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The Day Modern Architecture Died

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 The Day Modern Architecture Died
Rowell Ray L. Shih
March 28, 2016

"Happily, it is possible to date the death of Modern Architecture to a precise moment in time. Modern
Architecture died in St. Louis, Missouri on July 15, 1972 at 3:32pm."

- Charles Jencks

Between the 19th and 20th century, cities began to change drastically. In United States, people began to
migrate and work in the city, hoping to begin an urban way of living. These cities began to see an influx
of people from rural areas, mostly immigrants with little or no skills. A large portion of these were
African-American. The urban city core is losing its population due to suburban growth. As the urban
population grew, the rise of blighted and slum community also increased. City planner and officials
agreed that public housing is the solution. Public housing has been done before but in a smaller scale. The
concept of multiple, high rise public housing was never been attempted before. The American federal
government decided to address these overcrowded cities by implementing the Housing Act of 1949. This
was part of President Harry Trumans decision. Basically, the Act allowed the developers to expand into
the suburbs and additionally encouraged the city dwellers to move to the suburbs as well. When the large
portion of capital and tax base relocating to the suburbs, this resulted in decay and deterioration which
resulted in the slums taking a large portion of the city. St. Louis was just one of the many northern
industrial cities that was experiencing this housing crisis. The slum area was growing out of control and
was getting closer to the core of the city. With the Housing Act of 1949, the city accelerated their plans to
erase the blighted slums. Title 1 not only cleared the slums but also financed the construction of Pruitt-
Igoe. The city commissioned the project, in supervision with the St. Louis Housing Authority, to
Leinweber, Yamasaki & Hellmuth firm to design the first of its kind housing project. The housing project
was to be named Pruitt-Igoe after Captain Wendell O. Pruitt, an African-American Fighter pilot in World
War 2 and William L. Igoe, a former U.S. congressman. The housing project was designed by architect
Minoru Yamasaki. Yamasakis initial proposal was to provide a mix of high-rise, mid-rise and walk-up
buildings. This concept was first approved by the St. Louis authorities, but exceeded the federal cost
limits imposed by the Public Housing Authority. The PHA eventually intervened and imposed a uniform
building height at 11 floors. The design concept and planning has influenced by the principles of Le
Corbusier and the International Congress of Modern Architects (CIAM). The notion was to keep the
grounds and the first floor free for community activities and a river of trees" was to flow underneath the
buildings. Each building was given communal corridors every third floor to house a laundry, a communal
room, and a garbage room which also contained a garbage chute. The project was spread out on a 57 acre
lot which housed 13,000 people. There were 33 high rise buildings, each with 11 floors. There were 2700
units which consist of 1-5 bedrooms. The project cost US$36 million to construct. The occupancy peaked
in 1957 at 91% occupancy but in a few years immediately began to decline. From the beginning, Pruitt-
Igoe was designed to be a segregated space: The captain W.O. Pruitt for the black residents and the W.L.
Igoe for the white residents. On paper the design was impressive. The government praised Yamasaki and
even claimed it as the best high rise apartment of the year. Pruitt-Igoe was a collection of massive
buildings that rely on consistent funds for maintenance and these funds came entirely from the tenants.
When Pruitt-Igoe was full, it has adequate funds for the upkeep. The Public Housing Authority has the
duty to collect the funds and maintain the buildings. But when occupancy dwindled, the condition of the
buildings suffered dramatically. The physical state of the buildings slowly declined. Elevators began to
fail, water pipes began to leak, heating mechanisms began to fail and trash remained uncollected. These
are some of among the many maintenance setbacks that occurred at Pruitt-Igoe. There has been lots of
argument on what the contributing factors that contributes to the demise of Pruitt-Igoe, whether it was
economic, social, political or physical reasons. The city presumed that they can reliably collect the rent
and tax incentives from the city for the upkeep and maintenance cost of Pruitt-Igoe. I think one of the key
downfalls of Pruitt-Igoe was the inconsistent rent payments. In the beginning of the construction, the
federal government subsidized the cost of the building but did not plan for the maintenance and upkeep.
For some residents, up to 75% of their income goes to the rent. Over the years, it was difficult to depend
on the tenants for rent as many of them were in and out of employment and most of them without other
financial resources. Most of the jobs were moved to the suburbs and access to employment became
difficult. Starting in the 1960s St. Louis has too much housing and too little money. During these years,
the population of the city also dwindled from around 802,000 in 1930 to 450,000 in 1980. It was evident
that the St. Louis housing authority had little interest in maintaining and managing their biggest housing
project. During this time, the federal government changed its rules for admission to public housing and
many families who were previously excluded were now allowed entry into Pruitt-Igoe. Pruitt-Igoe then
became a dumping ground for all people that nobody wanted. Most of the people staying here are of
African-American residents of which only 10% were adult males. The city did not pay welfare for
families with a male who is the head of the household. This resulted in the head of the families leaving
their families in Pruitt-Igoe and find jobs elsewhere, mostly outside the city, where jobs were plentiful.
The vacancies continued to increase while the cost escalated. Some experts believe that the design also
contributed to the downfall of Pruitt-Igoe. The buildings feature skip-stop elevators, which was once
heralded as an architectural innovation during that time. This means that the elevators only stopped at the
first, fourth, seventh and tenth floors. The residents were forced to use the stairs. Staircases provided the
perfect environment for assaulters and crimes increased dramatically. The residents began to point the
fingers to the government for the poor implementation of the Pruitt-Igoe housing project. One of the key
decisions was the implementation of the Federal Housing Act of 1949 which encouraged middle-class
residents to take their money and buy a home in the exclusively white suburbs. This segregated the city
into a predominantly low income black area and to be condensed into Pruitt-Igoe. This might have
slightly contributed to the aftermath of Pruitt-Igoe. Others blamed the tenants for the destruction of Pruitt-
Igoe. The theory of Defensible Space, which was coined by Oscar Newman, was also being used to blame
the failure of Pruitt-Igoe. The theory behind defensible space is that concentrated housing project can
contribute to crime and a lack of care to the physical property that one lives in. This is because the tenants
do not have personal responsibility in an area occupied by so many people. Because all the grounds were
common and disassociated from the units, no one could identify with them. They proved unsafe. The
river of trees soon became a river of broken window glass, human waste and uncollected garbage. The
corridors, lobbies, elevators and stairs were dangerous places to walk through any time of the day. They
soon became covered in graffiti because no one cares about them. Many people blamed the lame excuse
of defensible space theory for the failure of Pruitt-Igoe while ignoring the social and managerial factors.
Many studies have been done as the real reason for the failure of Pruitt-Igoe, which was a unique housing
project in the U.S. it all boils down to the design and concept are to blame or the implementation and
management as the key forces.
 Pruitt-Igoe was a failure of modern architecture. Many blamed the design flaws and its architectural
shortcomings. One theory puts the responsibility to Swiss architect, Le Corbusier, with his leading
conception of a modernist city of high rises. But if you take a closer look at the real reason of Pruitt-
Igoes failure extend way beyond architectural design flaws. The architectural layout may not have been
the sole reason why Pruitt-Igoe was eventually demolished in 1972, at a loss of US$300 million, less than
20 years after it opened. It may have been the poor management that truly accelerated its death.
Meanwhile, across the street from Pruitt-Igoe was an older, smaller, row-house complex occupied by an
identical population, the Carr Square Village. It had remained fully occupied and trouble-free throughout
the construction, occupancy, and decline of Pruitt-Igoe. The social variables are constant in the two
developments. What was the physical difference in enabling Carr Square Village to survive while Pruitt-
Igoe fell apart?

The failure of modern architecture was an easy scape goat used by historians to explain the failure of
Pruitt-Igoe. Personally, I thought there is much behind the story than its architectural or design
deficiencies. The government failed to see the overwhelming maintenance cost of Pruitt-Igoe. When
Pruitt-Igoe was struggling to maintain its services, there was no help from the government. Circumstances
worsened until Pruitt-Igoe reached to a point of no return. For the former residents, it was a home with
lots of memories. The area where Pruitt-Igoe stands is now covered with trees and shrubbery. It is
difficult to think that this was the place where once stood many buildings where people call it their home.
The story of Pruitt-Igoe serves as a lesson and as a reminder of the catastrophic mismanagement and
failure public housing. Is there a lesson to be learned from here? Is public housing more expensive than
we thought it was? Was this the product of white political machines?

It was like an oasis in a desert, all this newness; I never thought I would live in that kind of
surrounding

-Ruby Russell (Pruitt-Igoe resident 1956)

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