XI.

ADOPTION

LAZATIN V CAMPOS-ADOPTION
Facts:
Margarita de Asis died, leaving a holographic will providing for a legacy of cash,
jewelry, and stocks to respondent Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of
support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her late sister; and a legacy of education to
Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner Renato Lazatin.
During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box at the bank which
either she or respondent Nora de Leon (adopted daughter) could open. 5 days after
her death, Nora opened the safety deposit box and removed its contents: (a) shares
of stock; (b) her adoption papers and those of her sister, respondent Irma L. Veloso;
and (c) jewelry belonging to her and to her mother. Nora claims that she opened the
safety deposit box in good faith, believing that it was held jointly by her and her
deceased mother.
Respondents filed a petition to probate (establish the validity) the will. After having
learned that the safety box was opened, petitioner's son, Ramon Sta. Clara, filed a
motion in the probate court, claiming that the deceased had executed a will
subsequent to that submitted for probate and demanding its production.
Petitioner Renato to Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara filed a motion to intervene in the
estate of Margarita de Asis as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed
by Benjamin Lazatin (brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin), the petitioner
was an "illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by him. This affidavit
was later modified to state that petitioner was adopted by both Mariano M. Lazatin
and his wife Margarita de Asis.
During the hearing, Renato presented no decree of adoption in his favor. Instead, he
attempted to prove, over private respondents' objections, that he had recognized
the deceased spouses as his parents; he had been supported by them until their
death; formerly he was known as "Renato Lazatin" but was compelled to change his
surname to "Sta. Clara" when the deceased spouses refused to give consent to his
marriage to his present wife; that at first, he and his wife stayed at the residence of
Engracio de Asis, father of Margarita, but a few months later, they transferred to the
Mercy Hospital at Taft Avenue, Manila, owned by the deceased spouses, where they
continuously resided up to the present.
Photographs were also intended to be presented by petitioner, e.g., photograph of
Irma Veloso where she addressed herself as sister of petitioner; photograph of
deceased Margarita de Asis and petitioner when he was a boy; document showing
that petitioners real name is "Renato Lazatin."
Respondent court first reserved its ruling when petitioner could not present
evidence on the issue of his alleged legal adoption, respondent court discontinued
the hearing and gave the parties time to file memoranda on the question of the
admissibility of the evidence sought to be introduced by petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not renato has established his status as an adopted child.

Held: NO.
 Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.
Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid
down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. The fact of
adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by the person
claiming its existence.
On the contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a
presumption of its non-existence. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by
the court, as provided by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a
child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a child to
establish such adoption.
Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption
proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such
secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the
instrument.
The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents;
although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.
As earlier pointed out, petitioner failed to establish the former existence of the
adoption paper and its subsequent loss or destruction. Secondary proof may only be
introduced if it has first been established that such adoption paper really existed
and was lost.
Cervantes v Fajardo

Facts: This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus over the person of the minor
Angelie Anne Cervantes.
Angelie Ann Cervantes was born on 14 February 1987 to Conrado Fajardo
and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. They offered the child
for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes
and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of the child when she
was barely two weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child was
executed by respondent Gina Carreon. The petition for adoption was filed by
petitioners before the RTC of Rizal, which granted the petition.
Sometime in 1987, the adoptive parents, Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes,
received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of
P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused. As a
result, while petitioners were out at work, the Gina Carreon took the child from her
"yaya" at the petitioners' residence, on the pretext that she was instructed to do so
by her mother. Gina Carreon brought the child to her house. Petitioners demanded
the return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire to
give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she
had executed was not fully explained to her.

Issue: Whether or not the natural parents or the adoptive parents have custody
over Angelie Ann Cervantes.

Held: The custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are granted to
petitioners, Zenaida and Nelson Cervantes, to whom they properly belong.

Ratio: In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children,
the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated
from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the Court finds
compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the custody of
minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the
child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social
standing of the contending parents.
Conrado Fajardo's relationship with the Gina Carreon is a common-law
husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with Gina will not accord the
minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright
and moral-minded person. Gina Carreon had also previously given birth to another
child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but
who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor to grow up with a sister whose
"father" is not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said
minor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be
morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and
giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless but
also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.
 Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and
consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect of dissolving the
authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child. The adopting parents
have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental
authority and responsibility over him.
Bartolome vs Social Security System
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014

Facts: John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by
Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since
February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the governments Employees
Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred
on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely
death the following day. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried.
Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, Johns biological mother and, allegedly,
sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the
Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS La
Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 20095 addressed to petitioner, denied the
claim on the ground that due to the Adoption of John by Cornelio Colcol, petitioner
Bartolome is no longer entitled to be the beneficiary as the parent of John.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the pension of the deceased biological
child despite adoption.

Held: Yes. When Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old,
petitioners parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be
overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelios death, was that
when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree,
John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.

Johns minority at the time of his adopters death is a significant factor in the case at
bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have
reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our
consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no
collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor
adopted child if the adopter passed away?

To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the

biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 8552 (RA
8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:

Section 20. Effects of Rescission. If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is

granted, the parental authority of the adoptees biological parent(s), if known, or the
legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or
incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the
adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.

Moreover, John, in his SSS application, named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries
for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the Social Security Law. While
RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and
expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the
member unlike in PD 626, Johns deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his
beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent.
Consequently, the confluence of circumstances from Cornelios death during Johns
minority, the restoration of petitioners parental authority, the documents showing
singularity of address, and Johns clear intention to designate petitioner as a
beneficiary effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit
claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
CASE TITLE: ORIBELLO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. G.R. NO. 163504
DATE: 2015-08-05

FACTS:
Before the RTC of La Union was an action for partition and damages of 12
parcels of land located in Sta. Rita, La Union.
8 of said lands were declared for taxation purposes in the name of Toribio, 2
under Toribio and Rosenda Oribello, 1 in Toribio and Berlinda Oribello, and 1 in
the name of Toribio and Emilia Oribello.
Toribio had 2 marriages.
First wife was Emilia. On September 10, 1981, His marriage with her was
dissolved by a decision of Court of California.
Second marriage was with Berlinda Oribello on March 10, 1982 before
municipal mayor of Agoo, L.U.
On August 18, 1993, Toribio died intestate.
On May 27, 1997, Remedios Oribello represented by natural father Alfredo Selga
instituted an action against Berlinda on the theory that she is an adopted
daughter of Toribio per decision dated March 26, 1974 of CFI wherein it granted
the petition of Toribio and Emilia, who were childless, for adoption of Remedios,
then 8 years old.
In an answer, Berlinda denied that Remedios is an adopted daughter to Toribio
and that Alfredo fraudulently secured the decree of adoption.
She averred that:
Proceedings in the first adoption case and the decree of adoption are void
ab initio.
Toribio could not have filed the first adoption case in Occidental Mindoro
given that he was a resident of Agoo throughout his life.
Toribio in the first adoption case and Toribio married to her are two
different persons.
Birth certificate of Remedios was simulated / fabricated
Remedios never lived nor submitted herself to parental authority and
care of Torbio even after her marriage with him.
Alfredos fraudulent scheme was shown by his filling of another petition
for adoption in 1983 in the RTC of Occidental Mindoro.
On March 30, 1998, RTC ruled that Remedios Selga is not a co-owner of the
properties, which Berlinda inherited from Toribio.
On July 31, 2003, CA held that the appealed decision is remanded back to lower
court for the 2nd phase of partition.
CA noted that even if the adoption proceedings had suffered from infirmities,
RTC did not have the authority to annul the adoption decree and to dismiss
the complaint for partition for that reason and that Berlinda had the option to
file either:
A petition for relief
An action for annulment of adoption decree in the appropriate court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Remedios Oribello is entitled to the partition of
real property belonging to Toribio Oribello?

HELD/ RATIO:
NO.
The Respondent did not discharge her burden of proof as to show that she was
entitled to the partition.
RTC correctly ruled against the right of Remedios Oribello to demand the
partition of the real property belonging to Tomas Oribello
In the case, Remedio Oribello had the burden of proof, as a party demanding the
partition of property, to establish her right to a share in the property by
preponderance of evidence. She failed to provide the factual basis of her right to
the partition warranted the dismissal of her claim for judicial partition.
The RTC found that Remedios Oribello did not satisfactorily establish her co-
ownership of the properties left by the late Toribio Oribello:
The court concludes that Toribio Oribello did not testify in the court
hearing on February 18, 1974 in Special Proceeding No. R-94. As per
record of the case it was a certain Toribio Orivillo who testified on that
date.
1. The person who physically appeared and actually testified before CFI of
Occidental Mindoro on February 18, 1974 was not Toribio Oribello but
one Toribio Orivillo or purporting to be one Toribio Orivillo, a person
physically different from the physical Toribio Oribello.
2. According to Atty. Jaravata, Sps. Orivillo were in a hurry going back to US
which explains the reason why they were not able to sign the petition for
adoption.
It would not take more than 10 minutes to prepare the one page
petition
If Spouses were really there, they could have corrected the spelling
Only one month separated the filing of the petition and its hearing.
It would not economical for the would-be-adopter, who was not
shown to have been very rih mere a sugar worker, to go to the US
in a hurry and then come back in the Philippines within a period of
30 days.
Facts established in the case, he did not show much interest in
exercising parental authority over the supposed-adopted child.
She remained in Occidental Mindoro
Toribio Orivillo never showed interest to such adoption neither
interest or anxiety over Remedios Selga.
3. The explanation of Atty. Jaravata that they were in a hurry to go back from
the States was mere to justify the absence of the signature of both spouses in the
one page petition
4. In the hearing of February 18, 1974, if the real Toribio Oribello appeared in
Court, he would have corrected his surname and stated his citizenship. Unnatural
for a person not to react when his surname is misspelled
5. Toribio Orivillo who testified was not the real Toribio Oribello who was born
on April 16, 1910 in Agoo, La Union and who died on August 19, 1993.
a. Somebody with the name of Toribio Oribello or purporting to be such and
testified for him in the CFI based on Occidental Mondoro on February 1974
b. Alfredo Selga said that Toribio Oribello did not know about the second
adoption cases
Tomas Orivillo who legally adopted Remedios Oribello under CFI decree of
adoption was not the same person as Tomas Oribllo whose property was the
subject to demand for judicial partition
RTC did not interfere with the jurisdiction of CFI as a court of equal rank and
did not negate the adoption decree but simply determined whether or not
the claim of Remedios Oribello to the partition of the property of
Tomas Oribello was competently substantiated by preponderance of
evidence. Only settled whether Remedios Oribello was a co-owner of the
property with Berlinda Oribello

TOPIC: ADHERENCE TO JURISDICTION

DOCTRINE: When a CFI issues a decree of adoption, the same cannot be annulled by
the RTC because they are courts of equal rank. The petititon to annul the decree
should have been filed before the court with a higher jurisdiction than that which
issued the decree sought to be annulled. Indeed, no court has the authority to nullify
the judgments or processes of another court of equal rank and category, having the
equal power to grant the reliefs sought. Such power devolves exclusively upon the
proper appellate court. The raison d'etre for the rule is to avoid conflict of power
between different courts of equal or coordinate jurisdiction which would surely lead
to confusion and seriously hinder the proper administration of justice.
TOPIC: JUDICIAL PARTITION
DOCTRINE: The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is
concerned with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists
and a partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise legally proscribed and may be
made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This
phase may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the desired partition
either because a co-ownership does not exist or a partition is legally prohibited. It
may also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in
truth exist, that partition is proper in the premises, and that an accounting of rents
and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In
the latter case, "the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among
themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the
partition so agreed upon by all the parties." In either case, whether the action is
dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and
may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.
The second stage commences when the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition ordered by the court. In that event, partition shall be effected for the
parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
This second phase may also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its
approval by the Court after the parties have been accorded the opportunity to be
heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto
entitled of their just shares in the rents and profits of the real estate in question.
Such an order is, to be sure, also final and appealable.

In the decision ordering partition, the execution of that part of the judgment which
will not necessitate any further proceedings may be enforced. Further proceedings,
such as the appointment of commissioners to carry out the partition and the
rendition and approval of the accounting, may be had without prejudice to the
execution of that part of the judgment which needs no further proceedings. Thus, it
has been held that execution was entirely proper to enforce the defendant's
obligation to render an accounting and to exact payment of the money value of the
plaintiffs' shares in the personal property and attorney's fees due defendants, as
well as the costs of the suit and damages.

The plaintiff has the burden of establishing his/her right to a share in the property
by preponderance of evidence.
TOPIC: Power of the court in cases of judicial partition
DOCTRINE: The court during judicial partition in cases of judicial partition has the
power to determine whether the plaintiff is a co-owner of the property being
partitioned.
Husband and wife jointly sec 7

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim

GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009

FACTS:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but
were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents
were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the
children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998,
Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December
2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given
under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed
separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial
court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18
years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario
gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

HELD:

Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was
not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly
exercised parental authority. The use of the word shall signifies that joint
adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept
of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of
consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he
must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the aliens
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental
authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and
rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their
moral mental and physical character and well being.
Alien as adopters sec. 7 (b)

Republic v. Toledano

Facts:

On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US Citizen and Evelyn
Clouse, a former Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, filed a petition to
adopt Solomon Alcala, a minor who is Evelyn's youngest brother. The trial court
granted the petition. Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed
contending that the lower court erred in granting the petition for the spouses are
not qualified to adopt under Philippine Law.

Issue:

Whether or not Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt

Held:

Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as
"The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are
clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.

Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the
persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to
adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted
provision. In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born
citizen of the United States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is
neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the
third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to
adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A.
Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she
was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify
pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino
citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for
adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which
mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:

Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must
be read along together with Article 184.

Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the
ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child,
it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures
harmony between the spouses.

Note:

The alien husband can now adopt under Sec. 7 (b) of R.A. No. 8552 (Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998). The Supreme Court has held in several cases that when
husband and wife are required to adopt jointly, each one of them must be qualified
to adopt in his or her own right. However, the American husband must comply with
the requirements of the law including the residency requirement of 3 years.
Otherwise, the adoption will not be allowed. (Desiderio P. Jurado, Civil Law
Reviewer, 2006 ed., p. 232)
Effects of a decree of adoption

1. On status, sec 17

Bagayas v. Bagayas

FACTS:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of sale and partition
before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 04-42, claiming that Rogelio, Feli`cidad,
Rosalina, Michael, and Mariel, all surnamed Bagayas (respondents) intended to
exclude her from inheriting from the estate of her legally adoptive parents,
Maximino Bagayas (Maximino) and Eligia Clemente (Eligia), by falsifying a deed of
absolute sale (deed of absolute sale) purportedly executed by the deceased spouses
(Maximino and Eligia) transferring two parcels of land (subject lands) registered in
their names to their biological children, respondent Rogelio and Orlando Bagayas
(Orlando). Said deed, which was supposedly executed on October 7, 1974, bore the
signature of Eligia who could not have affixed her signature thereon as she had long
been dead since August 21, 1971.By virtue of the same instrument, however, the
Bagayas brothers were able to secure in their favor TCT Nos. 375657 and 3756 over
the subject lands.

Rogelio claimed that after their parents had died, he and Orlando executed a
document denominated as Deed of Extra judicial Succession (deed of extra judicial
succession) over the subject lands to effect the transfer of titles thereof to their
names. Before the deed of extra judicial succession could be registered, however, a
deed of absolute sale transferring the subject lands to them was discovered from the
old files of Maximino, which they used by "reason of convenience" to acquire title to
the said lands. RTC dismissed the case. RTC held he was an adopted child.

The RTC further held that, even though petitioner is an adopted child, she could not
ask for partition of the subject lands as she was not able to prove any of the
instances that would invalidate the deed of absolute sale. Moreover, the action for
annulment of sale was improper as it constituted a collateral attack on the title of
Rogelio and Orlando.

It observed that the action for the declaration of nullity of deed of sale is not the
direct proceeding required by law to attack a Torrens certificate of title
signature of Eligia who could not have affixed her signature thereon as she had long
been dead since August 21, 1971.By virtue of the same instrument, however, the
Bagayas brothers were able to secure in their favor TCT Nos. 375657 and 3756 over
the subject lands.

No appeal was taken from the RTCs Decision dated March 24, 2008or the
Resolution dated June 17, 2008, thereby allowing the same to lapse into finality.

Subsequently, however, petitioner filed, on August 1, 2008, twin petitionsbefore the

same RTC, docketed as LRC Nos. 08-34 and 08-35, for the amendment of TCT Nos.
375657 and 375658 to include her name and those of her heirs and successors-in-
interest as registered owners to the extent of one- third of the lands covered therein.
The petitions were anchored on Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529,
otherwise known as the "Property Registration Decree," which provides as follows:

Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or

amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate
of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same be [sic]
Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered
owner [sic] of other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper
cases, the [sic] Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land
Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that x x x

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the dismissal of the earlier complaint on the ground that it is
in the nature of a collateral attack on the certificates of title constitutes a bar
to a subsequent petition under Section 108 of PD 1529.
2. Whether she can be declared an heir in an ordinary civil case

RATIO:

1. In dismissing Civil Case No. 04-42, the RTC declared that petitioner could not ask
for the partition of the subject lands, even though she is an adopted child, because
"she was not able to prove any of the instances that would invalidate the deed of
absolute sale purportedly executed by Maximino and Eligia. This conclusion came
about as a consequence of the RTCs finding that, since the subject lands belonged
exclusively to Maximino, there was no need to secure the consent of his wife who
was long dead before the sale took place. For this reason, the forgery of Eligia's
signature on the questioned deed was held to be inconsequential. However, on
reconsideration, the RTC declared that it committed a mistake in holding the subject
lands as exclusive properties of Maximino "since there was already an admission by
the defendants during the pre-trial conference that the subject properties are the
conjugal properties of the spouses Maximino Bagayas and Eligia
Clemente.Nonetheless, the RTC sustained its dismissal of Civil Case No. 04-42 on the
ground that it constituted a collateral attack upon the title of Rogelio and Orlando.

2. the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioners petition for annulment of sale on the
ground that it constituted a collateral attack since she was actually assailing Rogelio
and Orlandos title to the subject lands and not any Torrens certificate of title over
the same.

3. Be that as it may, considering that petitioner failed to appeal from the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 04-42, the judgment therein is final and may no longer be reviewed.

4. The crucial issue, therefore, to be resolved is the propriety of the dismissal of LRC
Nos. 08-34 and 08-35 on the ground of res judicata.

5. It must be pointed out that LRC Nos. 08-34 and 08-35 praying that judgment be
rendered directing the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac to include petitioner's name,
those of her heirs and successors-in-interest as registered owners to the extent of
one-third of the lands covered by TCT Nos. 375657and 375658, were predicated on
the theory43 that Section 108 of PD 1529 is a mode of directly attacking the
certificates of title issued to the Bagayas brothers. On the contrary, however, the
Court observes that the amendment of TCT Nos. 375657 and 375658 under Section
108 of PD 1529 is actually not the direct attack on said certificates of title
contemplated under Section 4844 of the same law. Jurisprudence instructs that an
action or proceeding is deemed to be an attack on a certificate of title when its
objective is to nullify the same, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which
the certificate of title was decreedCorollary thereto, it is a well-known doctrine that
the issue as to whether the certificate of title was procured by falsification or fraud
can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose. As explicated
in Borbajo v. Hidden View Homeowners, Inc.

6. In fact, based on settled jurisprudence, Section 108 of PD 1529 is limited only to

seven instances or situations, namely: (a) when registered interests of any
description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated
and ceased; (b) when new interests have arisen or been created which do not
appear upon the certificate; (c) when any error, omission or mistake was made in
entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate;
(d) when the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; (e) when the
registered owner has been married, or, registered as married, the marriage has been
terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (f)
when a corporation, which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not
conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; and (g) when there is
reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title

7. Petitioner claims that the determination of the RTC in Civil Case No.04-42 that she
is an adopted child and that the signature of her adoptive mother Eligia in the deed
of absolute sale transferring the subject land to Rogelio and Orlando was forged
amounts to a new interest that should be reflected on the certificates of title of said
land, or provides a reasonable ground for the amendment thereof.

8. First. While the RTC may have made a definitive ruling on petitioner's adoption,
as well as the forgery of Eligia's signature on the questioned deed, no partition was
decreed, as the action was, in fact, dismissed. Consequently, the declaration that
petitioner is the legally adopted child of Maximino and Eligia did not amount to a
declaration of heirship and co-ownership upon which petitioner may institute an
action for the amendment of the certificates of title covering the subject land. More
importantly, the Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in an ordinary civil action, for matters relating to the rights
of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of determining such rights

Second. Petitioner cannot avail of the summary proceedings under Section 108 of
PD 1529 because the present controversy involves not the amendment of the
certificates of title issued in favor of Rogelio and Orlando but the partition of the
estate of Maximino and Eligia who are both deceased. As held in Philippine Veterans
Bank v. Valenzuela,50 the prevailing rule is that proceedings under Section 108 of
PD 1529 are summary in nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of
mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not controversial issues.51Relief
under said legal provision can only be granted if there is unanimity among the
parties, or hat there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party
in interest.

In fine, while LRC Nos. 08-34 and 08-35 are technically not barred by the prior
judgment in Civil Case No. 04- 42 as they involve different causes of action, the
dismissal of said petitions for the amendment of TCT Nos.375657 and 375658 is
nonetheless proper for reasons discussed above. The remedy then of petitioner is to
institute intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouses Maximino and Eligia.
On Parental Authority

Tamargo v. CA

In 1981, Sps. Rapisura filed a petition to adopt 10 year old Adelberto Bundoc. A
year later, on October 1982, Adelberto shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle
causing injuries that led to her death. The adoption petition was
granted on November 1982.
A civil complaint for damages was filed against Sps. Bundoc [Adelbertos
natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the incident] by Jennifers
adopting parent, Macario, as well as her natural parents, Sps. Tamargo. Criminal
information for homicide through reckless imprudence was
filed against Adelberto, but he was acquitted and exempted from criminal
liability since he acted without discernment.
Sps. Bundoc claim that Sps. Rapisura [adopting parents] are the
indispensable parties to the action since parental authorities shifted to the
latter from the moment the petition for adoption was filed. However, Sps.
Tamargo claim that parental authority of Sps. Bundoc had not ceased nor been
relinquished by the filing and granting of the petition since Adelberto was then
living with his natural parents.
RTC dismissed Sps. Tamargos complaint and ruled that Sps. Bundoc
were not indispensable parties to the action. CA dismissed Sps. Tamargos
petition, since they lost their right to appeal.

ISSUE: Who should be responsible for the tortuous act of the minor Adelberto, his
natural parents or adopting parents?

PARENTAL LIABILITY UNDER VICARIOUS LIABILITY OR IMPUTED

NEGLIGENCE
Law imposes civil liability upon father (or mother, if father is dead or
incapacitated) for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who
lives with them [NCC 2180]
A person is not only liable for torts he committed, but also for torts
committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom
he is responsible
Cangco cited to explain basis for doctrine of vicarious liability
Legislature elected to limit extra-contractual liability to cases in
which moral culpability can be directly imputed to persons to be
charged; failure to exercise due care in ones own acts, selecting,
controlling agents or servants, controlling persons who, by reason
of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to
the person made liable for their conduct
Civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents
commits a tortious act, the parents were negligent in the performance of
 their legal and natural duty to closely supervise the child who is in
their custody and control Parental liability anchored upon parental
authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction(willful negligence)
in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority

SPS. BUNDOC [NATURAL PARENTS] WERE INDISPENSABLE PARTIES TO THE

ACTION
Adelbertos voluntary act of shooting Jennifer gave rise to a cause of action
on quasi-delict against him [NCC 2176]
Shooting occurred when parental authority was still lodged in Sps.
Bundoc [natural parents], so they are the indispensable parties to the
action since they had actual custody of Adelberto
Court did not give credence to the following contentions / legal bases of
Sps. Bundoc
PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code), Article 36 Decree of
adoption shall be entered, which shall be effective as of the date the
original petition was filed
PD 603, Article 39 An effect of adoption is the dissolution of the
authority vested in the natural parents
Courts legal bases
PD 603, Article 58 TortsParents and guardians are responsible
for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in
accordance with the Civil Code
FC 221 Parents [] exercising parental authority shall be civilly
liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of
their unemancipated children living in their company []

NO PRESUMPTION OF PARENTAL DERELICTION ON THE PART OF THE

ADOPTING PARENTS COULD HAVE ARISEN SINCE ADELBERTO WAS NOT
SUBJECT TO THEIR CONTROL AT THE TIME THE TORT WAS COMMITTED
PD 603, Article 58 provides that parental authority is provisionally vested
in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody because the
adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such period
In this case, trial custody period had NOT YET BEGUN or had NOT YET
BEEN COMPLETED at the time of the shooting; in any case, actual
custody was then with his NATURAL PARENTS
PETITION GRANTED; CA DECISION REVERSED AND SET ASIDE; CASE
REMANDED TO RTC
Rescission of Adoption, Sec. 19

Lahom v. Sibulo

FACTS:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In
1972, the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil
Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that,
despite the her pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their
surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities. Prior to
the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new statute
deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section
19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of
care and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to
rescind the decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When
Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A.
8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein
it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be
subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the
adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter
after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the
adopters action prescribed.

RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the
law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the
effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption
granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right
of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of
adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom
after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is
subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the
adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that
period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that
could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are
considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute,
unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is
a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a
present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against
arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a
"right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by
statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on
what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters
relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify
the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action
given by a statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.

But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for
valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an
undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may
expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
XII. SUPPORT

B. Who are obliged to provide support

Pelayo v Lauron

FACTS
Pelayo (plaintiff); Lauron et al (Defendant-Appellees)
Pelayo, a physician, filed a complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana
Abella.
Pelayo rendered medical assistance to the defendants daughter-in-law who
was about to give birth.
Just and equitable services rendered by him was 500 pesos with costs, in
which the defendants refused to pay.
Defendants argued that their daughter-in-law died after the childbirth and
when she was alive, she lived with her husband independently without any
relation with them, and that her stay with the defendants was coincidental
when she gave birth.
Defendants were absolved from the complaint for the lack of sufficient
evidence.

ISSUE
Who is bound to pay the bill, whether the father and mother-in-law of the
patient, or the husband of the latter?

HELD
Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined
in the code or special laws are the only demandable ones (art 1090)
Rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the
mutual obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual support.
Spouses are mutually bound to support each other; if either of them needs
medical assistance for illness, the other is under the unavoidable obligation
to furnish the necessary services.
PERSON BOUND TO PAY is the husband of the patient and not her father and
mother-in-law.
Obligation of the husband to support his wife, as established by the law, is
unavoidable.
Defendants were not under any obligation to pay the fees claimed.
Father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the obligation that
devolves upon the husband to provide support.
Sanchez vs Zulueta

Facts:

Plaintiffs, Josefa Diego and Mario Sanchez are the wife and child of the
Defendant, Feliciano Sanchez who refused and continues to refuse to support the
plaintiff for the reason that he has no means of subsistence despite being a recipient
of a monthly pension from the US Army and has left them without any justifiable
cause and now refuses to allow them to live with him. The defendant contends that
it was the plaintiff who left the conjugal dwelling as the latter committed adultery
with a Macario Sanchez and with whom she had an illicit affair and bore a child who
is the other plaintiff in this case. The plaintiff asks the court to compel the defendant
to give them allowance by way of support pendent lite the amount of P50 a month.
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and ordered defendant to pay support
pendent lite in the amount of P50 a month. The defendant filed a petition for
prohibition againt the judge in the CFI in the court of appeals which denied said
petition hence defendant appeal to this court.

Issue:Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to support

Held:No the plaintiffs are not entitled to support.

RULING:

Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support
(Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil., 285). Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense
that it is the fruit of such adulterous relations, for in that case; it would not be the
child of the defendant and, hence, would not be entitled to support as such. But as
this defense should be established, and not merely alleged, it would be unavailing if
proof thereof is not permitted.
De Asis v. CA
FACTS:

Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action in 1988
for maintenance and support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis who failed to
provide support and maintenance despite repeated demands. Vircel later on
withdrew the complaint in 1989 for the reason that Manuel denied paternity of the
said minor and due to such denial, it seems useless to pursue the said action. They
mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint with the condition that
Manuel will not pursue his counter claim. However in 1995, Vircel filed a similar
complaint against the alleged father, this time as the minors legal
guardian/mother. Manuel interposed maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of the
case. He maintained that since the obligation to give support is based on existence
of paternity between the child and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to
claim support.

ISSUE: WON the minor is barred from action for support.

HELD:

The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third
person. The original agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial complaint
was in the nature of a compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by
law. With respect to Manuels contention for the lack of filial relationship between
him and the child and agreement of Vircel in not pursuing the original claim, the
Court held that existence of lack thereof of any filial relationship between parties
was not a matter which the parties must decide but should be decided by the Court
itself. While it is true that in order to claim support, filiation or paternity must be
first shown between the parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially
established and declaration is vested in the Court. It cannot be left to the will or
agreement of the parties. Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of another
action asking for the same relief (no force and effect). Furthermore, the defense of
res judicata claimed by Manuel was untenable since future support cannot be the
subject of any compromise or waiver.
Rondina v. People (No digest huhu)

Sadly, this is yet another case of a lass pitilessly stripped of her innocence.

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner Victor Rondina (Victor) assails
the Decision1 dated July 24, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00185 which affirmed with modification the Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Ormoc City, Branch 35 in Criminal Case No. 5548-0 finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

Factual Antecedents

On March 29, 1999, the City Prosecution Office of Ormoc City filed with

the RTC an Information3 charging Victor as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of July 1998, at around 4:00 oclock in the afternoon,
at "DDD", [Ormoc City], and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused: VICTOR RONDINA, being then armed with a knife and by
means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge [of] the complainant herein, "AAA"4 - a sixteen
(16) year old lass, against her will.5

On arraignment, Victor pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged.6 Pre-trial and trial
thereafter ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

In 1998, "AAA" was a young girl of 16 who was in second year high school. The
youngest and the only girl among a brood of four, she lived with her parents and
siblings in a rented house located in "DDD," Ormoc City.

On July 15, 1998, "AAA," upon arriving home from school at around 4:00 p.m.,
immediately proceeded to the toilet to defecate. The said toilet, constructed of
hollow blocks with G.I.-sheet roofing, had only a tie-wire as lock. It was located
outside "AAAs" house and was being used as a communal toilet by the occupants of
nearby houses.

Once inside, "AAA" immediately took off her panty and relieved herself, forgetting to
lock the door.7 After washing her anus, "AAA" was surprised when Victor, a
neighbor, suddenly entered the toilet with only a towel covering himself from the
waist down. Victor immediately removed the towel from his waist as well as his
brief. He then poked a knife on "AAAs" neck, covered her mouth and threatened her
by saying "[d]ont ever tell anybody otherwise I will kill your parents, your siblings
including yourself."8 Because her mouth was covered, "AAA" was not able to shout.9

Victor ordered "AAA" to stand against the wall with her hands on both sides10 and
forcefully inserted his penis into "AAAs" vagina.11 "AAA" felt pain.12 After a while,
she felt a liquid-like substance discharged from Victors penis.13When Victor had
already satisfied his bestial desire, he again wrapped the towel around his
waist14 and before getting out of the toilet uttered "do not tell your mother or else I
will kill you."15

"AAA" did not immediately tell anyone of her misfortune and just kept on crying.
However, it came to the point where she could no longer keep silent so that a few
months after the incident, "AAA" finally told her mother "BBB" that Victor raped
her.16

When "BBB" had "AAA" examined by physicians, it was discovered that aside from
having healed hymenal lacerations, "AAA" was more or less six months
pregnant, viz:

OB-GYNE NOTES no fresh lacerations.

G1 P0 LMP July, 1998 (1st hymen with healed

week) lacerations at the 3 oclock,

EDC April, 1999 (2nd week) 5 oclock and 9 o clock

positions
Abdomen soft, uterus
palpable with fundal height of Vaginal opening admits two
23 cms. examining fingers freely

Fetal heart tone not Pelvic Ultrasound Result:

appreciated Single live intrauterine
pregnancy with
Quickening noted December,
1998 mean AOG of 24 weeks and 2
days by BPD
Visual Vulva Examination
pubic hair - present and FL.17

no inflammations - noted.

Hence, Victor was charged with the crime of rape. During the pendency of the
proceedings and after about nine months from the date of the alleged incident,
"AAA" gave birth to a baby girl, "CCC," on May 1, 1999.

Version of the Defense

Victor interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He averred that he could not have
raped "AAA" at 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of July 15, 1998 because during that
time, he was in a cockpit in Brgy. Macabug, Ormoc City. He went there at 2:00 p.m.
with Alex Oliveros (Alex) and Ruben Bertulfo.18 He could still very well remember
the cockfight on that particular day as same was held because of the approaching
fiesta of Macabug on July 25 and also because he won. He even gave part of his
winnings to Alex for the latter to spend on his birthday.19 It was already around 5:30
p.m. when Victor and his companions left Macabug. From Macabug, he and Alex
headed to the public market of Ormoc City and bought viand.20 After that, the two of
them went to their respective homes. Victor arrived home at around 6:00 p.m.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

With two conflicting versions before it, the RTC declared the issue to be one of
credibility, that is, whether "AAAs" claim that she was raped by Victor vis--vis the
latters denial and alibi, is credible, convincing and satisfactory as to hold the latter
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.21

In resolving the case, the court held that the prosecution was able to duly establish
all the elements of rape. It gave much credence to "AAAs" testimony since it
observed that the latter, despite some inconsistencies in her testimony during trial,
narrated her travails at the hands of Victor in an earnest, spontaneous and
straightforward manner. She was able to give all the core elements of rape in her
narration. As to the inconsistencies, the RTC chose to brush them aside as it found
them to be minor inconsistencies which only tend to bolster rather than weaken the
rape victims credibility as they show that her testimony was not contrived.22 The
RTC then declared itself convinced that the prosecution, by its own evidence, was
able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, the
dispositive portion of its Judgment23 dated June 7, 2000:

WHEREFORE, after considering all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Victor
Rondina GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as charged in the
information and, accordingly, without any finding as to mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of Forty (40) years
reclusion perpetua, to pay the offended party the sum of 75,000.00 as indemnity,
50,000.00 as moral damages, and costs; also to acknowledge the offspring [CCC]
and to give her support.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.24

Victor filed a Notice of Appeal25 which was granted by the RTC in its

Order26 of June 28, 2000. After the elevation of the records of the case, this Court
accepted the appeal on February 21, 2001.27 Conformably, however, with the Courts
ruling in People v. Mateo,28 the case was subsequently transferred to the CA for
appropriate action and disposition.29

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In his brief,30 Victor averred that the RTC should not have given full faith and
credence to "AAAs" testimony for the following reasons: (1) "AAA" reported the
crime only after five months from its alleged occurrence; (2) the rape could not have
been committed in the said toilet because of the presence of the occupants of nearby
houses; (3) it was unimaginable and improbable to commit the rape in the manner
and position narrated by "AAA"; (4) "AAAs" testimony was full of inconsistencies;
and (5) "AAA" was impelled by other motive in filing the charge against him.

The CA, however, found no compelling reason to depart from the RTCs ruling. Aside
from reducing the award of civil indemnity from 75,000.00 to 50,000.00, it
affirmed the trial courts judgment in all other respects in a Decision31 dated July 24,
2007, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, except for the MODIFICATION in the award of

civil indemnity as aforementioned, the trial courts Decision dated June 7, 2000 is
hereby AFFIRMED as to all other respects.

SO ORDERED.32

Hence, Victor comes to this Court to seek a reversal of his conviction.

Assignment of Errors

Victor ascribes upon the lower courts the following errors:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals and the Honorable Regional Trial Court
committed serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion when it did not
apply the ruling of this Honorable Supreme Court in PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. CRISPIN T. RUALES [G.R. No. 149810, August 28, 2003] to
the effect that due to the nature of the crime of rape where only two persons
are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized
with extreme caution and that the evidence for the prosecution must stand
or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.

2. The Honorable Court of Appeals and the Honorable Regional Trial Court
committed serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion when it did not
apply the ruling of this Honorable Supreme Court in PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. APAT [114 SCRA 620] which ruling is squarely applicable to
the facts in the present case;
 3. The Honorable Court of Appeals and the Honorable Regional Trial Court
committed serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion when it
declared that the petitioner x x x failed to show any improper motive on the
part of the private complainant, which would have prompted the latter to file
false claims against the petitioner;

4. The Honorable Court of Appeals and the Honorable Regional Trial Court
committed serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion when it merely
brushed aside the alibi of the petitioner not taking into account that while
alibi may be considered a weak defense, such alibi could work to exculpate
the petitioner as such alibi is the truth and is sufficiently corroborated;

5. The Honorable Court of Appeals and the Honorable Regional Trial Court
committed serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion when it
rendered and affirmed a judgment of conviction despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.33

Our Ruling

The petition is devoid of merit.

The lower courts did not err in giving full faith and credence to "AAAs" testimony.

Victor avers that the lower courts, in resolving the case, failed to apply the Courts
pronouncement in People v. Ruales,34 viz;

In deciding rape cases, we have been guided by the following well-established

principles: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove
but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) due to
the nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.35

The Court had consistently acknowledged that "[a]t the core of almost all rape cases,
the credibility of the victims testimony is crucial in view of the intrinsic nature of
the crime where only the participants therein can testify to its occurrence."36 Hence,
"the testimony of the complainant must be examined with extreme care for, whether
the case results in conviction or in acquittal, the final outcome would almost
invariably be dependent on what the victim declares and on how she has stood and
comported herself at the witness stand during questioning."37

We have carefully examined the records of this case and hold that the lower courts
did not commit reversible error in according superior weight to "AAAs" testimony.
It is worthy to note that before "AAA" was put on the witness stand, the RTC
directed the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to cause her to
be subjected to a psychological examination.38 This was due to the prosecutions
claim that "AAA" was then emotionally unstable. In compliance therewith, the
DSWD submitted to the court the result of the Psychiatric Evaluation and Mental
Status Examination39 performed upon "AAA" indicating that she was suffering from
organic brain disease which is mental retardation. She could, however, undergo trial
albeit with assistance because of her sub-average general intellectual functioning.40

Notwithstanding "AAAs" mental condition, the Court notes that she was still able to
recount the details of her traumatic experience in a credible, convincing and
straightforward manner and therefore her testimony bears the ring of truth. She
testified as follows:

Q: You said that you were already Q: Where [did] this incident [take]
inside the toilet, what did you do place[,] his insertion of his penis into
inside? your vagina?

A: I defecated. A: Inside the toilet.

xxxx Q: What was your position when he

inserted his penis [into] your female
Q: While you were inside what organ?
happened?
A: He made me lean against the wall.
A: He inserted his penis [into] my
vagina. Q: You mean to say that you were in
the standing position?
Q: To whom are you referring the
pronoun "he"? A: Yes, sir.

A: Victor. Q: Did you not resist x x x the sexual

advances of the accused.
Q: Are you referring to the accused in
this case Victor Rondina? A: I resist[ed].

A: Yes, sir. Q: In what manner?

Q: Are you telling us that he went A: He told me, "do not kuan because
inside the toilet? [youre still young and Im old"].

A: Yes, sir. Q: What do you mean by saying the

word "dont"?
xxxx
A: What I mean is that, when I was in
the toilet, I was poked with a knife and
I was not able to shout because my
mouth was covered.
Q: In what part of your body was the
knife being poked?
A: In my neck. (And the witness
pointed to [the] left side of her neck.)
Q: Did you see the weapon.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you please describe to us the
length and the size of the weapon?
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness estimated the length at
about 5 inches.
Q: That excludes the handle?
A: It does not.
Q: So that size consist[s] only of the
blade?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did he say anything when he poked
the knife in your neck?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Would you recall what [were] the
utterances made by the accused?
A: "Dont you ever tell anybody
otherwise I will kill your parents, your
siblings including yourself."41
xxxx
Q: While his male organ was inside
yours, what else did he do?
A: That is what Ive told you sir, that
he told me that [once] you tell
anybody Ill kill your parents.
xxxx
Q: What did you notice from his penis
if any?
A: [Felt] different.
xxxx
Q: Was there anything that you [felt]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What?
A: He inserted his penis [into] my
vagina and there was some kind of
"apple-apple" or a liquid like
substance.
Q: What did you do [in] that instance
that his penis was inside your female
organ?
A: It [felt] so different for me.
Q: Did you like it?
A: No sir.
Q: Did you feel pain?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After youve noticed that he had
already ejaculated, what else did he
do?
A: When he was about to get out, he
said that "do not tell your mother or
else I will kill you.42
When asked by the trial court to
demonstrate her position during the
alleged sexual intercourse, "AAA" even
readily made a physical illustration of
the same:
is the wall of the toilet. Illustrate how
you were standing at the time that you
were sexually molested.
COURT INTERPRETER:

Q: You were in the straight standing The witness illustrate[s] to the Court
position during the alleged sexual by standing [with] her back leaning
intercourse? against the wall with hands on both
sides.
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: Were you not in a squatting
Q: [As a] preliminary to the ocular position?
inspection, the Court would like you to
make the physical illustration as to A: No your honor, I just position[ed]
your position. This is now [the] wall of myself like this. (As the witness earlier
the courtroom, imagine that, that wall demonstrated to the Court).43
With her intelligence level, it is hard to believe that her testimony had been
rehearsed as Victor would want to put it. If such was the case, "AAAs" testimony
would have eventually fallen apart. However, as shown above and except for a few
minor inconsistencies and some difficulty in understanding the questions
propounded to her,44 "AAA" was still able to testify with definiteness on the material
details of her harrowing experience at the hands of Victor.

Victor avers that the manner in which the rape was committed, as narrated by
"AAA," defies imagination, is incredible and contrary to human experience. He calls
attention to "AAAs" testimony during cross examination that his left hand was
covering her mouth while his right hand was poking the knife at her the entire
duration of the alleged sexual intercourse. Given the circumstances, Victor implies
that it was improbable for him to penetrate "AAAs" vagina in a standing position
considering that his two hands, as testified to by "AAA," were not free and that
"AAA" was moving to resist the penetration. Victor thus invokes the case of People v.
Apat45 where the Court pronounced as follows:

3. The manner by which the appellant allegedly raped Gregoria, as narrated by her,
defies the imagination. It may hardly be envisioned how a man can successfully
consummate the sexual act on an unwilling woman with his left hand placed over
her mouth (supposedly to prevent her from shouting for help) and with his right
hand x x x holding a hunting knife pointed at the womans forehead and, while so
positioned, was able to manage to remove the pantie of the woman, spread her legs,
unbutton his short pants, and perform the sexual intercourse.46

Victor likewise cites the following inconsistencies in "AAAs" testimony: (1) "AAA"
stated in her direct examination that on the day of the alleged rape, she came home
from school at 4:00 p.m. On cross examination, however, she testified that she just
stayed home the whole day; and (2) in "AAAs" Affidavit47 executed on January 29,
1999, she stated that Victor was wearing shorts when he entered the toilet and that
it was the latter who took off her underwear. But later on direct examination, she
claimed that she was the one who removed her underwear and that Victor was
wearing a towel and a brief. Despite all these, the lower courts still chose to treat
"AAAs" testimony as gospel truth instead of considering her irreconcilable
contradictions as sufficient grounds to create doubt in Victors favor.

We have gone over the records and observed that both on cross and re-cross
examinations, "AAA" answered "yes" when asked by the defense counsel if at the
time Victor inserted his penis into her vagina, he was also covering her mouth with
one hand and poking a knife on her neck with the other.48 In re-direct examination,
however, "AAA" testified as follows:

Q: You told us earlier that you tried to COURT

keep on moving while the accused
inserted his penis into your vagina if to the witness
only to prevent [him] from
penetrating you, is that correct? Q: In what manner did he [insert] his
penis? Did he [use] his hands or what?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: If you keep on moving, how is it
that he was able to penetrate you? Q: Which hand did he [use] if you can
recall?
A: He really penetrate[d] it and he
insert[ed] it. A: Left.

Q: Easily or forcefully? Q: Does it mean that his left hand was

holding his penis in guiding it towards
A: Forcefully.49 the inside of your vagina?

Upon inquiry by the Court, "AAA" A: Yes, your Honor.50

answered:
From AAAs testimony, it can be inferred that the covering of the mouth, the poking
of the knife and the insertion of Victors penis into her vagina were all happening at
almost the same time. Hence, it is not difficult to understand why "AAA" answered
"yes" when asked by the defense counsel if Victor was covering her mouth and
poking a knife at her neck when he inserted his penis into her vagina. Moreover,
"[r]ape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For
such an offense is not analogous to a persons achievement or accomplishment as to
be worth recalling or reliving; rather, it is something which causes deep
psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for
life and which her conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a
rape victim cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an accurate
account of the traumatic and horrifying experience she had undergone."51 In this
case, "AAA" was just 16 years old when she was cruelly abused by Victor. She was
also later found possessed of low level intelligence. A fortiori, we must "accord to
her greater understanding, consideration, and sensitivity as she relives, through her
testimony, her harrowing [experience] at [Victors] hands."52 This also goes true
with respect to the inconsistencies pointed out by Victor, which the Court finds too
flimsy and trivial to merit serious consideration.53 To reiterate, it is not unnatural to
find minor discrepancies in the testimony of a rape victim as she cannot be expected
to remember every minute detail of her ordeal. 54

Furthermore, "AAAs" testimony is corroborated by the doctors findings that she

was pregnant and that her hymen has healed lacerations at 3 oclock, 5 oclock and 9
oclock positions. Dr. Ma. Esperanza S. Agudo testified that these lacerations could
have been caused by sexual intercourse.55 "Where a rape victims testimony is
corroborated by the physical findings of penetration, there is sufficient basis for
concluding that sexual intercourse did take place."56

Thus, there being no compelling reason to deviate from the lower courts
appreciation of "AAAs" testimony, the Court gives deference to the well-settled rule
"that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best
undertaken by a trial court, whose findings are binding and conclusive on appellate
courts. Matters affecting credibility are best left to the trial court because of its
unique opportunity to observe the elusive and incommunicable evidence of that
witness deportment on the stand while testifying, an opportunity denied to the
appellate courts which usually rely on the cold pages of the silent records of the
case."57

Victors imputation of ill motive on the part of "AAA" and her family deserves scant
consideration.

Victor contends that "AAA" and her family harbored a grudge against him.

He claims that "AAAs" family, who used to rent the house owned by the aunt of
Victors wife, was made to vacate the same so that his family could occupy it instead.
And as the pleas of "AAAs" family to continue occupying the house were ignored,
charges were filed against him.

The Court, however, is unconvinced.

"Motives such as family feuds, resentment, hatred or revenge have never swayed
this Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a rape victim. Also, ill
motives become inconsequential if there is an affirmative and credible declaration
from the rape victim, which clearly establishes the liability of the accused. In the
present case, "AAA" categorically identified [Victor] as the one who defiled her. Her
account of the incident, as found by the RTC, the Court of Appeals, and this Court,
was sincere and truthful. Hence, petitioners x x x flimsy allegation of ill motive is
immaterial." 58
Besides, it is difficult to believe that "AAAs" family would stoop so low as to subject
her to physical hardship and disgrace that usually accompany the prosecution of
rape just to relieve hurt feelings. Indeed, it is highly inconceivable that any family
would willfully and deliberately corrupt the innocent mind of its minor member and
put into her lips the lewd description of a carnal act just to satisfy a personal grudge
or anger against the accused.59

Victors alibi cannot prevail over "AAAs" positive identification of him as her rapist.

Victor contends that the lower courts erred in brushing aside his defense of alibi on
the sole ground that it is inherently weak. He avers that proving that he was not at
the place of the alleged incident when it happened is the most plausible defense
against the charges hurled upon him. Besides, his alibi that he was in Brgy. Macabug,
Ormoc City at the time of the alleged rape is corroborated by the testimony of Alex,
who was with him during that time.

"In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, two requisites must concur: first, the
appellant was at a different place at the time the crime was committed, and second,
it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of its
commission."60 In this case, the second requisite is not met. Victor himself testified
that the distance between Brgy. Macabug and the place where the rape occurred is
just three to four kilometers and that the same can be traversed by land
transportation in just a few minutes.61 Hence, it was not physically impossible for
him to be at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime. Also, even if
Victors alibi is corroborated by Alex, said defense is still unworthy of belief. Alex
admitted that Victor was his employer62 and that he was testifying for Victor as he
relied on him for livelihood.63 "[I]t has been held that alibi becomes more unworthy
of merit where it is established mainly by the accused himself and his or her
relatives, friends, and comrades-in-arms and not by credible persons."64

Moreover and most importantly, "denial and alibi are practically worthless against
the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses, especially by the rape
victim." Victors weak alibi cannot thus overcome "AAAs" positive identification of
him as her rapist.

The lower courts did not err in convicting Victor of the crime of rape.

All told, we hold that neither did the RTC err in finding Victor guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape nor did the CA in affirming said conviction. As
aptly declared by the appellate court, the prosecution has sufficiently established
that Victor had carnal knowledge of "AAA" against her will and consent. We
subscribe to the same.

Damages awarded
The CA was correct in reducing the award of civil indemnity from 75,000.00 to
50,000.00. "In cases of simple rape as in this case, civil indemnity of 50,000.00 is
automatically awarded without need of pleading or proof."66

However, we note that the both the RTC and the CA failed to make an award for
exemplary damages. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. "Exemplary damages
are intended to serve as deterrent to serious wrongdoings, as a vindication of undue
sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured, or as punishment for
those guilty of outrageous conduct. Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages
can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also
where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous
conduct of the offender."67 Here, Victor raped a minor, "AAA," with the use of a knife,
threatened to kill her and her family if she tells them of her ordeal, and even got her
pregnant. Victor should therefore pay AAA exemplary damages in the amount of
30,000.00 in line with existing jurisprudence.68 Also, interest at the rate of 6% per
annum is imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid.69

Support of the offspring "CCC"

The RTC ordered Victor to acknowledge "AAAs" offspring "CCC" and give her
support. "Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three different kinds of
civil liability that may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b)
acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing,
and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code,
the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal
fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children.
Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the
mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion
perpetua automatically loses the power to exercise parental authority over his
children, no further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides
for the childs status. Hence, [Victor] should only be ordered to indemnify and
support the victims child."70 "The amount [and terms] of support shall be
determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article
20171 of the Family Code."72

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 24, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00185 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:

1) Petitioner Victor Rondina is ordered to pay "AAA" 30,000.00 as

exemplary damages.

2) Interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all the damages

awarded in this case from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
 3) Petitioner Victor Rondina is further ordered to give support to "AAAs"
offspring, "CCC," in such amount and under such terms to be determined by
the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City in a proper proceeding with support
arrears to be reckoned from the finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

PERLA V BARING
FACTS:
Respondents Mirasol Baring and her son, Randy, alleged that the former lived
with Antonio as his common-law wife. As a result of such cohabitation, Randy
was born on November 11, 2983. Antonio then landed a job as a seaman and
abandoned them, failing to provide support to Randy. Thus, the respondent
prayed that Antonio be ordered to support Randy.
Antonio answered that he is now married and has a family, denying having
fathered Randy. He did admit to knowing and having sexual relations with
Mirasol, but he contested that Mirasol never became his common-law wife
nor was she treated as such.
Randys Certificate of live birth and Baptismal Certificate were presented
indicating that Mirasol and Antonio were the parents. It is claimed that it was
Antonio himself who supplied his name and birthplace after Erlinda Balmori,
the hilot who assisted in Mirasols delivery of Randy. Mirasol further claimed
that it was Erlinda who supplied the date and place of the marriage so that
the latter can file the birth certificate.
Randy took the stand to testify that: 1.) he knew Antonio to be the husband of
his mother; 2.) the first time he met Antonio was in the house of his aunt
(Antonios sister), and that during the said encounter, he referred to Antonio
as Papa, kissing his hand and sharing a hug after; 3.) Antonio promised to
support him; and 4.) his aunt, Antonios sister, treated him as family.
Antonio, testifying for himself, denied having courted Mirasol, because
during that period which Mirasol claims to have been courted by him, he was
studying in Iloilo City as shown by his diploma. He claimed to have had sex
with Mirasol but only once which was more than 9 months way before
Randys birth. Moreover, he averred that the first time he met Randy was
when he was already being charged by Mirasol with abandonment, asking for
support. Prior to that, neither Mirasol nor Mirasols sister told him about the
child.
Furthermore, Antonio testified that there were several inaccuracies in
Randys Certificate of Live birth such as the error in his middle initial and
that he is not a protestant and a labourer as indicated in the said certificate.
RTC and CA ruled in favour of Mirasol. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N Randy is entitled to support from Antonio.

HELD: NO
 The respondents claim for support is based on Randys alleged illegitimate
filiation to Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation
must be established with sufficient certainty. A review of the Decision of RTC
would show that it is bereft of any discussion regarding Randys filiation. The
lower Court erred in its ruling for counting the certified true copies of the
Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificates as Randys proof of
filiation despite the fact that the same documents do not bear Antonios
signature.
The proof of filiation are found in Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code.
The Court cannot also give credence to Mirasols claim that Antonio supplied
certain information through Erlinda as the respondents did not present
Erlinda to confirm the same. This is notwithstanding the fact that several
unexplained discrepancies in the documents in Antonios personal
circumstances are manifestations of Anotionios non-participation in the
documents preparation.
Randys testimony also failed to establish his illegitimate filiation. His stories
does not amount to his open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child under Art. 172. The article manifests that the action of the
father towards the illegitimate child must be of such a nature that they reveal
the conviction of paternity as well as the desire to have and treat the child in
all relations in society and in life continuously. Antonio never showed actions
towards Randy that could amount to an open and continuous possession of
Randys claim of illegitimate status.
Moreover, the Court cannot agree that Antonio fathered Randy just because
he admitted to having sexual relations with Mirasol. Randy was born on
November 11, 1983, and Mirasol was not able to prove that the sexual
relations happened during the period wherein Randys conception was
possible.
Source of Support

LERMA VS CA 61 SCRA 440

FACTS: Teodoro E. Lerma and Concepcion Diaz were married on May 19, 1951. On
August 22, 1969 the petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the respondent
and a certain Teodoro Ramirez and on September 26, 1972 the court of First
Instance of Rizal decided the adultery case of the respondent and found her and her
co-accused, Teodoro Ramirez, guilty of the charge, sentencing them to a term of
imprisonment. During the pendency of the adultery case against the respondent,
wife On November 18, 1969 the respondent filed with the lower court, a complaint
against the petitioner for legal separation and/or separation of properties, custody
of their children and support, with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for
her and their youngest son, Gregory, who was then and until now is in her custody.
The respondent's complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds:
concubinage and attempt against her life. The application for support pendente lite
was granted in an order dated December 24, 1969, which was amended in an order
dated February 15, 1970. The petitioner filed his opposition to the respondent's
application for support pendente lite, setting up as defense the adultery charge he
had filed against the respondent

On March 12, 1970 the petitioner filed with respondent Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the
aforementioned orders on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of
discretion. The next day the respondent court gave due course to the petition and
issued a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Judge Luciano from enforcing said
orders.

The respondent court, in its decision of October 8, 1970, set aside the assailed
orders and granted the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence before the
lower court in support of his defense against the application for support pendente
lite.

The respondent moved to reconsider the decision on the ground that the petitioner
had not asked that he be allowed to present evidence in the lower court. The
respondent court, in its resolution of January 20, 1971, set aside the decision of
October 8 and rendered another, dismissing the petition. This is now the subject of
the instant proceeding for review.

ISSUE: W/N the lower court acted with grave abused of discretion in granting the
respondents application for support pendente lite without giving the petitioner an
opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense against the said
application.
HELD: Court of Appeals January 20, 1971 resolution and the orders of respondent
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court herein complained of, dated December 24,
1969 and February 15, 1970, all are set aside and their enforcement enjoined,
without prejudice to such judgment as may be rendered in the pending action for
legal separation between the parties.

The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership
property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming
such right to live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which
states that after the filing of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be
entitled to live separately from each other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed
by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal
separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the
intendment of the law granting separate support. In fact under Article 303 of the
same Code the obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a
forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and
under Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse
has given cause for legal separation." The loss of the substantive right to support in
such a situation is incompatible with any claim for support pendente lite.

Reyes v. Ines-Luciano

Reyes v Ines-Luciano
February 28, 1979 | Fernandez
Petitioner: Manuel J.C. Reyes
Respondent: Hon. Leonor Ines-Luciano (Judge of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations
Court, QC), the Court of Appeals, Celia Ilustre-Reyes

DOCTRINE

Art. 61, FC. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses
shall be entitled to live separately from each other.
The Court, in absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall
designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute
community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed
by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian
under the Rules of Court.
 Art. 62, FC. During the pendency of the action for legal separation, the
provisions of Article 491 shall likewise apply to the support of the
spouses and the custody and support of the common children.

FACTS
1. Celia Ilustre-Reyes filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Quezon City a complaint against her husband Manuel J.C. Reyes for legal
separation on the ground that he had attempted to kill her:
a. 3/10/1976 he punched her, held her head, and bumped it several
times against the cement floor. He also pushed her at the stairway of
13 flights, and swung at her abdomen which got her half-unconscious.
It was her father who saved her.
b. He doused her with grape juice, kicked her several times, and was
saved this time by her driver.
2. She filed for support pendente lite2 for her and her 3 children. Manuel
opposed this by saying that his wife committed adultery with her
physician.

RTC
- Granted, P5000 per month (from June 1976) P4000
CA
- Dismissed Manuels petition for the annulment of the RTC order
- Manuel appears to be financially capable of giving the support

ISSUE: WON adultery can be used as a defense in an action for support YES,
QUALIFIED (not in this case)
RATIO
1. The alleged adultery must be established by competent evidence.
Adultery is a good defense if properly proved.
2. Manuel did not present any evidence to prove his allegation.
3. He still has the opportunity to adduce evidence on this alleged adultery when
the action for legal separation is heard on the merits before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of QC.

1 The Court shall provide for the support of the spouses, the support and custody of the
common children. Paramount considerations = moral and material welfare of the children,
their choice of parent
2 Pending the litigation; support to provide for the lower income spouse as the legal process moves

ahead
 4. However, it is doubtful whether adultery will affect her right to alimony
pendente lite she is asking for support to be taken from their conjugal
property, not Manuels personal funds.

ISSUE: WON in determining the amount of support it is enough that the Court
ascertain via affidavits or other documentary evidence YES
RATIO
1. Mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for support
pendent lite; it is enough that the facts be established by affidavits/other
documentary evidence.
2. Celia submitted documents that the corporations controlled by Manuel
have entered into multi-million contracts in projects of the Ministry of
Public Highways.

Order of Support

MANGONON V. CA

FACTS:
1) On 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were
civilly married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City,
Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent
Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the
required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11
August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

2) 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their

marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to
petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon,
raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned
them.

3) Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America
(USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband,
had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of
Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island
University and Western New England College. Despite their admissions to
said universities, Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of
pursuing collegiate education because of the following:
a) The average annual cost for college education in the US is
about US$22,000/year or a total of US$44,000.00, more or
less, for both Rica and Rina
 b) Rica and Rina need general maintenance support each in
the amount of US$3,000.00 per year or a total of US$6,000
per year.

c) Unfortunately, petitioners monthly income from her 2 jobs

is merely US$1,200 after taxes which she can hardly give
general support to Rica and Rina, much less their required
college educational support.

d) Neither can petitioners present husband be compelled to

share in the general support and college education of Rica
and Rina since he has his own son with petitioner and own
daughter (also in college) to attend to.

e) Worse, Rica and Rinas petitions for Federal Student Aid

have been rejected by the U.S.
Department of Education.

4) On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her

then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy
and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati
5) Petitioner averred that demands were made upon Federico and the latters
father, Francisco, for general support and for the payment of the required
college education of Rica and Rina. The twin sisters even exerted efforts to
work out a settlement concerning these matters with respondent Federico
and respondent Francisco, the latter being generally known to be financially
well-off.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, respondent Francisco Delgado be held liable for her
granddaughters educational support

HELD:
ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall
devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.

There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent
Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are
primarily charged to support their childrens college education but being restricted
by their financial income- respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of
Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their
parents, it having been established that respondent Francisco has the financial
means to support his granddaughters education.

Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the
obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the
family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative
cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.

The obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to
give support. Respondent Francisco and Federicos claim that they have the option
under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to support Rica and
Rina, respondent Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should move here to the
Philippines to study in any of the local universities. Thus, he may give the
determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay in
the family dwelling. This option cannot be availed of in this case since there are
circumstances, legal or moral, between respondent and petitioner which should be
considered.

Respondent Francisco is held liable for half of the amount of school expenses
incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As established by petitioner,
respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given his
various business endeavors, thus the amount of support should be proportionate to
the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals fixing the amount of support pendente
lite to P5,000.00 for Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel, are hereby MODIFIED in that
respondent Francisco Delgado is hereby held liable for support pendente lite in the
amount to be determined by the trial court pursuant to this Decision.

**Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done with their
education by the time of the promulgation of this decision, we deem it proper to
award support pendente lite in arrears to be computed from the time they entered
college until they had finished their respective studies.

NOTES:
Rich Lolo
(respondent Francisco is the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of
Directors of Citadel Commercial, Incorporated, which owns and manages twelve
gasoline stations, substantial real estate, and is engaged in shipping, brokerage and
freight forwarding. He is also the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of
Directors of Citadel Shipping which does business with Hyundai of Korea. Apart
from these, he also owns the Citadel Corporation which, in turn, owns real
properties in different parts of the country. He is likewise the Chairman of the Board
of Directors of Isla Communication Co. and he owns shares of stocks of Citadel
Holdings. In addition, he owns real properties here and abroad. )
** What is SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE

SECTION 1. Application.- At the commencement of the proper action or proceeding,

or at any time prior to the judgment or final order, a verified application for support
pendente lite may be filed by any party stating the grounds for the claim and the
financial conditions of both parties, and accompanied by affidavits, depositions or
other authentic documents in support thereof.

Spouses Prudencio and Filomena Lim vs. Ma. Cheryl S. Lim, et. al.

Facts: In 1979, Cheryl married Edward, son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward
three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl,
Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati
City, together with Edwards ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband
Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edwards family business, which provided him with a
monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady
source of income.

On October 14, 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the
children with her (then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom
she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described
"a very compromising situation."

Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and
Mariano (defendants) in RTC for support. RTC ordered Edward to provide monthly
support of P6,000 pendente lite.

On January 31, 1996, RTC rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to
"jointly" provide P40,000 monthly support to respondents, with Edward
shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the balance of P34,000 subject to Chua Giaks
subsidiary liability. The defendants sought reconsideration, questioning their
liability. RTC, while denying reconsideration, clarified that petitioners and Chua
Giak were held jointly liable with Edward because of the latters inability to give
sufficient support.

Petitioners appealed to the CA assailing, among others, their liability to support

respondents. Petitioners argued that while Edwards income is insufficient, the law
itself sanctions its effects by providing that legal support should be "in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family" under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended
by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the Philippines).

On April 28, 2003, CA affirmed RTC. Parents and their legitimate children are
obliged to mutually support one another and this obligation extends down to the
legitimate grandchildren and great grandchildren. Should the person obliged to give
support does not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the other persons
enumerated in Article 199 in its order shall provide the necessary support. This is
because the closer the relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds
them. Thus, the obligation to support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the
closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved to the next nearer
relatives and so on. CA denied motion for reconsideration.

Issue: WON petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to
respondents.

Held: Yes. Petitioners are liable to provide support but only to their grandchildren.
By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal
support to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much
they limit their petition to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered,
not if they are liable. Relying on provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as
amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability is activated
only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or
suspension during the childrens minority. Because at the time respondents sued for
support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their
children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latters offspring ends
with them.

Grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if they have
parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them. This is
so because we have to follow the order of support under Art. 199. There is no
showing that private respondent is without means to support his son; neither is
there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was
willing to voluntarily provide for her grandson's legal support.

There is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide

sufficient legal support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed
that the amount of support Edward is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month,
is insufficient to meet respondents basic needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl
to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to the
ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and
maternal lines, following the ordering in Article 199.1avvphi1

Petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this

word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As
petitioners grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace
and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryls right to receive support
from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital
bond. Cheryls share from the amount of monthly support RTC awarded cannot be
determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the case to the
trial court for this limited purpose.

As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option in Article 204 of

the Civil Code, as amended, and pray that they be allowed to fulfill their obligation
by maintaining respondents at petitioners Makati residence. The option is
unavailable to petitioners. The application of Article 204 which provides that the
person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling
the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be
availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.

The persons entitled to receive support are petitioners grandchildren and

daughter-in-law. Granting petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to the
grandchildren a well-provided future; however, it will also force Cheryl to return to
the house which, for her, is the scene of her husbands infidelity.