Masaryk University

Faculty of Arts

Department of English
and American Studies

English Language and Literature

Andrea Krsiov

Irony as a Pragmatic Concept

Bachelors Diploma Thesis

Supervisor: Mgr. Jan Chovanec, Ph. D.

2013
 I declare that I have worked on this thesis independently,
using only the primary and secondary sources listed in the bibliography.

..
Authors signature
 I would like to thank my supervisor
Mgr. Jan Chovanec, Ph.D. for his kind help and support.
Table of Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................. 5

1. Irony ....................................................................................................... 6

1.1. Underlying and literal irony ................................................................. 7

1.2. Participants ...................................................................................... 12

1.3. Extra-linguistic cues .......................................................................... 15

1.4. General definition of irony ................................................................. 18

1.5. The use of open criticism opposed to irony ........................................ 20

1.6. Being ironic opposed to lying ............................................................ 23

2. Irony as a pragmatic concept .................................................................. 25

2.1. Grices cooperative principle and its critiques...................................... 25

2.1.1. Cooperative principle .................................................................. 25

2.1.2. Leech ........................................................................................ 29

2.1.3. Sperber and Wilson .................................................................... 29

2.1.4. Pretence theory ......................................................................... 33

2.1.5. The indirect negation theory ....................................................... 34

3. Irony and sarcasm .................................................................................. 38

Conclusion ................................................................................................. 44

Bibliography ............................................................................................... 45

Summary ................................................................................................... 48

Resum ..................................................................................................... 49
Introduction

The purpose of this work is to describe and compare the most interpreted

pragmatic theories that describe irony since Grices cooperative principle.

The demonstration of these theories requires the description of the process

of encoding and decoding irony. Therefore I first describe the method of

creation of an ironic utterance. In connection with this topic I would like to

mention the importance of discrepancy in speaker and sentence meaning and

characterise the participants of an ironic discourse.

I will proceed to describe also the interpretation of irony. The text deals with

two approaches which have been proposed to describe this process, the direct

access theory and the classic model. Further I would like to mention how extra-

linguistic cues can help the process of correct interpretation.

The main body of the text offers a review of the most influential pragmatic

theories of defining irony: Leechs politeness principle, the echoic mention

theory, the pretence theory and lastly Gioras indirect negation theory.

At the end of the text, the difference between irony an sarcasm is

characterised, as from personal experience I concluded that a lot of people

incorrectly exchange these terms. Finally, the question why people use a figure

of speech instead of an honest utterance is addressed.

5
1. Irony

Before the pragmatic theories that propose a definition of irony can be

described, ironys general description needs to be done. In the first part of this

chapter I would like to concentrate on the description of intra-linguistic

conditions of irony, such as the explanation of the difference in sentence and

speaker meaning or underlying criticism. To be able to speak about irony it is

important to point out that these two meanings cannot agree. They do not

have to stay in opposition, however, there is always some kind of discrepancy

between them.

The perception of these differences depends on the understanding of each

person. Even though the analysis of understanding is not a pragmatic discipline

it is important to describe what conditions can shape our understanding and

what factors can influence them to give some background information for the

theories described in the second chapter. It is also important to mention that

our interpretation is not shaped only by the linguistic devices used in the

utterance, but also by extra-linguistic cues.

If we analyse the process of understanding then the process of creating an

ironic utterance needs to be analysed too. The linguistic aspects will be

described at the beginning of the chapter, then I will analyse the speakers

intention. The main question asked is why a speaker uses an ironic utterance

instead of a direct statement which does not involve any extra effort to create

or to interpret.

6
1.1. Underlying and literal irony

The most common and the simplest definition that is used to define irony is

that it is saying something while meaning its opposite (Muecke 1970; Barbe

1995; Giora 1998; Colebrook 2004). The main problem with this definition is

that the underlying meaning of an ironical utterance does not necessarily mean

the exact opposite of its literal meaning.

Based on the above observation we can distinguish two types of irony. In my

thesis I would like to rely on the division that Katharina Barbe used in her work

Irony in context (1995), one group being the so-called underlying irony when

the definition it is saying something while meaning its opposite is applied, and

the other one is literal irony where the sentence meaning and the underlying

meaning do not stay in opposition.

To be able to demonstrate the discrepancy between the literal or the

sentence and the implied or underlying meaning first the distinction between

sentence and speaker meaning needs to be explained. To understand the

sentence meaning the interpreter needs to understand the dictionary meaning

of the words that are linked to the grammatical devices used in the sentence.

However, to understand the speaker meaning it is not enough to know the

meaning of the words used in the utterance. The speaker meaning consists of

two components: utterance meaning and force (Thomas 1995: 18). The

utterance meaning is what the speaker actually does mean by these words on

this particular occasion (Thomas 1995: 16) while the term force [] refers to

the speakers communicative intention (Thomas 1995: 18).

7
 Dichotomies of the sentence meaning and speaker meaning are not always

applicable when speaking about irony. Barbe (1995: 88) argues that clear

distinction of these dichotomies can be applied to underlying irony, as in this

case the underlying meaning is clearly the opposite of the utterance. Lets take

for example two utterances, the utterance A is an example of underlying irony,

as the implied meaning is the opposite of the sentence meaning, while the

utterance B is an example of literal irony, as the discrepancy between sentence

and the underlying meaning is not present.

A. If Comrade Napoleon says it, it must be right. (Orwell 1957: 80)

The utterance A is an example from George Orwells Animal farm uttered by

Boxer, one of the animals on the farm. Napoleon is their leader, however, not

all the animals agree with his believes. One of the animals that do not agree

with Napoleon is Boxer who expresses his disagreement throughout the above

ironic utterance. Utterance A is ironic as Boxer believes that Napoleon is not

right, but he says the opposite of what he thinks.

To demonstrate the situation where the discrepancy between the sentence

meaning and the speakers opinion is not apparent I would like to use an

example from the book Irony in context by Katharina Barbe. In her example the

speaker is upset with the victim of the irony, as he left a door open on a cold

day:

B. I think people who shut doors when its cold outside are really

considerate (Barbe 1995: 11).

She explains that

8
 [t]he speaker of [the utterance] in all probability actually believes that people

who shut the doors when its cold outside are really considerate . Thus, there

is no discernable opposition of a surface and an underlying reading.

Nonetheless, examples like [this] should also be covered by any definition of

irony. This, of course, opens irony up to include many more instances that

those that express mere opposition of a surface to an underlying reading. As

in [the above example], the so-called literal reading may be ironic, too.

(Barbe 1995: 11-12)

It could be questioned why this utterance is classified as ironic as the

speaker does appreciate if people close the door on a cold day. In my

argumentation the utterance is ironic as its underlying meaning implies

criticism. Lets use the same utterance in a different context, where two friends

talk about what kind of qualities they like or do not like in people. The

underlying meaning of the sentence I think people who shut doors when its

cold outside are really considerate (Barbe 1995: 11) in the second situation is

I love people who close doors, so it is the same as the sentence meaning.

However, in the first situation, when the context is leaving the door open, the

underlying meaning can be interpreted as Could you close the door? so the

speaker says one thing but means something else. Even though the ironist

implies that the victim is inconsiderate, as he has not closed the door, the

sentence meaning does not describe the victim, but the people who do close

doors. The dichotomy can be found between the groups of people who do close

doors and those who do not, but not in the criticism itself, as the underlying

meaning of the utterance is implying that the ironist wants the victim to close

9
the door. The sentence meaning is I like people who close doors, but the

underlying meaning is not I do not like people who close doors. If the ironist

said that I think people who shut doors when its cold outside are really

inconsiderate. or I do not think people who shut doors when its cold outside

are really considerate. the dichotomy could be applied. However, in that case

the sentence would be an example of underlying and not literal irony.

Another situation where the discrepancy does not play any role in implying

irony is stating or even asking the obvious. Lets take as an example a birthday

dinner, where the served meat is overcooked. One of the guests states the

obvious:

C. This meat is black.

The speakers utterance literally corresponds with the situation, as the meat

served is actually burnt. However, by stating the obvious the speaker is drawing

attention to the fact that the meat should not be of that particular colour. Using

this particular sentence the speaker is criticising the victims ability to cook,

however, this utterance does not require any reply from the cook 1, so that way

they avoid arguing.

The sentence meaning in the example C describes the colour of the meat

and not the fact that it is uneatable. Even though the sentence implies on the

underlying level that the meat is not eatable, meaning bad, the literal meaning

of the word used in the sentence describing the meat is not a direct opposite of

the implied word, as black is not the opposite of the word bad. So the situation

1
See open criticism in section 1.5.

10
can be perceived as ironic, as it contains criticism and the sentence meaning

and the underlying meaning do not correspond.

To make the above definition of irony applicable in those situations where

the dichotomy between the sentence meaning and the underlying meaning is

not present it needs to be altered to express that the sentence meaning and

the speakers intended meaning does not have to stay in opposition, but the

underlying meaning does not correspond with the sentence meaning. So it

could be said that irony is saying something, while meaning something else

(Barbe 1995).

However, it is not always apparent for the interpreter what the speaker

meaning is, as

meaning is not something which is inherent in the words alone, nor is it

produced by the speaker alone, nor by the hearer alone. Making meaning is

a dynamic process, involving the negotiation of meaning between speaker

and hearer, the context of utterance (physical, social and linguistic) and the

meaning potential of an utterance. (Thomas 1995: 22)

If the sentence meaning corresponds with the speaker meaning, so the

speaker does not try to imply anything else but the literal meaning, then no

irony can be found in the sentence. For example:

D. What an interesting story!

The sentence meaning in this case is I find your story very exciting. If the

ironist indeed finds the story exciting there is no discrepancy between the

speaker and sentence meaning, so irony cannot happen here.

11
 On the other hand if the sentence meaning differs from the speaker meaning

there might be irony present. The sentence meaning in utterance D has not

changed but if the speaker meaning is I do not find your story interesting at

all. or I do not believe you. then the speaker and the sentence meaning are

different, so in this particular case we can observe irony. If this condition is not

fulfilled irony cannot be present. However, it cannot be said that every time

there is a discrepancy in sentence and speaker meaning there always must be

irony observable. Lets take for example a situation, when the speaker is

lovesick, and the above metaphoric sentence is uttered:

E. I have a broken heart.

The sentence meaning is My heart is physically broken into several pieces, and

the speaker meaning is My love left me so I am suffering. Even though the

sentence and the speaker meaning do not correspond, we cannot speak of an

example of irony in this sentence as in the underlying meaning there is no

criticism in this context.

In an ironic utterance there need to be criticism implied, and there need to

be a difference between the speaker and the sentence meaning. These two

meanings do not have to stay in opposition, it means that the sentence

meaning can be true, the important thing is that the two meanings do not

correspond. If they do, no irony can be observed.

1.2. Participants

When speaking about irony it is important to mention the participants who

can be present when an ironic remark is uttered and also to analyse their role.

In my work I would like to use Linda Hutcheons division of the participants who

12
are present at an occurrence of irony. She divides them into three groups: the

ironist, the interpreter(s) and the victim (Hutcheon 1995: 11). These three

categories can sometimes overlap.

- the ironist: the role of the ironist is quite clear, he is the one who

makes the irony happen (Hutcheon 1995: 12)

- the interpreter: the interpreter is the person who understands the

ironists intention and recognises irony, however, he does not usually

suffer the criticism of the ironic utterance, but it still can be addressed to

him

- the victim: there must always be a target, so a victim, to every

ironic remark or situation. In my analysis I conceive the concept of the

victim in a broad way, broader then for example Barbe who in her

analysis divides irony based on the person of the victim. In this work the

victim can be anyone or anything that is criticised either willingly or

unwillingly so it can be just one person, a group of people, fate or it

can include the interpreter(s), both those interpreters, who do and who

do not understand the irony in the remark, or even the ironist

themselves. The victim suffers the criticism of irony and gets into

a hierarchically lower position to the ironist as well as the interpreter

(Hutcheon 1995: 18). The victim can, but does not necessarily have to

recognise the irony of the sentence addressed to him.

This is the standard set-up for irony to happen. However, this is not the only

case where irony does happen. The second, also common happening of irony,

is when the ironist does not intentionally make an ironical remark. In other

13
words, the interpreter recognises irony even though the ironist did not mean to

use it. Lets take as an example a situation when two people go to see

a romantic film. One of them, S1, is excited to see it, the other one, S2, not so

much as he does not like romantic films. In our situation S2 ends up enjoying

the film:

S2: This was a great film!

S1: Please, you dont have to pretend that you liked it.

The confusion of S1 is understandable, as he presupposed that his friend would

not like the film, therefore he assumed that the implied meaning of his

utterance is negative, while S2 did really enjoy the film.

The way people understand is formed by many factors, for example gender,

education, age, cultural background, etc., so as Barbe points out [t]he

recognition of irony is culturally dependent and not globally unified (1995: 5).

The way people view and understand their surroundings determines in which

cases they will interpret an ironic remark correctly. Claire Colebrook argues in

her book Irony that understanding is important in perceiving irony as [r]eading

ironically means, [] not taking things at their word; it means looking beyond

standard use and exchange to what this or that might really mean (2004: 4)

and that [a] word does not have a meaning independent of its social exchange

[...] language is not just a logical system but relies on assumed norms, values.

(2004: 16). She further argues that the interpretation of a text depends on the

beliefs of the reader, as everyone interprets a discourse or a piece of literature

based on how they understand and view the context. Colebrook gives as an

example the plays of Shakespeare as they can be read both in ironic and non-

14
ironic way, depending on the interpreters opinion on the Elizabethan era, either

praising or criticising it (2004: 5).

Ironys recognition depends on the understanding of the participants that are

present during a discourse. Their understanding is shaped by many factors that

affect the way they think and interpret discourses. That is why it can be

concluded that irony can happen even if the speaker does not intend to utter an

ironic utterance and also an intended irony can be left unrecognised.

1.3. Extra-linguistic cues

The ironist cannot rely on any syntactic device to signify irony. Therefore

extra-linguistic cues can be used to signify irony both in written and spoken

context. In case that there is an extra-linguistic factor that underlines an

ironical statement it can help the interpreter and the victim to recognise irony.

An example could be saying

A. What a lovely day!

when standing outside in the pouring rain. The extra-linguistic factor (in this

case the rain) shows the contrast between the speakers statement and its real

meaning.

This example shows that the context helps the interpreter and the victim to

recognise irony. However, the context is not always as clear as in the above

example or there is not any possibility to refer to any context that could

underline the ironic utterance. In that case the interpreter needs to search for

extra-linguistic hints and cues to recognise irony. These hints and cues, just like

the context, can be misinterpreted and an interpreter can suspect irony in an

utterance, where it was not intended.

15
 Burgers distinguishes between irony factors and irony markers (Attardo et

al., as cited in Burgers, Mulken & Schellens 2012: 231). The irony factors are

the characteristics an utterance need to have in order to be ironic. If an

utterance lacks these factors it no longer can be qualified as ironic

(Burgers et al. 2012). Based on the above description these characteristics need

to include at least two things: different underlying meaning and criticism.

The irony markers are the extra-linguistic cues used in a discourse to signify

irony (Burgers et al. 2012). These irony markers differ in spoken and in written

context.

In written context these markers can be quotation marks, hyperboles, or

emoticons (Burgers et al. 2012: 232). Burgers in his paper describes an

experiment concentrating on the importance of irony marker in written context.

In this experiment he used three different texts, a text with no irony markers,

one with one irony marker and one with three irony markers. The conclusion of

the experiment showed that irony marker in written interaction helps the

interpreter to perceive irony. Their hypotheses was that the more irony

markers an ironic utterance contains, the easier it is perceived and the better it

is understood (Burgers et al. 2012: 238). Their hypothesis was proven to be

true. They concluded that

(a text with) an ironic utterance with three markers is perceived as less

complex than (a text with) an ironic utterance with one or no markers.

Besides, an ironic utterance with three markers was better understood than

an ironic utterance without markers. (Burgers et al. 2012: 238)

16
 In spoken context one of the extra-linguistic cues used by the speaker to

signal irony is different tone of voice and pace of speech from the non-ironic

tone and pace. However, it is not possible to define one kind of tone or pace of

voice that could be labelled as ironic. The used intonation is speaker and

context dependant (Bryant & Fox Tree 2002: 101).

Bryant and Fox Tree ask the question if the interpretation of an utterance

depends on how it is said, or what preceded it? (2002: 99). In their

interpretation of irony they rely on Wilson and Sperbers echoic interpretation

theory2, and they stress the importance of extra-linguistic cues to allow

listeners to understand such a complex speech act as irony. (2002: 100). They

argue that

[t]he production and processing of disambiguation cues involves certain

costs, but without the cues, interlocutors risk misunderstanding. To minimize

the potential costs and maximize relevance, verbal irony should contain

features that assist listeners in reaching correct interpretations, particularly in

contexts with reduces available information. (2002: 100)

From their research they deduced that the recognition of different tone of

voice is required to make an utterance relevant, and this recognition can be

achieved through the use of [] global prosodic cues (2002: 110), so

intonation. Sarcastic intonation or ironic tone of voice is thought to be

recognized through nasalization, slowed speech rate, prolonged syllables, and

other particular prosodic features (Bryant & Fox Tree 2002: 101).

2
See section 2.1.3.

17
 Besides the discrepancy in sentence and speaker meaning the ironist can use

extra-linguistic cues to signify irony. These cues differ in written and spoken

context. Their presence does not guarantee that the irony will be recognised it

just helps the recognition.

1.4. General definition of irony

Burgers argued that an utterance can be ironic only if it contains irony

factors (2012: 231). I argue based on the previous sections that these irony

factors are discrepancy between the sentence and the speaker meaning and

presence of criticism.

To clarify the definition irony is saying something, while meaning something

else I would like to concentrate on the meaning of the part something else in

the above definition. It can be derived from the above examples that

something else, so the underlying meaning, should be criticism (Boxer

criticises Napoleon, the speaker criticises the person who left the door open, or

even the circumstances like weather, can be criticised). At this point I would

like to draw attention to Aristotles (Barbe 1995: 5) distinction of two kinds of

irony, criticising-by-praising and praising-by-criticism. In case of criticising-by-

praising, as its name implies, the critical undertone is obvious. An example can

be saying to an actor who has no talent whatsoever:

A. You are so talented!

In this situation the ironist seemingly compliments the victim, but he means the

opposite, so he means to criticise the victim.

However, one could argue that in Aristotles praising-by-criticism where the

underlying meaning is actually praising the victim does not fulfil the condition to

18
contain underlying criticism. In fact it does the opposite, so praises the victim,

so the principle that the underlying meaning is criticism should not be applied.3

Rachel Giora argues that this kind of irony is not prototypical; most of the

verbal ironies tend to be articulated in positive terms (Giora 1998: 3). Even if it

is a marginal case, it needs to be analysed as it goes against the above derived

rules.

Using a figure of speech gives an extra quality to the utterance so it can be

argued that the ironist used this ironic utterance instead of directly praising the

victim for a reason. If the ironists intention was only to praise the victim, he

could have used an utterance with no different underlying meaning to the

sentence meaning, however, the ironist decided not to praise openly

(Dews & Winner 1996: 3072). Shelly Dews and Ellen Winner argue that irony

has two main functions: muting and humor function (1996: 3072). The humor

function allows the ironist to show that he is not upset and [is] in control of

the situation, while the muting function mutes the implied criticism [] or the

implied praise [] [so] an ironic compliment is perceived as less praising than

a literal compliment (1996: 3072). So it can be concluded that even though

the underlying meaning of the utterance is not criticism, the praising has been

dialled down on purpose, thus showing a not entirely positive attitude towards

the victim.

3
The criticism is present in the utterance, as the sentnce meaning is criticism, but this does not

fit the definition which says that the implied meaning needs to be the one that criticises the

victim.

19
1.5. The use of open criticism opposed to irony

As discussed above, an ironic utterance criticises a victim. To criticise

someone or something the speaker does not have to use irony, they could

openly criticise the victim. Open criticism, however, can lead to conflicts, while

by using irony the speaker can avoid confrontation. Apart of avoiding

confrontation reasons to recourse to irony can be numerous, for instance it can

be a self defence mechanism if someone does not want to lose face

(Barbe 1995: 5) or simply to make a fool of the victim, when the interpreters

understand the underlying context, while the victim is under the impression that

the ironists praise was honest. Another reason why irony is used sometimes

instead of direct criticism is to exclude graded interpretation.

Open criticism is always meant to be recognised by the victim of the criticism

and the interpreters too, while irony is not always intended to be recognised by

all the partakers (Barbe 1995: 11). Lets take an example from everyday life.

Lets imagine that the ironist hates art. He has a birthday party and the victim

of the ironic remark gives the ironist a painting. The ironist can react in two

ways:

A: Thank you very much for the effort, however, I hate this present.

or

B1: Thank you very much. Who wouldnt love this painting?

By using sentence A, the speaker openly criticises the victim, and probably gets

him into an uncomfortable situation in front of the guests, making him and

most of the participants uncomfortable. However, if the ironist uses the

sentence B1, it lessens the probability that the gift giver will be offended as

20
there is no humiliation intended in the sentence.4 If the ironist uses the

utterance B1 there can be three possible reactions to it. Firstly it can happen

that nobody recognises the irony in the utterance, so the gift giver appears in

a good light. Secondly it can happen that only a part of the interpreters (for

example the ironists close friends) will understand the true meaning of the

utterance, while the victim and the rest of the guests will remain under the

impression that the ironist was sincere and go on enjoying the party. The third

possibility is that the victim will also recognise that the ironists remark was not

sincere, however, he does not have to defend himself, as the ironic utterance

does not require reply, while the critical utterance does. That way the ironist

can avoid open confrontation.

On the contrary, if the ironist does love art and after getting a painting uses

the utterance B1 an interpreter who is not aware of the context might think that

the response to the gift was meant ironically. This also can be an example of

how important it is to know the context of an utterance so it can be assumed

that to be able to safely interpret a sentence as ironic or non-ironic the

interpreters and the ironist need to have commonly shared knowledge

(Barbe 1995: 12) of the situation.

An uninvolved interpreter might conclude that the utterance B1 is ironic

because of the ironists choice of sentence structure. Lets imagine that the

response B1 was slightly different:

B2: Thank you very much. I love this painting.

4
There can be humiliation implied, however in taht case we would be speaking about sarcasm.

The difference between irony and sarcasm is discussed later.

21
 The response can still be understood as ironic by the close friends of the

ironist (in case that the ironist hates art), however, an uninvolved interpreter

would consider it as sincere, as the sentence the ironist used was declarative.

On the other hand in the response B1 the ironist asked a rhetoric question

making the interpreters to analyse the situation and think further before

accepting the response as fully sincere.

Another difference between irony and open criticism was proposed by Rachel

Giora who argues that irony opposed to direct criticism is more informative if

the criticism is recognised (1995: 258-259). The reason for this according to her

explanation is that irony excludes graded interpretation, while criticism usually

contains it. She gives as an explanatory example the following sentence

(1995: 259)

C. The party is not lovely.

The utterance is open criticism, and there is a possibility for graded

interpretation, as it can be interpreted as the party is not lousy either, or it

could be worse or it is a disaster (1995: 259). However, the underlying

meaning of the ironic utterance does not contain any graded interpretation

D. What a lovely party.

If the example D was meant ironically, it can be interpreted only in one way,

meaning The party is far from being lovely (Giora 1995: 259).

If an interpreter recognises the irony in an ironic utterance it can be

interpreted only in one way, however, some examples of direct criticism can be

interpreted in several ways, all being critical, but the intensity of criticism is

changing. So to avoid this kind of ambiguity the speaker can use irony. Irony

22
can be used to avoid several other unpleasant situations, for example loosing-

face or confrontation.

1.6. Being ironic opposed to lying

Douglas C. Muecke in his work Irony (1970) distinguishes three different

types of irony: overt, covert and private irony.

In the happening of overt irony both ironist and victim participates the

ironist produces the irony, the victim and the interpreter decode it. Overt irony

is obvious, and easy to detect as there is an open criticism in it, which is

supported by extra-linguistic factors, such as in the utterance What a great

whether in a downpour.

Covert irony needs to be detected by analysing the utterance, as there is no

obvious extra-linguistic factor that would signal it. Christian Burgers (2012: 232)

uses Wilson and Sperbers example to explain covert irony:

Oh, Tuscany in May.

In this example, the irony is uttered by a speaker who was invited to a summer

cottage in Tuscany in May, because the weather in May would always be good.

When this speaker arrived in Tuscany, the weather was horrible, which

prompted him to produce the ironic utterance. This utterance is ironic, even

though it does not contain an evaluative word: it is up to the addressee to infer

that the utterance is actually meant as evaluative. These ironic utterances are

implicitly evaluative. (Burgers et al. 2012: 232)

Private irony should not be understood by anybody else but the ironist

themselves. Based on this fact, private irony can resemble a lie. A lie is telling

the opposite to something that happened or will happen and it should not be

23
recognised by the victim or the interpreter just like private irony, however,

there is one difference between these two figures of speech that differentiates

private irony from lie, and that is that lie does not criticises the victim. Sweetser

defined three conditions of lie based on the work of Coleman and Kay. The first

condition is that the speaker knows that his utterance is not true, the second

one is that the speaker misleads the hearer intentionally and the third one

states that the utterance must not have any truthful value. If we apply these

conditions to irony we can see that the second one is not true in the case of

irony (Sweetser as cited in Barbe 1995: 114).

Saying the sentence I loved your soup! ironically criticises the victim, so the

implied meaning of the utterance is to say that the victim is not a good cook,

while if this sentence was told as a lie, the implied meaning would not be

criticism. The liar is aware that the victim is not a good cook, however, he does

not intend to criticise the victim, but he intends to protect himself and avoid

further discussion on why he does not like the food. Even though the speaker in

both cases thinks that the soup was not eatable, the underlying message of the

sentence is different.

24
2. Irony as a pragmatic concept

Since Paul Grice proposed the cooperative principle many more theories

have arisen to describe irony, but the base of all these theories is the

cooperative principle. Leech and Giora further developed Grices theory, while

Sperber and Wilsons echoic mention theory and the pretence theory present

theories that are opposed to the cooperative principle.

In this section first I would like to describe the cooperative principle, so that

the distinction between Grices and the other theories can be made apparent,

then I will proceed to describe the above mentioned theories.

These theories can be divided into two groups also based on the fact if they

include one (the echoic mention theory and the relevance theory) or two stages

(cooperative principle and the indirect negation theory) of interpretation of

irony. In my work I would like to proceed describing these theories in

chronological order to show how they are connected.

2.1. Grices cooperative principle and its critiques

2.1.1. Cooperative principle

In an ideal situation during a discourse the shared information is decoded as

it was intended by the speaker. This situation can arise when the participants of

a conversation do not use any figure of speech, so their sentence and speaker

meaning is the same, and the participants share the same cultural and historical

background. This can be achieved if the partakers of a discourse follow Paul

Grices cooperative principle.

25
 The cooperative principle includes four maxims which should not be flouted

in order to avoid ambiguity. However, the flouting of these maxims allows the

speaker to use different figures of speech and enrich the conversation, be more

polite or less aggressive than the speaker would be if he followed the rules

based on Grices maxims. For example saying to a sportsman in a situation,

when he finished last even though he did his best:

A. Based on your todays performance you are not talented.

B. You almost won this one.

The utterance A fulfils all Grices maxims5, but saying this sentence could cause

confrontation. The utterance B flouts three of Grices maxims, however, using it

in the above context can be more polite and less probable to start a quarrel.

Grice himself proposed a theory of irony, in which he argues that using irony

means flouting at least one of the maxims of the cooperative principle

(Barbe 1995: 57). The four maxims are the following:

1. maxim of quality

If Comrade Napoleon says it, it must be right. (Orwell 1957: 80)

The maxim of quality instructs that the speaker that they should not say

what he believes is not true. In the above example the speaker goes

against this maxim as he exactly states what he believes is not at all

true. The sincere meaning, the one that would fit Grices maxim of

quality, is just implied. So the speaker meaning flouts the maxim of

quality. However, this maxim does not have to be flouted every time

irony occurs. If the speaker does not use the so called underlying irony,

5
See Grices four maxims below.

26
but the literal irony the sentence meaning of the statement can be true,

just like in the above mentioned example I think people who shut doors

when its cold outside are really considerate (Barbe 1995: 11).

2. maxim of quantity

This meat is black.

The maxim of quantity states that the speaker should make themselves

clear by providing the hearer with enough information, so that the

speakers opinion and point is clear, and the speaker should not say

neither less nor more than needed. This maxim excludes the possibility

to look for an implied meaning that would be different from the one that

has been uttered. The above example flouts this rule, as the sentence

meaning, so the literal meaning, does not give enough information to

decode the speakers point, which in this case was criticism of the

victims ability to cook. The sentence meaning states only that the colour

of the meat is black, and does not states anything about the speakers

opinion.

3. maxim of relation

The maxim of relation advises the speaker to be relevant and to form

his/her reply in a way that it is directly relevant to the topic of the

conversation. For example if someone asks How did you like the soup?

and the answer is The noodles were perfectly prepared. the reply does

not answer the question directly, so it flouts the maxim of relation. The

speaker meaning is criticism, so irony can be found in the remark.

4. maxim of manner

27
 The maxim of manner states that the speaker has to be as direct and

clear as possible. If there is any ambiguity in the utterance the maxim of

manner is not fulfilled. For example speaker A and B would like to go to

the cinema, and speaker A makes a suggestion:

A. Ive heard that they play the new James Bond movie downtown.

B. Ive heard it too.

The reply of speaker B is ambiguous, as it is not clear from the reply only

if he means that he heard that information too and would like to go, or

that he heard it too but has no intention to watch that movie.

If the cooperative principle is fully observed, there is no difference between

the sentence and the speaker meaning. However, it is not possible to go by this

principle in every situation. As Barbe points out, there are situations when irony

is expected and acceptable (Barbe 1995: 54). Lets take as an example

a stand-up comedian. In his performance irony is expected by the audience so

it is questionable if irony is in fact flouting for example the maxim of relation.

Grice later (1978) suggested that what was missing from this account of irony

is the idea that irony involves the expression of a certain critical judgement or

attitude (Hesse n.d. p. 5).

It can be argued that irony is flouting Grices maxims, however, the

cooperative principle sometimes interferes with other principles of pragmatics,

such as the politeness principle. Based on the examples given in this work it

can be concluded that not every conversation can be led by the cooperative

principle (Barbe 1995), so to analyse a conversation according to them the

interpreter must take into consideration the context.

28
 2.1.2. Leech

Geoffrey N. Leechs theory is closely connected to Grices maxims. He

argues, that the cooperative principle is applicable to describe the ideal process

of conversations, however, it needs to be extended by the politeness principle.

He explains that the [cooperative principle] in itself cannot explain [] why

people are often so indirect in conveying what they mean (Leech 1983: 80)

and the politeness principle is needed to explain the situations when Grices

maxims are flouted. While the cooperative principle regulates that the

participants cooperate, the politeness principle regulates the peace between the

participants (Leech 1983: 82). According to Leech to maintain the state of

peace the participants can use white lies or irony. He explains that

[I]rony is in fact a second-order principle, which builds upon, or exploits, the

principle of politeness. The irony principle [] may be stated in a general

form as follows:

If you must cause offence, at least do so in a way which doesnt overtly

conflict with the [politeness principle], but allows the hearer to arrive at the

offensive point of your remark indirectly, by way of implicature.

(Leech 1983: 82)

It can be concluded that based on Leechs politeness principle using irony is

less harsh than using a sentence following the cooperative principle if the

speakers intention is criticism.

2.1.3. Sperber and Wilson

Sperber and Wilson criticised Grices explanation of irony, and suggested that

it is not true that irony is always present if at least one of the maxims is

29
flouted. They deduce their theory on Grices maxims from Searle, who argues

that Grices theory of irony

fails to account for the extent to which meaning can be a matter of rules

and conventions. This accounts of meaning does not show the connection

between ones meaning something by what one says, and what that which

one says actually means in the language. (as cited in Sperber & Wilson

1996: 25)

In other words, the speaker should intend the hearer to understand her by

decoding her utterance (Sperber & Wilson 1996: 25).

In contrast to Grices maxims, Sperber and Wilson ask different questions.

They point out the importance of two aspects that they believe should always

be fulfilled for an utterance to be successfully labelled as ironic. Their first

aspect is motivation (Porter 2008: 2), meaning that the ironist always has to

have a reason why he used an ironical utterance opposed to directly stating

his/her opinion. Motivation to use irony can be numerous, the most commonly

mentioned is to avoid confrontation. As discussed before, an ironic utterance

should contain underlying criticism. To directly criticise somebody or something

can lead to conflicts, as a direct insult requires or sometimes even provokes

a reply, while an ironic utterance or a rhetorical question can be left

unanswered (Leech 1983: 144).

The second aspect Wilson and Sperber mention is common background

information (Porter 2008: 3), a concept that is left out from Grices theory. The

underlying ironical meaning of an utterance does not have to be understood by

all the participants of a conversation, on several occasions the criticism is

30
intended to be understood only by a selected group of people, who share

common background information on the criticised subject, while others should

remain uninitiated.

Sperber and Wilson proposed the relevance theory that opposed to the

cooperative principles assumes that every utterance (fulfilling or flouting Grices

maxims) was formulated in that way for a reason, so they are relevant, and it is

the interpreters job to decode the speaker meaning based on the sentence

meaning, the context and on the seemingly irrelevant details and information

that the speaker gives. The relevance theory includes their interpretation of

irony, so the echoic mention theory.

Wilson and Sperber argued that verbal irony is a form of echoic

interpretation; that is, speakers communicate an attitude toward some

attributed proposition by echoing that proposition explicitly or implicitly, and

simultaneously commenting on it (Bryant 2002: 100). They emphasise the

difference between descriptive and figurative utterances, the descriptive

meaning that the speaker does not distance himself from what he said, and

opposing to it stands the figurative sentence, meaning that that the speaker

distances himself and expresses an attitude.

Wilson and Sperber argue that there are three factors that help to identify an

ironic utterance: first, [] a recognition of the utterance as echoic; second []

an identification of the source of the opinion echoed; and third, [] a rejection

or dissociation (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 240). They further argue that using an

echoic utterance can express several attitudes, however, they

31
 doubt very much that there is either a well-defined subset of ironical

attitudes or a well-defined subset of ironical utterances which express them.

Rather, what exists is [] a whole range of borderline cases which do not fit

neatly into any existing scheme. (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 240)

Another difference between the relevance theory and the cooperative

maxims is that Grice recognises two stages of comprehension, firstly the

decoding of the literal and secondly the non-literal meaning, while Wilson and

Sperber argue that the speaker can immediately analyse the non-literal one

based on the context. This assumption was proved to be wrong by Giora

(2007).6

The echoic mention theory has been criticised because it cannot be applied

in every situation. Even if Wilson and Sperber tried to find an explanation of

what is echoed in every example they have given in their proposal, it is argued

that the examples are all created to fit the theory and not the theory is fit to

the examples (Simpson 2003: 93). One of the examples Wilson and Sperber

give in their work and according to Simpson does not fit their theory is

criticising the weather by uttering a positive sentence. They argue that the

ironist can echo the words of a weatherman or a person the ironist has met

previously, but Simpson opposes that the ironic remark, mainly in this case, can

be the speakers own remark and not an echo (2003: 93).

Even if Wilson and Sperbers theory cannot be applied in every situation their

work is significant as they draw attention to the importance of the common

knowledge in the interpretation of irony.

6
See section 2.1.5.

32
 2.1.4. Pretence theory

In the 1990s another theory arose, namely the pretence theory, which is

similar to the echoic mention theory in the sense that it also states that the

interpreter does not need to interpret the literal, just the non-literal meaning.

Both theories claim that irony is communicated by the speaker pretending to

agree with their declaration. The difference between these two theories is that

in the echoic mention theory the speaker echoes someone elses utterance,

while in pretence theory the ironist is just pretending to perform a speech act.

This way it expresses critical attitude not just towards the person whose idea is

echoed, but towards a though or people that would utter it

(Wilson 1735: 1735).

The Classical View of Irony in claiming that the ironist is pretending to be an

other real or imagined person holding the believes, characteristics, ideas,

thoughts and so forth and at the same time by imitating that real or

imagined person distancing oneself from that persons believes and

criticising them. The speaker is not himself performing a speech act, but is

pretending to perform it or is pretending to be a person who is performing

these speech acts (Hesse, n.d. p. 12)

However, just like the echoic mention theory, the pretence theory has also

been criticised, as it covers even less aspects of irony than the above

mentioned theories and does not give an explanation to how irony is different

from parody.

In the case of parody the audience is aware that the speaker is only

pretending to be another person. In the case of imitation or impersonation

33
 the speaker intends to deceive his audience. He wants them to really

think he is that person. This crucial difference that the lie must be obvious

both in parody and irony is missing from the pretence theory. (Hesse, n.d.,

pp. 12-13)

Even if the pretence theory has been criticised it is important to mention its

existence, as it stays in opposition with the next theory proposed by Rachel

Giora. She criticises that the pretence theory excludes the literal meaning of an

utterance from the process of understanding. She also pointes out that this

theory has not brought anything new to the interpretation of irony as

pretending to be someone else does not change the fact that the implied

meaning is substituted by the spoken sentence (Hesse, n.d., p. 12).

2.1.5. The indirect negation theory

The latest theory that criticises Grices cooperative principle is the indirect

negation theory by Rachel Giora. She agrees with Grice in dividing the

interpretation of an utterance into two sections, first understanding the literal

meaning secondly the underlying message, so using the Standard Pragmatic

Model. However, Gioras theory criticises the division of meaning into literal and

non-literal meaning.

She argues that when an interpreter hears or sees a word (without any

context) the first interpretation will be the one which is the most known to

them. A word's salient meanings are those coded in the mental lexicon. Their

degree of salience may be affected by e.g. conventionality, familiarity,

frequency, or prototypicality (Giora 1998: 7). She gives the following example:

if somebody needs to interpret the word bank without any context the first

34
interpretation may differ, as for somebody the primary meaning of the word is

an institute that deals with money for others it is a shore. So while Grices

theory takes into consideration in the first step of interpreting an utterance the

literal meaning (so the one that can be found in a dictionary), Giora introduces

the term salient meaning, which is user dependent. Also in the second step

Giora uses the term non-salient instead of non-literal, which is also user-

dependent.

This distinction between literal and salient meaning is important in Gioras

further observations where she analyses the difference between the conception

of novel and conceptual irony. When an interpreter interprets a novel irony

the above mentioned steps are fulfilled, however, in the case of conventional

irony it does not have to be so. While Grices theory says that the interpreter

first always analyses the literal meaning and then the non-literal meaning, Giora

argues that in case of conventional irony the non-literal meaning can be

perceived by the interpreter as salient (Giora 1998: 8).

Giora (1995) proposes a set of rules that always need to be fulfilled to lead

a succesfull conversation, these are the rules for discourse well-formedness and

another set that needs to be fulfilled if irony happens, these are the conditions

for irony well-formedness. The first condition of irony well-formedness equals

with her first condition of discourse well-formedness, so that the utterance

needs to be relevant to the topic. The second condition for irony opposes her

condition of discourse well-formedness, so it violates the graded

35
informativeness requirement7 (1995: 244). These conditions are set up based

on Grices maxims. The third condition is that irony makes the addressee

evoke an unmarked interpretation (19995: 245).

Gioras indirect negation theory argues that the negation in irony cannot be

direct, so grammatical, only indirect. Giora

proposed that irony is a form of indirect negation. [] [It means that] the

ironist negates without using an overt negation marker. More often than not,

an affirmative expression or utterance is used to implicate that a specific

state of affairs is different from the desirable state of affairs made explicit by

the very same expression. (Giora 1998: 4)

Direct negation can be compared to the (classical) negation of a statement

which cancels the assertion but retains the presupposition(s). Direct negation

can lead to graded interpretation, as discussed above, which is one of the

effects that can be avoided by using irony. Direct negation is also marked both

linguistically and psychologically. [] Psychologically [] [t]hey have an

unpleasant hedonic value (as cited in Giora 1995) associated with them. Irony

[] avoids this unpleasant value (Giora 1995: 241-242).

She further argues that direct negation cannot be used in interpreting literal

irony. If a literal ironic utterance is grammatically negated its meaning will not

reflect the underlying ironic meaning. For example if the utterance This meat is

black is directly negated, it becomes This meat is not black which does not

correspond with the underlying meaning, this meat is uneatable.

7
The graded informativeness requirement describes that an utternace should not state neither

less nore more about the topic as it is relevant in the givencontext.

36
 The indirect negation theory has eliminated the pitfalls of the preceding

theories. It includes and explains both literal and underlying irony, but it does

not consider necessary to include anybody whose idea would be echoed in the

ironic utterance.

37
3. Irony and sarcasm

Kreuz and Glucksberg (1989) argue that the difference between verbal irony

and sarcasm is the intention to ridicule. There is a fine line between these two

terms, and on several occasions they are interchangeable.

Every sarcastic utterance can be referred to as an example of verbal irony as

both criticise the victim, however, it is not always true in the opposite direction.

Using verbal irony means saying something, while meaning something else,

while being sarcastic means saying something, while meaning something else

while mocking somebody. For example:

A: Such a nice weather we have today!

B: He is a very talented rhetorician.

The utterance A can be ironic if the weather is terrible, e.g. the wind is

blowing while it is raining, but it cannot be sarcastic, as the ironist does not try

to ridicule anybody in this context.8 On the other hand, the utterance B can be

labelled as sarcastic. The utterance is definitely ironic if the victim of the

utterance is boring or his speech is unintelligible, so the ironist means

something else than he is actually saying, and the ironist criticises the victim.

However, it is also sarcastic as the ironist not just criticises but ridicules the

speaker with this remark.

Another difference between these two figures of speech is the way their

conception has or has not changed since their recognition. It can be derived

from the above examples that both irony and sarcasm evoke negative feelings
8
Of course the example A can also be sarcastic in a different context, for example if the ironist

wants to ridicule the originator of the false prediction.

38
in the victim as their aim is to criticise them. However, Socrates managed to

add a positive concept to irony, as he used irony as a tool to draw attention to

the truth, while sarcasm has always been used only in a negative way to

ridicule or even harm the victim, with no positive effect on the interpreters

whatsoever (Katz, Blasko & Kazamerski 2004: 187).

Lee and Katz argue that the next difference between irony and sarcasm is

their different conception of the victim. Their assumption is that the presence of

the victim is irony is important, however, not crucial. Also, the victim can be the

ironist themselves. Opposed to that in sarcasm the fact that the victim is

human, is present and is not the same person as the ironist plays an important

role. Their argumentation is that people tend to ridicule rather someone else,

than themselves. Therefore [t]he emotional effects can be different for the

[ironist] and the listener, and a sarcastic comment is seen as more caustic and

less funny by the victim than by the [ironist] (Katz et al. 2004: 187). They

supported their hypothesis by three different experiments, where a group of

people were given several stories which were created for this experiment and

they had to rate them as being ironic or sarcastic or neither. They concluded

the experiments in their paper The Differential Role of Ridicule in Sarcasm and

Irony (Lee & Katz 1998). In each case the stories that contained ridicule of a

victim were rated as the most sarcastic of all, while in the ones rated as ironic

there was no effect of a victim being present or not.

The question could be asked again, why people use sarcastic utterances, if

they could sincerely and openly address the victims mistake or ridiculous deed.

The use of irony instead of a sincere statement has already been discussed

39
above, the main reason being to avoid confrontation. This can also be applied

in case of sarcasm, however, Katz (2004) argues that being funny is a more

important reason to use sarcasm than to avoid conflict. In reading tasks,

people perceive characters who use a statement sarcastically as more verbally

aggressive, and yet more humorous, than characters who use the same

statement literally (Katz et al. 2004: 187). A sarcastic message is also

perceived as more insincere, impolite, noninstructional, and ambiguous than

a literal statement (Katz et al. 2004: 187).

To understand the underlying meaning of a sarcastic or ironic statement the

interpreters (now also including the victim) according to John Searle

(Katz et al. 2010: 187) need to complete two phases. First the interpreters need

to analyse the sentence meaning, so the literal meaning. If the sentence

meaning for any reason arouses any discrepancy between the interpreters

expectation and the ironists actual reaction they need to analyse the utterance

further. So as the second step the interpreters analyse the non-literal,

underlying meaning of the utterance. If the underlying meaning fulfils the

expectations of the interpreters, they will consider the utterance as ironic or

sarcastic.

The classic theoretical position holds that sarcastic language (and other

forms of non-literal language) is processed by obligatory processes during

the initial stages of language comprehension, and that contextual and

pragmatic effects come into play only later. [This model suggests] that non-

literal language processing should be optional if a literal interpretation is

possible and that non-literal understanding should take more time than

40
 literal understanding, because additional processing is needed.

(Katz et al. 2004: 187)

Opposed to the classic model Katz supports the direct access theory and

argues that the lasting of the process of interpretation highly depends on the

expectation of the interpreters. He argues that there are more sarcastic and

less sarcastic occupations, people and situations. If the ironist is well-known for

being ironic or sarcastic (for example a comedian), the interpreters expect the

occurrence of a sarcastic utterance, so they might skip the literal reading. Also

several situation presuppose the appearance of sarcasm in the discourse, so the

interpreters will understand the utterances accordingly, not analysing if the

sentence meaning correspond with the situation (Katz et al. 2010: 187). Just

like Katz, Gibbs and Wilson and Sperber also support the direct access theory,

so they agree that background information is so important that if it is

supportive enough, the interpreter does not need to interpret the literal

meaning of an utterance he can immediately understand the underlying ironic

meaning.

This view goes against Grices Standard Pragmatic Model which is similar to

Gioras findings. They both support the above mentioned classic theoretical

model, but there is one major difference between Grices and Gioras theories.

While the Standard Pragmatic Model discards the literal meaning, so the

meaning decoded in the first step of understanding is not present in the second

step, Giora finds that the literal meaning is still present in the interpretation in

the second phase too thus creating the discrepancy between the sentence and

41
speaker meaning. She argues that more often than not, irony is reacted to by

resonating with its salient literal interpretation (Giora 1998: 8).

She further argues to support the classic model that the effort of using

sarcasm to make a point that could be made in some more direct fashion wants

the listener/reader to consider both the expressed message and the indirect

intended message (Giora 1998: 8). She supports her theory by scientific fact

driven from her research Does an ironic situation favour an ironic

interpretation? (Giora, Fein, Kaufman, Eisenberg & Erez 2009). The experiment

was based on the hypothesis, that irony interpretation should be (i) promoted

as well as (ii) facilitated by a context that involves an ironic situation

(Giora et al. 2009: 393). The results support an opposing view the direct access

theory. Giora concludes that

regardless of how supportive a context is of an ironic interpretation, it does

not allow appropriate interpretations to circumvent inappropriate but salient

meanings and interpretations based on these meanings (which here

coincided with literal interpretations). As a result, salience-based

interpretations were faster to derive. (Giora et al. 2009: 394)

In the same article Giora refers to one of her previous research, where the

context constitut[ed] strong contextual information. Her assumption was that

expectancy may be built-up by preceding stimulus sequences [] [they]

proliferated use of ironic utterances in contexts preceding ironic and literal

targets. Such contexts indeed induced an expectation for an oncoming ironic

utterance (Giora 2009: 394). However, she concludes that even if there was

expectancy in highly predictive contexts did not facilitate ironic utterances

42
compared to salience-based (literal) interpretations, which were always

activated initially (Giora 2009: 394).

It can be concluded that sarcasm is a sub-category of irony as both contain

discrepancy between the sentence and speaker meaning and both criticise the

victim. The main difference, as Katz concluded, between them is that sarcasm

contains an extra element which is mocking the victim.

However, the process of their interpretation is not affected by this fact.

There are two types of theories of the procession of interpretation of irony and

sarcasm. One is the direct access theory which is supported by Katz and Wilson

and Sperber, and says that the process of the interpretation is context-

dependant, so a supportive context can lead to understanding irony and

sarcasm immediately without interpreting the utterances literal meaning.

Opposed to that theory stays Gioras view, who argued the interpretation of an

ironic or sarcastic utterance always has two phases, and regardless of the

context the interpreter needs to analyse the salient meaning of the utterance,

as the discrepancy between the salient and non-salient meaning will signify the

irony. Based on Gioras theory the direct access theory cannot be applied as the

interpretation needs to be a negation of something, so the interpretation needs

to go through two phases. Also, based on her theory about the salient meaning

it is not possible to omit the sentence meaning from the process of

interpretation of irony.

43
Conclusion

Since Grices proposal of irony many linguists tried to propose a theory that

would cover all the possible occurrences of irony. All of these theories opened

up a new possibility to describe irony, however most of them were not

applicable in every case. Gioras indirect negation theory, however, gives an

answer to each problem that was raised by the preceding theories.

All the theories have added an extra to the description of irony. Grice

proposed that a sentence is ironic if the sentence and speaker meaning stand in

opposition. Leech added to the theory that irony is not used only to criticise,

but can be also used to weaken criticism. Wilson and Sperber draw attention to

the importance of the commonly shared knowledge in the interpretation of

irony. They also proposed that the speaker and the sentence meaning do not

have to stay in opposition, so included a whole new type of iron into their

theory. Giora first specified the process of interpretation ad introduced the term

salient meaning instead of literal meaning. Later she proposed the indirect

negation theory.

Successful interpretation of irony depends on the personality of the

interpreter, there is no universal theory that could be adapted to help the

observation of irony. However, the use of extra-linguistic cues can help the

interpreter.

44
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Summary

This thesis offers a review of the most influential pragmatic theories of

defining irony which have arisen since Grices proposal. Each theory brought

a new aspect of interpretation of irony, however, none of them managed to

cover all its aspects. The latest theory which is mentioned in this work is the

Indirect negation theory by Rachel Giora. Her proposal has eliminated the

pitfalls of the preceding theories.

In this work I also examine both the encoding and the decoding of irony.

Based on the analysis of the proposed examples it is concluded that two ironic

factors need to be present in utterance to be ironic. These factors are

discrepancy between speaker and sentence meaning, and underlying criticism.

It shows that the interpretation of irony depends on the recognition of irony

factors. The process of recognition appears to be easier if the speaker and the

interpreter share some common background knowledge of the situation. The

speaker can further help the correct interpretation by using irony markers,

extra-linguistic cues, such as intonation, facial expression, or in written context

some graphical elements. When analysing the understanding of irony two

approaches have been described, the direct access theory and the classic

model. Based on the description of irony that is outlined in the first chapter, the

direct access theory has been rejected.

Lastly, the importance of mockery, not just criticism, in sarcasm is described

and an explanation is given why people use a figure of speech, like irony or

sarcasm, instead of open criticism.

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Resum

Tato prce nabz pehled nejdleitjch pragmatickch teori o ironii, kter

vznikly na zklad Griceovy teorie. Kad teorie poukzala na nov monosti

interpretace ironie, ale ani jedna teorie nebyla schopn popsat ironii ze vech

monch stran. Nejnovj teorie, kter je zmnna v tto prci, byla navrhnuta

Rachel Giorovou. Jej teorie eliminovala problmy, kter nastolily pedel

teorie.

V tto prci se tak zabvm vytvoenm a interpretac ironie. Na zklad

analzy pklad uvedench v tto prci meme usoudit, e ironick vta mus

obsahovat dva prvky ironie. Tyto prvky jsou jednak rozdl mezi vznamem

vtnm a enkovm, a tak naznaen kritiky(naznaen kritika?).

Interpretace ironie zle na rozeznn tchto faktor. Prbh interpretace

me bt odlehen, pokud mluv a poslucha maj spolenou znalost o situaci.

Mluv me dle napomhat sprvn interpretaci pomoc ironickch znak,

mimo-jazykovdnmi signly, jako je intonace, mimika, nebo v psan form

grafick elementy. Na analzu interpretace ironie byly charakterizovan dva

postupy, teorie pmho pstupu a klasick model. Na zklad popisu ironie v

prvn kapitole meme usoudit, e teorie pmho pstupu nen platn v kad

situaci.

Na konci prce je popsna dleitost posmnho podtextu, a nejen kritiky,

v sarkasmu, a tak je vysvtleno z jakch dvod me bt ironie pouita msto

oteven kritiky.

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