitioner, together with his security men, led the firemen
using a firetruck in dozing water to the people and the bystanders.

Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod,

appointed by former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13, 1988, without the
benefit of charges filed against him and no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite
was arrested and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of petitioner.
In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other detainees thereby causing injuries. He
was released only the following day. 3

The Mayor thereafter answered, 4 and the cases were set for hearing. The opinion of the
Court of Appeals also set forth the succeeding events:
xxx xxx xxx
The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on
June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional Office of the Department of Local Government
in Iloilo City. Notices, through telegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L) and
the parties received them, including the petitioner. The petitioner asked for a
postponement before the scheduled date of hearing and was represented by
counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers, Atty. Salvador Quebral and
Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the way from Manila for the two-day
hearings but was actually held only on June 20, 1988 in view of the inability and
unpreparedness of petitioner's counsel.
The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27, 1988 in the same venue Iloilo
City. Again, the petitioner attempted to delay the proceedings and moved for a
postponement under the excuse that he had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless,
the hearing officers denied the motion to postpone, in view of the fact that the
parties were notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings (Annex M).

In the said hearings, petitioner's counsel cross-examined the complainants and

their witnesses.
Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive
suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11, 1988 for a period of
sixty (60) days.

Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner
again asked for a postponement to September 26, 1988. On September 26, 1988,
the complainants and petitioner were present, together with their respective
counsel. The petitioner sought for a postponement which was denied. In these
hearings which were held in Manila, the petitioner testified in Adm. Case No. C-
10298 and 10299.

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 The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the
complainants testified including their witnesses.
On October 10, 1988, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Onginal moved for a
postponement of the October 24, 1988 hearing to November 7 to 11, 1988 which
was granted. However, the motion for change of venue was denied due to lack of
funds. At the hearing on November 7, 1988, the parties and counsel were present.
Petitioner reiterated his motion to change venue and moved for postponement
anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take the deposition of witnesses in
Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed. However, the parties failed to
come to terms and after the parties were notified of the hearing, the investigation
was set to December 13 to 15, 1988.
The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his witnesses
were sick or cannot attend the investigation due to lack of transportation. The
motion was denied and the petitioner was given up to December 14, 1988 to
present his evidence. LexLib

On December 14, 1988, petitioner's counsel insisted on his motion for

postponement and the hearing officers gave petitioner up to December 15, 1988
to present his evidence. On December 15, 1988, the petitioner failed to present
evidence and the cases were considered submitted for resolution.

In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary
detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the petitioner's
second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days.
The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The second
preventive suspension was not enforced. 5

Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition
against the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial
Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction.
Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the respondent
Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively
suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and
designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor
Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of Appeals, a petition for
prohibition, 6 (Malabor, it is to be noted, is one of the complainants, and hence, he is
interested in seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)
On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP
No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No.
20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a Resolution certifying the petition
of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similarly charged by the respondent Secretary, to this
Court.
On June 26, 1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent
Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of
the Court of Appeals' two decisions.
In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our
Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we gave due course thereto.
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 Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (G.R. No. 93252), that the Department of Local
Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due process of law and
that the respondent Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards him 7
arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino party 8 and the running political rivalry they maintained in the last congressional
and local elections; 9 and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. 1 0 He also
alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension since it had come ninety days
prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14, 1988), 1 1 notwithstanding
which, the latter proceeded with the hearing and meted out two more suspension orders
of the aforementioned cases. 1 2 He likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases
to Iloilo City (they were held in Manila) in order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the
Secretary rejected his request. 1 3 He states that he asked for postponement on 'valid and
justifiable" 14 grounds, among them, that he was suffering from a heart ailment which
required confinement; that his "vital" 1 5 witness was also hospitalized 1 6 but that the latter
unduly denied his request. 1 7
Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of
Local Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local
officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No.
93746).
As to Mayor Ganzon's charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very
clearly in what manner the Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the respondent
Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary Luis Santos were (are) political rivals and that
his "persecution" was politically motivated are pure speculation and although the latter
does not appear to have denied these contentions (as he, Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can
not take his word for it the way we would have under less political circumstances,
considering furthermore that "political feud" has often been a good excuse in contesting
complaints.
The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so's that Secretary Santos had
attempted to seduce him to join the administration party and to operate a lottery in Iloilo
City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can not accept them
at face value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us accept them, 1 8 for
the same reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his say-so's were never
corroborated by independent testimonies. As a responsible public official, Secretary
Santos, in pursuing an official function, is presumed to be performing his duties regularly
and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed to him.
As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to defer
the hearing on account of the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas Blg. 337,
the Court finds the question to be moot and academic since we have in fact restrained the
Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the petitioners. 1 9
As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given any
compelling reason why we should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found no
convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides,
postponements are a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based on
Mayor Ganzon's above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been guilty of a
grave abuse of discretion.
The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos' actuations
deprived Mayor Ganzon of due process of law.
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 We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the
President's alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.
It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution 2 0 no longer allows the President,
as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or
removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first,
to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase "as
may be provided by law," 2 1 to strip the President of the power of control over local
governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the
Constitutional Commission.

The provision in question reads as follows:

SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities
and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component
barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions. 2 2

It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote:

SECTION 10. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. 2 3

The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as
their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2)
hence, no law may provide for it any longer. LLphil

It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of Local
Government acted in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the
Local Government Code, we quote:
SECTION 62. Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after the complaint is
filed, the Minister of Local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case
may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within seven
days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and investigation
of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the respondent. No
investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately prior to an election, and
no preventive suspension shall be imposed within the said period. If preventive
suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive
suspension shall be lifted. 2 4
SECTION 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be
imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or
city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal
official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective
barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are
joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has
committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is
strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in
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 office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive
suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed
reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings
against him until its termination. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the
case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be
counted in computing the time of suspension. 2 5

The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987
Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the
President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and or remove local officials?
(2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3)
What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language?
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the
constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or
the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide
administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as
may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments'
autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs.
The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the
legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government
units, as in the federal governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Germany),
although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal corporations euphemistically to
"small republics". 26 Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star,
though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the
Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest is to wean local
government units from over dependence on the central government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but
subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, 2 7 a local tax law,
2 8 income distribution legislation, 2 9 and a national representation law, 3 0 and measures 3 1
designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of
autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of
the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the
local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that
Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has
done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus:
SECTION 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government
units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units. 3 2

As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress,
sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing
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 congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of
local legislation. 3 3 The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing
legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to
proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.
The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her
control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression
because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court
has held, 3 4 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this
Court had occasion to discuss this scope and extent of the power of supervision
by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of
control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was
emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things
which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. Thus in that case the
Court has made the following digression: "In administration law supervision
means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter." But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the
power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not
include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public
service so requires, as postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative
Code. . . . 3 5
xxx xxx xxx

"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter." 36 "Supervision" on the other
hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties." 3 7 As we held, 3 8 however, "investigating" is not inconsistent
with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering".
The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at least three
cases, Lacson v. Roque, 3 9 Hebron v. Reyes, 4 0 and Mondano v. Silvosa, 4 1 and possibly, a
fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General. 4 2 In Lacson, this Court said that the President
enjoyed no control powers but only supervision "as may be provided by law," 4 3 a rule we
reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the President "may not . . .
suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against
him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board." 4 4 However,
neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondano categorically banned the Chief Executive from
exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but
because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. Thus, according to Lacson:

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 The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend
municipal officers is without doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension of
public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its
proper construction subject to constitutional limitations. 4 5

In Hebron, we stated:
Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by
law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence
of express or clear provision to the contrary which does not exist with respect to
municipal officers. . . . 4 6

In Mondano, the Court held:

. . . The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision
over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive
and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for
neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of
office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude."
And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the
matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused
either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the
officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his
opinion the charge by one effecting the official integrity of the officer in question."
Section 86 of the Revised Administration Code adds nothing to the power of
supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of . . .
municipalities. . . . If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the
same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79(c) of the
Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have
been abrogated by Section 110(1), Article VII, of the Constitution." 4 7
xxx xxx xxx

In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local
officials except on appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative Code.
48

Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend remove) it
was not because we did not think that the President can not exercise it on account of his
limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases in
which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty
in sustaining him. 4 9
The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the
Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers. The Court believes that the
deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose
Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President, 5 0 Commissioner Blas
Ople would not. 5 1
The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the
Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not
incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger
expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of
the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect. 5 2
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and
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 accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization."
5 3 The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of
the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political
adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy,
however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the
central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of
federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the
Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than
precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.
As we observed in one case, 5 4 decentralization means devolution of national
administration but not power to the local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more
responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate
on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them,
but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has
no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with
his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political

power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation,"
since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the
central authorities but to its contituency. 5 5

The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another
matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the
Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of
600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The Court
is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is
guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of
suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. As we held: 5 6
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His
term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the
suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his
functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of
October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral
process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services
of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them
could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance,
criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be
a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A
preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an
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 unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter
he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified.
Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the
only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were
deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that
sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this
preventive suspension had outrun the bonds of reason and resulted in sheer
oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an
unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted. 5 7

The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above
reasons, 5 8 and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local
government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, 5 9 is simply "to prevent
the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and
authority over possible witnesses" 6 0 or to keep him off "the records and other evidence."
6 1 It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an
erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days, 6 2
which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise
sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved
their purpose in a shorter span.
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the
accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the
respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty. cdphil

Suspension finally is temporary, and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be
imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held, 6 3 a longer suspension is unjust and
unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote
possibility on Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest
of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension
permanent.
It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor's guilt has not
been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught because needless to say, the length
of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure
considerably.

The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary to
see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor
Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, the respondent Secretary has had
sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor
without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that the respondent Secretary
has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to pin him
down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent Secretary, could have pursued a
consolidated effort.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior
from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is
exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.

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 The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under question, and that any talk of
future suspensions is in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has
been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension and the possibility of sixty days
more is arguably around the corner (which amounts to a violation of the Local Government
Code) which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the
rest of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a
concerted effort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act.
As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs.
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third
suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued.
Insofar as the seven pertaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department of
Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the
same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or
certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out
further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of
prima facie evidence.
In resum, the Court is laying down the following rules:
1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of
administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central
government in the manner the law may provide;
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;
3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was
meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter
from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental
premise of autonomy;
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may,
by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local
officials;
5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not
signify "control" (which the President does not have);
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may serve the suspension so far ordered, but
may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided:
a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect
or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of
suspension." [Supra, sec. 63(3)]

b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the
petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges
are filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension
shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under
subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary

Restraining Order issued is LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED,
provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future
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 suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against
him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to
consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon. cdasia

The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C . J ., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Footnotes

1. Rollo, G.R. No. 93252, 76; 77.

2. Hon. Bonifacio Cacdac, Jr., J.

3. Rollo, id., 76-77.

4. Id., 77.
5. Id., 77-78.
6. Id., 78. The first suspension was on the Cabaluna and Ortigoza complaints. CA-G.R. No.
1.6417 was on the Erbite complaint. CA-G.R. No. 20736 was a challenge on the
designation of Vica-Mayor Malabor.

7. Id., 21.
8. Id.
9. Id., 27.
10. Id., 28.
11. Id., 30.
12. Id., 31-32.
13. Id., 34-35.
14. Id., 36.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id., 38.
18. Id.
19. By virtue of the Temporary Restraining Order the Court issued on June 26, 1990.

20. CONST., art. X, sec. 4.

21. CONST. (1935), art. X, sec. 10(1). The 1973 Constitution contained no similar provision,
but see art. VII, sec. 18.

22. CONST. (1987), supra.

23. CONST. (1935), supra.
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 24. Batas Blg. 337, sec. 62.

25. Supra, sec. 63.

26. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 64 (1987 ed.).
27. CONST., supra, art. X, sec. 3.

28. Supra, secs. 5, 6.

29. Supra, sec. 7.
30. Supra, sec. 9.

31. See supra, sec. 14, providing for regional development councils to be organized by the
President.

32. Supra, sec. 3.

33. G.R. No. 95245, id., 53; see Mendoza, J., Concurring.
34. Ganzon v. Kayanan, 104 Phil. 484 (1985). In this concurrence (id., 48-61), Justice
Mendoza cited this case.

35. Supra, 489-490.

36. Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 148 (1955).

37. Supra, 147.

38. Ganzon v. Kayanan, supra.
39. 92 Phil. 456 (1953).

40. 104 Phil. 175 (1958).

41. Supra.
42. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965, 15 SCRA 569.

43. Lacson v. Roque, supra, 463.

44. Pelaez v. Auditor General, supra, 583.

45. Lacson v. Roque, supra, 462.

46. Hebron v. Reyes, supra, 185.

47. Mondano v. Silvosa, supra, 148.

48. Pelaez v. Auditor General, supra, 583.

49. G.R. No. 95245, id., 50-51; see Mendoza, J., Concurring.

50. Id., 23.

51. Id., 53.
52. Bagabuyo v. Davide, G.R. No. 87233, September 21, 1989.

53. CONST., supra, art. X, sec. 3.

54. Limbona v. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989, 170 SCRA 786.
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 55. Supra., 794-795.
56. Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, No. 65848, May 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 536.

57. Supra, 541.

58. See supra.
59. Lacson v. Roque, supra.

60. Supra, 469.

61. Batas Blg. 337, sec. 63.

62. Supra.
63. Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra.

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