1.
Francisco vs Master Iron Works
Francisco vs Master Iron Works
Francisco vs. Master Iron Works Construction
Corporation
GR. No. 151967, February 16, 2005
FACTS:
Josefina Castillo was 24 years old when she and
Eduardo Francisco got married on January 1983.
The latter was then employed as Vice President in
a Private Corporation. Josefina acquired two
parcels of land where Imus Bank executed a deed
of absolute sale in favor of Josefina, married to
Eduardo. An affidavit of waiver was executed by
Eduardo where he declared that prior to his
marriage with Josefina, the latter purchased the
land with her own savings and that he waived
whatever claims he had over the property. When
Josefina mortgaged the property for a loan,
Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the
deed. In 1990, Eduardo who was then a General
Manager, bought bags of cement from defendant
but failed to pay the same. The latter filed a
complaint for recovery and trial court rendered
judgment against Eduardo. The court then issued
a writ of execution and the sheriif issued a notice
of levy on execution over the alleged property of
Josefina for the recovery of the balance of the
amount due under the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner filed a third party claim over the 2
parcels of land in which she claimed as her
paraphernal property.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is the conjugal
property of Josefina and Eduardo.
HELD:
The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that
she acquired the property with her personal funds
before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she
was the sole owner. The Deed of Absolute Sale on
record showed it was issued after her marriage.
Their case fall under Article 148 and since they got
married before the Family Code, the provision,
pursuant to Art 256, can be applied retroactively if
it does not prejudice vested rights. Petitioner
likewise failed that she had any vested right.
Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a
legal impediment that invalidates such marriage,
Art 148 should be applied. In the absence of proof
that the wife/husband has actually contributed
money, property, or industry to the properties
acquired during such union the presumption of co-
ownership will not arise.
The petition was denied for lack of merit. The
decision of CA that the property was conjugal was
affirmed.
2. Relucio vs Meija Lopez
GR No. 138497, January 16 2002
FACTS: Herein private respondent Angelina Mejia
Lopez filed a petition for "APPOINTMENT AS SOLE
ADMINISTRATIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF
PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC.," against
defendant Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda
Relucio, in the Regional Trial Court. In the petition,
private-respondent alleged that sometime in
1968, defendant Lopez, who is legally married to
the private respondent, abandoned the latter and
their four legitimate children; that he arrogated
unto himself full and exclusive control and
administration of the conjugal properties,
spending and using the same for his sole gain and
benefit to the total exclusion of the private
respondent and their four children; that defendant
Lopez, after abandoning his family, maintained an
illicit relationship and cohabited with herein
petitioner since 1976.
A Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by
herein petitioner on the ground that private
respondent has no cause of action against her. An
Order was issued by herein respondent Judge
denying petitioner Relucio's Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that she is impleaded as a necessary or
indispensable party because some of the subject
properties are registered in her name and
defendant Lopez, or solely in her name. Petitioner
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari assailing the trial court's denial of her
motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals denied
the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: 1. Whether respondent's petition for
appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal
property, accounting, etc. against her husband
Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of action
against petitioner;
2. Whether petitioner's inclusion as party
defendant is essential in the proceedings for a
complete adjudication of the controversy.
RULING: (1.) A cause of action is an act or omission
of one party the defendant in violation of the legal
right of the other. The elements of a cause of
action are: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of
such defendant in violation of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation
of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the
latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages.
The first cause of action is for judicial appointment
of respondent as administratrix of the conjugal
partnership or absolute community property
arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez.
Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of
action. Article 128 of the Family Code refers only
to spouses, to wit: "If a spouse without just cause
abandons the other or fails to comply with his or
her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse
may petition the court for receivership, for judicial
separation of property, or for authority to be the
sole administrator of the conjugal partnership
property xxx" The administration of the property
of the marriage is entirely between them, to the
exclusion of all other persons. Respondent alleges
that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore,
her first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez.
There is no right-duty relation between petitioner
and respondent that can possibly support a cause
of action.
The second cause of action is for an accounting by
respondent husband. The accounting of conjugal
partnership arises from or is an incident of
marriage. Petitioner has nothing to do with the
marriage between respondent Alberto J. Lopez.
The third cause of action is essentially for
forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in property co-
owned by him and petitioner. The issue is whether
there is basis in law to forfeit Alberto Lopez' share,
if any there be, in property co-owned by him with
petitioner. Respondent's asserted right to forfeit
extends to Alberto J. Lopez' share alone. Failure of
Alberto J. Lopez to surrender such share, assuming
the trial court finds in respondent's favor, results
in a breach of an obligation to respondent and
gives rise to a cause of action. Such cause of
action, however, pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not
petitioner.
(2.) A real party in interest is one who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.
In this case, petitioner would not be affected by
any judgment in Special Proceedings.
If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she
cannot be an indispensable party. An
indispensable party is one without whom there
can be no final determination of an action.
Petitioner's participation in Special Proceedings is
not indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can
issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to
make an accounting of his conjugal partnership
with respondent, and give support to respondent
and their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez'
conjugal partnership with respondent, and forfeit
Alberto J. Lopez' share in property co-owned by
him and petitioner. Such judgment would be
perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J.
Lopez.
Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in the
above Special Proceedings. A necessary party as
one who is not indispensable but who ought to be
joined as party if complete relief is to be accorded
those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject
of the action. In the context of her petition in the
lower court, respondent would be accorded
complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to
account for his alleged conjugal partnership
property with respondent, give support to
respondent and her children, turn over his share in
the co-ownership with petitioner and dissolve his
conjugal partnership or absolute community
property with respondent.
3. Agapay vs CA
Facts: Miguel Palang married Carlina in 1949. He
left to work in Hawaii a few months after the
wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in
1950. When Miguel returned for good in 1972, he
refused to live with Carlina.
In 1973, Miguel who was then 63 years old
contracted a subsequent marriage with 19-year
old Erlinda Agapay. Two months earlier, they
jointly purchased a riceland. A house and lot was
likewise purchased, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole
vendee. Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation
produced a son named Kristopher.
1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of
Donation as a form of compromise agreement to
settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties
therein agreed to donate their conjugal property
consisting of six parcels of land to their only child,
Herminia.
In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of
concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. Two years
later, Miguel died. Carlina and Herminia instituted
a case for recovery of ownership and possession
with damages against Erlinda, seeking to get back
the riceland and the house and lot allegedly
purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with
Erlinda. The lower court dismissed the complaint
but CA reversed the decision.
Erlinda claimed that: (1) The Court of Appeals
erred in not sustaining the validity of two deeds of
absolute sale covering the riceland and the house
and lot, the first in favor of Miguel and Erlinda and
the second, in favor of Erlinda alone. (2) The CA
erred in not declaring Kristopher as Miguels
illegitimate son and thus entitled to inherit from
Miguels estate. (3) The CA erred in not finding
that there is sufficient pleading and evidence that
Kristoffer should be considered as party-defendant
in Civil Case No. U-4625 before the trial court and
in CA-G.R. No. 24199.
Issues:
1. Who owns the riceland?
2. Who owns the house and lot?
3. Does the trial courts decision adopting the
compromise agreement partake the nature of
judicial confirmation of the separation of property
between spouses and the termination of the
conjugal partnership?
4. Can Kristophers status and claim as an
illegitimate son and heir be adjudicated in an
ordinary civil action for recovery of ownership and
possession?
Held:
1. The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was
made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The
provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of
the Family Code providing for cases of
cohabitation when a man and a woman who are
not capacitated to marry each other live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted
marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently
void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and
Carlina was still susbsisting and unaffected by the
latters de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. It must be stressed
that actual contribution is required by this
provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states
that efforts in the care and maintenance of the
family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or
work or industry. If the actual contribution of the
party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership
and no presumption of equal shares.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her
testimony that she is engaged in the business of
buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to
persuade us that she actually contributed money
to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the
fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973,
petitioner was only around twenty years of age
and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a
pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering
her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that
in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in
the purchase price of subject property, there being
no proof of the same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was
bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda
actually cohabited. In the nature of an
afterthought, said added assertion was intended
to exclude their case from the operation of Article
148 of the Family Code. Proof of the precise date
when they commenced their adulterous
cohabitation not having been adduced, we cannot
state definitively that the riceland was purchased
even before they started living together. In any
case, even assuming that the subject property was
bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-
ownership would still apply and proof of actual
contribution would still be essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she
contributed money to the purchase price of the
riceland, we find no basis to justify her co-
ownership with Miguel over the same.
Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly
held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the
conjugal partnership property of the deceased
Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.

2. With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda
allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on
September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years
old. The testimony of the notary public who
prepared the deed of conveyance for the property
reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty.
Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang
provided the money for the purchase price and
directed that Erlindas name alone be placed as
the vendee.
The transaction was properly a donation made by
Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void
and inexistent by express provision of law because
it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation, under
Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87
of the Family Code expressly provides that the
prohibition against donations between spouses
now applies to donations between persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those
who incurred guilt would turn out to be better
than those in legal union.
3. No. Separation of property between spouses
during the marriage shall not take place except by
judicial order or without judicial conferment when
there is an express stipulation in the marriage
settlements. The judgment which resulted from
the parties compromise was not specifically and
expressly for separation of property and should
not be so inferred.
4. No. Questions as to who are the heirs of the
decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children
and the determination of the estate of the latter
and claims thereto should be ventilated in the
proper probate court or in a special proceeding
instituted for the purpose and cannot be
adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action
which is for recovery of ownership and
possession. Kristopher, not having been
impleaded, was not a party to the case at bar. His
mother, Erlinda, cannot be called his guardian ad
litem for he was not involved in the case at
bar. (Erlinda Agapay vs. Carlina Palang, G.R. No.
116668, July 28 1997).
4. Maxey vs CA
Nature: Action to annul sale of properties and
recovery thereof
DOCTRINE:
A common law wife owns property in common
with her husband because of her contribution to
the marriage, which need not come in monetary
form.
FACTS: Relevant Provision of Law:
Art. 144 of the Civil Code
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started
living together in 1903 but were only married in a
military fashion. However, they had a church
wedding in 1919. The properties in dispute were
acquired in 1911 and 1912. In 1919, Regina died.
Melbourne remarried and in 1953, his second wife
Julia (using a power of attorney) sold the
properties to private respondents spouses
Macayra. Julia is of the belief that said properties
were exclusive to Melbourne. Petitioners are
children of Melbourne and Regina. They seek the
annulment of the above sale and recovery of
possession. They allege that such properties were
conjugal properties of their parents marriage as
they were bought with their joint effort and
capital. The trial court ruled for the petitioners,
while the CA found otherwise.
ISSUES:
(1) W/N Melbourne and Regina were married in
1903 in military fashion
RULING:Act No. 3613 recognizing military
marriages was only enacted in 1929. The military
wedding did not make a valid marriage. They were
only legally married in 1919.
(2)W/N the properties in question were conjugal
or exclusive to Melbourne
RULING:They were conjugal property
The CA disputed the application of Art. 144 of the
Civil Code because it could not be applied
retroactively in prejudice of vested rights. But
even if Art. 144 did apply, the CA is of the view
that the property could not have been acquired by
the spouses joint efforts because this pertains to
monetary contributions and Regina was a mere
housewife. SC rules otherwise. It applies Art. 144
retroactively because no vested rights of
Melbourne were impaired because there exists a
concurrent right of Regina or her heirs to a share
of the properties in question. The disputed
properties were owned in common by Melbourne
and the estate of his late wife Regina when they
were sold. Art. 144 recognizes that it would be
unjust to require a woman who is a wife in all
aspects of the relationship except for the
requirement of a valid marriage to abandon her
home and children, neglect her traditional
household duties, and go out to earn a living or
engage in business before the rules on co-
ownership would apply. It does not matter that
she made no monetary contribution, for the "real
contribution" to the acquisition of property must
include not only the earnings of a woman but also
her contribution to the family's material and
spiritual goods through caring for the children,
administering the household, husbanding scarce
resources, freeing her husband from household
tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional
duties of a housewife.But given that the
properties were owned in common by the
spouses, Julias sale over Melbournes share is
valid. Petitioners should return one-half of the
purchase price of the land to private respondents
while the latter should pay some form of rentals
for their use of one-half of the properties.
5. Gonzales vs Gonzales
G.R. No. 159521 December 16 2005 [Article 147-
Property Regime of void marriage]
FACTS:
After two years of living together, Francisco and
Erminda got married in 1979. Four children were
born from this union. During the time they lived
together, they acquired properties, and Erlinda
managed their pizza business.
In 1992, She prays for the declaration of the nullity
of their marriage based on Mario's alleged
psychological incapacity, and for the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains. During the time
they lived together, they acquired properties. She
managed their pizza business and worked hard for
its development. Mario denied she was the one
who managed the pizza business and claimed that
he exclusively owns the properties "existing during
their marriage."
In 1997 the trial court rendered its decision,
rendered its judgment and ordered the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership of gains and divide the
conjugal properties between Francisco and
Erminda. Not satisfied with the manner their
properties were divided, Francisco appealed to the
CA, which in turn affirmed the trial court decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fransisco exclusively own the
properties existing during their marriage.
RULING:
No. SC held that the Francisco and Erminda are co-
owners of the properties in question. The
marriage of Fransisco and Erminda is declared void
ab initio by the trial court which was later affirmed
by the CA. Consequently, their properties shall be
governed by the provisions of Article 147 of the
Family Code.
These provisions enumerate the two instances
when the property relations between spouses
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
These are: (1) when a man and woman
capacitated to marry each other live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage; and (2) when a man and
woman live together under a void marriage.
Under this property regime of co-ownership,
properties acquired by both parties during their
union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are
presumed to have been obtained through the joint
efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in
equal shares.
Article 147 creates a presumption that properties
acquired during the cohabitation of the parties
have been acquired through their joint efforts,
work or industry and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. It further provides that a party who
did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
formers efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
6. Abing vs Waeyan
Facts:
In 1986, John Abing and Juliet Waeyan cohabited
as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. Together, they bought a 2-storey
residential house. In December 1991, Juliet left for
Korea and worked thereat, sending money to John
which the latter deposited in their joint account. In
1992, their house was renovated and to it was
annex a structure which housed a sari-sari store.
In 1994, Juliet returned.
In 1995, they decided to partition their properties spouses during their period of cohabitation is
as their relationship soured. They executed a presumed to have been obtained thru their joint
Memorandum of Agreement. Unfortunately, the efforts and is owned by them in equal shares.
document was left unsigned by the Their property relationship is governed by the
parties although signed by the witnesses thereto. rules on co-ownership. And under this regime,
Under their unsigned agreement, John shall leave they owned their properties in common "in equal
the dwelling with Juliet paying him the amount of shares."
P428,870.00 representing John's share in all their
properties. Juliet paid John the sum of Being herself a co-owner, Juliet may not be ejected
P232,397.66 by way of partial payment of his from the structure in question. She is as much
share, with the balance of P196,472.34 to entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as
be paid by Juliet in twelve monthly installment. John. Juliet's failure to pay John the balance of the
latter's share in their common properties could at
Juliet, however, failed to make good the balance. best give rise to an action for a sum
John demanded Juliet to vacate the of money against Juliet, or for rescission of the
annex structure. Juliet refused, prompting John saidagreement and not for ejectment. (John Abing
to file an ejectment suit against her. John alleged vs Juliet Waeyan, G.R. NO. 146294, July 31, 2006)
that he alone spent for the construction of the
annex structure with his own funds and thru
the money he borrowed from his relatives. He Family
added that the tax declaration for
the structure was under his name. 1. SPS Wee vs. Galvez

Issue:

Does John exclusively own the property subject of

the suit?

Held:

No. Other than John's bare allegation that he

alone, thru his own funds and money he borrowed
from his relatives, spent for the construction of
the annex structure, evidence is wanting to
support such naked claim.

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are

capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties

acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition
by other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof
if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.

The law is clear. In the absence of proofs to the

contrary, any property acquired by common-law 2. GAUDENCIO GUERRERO vs. RTC OF ILOCOS
NORTE
FACTS: HELD:
Guerrero and Pedro are brothers in law , their Yes, Esperanza may testify over the objection of
respective wives being sisters. Filed by petitioner her husband. The disqualification of a witness by
as an accion publicana against private respondent, reason of marriage under Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the
this case assumed another dimension when it was Revised Rules of Court has its exceptions as where
dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the marital relations are so strained that there is
the parties being brother-in-law the complaint no more harmony to be preserved. The acts of the
should have alleged that earnest efforts were first petitioner stamp out all major aspects of marital
exerted towards a compromise. life. On the other hand, the State has an interest in
ISSUE: WON brothers by affinity are considered punishing the guilty and exonerating the innocent,
members of the same family. and must have the right to offer the testimony of
HELD: Esperanza over the objection of her husband.
Considering that Art. 151 herein-quoted starts
with the negative word No, the requirement is
mandatory 4 that the complaint or petition, which
must be verified, should allege that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have been made but that
the same failed, so that [i]f it is shown that no
such efforts were in fact made, the case must be
dismissed.
No. The court already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon 6
that the enumeration of brothers and sisters as
members of the same family does not
comprehend sisters-in-law
3. ALVAREZ vs. RAMIREZ
FACTS:
Respondent Susan Ramirez was the complaining
witness in a criminal case or arson pending before
the RTC. The accused was petitioner Maximo
Alvarez, stranged husband of Esperanza Alvarez,
sister of respondent. On June 21, 1999, Esperanza 4. Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc
Alvarez was called to the witness stand as the first
witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner
filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from
testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification.
Respondent filed an opposition to the motion.
Pending resolution of the motion, the trial court
directed the prosecution to proceed with the
presentation of the other witnesses. On
September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the
questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez
from further testifying and deleting her testimony
from the records. The prosecution filed a motion
for reconsideration but was denied in the other
assailed Order dated October 19, 1999. This
prompted respondent to file with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari with application
for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. On May 31, 2000, the Appellate
Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting
aside the assailed Orders issued by the trial court.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Esperanza can testify over
the objection of her estranged husband on the
ground of marital privilege.

5. Martinez vs Martinez
FACTS:
Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-
Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land. The
former executed a last will and testament directing
the subdivision of the property into 3 lots
bequeathed to each of his sons namely Rodolfo,
Manolo (designated as administrator of the
estate), and Daniel Jr. In October 1997, Daniel Sr.
died. Rodolfo then found a deed of sale
purportedly signed by his father on September
1996 where it appears that the land was sold to
Manolo and his wife Lucila and was also issued to
them. Rodolfo filed a complaint against his
brother
Manolo
and
sister-in-
law
Lucila for
the
annulment of the deed of sale and cancellation of
the TCT. Spouses wrote Rodolfo demanding him
to vacate the property which the latter ignored
and refused to do so. This prompted the spouses
to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against
Rodolfo. This matter was referred to the barangay
for conciliation and settlement but none was
reached. It was alleged in the position paper of
the spouses that earnest efforts toward a
compromise had been made but the same proved
futile.
ISSUE: WON spouses Martinez complied with the
requirements of Art 151 of the Family Code.
HELD:
No suit between members of the same family shall
prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but the same have
failed.
Lucila Martinez, the respondents sister-in-law was
one of the plaintiffs in the case at bar. The
petitioner is not a member of the same family as
that of her deceased husband and the
respondent. Her relationship with the respondent
is not one of those enumerated in Article 150. It
should also be noted that the petitioners were
able to comply with the requirements of Article
151 because they alleged in their complaint that
they had initiated a proceeding against the
respondent for unlawful detainer in the
katarungan Pambarangay in compliance with
PD1508 and that after due proceedings, no
amicable settlement was arrived at resulting in the
barangay chairmans issuance of a certificate to file
action.
6. Santos vs Santos
NICANOR T. SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
CONSUELAO T. SANTOS-GUERRERO and ANDRES
GUERREROG.R. No. 134787 November 15, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private
respondent Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are
brother and sister, born to spouses Urbano Santos
and Candelaria Santos, now both deceased.
Sometime in 1956, Nicanor, Consuelo and eight of
their siblings, executed a "Basic Agreement of
Partition" covering properties they inherited from
their parents. Two years later, Consuelo, joined by
her husband, herein respondent Andres
Guerrero(collectively, the "Guerreros"), filed suit
with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal
against petitioner Nicanor and two (2) other
brothers, for recovery of inheritance.
Issue:
Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to
Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court has no
application
Ruling:
A lawsuit between close relatives generates
deeper bitterness than between strangers. Thus,
the provision making honest efforts towards a
settlement a condition precedent for the
maintenance of an action between members of
the same family. As it were, a complaint in
ordinary civil actions involving members of the
same family must contain an allegation that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code,
now pursuant to Article 151of the Family Code.
Otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed under
Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
Admittedly, the complaint filed in this case
contains no such allegation. But a complaint
otherwise defective on that score may be cured by
the introduction of evidence effectively supplying
the necessary averments of a defective complaint.
7. SPS. Kelly vs Planters Products INC
SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A.
KELLEY vs. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. and JORGE
A. RAGUTANA,
G.R. No. July 9, 2008
172263
Facts:
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther)
acquired agricultural chemical products on
consignment from respondent Planters Products,
Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Authers failure to pay
despite demand, PPI filed an action for sum of
money against him in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City. After trial on the merits, the RTC
Makati City decided in favor of PPI and issued a
writ of execution. After being belatedly informed
of the said sale, petitioners Auther and his wife
Doris A. Kelley filed a motion to dissolve or set
aside the notice of levy in the RTC Makati City on
the ground that the subject property was their
family home which was exempt from execution.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is the
family home of the petitioners.
Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there is no need to
constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after
the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988)
are constituted as such by operation of law. All
existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are
considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code.
The exemption is effective from the time of
the constitution of the family home as such and
lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein. Moreover, the debts for which the
family home is made answerable must have been
incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if
it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the
alleged family home must be shown to have been
constituted either judicially or extrajudicially
pursuant to the Civil Code.
The rule, however, is not absolute. The
Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for the
following exceptions: Article 155. The family home
shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except: (1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of
the family home; (3) For debts secured by a
mortgage on the premises before or after such
constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers,
mechanics, architects, builders, material men and
others who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building.
8. Patricio vs Dario III
PATRICIO VS. DARIO
NOVEMBER 20, 2006
FACTS:
M died intestate and was survived by his wife and
two children. The surviving heirs extrajudicially
settled his estate. One of the properties he left
was the family home. A new title for the said
property was thereafter issued under the name of
the wife and the two children as co-owners. After
some time, the wife and one of the sons expressed
their desire to partition the family home and
terminate the co-ownership. The other son
opposed the partition on the ground that the
family home should remain despite the death of
one or both the spouses as long as there is a
minor beneficiary thereof. The supposed minor
beneficiary is oppositor's son, the grandchild of
the decedent.
ISSUE:
Whether the partition of the family home is
proper where one of the co-owners refuse to
accede to such a partition on the ground that a
minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.
HELD:
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three
requisites must concur: (1) they must be among
the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the
Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and
(3) they are dependent for legal support upon the
head of the family.
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the
family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an
unmarried person who is the head of a family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants,
brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate. The term 'descendants'
contemplates all descendants of the person or
persons who constituted the family home without
distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the
grandchildren and great grandchildren of the
spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the
law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish. Thus, private respondent's minor son,
who is also the grandchild of the deceased
satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries
must be actually living in the family home to avail
of the benefits derived from Art. 159. The son of
private respondent and grandson of the decedent
has been living in the family home since 1994, or
within 10 years from the death of the decedent,
hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, the grandson
cannot demand support from his paternal
grandmother if he has parents who are capable of
supporting him. The liability for legal support falls
primarily on his parents, especially his father,
herein private respondent who is the head of his
immediate family. The law first imposes the
obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of
the parents, especially the father, and only in their
default is the obligation imposed on the
grandparents.
9. Manacop vs CA
Manacop vs. CA
GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992
FACTS:
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased
on March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow
located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to
pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of
assignment signed between petitioners
corporation and private respondent herein (FF
Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint for the
recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for
preliminary attachment against the former.
Consequently, the corresponding writ for the
provisional remedy was issued which triggered the
attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City
owned by the Manacop Construction President,
the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached
property is a family home having been occupied
by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore
exempt from attachment.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is indeed
exempted from attachment.
HELD:
The residential house and lot of petitioner became
a family home by operation of law under Article
153 of the Family Code. Such provision does not
mean that said article has a retroactive effect such
that all existing family residences, petitioners
included, are deemed to have been constituted as
family homes at the time of their occupation prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code and
henceforth, are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded
the effectivity of the Code and his property is
therefore not exempt form attachment.
The petition was dismissed by SC.
10. SPS Versola vs CA
Facts:
Spouses Versola purchased a house and lot from L
who in turn owed private respondent, O, a certain
amount of money. To fix their debts, an agreement
was made where in the spouses would obtain a
loan from A with their house and lot as mortgage
and pay private respondent with said loan. A
discovered that the property was being held as
lien for another obligation of L so they did not
release loan to the spouses. Private respondent
filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money where the
RTC as well as the CA ruled in her favor. No other
appeal was made so private respondent filed a
Motion for Execution (sale of the house and lot at
a public auction), which was granted and the
property was sold to private respondent.
Petitioners did not redeem their property during
the period of redemption and filed their
objections when private respondent filed an Ex
parte Motion for Issuance of Confirmation of
Judicial Sale of Real Property.
Issue:
Held
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
respondents due to failure of petitioners to prove
that the house and lot was their family home.
Petitioners claim that the auction sale of the
house and lot was invalid as it violated Articles
152-160 of the Family Code, which are provisions
on the family home. Article 153 The family home
is deemed constituted on a house and lot and is
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment.
However, the right to exemption is a personal
privilege granted to the debtor and such
exemption should be claimed and proven by
debtor before the public auction.
11. Modequillo vs Breva
GR. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land
located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on
July 1988, registered in the name of Jose
Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land
located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de
Sur also registered in the latters name. A motion
to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that
the residential land is where the family home is
built since 1969 prior the commencement of this
case and as such is exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153
except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155
thereof, and that the judgment sought to be
enforced against the family home is not one of
those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural
land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public
land and the transfer in his favor by the original
possessor and applicant who was a member of a
cultural minority. The residential house in the
present case became a family home by operation
of law under Article 153.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is deemed to be
a family home.
HELD:
The petitioners contention that it should be
considered a family home from the time it was
occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is
not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family
Code, it provides that the provisions of this
Chapter shall govern existing family residences
insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does
not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a
retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted
as family homes at the time of their occupation
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are
exempt from the execution for payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the
Code. The said article simply means that all
existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code, are considered
family homes and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the FC.
The debt and liability which was the basis of the
judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the
Family Code. This does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided in the FC.
As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly
ruled that the levy to be made shall be on
whatever rights the petitioner may have on the
land. Petition was dismissed.
12. SSS vs Aguas
Social Security System (SSS) vs. Aguas
Facts: Pablo Aguas, SSS pensioner, died on
December 8, 1996. His surviving spouse Rosanna
Aguas filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits.
In her claim, Rosanna indicated that Pablo was
survived by his minor child Jeylnn. Her claim was
approved on February 13, 1997.
In April 1997, deceased sister, Leticia Aguas-
Macapinlac contested Rosannas claim, saying that
Rosanna abandoned the family abode about 6
years earlier and that she was living with another
man. Leticia further alleged that Pablo did not
have any children with Rosanna but Rosanna had
several children with a certain Romeo dela Pena.
SSS suspended the payment of the pension and
conducted an investigation. The investigation
confirmed that Pablo did not have any children
with Rosanna and that Pablo was incapable of
having children based on the certification of Dr.
Manuel Macapinlac that Pablo was infertile.
It was on this ground that the SSS denied
Rosannas request to resume payment and
ordered Rosanna to refund to SSS the
Php10,350.00 death benefits already released to
her and Jeylnn.
When Rosanna filed a petition with the Social
Security Commission, Janet H. Aguas also claiming
to be a child of the deceased, joined Rosanna and
Jeylnn as claimants. As proof, the petition included
a photocopy of Jeylnn and Janets certificates of
live birth. SSS denied their claims but decided to
conduct hearings. During the hearings, the SSC
found sufficient proof that Rosanna contracted
marriage with Romeo dela Pena while still being
married to Pablo; that Rosanna had a child with
Romeo dela Pena while still married to Pablo (as
evidenced by the baptismal certificate presented
to the court for Jenelyn H. dela Pena showing that
the showing that she was the child of Rosanna
Hernandez and Romeo dela Pena)
The SSC ruled that because of her adultery,
Rosanna was no longer entitled to support from
Pablo. As for Jeylnn, the SCC ruled that Jeylnn was
not Pablos legitimate child, even if her birth
certificate was signed by Pablo. The SSC deduced
from the records that Jeylnn and Jenelyn was one
and the same person. Janet on the other hand was
only adopted by Pablo and Rosanna but with no
legal papers.
The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling based on
the birth certificates of Janet and Jeylnn showing
that they were children of the deceased.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners may be
considered primary beneficiaries of the deceased
for his SSS pension and therefore entitled to the
SSS death benefits.
Held: Only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her
right to a monthly pension.
Jeylnns claim is justified by the photocopy of her
birth certificate showing the signature of Pablo as
her father authenticating that Jeylnn was born on
October 29, 1991. Records show that Rosanna and
Pablo were married on December 4, 1977 which
continued, as far as the records are concerned,
until the death of Pablo on December 8, 1996.
Based on the records, Jeylnn was born during the
marriage of Rosanna and Pablo. Since Jeylnn was
conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents, she is considered legitimate.
Petitioner Rosanna married Romeo dela Pena
during her marriage to Pablo. A wife who is
already separated de facto from her husband
cannot be said to be dependent from support
upon the husband
Even if the records show that the spouses adopted
Janet, there were no legal papers to prove it. She
therefore does not qualify as a primary beneficiary
13. Concepcion vs CA
G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE,
Respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma. Theresa
Almonte were married on December 29, 1989.
They lived in Fairview, Quezon City and a year later
on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to
Jose Gerardo.
On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to
have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the
ground of bigamy, alleging that her marriage with
Mario Gopiao on December 10, 198- was never
annulled. Although Ma. Theresa did not deny
marrying Mario, she averred that the marriage
was a sham and that she have never lived with
Mario at all.
The trial court said otherwise, and ruled that Ma.
Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and
subsisting, thus declaring her marriage to Gerardo
as void ab initio. It deemed Jose Gerardo to be an
illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to
Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation
rights. Also, it allowed the child to use the
surname of his father.
Ma. Theresa appealed and pleaded for the reverse
of the courts decisions. The Court of Appeals
ruled that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma.
Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first
marriage considering the fact that the second
marriage was void from the beginning. Therefore,
the child Jose Gerardo under the law is the
child of the legal and subsisting marriage between
Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao.
Gerardo Concepcion moved for the
reconsideration of the decision.
Issue:
Whether the child is the legitimate child of Ma.
Theresa and Gopiao or the illegimate child of Ma.
Theresa and Gerardo.
Held:
The child, Jose Gerardo, is the legitimate child of
Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised as per Art. 164 of the Family Code
which states, A child who is conceived or born
during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. It
is fully supported by Art. 167 of the Family Code
which states, The child shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as an adulteress.. The law requires that every
reasonable presumption be made in favor of the
legitimacy. It is grounded on the policy to protect
the innocent offspring from the odium of
illegitimacy.
Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa
was void from the very beginning, he never
became her husband and thus never acquired any
right to impugn the legitimacy of her child. The
minor cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate
status on the bare declaration of the mother
and/or even much less, the supposed father. In
fine, the law and only the law determines who are
the legitimate or illegitimate children for ones
legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be
compromised. It should be what the law says and
not what a parent says it is. Additionally, public
policy demands that there be no compromise on
the status and filiation of a child. Otherwise, the
child will be at the mercy of those who may be so
minded to exploit his defenselessness.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the
right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and
mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the
provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. Also,
there being no such parent-child relationship
between the child and Gerardo, Gerardo has no
legally demandable right to visit the child.
The State as parens patriae affords special
protection to children from abuse, exploitation
and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. It is mandated to provide protection
to those of tender years. Through its laws, the
State safeguards them from every one, even their
own parents, to the end that their eventual
development as responsible citizens and members
of society shall not be impeded, distracted or
impaired by family acrimony. This is especially
significant where, as in this case, the issue
concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very
identity and lineage. The child, by reason of his
mental and physical immaturity, needs special
safeguard and care, including appropriate legal
protection before as well as after birth. In case of
assault on his rights by those who take advantage
of his innocence and vulnerability, the law will rise
in his defense with the single-minded purpose of
upholding only his best interests.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Gerardo is hereby
DENIED. The resolution of the Court of Appeals in
favor of respondents is AFFIRMED.
14. US vs Mata
G.R. No. L-6300
15. De Jesus vs Estate of Dizon
De Jesus vs. Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon
Facts:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got
married on 23 August 1964. It was during this
marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie
Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991,
Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie
de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by
Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died
intestate on 12 March 1992. Jacqueline and Jinkie
filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition
with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon
estate with the Regional Trial Court. Respondent,
the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the
decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations
of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought
the dismissal of the case, arguing that the
complaint, even while denominated as being one
for partition, would nevertheless call for altering
the status of petitioners from being the legitimate
children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and
Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate
children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan
Dizon. The trial court, ultimately, dismissed the
complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action
and for being improper. It decreed that the
declaration of heirship could only be made in a
special proceeding in as much as petitioners were
seeking the establishment of a status or right.
Issue:
Whether or not they are illegitimate children of
Juan for the purpose of inheriting from him.
Ruling:
No, they are not. The issue whether the
petitioners are indeed the acknowledged
illegitimate children of Juan cannot be adjudicated
without an action having been first instituted to
impugn their legitimacy as being the children of
Danilo and Carolina in a valid marriage.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions
considered, the instant petition is DENIED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
16. Tison vs CA
Facts: The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene
Dezoller are niece and nephew of the deceased
Tedora Dezoller Guerrero, who appears to be the
sister of their father Hermogenes Dezoller . The
present action for reconveyance involves a parcel
of land with a house and apartment which was
originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero
and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It. Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without
any ascendant or descendant, and was survived
only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein
petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died
on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit
from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of
representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse executed
an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement
adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir,
the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot to herein
private respondent Teodora Domingo and
thereafter.
Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein
petitioners filed an action for reconveyance
claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half
of the property in question by right of
representation. Tedoro Domingo however, attacks
the legitimacy of Hermogenes.
Issue: Whether or not a third person, not the
father nor an heir, may attack the legitimacy of
Hermogenes
Held: NO. the private respondent is not the proper
party to impugn the legitimacy of herein
petitioners. There is no presumption of the law
more firmly established and founded on sounder
morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the
issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a
child born to his wife. He is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the
infidelity of his wife produces; and he should
decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose
it, in view of the moral and economic interest
involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his
heir are allowed to contest such legitimacy.
Outside of these cases, none even his heirs
can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an
insult to his memory.
17. Andal and Duenas vs Macaraig
GR No. 2474, May 30, 1951
FACTS:
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother
Maria Duenas, filed a complaint for the recovery
of the ownership and possession of a parcel of
land owned by Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas.
Eduvigis Macaraig, herein defendant, donated the
land by virtue of donation propter nuptias in favor
of Emiliano. The latter was suffering from
tuberculosis in January 1941. His brother, Felix,
then lived with them to work his house and farm.
Emiliano became so weak that he can hardly move
and get up from his bed. Sometime in September
1942, the wife eloped with Felix and lived at the
house of Marias father until 1943. Emiliano died
in January 1, 1943 where the wife did not attend
the funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria gave birth to
a boy who was, herein petitioner.
ISSUE: WON Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of
the deceased.
HELD:
Considering that Mariano was born on June 17,
1943 and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the
former is presumed to be a legitimate son of the
latter because he was born within 300 days
following the dissolution of the marriage. The fact
that the husband was seriously sick is not
sufficient to overcome the presumption of
legitimacy. This presumption can only be rebutted
by proof that it was physically impossible for the
husband to have had access to his wife during the
first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the
birth of the child. Impossibility of access by
husband to wife includes absence during the initial
period of conception, impotence which is patent,
and incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be
shown that cohabitation took place through
corrupt violation of prison regulations. Marias
illicit intercourse with a man other than the
husband during the initial period does not
preclude cohabitation between husband and wife.
Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate
son of the deceased making him the owner of the
parcel land.
18. Jao vs CA
FACTS:
Arlene Salgado, Janice Marie's mother, filed a case
for recognition and support against Perico V. Jao.
Jao denied the paternity so they agreed to a blood
grouping test which was in due course conducted
by the NBI. The test came out indicating that
Janice could not have been the possible offspring
of Jao and Arlene. Upon Arlene's motion for
reconsideration, the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court declared the child the offspring of
Jao. Jao appealed to the CA, arguing that the
blood grouping test could have been conclusive
and disputable evidence of his non-paternity,
because there was no showing of irregularity or
mistake in the conduct of the tests. CA upheld
Jao's contention and reversed the trial court
decision.
ISSUE:Whether or not the result of blood grouping
test is admissible and conclusive to prove
paternity.
RULING:
Yes. SC denied the petition for review.
Supreme Court had given weight to the findings of
the NBI in its blood grouping test. Thus, it cannot
be gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to
conduct blood grouping tests has been recognized
as early as the 1950's. (Co Tao vs. CA, 101 Phil.
188)
In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests,
among other evidence, to, affirm paternity was
dealt with in Co Tao v. CA. In said case, the NBI
expert"s report of the blood tests stated that
"from their blood groups and types, the defendant
Co Tao is a possible father of the child." From this
statement the defendant contended that the child
must have been the child of another man. The
Court noted: "For obvious reasons, the NBI expert
cannot give assurance that the appellant was the
father of the child; he can only give his opinion
that he is a "possible father." This possibility,
coupled with the other facts and circumstances
brought out during the trial, tends to definitely
establish that appellant is the father of the child."
Where the issue is admissibility and
conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to disprove
paternity, rulings have been much more definite in
their conclusions. For the past three decades, the
use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage
has already become an important legal procedure.
There is now almost universal scientific agreement
that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-
paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity
that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a
possible product of the mother and alleged father
does not conclusively prove that the child is born
by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child
is not the possible blood type when the blood of
the mother and that of the alleged father are
crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be
that of the alleged father.
In the United States jurisdiction, the admissibility
of blood tests results to prove non-paternity has
already been passed upon in several cases. The
positive results of blood tests excluding paternity,
in a case in which it was shown that proper
safeguards were drawn around the testing
procedures, were recognized as final on the
question of paternity (Gilpin v. Gilpin). Evidence of
non-paternity consisting of the result of blood
grouping tests was admitted despite a finding that
the alleged father had cohabited with the mother
within the period of gestation (Cuneo v. Cuneo).
The Court said that the competent medical
testimony was overwhelmingly in favor of the
plaintiff, and to reject such testimony would be
tantamount to rejecting scientific fact.
19.
Go Kim Huy vs. Go Kim Huy G.R. No. 137674.
September 20, 2001
SUBJECT MATTER: Action To Claim Legitimacy
Facts
Bonifacio Go Kim died on February 26,
1974. William Go Kim Huy, petitioner herein,
claims hereditary rights over the mass of property,
rights, and assets belonging to the estate of the
deceased.
On June 18,1980, petitioner filed a
complaint against Santiago Go Kim Huy, the
latters children, Bonifacio Go Kim & Sons, and
Santiago Go Kim Huy & Sons, Company, to declare
the properties and business held by them as part
of the estate the Bonifacio Go Kim, and compel
them to render an accounting.
Petitioner testified that he is known by his
name Go Kim Huy or William Go. He added that
his schooling, sustenance and everyday needs
were shouldered by the decedent. He asserts that
he was forced to file the case in court because
respondent Santiago refused to give him his share
on the estate of his father.
On the other hand, respondent Santiago
avers that he is the only son of Bonifacio Go Kim.
He maintains that petitioner has lived and worked
with them and was treated as a family member
because petitioners father was a close friend of
the decedent. Petitioners real parents were Gaw
Gee and Ng Kee as appearing in his landing
certificate. Respondent denied any relation with
petitioner and declares that the grant of petitioner
for change of name from Gaw Piak to William Go
Kim Huy did not make him a member of the family
of Bonifacio Go Kim.
While the case in the trial court was
pending, respondents counsel filed a letter-
complaint dated May 23, 1983 with the Ministry of
Justice attacking the certification dated May 27,
1974 stating that the records filed in the Bureau of
Immigration (BID) showed that the decedent
registered petitioner as one of his sons. The BID
then cancelled its certification and declared that
petitioner is not a son of the decedent.
Petitioner went to the Supreme Court via
a special civil action for certiorari assailing the
opinion of the Ministry of Justice. Petition was
denied on August 22, 1988.
On February 16, 1996, the trial court
dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence and ordered petitioner to pay
respondent in sum of P200, 000.00 as moral
damages.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner can claim
legitimacy so as to be entitled to acquire his share
over the estate of the decedent?
Held
By provision of will or operation of law,
heirs are called to succeed. Nevertheless, the
burden of proof is on the petitioner to establish
his affirmative allegation that Bonifacio Go Kim is
his father. Petitioner insists that the Supreme
Court disregard the action taken by the BID and
consider the documents previously cancelled by
the said office to support his claim for legitimacy.
The documents petitioner wanted the Supreme
Court to reconsider were already cancelled by the
BID, which has been affirmed by the Supreme
Court thirteen years ago. In fact, petitioners
alleged filiation was merely dependent upon the
certification issued by the BID in 1974 and he has
failed to show by convincing evidence, other than
the cancelled certification, that indeed he was
related to the decedent. In the voluminous
records presented, it all boils down to a
reconsideration of the BID finding, which cannot
no be disturbed.
20. Roces vs Local civil Registrar
G.R. No. L-10598
Facts:
On January 7, 1956, appellant Joaquin P. Roces
filed, with the Court of FirstInstance of Manila, a
petition alleging that he is married to Pacita
Carvajal; that on November 4, 1955, he came to
know of the existence of abirth certificate
registered with the Locakl Civil Registrar of
Manilsa, certified true copy of which is attached to
said complaint, mentioning him as the father of
one Ricardo V. Roces, an illegitimate child; that
said birthcertificate shows, on its face, that it had
been executed which neither the knowledge nor
the consent of the petitioner; and that said
information with regard to the alleged party of
Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces is false, andcontrary to
the provisions of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of
the Civil Codeof the Philippines.
Issue:
The issue in the case at bar, however, entirely
different in nature. Thelegal status of Ricardo
Joaquin V. Roces is not in dispute. The pleadings
andhis birth certificate show that he was born
outside wedlock. The only question before Us are
whether the statements in said birth certificate
identifying the alleged father of said child are valid
and whether the LocalCivil Registrar was justified
in making the corresponding entry in the records
of his office.
Held:
It should be noted, in this connection, that
according to said birth certificate, the mother
Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces, is one Carmen O.
Valdellon,is said to be "single". The certificate is
signed by the physician of a local hospital and,
apart from naming Joaquin P. Roces as the father
of the child, it states that said petitioner is
"married". On the back of the instrument there is
a sworn statement of Carmen O. Valdellon about
the truth of the data therein contained. Petitioner
Joaquin P. Roces did not subscribe either the birth
certificate or the aforementioned verified
statement or ally otherdeclaration of similar
import. Upon the other hand, section 5 of Act No.
3753, specifically ordains, in the penultimate
paragraph thereof, that:
In the case of an illegitimate child, the
birth certificate shall be signed and sworn
to jointly by the parents of the infant or
only by the mother if the father refuses. In
the latter case, it shall not be permissible
to state or reveal in the document the
name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein
any information by which such father
could be identified.
Similarly, Article, 280 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines provides:
When the father or the mother makes the
recognition separately, he or she shall not
reveal the name of the person with whom
he or she had the child; neither shall he or
she state any circumstance whereby the
other parent may be identified.
Thus, both legal provisions explicitly prohibit, not
only the naming of the father of a child born
outside wedlock when the birth certificate, or the
recognition, is not filed or made by him, but, also,
the statement of "any information" or
"circumstance" by which he "could be
identified."Accordingly, in Crisolo vs. Macadaeg *
(G.R. No. L-7017, decided April 29, 1954), we held
that "the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to
make of record the paternity of an illegitimate
child "upon the information of aperson"; that
"records of public officers which are admissible
'are limited to those matters which the public
officer has authority to record,"; that "it is
essential authorize admission of a copy of the
record of a privateinstrument that such
instrument 'be made in accordance with statutory
requirement"' (see also, 20 Am. Jur., p. 880); was
signed by the mother of and that the certificate of
birth of an illegitimate was signed by the mother
of the latter, "is undoubtedly incompetent
evidence of fathership of said child."
It appearing on the face of the birth cwtificate of
Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces, that the alleged father of
child has not signed the instrument, it is clear that
statements therein relative to the identity of the
father of said child were, and are, an open
violation of the law. Consequently,the local civil
registrarwho is duty bound to comply with said
law and is partly charged with its enforcement
had no authority to incorporate said unlawful
statements in the corresponding entry made by
him in the records of his office, and that the entry,
insofar as the identity of the father of Ricardo
Joaquin V. Roces,is null and void, and should be
cancelled or corrected.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed
and the relief for in appellant's petition hereby
granted, without special pronouncement as to
costs. It so ordered.
21. Ilano vs CA
FACTS:
Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while
she was working as secretary to Atty. Mariano C.
Virata. Leoncia, then managing a business of her
own as Namarco distributor, met petitioner again.
Later, he courted her more than four years. Their
relationship became intimate and with his promise
of marriage, they eloped. While they were living at
Makati, private respondent Merceditas S. Ilano
was born Her birth was recorded as Merceditas
de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de
los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano. Inasmuch as it
was already past seven o'clock in the evening, the
nurse promised to return the following morning
for his signature. However, he left an instruction to
give birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature,
as he was leaving early the following morning.
During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were
living as husband and wife, he showed concern as
the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in
Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial School, he
signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth
grading periods CA REVERSED RTC judgment
declaring plaintiff MERCEDITAS S. ILANO as the
duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate
child.
ISSUE:
W/N MERCEDITAS S. ILANO is the duly
acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child.
Held:
Petition is DENIED. CA affirmed.
YES.
Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil
Code, illegitimate children or those who are
conceived and born out of wedlock were generally
classified into: (1) Natural, whether actual or by
fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock
of parents who, at the time of conception of the
child, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other (2) Spurious, whether
incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other
on account of certain legal impediments. Since
petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at
the time Merceditas was conceived, she is a
spurious child. Rights of an illegitimate child arose
not because he was the true or real child of his
parents but because under the law, he had been
recognized or acknowledged as such a child. A
recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It
cannot be withdrawn. A mere change of mind
would be incompatible with the stability of the
civil status of person, the permanence of which
affects public interest. Even when the act in which
it is made should be revocable, the revocation of
such act will not revoke the recognition itself. To
be sure, to establish "the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it
is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential
requirements. "Continuous" does not, however,
mean that the concession of status shall continue
forever but only that it shall not be of an
intermittent character while it continues (De Jesus
v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The possession of such
status means that the father has treated the child
as his own, directly and not through other,
spontaneously and without concealment though
without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate).
There must be a showing of the permanent
intention of the supposed father to consider the
child as his own, by continuous and clear
manifestation of paternal affection and care.
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is
not sufficient to offset the totality of the evidence
indubitably showing that the signature thereon
belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of Live
Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated
therein as married does not mean that Merceditas
is not appellee's daughter. This particular entry
was caused to be made by Artemio himself in
order to avoid embarrassment. It is difficult to
believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere
dressmaker, had long beforehand diabolically
conceived of a plan to make it appear that
defendant, who claims to be a total stranger to be
a total stranger, was the father of her child, and in
the process falsified the latter's signatures and
handwriting. The natural, logical and coherent
evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the
relationship between Leoncia and appellee, their
living together as circumstances of plaintiff's birth,
the acts of appellee in recognizing and supporting
plaintiff, find ample support from the testimonial
and documentary evidence which leaves no room
to reasonably doubt his paternity which may not
be infirmed by his belated denials.
22. Labagala vs Santiago
LABAGALA vs. SANTIAGO
FACTS:
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land in Manila.
However, his sisters sued him for recovery of 2/3
share of the land alleging that he had fraudulently
registered it in his name. The trial court decided in
favor of his sisters. Jose died intestate. His sisters
then filed a complaint before the RTC for recovery
of the 1/3 portion of said property which was in
the possession of Ida C. Labagala (who claimed to
be Ida C. Santiago, the daughter of Jose). The trial
court ruled in favor of Labagala. According to the
trial court, the said deed constitutes a valid
donation. Even if it were not, petitioner would still
be entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property as
Jose's daughter. When appealed, the Court of
Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of the trial
court. It took into account that Ida was born of
different parents, as indicated her birth certificate.
ISSUES:
1. WON respondents may impugn
petitioner's filiation in this action for
recovery of title and possession.
2. WON petitioner is entitled to Jose's 1/3
portion of the property he co-owned with
respondents, through succession, sale, or
donation.
HELD:
The Court AFFIRMED the decision of the
CA.
On Issue No. 1
Yes.
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a
person is not a man's child by his wife. However,
the present respondents are asserting not merely
that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but
that she is not a child of Jose at all.
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not
conclusive proof of filiation. Use of a family name
certainly does not establish pedigree. Thus, she
cannot inherit from him through intestate
succession.
On Issue No. 2
No.
The Court ruled that there is no valid sale in this
case. Jose did not have the right to transfer
ownership of the entire property to petitioner
since 2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters. Petitioner
could not have given her consent to the contract,
being a minor at the time. Consent of the
contracting parties is among the essential
requisites of a contract, including one of sale,
absent which there can be no valid contract.
Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not pay any
centavo for the property which makes the sale
void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides that if
the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act
may be shown to have been in reality a donation,
or some other act or contract.
Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid
deed of donation. Even assuming that the deed is
genuine, it cannot be a valid donation. It lacks the
acceptance of the donee required by Art. 725 of
the Civil Code. Being a minor, the acceptance of
the donation should have been made by her
father or mother or her legal representative
pursuant to Art. 741 of the same Code. No one of
those mentioned in the law accepted the donation
for Ida.
23. De Aparicho vs Paraguya
G.R. No. L-29771
Facts:
Trinidad Montilde, a young lass of Tubigon, Bohol
had a love affair with a priest, Rev. Fr. Felipe
Lumain and in the process she conceived. When
she was almost four (4) months pregnant and in
order to conceal her disgrace from the public she
decided to marry Anastacio Mamburao. Father
Lumain solemnized their marriage on March 4,
1924. 1 They never lived together as man and
wife. On September 12, 1924, 192 days after the
marriage, Trinidad gave birth to Consolacion
Lumain. As shown by her birth certificate her
registered parents are Trinidad and Anastacio. 2 On
October 31, 1936, Fr. Lumain died but he left a last
will and testament wherein he acknowledged
Consolacion as his daughter and instituted her as
the sole and universal heir of all his property rights
and interests. 3 This was duly probated in the Court
of First Instance of Bohol on June 11, 1938 and on
appeal it was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 4
Soon after reaching the age of majority
Consolacion filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Bohol against Hipolito Paraguya for the
recovery of certain parcels of land she claims to
have inherited from her father Fr. Lumain and for
damages.
Issue:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
PLAINTIFF- APPELLEE IS A NATURAL CHILD OF THE
LATE REV. FR. FELIPE LUMAIN.
Held:
Under the second assigned error appellant points
out that appellee Consolacion Lumain is the
legitimate child of spouses Anastacio Mamburao
and Trinidad Montilde as she was born on
September 12, 1924, 192 days after the marriage
of said spouses citing the provision of Article 255
of the Civil Code (then Article 108 of the Spanish
Civil Code)
ART. 255. Children born after one
hundred and eighty days following
the celebration of the marriage
and before three hundred days
following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no
evidence shall be admitted other
than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband's
having access to his wife within
the first one hundred and twenty
days of the three hundred which
preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be
caused:
(1) By the impotence of the
husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband
and wife were living separately in
such a way that access was not
possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the
husband.
Appellant further argues there is no evidence of
physical impossibility on the part of husband
Anastacio to have access to his wife Trinidad in the
first 120 days of the 300 days which preceded the
birth of the child. Under Article 115 of the Spanish
Civil Code, now Article 265 of the Civil Code, it is
provided that:
The filiation of legitimate children
is proved by the record of
birth appearing in the Civil
Register, or by an authentic
document or a final judgment.
(Italics supplied.)
Appellant concludes appellee Consolacion is the
legitimate child of said Mamburao spouses as
shown by the birth certificate. 11
Appellant also avers that the declarations of
Trinidad Montilde against the legitimacy of
appellee Consolacion cannot prevail over the
presumption of legitimacy under the provisions of
Article 109 of the Spanish Civil Code, now Article
256 of the Civil Code.
However, the Court finds it unnecessary to
determine the paternity of appellee Consolacion
in this case. In the last will and testament of Fr.
Lumain he not only acknowledged appellee
Consolacion as his natural daughter but
designated her as his only heir. Said will was duly
probated in Court. As Fr. Lumain died without any
compulsory heir, appellee Consolacion is therefore
his lawful heir as duly instituted in his will. 12 One
who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will
of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any
person having capacity to succeed.13
24. Barrueco vs Consul General
G.R. No. L-48796
Facts:
This action was instituted on behalf of a baby girl
named Linda Mohamed Barrueco to compel the
defendant, as administrator of the intestate estate
of the deceased Julio Veloso Barrueco, to
recognize her as a natural daughter of said
deceased. Previous to the commencement of the
present action this same plaintiff, thru her
grandmother and guardian ad litem Ciriaca
Sulayao, had filed a petition in the intestacy of
Julio Veloso Barrueco (case No. 55129 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila) for the purpose of
obtaining a judicial declaration that she is the sole
and universal heir of the decedent. That petition
was opposed by the herein defendant and, after
due hearing, was denied by Judge Gervasio Diaz,
who in his decision rendered on November 20,
1939 (exhibit Z)
Issue:
Whether or not the deceased Julio Veloso
Barrueco recognize Linda Mohamed Barrueco as
her natural daugther.
Held:
We think such opinion is untenable because it
completely disregards the clear and express
provisions of articles 29 and 30 of the Civil Code.
Plaintiff's possession of the status of a natural
child of the deceased, under the facts stated, was
uninterrupted from the moment she was
conceived to the very last moment of her father's
life. The open marital cohabitation of the parents;
the father's act of bringing the mother to the
hospital to deliver the child; his payment of the
hospital expenses; his oft-repeated wish that if the
child in the mother's womb turned out to be a boy
it be baptized with his own name; his having
inquired, two days before his death, of a friend,
Miss Sofia Reyes, whether she had seen his
daughter Linda these acts and conduct are, in
our opinion, sufficient to justify the uninterrupted
possession by the plaintiff of the status of a
natural child of the deceased.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and set
aside, and the case is ordered remanded to the
trial court with instructions that the legitimate
heirs or kin of the deceased Julio Veloso Barrueco
be included as parties defendant and summoned
according to law, after which the case shall be
retried and decided anew. There is no
pronouncement as to costs in this instance. So
ordered.
25. Mendoza vs CA
CECILIO MENDOZA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, and LUISA DE LA ROSA MENDOZA
G.R. No. L-23102
Facts:
In the complaint, private respondent, Luisa
De La Rosa Mendoza averred that she was married
to Cecilio Mendoza on 2 September 1953, that
they lived together as husband and wife until 14
July 1954, when the husband departed for the
United States to further his studies and practice
his profession. Since then, defendant Mendoza,
without justifiable cause or reason deliberately
abandoned and neglected plaintiff and despite
repeated demands by plaintiff, defendant has
failed and refused, and still fails and refuses, to
provide for the maintenance and support of
plaintiff, who is allegedly to be pregnant, sickly
and without any source of revenue, while
defendant (now petitioner) is employed in a
hospital in the United States.
Issue:
Whether or not the case at bar is covered
under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward
compromise should first be made prior the filing
of the petition, and invoking Article 222 of the
New Civil Code of the Philippines.
Ruling:
Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines requires that before a suit between
members of the same family (in this case between
husband and wife) is filed or maintained, it must
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, and the only way to make it so
appear when the suit is filed is by a proper
averment to that effect in the complaint. Since the
law forbids a suit being initiated filed or
maintained unless such efforts at compromise
appear, the showing that efforts in question were
made is a condition precedent to the existence of
the cause of action. It follows that the failure of
the complaint to plead that plaintiff previously
tried in earnest to reach a settlement out of court
renders it assailable for lack of cause of action and
it may be so attacked at any stage of the case even
on appeal.
While the Supreme Court agree that
petitioner's position represents a correct
statement of the general rule on the matter, we
are nevertheless constrained to hold that the
Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance
committed no error in refusing to dismiss the
complaint, for on its face, the same involved a
claim for future support that under Article 2035 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines can not be subject
of a valid compromise, and is, therefore, outside
the sphere of application of Article 222 of the
Code upon which petitioner relies. This appears
from the last proviso of said Article 222, future
support.
26. Cruz vs Cristobal
G.R. No. 140422
PROOF OF ILLEGITIMACY
MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, et al. vs.
EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, et al.
G.R. No. 140422
August 7,
2006
Facts:
Petitioners are the alleged children of
Buenaventura during his first marriage. Private
respondents on the other hand, claim to be
Buenaventuras children from his second marriage.
Long after their alleged father died, petitioners
learned that respondents had executed an
extrajudicial partition of a certain property
belonging to their alleged father and transferred
such to their names. Such was contested by the
petitioners and filed a complaint to recover their
alleged shares in the property.
To prove their filiation, petitioners
presented their baptismal certificates. Such
contention was also confirmed by witnesses
presented during the trial.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged filiation of the
petitioners to Buenaventura was sufficiently
proven.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 172 of the Family Code
provides that the filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following: (1) The record
of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. In the absence of the foregoing
evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by: (1) the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
"Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and Special Laws," may consist of the childs
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family
bible in which the childs name has been entered,
common reputation respecting the childs
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission.
In the case at bar, the baptismal
certificates of respondents were adduced. In the
case of Mercedes, she produced a
certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar
attesting to the fact that records of birth for the
year she was born were all destroyed. A witness
was also presented who testified that petitioners
enjoyed that common reputation in the
community where they reside as being the
children of Buevaventura. Testimonies of
witnesses were also presented to prove filiation by
continuous possession of the status as a legitimate
child. The foregoing evidences thus suffice to
prove that petitioners are children of the late
Buenaventura.
27. Tijing vs CA
TIJING VS CA (& Diamante)
FACTS: Edgardo Tijing and Bienvenida Tijing,
husband and wife, have six children. The youngest
is Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
Petitioner Bienvenida served as the
laundrywoman of Angelita Diamante. According
to Bienvenida, Angelita went to her house to fetch
her for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida
was on her way to do some marketing, she asked
Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left
her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under her
care, as she usually let Angelita take care of the
child while Bienvenida was doing laundry.
When Bienvenida returned from the
market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. She
was told that her employer went out for a stroll
and was told to come back later. She returned to
Angelita's house after three days, only to discover
that Angelita had moved to another place.
Bienvenida and her husband looked for
their missing son in other places. However, despite
their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his
whereabouts.
Four years later, Bienvenida read in a
tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly
the common-law husband of Angelita. Thus, she
wen to to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly
saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after
four years. She claims that the boy was already
named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that
Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite
her demand to do so.
The spouses filed their petition for habeas
corpus with the trial court in order to recover their
son. To substantiate their petition, petitioners
presented two witnesses. One of whom is
Benjamin Lopez, the brother of Tomas Lopez. He,
declared that his brother, could not have possibly
fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was
sterile.
The trial court concluded that since
Angelita and her common-law husband could not
have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas
Lopez is an impossibility. The Court of Appeals
however reversed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John
Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is
the son of petitioners?
HELD: YES. A close scrutiny of the records of this
case reveals that the evidence presented by
Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John
Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo
Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could
no longer bear children. From her very lips, she
admitted that after the birth of her second child,
she underwent ligation in 1970, before she lived
with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage
in 1974.
Second, there is strong evidence which
directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer
capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared
in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile
because of the accident and that Tomas admitted
to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an
adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal
wife, Maria Lopez, had no children after almost
fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez had
lived with private respondent for fourteen years,
they also bore no offspring.
Third, the court found it unusual the fact
that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez
was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife,
four months after the alleged birth of the child.
Under the law, the attending physician or midwife
in attendance at birth should cause the
registration of such birth. Only in default of the
physician or midwife, can the parent register the
birth of his child.
Fourth, the trial court observed several
times that when the child and Bienvenida were
both in court, the two had strong similarities in
their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged
parent is competent and material evidence to
establish parentage.
Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she
assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. Unlike private respondent,
she presented clinical records consisting of a log
book, discharge order and the signatures of
petitioners.
All these considered, the SC was constrained to
rule that subject minor is indeed the son of
petitioners.
_________________________________________
__________________
Tijing vs. CA
Facts: Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus
in order to recover their son from respondent and
presented witnesses to substantiate their petition.
Respondent claimed on the other hand that she is
the natural mother of the child.
The trial court held in favor of the petitioners and
granted the petition for habeas corpus. On appeal,
the CA reversed and set aside the decision
rendered by the trial court. The appellate court
expressed its doubts on the propriety of the
habeas corpus.
Issue: WON habeas corpus is the proper remedy
to regain custody of a minor.
Held: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which
the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto. The writ of habeas
corpus is the proper legal remedy to enable
parents to regain the custody of a minor child
even if the latter be in the custody of a third
person of his own free will.
28. Herrera vs Alba
Facts: Rosendo Alba ("respondent"), represented
by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial
court a petition for compulsory recognition,
support and damages against petitioner. Petitioner
filed his answer with counterclaim where he
denied that he is the biological father of
respondent. Petitioner also denied physical
contact with respondent's mother. Respondent
filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA
paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings.
RTC and CA granted the motion
Issue: Petitioner raises the issue of whether a
DNA test is a valid probative tool in this
jurisdiction to determine filiation.
Held: Yes. By 2002, there was no longer any
question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis
as evidence. The Court moved from the issue of
according "official recognition" to DNA analysis as
evidence to the issue of observance of procedures
in conducting DNA analysis.
DNA analysis that excludes the putative
father from paternity should be conclusive proof
of non-paternity. If the value of Probability of
Paternity W is less than 99.9%, the results of the
DNA analysis should be considered as
corroborative evidence. If the value of Probability
of Paternity W is 99.9% or higher, then there
is refutable presumption of paternity.55 This
refutable presumption of paternity should be
subjected to the Vallejo standards.
In assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, therefore, courts should consider,
among other things, the following data: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled,
the possibility of contamination of the samples,
the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether the proper standards and procedures
were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the
tests.
29. Colorado vs CA
Colorado vs. CA GR No. L-39948February 28, 1985
Second division Cuevas, J.:
Facts: Petitioners are the natural children of
Flaviano Colorado and Juliana del Rosario who
were married in articulo mortis before Flaviano
died on August 31, 1922. Petitioners claim that
they are the legitimated children of Flaviano by his
subsequent marriage to Juliana. The trial court
ruled in favor of the petitioners but the CA
reversed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: W/n natural children are legitimated by
subsequent marriage of their parents?
Held: under the Spanish Civil Code, recognition by
the parents to be valid must be expressed or
formal not tacit or implied. Under the law prior to
the Spanish Civil Code, tacit acknowledgment was
sufficient; but since the enactment of the Code,
acknowledgment must be effected as prescribed
by Art. 131. Acknowledgement by the parent is
the conditional compliment of the natural filiation
of a child born out of wedlock before such child
can be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of
his parents under Art.121 of the Spanish Civil
Code.
Art. 121. Children shall be
considered as legitimated by a
subsequent marriage only when
they have been acknowledged by
the parents before or after the
celebration thereof.
Art. 131. The acknowledgment of
a natural child must be made in
the record of birth, in a with or in
some other public document.
Art. 133. The approval of the court
shall be necessary to the
acknowledgment of a minor
unless such acknowledgment be
made in a certificate of birth or in
a will. (Emphasis supplied)
The formalities for a valid acknowledgment of a
natural child are provided for in Article 131 of the
Spanish Civil Code. According to that Article such
acknowledgment 'must be made in the record of
birth, in a will, or in some other public document.'
It is clear that the legitimation of natural children
does not take place by mere subsequent marriage
between the parents.
The record shows that in the Register of Births on
file in the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of San
Marcelino, Zambales, the birth of Leonardo
Colorado (Exhibit "E"), Alfonso Colorado (Exhibit
"E-1"), Juan Colorado (Exhibit "E-2"), Antonio
Colorado (Exhibit "E-3"), and Porfirio Colorado
(Exhibit "E-4") was reported only on March 6,
1923, after about a year from the date of the
death of Flaviano Colorado. In their record of birth
it does not appear that Flaviano Colorado made
acknowledgment, and there is nothing in the
record to show that Flaviano Colorado signed any
document pertaining to their status. Since no
acknowledgment with respect to them was made
by Flaviano Colorado in their certificate of birth or
in some other public document and that he died
without a win where the acknowledgment could
be made, they cannot be considered as
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their
parents.
Plaintiffs-appellees and third party defendants-
appellees cited the compromise agreement of the
parties (Exhibit "U") filed in Civil Case No. 4 of the
lower court, where the legitimacy of the five
Colorado brothers is admitted, and invoked the
doctrine of estoppel. The law on estoppel has no
application when the compromise agreement is
relied upon to establish civil status because no
compromise can be made with respect to civil
status of persons. ...
The Court of Appeals then finally decreed
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby
MODIFIED, in the sense that it is declared that
Leonardo, Alfonso, Juan, Antonio and Porfirio all
surnamed Colorado, are not the legitimated
children of the late Flaviano Colorado by the
subsequent marriage of the latter to Juliana del
Rosario and, therefore, not entitled to inherit from
said Flaviano Colorado. The decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
30. Liyao jr vs Tanhoti Liyao
Liyao vs. Liyao
GR No. 138961, March 7, 2002
FACTS:
William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the
deceased, as represented by her mother
(Corazon), filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-
Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to
recognize and acknowledge the former as a
compulsory heir of the deceased and to be
entitled to all successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the
status as the child of the deceased having been
recognized and acknowledged as such child by the
decedent during his lifetime. There were two
sides of the story. Corazon maintained that she
and the deceased were legally married but living
separately for more than 10 years and that they
cohabited from 1965 until the death of the
deceased. On the other hand, one of the children
of the deceased stated that her mom and the
deceased were legally married and that her
parents were not separated legally or in fact.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner can impugn his own
legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of
the deceased.
HELD:
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly
personal right of the husband, or in exceptional
cases, his heirs for the reason that he was the one
directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule
which the infidelity of his wife produced and he
should be the one to decide whether to conceal
that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and
economic interest involved. Hence, it was then
settled that the legitimacy of the child can only be
impugned in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties and within the
period limited by law.
Furthermore, the court held that there was no
clear, competent and positive evidence presented
by the petitioner that his alleged father had
admitted or recognized his paternity.
31. Pe Lim vs CA
270 SCRA 1
FACTS:
Maribel was sixteen years old in 1978 and a part-
time student. She also worked as a receptionist in
a Club where she met petitioner during her first
night on the job. Petitioner wooed her and
Maribel reciprocated his love and soon lived
together. Maribel left for Japan in July 1981,
already pregnant, and returned to Manila in
October of the same year. On January 17, 1982,
Maribel gave birth to their daughter and he
registered the name Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim on the
childs birth certificate. After Joanna Roses birth,
the love affair between Maribel and petitioner
continued.
Towards the latter part of 1983, Maribel noted
that petitioners feelings toward her started to
wane. He subsequently abandoned her and
Joanna Rose. Maribel then filed a complaint for
support.
Petitioner negated all of Maribels claims and even
his paternity. The trial court rendered a decision
on in favor of Maribel ordering herein defendant,
Raymond Pe Lim to give support to his natural
daughter.
Petitioner then elevated his case and argues
before the Court that there is no clear and
convincing evidence on record to show that there
was actual cohabitation between him and Maribel.
ISSUE: Whether the evidence presented sufficient
to claim filiation therefore, making the father
liable for support.
HELD:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate
filiation may be established in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code states:
The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:
1. The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
3. The open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child;
4. Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.
Petitioner has never controverted the evidence on
record. His love letters to Maribel vowing to be a
good father to Joanna Rose; pictures of himself on
various occasions cuddling Joanna Rose and the
Certificate of Live Birth say it all. Accordingly, his
suit must fail.
32. Rivero vs CA
Facts: In behalf of her minor child, Benedick
Arevalo, her mother filed a complaint against
defendants for compulsory recognition as the
illegitimate child of their deceased father. During
trial, Mary Jane Dy-Chiao De Guzman, one of the
sister entered a compromised agreement with
plaintiff whereby she is acknowledging the
petitioner as the illegitimate son of her father and
pay petitioner P6M as a share in the estate of their
deceased father. RTC Granted the compromised
agreement .Meanwhile, the Dy Chiao Brothers
represented by their uncle filed for annulment of
judgment and TRO for the writ of execution of
judgment and motion to dismiss. CA directed
Mary Jane on the other hand to file a comment on
the opposition of her uncle. In her reply, she
question assailed decision of RTC since the
illegitimate filiation of Benedick could not be the
subject of a compromise agreement. She further
alleged that the parties thereunder did not
recognize the validity of the compromise
agreement, as in fact she and the petitioners were
exploring the possibility of modifying their
extrajudicial settlement.CA ruled in favor of the
defendants, hence a petition.
Issue: W/N the compromise regarding filiation is
valid?
Held: NO. The ruling of RTC based on the
compromise agreement executed by Mary Jane is
null and void. Article 2035(1) of the New Civil
Code provides that no compromise upon the civil
status of persons shall be valid. As such, paternity
and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a
relationship that must be judicially established,
and it is for the court to determine its existence or
absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement
of the parties. Such recognition by Mary Jane ,
however, is ineffectual, because under the law,
there cognition must be made personally by the
putative parent and not by any brother, sister or
relative
33. Bernabe vs Alejo
FACTS:
The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered
a son with his secretary Carolina Alejo and was
named Adrian Bernabe who was born on
September 18, 1981. After Ernesto Bernabe and
Rosalina (legal wife) died, the sole surviving heir
left was Ernestina. Carolina, in behalf of his son
Adrian, filed a complaint that Adrian be declared
an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe and be given a share of his fathers
estate.
Trial courts ruling: Under the new law, an action
for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be
brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent
to give the latter an opportunity to either affirm or
deny the childs filiation.
CA ruling: The rights of Adrian are governed
under Article 285 of the Civil Code which allows an
action for recognition to be filed within 4 years
after the child has attained the age of majority and
that subsequent enactment of the Family Code did
not take away his right.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be
declared an acknowledged illegitimate son.
HELD:
The Family Code makes no distinction on whether
the former was still a minor when the latter died.
Thus, the putative parent is given by the new code
a chance to dispute the claim, considering that
illegitimate children are usually begotten and
raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family
being aware of their existence.
Furthermore, the grounds or instances for the
acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to
establish the filiation of spurious children.
Hence, the petition was denied and assailed
decision was affirmed.
34. Mossesgeld vs CA
Case Doctrines:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname of
the mother, and this is rule regardless of whether
or not the father admits paternity.
Mandamus does not lie to compel the
performance of an act prohibited by law
Facts: In 1989, Marissa Mossesgeld (single), gave
birth to a baby boy. The father, one Eleazar
Calasan (married), signed the birth certificate of
the child as the informant, indicating therein the
childs name as Jonathan Mossesgeld Calasan.
Both Eleazar and Marissa accomplished the dorsal
side of the certificate of live birth stating that the
information contained therein were true and
correct. In addition, Eleazar executed an affidavit
admitting paternity of the child.
The person in charge at the hospital refused to
place Calasan as the childs surname in the
certificate of live birth; hence, Eleazar himself
submitted the certificate to the office of the local
civil registrar of Mandaluyong, for registration. The
local civil registrar denied the registration on the
basis of Circular No. 4, dated October 11, 1988, of
the Civil Registrar General, providing that under
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
illegitimate children born on or after August 3,
1988, shall use the surname of their mother.
Eleazar filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
a petition for mandamus to compel the Local Civil
Registrar of Mandaluyong to register the
certificate of live birth of his alleged illegitimate
son using his surname. The RTC denied the
petition. Eleazar filed a motion for
reconsideration. Later, he filed a motion for leave
to amend petition and to admit amended petition,
substituting the childs mother Marissa A.
Mossesgeld as the petitioner. The MR was denied.
The CA affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Does mandamus lie to compel the Local Civil
Registrar to register a certificate of live birth of an
illegitimate child using the alleged fathers
surname where the latter admitted paternity?
Held:
No. Article 176 of the Family Code of the
Philippines provides that illegitimate children
shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
This is the rule regardless of whether or not the
father admits paternity. Consequently, the Local
Civil Registrar correctly refused to register the
certificate of live birth of petitioners illegitimate
child using the surname of the alleged father, even
with the latters consent. Of course, the putative
father, though a much married man, may legally
adopt his own illegitimate child. In case of
adoption, the child shall be considered a
legitimate child of the adopter, entitled to use his
surname.
Mandamus will not lie to compel the local civil
registrar to register the certificate of live birth of
an illegitimate child using the fathers surname,
even with the consent of the latter. Mandamus
does not lie to compel the performance of an act
prohibited by law. (Mossesgeld vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 111455. December 23, 1998)
35. Republic vs Vivencio
Facts :
The petitioner was born at Capitol Medical Center
in Quezon City on January 19, 1971 to parents
Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega
Leabres. On January 10, 1927, after a marital
disagreement, Vicencio left their Meycauayan
Bulacan conjugal property and never returned nor
gave support to his family. Leabres found an ally in
Ernesto Yu who would later end up as her
husband. On June 29, 1976, Leabres filed a
petition, known as civil case number E-02009 with
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the
dissolution of her conjugal partnership with
Vicencio. In a decision given by Hon Regina C.
Ordoez Benitez dated July 11, 1977, the petition
was granted. The petitioners mother filed another
petition in 1983 to drop the surname of her
husband therefrom and this, known as Special
Proclamation 8316346 was again approved in a
decision rendered by Hon. Emeterio C. Cui of
Branch XXV. Yet again, under Special Proclamation
number 84-22605, Leabres filed a petition to
declare Pablo Vicencio an absentee. Hon. Corona
Ibay- Somera decided in favour of the petitioners
mother on April 26, 1984. The positive results of
these petitions paved the way for the marriage of
the petitioners mother and Ernesto Yu on April
15, 1986.
Evidence was established that the petitioner had
not remembered much her real father, Pablo
Vicencio, and that in his absence, it was Ernesto Yu
who had taken Vicencios place. Although
petitioner uses the surname Vicencio in her school
and other related activities, she contends that in
such situations, confusion arose as to her
parentage leading to inquiries as to why she is
using Vicencio as surname; causing much
embarrassment on her part. In two occasions
when she ran as a beauty contestant for Lions
Club Affair and Manila Red Cross, her name was
registered as Cynthia L. Yu. His stepfather had
given his consent thereto upon prior consultation
with him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), having
participated in the cross examination of Cynthia
Vicencio and her witnesses, manifested opposition
over the petition. The court argued that there was
no valid cause for the denial of the petition and
that taking into account the fact that the court
cannot compel the stepfather of the petitioner to
consider adoption, failure to observe the process
should not be a cause for disallowing petitioner to
legally change her name, in addition to the
opportunity of the respondent to improve her
personality and welfare under a socially
recognized surname, that of her stepfather. On
August 31, 1987, the Manila Regional Trial Court
Branch 52 granted private respondent Cynthia
Vicencios petition for change of surname from
Vicencio to Yu. The same was affirmed by the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 28,
1989.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court made a
mistake or violated standards in affirming the
decision of the trial court to allow the change in
private respondents surname to that of her
stepfathers surname.
Decision:
Recognized inter alia in Republic vs. Hernandez,
the following are sufficient grounds to warrant a
change in name; a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce, b) when the change is a legal
consequence of legitimation or adoption, c.) when
the change will avoid confusion, d) when one has
continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of
an alien parentage, e) when the change is based
on sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
sign of former alienage, in good faith without
prejudice to anybody and f) when the surname
causes embarrassment and there is no showing
that desired change of name was far a fraudulent
purpose or would prejudice public interest.
Private respondent asserts that she falls under one
of the justifiable grounds, specifically under
avoidance of confusion since she has been
recognized by society as the daughter of Ernesto
Yu although she admits to having used Vicencio in
beauty pageants and in her debut.
In the argument of the Solicitor General, it argues
that change in surname might give rise to legal
complications since her stepfather has two other
children with her mother and such complications
may affect even the issue of inheritance should
the stepfather die. The OSG further argues that
change of name would be easy through adoption
which Ernesto Yu did not opt for.
The court contends that though confusion may
arise with regard to parentage, more confusion
with grave legal consequences could arise if
private respondent is to use his stepfathers
surname even if she is not legally adopted by him.
Legal constraints lead the court to reject private
respondents desire to use her step-fathers
surname and no assurance exists that the end
result would not be even more detrimental to her
person, as it may trigger deeper inquiries
regarding her parentage. It is also noteworthy that
as a result of Republic Act 6809, the private
respondent although already 18 when the
appellate court rendered its decision, was still
considered a minor.
The court reversed and set aside the appealed
decision to allow private respondents change of
name from Vicencio to Yu and granted the instant
petition to retain surname due to lack of legally
justifiable cause for allowing such change.