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2

er for Fds- og Konfhktfoknang


y7(of Peace and Conflict Research - - - - -

Paper presented at the


Research Training Seminar,
Sostrup Manor, June 1989.

Revised Jerusalem/Tel Aviv


June 25-26, 1989

Security, the Speech Act


Analysing the Politics of a Word
Ole Waver

2nd draft

There's a word for it


And words don't mean a thing
There's a name for it
And names make all the difference
in the world
David Byrne
1. Introduction
2. A 'new' Security Concept for Non-Military aspects of European Security
2.1. Openness, Human Rights arid Security in European Politics
2.2. 'Security' - from a positive to a negative meaning
2.2. Problems and Possibilities
? 2.4. Status quo and change / 2.4. Conceptions of Politics (and morality)
3. The Concept of Security: Traditional Alternatives and the Tradition as Alternative.
3.1. 'Security' - dassical acceptations
3.2. 'Alternative Security'
3.3. Post Structuralist Realism
3.4. The Speech Act

4. Concepts of Security' in the Figuration <cfIPRA-chapter, Macm..-concl, TAPRI>


.1. 'Concepts of Security' as object of analysis
4 .2. Figuration
.3. The Present Figuration

Appendix 1; The Basic Narrative Structure ot'Security': a semiotic note in the tradition of A.J. Greimas.

Summary:

This paper challenges two basic elements of 'security' as we usually talk of it. 1)
Security is normally seen as a 'reality' prior to language; it is seen as being 'out there'
- irrespective of the conception is 'objective' or 'subjective', that is, measured in threat,,
or fear. Basically the word 'security' refers to something which we think of as
'security' and which would be there whether it was labelled security or not, talked
about or not. 2) The more security, the better. In contrast the present paper argues
1) The word 'security' is the act, the utterance is the primary reality. 2) The most
radical, transformational and still realist <political> perspective Is oneof minimizing
'security'. And then it is claimed that the new understanding put forward is the
traditional one.

Security is basically linked to the regimes, the power holders - they have among their
instruments the speech act 'security' which has the effect of raising a specific
challenge to a principled level implying that all means will - If necessary- be used to
block the development in case. No rules will bind the state In this case, since the
threat is defined as existential. A challenge to sovereignty. This 'use' of security can
not be countered by any 'alternative' measure for 'reasonable' or 'legitimate' use of
the word; 'security' is what the regime defines It to be; all other specifications are
basically non-sensical. They do define It. This is not new. But In nuclear Europe
the speech act will always be efficient since violent overthrow Is not possible the way it
was In earlier times where elites tried to use the Instrument but often failed. The
present structure has therefore an inbullt status quo-gurantee it Is a multi-veto
system. Therefore, change can only take the form of negotiated limitations on the
use of the 'speech act security'.

On this basis we reach a surprising, new 'formula' for improved conditions: less
security and more politics.

As the basic project was to open new perspectives, new views and newways, in
European security, the conclusion Is: In the part of the world where I live, it Is
significant to say 'security Is a speech act'. -
Plan for re-structuring of the parer "Security, the Speech Act"

Tasks:
* In the theoretical part, the concepts of sovereignty and
legitimacy have to be adressed.

* Already at the time of writing it was clear that the paper


could not only deal with the special case of Eastern Europe in
the post-war system. Also Western Europe - and now post-cold war
Eastern Europe has to be dealt with. The concept developed on the
'ideal type' of Eastern Europe has to prove its value on these
more complicated cases.

* The conclusions of the paper (as also presented elsewhere in my


writings, notably the introduction to "Hele Europa") pointed to
one specific form of change as the only one possible, has
evidently proven false. The change in Eastern Europe - and thereby
of the European system - took a different form. This has to be
explairied(l). Worst of all: the conclusion regarding the 'necessary'
form of change is in contradiction with the essential argument
made in this very paper regarding the nature of speech acts. On
the basis of Derrida's (and to some extent Deleuze's) critique -
and use - of speech act theory, I argue that It is essential to
remember that the possibility of failure is present at the core
of a speech act. This evidently should lead to the conclusion
that one possible form of change is the failure of a speech act
(i.e. what we have witnessed the last year) leading to dramatic
and sudden change, and another (probably the other) form of
change is the one based on the continuing power of the speech act
(i.e. the form of 'change through stabilization' which the paper
in the present form presents, and which -has actually been the
form of change around which European security policy has been
circling from the mid l960s to the end of the 1980s).

Therefore, the paper has to present two logical forms of change.


At present I am working with the idea that they both represent
'de-securitization' (or politizationof security). The revised
logical structure therefore presents: 1) the logic of a security
system as basically conservative, preventing (specific types of)
change.; 2) the alternative to the non-change of security is the
de-securitization which can take two possible forms: 2a) change
through stabilization where the change-preventing speech act
remains in function. but change is kept below the level wbere it
is activated, and its range of control is restricted; 2b) failure
of the. speech act leading to. a . 'type of change which is extremely
sudden because a collapse is happening at the soft-core--cf a
social order, the iiots d'ordre keeping people in place.

(1) An early attempt to deal with the change -on the basis of
the present . speech act approach is found in the paper presented
at the BISA-conference December 19,89 ("The .Changing Character of
Continuity"). . 1
Structure:
(Part 3 is the theoretical core chapter; 2 introduces the new
perspective through a case (dtente as change through
stabilization - especially in relation to the repressive regimes
in Eastern Europe); Part 4 extends the analysis to the other
cases: a! the Western way, b/ the break down of the (Eastern
element of the) European s curity order, Cl security in post-wall
Europe.
1. Introduction
2. A 1980s Security Concept: Non-Military Aspects of -European
Security
2.1. Human Rights and Security in European Politics
2.2. 'Security' from a positive to a -negative meaning
2.3. A possibility for change

3. The Concept of Security


3.1. 'Security' - classical acceptations
3.2. 'Alternative Security'
3.3. Post Structuralist Realism
3.4-. Specifying the notion of 'Security' as a peech Act
3 5 Two forms of Change the political centre not able or
not motivated to use the costly 'special mechanism'

4. Explaining the less obvious cases


[less obvious than Eastern Europe, 1945-1989,
dealt with in part 2]
41. Western Europe, 1945-1989
4.2. The Break-down of 'Eastern Europe': 1989
4.3. The meanings and functions of 'Security' in post-wall
Europe
5. European Security in the 1990s: The Changing Character of
Continuity

2
Security, the Speech Act
How to analyse the politics of a word

1. Introduction

The ambition of this study - be it presumptiuous or just


redundant - is to re-think ccet of security. An
impulse for this ls found in a .philosriia1tradition
sometimes labelled 'post-structuralist' (or more popularly
'post-modernist') - notably Derridean 'deconstruction, This
is often viewed as being relativist and only able to
contribute criticism, confusion and - at best - corrections
to the 'real' studies in international relations. Elsewhere
(Waver 1989d) I have argued at a more general level for the
possibility of building an approach to international
relations ('post structuralist realism') that can be truly
political - and thereby possibly 'critical'. On the present
occassion the aim is to show more specifically how a
non-foundational approach to the concept of security (not
linking it to any substance 'out there') is not only less
naive compared to traditional securitystudies but also able
to open up new perspectives for security studies.

The article tries to show this mainly by an outline of a


general understanding of the current dynamics arid problems of
European security. In the last half of section 2 this will
be done through a discussion of the politics of using the
term 'security'. This is presented as an essential element in
the controversies and possible perspectives regarding the
non-military aspects of European security. This is extended
in section 4 where the 'concepts of security' held by various
actors are seen as major components of the European security
figuration which is ue.ied to be the most adequate concept
for analysing the over-all pattern of regional security.
Also this latter method presupposes a non-foundational
definition of security.

The theoretical and conceptual innovations, are concentrated


mainly in section 2.l.-2 .3. and 3-4, whereas section
3.1. -3.3. serve partly to introduce the 'methodology', partly
the main elements of the existing litterature on the concept
of security. :

The article starts out.in med.as res. It starts out in an


important but troubled empial-po1itica1 field - on in need
of a theoretical apparatus. The chosen field is 'the
non-military aspects . of European Seurity'; i.e.
political-ideological . but also economic. relations (mainly
East-West relations). These often caused problems for
theoretical studies and the view of. these 'non-military
S

aspects' has basically pictured them in an external relation


to proper 'security' l.a. the Western policy for European
security (in CSCE and places like that) flas basically been to
trade 'security' for 'human rights', whereas it has been very
difficult to concpetuaiize 'human rights' asan issue fl the
security political field.
Thus we will develop the understanding of security as a
speech .act in the analysis of European security.<l>
2. A New Security Concept for European Security

2.1. Openness, Human Rights and Security in European Politics


There is a danger involved in discussions of openness and
human rights. When European security is discussed in terms
of human rights it is assumed that the problem can be solved
by finding out 'what is the proper understanding of human
rights' - and then making European reality confirm to this.

An approach of this kind would miss the essential dimension:


'human rights'; i e that which is called 'human rights' and
which is essentially a political field,.1ablled "human
rights' and containing a particular political logic due to
the fact that it deals with security - but not military
problems. It is about one of the key 'non-military
dimensions of security'.
In a similar way, 'openness' is on the one hand an objective
to discuss, evaluate, outline, and on the other hand it is
and has always been - part of a political conflict.<2>
What are the political considerations that have influenced
the issue of openness? This is probably a simple question
leading into a well-known terrain of the stakes and fears in
the East-West conflict. What is the character and dynamics
of the political process where this unfolds? This question
seems to be somewhat more novel and promising. Also the
question of human rights nust necessarily be analysed in a
framework of 'European security'. In order to do this it is
necessary to carry out a Copernican turn in our understanding

I. The 'motto' on the title page is from the song 'ive Me


Back My Name' on the Talking Heads LI' 'Little Creatures' from
1985.
/

2. Cf the contributions by Margaret Gowing and Karl Birnbauin


to the proceedings of the first Niels Bohr-symposium, Boserup.
et a]. 1986.

-2--
g$^ i to fO47' eL,0/ /yi

(rcJI.( &icL
14 iit
tittVLI lb CVMVje. / 4fIj
SY! o*c. ac- ,Y. 4hm5 a pfJt4f4f

O? ca..ri Le k 1L iat': /h 14c.d 4h.frSir.


i

/ of the concept of security. This happens on p.5. First, we


/ try to find our way from the field of 'human rights' to the
/ security question. Then the concept of security is
/ investigated in the context of 'non-military aspects of
/ European security'. This leads - on p.6 - to a paradoxical
( guiding principle for policies in the fields of European
security and human rights. 1nally h-.-' ic-p'cQd in he
1fli (fsQmg_nQe peiie step- c' the zay ahead -ftnd--we-
-> tz_te -di8een eieof the. b1-e5 -e---e eneeunee -u-e4--.
ate4ng thic land3c-aps/ In this process the 'speech act'
perspective on security will be developped in a 'soft' form.
Section 3 develops a more formalized conceptualization in a
theoretical and philosophical context. Z' seIs Y W. /7'4
rs s'fl1.. $. cPSw.1f4 (44
'Human Rights' ' ' if P1 4

'Human Rights' became the name of a debate. The debate over


rules of interaction across the system-border; of
interference/non-interference; stabilization/de-stabili-
zation; un-acceptable and acceptable interaction. This
controversy has become known under the name 'human rights'
because this is the word shouted most often and most loudly.
The logic of this field is not necessarily found by thinking
in terms of 'human rights', as such. Maybe it should be
conceptualized instead as 'Non-military aspects of
security'.
From the Eastern states the demarcation ('Abgrenzung')
against un-wanted influence was previously executed under the
banner of 'non-interference'. It has been some irony that the
revolutionary state, the Soviet Union, has been the one to
nurse this classic diplomatic principle.
u'Y7-rr
N the states in the East :- tended to move towards a
willingness to discuss concrete human rights violations.<3>
The legitimacy of criticism 4s accepted - and counter
criticism mounted. (This obviously led to challenges
regarding Western policy on human rights, proper. This will
not be pursued directly.bere.) In the area (called 'human
rights') as . a political . area - where we -try to find the
political. logic of developments - we are instead led to
search for the new stronghold of Eastern discourse. - What
happen& when.. they. accepte4 that .. the absolute. claim of
non-interference does: --not hold?- When they accepto. 'discuss
human rights? Then they give the specific arguments. ,hy it
is 'not possible' to fullf ill the rights . in the particular
case: due to the needs of national 'security'. - -

3. -- references --

-3---
This was the argument behind the earlier argument
(non-interference). Now itd.s stated directly - and in its
basic form unspecified regarding the sources of challenge
(domestic or foreign). Thus we ha philosophically and
historically in a way moved back a step - but that Was
probably the way to advance: to get to the basic issue.
What is then security? We often associate military questions,
but these are just the form that 'security problems' for
empirical reasons have mainly taken. This does not tell us
much about the meaning of security. <4>

2.2 'Security' - from a positive to a negative meaning

Security problems are developments which in a particularly


rapid or dramatic way threaten the sovereignty or
independence of a state, not just something harming it, but
something threatening to deprive the unit of it's capacity to
manage 'by itself (choose the least damaging strategy);
thereby changing the foundation for everything else;
undercutting the political order. ? threat of this kind will
be met with the mobilization of the maximum effort if
needed. The other way round:

By naming a certain development a security problem the


'state' claims a special right. And - this is the
peculiarity - a right which will in the final instance always
be defined by the one using it. Trying to press un-wanted
political change on a ruling elite is like playing soccer
when the opponent has the right bo change the rules during
the game.

Basically 'security' is linked to the concept of


'sovereignty'. And to the idea founding the modern state -
where it s for instance by liobbes stressed how the first
task is to secure order - domestic peace, stability of the
poiitical'order.

It is a problem - basically un-solvable - that those


'administrating' this 'order-principle' can easily use it for
specific political purposes. This is radicalized in the
Soviet system where the security of the political order is
linked legally to. a specific political development: ...whether
activities further or hinder the development of sociajsm.

4. Some further elaborations on 'non-military aspects of


European security' are to be found in Jahn et al 1987 and in
Waver 1989b.

-4-
I -----------
- - -

But there is a problem in the West, too. In Denmark we saw


this recently at an international seminar with Eastern and
Western experts discussing human rights in Europe. Almost all
of the debate dealt with Eastern Europe - for well known
reasons. But at the end came from the audience two
questions; to the West German and the British.partiCipant on
respectively 'Berufsverbot' and Television censorship
relating to Northern Ireland. What was interesting was not so
much whether these accusations were correct or not - whether
they are probably miniature compared to the problems in the
East. It was surprising to see how the experts from the FRG
and Britain responded naively "But this is obviously
necessary because of national security" - without seeing that
basically the structure of this argument was identical to the
Eastern one. The one they had been analysing and criticising
the whole day.

When asked again in an interview the German law professor


responded with a counter-question "I guess, You in Denmark
wouldn't hire communists as police men?" - and the Danish
jdurnalist replyed: "Yes, we would",.<S> My point is not that
one or the other state is right or wrong - just that\these
kinds of principled questions are not in themselves a
mis-step. One cannot ask idealistically for the day when
states grant the rights to citizens without any concern for
the 'state': that is, for the social and political order.
The question will always be there. Why is this important?
Because this means that one has to engage in some, kind of
negotiation about when the 'special right' will be used -
develop a kind of 'codex'. (Concretely, non-military security
/4ae( problems/mainly arisein the East because there the systems
lacklegitiinacy - the political order&s vulnerable.)

WhatfgjEen security? One can view 'security' as that which,


j is in language theory called a speech act: it is not 'n9n
interesting as a sign referring to something more real - it
is the utterance in itself that is the act: by saying it
, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a

-5--
fjship). <6> By saying 'security' a state-representative moves
the particular case into a specific area; claiming a special
J right to use the means necessary to block this development,
but paying the price of some loss of prestige by needing to
use this special resort. "National security was
threatened."
Security is of course more than a word. It is necessary to
have the means to block the devlopment deemed threatening:

* if a foreign army is walking in or trying to intimidate,


it is necessary to have sufficient military strength.
* and if social un-rest is the problem (caused pfu in- or
outside), it is necessary to have sufficient police and some
legitimacy to avoid escalation of public opposition.
It seems that today, in the non-military area it is in fact
always possible for the regime to control things - if not in
any other way then with the help of some friends (with
tanks). (In this respect the Brezhnev doctrine is probably a
reality independent of all Soviet proclamations about the
opposite.) And in the present European. situation, the
military threats can also be fenced off (because of\ the
general nuclear threat)
Quoting the late Franz Josef Strauss: "In the present
European situation there is no possibility of changes through
war, b.ut neither through revolution or civil war.."<7>
S1 tJ/ see4,; / vvS.L
In the European there . . be no change without some
degree of consent by the power holders. Change had to be a
negotiated process of pressure and acceptance, stabilization
and de-stabilization.

Therefore the crucial task in the field called 'human rights'


tvts to develop rules of the game for this non-military

6. Ny language use is a bit sloppy in the reference to


'security as a speech act' Though the phrasing is common in
reference to speech acts, the correct expression would be
that in the theory of speech acts it would be seen as an
3.llucotionary act to declare something a security problem.
This will be elaborated at length in section 3.4.

7. Dr. Franz Josef Strauss said something like this at


several instances, i.a. in a speech for the Plebrpolitxschen
Kongress of the CSU on 7 April 1984, and in an' article in
Mitteldeutscher.Kurierl984/5;.quoted. in Brocke 1985, pp.66f
and 79f. My quotation is not absolutely literal.

-6-
East-West interaction. <8>
At the core is a project of mutual stabilization and
reassurance; "stabilizing the status quo in order to overcome
the status quo" - as some great statesmen of the West said in
the sixties.

2.3. Problems and Possibilities


to strengthen and narrow the 'rule
of non-interrerence'. The aim can in fact be put on a very
simple formula: less security and more politics. As many
problems as possible should be changed from being perceived
as threats to become challenges. More and more trans-border
activities should be handled as ordinary politics; criticims
countered by arguments, economic problems by economic means,
etc. If conventional stability was at the same time achieved
in the military sphere - and domestic and foreign opponents
signalled clearly that the key elements of the political
order would not be violently over-thrown, we would have no
security problems. They would be squeezed out by stability
on the one hand and dynamic political exchange on the other.
In a way the main obstacles to,this ,. . development were
domestic - on both sides.r7,/ /
:V
The problem in the East: how to develop procedures for
managing these new challenges when there is no continuous
political culture.

The problem in the West: to say aloud things we all knew. To


admit that certain elements of the status quo were taken as
relatively permanent, .re respected. This could for instance
be seen in relation to the common paper on ideology issued by
SED and SPD. This paper was exactly an attempt to set up some
of the needed rules of the game in order to free some open

8. Of course anybody could pronounce the word 'security'. But


since the international system is organized according to the
principle ofterritoriality and exclusivity, only one
political centre in each unit is able to make use of
reference to 'security' to signal: We will, if necessary,
make use of "the specific means peculiar to it (...), namely,
the use of physical. force! (Weber). And the.. discourse by
. ,..

other - on 'security' is then not referrthg to .the.ability


-.

of these other groups to . make the security act; it, ,&s is a


discourse on the states'. use and non-use .of.this possibility.

Cc, I.. - . . . .
...... ..
..: .

w /
/ 9. The 'common paper'. as . well as. important parts of the
/ reaction and debate can be found in I3rinkel & Rodejohann
C
. t 1 / // () f( .

. -7.-
debate and competition.<9> Naturally it caused critical
reactions in the Federal Republic - but surprisingly often
criticism against the expression of recognition of realities
which the liberal-conservative government ws clearly
recognizing all the time, without spelling it out. For
instance: that the rule of non-interference generally covers
all attempts at getting rid of the other system. And i.a.
the parties have to see each other as capable of peace - in
order to act on the condition of a protracted co-existence.
It might be a structural problem in Western societies -where
elections are primarily won on domestic issues- that no
sensible political party will spell out these constructive
self-limitations and risk the label of moral traitor; a label
which inevitably spills over into domestic politics. Thus
all prefer to up-hold illusions and thereby miss security
political chances.

On the positive side one should note the importance of the


new 'mechanism' introduced in CSCE: a formal procedure for
questioning human rights violations. in the langauge here
aaopted this amounts to a formal procedurefor appeal when
another government uses it's 'security' label. Of course, it
has always been possible to criticise this. What has
changed? There is a name for it. t1Names make all the
difference in the world.1' The specific act (and right) of
'security' can now be answered with a specific procedure - a
procedure holding a defined place in the diplomatic
machinery.

It should especially be seen as an element of the


transformation of the Eastern societies. 'The crucial problem
in the East is to advance from liberalization to
democratization, from the regimes' acts of grace to
guarantees, to rights, to control mechanisms against the
state. Therefore this new CSCE-mechanism is very important -
it introduces an element of appeal against the Eastern states
which they have not previously allowed It is only a step
but in the direction of institutionalization of a state based
on law.

This obtains particular importance with the tnd uE


transformation taing place in in the late Eighties in the
East and for instance the Poles negotiated an electior system
accepted by Solidarnosc as well as the party9 Important
sections of Solidarnosc saw this electory system as a price
they had to pay. Not the aim. (At least, so it was before
Solidarnosc was caught by election fever; now the number of
seats seems to have gained in importance compared to the

-8-
value of the process - the space.<lO> This does, however,
not change the principles of the present argument.) What
they wanted to gain was the legalization of organizations
like Solidarnosc and the opposition party linked to
Solidarnosc - the 'civic committee'. What they aim at is to
recreate a 'civil society'. And the West should probably be
more aware of this collective level than the specific
'rights'. To create a 'civil society' is simply to re-open a
public realm - recreate politics. To allow the formation and
interplay of autonomous organizations. Even if the interplay
is still not 'fair'. (Solidarnosc was willing to let the
Ruling Party have 65% of the seats - on the condition that
the rest were open for a completely free process.) Just like
the help-to-selfhelp principle in 3rd World aid, the need for
the East is political changes that open up possibilities for
politics in these societies. From there the other changes
can be conquered by the people there. This is a more
promising dynamic than improved possibilities for
emmigrat ion.

Thus my conclusion is: 'human rights', are not abstract, fixed


a-historical principles where one. '.. can. just, repeatedly demand
full implementation.
We are dealing with politics - domestic and international.
Political forces acting as if these principles were pure'y
'natural' end up in a self-righteous position without an
understanding of the mechanisms of the process. As Henry
Kissinger wrote in 1957 in his doctoral dissertation about
early Nineteenth century European security politics: "The
most fundamental problem of politics is not the control of
wickedness but the limitation of righteousness" (Kissinger
1957: 206).

At one level it is of course possible, correct and wise


- -

for a party to support politically .and.morally those on the


other side one sympathizes with. At the same time in order
to influence the power holders who have to be also 'playing
.

their part, it is necessay to mix stabilization of core fears


with pressure on the things that could be changed without
de-stabilizing the system. .' . . .

I would not say 'carrot and stick'..: because we talk 'about


fears, security problems and. they., are.. not relAyed by
'tempting' the elites' out . with., a.' carrot. - quite on the
contrary; They are ..so1ved by :ruling out:, certain horror
by removing military options fd attack, or

10. Cf. Tromer 1989 7!?.

-9-
retracting an ideological framework that contain the
possibility of supporting (in a given situation) a political
'revolution' on the other side. Not to speai about the value
of economic help.
All this can be translated into a completely different
political language: all this relates to the problem how to
handle the interaction of two processes: all-EuropeaniZatiOfl
and Western-europeanization. Whether we intend it or not, the
- now again dynamic - process of Western European integration
will necessarily have destabilizing and magnetic effects in
and on Eastern Europe. On the other hand, processes of
all-Europeanization have always been seen as latently
dangerous for the West as they could entail a certain Soviet
dominance of an all-European security system - dtente and
'Common European home' These two processes might be
mutually reassuring - creating a 'balance of imbalances'. Or
they might mutually reinforce a process of destabilization.
At least one should be aware that they might for some period
seem purely positive - but accumulate fears in liinitied but
important groups - 'security: elites' inWest and Eas And
one day this will cause a :draiatic back-lash.
Abit schematically one could cla&m that hig.4litic,s is a
problem to the West (the disarmamentdi:plomic victories of
Gorbachev) and low politics is a proem to the East
(societal and economic developments) (fFurthering 'human
rights' in Europe will in the last instance depend on
policies calming the fears on both sides - and thereby create
a dynamic process where all these contraditory changes can
un-fold.

A rule-of-thumb can here be to turn 'threats' into


'challenges'; security problems into politics; make elites
avoid the term 'security' and open Up domestically room for
more open political struggle - even if the rules are not yet
'fair' according to absolute standards. If first the room
for politics is opened there are lots of brillant people in
the societies who will carry the cause further.
2.4.: status quo and change

from my two TAPRI-papers. Or not at all.

2.4. Concepts of Politics

Finally the paper will be summed up in a warnihg against two


opposite policies that stem from one and the -'same fallacy
stabilization and de-stabilization Both are build on the

- 10 -

- ____
t I '--:----- -

fallacy of collapsing politics and social reality into one


level of reality (the Prophet's Fallacy).
Politics is a sphere of re-presentation of the social - it is
not the social, nor can it ever be.
Life in all its complexity takes place in a culture which is
not defined according to a public logic - on the contrary: it
takes place in the private sphere. When venturing onto the
political arena positions and roles are taken. These are
defined in relation to the political figuration taking
account of the others (gaining influence, supporting others,
make impressions; i.e. making oneself as a historical
figure<ll>) - it is a zone - of - strategic action. These
positions and roles do not introduce the presence in the
political of the concrete life and individuals. Various
tendencies in modern thinking - which we cannot go into here
- -have tended to erase this distinction. Still the classical
(strategic) concept of politics tended to survive in
international politics. Exactly, this might tend to become
undermined at present - and we better watch carefully the
consequences. -. --- -- -::

Policies of de-stabilizatjon can for instance take the form


of Western liberation programs. Human rights are claimed as
absolute values and therefore Ostpolitik can not take the
form of mutuality but must inevitably press for the natural
and right. <12>
The 'opposite' policy - of say the younger generation in the
West German SPD - views this first line with concern. They
fear it might lead to upheav-els and thereby set-backs for

11. Cf. Hannah Arendt (1958). The phrasing in these


paragraphs .is also inspired from a lecture by Anne- Knudsen,
'From Political Culture to Politics as Culture' at a Nordic
Summeruni-versity seminar, Lund April 1989.

- 12. In some texts presently in preperation, I try to show


this logic at play in the different 'Europes' that are now
entering the scene: East-Central Europe, Mitteleuropa, French
Europe-thinking,- the Soviet -concept of a 'Common '-European
- -

House' and finally a- vision from social movemen.. of -a


-

'European Civil Society'. These constructs


- - seek their
legitimation in pre-political
- - : ground:- :-history,
- - -.culture,
identity, geography etc. -Therefore. they pbse a risk of -

self-righteous, un-political policies too. specially as


they all -take the form of pure 'we'-constructs - locating the
other somewhere outside.

-. ----. -li.-_ -
dtente. In stead they find it necessary to pursue a policy
of stabilization. In order to make this morally tolerable the
picture of the East is tendentially coloured more rosy The
dynamics of reform is supposed to come from the top - the
reforrnThhige elites - and it is therefore logical to
stabilize their situation.<13>
The second policy repeats the mistake of the de-stabilization
policy. Both assume that policy and morality should be
brought into close and early correspondance. This we could
appropriately call the Fallacy of the Prophet: <14> the
prophet believes it possible to realise transcendental
standards in the temporal structure ; the prophet is moved by
the goal of a political order able to be judged according to
absolute standards.
This obviusl applies to the first group - direct moralism.
In the second case (the stabilizers) the realisation of
limits to possible change leads them to give up ideals. It
is felt impossible to live with the tension between ideals
and reality. Thus both share the premise that the political
order should be judged according to absolute standards.

None of the spheres of politics and personal ethics can be


seen - or made - a simple reflection or derivation from the
other The believe in this can lead to either moralistic and
un-wise politics or to an un-necessary sacrifice of moral
positions for the sake of the political order. As part of
the actions in the political sphere it might be necessary to
renounce claims or accept unpleasant realitites - this
should, however, be seen as political acts not demanding
personal convetion.

This is particularly important in a period of new openings


and persistent limitations - as well as disagrements over the
nature and location of these.

It is often assumed thesedays that we are witnessing the end


of the cold war. Some discuss whether the less structured
alternative is better ' or worse - more or less stable, etc.
Independent of this question - irrespective of the relative
merits of the 2 worlds - there is a specific problem relating
to the route from one to the other. In the particular case

13. I deal more extensively with this in 1989b and C.

14. This is of course inspired by Kissinger's omparison of


the Statesman and the Prophet (1957: 187 and 292f; and 1966:
526f).

-12-
of 'walking out' of the cold war system it is necessary to be
extremely careflll. As argued above the status quo is always
an available option - and the veto-holders are many.
' In all otherPperiods a major transformation like the one we
are beginnning to imagine would entail the transformatory
mechanism of war - or at least revolutions. In the nuclear
age this is excluded in a region like Europe. "Europe (...)
is the frontier where any retreat implies a gain for the
challenger. To yield on indirect or outlying fields of
confrontation is one thing; to retreat from one vested with
geographical, psychological, political, and economic
symbolism is quite another" (David 1989: 104 f). Thus, drastic
losses are not possible; means of repression will, if
necessary, be supplied to curb domestic upheavals. Change
through direct force from outside is impossible, due to the
nuclear shadow. Indirect (i.e. non-military) pressure from
outside will have to be translated through domestic action to
yeild political results. And we are back with the domestic
impossibility.

Late 20th Century change in European politics is a peculiarly


difficult project.
Thus, while presenting clearly the different ideals we uphold
regarding openness and human rights, we should always keep an
eye on the particular European dynamics of stabilization and
change - of security and politics.
It is still very likely that we will be grasped from behind -
by history. It is necessay to steer at least as much through
the rear-view mirror as by looking ahead. Slowly widening
the room of action from inside the present structure (by
steering free of 'securitization') is more likely to lead to
change than are head-on policies conceptualized in terms of
different possible orders. At the same time this only leads
to stability if it Is approached in terms of a process of
continuous political reform - otherwise it turns into a
poLicy of pure status quo in the long run the most
impossible of all. (Cf. Aron 1958: 94-102; Hassner 1968) As
Zbigniew Brzezinski recently put it (Brzezinski 198?: 16):
"Continuous change has been the only constant in human
affairs".

3. The Concept of Security: Traditional Alternatives..and the


Tradition as Alternative.

3.1. 'Security' - classical definitions

In this section I would like to encircle the (often


implicit?) core of 'security' in traditional thinking about

-
-13-
international relations. The list of philosophers is not
meant to be exhaustive. The idea is just to point out some
elements of our thinking that might be related to some
organizing principles for the international system and
therefore necessarily present - in various ways - in the
different discourses on security.

'Security' is not a 'traditional' concept in the sense of the


word having a solid history. For instance it is not in the
index to (broadly painting, classically minded) books like
Hinsley (1986 <1966>) Horowitz (1957) or Wight (1986 <1946>).
usedpreviously on many of the occassions
where we today speak of 'security'<15> (i.a. one spoke much
more directly about 'interests' and about 'war' - before the
world wars of this century) .<16> But when the term security
- for whatever reason - attained prominence it also
established its meaning in this field of conceptualizations
It had gained (at the time when it entered the stage) a logic
that gave it a closely interlinked place at the heart of
international relations discourse - intertwined with
longstanding key concepts (sovereignty, war, state).
Can a shared understanding be found in 'the philosophical
tradition'? History has witnessed, of course, long
philosophical debates on the nature of 'war' and 'peace', and

15. It is in itself an interesting question why security


entered as the new key-concept? What were the properties
that made it particularly well suited to take over when the
other terms were worn out or started to suffer from the bad
press on nationalism and militarism? Was it due to the
implicit link between individual and national values? Or was
it its inherent conservative connotations? The first could
be explained by the 'democratic' - or at least popular/public
- turn of foreign policy in the twentieth century, the second
by the increasingly widespread image of international
politics relating to dangers and not options, risks and not
opportunities. One could further link this to the general
development. towards 'Governmentality' and 'normalization'
through surveillance (Foucault). An investigation of the
genealogy of the term would definitely supplement the present
study in a most valuable way. (Some elements of its history
are found in Kaufman 1973 and Krell 1981.)

16. Ministrys of War became Ministries of Defence And when


Israel was established 1948 it got a Ministry o'f Security. If
there would be an occassion for renaming there can be no
doubt that quite a few governments at least in Northern
Europe would like to follow this example.

- 14 -
on various 'peace plans', etc. We have the works of
internatiohal law that appear to be markedly different from
i.a. the power tradition of the German historians. Still -
even aiong the more idealist writers - there -have been
certain shared assumptions since - at least - the last
quarter of the seventeenth century (Holzgrefe 1989)<17>,
reflecting a specific structuration of political space.
So the following is not a 'genealogy' of security. It offers
the philosophical basis for something I hereby invent in the
name of 'the classical concept'. The history of philosophy
is naturally constructed in a backwards direction with the
'conclusion' as starting point. This presentation slides
into a more systematic (representative) presentation of the
security concept in I.R.-theory.
As already shown in part - II,. the prolect in the present
conceptualization is to link 'security' solidly to the
self-defense by states (read: regimes) against threats from
the outside as well as the inside: basically we are dealing
with threats against the social order. Or rather with the
'right' of the rulers to state that a certain development is
a challenge to the social order. - We will discuss this
briefly in relation to challenges that are:

A: domestic

B: international
Aristotle: Even he, who has development of individual virtue
as the aim for the state, accepts a bottom line. Not only
does he specualte about the merits of different political
systems - not least in terms of stability - he also
considered it natural that the political power (the state)
uses the means available to counter all attempts at
overthrowing the social order. "----HVOR F. ER DET
CITAT?---" After all, this should not surprise us thinking of
Aristotle's well-known .distaste of revolutions -. or maybe

17. J'.L.Jiolzgrefe argues convincingly how the "transformation


of European political relations between 1450 and 1550 was So
profound that it is not surprising that contemporary
commentators were unable to grasp the significance...,of the
changes they were witnessing" (1989:. 22). And he shows this
by solidly delineating the processes . of . hesitant change in
conceptualizations regarding specific areas o international
relations 'theory' from. the -early sixteenth century to the
late seventeenth century. (For the 'delayed' formalization
of these changes,.see also Wight 1977: 129-152.)

:i 5
more correctly of 'civil strife' (cf Lintott 1982: 245). Nore
basically the state is seen as prior to the individual. (In
fact a true human being can only exist in a state - "he who
is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he
is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god:
he is no part of a state" (Politics, 1:2, 1253a:28-29 - see
also 1:2, 1253a:l-7). Aristotle certainly favors non-violent
means for the handling of challenges to the established order
(basically: respect for the law; wise design of the
constitution <cf himself!>; control over the economic balance
of society; diplomatic handling of the relations to those who
are not sharing power). ut he also deals with necessary
ostracising of the individuals concerned. And generally -
due to the 'civilizing' role of the state - it is taken for
granted that 'civil strife' (stasis) should in the final
instance be coinbatted by all means necessary, when deemed
necessary, by the state

We will not follow the winding road of political philosophy


in general, nor try to find moments when the term 'security'
was in use. <18> Focus is to be put immediately on Thomas
Hobbes, the central figure on theA-line. o Iitf11 'YJ

It is familiar how Hobbes - in the after-math of the English


Civil War puts forward a political theory with one essential
idea: All individuals should in their own interest submit to
a 'common power'. When this - preferrably absolute - power
is in place it cannot be questioned or punished by the
subjects. The basic premise for peace (basically domestic
peace) is: a central, sovereign power. The basis for this is
a lengthy analysis of human faculties and natural conditions
showing that "during the time men live without a common Power
to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is
called Warre; and such .a Warre, as is of every iuan, against
every man." Then the life of man is "solitary, poore, nasty,
brutish, and short" (Hobbes 1968 (1651) 18Sf).

Leviathan delivers numerous :arguments relevant to the present


purpose; it is proliferate in its use of the term 'security',
and contains what I will putas the essential sentence: "The
Soveraigne is judge of what is necessary for the Peace and

18. According to Krell (1981: 239) the concect of 'scuritas'


developped in Roman times from a catch-word designating all
kinds of protection by N.N. of values x against 1' "into a
personified symbol of political stability - 'securitas as a
female figure with sceptre, cornucopia, or wreath".

19. The quotation is in tact taken from the summary in the

-16-
S -..-- .- -

Defence of his Subjects" (ibid: 232) <19>

The question of the social order started to become a question


in its own right when political authorities lost their divine
legitimation. Before this it was not necessary to legitimize
the defensive acts of the political order; political
stability was only a subordinate question in relation to a
specific political order which was legitimized substantially
(or we could say, by a transcendental argument). When this
legitimacy faded it became an issue to defend stability in
itself. @comment<Metternich, Kissinger, Talleyrand (Hviid)>
The central power defending the political order is present
also in Machiavelli. To Machiavelli it was important to
stabilize a domestic order - to set up a stable structure.
This is in the Prince a means to an end - but a necessary
means. In Discorsi the perspective is shifted, and the
stabilization of a social order is more of an aim in itself.
In fact, founding a state was the highest one could do,
according to Machiavelli (also in The Prince).- Most
importantly, in neither of the two mentioned books there was
any doubt whether one should try, in all cases and with all
means, to defend the established order against threats - be
they internal or external.

Most of the time, in the The Prince, there is no sharp


distinction domestic/international. At different moments
someone tries to establish power - and he is naturally
challenged from outside as well as inside (and worst of all:
in a combination of the two). Political regimes are set up
as islands of stability in the turbulent stream of history.
These islands have determined our (only possible) way of
viewing (and especially: of talking about) international
politics. We take a view through a lense called 'the state'
(articualted thorugh the regime). This does not happen
within 'loccally' given oppositions, like inside/outside
, margin (Hobbes' own). The tuil paragraph is: "And becausi
,j I. '1 C'J. the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence of them
(1 all; and -whosoever has right to the End, has right to the
Means; it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly
that hath . the Soveraignty, to be Judge. both of the meanes of
Peace and Defence;-.-- and . also of the hindrances, and
disturbances of the same;:and to do whatsoever he shall think
necessary to be done, both . before hand, for the preserving of
Peace and Security,, by prevention of. Discord at qme and
Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace andSecurity are lost,
for the recovery of the same." (Hobbes 1968 (1651): 232f).

20. Cf. Walker 1987a; Ashley 1987, 1988, 1989; Wver 1989d.

-17- -
(domestic/international) <20> The state/regime establishes
itself as the thin line creating in this very process the
distinction.. And it is under pressure from -'both sides' -
that is: threatened by processes and aspirations that are
originally very like.
This mode of thinking is linked to the various material
processes leading to a gradual concentration of political
power (Elias 1978 <1939>: --; Herz 1959: 43-48). The
'civilizing process' led to a situation where the states had
out-manoevred the units above and beneath: Pope and local
knights. Resulting in a territorially based .states-system.
The most famous sentence on this is probably Max Weber's on
the monopoly on violence.
At present the interest is mainly to find a shared
bottomline, and there is therefore reason to pick the 'hard
challenges' - those philosophers who would be generally
assumed to take a different stand. For instance Immanuel
Kant. It is well-known that he takes a rather puzzling
position on the question of domestic stability versus revolt,
aild thereby clearly supports our present argument along the
A-line. But on the B-issue he is generally seen 'as a
supporter of moral obligations as leading principles for
international politics. And so he is. But this is on the -
to him self-evident? - basis of a balance of power (Kant
1979 <1796>: 57) and a natural inclination to defend national
independence (not freely accept the courts of other states
(ibid: 61). And Kant stresses that "one could not demand of a
state that it should change a constitution - not even a
despotic one - that contains larger strength of resistance
against outside enemies, as long as the state thereby would
expose itself to the risk of being immediately swallowed by
other states. Thus, it must be it allowed to postpone to a
more favorable time the implementation of its intention (its
moral duty to move towards better conditions for peace
including 'republican' constitutions, ow)" (ibid 63 - my
preliminary translation)
And also Kant believes that it was the necessity of
organizing as a power towards the external world - to be
armed against another people - that made it necessary to
organize internally as a state (Kant 1979 <1796>: 55). Hereby
we have entered the second (B) part of the qtiestions.
international challenges to the state.

The very best expression is probably found with Jean-Jacques


Rousseau (1988 <1762>: 90). (Still it does n'ot deal with
'security' but he offers an important remark on 'war', and
the inner logic of 'security' is - as it will be shown - in
an important way modelled on the problernatique of war.)

-18-
War is not, therefore, a relation of man to iiian but
a relation of state to state, in which individuals
are enemies only by accident, not as men or even as
citizens, but as soldiers, not as members of the
homeland, but as its defenders.
From here there is obviously an easy link to the particular
logic of war according to Clausewitz: War has its inner logic
and this follows from its basic character of being the
unrestrained situation where each chooses maximum effeciency
in relation to a clear and polarly defined aim, victory. It
is the situation where a state is up for a test of will --
testing whether it is still a sovereign unit. The ability to
fend off a challenge is the criterion for establishing
oneself as a sovereign unit - forcing the others to recognize
one's sovereignty and thereby gaining identity. Aron <21> It
is in fact not the particular means (military) that defines
the situation as one of war - it is the structure of the
'game'. Logically seen it is coincidence that military means
have traditionally been the ultimo ratio. The basic logic of
Clausewitz's argument follows from the situation pf an
ultimate test: what is then logically to be done ('throw

21. This side of Clausewitz is especially stressed in the


interpretation by Anders Boserup (1986) - see Andreasen 1986
and 1989 for presentations in English (and .Boserup1
forthcoming?). Also Aron underlines the test of will (1966
/1962/). But Aron does not see this as constitutive for the
state. The everpresent possibility of war is fundamental to
the specific character of the international system according
to Aron. In this the states are taken for granted; and most
of the book then deals with the ways of 'influencing' or
excercising power - before and after the bomb. Altogether a
less 'existential' meaning of war for the individual state.
Boserup makes. a.convincing case of reading Clausewitz with
Hegel (concept of state, -. concept of recognition). Andreasen
specifies this through Fichte.

22. When this approach is employed in current discourse it


seems to be assumed that military means are decisive in this
struggle for recognition: i.e. aspotential means for
challenging sovereignty. I believe, it has to be stressed
that this superiority of . 'military means is a contingent
fact.. The,. . ::.. Clausewitizian logic of
challenge-resistance/recognition, escalation 'and pause is
rnorerbasic. The present paper can therefore be seen as a
non-military version of-this C1ausewitzian argument. This
non-military Clausewitz/Boserup argument at one and the same

-19-
I

proceed in two directions:


1) deny the elites the 'right' to dress up their interests as
'national security' and in stead label these something else
(class interests, elite interests, ...). The other side of
this must necessarily be to give national security a
definition independent of the elites. But there are good
reasons to stay with subjective interests Karup Pedersen
1970: 265). And such ones can only come from a politically
organized group. 'The people' or 'the nation' can not have a
'subjective interest': 'the people' can not speak, only
organized political groups. Paradoxically this leads these
critically minded people into the well-known 'realist'
dead-end called 'the national interest'.

2) state that 'national security' in the phenomenological


sense is that which is labelled so by the respective power
holders A major consequence of this is that security is not
a strictly 'positive' value. There seems to be an almost
total concsensus on constructing conceptual landscapes in a
way that locate the negative outside the 'proper' meaning of
security. if some problems are stealing in upon it, new
distinctiOns are made that keep the concept of security
unblemjshed.<26> For instance we can see in the writings on
the 'power and security dilemma' (Herz 1959; Buzan 1983) how
there is an attempt to distinguish between the strivings for
security and those for power. This distinction serves to

26. This probably stems from the concept's positive valuation


in politics making it a rather unwise approach to denounce
'security'. Also a cynical approach like the present has been
impossible earlierr. This might be changing (since/i.a., I
am writing this). The basis could be the more and more
pragmatic approach towards the East-West conflict evolving in
Europe. The European security debate of the 198 Os have been
marked by an increasing role of the position marked by
simultaneous acceptance of the importance of the East-West
Conflict and the impossibility of solving problems through
it. It was more and more seen as a problem to be handled
(Tunander 1985; Wver 1987; Jahn et al 1987). Then security
is an area where morality, power relations and truth are not
to be brought in harmony. And therefore security an move
from the 'aim or obstacle' position to a status. as a
phenomenon to be dealt with. The reality of 'security
politics' can be accepted as inescapable without being
glorified into a realisation of 'values'. One could, however,
be pessimistic - from the present perspective -regarding the
possibilities of upholding this (cynical) attitude in the
more euphoric athmosphere of the late 1980s - early l990s.

- 22 -
reserve 'security' as positive whereas 'power' can be
legitimate or not, depending on the historical situation.
The striving for security can also lead to more or less lucky
effects due to the structure or the level of aspiration (the
security dilemma simpliciter) but the motive as such is by
definition legitimate and positive.
As we shall see in the next section, some radical critics -
notably in peace research - have denounced 'security' and
deemed it a part of the problem. Still this operation hinges
partly on an idea of true security. And it wants to put
'peace' or 'justice' in the place of 'national securitry'.
But partly, in noticing the close link between 'national
security' (as an empirically existing referent) and
particular interests, this radical position shares crucial
elements with the present analysis. The conclusions drawn
have until now been radically different.

The analysis now proceeds to the concept of security in


I.R..-theory:

Arnold Wolf ers has written probably the most famous article
on the concept of security ("National Security as an aTflbigous
symbol" from 1952; reprinted in Wlfers 1962: 147-165). As
pointed out by Buzan (1983: 4) the article largely had the
effect to kill of theoretical interest in the concept of
security whereas the purpose more likely was the opposite.
The first part of the article summarises the general
assumptions about what security is 'about':
ttWe know roughly what people have in mind if they
complain that their government is neglecting
national security or demanding excessive sacrifices
for the sake of enhancing it. Usually those who
raise the cry for a policy oriented exclusively
toward this interest are afraid their country
underestimates the external dangers facing it or is
being diverted into idealistic channels. unmindful
of thes dangers. moreover, the symbol ('national
security', OW) suggests protection through power
(...). For these reasons it would be an
excaggeration to claim that the symbol of national
security is. nothing but a stimulus to semantic
confusion, though. closer analysis; will show that If
used without spcification it leaves room for zre
confusion than sound.. political counsel or
scientific usage can afford." . (1962: 149)

According to. Wolfers the term 'security'. covers-a wide range


of goals - a range "so wide that highly divergent policies
can be interpreted as policies of security" (ibid: 150). A

- 23 -
basic orientation of 'security' is towards protection of
values previously acquired and in this sense the term has a
basically conservtive twist (bc. cit; Krell 1981).
The probably most famous passage from Wolfers' article - and
one of the best established definitions of security goes like
this:
security in an objective sense, measures the
absence of threats to acquired values, in a
subjective sense, the absence of fear that such
values will be attacked.
<27>

The message of the article is then an argument to the


conclusion that nations do not act uniformly and especially
we can not expect 'a uniform drive for enhanced or maximum
security (...). Efforts for security are bound to be
experienced as a burden; security after all is nothing but
the absence of the evil of insecurity, a negative value so to
speak." (Wolfers 1962 <1952>: 153) Therefore, most nations
will be concerned with other - less dramatic goals iu9st of
the time, and they will set modest aims in relation to
security. The means chosen in the search for security will
vary too. One can not analytically define a 'generally
expedient' security policy, nor whether a specific level of
security is so.

Raymond Aron (1966 <1962>: 72f) designates as "the first


objective which the political unit may logically seek": to
survive, to maintain the collectivity; i.e. security is the
primary objective. It can be based either on the weakness of
rivals or on force itself. Like Wolfers he is aware that
maimum force does not (always) equal maximum security as it
provokes reaction by others. But then states entertain other
goals too: power for its own sake, and glory. But for
_________________ -. -

27. Gert Krell adds to this the doubling of security into a


question of absence of danger (objectively as well as
subjectively) on the one hand and the connotations of
certainty, dependabi1ity, reliability and foreseeability. It
is thereforepossible to talk of a 'security of seurity'.
The line of. speculation seems, . however, not to. lead
anywhere. It is therefore better to.assunie.that . the second
dimension is always -involved in the.. first in/the sense that
any arrangement in order to deliver 'security' must appear to
be relatively solid, and 'reliable. Security is always a
concern about the future.

-24-
security proper there would be an optimum of forces and
(theoretically) the issue would not be very complicated -, if
it was not for the other motives.
John Herz is one of the first IR-theorists to put security at
the centre (leading him to the 'discovery' of the security
dilemma - simultaneously with Herbert Butterfield). In
important books and articles (like 1957, 1959, 1964, 1969,
1981) the concept is left not only un-defined but without any
reflection on its origins, connotations or content. The
original article on the security dilemma (1950) contains the
following: In a "social constellation (...) where a plurality
of otherwise interconnected groups constitute ultimate units
of political life" arises "what may beclied the 'security
dilemma' of men, or groups, or their leaders. Groups or
individuals living in such a constellation must be, and
usually are, concerned about their security from being
attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other
groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from
such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power
in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This,
in.turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to
prepare for the worst" (l950:157).'Herz is mainly interested
in the social structure or 'constellation'; the content of
'security' is indicated indirectly by reference to attack,
domination and annihilation as that which is feared - and
countered by accumulation of power

More recently a major theoretical inquiry into the concept of


security has been carried out (with a not negligible
inspiration from Herz) by Barry Buzan (1983). (Later we will
look somewhat more critically at Buzan 's attempts in the
'alternatives' business. For now we shall just notice that
he presents a very clear version of the key understanding of
security - though some of the elements are only talking
behind his back.) The "general sense of what we are talking
about is clear: (...) the pursuit of freedom from threat"
(1983: 11). Furthermore, "Where the state is strong, national
security can be viewed primarily in terms of protecting the
components of the state from outside threat and interference"
(1983: 67). (In a weak state (that is, weak not as power but
as state, with unclear institutions and idea etc) the concept
lacks a clear national reference and is easily used to
support the interests of a particular group. "Beacuse of
this, it is probably more appropriate to view secu&ty in
weak states in terms of the contending groups, organizatios
and individuals, as the prime object of security"

28. Buzan's argument about the misleading - or even

- 25 -
(loc.cit.)..) <28> Insecurity sterns from a combination of
threats and vulnerabilities (Cf Wolfers, Kissinger and
others). Threats become threats to security by being "swift"
and marked by "a sense of outrage at unfair play" (ibid: 75).
Thus, the ideal type of security (policy) is a state 's
(pursuit of) freedom from external threat and interference.

By now we have distilled what will be claimed to be the


traditional 'meaning' of security - in a broad sense, as
context for present discourses in academia and politics.

The recurring theme is security as freedom from threat


(objectively and subjectively). The kinds of threats that
are seen as relevant are (more or less implicitly) those that
effect the self-determination/sovereignty of the unit.
Survi vial (Aron) might sound too dramatic but it is in fact
the key: the survivial of the unit as basic political unit
(soverign state); i.e. security refers to those cases where
a threat or development is designated as incompatible with
the state's sovereignty which leads to a test of will and
force thereby testing whether the state is a sovereign
state.

Most current books on security do not care at all to define -


or just reflect on - the concept. Those who do, generally
stay with the elements presented above, especially in a form
similar to Wolfers, Herz and Aron.

Official reports (and apologetic writings on 'national


security' from the scientific community) usually build on
definitions like "The security problem is put by the world
around us and arises in situations where there is fear of
one's society being eposed to destructive acts of war or by
threats of use of force being exposed to unwanted external
influence." And it is its aim to "create the best possible
conditions for the nation retaining its freedom to arrange
itself as it wants" <29>

The internal dimension is in this context not mentioned. At


this point we can localize a tension between the philosophers
current oliticij..4itJithe.1..R.. theorists in
'security' in a
extremely important. The present paper can be read 'as an
argument for the case that this domestic use of 'security' is
a reality everywhere; all states are weak enough. 4

29. The official definition of 'Danish Security'. It stems


original from the socalied Seidenfaden-report (1969) but has
been repeated at crucial points ever since.

- 26 -
between)
The place from where the security discourse is spoken has
become invisible.<30>
This first sub-section of chapter 3 is rounded of with a
brief indication of the main tendencies in scientific
writings on 'security' in the post-war period; i.e. the way
'security' shows on the surface as an 'analytical' term.
From this we will soon proceed to the attempts at
transcending the 'traditional' meaning into some type of
'alternative security concept'. Before this: the ways it has
been employed. In less conceptually oriented writings the
concept of security appears basically in four forms:
1) from a national perspective (i.a. 'British Security in the
1990s') and then it is often identical with considerations on
national.defence, 'strategic studies'.
CurIously the the second major heap of references to
something called 'security' is to be found at the opposite
extreme:
2) international security - close tthe peace genre.
Third, and theoretically probably most important:
3) writings on the 'security dilemma'. It is possible to
distinguish two traditions of realism (cf Herz 1951, 1959:
231-143; Wolfers 1957 <1951 & 1952>; especially pp. -----
Jervis 1976): One is the 'classical realism' based at least
partly on anthropological arguments about tle (evil) human
nature leading to a eternal power drive etc. The other views
security as a dynamic in it's own right - it has even been
proposed as the priviliged 'middle ground' (Buzan 1984)
because it avoids any reference to the evil nature of man but
on the other hand points to continuing probierns.<31> >

This is built on a distinction between power and security


(somewhat parallel to the way Morgenthau invokes the
distinction between status quo and imperialist powers).

30. This correlates with a more general tendency 'for the


state to become invinsible in I .R. Theory to the: exttit that
it becomes the centre, Hoffmann 1989.
31. Cf. Waltz 1959 who criticises strongly /the kind of
Niebuhrian Realism based on a specific (negative) image of
man.

- 27 -
When it can be generally assumed that all states are status
quo powers, a focus on inherent vicious circles in a closed
universe of 'security' - generated by short-sighted policies
- will naturally lead to the kind of security thinking today
known as common security. (For pre-Palme versions, see ia.
Bohr 1950; Wolfers 1962 <1952>: 158-165; Herz 1959; Jervis
1976: --).<32>
Finally, and logically following from this:

4) security as one of the aims (or 'values') pursued through


foreign policy. The sub-discipline of Comparative Foreign
Policy has witnessed numerous attempts at typologies for the
'goals pursued by a state'. Also Aron (1966 <1962>: 71-82)
makes a typology of the aims of a state: three eternal
objectives, Security, Power and Glory, and the historically
specific ones that can discussed also under three headings:
territory, subjects and ideas ('Space, Men and Souls').

One way of indicating what is missing from all four, and


thereby summing up my argument so far, could be by way of
comparison with a recent article by, Fred Halliday (1988a).
Halliday shows the importance of chosing to think of the
state in two different ways; state-i and state-2. He claims
that I.R. implicitly operate with a concept of 'the state'
which he charecterizes as "the national-territorial totality"
- that which is denoted visually on a map: "the country as a
whole and all that is within it: territory, government,
people, society (l988a: 217). Halliday wants instead a focus
on the state as "a specific set of coercive and
administrative institutions" (1988a: 218). Among other new
issues being opened for research, Halliday points out how the
interlinking - by the state/regime - of international and
domestic issues becomes an esseantial issue: "Those in state
power, and those associated with the state, will deploy
international ressources to contain domestic threats (...).
Much of international relations can be seen therefore as an
internationalization of domestic conflicts, of relations

____----

32. "It.implieE that national security policy, except when


directed against a country unalterably committed to ''ttack,
is. the more rational the more it . succeeds in taking the
interests, including - the security interests of the others
side into consideration" (Wolfers 1962 (1952):. 161).

33. The last 6 words are problematic. There isa tendency in


Halliday to reduce. 'political conflicts'., to conflicts between

- 28 - -
When it can be generally assumed that all states are status
quo powers, a focus on inherent vicious circles in a closed
universe of 'security' - generated by short-sighted policies
- will naturally lead to the kind of security thinking today
known as common security. (For pre-Palme versions, see i.a.
Bohr 1950; Wolfers 1962 <1952>: 158-165; Herz 1959; Jervis
1976: --).<32>

Finally, and logically following from this:

4) security as one of the aims (or 'values') pursued through


foreign policy. The sub_discipline of Comparative Foreign
Policy has witnessed numerous attempts at typologies for the
'goals pursued by a state'. Also Aron (1966 <1962>: 71-82)
makes a typology of the aims of a state: three eternal
objectives, Security, Power and Glory, and the historically
specific ones that can discussed also under three headings
territory, subjects and ideas ('Space, Men and Souls').

One way of indicating what is missing from all four, and


thereby summing up my argument so far, could be by way of
coiiparison with a recent article by Fred Halliday (1988a).

Halliday shows the importance of chosing to think of the


state in two different ways; state-i and state-2. He claims
that I.R. implicitly operate with a concept of 'the state'
which he charecterizes as "the national-territorial totality"
- that which is denoted visually on a map: "the country as a
whole and all that is within it: territory, government,
people, society (1988a: 217). Halliday wants instead a focus
on the state as "a specific set of coercive and
administrative institutions" (1988a: 218). Among other new
issues being opened for research, Halliday points out how the
iriterlinking - by the state/regime - of international and
domestic issues becomes an esseantial issue: "Those in state
power, and those associated with the state, will deploy
international ressources to contain domestic threats (...).
Much of international relations can be seen therefore as an
internationalization of domestic conflicts, of relations

32 "It unplies that national security policy, except when


directed against a country unalterably committed to' attack,
is the more ratIonal the more it succeeds in taking the
interests, including the security interests of the others
side into consideration" (Wolfers 1962 (1952): 161).

33. The last 6 words are problematic. There is a tendency in


Halliday to reduce 'political conflicts' to conflicts between

- 28 -
between state and society."<33>

I follow Hidemi Suganaini (1988) in insisting on the


impossibility of thinking state-2 without state-i. There is
an element of territoriality - a state can not be just any
administrative unit (there are after all the same number of
state-2s and state-is). Furthermore, I diverge from Halliday
in stressing more the link between the state and the ruling
elite/a specific social order - not following Halliday's
orientation towards the 'apparatus' as such. But the basic
distinction between states 1 and 2 could clarify the present
argument. Basically the speech-act theory of security
operates with state-2. We talk about. a construct<ion> of
order defending itself against threats from both sides. In
contrast, the dominant conceptions of security share the
'state-i' - all four.<34>
3.2. 'Alternative Security'

There are 2 main tendencies in conceptualizing security


'differently'. Both see them selves as 'broader' conceptions
taking the concept free of the narrow confines of military
means and 'national' objectives. .One bases security ': a
'value' basis and defines security as (or in relation to)
positive goals like survival, development, freedom and
identity. The other works more traditionally retaining the
more 'negative' meaning of security but tries to bring in
other actors or levels (individual and international).

Th ost guaiified representatives of the two strands seem to


J state and society. Besides setting up 'soceity' as ttie new
'. innocent 'good' (above poiitics) it detracts awareness from
the relationship between IR and the various conflicts in the
societies.

34. Foreign Policy Analysis is sometimes closer to a state-2


since the state is located between domestic and foreign
'variables'. A very good example of FPA where all 'objective'
or 'national' interests are replaced by the calculations of
'the regime' loacted at: the domestic-international border is
Mouritzen 1988. It has been an important insipiration for the
present article due to its consistent, concpetualization in
terms of regimes.

35. Unfortunately the .main.work ofJan berg.is notavailable


in English, only Danish. (1983). .and..Swedish. (1986). . Shorter
presentations of. .the. main ideas. can be. found in Aiheit,
Kjaer & Sandktthler. (eds) . 1985,.pp.175-179,. and ???????.
Integrated into a larger context similar ideas are expressed

- 29 -
4

me to be Jan berg and Barry Buzan.<35>


Jan berg's basic argument is that 'peace' can be defined as
the permanent process which aims at developing security and
securing development. What does this mean?
He insists that an understanding of security, development or
peace has to start out from a model of human needs. (berg
follows Galtung in operating with 4 categories of needs:
political (freedom), cultural (identity), economic (welfare)
and military<?> (protection). Security is then "the combined
defence policy for each need category, the totality of
defence endeavours entire human-societal
organization".

Most of the book concentrates on criticising the present


world. Various institutions and abstraction are shown not to
serve the needs of the individuals, the human needs.
'Security' as it is employed now is a part of the problem.
Thus, 'security' attains a double meaning in berg's book:
1)_a part of all <or: the> good.cz36>

2) actual 'security' = national security = arms races and


mal'-development. <pp.179ff>
berg's style is very good at connecting: A is related to B,
and B can not be properly understood without taking C into
account, etc. But it is generally a doubtful method that
in Fischer, Nolte and berg, forthcoming.

36. In fact all good links together by definition, since the


basic methodological( (??)) principle of the book is
'isoinorphism'. The current reality is marked by a 'negative
isomorphism' of mal-development and in-security linked
together through a 'culture and code o militarism. 'Peace'
will be the 'positive isomorphism' of development and
security.

37:. Essentially. this amounts to mixing up extension and


intension of a concept; that also b is an example of A
(extension) versus what it is that makes b (together with a
and c) examples of A (intension). (Somehow ' 'broad'
definitions have come into fashion - they are ususally seen
as more progressive. One is inevitably in a weaker position
wanting to argue for the exclusion of something from the
defining traits of a category because everyone can see that
(at 1-east in thepresent case) thereisa link A broad
definition of a horse is "an animal with more than one leg".)

- 30 -
p -- --- - - --

wants - on this account - to bring the relations into the


definition<37>. In berg's case this method leads to a
conceptual universe where it is un-clear whether 'security'
and 'development' have become synonymous or 'security' is
somehow the more structural precondition for development
(pp.171 and 173). Basically security can not be seperated
from (any) other goals since they are generated from the
individual level. The individual have various needs and can
be hurt by threats to any of these, whereas the concept of
security at the state-level (in the classical disocurse;
section 1.1.) was linked not to a specific ultimate aim but
to a modality: the possibility of a challenge leading to an
ultimate test of will and force.

Very interesting is then the way the repressed, classical


-concept of security returns:
1) bergs own concept of security can not be presented
without the classical one as sparring partner. berg's
security is 'broader'; there are 'other' threats than the
military ones; y is just as relevant as the classical x;
etc. But there is not a basic logic to berg's security
other than as corrective/mirror image of the traditional
concept. If the classical discourse had not existed, if we
did not all of us take it for granted as part of the
universe, we would not understand berg's conception.

2) There is still certain phenomena that berg can only deal


with through a most traditional concept of security (that has
somehow miraculously survived the 'redefinition'). Thus, the
broad, alternative concept co-exists with a classical one
that handles the problems of real danger of war and on
Non-offensive defence. <<p.214ff> <elaborate?>

Conclusion: the classical concept is still there. Naybe, it


even works more effeciently in the text when the author
believes be has-got rid of it?. -

_1
-0-

Elsewhere (-Waver.l - . - have icised similar arguments


put forward by R.B.J.-Walk . -a critique -o,f Buzan 1983
(Walker 1987b). thisflou e-...integraed into the
present pape. haven't had time sier it. Recently
Wa1ker-. in a different context (19&8.;

( -
-31-
- I - - - -

For all its aura of tough-minded clarity -he


dominant understanding of security is exc onally
msy and vague. As a centr term of
con orary political discourse ecurity' seems
to ha een abandoned to t ropagandists nad
ideologues, has becom ss a concept with any
analytical c on an n instrument of
mystifying rhet . Appeals to the need for
security justif e m blatant abuses and
encourage th esort to e alating levels of
violence, appeals egiti e vast arsenals
and th urtailment of ocrati rights and
proc es. The concept of se rity i now more a
s om of the problem than guide to the
sibilities of peace and justice.
approach of Walker and berg is then to counte this
hrough reference to a more 'human' - less 'mystifying .' -
meaning of 'security'. This is a foundational approach - d
it forgoes the possibility of dealing with that which is don
in- the existing arena of 'security'. /1 (done at present
through the concept of security).

-0-

2) on Buzan:

Buzan wants to avoid a definition of the concept of security


- it is an 'essentially contested concept'.<38> I certainly
agree there has to be retained an open element. (The
argument is essential for section 4 of the present paper ...)

38. Cf Gallie 1956 and conolly 1974. Buzan's main argument


for not defining the concept seems to be its inherently
political/ideological meaning foreclosing the possibility of
making a definition above the competing world views (It is
.a question how -e then write and talk at all. Basically all
concepts are 'contested' as the meaning of all are defined
relationally inthe -1anguage -system - cf. Saussuie and
Laclau/Nouffe. Some kind of inter-subjective meaning is
constructed even if it should theoretically be 'impossible' -
that is, it cannot be substantial only convential; Cf
Brandt 1988 and Waver 1989d: 48) . Thus it should be possible
to speculate somewhat more about a unifying modality.) Buzan
has a different line of argument pointing to the different
meaning it has :- to: different states due to geographic,
historic and political reasons. This is stressed much more
strongly by Kissinger 1957 - and Jahn et al 1987 and 1988.

- 32 -
We can not as researchers define abstractly the 'true
security' of state x. But the concept of security can not be
traced solely by talking 'around' it. It is not enough to
map by walking back and forth across the territory. There is
something unifying - otherwise there would be no discourse.
The unifying moment is probably a certain basic modality.
And, indeed, it is in Buzan's book. It slips out between the
lines. (More on this in a moment.)
By this manoevre Buzan pretends to obtain an openness which
is false. It results in a duality of perspectives: on the
one hand, there is a focus on national security (put in a
broad context) on the other hand Buzan presents as an
essential idea that security is - and should be - located at
3 levels (individual, state and international). This is
mirrored in the titel/sub-title contrast: People, States and
Fear: The National Security Problem in International
Relations. For analytical purposes I prefer the sub-title
(though, of course, the title is stylisticly attractive, and
the combination compelling).

A further opening is carried out through questioning whether


'state' is such a self-evident concept. It is de-coinposed
into: physical base, institutions and idea. (This is an
important prerequsite for Buzan's big step forward for our
understanding of the importance of different kinds of
vulnerabilities; cf. section 4 below. But it is not
unproblematic for the concept of security.)

Two questions to Buzan: 1) is there a definition of security


hidden in the text?; ii) can we really, as he proposes,
create a three-decker out of the concept of security?

1) As already indicated above (in 1.1.) the real definition


is linked to the strong state (where security relates purely
to external threats). This is the ideal type around which
the thinking is developped. In the other cases one cannot
really talk security! When Buzan is in our part of the world
it is taken for granted that. the. (relevant) states , are
strong. This leads to problems in relation to l.a. Eastern
Europe. And it is, accordingly, left out (Buzan . 1989);
European security takes place -in a US-Soviet-West European
triangle.'
So 'real' security relates to external threats.

Second aspect:' Is it decomposed together 'with the ,'state'


into the three elements?. So it is presented, ,but this is a
confusion of ultimate reference with modalities.'.' Ends and
means. What is important to security is a test of means -
the ends are secondary. This is what lends unity to the

- 33 -
concept (cf 3.1.). But this is my- claim not Buzan' s. No, not
only mine. Buzan has a chapter on threats divided into
sectors (military, political, economic, ecological). And it
is clear that the military is the- starting point whereas the
others have somehow started to challenge it. How? in the
chapter on military threats some words are revealing: The
military threats have been primary because they evolved
"swiftly" and with "a sense of outrage at unfair play" (Buzan
1983: 75) This used to be an option mainly related to the
military sphere. When the sante can be done through economic
or political means overturning the political order these will
be security problems, too. Isn't this the basic definition
of security that it relates to developments that can undercut
the politial order and thereby "alter the premises for all
other questions" (Jahn et al 1987: 9)?

Thus there is an idea of the 'test point', too. And this is


probably what is lost with the de-composition of the state
the state is united through the concept of sovereignty And
even if challenges can operate on the different components of
the state they pass though one focus: the test of will
deciding the status regarding domains of sovereignty.
ii) Does it make sense to operate with 'security' at three
levels (indvidual, state-level and international) - and
arguing about the correct 'balance' between the three? As
argued elsewhere (Jahn et al 1987: 51-53) it seems more
correct to put this in terms of 'enlightened' national
security policy, since the policies that takes into account
the dynamics at the other levels will be the optimum policy
for national security. It will not be a balancing operation
since it does not aim for less national security. More
basically we have the question about the nature of security
at the different levels; do we have a clear idea about the
referent object at the other levels?

* individual' Security: It is certainly not inunpossible to


deal sericly (scientifically) with individual security
(Berki 1986 is the best proof to this). But the problem is
whether this is the place to search for answers to
i.R.-guestions. As I have put it previously: Is it the same
security? (Jahn et a? l987 52).

Does this logic of individual security link up to the one at


the national level? Buzan' own analysis does not sh this
very well. What he connects is all kinds of political
developments at the sub-state level of (high!) importance for
national security. It is not necessarily indivdua1 security
that relates to national security. -
* International Security: It .is an old story that the meaning

- _34 -
of international security is a very open question. Does it
mean the maximum security for the iuaximuin number of states?
Then it is basically defined at the national level and then
aggregated. Or is it the global security for human beings -
then it is defined at the individual level - and then
aggregated. Is it the stability of the international
system/order? Probably not since this would often be a
rather negative thing and not similar to what is usually seen
as a positive aim: international security. Is it then,
fourthly, the security against international war? For some
reason this is often the analytical solution preferred but it
seems unacceptable due to the fact that security is generally
seen as more than security against war (i.a. freedom); and
this can not be left out at the international level just
because there is no harmony between the different national
goals.<39> Leaving aside all the problems of weighing if
there is war between Ghana and Togo but increased security in
Europe, we have what seems to be an insolvable problem about
the unit of reference.

But Buzan is definitely right (and has done an important work


in showing) that national security can neither be
sufficiently understood nor realistically obtained from a
perspective only viewing the world from the spot where \one's
on state happens to be located. National security is
radically dependent on international dynamics (and among
these probably especially the regional ones). This is,
however, not a relationship between national security and
international security.

Instead of locating 'security' at three different levels we


should understand national security through Waver's hourglass
model: international level various dynamics

state conceptual focus:


'security'

sub-state various dynamics

39. A somewhat similar dilemma appears in the litterature on


'common security' also tending to give security against war
prominence relative to security against/ political
intimidation (Jahn et al 1987; Waver 1989c).

- 35 -
The meaning of 'security' is basically 'national security'
and related to a specific problematique (the stability of the
political order). If one tries to move the concept of
security to the other spheres (individual/international) this
will in reality amount to speaking about something else -it
is not the 'same security'. Therefore, the only meaningful
way to speak about 'security' is to relate to the classical
meaning (national security) and broaden the understanding of
relevant dynamics: not only state-to-state, but also the
quality of international politics and sub-state dynamics.
The concept of security is posited :at the level of 'state'.
At the other levels developments can not be summed up in a
similar way. We have various interactions at all three
levels. But the issue of 'security' has to be read through
the lense of 'national security'.

Conclusion: again we see that abetter underst4j,i'ng is


obtained by trying to stay as close as possible to the
classical un lerstanding of security. And thereby try to
frighten the classical concept into making small but decisive
movements:

3.3. Post Strucuturalist Realism


The present approach to the security problem is intended as
an alternative to the more common 'alternative' security.
Almost all the - very different - theories of security agree
in defining security as a positive object to maximize. The
more security the better - it just has to be the right one.
There are disagreements over the content of security.
'Alternative' thinkers generally want to propose a broader
concept. These critics contest the what or the who
(threatens) or the whom to be secured. (They do not
scrutinize the 'securitiness' of the phenomenon.) Thus their
project seems to be to set the ideal definition and then
orient politics in that direction. However, security is by
its nature a negative problem. Security policies deal with
security problems (in-security) We will (hopefully) never
walk rond saying "Wonderful, how secure we are noi'. If
there are no security problems we will think 1i other
categories: politics, economy, etc.
Security and In-security does not constitute a binary
opposition - not a relation of contrarity; i.e. the
opposition does not present an exhaustive list of options.

- 36 -
'Security' signifies a situation marked by the presence of a
security problem and some measure against it. In-security is
the situation with a security problem but no measure against
it. The both share the security probleiuatique. There are
obviously situations other than these; characterised by
'a-security' or 'non-non-security'. The semiotics of this is
a large issue in itself. Suffice it for now to say that we
should not necessarily let ourselves be limited to the
universe of security <---> in-security. (See also appendix.)

Viewing the security debate at present, one often gets the


impression of the object playing around with the subjects -
the field with the researchers. The problemati.que is locking
people into talking in terms of 'security' - and thereby
re-inforcing the hold of 'security' on our thinking. There
is no approach aiming at a de-securitization of politics.
Therefore it is necessary to avoid the more widespread form
of working 'critically'.. This usually takes the form of
subjecting a concept to sustained critique - and then
redefining it. This is not a viable strategy in relation to
essential, metaphysical concepts like sovereignty and state -
inherent in our political philosophy and structures. When
they are denounced (or voluntaristically redefined), they
show up in new forms; i.a. that the new concept is a
mirrored version of the old.

When critics in this way denounce the traditional concerns


and try to place some other problems on the agenda in stead -
without noticing the basic modality of security - the logic
of security is left un-touched. (Or re-inforced.) Truly
critical analysis works with the logic of the traditional
discourse - from the inside - and reinforces an already
existing dimension of its internal logic until this becomes
destabilizing for the traditional security thinking. Then -
because of the 'respectful' treatment - the classical concept
is displaced. We deal with the classical core - but in a new
circumscription. New perspectives for security policy is
opened exactl.y by spelling out this actual logic of security
as jus necessitatis for threatened elites. Not in order to
'disclose' the naked truth to be then turned down. The
purpose is to open new political perspectives by taking
serious, this 'un-founded', concept of security that does not
refer to any 'objective' security: outside itself. <40>

40. The present approach - mainly inspired by the works of


Jacques Derrida - is set forth at some length in Waver 1989d.
Cf. especially Jacques Derrida 1981a (1972) and 1982 (1972).

-37-
The aim of 'post-structuralist realism' is to develop a
theory that can be political. It does not want to find a new
place to stand outside realism. InCstead it tries to be at
the limit of the tradition. Working with the classical
meanings in a way which is faithful - but too faithful. The
method will be to work with the realist concepts in order to
mark them so that they are not able anymore to function in
the harmonious self-assured standard-discourse of realism.
This is not achieved through a change from outside, but from
the inside. (The name 'PSR' achieves this by its double
meaning: it is a post-structuralist reading of realism. But
it is also 'post' in particular to the structural realism of
Waltz - the main object for the deconstructivist criticism.
In this way - and generally by laboring faithfully on the
classical concepts it it in a way inside realism and in a way
outside. It is not clear whether I am a realist or not.) 3"

Take a concept - one dimension of realist reality - and make


it unfold ... until it becomes problematic. Not by inventing
new meanings (as this is a completely unrestrained
possibility it is also irrelevant, no rules, no meaning) In
stead it is done by asking patiently for the intrinsic
meaning of the concept - until this becomes dangerous,
destabilizing. Our primary example is of course 'security':
This concept functions today partly by simulating a reference
tosome vaguely defined objective - ''security' as the aim we
try to maximize. One can bounce off from this dimension and
try to fill out the content (what is to be secured
Another possibility is to show that the logic is in fact
circular - and rightly so. A security problem is that which
is labelled so by someone in a position to define this. And
this is it. This is the actual use, and the actual logic of
reasoning around it. It is just not spelled out (for obvious
reasons) that the 'language game' of 'security' is a us
necessjtatjs for threatened elites. The point in reading
this out of the traditional discourse is not to 'disclose'
this naked truth in order for people to 'reject' security.
This logic of security is an intrinsic element in the logic
of our political organizing principle (national and
international). By taking seriousthis 'un-founded' concept
of security it is possible to raise a new agenda of security
research and politics.

We could also take another example: 'defence': One


possibility is to broaden the concept to an all-connecting
synonym for everything good. (Defense is to defed that
which is valuable, etc.) The political issue becomes then
the definition of what is valuable; a 'moral' question. And
it is rather easy for the traditional discourse to keep a
distance to this. Also one will notice that a very simple
meaning of defence will then be transferred along, as nothing

38
9 /

/ 1:
-

4'j ' .'J/

s''34A _/c I L
It

k4rn 4/ A ' '1


sL/(, - - A i:
Ji? Jk IL, , .' ,.
is done to the 'figure' fanning structurally the basis for
its meaning.
Another possibility is to narrow it until it becomes so sharp
that it can really cut: distinguish it from deterrence; point
out how the logic of deterrence and defence actually
contradict each other, etc. This has been one influential
strategy in the work on Non-offensive Defence,. to simply take
the concepts of defence and strategy back to their basic
meaning - not least through a very structured reading of
Clausewitz (Boserup 1986 and forthcoming).

As a general strategy this implies to locate oneself


balancing on the edge of realism: working on the classical
text where one continues engaging the traditional concepts
but dicplaces them by stressing operations that are already
active in the realist text.
All texts contain various strata that are not at peace with
each other. They can be mobilized against each other. In
the case of 'realism' it is therefore possible - at various
points - to be "more realist than the realists". And this
kind of working with the tradition has a chance of really
leaving marks on the basic figures of thinking so that the
concepts can afterwards not be their old, innocent self
anymore. (As it has to some extent happened to the concepts
of 'defence' and 'stability' through the most 'realist' part
of the discourse on non-offensive defence.) Concepts and
theories are after this 'treatment' in a way different and in
a way the same. Therefore it is difficult for the tradition
to reappropriate this discourse without being contaminated by
it.

The possiblity is in recognizing that what we are moving in -


as well as what we are making - is: the trace. The
development has become a process - neither more nor less.
Letting go of the image of definitive fixed points, pre-given
meaning, we are left with the possibility of writing on with
the given material, commenting and criticizing without
thereby achieving any new foundings in 'history' or in
structural, ahjstorjcal 'laws'. What we do is only
understandable on the background of that which preceded.
There is no fixed starting or end point.

This might sound as a simple relativism. It is not:'


17
To put things simpi: Critical approaches are often
presented with a dii*emma. On th one hand we have
criticisms building on all kinds of 'absolute" grounds that
are always questionable. On the other hand we have positions
stressing that there is no ultimate point of reference. They

- 39 -
run the risk of seemingly just opening up unlimited
possibilites for theoretical activities (without effect and
any rules). The latter seems to be troubled by the
difficulty of finding any necessity. And furthermore this
'relativism' will always be reproached with the critique of
undercutting itself: how can one be absolutely sure about
relativism, etc.
The writings of Derrida seems to handle this dilemma by
treating the existing philosophical (metaphysical) tradition
as tightly integrated, forcing our thinking into fixed
patterns. Working with this tradition thereby demands a high
degree of discipline. The inertness of the tradition might
offer something relatively solid to hold on to. 'Anything
goes' is. avoided at the same time as (illusionary)
foundations are also dispensed with.
.-
0 -

For a deconstructive attempt at displacing a metaphysical


concept there will be several possibilities. The one
pzesented in this article is therefore not the only
possible. Still it is not possible to do just anything. The
textual work has to follow some inherent structures in the
tradition. In other contexts it would be more useful - that
is more relevant and carrying more effect - to work in other
directions. The present concept is mainly developped with
the purpose of analysing the political dimensions of current
European security (and to politicise the security issue).
The discourse on 'security' could and should be analysed from
various other perspectives: why did 'security' achieve the
present prominent position?; what are the broader
structurations of political space carried out through the use
of the 'security' discourse - l.a. for the self-image
created in and for the United States?; and how does the
concept of 'security' link into the competing conceptual
universes in the various political struggles? <41> The
danger of the present conceptualization is to under-play the
role of security in the long-term struggle over meaning (cf
Waver 1989a & c). it is, however, also important to
understand the 'micro-politics' the specific moves in the

41. The importance of the second question . ha.s been jointed


out amongst others by Michael Shapiro (1989: 17) and some
attempts at analysis have been made notably by Bradley S.
Klein who also touches on the first question. The third
question has been - and will remain - at the center of my own
main work analysing the security debate in the FRG.

- 40 -
stream of events (Waver, eternally forthcoming).
We also tend to underestimate here the '-sign'function of
'security' (or the exchange of 'signals') (cf Schelling 1960;
Jervis 1976; Baudriliard 1983; NoCanles 1984; Derrida 1984c;
Tunander 1989; Waver l989d: 102-105; Luke 1989). In contrast
to this communications perspective we are here more
investigating the 'limit' to communication; i.e. the cases
when it is deemed necessary to seek self-reliant action.
The present analysis therefore tries to take the concept of
security in a specific direction which is deemed relevant in
the context of European security. This does not mean that
one can 'define' a concept of security for a particular
purpose (the 'instrumentalist' view of concepts; nor can we
search for the true meaning of the concept, which would be
the position of a strong 'realist'). Textual practice is
limited by the existing material, by the dimensions and
tensions already existing in the tradition of thinking; but
different strategies are available for the textual work.
This one aims at an interference in European Security of the
l990s.
Finally, there might be a need for developping
'counter-discourse' as well. The present approach seems at
first to exclude this possibility by attacking all attempts
to develop 'peoples security' or 'global security'. The
point is however not to deny the role of counter-discourse -
just to point out that it should probably not be done in
terms of security. Then the inner force of 'security' - the
weight of classical thinking - is likely to take its
revenge. 'Visions' coined in any kind of security
terminology will inevitably stabilize the importance of an
insecurity-security dimensions. Alternative programs are
more likely to lead beyond 'traditional security' if they are
expressed in terms of a-security; other aims.

3.4. Clarifying the notion of 'security' as a speech act

In section 2 the conception of security being a speech act


was presented in a loose, narrative form in methas res But
is it possible to formulate it somewhat more formally - and
maybe using the more detailed elements of this theory. This
is the first question to be adressed in this section
Secondly, it is necessary to explain the relationship between
the speech act argument and an understanding in terms of
security regime, rules of the game, or the like. Thirdly,
there are some more philosophical guestions'to be (too)
briefly considered, since it would at first seem to be a

- 41 -
somewhat surprising constellation to have speech act theory
married to- post-structuralism. After all Derrida hos mounted
a major attack on speeh act theory. And the immediate
answers of Searle were rather weak - and the dialogue not
really a dialogue. Some recent contributions have pointed to
the possibilities of a somewhat more fruitful relationship;
and to the points of similarity.

1) What exactly is the 'security' act?


First, speech act theory in general: In the early version
J.L. Austin distinguished between Performatives and
Constatives. Constatives are 'traditional' sentences making
statements of a descriptive nature about something
independent of the statement itself. This kind of statement
is either true or false (or non-sensical). The term
'performative' (like 'Speech Act') "indicates that the
issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action (1980
<1962>: 6). -

Later Austin changed the theory so that all statements were


seen as speech acts. They have three independent dimensions:
1) the locutionary is the simple 'saying something' (about
something). Still to be viewed as true or false, etc. 2)
the perlocutionary effect is the effect on someone else who
is made to do something. 3) the illocutionary force is what
we could a bit simplistically call the 'pure speech act
dimension'. It does not depend on the effect on the receiver
(in contrast to the perlocutionary act) nor can it be seen
independent of any external 'felicity conditions'. Like
promises, betting, naming a ship, ... they are executed as
soon as the sentence is uttered if certain conditions are met
- conditions that can be defined for each particular act (you
shall be the one who is assigned to name the ship, etc).

What is the illocutionary act in relation to security? It is


to define the particular case as one belonging to a specific
category ('security') where the state tends to use all
aviabie means to -combat it. It is partly a threat but also a
kind of promise since more is staked on the particular
issue. The sovereign '-himself' (the -regime) is potentially
put into question.
It might not end out like this. That is -another question.
One can make promises -and -break them. However, usually not
without some consequences!

The perlocutionary effect is a different question from its


illocutionary strength. The perlocuti-oriary ac -depends on
the final outcome - i.e. including the relations of power.
The illocutionary force is just a question of succeding in

- 42 -
S

establishing: This question is hereby turned into a


test-case. It is an open question whether the state then
fails - with possible effects for sovereignty or the social
order - or it succeeds in blocking the developments in case.
The act in iself just serves to raise the stakes to a
principled level.

A major part of Austin's theory consists in setting up the


felicity conditions for a speech act. <listing them --

applying to 'security'. This is to follow ....>

2) Are we then speaking about a kind of 'rules of the game'?


Yes and no: There is a certain code (or 'convention') and the
enunciation of the security-reference does presuppose some
general presupposition of a specific meaning otherwise it
would be useless (after all, we can view all language use and
probably all behaviour in this perspective). This approach
could, however, be misleading as it could tempt us into
viewing 'security'. as functioning on the basis of an
international 'norm' - on some 'international society' If
this wasthe case it's effeciencly would be dependent on
other states accepting the legitimacy of the speech-act. And
this is exactly not the case.

This kind of 'negotiated' activities are interesting and


worth studying. But we are here interested in the step
before this - the act that is carried out unilaterally by the
actor fecur-itizing a-eetaizL issu Thi-s--a-et3moving a
certain issue into the security domain is first of all a
statement about what is potentially going to happen
domestically (i.e. bringing a possible emergency situation
into the perspective).

It is then a further question to ask for the 'regimes' (or


just 'rules of the game' or norms) that are set up. These
are necessarily based on some degree of reciprocity (Cohen
1981: 26f; Keohane -- ; Jervis ---). There can be some degree
of regime evolution on the domestic as well as the
international side. The sub-sections 2.2-2.4. in fact dealt
with the possibility: Of deveoppng such regimes, shared
expectations - rules of the game for the (still basically
unilateral) use of the speech-act: 'this is a security
probl:emF.

3) The third question. is motivated to a large extent by a


general image of incompatability of post-structuralism (a la
Derrida) and speech act theory - an image mainly stemming
from one specific, rather harsh debate.. In ',197l Jacques
Derrida read a paper (published in English 1977) basically

- 43 -
attempted to question our traditional concepts of
conuuunication and context. (In -many ways this article is a
brillant summary of some of Derrida's central themes from the
early books (1974, 1978).) Of this article some seven pages
dealt with speech act theory. This motivated a completely
negative response by John R. Searle who saw literally no
value in Derrida's contribution. Actually Searle found that
Derrida had "a distressing penchant for saying things that
are obviously false" (1977: 203). And furthermore his line of
argumentation was generally too un-clear for really allowing
for a debate. Derrida's lengthy reply (1977b/78?) contained
some rather vicious traits (of which some are entertaining).
And the 'dialogue' ended.

it has more recently been pointed out that this should not
make us overlook some elements of affinity.
Post-structuralism and strands of analytical philosophy share
the denial of a purely represential view of language (Frank
1983: 279-286). And in fact Derrida stressed how he felt
committed to some of the essential ideas of Austin (Searle's
'Grand Theory' is, howevex, more problematic than Austin's
original more playfull variant.) Christopher Norris points
out how Paul de Man (who was seen as the leading American
'deconstructivist') puts the constative/performative
distinction "to work in ways undreamed of by J.L.Austin"
(Norris 1988: 43). Manfred Frank (1980; 1983) has carried out
some of the most carefull investigations of the relationship
between Derrida and Anglo-saxon analytical philosophy.

We should here notice the possibility of a Nietzscheari


interpretation of Austin (Derrida 1978: ; Frank 1983: 498f).
Even a constantjve statement is not in the last instance to
be understood through pure logic. The creation of meaning is
conceptualized in terms of force - not truth.

The most extreme Nietzschean variant of Speech Act Theory,


Deleuze's, has something to contribute to the present
project. lie reminds us that we should not over-stress the
character of 'rules' which would lead us to see speech acts
as basically a cooperative behavior, a project of
coordination (cf 'regime theory', norms in a rational choice
perspective, etc etc). Deleuze stresses that langauge is
basically about orders (cf Frank 1983: 499). "Language is not
even created for one to believe but for obeying and for
making others obey" <42>

42. Deleuze, Mule Plateux, p.96, quoted by Frank (1983: 499)


- unofficial translation by Ulla Holm.

- 44 -
I

What is the the conclusion regarding a post-structuralist use


of speech act theory for the analysis of security? That it
is o.k. to use it but there is a marked difference compared
to the use by certain others. In the Derrida-Searle debate
the major problem is clearly the role of intentions
(intentional ity): whether speech acts are understood (and
works) through the receiver's understanding of the sender's
intention (Searle). Derrida opposes this strongly (with a
long argument which we cannot and nead not go into at
present). But Frank shows how this critique only prevents a
fixed 'grammar' for speech acts; i.e. Searle's 'Taxanomy of
Illucotionary Acts'. The rules for felicity/infelicity are
never fixed - and success therefore never secure.

Thus, in a way the most interesting about a speech act is


that it might fail. And this is an essential part of its
meaning (Derrida 1978: 189). In our context this is clearly
the case: the invocation of 'security' is only possible
because it invokes the image of what would happen if it did
not work And not only this (this would be a simple
aufhebung whereby the possibility and menaing was secured by
the non-realised idea of failure): the security speech act is
only a problematic and thereby political move because it has
aprice. The securitizer is raising the stakes and investing
some (real) risk of losing (general) sovereignty in order to
fence of a specific challenge. In the present usage of
speech act theory the meaning of the particular speech act is
thus equally constituted by its possible success and its
possbile failure - one is not primary and the other derived

43. This is quite the contrary usage f the one by JUrgen


Habermas (i.a. 1979 (1976): --). Habermas basically uses
speech act theory for constructing his general framework in
the form of a 'pragmatics' building on language as a
phenomenon and not in a narrow semantic sense; but he also
wants to argue the distinction between communicative and
strategic action. As pointed out by Jonathan Culler (1988:
189) the latter distinction really does not follow the
distinction in speech act theory between perlucotionary and
illucotionary acts. The first, and primary, operation has
led Haberinas to a position wiere 'language' is the key but
the category of language is an idealised one, wherefore all
arguments from empirical language use together with more
complex theories of language are un-welcome. 'T have
presented these arguments in 1989d: --. For the present
puropse the remark on Habermas has only the purpose of
pointing out that he and I use speech act theory for quite
different purposes. So one should not be confused to assume
somerelationship to any kind of 'universal pragmatics' just

- 45 -
(Derrida 1978). <43>

4. na1ysis of tie Piguration through the Concepts of


Security

This is not really written for the present purpose but stolen
from another context. Just in order to give an impression of
the kind of arguments I would like to make in the last
section. Or not make? Should this section go along or not?
A few words about the method of 'figuration' analysis have to
be put in (cf Elias and Foucault). Probably as 3.2. And in
3.3. a paragraph on French-German relations have fallen out.
3 1. Concepts of Security as object of 1ysis

As Barry Buzan has pointed out, security is one of those


'essentially contested concepts' that, given their inherent
political character, cannot be precisely defined (Buzan
1983: 6ff.)

The core-fears of each nation are unique; they relate to its


vulnerabilities (Ibid: 36-93; and Kissinger 1957: 29f, 82f,
207ff, 30Sf, and 324ff.) and historical experience.
(Neustadt and Nay 1986; Jervis 1976: especially pp.58ff and
217ff). Thus security means different things to different
nations.

Is it possible to adumbrate a general pattern for the late


198Os/early 199Os, a situation ci aracterized by post-INF
dynamism and general expectations of some kind of
'Europeanization'?

Here it is again necessary to avoid the 'scientific'


definition of the different actors' security. The nature of
the fears is no more a given of the situation than the nature
of the reaction; both are political decisions. We should
analyse these decisions on threat perceptions and security
statements cf Birnbaum in Lodgaard and Br.nbaum 1987). It
can be recommended to pay attention to the difference in
emphasis between East and West on non-military dimensions of
security. inong the most urgent priorities fr the East is
economic security, whereas the West tends to focus on the
political (military-pol.itwal).

To use these facts to outline the transnata.onal figUration,


we must structurally locate the relevant fears:

because of the reference to 'speech acts' (A , critique by


Habermas of Derrida's attack on Austin and Searle can be
found in 1985: 227ff).
-2 a/c'

- 46 -
3.3. The Current Figuration

Western fears focus on the 'high level' related to diplomacy


and disarmament policy: the image of Gorbachev being the most
'able' player on the diplomatic scene--and especially on the
transnational media screen. (This fear is probably not
lessened by the change of American President 1988/89!)

For the East, the perceived threat is developments coming


from below, developments whose goals are not necessarily
clear. But social interaction with the West, the need to
react to human rights campaigns or 'intervention in domestic
affairs', does pose a challenge. So do the processes of
economic integration, which happen pretty much on the terms
Set by the West, or more particularly, the EEC. The West is
acquiring increasing possibilities of leverage in the East
through economic linkage. But it may well be that the
political effects of not linking up to the world market are
more threatening and, paradoxically, take similar forms:
destabilization and popular discontent.'<44>

Thus it is very understandable that Eastern security concepts


in the Eighties involve a 'broad understanding' of the term,
and considerable interest in 'non-military aspects'.

Eastern diplomacy has always stressed the need for


non-intervention, respect for borders and so on. In the new
security debates, this has evolved into a broader notion of
security, including social, political and especially economic
security. <45> The sensitivity generated in the East by the
'German problem' relates partly to military matters, but also
to the fear of social destabilization. The Federal Republic
is, after all, the only state in Europe to avow what we might
call a 'revisionist' outlook in the matter of nation-states -

44. For a typology of economic effects on security, see Hanns


Maull, 'Trade, Technology and Security: Implications for East
Asia and the West: Part I', in Adelphi Papers 218, spring
l87, pp.23-38. The effects of economic performance :have to
be weighed against the risks of increased vulnerability to
foieign leverage made possible by dependence. On the
rationale of linking up to the world market, see especially
Lemaitre 1989 and forthcoming.

45. As we shall see below, economic security has here a


double meaning: (1) securing the economic system--and thereby
the social status quo (state) --and (2) securing the
performance of the economic system, that is welfare in
society.

- 47 -
though not, pray, at the level of borders. The more general
'revisionism' of East and West, their tendency to 'correct',
adjust, or reject each other's ideologies and social systems,
is more difficult to calibrate in so far as it affects
nation-states. <46> But clearly the level of interaction
that takes place amounts to transnationai politics. And a
core-question for European security is the politically
decided one of where to place the limit as to what is
ordinary interaction (transnational politics) and what is a
security problem. The 'security problem' status can be
asserted by appeal to the category of interference. This the
East generally did until the mid-Eighties when criticism of
human rights was accepted as in principle legitimate. The
pretext now heard invokes a different aspect of security;
lack of human rights is justified in terms of internal
security, and sovereignty is thus at risk from within rather
than from the objections raised from without (interference).
'Vulnerabilities' may be confessed. Order has to be
maintained. In these cases, the East has to mobilize a logic
of security and international politics to combat phenomena
that are seen by the West as natural parts of civil and
civilized interaction. The problems of the East in this
regard are unlikely to be alleviated by the process of
Europeanization and normalization of East West relations.
For the East, there is direct, defensive action to be taken
by a nation which forms the object of such criticism; the
question whether and how to label these interactions as
security problems or violations of international law--how to
take them out of the area of transnational politics, which
are supposed to function according to the rules of domestic
politics. Then at the institutional level there is the task
of designing a European security system able to handle these
problems. Narek Grela (1989), points to the dilemmas
involved in setting up a European security system that both
allows the necessary processes of change and at the same time
provides for a degree of stability. The question of how to
deal with this issue constitutes a major issue for Western
Ostpolitik.

The Western concept of security focuses more on the military


dimension, on the security problem arising if one is to face
an opponent superior in power.

46. A good discussion of Eastern as well as Western


'offensive ideology' is found in Eppler 1988. A more formal
and concise presentation of a very similar analysis is Jahn
1981.. .

- 48 -
Basically this is due to the difference between what Buzan
labels strong and weak states. He distinguishes between
strong and weak powers--the classical question of power to
influence others--and strong and weak states, referring to
the strength of the state as state, its coherence, the degree
of harmony between state and nation, and between its
different components: physical base, institutions and ideas.
In this sense the states in Eastern Europe are much weaker
states. They are thus much more vulnerable at the level of
institutions and ideas--whereas the Western states are so
coherent that they are maiily to be threatened through
physical power. This does not necessarily mean use of
physical power, but the main fear is that in the shadow of
Eastern power the West will be vulnerable to coercive
diplomacy. On further investigation, it becomes clear that
the right wing in the West does in fact doubt the capacity of
Western society to withstand pressure. For the Right in
particular, Western European states have been sapped by
decadence, the welfare state, postmaterial values, etc <47>

So in reality the West is also rather ambivalent towards


enhanced political and societal interaction with the East.
The patterns of reciprocal fear can be modelled thus (figure
1). The fear in the West is not that 'Eastern values' may
somehow prevail, but rather of the 'softness' of the
population being somehow part and parcel of the the spreading
ignorance regarding the motives of the East and the rules of
the power politics game. The Western Security Establishment
fears that the characteristic weaknesses of democracies can
be exploited by diplomatic manoeuvres, and the 'break
through' feared is supposed to happen at the level of 'high
politics'.

High politics

Western
fears
Western Eastern
Europe Ewope
Eastern
fears

Societal level

47. l.a. Kaltefleiter and Pfaltzgraff (eds.) 1985 (epciaily


the introduction by Kaltefleiter and the chapter by
NH. Serry); Windel 1987 For some penetrating comments on the
way e.g. The Economist turns Gorbachev into a threatening
figure who can outsmart the West, see41987.

- 49 -
The context of this model,- is the withdrawal of
the overlay which has for forty years limited interaction
between the blocs, and structured it on the. lines of the
superpower conflict.<48> The overlay is now 'retreating',
and Europe is consequently less stable. One way or another,
the two parts of Europe are tending to drift towards each
other. This necessarily entails more contacts and mutual
influence. It means new options, and maybe perspectives for
transformation of the regional system, but it also means--for
the professionally pessimistic, and all societies have and
have to have a security establishment--a higher level of
fears of breakthrough in the non-military East-West war. So
we start to worry more about breakthroughs. And break
downs At a time when the level of hope in society at large
is rising.
As the fears are assymetrical (figure 1) to understand the
situation is not simply to establish whether it is the one or
the other side that is gaining ground. It is not possible to
say who should feel secure and who insecure. There are fears
on both sides, but different ones. The fears of both sides
may very well be founded. And for those who favour a
continuation of the process of dtente and Europeanization,
the fears of both sides should be taken into account by both
sides because if any of the elite groups threatened feels too
threatened there is a risk of the whole process being

48. This conflict is (in Europe) not to be seen as merely


exterior and imposed--it is very real in and among the
societies in Europe. Luckily it is not necesary here to
settle the historical hierarchy of causation in the mutual
interplay of domestic and extra-European conflicts. The
convergence of the social conflict and a geopolitical
structure created a stable format for European security. For
internal as well as international reasons this format is
'loosing its grip'.

49. Note that the present analysis does not apply t social
groups threatened in their personal area by the prcess--this
is not likely to cause a veto on detente. On the other hand,
we are not talking about the national security debate or
popular opinion either. It is a question of drucial elite
perspectives on 'national security'.

- 50 -
paralysed. <49>

So to dabble in politics a bit: the main task at present


might be to stabilize both West-West relations (Bertram 1988:
8) and the basic political/social system in the East--within
the overall framework of change.
What is threatened is what peace reaserchers have
traditionally seen as relations of domination. The pressure
is mostly on the interstate dimension in the West (superpower
dominance), and on the political-societal dimension in the
East (domestic relations of power and control). In the
present situation the paradoxical task of peace politics
might be to stabilize exactly these two relations of
'domination', the reactions from these quarters are the most
likely stumbling blocks for a 'process of dtente.
The reason why this is a task for peace researchers is that
they take dtente seriously asa principled project, trying
to work in a long-term perspective of tranformat.ion,
including transformation of the two threatened relations of
domination, which are more likely to change when imbedded in
a steadily-moving, integrated process.
5. Conclusion

<When the study finds its final form it should hopefully be


able to show convincingly> that it is possible to make a
structured and disciplined analysis on a 'post-structuralist'
basis. Deconstruction is not a purely negative addition to
I.R. Probably the 'deconstructivists' in IR were at first
overly focusred e the chances for disturbing, troubling,
irritating the established discourse. A paradoxical effect
of this is to create an (un-wanted) image of only one way of
acting critically: write post-structuralist articles in
International Studies Quarterly. The second wave of writings
tend to go for. more concrete analysis (of Der Derian 1989;
Shapiro and Der Derian 1989) . The present study has tried to
show how a new analysis is made possible by avoiding ultimate
foundations - and in this case avoiding any substantial
definition of security. This opens up possibilities for a
more clear focus on the political processes unfoiding around
the use of the concept security.

The political discourse on security is not analysed in order


to compare it with the 'real' situation ('perception and
misperception') - but as a reality in its own right (Karup
Pedersen 1970; Waver 1989:a, c and d).

How is the sense of direction imputed into' the present


study. Somehow there is a normativity present which guides

- 51 -

, ,(
especially the recommendation for 'less security, more
politics'. There is a choice in favor of stable change in
the European political situation. There are alternatives to
this: i) continued status quO (which is probably no real
option in the long run) and unregulated break downs or break
up (which is most likely to lead to no changes - or follow
from total insistence on the status quo). The present
analysis tries to present certain logically derived
conditions for a possible regulated change in the European
order that has been so surprisingly stable for 40 years.
What is deduced is not a specific policy. Such a
scientifically justified policy is never possible (cf Wver
l89c). What can be concluded is at the level of the
necessary modalitites which any project has to adapt to -
certain forms any process has to take on due tothe nature of
security, technology and politics.

The most promising way of overcoming the status quo in Europe


seems to be this very conservative interpretation of the -
basically conservative - concept of security. The basic
principle is most clearly understood by viewing it as a
speech act. By reducing it to this cynical and in-escapable
mechanism it might become politically possible to handle this
ever-present veto-option that has become in the nuclear age
an option with almost total guarantee 'for success. This
obliquely realist, power-political approach to power politics
must therefore try to develop the possible modalities for a
de-securitization of European politics.

"Security after all is nothing but the absence of the evil of


insecurity, a negative value so to speak." (Wolfers 1962
<1952>: 153)

- 52 -
Appendix 1: The Semiotic Structure of 'Security'; A
Greimasian Note

It has been postulated several times in the text that the


concepts of 'security' and 'insecurity' are not necessarily
an exhaustive discription of the possible conditions - we
should not think of the two as constituting an exhaustive
typology. We could also think of 'a-security' or
'non-security' - which are of course only technical terms to
designate activities carried out with aims other than
security/in-security, i.e. take* place outside the shadow of
'in-security'. In the appendix this possibility will be
investigated in a more rigorous manner through the use of
what is commonly known as 'the seid5uic square', or:
Greimas' square

The semiotic square is a figure that catches nothing less


than the fundamental nature of meaning. It builds on a basic
Saussurian understanding of language (as a system of
differences). And the main novelty is to combine two types
of binary relations (Greimas and Rastier 1968; Greimas and
Courts 1979<1969>):

TETTE
s2

non s2 <=========> non 51

<====> relation of contrariety (and sub-contrariety)


< -> relation of contradiction
> relation of implication
In a relation of contradiction the one component is defined
as (all) what the other is not. In a relation of contrariety
the two are understood in relation to the other - the meaning
we attach to one stems from it being not the other - but the
relationship is not (necessarily) one of contradiction.<50>
The upward arrow indicates that the lower term is a condition
for the upper; the lower is the more comprehensive of the
two.

a.

50. In fact it can be but then we get a rather-toring square


since non s2 then equals Si and non si equals s2.

- 53 -
An example could be
life <=--===> death

non-death
>Zi
<=-.---====> non-life

Le1aborate a bit on what this could mean cf Olsen 1982 ??)


Another famous one relates to the sexual norms in a culture:

Permitted relations Unacceptable relations


(Culture) (Nature)

Matrimonial relations Abnormal relations


(pcescribed) (toibidden)
Cl ---------------- i-C2

i. ----
Nocrnal relations Non-matrimonial relations
(not fortr1desi) (not prescribed)
(1968a: 93-94)

It then varies among cultures what they locate where, La.

(patriarchal model of sexual relations)


Conjugal love .......... incest, homosexuality

><
J(ltlllery by the woman ........ . adultery by the man

- 54 -
Security

As we saw in section 1.1. security is usually defined


objectively as the absence of threats and subjectively as the
absence of a feeling of threat.

security <==================> (feeling of) threat


I

not (feeling of) threat <=======-===--> in-security

<===> relation of contrariety (and sub-contrariety)


< -> relation of contradiction
> relation of implication

The most revealing place to look is immediately for the


difference between the sub-conti-are (non-s2) and the positive
term (sl) (as well as between non-si and s2). In this
context:

A: in-security > threat (feeling)


B: not (feeling of) threat > security

ad A: what could in-security be more than the presence of a


threat? It could be paranoia without a specific object.
And yet more interesting:

ad B: what is in the lower left corner that is not


necessarily identical to security: a-security, exactly the
category put into the analysis in this article - the
perspective missing from traditional security analysis which
operates as if there was an exhausitve universe defined by

security < ----- > threat

I.e. traditional analysis poses the two as a contradictory


relation when it is in fact just one of contrariety.

We could maybe clarify this by drawing up the distribution of

- 55 -
-V

threats (t) <51> and countermeasures (c):

security threat
t +c - +t /c

/t ?c ?t jc
non-threat in-security

<52>

51. Here 'threat' means the presence of specific problems


that are designated as 'threats' (security problems) and
therefore the lower left corner is undecided.

52 We could continue to second order categories. The


combination of the two upper categories define the complex
term (both/and) whereas the two lower define the neutral one
(neither/nor). At the present I cannot really see how this
tells us anything useful but it works and thus'shows that it
is a properly -constructed 'square'!

- 56 -
4 S

FRIDAY, MAY 26,1989 - -

OPIINTON ___
* S - --------.---. --.--- - -

(I
(
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