Professional Documents
Culture Documents
19
Aram Terzyan
1
President Serzh Sargsyan at the Plenary Session of the Pace Responded to the Questions
Raised by the Members of the Parliament, 02 October 2013, at http://www.president.am/en/
interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2013/10/02/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-answered-the-ques
tions-of-PACE-members, 10 June 2015.
248 Aram Terzyan
2
President Serzh Sargsyan Met With the Representatives of the Mass Media, 18 March 2013,
at http://www.president.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2013/03/18/President-Ser
zh-Sargsyan-press-conference, 2 April 2015.
3
Customs Union not necessary for Armenia PM, 4 April 2012, at http://news.am/eng/
news/99883.html, 10 May 2015.
4
Armenia to Deepen Cooperation With EU Within Neighborhood Policy, 16 May 2005, at
http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/politics/news/13311, 27 April 2015.
5
Speech by President Serzh Sargsyan at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 07 March 2012, at
http://www.president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2012/03/07/news-124, 25 February
2015.
6
Statement by President Serzh Sargsyan at the EU Eastern Partnership Second Summit,
30 September 2011, at http://www.president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2011/09/30/
news-111, 22 February 2015.
Armenias foreign policy between European identity and Eurasian integration 249
7
Edward Nalbandyan: Armenias EEU Membership is of Strategic Importance to the
RA, 14 March 2015, at http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=716D3A30-CA47-11E4-
99FD0EB7C0D21663, 20 April 2015.
8
Ruling party says Customs Union decision meets Armenias national interests, 6 March
2013, at http://www.armenianow.com/news/48249/armenia_ruling_party_customs_union_russia,
14 March 2015.
9
A. Mir z oy an, Armenia, the Regional Powers, and the West: Between History and Geopolitics,
New York 2010, p. 28.
250 Aram Terzyan
I. J. Mc Ginnit y, Selling its Future Short: Armenias Economic and Security Relations with
10
underlying tension between the EUs soft tools and geopolitical realities of the region
characterized by domination of hard power politics.
Moreover, the credibility in the EUs transformative power was further challenged
by the substantial shift in energy-related projects in EU-Azerbaijan partnership
which have visibly widened the gap between the EUs energy and broader regional
policy objectives, as well as in democracy promotion and conflict settlement. The
EUs tolerance towards permanent violations of Azerbaijans commitments makes
clear that pragmatic energy interests dominate over normative goals, thus engender-
ing more scepticism over Brusselss positive engagement in the region. This has led
President Sargsyan to explicitly question the effectiveness of the Eastern Partnership
pointing to its three core shortcomings - namely, the unclear criterion of grouping
partners, lack of powerful incentives for Azerbaijan to move beyond energy partner-
ship and comply with the EU policies as well as its irrelevance to Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict settlement. The President particularly stressed: The countries differed in
their approaches, their goals and I think that this is the reason that at least of the East-
ern Partnerships components the regional cooperation component was doomed to
failure. I still do not understand the criterion of grouping Armenia and Azerbaijan into
one partnership different opportunities, different approaches, different goals and this
is the reason that component did not work. 13
Sargsyan has consistently pointed to the shortcomings of Europeanization in the
region that stem from misperceptions of European values across Armenias imme-
diate neighbors: Evidently, for some countries advancement toward Eurointegration
doesnt necessarily signify a peaceful, prosperous, free and secure development. One of
our immediate neighbors has misapprehensions regarding the European way, perceiving
the European realm exclusively as a convenient market for selling oil and gas Another
neighbor of ours, Turkey, which also aspires to become part of Europe, will not open
its borders with Armenia despite its international obligations. One may wonder if our
neighbors are aware that free movement is a pivot of the European system of values.14
In a way this rhetoric reflects Sargsyans take on limitations of European inte-
gration in the region, given the fact that the process itself is doomed to a negligible
success because of Armenias unlawful blockade imposed on the country by its two
neighbors. Hence, at times President has abstained from pinning high hopes on the
path of European integration as a silver bullet to regional security, given the fact that
13
Statement by the President of the Republic of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan at the High-
-Level Meeting on the 5th Anniversary of the Eastern Partnership, 25 April 2014, at http://www.
president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2014/04/25/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-speech-
Eastern-Partnership-Prague/, 14 December 2014.
14
Remarks of the President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan at the Joint Press Conference with the
President of Slovenia Danilo Turk, 13 April 2011, at http://www.president.am/en/interviews-and
-press-conferences/item/2011/04/13/news-65/, 18 January 2015.
252 Aram Terzyan
the EUs strategic energy partner Azerbaijan lacks powerful incentives to pursue deep
and comprehensive Eurointegration. Armenia remains subject to blockade by its an-
other neighbor Turkey, which tremendously hinders the effectiveness of European
integration. Remarkably, Yerevan has tended to regard Turkeys belligerent policy
towards Armenia as a major obstacle to countrys swift and smooth integration into
European organizations. In this regard President Sargsyan pointed out: Armenia is
interested in the further development of the Eastern Partnership format. It should con-
tinue to serve its major objective united Europe that is free of dividing lines, stable
and prosperous. It is important for the Eastern Partnership to be responsive to the vital
interests of all the participating states. For Armenia it is first of all the unblocking of the
closed border with Turkey. 15
It should be emphasized that Russias increasing assertiveness towards the EU in
the wake of Vilnius summit (November 2013) significantly affected Armenias per-
ception of the EU association perspective. Evidence indicates that Armenias Euro-
pean foreign policy agenda plays out insofar as it is not perceived as detrimental to
Russias strategic interests. Unsurprisingly, Russias increasingly confrontational po-
sition towards the EU found its vivid expression in Armenia - EU relations. When
providing explanations on the decision pertaining to Armenias membership into
Russian-led Customs Union, President placed a special emphasis on security-relat-
ed determinants of the choice16. Thus, civilizational dimension proved to be overly
dominated by security-first approach revealing the root shortcomings of identity-
based foreign policy making.
In elaborating on driving forces behind Armenias membership into the Customs
Union the President implicitly pointed at undesirability of Ukrainian scenario ap-
plication in Armenia. He particularly mentioned: The Ukrainian crisis has demon-
strated that lack of understanding of the root causes of the current situation can call
further proceeding of the Eastern Partnership into question. Armenia joined the Eastern
Partnership with a deep conviction that it is not directed against any third country It
is necessary to find solutions by means of a dialogue that take into account interests of
all regional beneficiaries17.
15
Statement by the President of the Republic of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan at the High-
-Level Meeting on the 5th Anniversary of the Eastern Partnership, 25 April 2014, at http://www.
president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2014/04/25/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-speech-
Eastern-Partnership-Prague/, 18 May 2015.
16
President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan and President of the Russian Federation Vladimir
Putin signed Joint Statements, 3 September 2013, at http://www.president.am/en/press-release/
item/2013/09/03/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-and-President-Vladimir-Putin-joint-statement/,
20December 2014.
17
Statement by the President of the Republic of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan at the High-Le-
vel Meeting on the 5th Anniversary Of The Eastern Partnership, 25 April 2014, at http://www.
Armenias foreign policy between European identity and Eurasian integration 253
president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2014/04/25/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-speech-
Eastern-Partnership-Prague/, 30 May 2015.
18
I. J. Mc Ginn it y, op. cit., pp. 7-15.
19
Armenian Lawmakers Ratify Controversial Russian Gas Deal Amid Protests, 23 December
2013, at http://www.rferl.org/content/armenia-russia-gas-deal/25209474.html, 10 April 2015.
20
E. D an ielyan, Russia Tightens Control over the Armenian Energy Sector, 16 October 2006,
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav101706.shtml, 10 March 2015.
254 Aram Terzyan
It is worth noting that prior to Armenias move towards the Customs Union Rus-
sia played its energy card by increasing gas prices for Armenia and thus indicating
the economic consequences of alternative foreign policy choices.
Remarkably, having witnessed the politicization of Russian energy supplies in
both Ukraine and Moldova, Armenian political leadership spared no effort to avoid
similar hardships caused by energy supply cut offs. In this regard President Sargsyan
particularly pointed out: Our choice is not civilizational. It corresponds to the eco-
nomic interests of our nation. We cannot sign the Free Trade Agreement and increase
the gas price and the electricity fee three-fold. 21
Another factor explaining Armenias decision is the question of economic secu-
rity and the dominant role of Russia in Armenias trade. As a single country, Russia is
the main external trade partner of Armenia which is the destination for 20 per cent
of Armenian exports and source of 70 per cent of remittances.22 Russia also maintains
lead in the realm of foreign investments in Armenia. According to official informa-
tion, there are about 1,300 enterprises with Russian capital, which is over one fourth
of all economic entities with involvement of foreign capital.23
Evidence suggests that permanent flows of Armenian migrant workers to Russia
in recent years have catalyzed substantial increase in cash transfers from there mak-
ing up around 9.1 % of Armenias GDP. In 2013, non-commercial money transfers of
individuals from Russia to Armenia via banking system amounted around $ 1.6bln.
while Armenias budget for 2013 was set $ 2.8 bln on expenditures and $ 2.7 bln on
revenues. 24 Clearly, Armenian economy has rendered increasingly dependent on re-
mittances coming mostly from Russia.
Therefore, the expected annual increase in remittances contingent upon Arme-
nias integration into the Customs Unions single labour and capital market is unequiv-
ocally deemed to be one of the core benefits of Armenias membership into the CU.
Importantly, the core explanations offered by President Sargsyan pertaining to
Armenias Russia first choice along with security and economic issues were inextri-
cably linked to large Armenian diaspora in Russia.
, . , ,
21
25
From Moscow With Love: Armenian reporter finds neo-Soviet Russia on pro-Eura-
sian tour, by G. M k r tchyan, 14 October 2014, at http://www.armenianow.com/society/featu
res/57604/armenia_moscow_visit_russia_eurasian_union, 17 May 2015.
26
Statement by the President of the Republic of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan at the Fourht
Eastern Partnership Summit, 22 May 2015, at http://www.president.am/en/statements-and-messa
ges/item/2015/05/22/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-Eastern-Partnership-Latvia-speech/, 8 June 2015.
256 Aram Terzyan
Conclusions
Armenias abrupt move away from the Association Agreement and the substan-
tial shift in Eurasian integration has brought into the spotlight the core challenges
and constraints of identity-based foreign policy making. Notwithstanding its overly
European foreign policy identity Armenia opted for Russian-led Customs Union due
to the following paramount reasons: firstly, Armenias key economic and security
ally Russias increasing assertiveness towards the EU which found its vivid expres-
sion in the Armenia-EU relations; secondly, traditional security challenges which
sent new ripples of apprehension to Armenia afterwards a major shift in Russian
military hardware supply to Azerbaijan; thirdly, energy security concerns and namely
Armenias heavy dependence on Russian energy supply, which was skilfully used by
Russia; fourthly Russias dominant role in Armenian economy both in terms of exter-
nal investments and the share of trade; last but not least - large Armenian diaspora in
Russia, which might considerably suffer from the shortcomings of Yerevans alterna-
tive foreign policy choices.
All the arguments mentioned above lead to the conclusion that Armenias mem-
bership in the Customs Union was no choice option. In fact there was no room for
manoeuvre and particularly for the further promotion of the Association Agreement
with the EU.
Bibliography
Armenian Lawmakers Ratify Controversial Russian Gas Deal Amid Protests, 23 December
2013, at http://www.rferl.org/content/armenia-russia-gas-deal/25209474.html, 10 April
2015.
Armenia Monthly Economic Update, World Bank Group (March, 2015), at http://www.
worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/eca/armenia/armenia-economic-up
date.pdf, 5 May 2015.
Armenias foreign policy between European identity and Eurasian integration 257
Statement by the President of the Republic of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan at the High-Level
Meeting on the 5th Anniversary of the Eastern Partnership, 25 April 2014, at http://www.
president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2014/04/25/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-
speech-Eastern-Partnership-Prague, 14 December 2014.
Statement by the President of the Republic of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan at the High-Level
Meeting on the 5th Anniversary of the Eastern Partnership, 25 April 2014, at http://www.
president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2014/04/25/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-
speech-Eastern-Partnership-Prague, 18 May 2015.
Statement by the President of the Republic of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan at the High-Level
Meeting on the 5th Anniversary Of The Eastern Partnership, 25.04.2014, at http://www.
president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2014/04/25/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-
speech-Eastern-Partnership-Prague/, 30 May 2015.
Speech by President Serzh Sargsyan at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 7 March 2012,
at http://www.president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2012/03/07/news-124,
25February 2015.
Statement by the President of the Republic of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan at the Fourht Eastern
Partnership Summit, 22 May 2015, at http://www.president.am/en/statements-and-mes
sages/item/2015/05/22/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-Eastern-Partnership-Latvia-speech,
8June 2015.
Ter-Matevosyan, Vahram, Integration Vs. Security: Or What Is to Be Learnt from Arme-
nias Decision to Join The Eurasian Economic Union (Customs Union)?, Policy brief, at
https://tcpablog.files.wordpress.com/2014/12/brief.pdf, 12 June 2015.
, . , ,
, 23 September 2014. (Aravot Daily, Diary
for me and for everyone. You are interesting people, you came here and want to determine
the destiny of Armenia?) web. 28.09.2014, http://www.aravot.am/2014/09/24/499600/,
7May 2015.
Abstract
The dichotomy of European and Eurasian paths to integration revolving around foreign pol-
icy of Armenia ended up with its membership into the Russian-led Customs Union (CU).
The decision sparked vigorous debates in Armenia, particularly pertaining to challenges and
constraints of identity-based foreign policy making. The article examines the driving forces
behind Armenias membership into the Customs Union with a special emphasis on the core
obstacles that rendered its long-desired EU Association perspective unfeasible. Armenias
abrupt move away from the European Union (EU) and a shift in Eurasian integration clearly
indicated that its identity-based foreign policy agenda is overly hindered by constraints stem-
ming from heavy economic and political dependence on Russia.