14. Ylarde vs. Aquino, G.R. No.
R. No. L-33722 (1988) if there is no pre- existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
FACTS:
Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School, a public educational institution
located in Tayug, Pangasinan- Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. At that time, the school
was fittered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was
destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the
schoolchildren, another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez started burying them one by one. In
fact, he was able to bury ten of these blocks all by himself.
Deciding to help his colleague, private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male
pupils, aged ten to eleven, after class dismissal. Being their teacher-in-charge, he ordered them
to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried.
The work was left unfinished. The following day, also after classes, private respondent Aquino
called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging. These four pupils Reynaldo
Alonso, Francisco Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, dug until the excavation was one
meter and forty centimeters deep. At this point, private respondent Aquino alone continued digging
while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the
digging.
When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, private respondent Aquino
and his four pupils got out of the hole. Then, said private respondent left the children to level the
loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away.
Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could
get some rope. Before leaving. , private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch
the stone."
A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left, three of the four kids, Alonso, Alcantara and
Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. Then, without any warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped
on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso and Alcantara
were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately fo Ylarde, the concrete block
caught him before he could get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing position. As a result
thereof, Ylarde sustained injuries. Three days later, Novelito Ylarde died.
Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for damages against both private respondents
Aquino and Soriano.
The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds:
(1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education;
(2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person; and
(3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the lower court.
Petitioners base their action against private respondent Aquino on Article 2176 of the Civil Code
for his alleged negligence that caused their son's death while the complaint against respondent
Soriano as the head of school is founded on Article 2180 of the same Code.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
On the other hand, the applicable provision of Article 2180 states:
Art. 2180. x x x
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. 3
ISSUE:
Whether or not under the cited provisions, both private respondents can be held liable for
damages.
HELD:
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the
questioned judgment of the respondent court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another
judgment is hereby rendered ordering private respondent Edagardo Aquino to pay petitioners an
Imdemnity for the death of Child Ylarde, Exemplary damages and Moral damages.
As regards the principal, Mariano Soriano
We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head
of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades.
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the
provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where
the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first
part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades,
it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule.
In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where
the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable.
Following the canon ofreddendo singula sinquilis 'teachers' should apply to the words "pupils
and students' and 'heads of establishments of arts and trades to the word "apprentices."
As regards the teacher, Edgardo Aquino
From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them
and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons. However,
as earlier pointed out, petitioners base the alleged liability of private respondent Aquino on Article
2176 which is separate and distinct from that provided for in Article 2180. With this in mind, the
question We need to answer is this: Were there acts and omissions on the part of private
respondent Aquino amounting to fault or negligence which have direct causal relation to the death
of his pupil Ylarde?
Our answer is in the affirmative. He is liable for damages.
The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous
site has a direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was
but natural for the children to play around. Tired from the strenuous digging, they just had to amuse
themselves with whatever they found. Driven by their playful and adventurous instincts and not
knowing the risk they were facing three of them jumped into the hole while the other one jumped
on the stone. Since the stone was so heavy and the soil was loose from the digging, it was also a
natural consequence that the stone would fall into the hole beside it, causing injury on the
unfortunate child caught by its heavy weight. Everything that occurred was the natural and
probable effect of the negligent acts of private respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the child
Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation created by private respondent
Aquino which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger.

We cannot agree with the finding of the lower court that the injuries which resulted in the death of
the child Ylarde were caused by his own reckless imprudence, It should be remembered that he
was only ten years old at the time of the incident, As such, he is expected to be playful and daring.

The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered
to care for himself. The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection
is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion,
knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. Bearing this in mind, We
cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence.

The court is not persuaded that the digging done by the pupils can pass as part of their Work
Education. A single glance at the picture showing the excavation and the huge concrete
block 7 would reveal a dangerous site requiring the attendance of strong, mature laborers and not
ten-year old grade-four pupils.

We cannot comprehend why the lower court saw it otherwise when private respondent Aquino
himself admitted that there were no instructions from the principal requiring what the pupils were
told to do. Nor was there any showing that it was included in the lesson plan for their Work
Education.

The contention that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person is certainly
without cogent basis. A reasonably prudent person would have foreseen that bringing children to
an excavation site, and more so, leaving them there all by themselves, may result in an accident.
An ordinarily careful human being would not assume that a simple warning "not to touch the stone"
is sufficient to cast away all the serious danger that a huge concrete block adjacent to an
excavation would present to the children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his
pupils would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company.

We close by categorically stating that a truly careful and cautious person would have acted in all
contrast to the way private respondent Aquino did. Were it not for his gross negligence, the
unfortunate incident would not have occurred and the child Ylarde would probably be alive today,
a grown- man of thirty-five. Due to his failure to take the necessary precautions to avoid the hazard,
Ylarde's parents suffered great anguish all these years.

15. Vda. De Gregorio vs. Go Chong Bing, G.R. No. L- 7763 (1957)
FACTS: On or before June 2, 1952, defendant was the owner of a truck. He had a driver and a
cargador or driver's helper by the name of Francisco Rosomera. In the afternoon of June 2, 1952,
defendant ordered Romera to drive his truck, with instructions to follow another track driven by his
driver and help the latter in crossing Sumlog river which was then flooded, should it be unable to
cross the river because of the flood. Romera at that time was not a licensed driver. He only had a
student's permit, issued to him on March 31, 1952 (Exhibit "1"). The truck started from the town of
Lupon at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, driven by Romera. Some persons boarded the truck
and among them was one policeman by the name of Venancio Orfanel. While the truck was on
the way, it made a stop and then Orfanel took the wheel from Romera, while the latter stayed on
the driver's left, reclined on a spare tire inside of the truck. As to the circumstances under which
Orfanel was able to take hold of and drive the truck, there is some dispute and this matter will be
taken up later in the decision.
While the truck was being driven by Orfanel, with another truck ahead of it driven by defendant's
driver it so happened that they came to a truck that was trying to park on the left side of the road.
Romera suggested to Orfanel that he shift to low gear and Orfanel did so. But as they approached
the parking truck, and in order to avoid colliding with it, Orfanel swerved the truck towards the
right. It so happened that at that time two pedestrians were on the right side of the road, As the
truck had swerved to the right and was proceeding to hit the said pedestrians, Romera told Orfanel
to apply the brake, but Orfanel instead of doing so put his foot on the gasoline and the truck did
not stop but went on and hit and run over one of the pedestrians, by the name of Quirico Gregorio.
The plaintiffs appellants' in this action are Gregorio's widow and his children and of the accident,
Orfanel was prosecuted for homicide with reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty to the charge
and was sentenced accordingly.
Court of First Instance: absolved defendant from liability for the accidental death of Quirico
Gregorio
ISSUE: whether or not the defendant is liable.
SC: We are of the belief that defendant's claim that Romera gave the wheel to the policeman for
fear of, or out of respect for, the latter, has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The
testimony of witness Dayo is not corroborated by any other testimony. As he testified that he was
two meters behind Romera, he could not have noticed with exactness the circumstances under
which the policeman was able to get hold of the wheel and drive the truck and his testimony in
that respect cannot be believed. We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion that the defendant's
cargador, or Francisco Romera gave the wheel to Orfanel out of respect for the latter, who was a
uniformed policeman and because he believed that the latter had both the ability and the authority
to drive the truck, especially as he himself had only a student's permit and not a driver's license.
The court a quo dismissed the action on the ground that as the death or accident was caused by
an act or omission of a person who is not in any way related to the defendant, and as such act or
omission was punishable by law, and as a matter of fact he had already been punished therefor,
no civil liability should be imposed upon the defendant. Against this decision the plaintiffs have
appealed to this Court, contending that when defendant permitted his cargador, who was not
provided with a driver's license, to drive the truck, he thereby violated the provisions of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law (section 28., Act No. 3992), and that this constitutes negligence per se. (People
vs. Santos, et al., CA-G.R. No. 1088-1089R.) But admitting for the sake of argument that the
defendant had so violated the law, or may be deemed negligent in entrusting the truck to one who
is not provided with a driver's license, it is clear that he may not be declared liable for the accident
because his negligence was not the direct and proximate cause thereof. The leading case in this
jurisdiction on negligence is that of Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, 16 Phil.
8. Negligence as a source of obligation both under the civil law and in American cases was
carefully considered and it was held:
We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted
doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order
to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff. (2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or
some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty. (3) The connection of cause and effect
between the negligence and the damage. (Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., supra.
p.15)
In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, in order that a person may be
held guilty for damage through negligence, it is necessary that there be an act or omission on the
part of the person who is to be charged with the liability and that damage is produced by the said
act or omission.
In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden thereof is upon the plaintiff,
it is apparent that it is the duty of him who shall claim damages to establish their existence. The
decisions of April 9, 1896, and March 18, July 6, and September 27, 1898, have especially
supported the principle, the first setting forth in detail the necessary points of the proof, which are
two: An Act or omission on the part of the person who is to be charged with the liability, and the
production of the damage by said act or omission.
This includes, by inference, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect between the act or
the omission and the damage; the latter must be the direct result of one of the first two. As the
decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is necessary that the damages result immediately and directly
from an act performed culpably and wrongfully;
'necessarily presupposing, a legal ground for imputability. (Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and
Light Co., supra, p. 28.).
It is evident that the proximate, immediate and direct cause of the death of the plaintiffs' intestate
was the negligence of Orfanel, a uniformed policeman, who took the wheel of the truck from
defendant's cargador, in spite of the protest of the latter. The reason for absolving the defendant
therefor is not because the one responsible for the accident had already received indemnification
for the accident, but because there is no direct and proximate causal connection between the
negligence or violation of the law by the defendant to the death of the plaintiff's intestate.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, without costs.

16. Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Spouses Ong seek to recover from Metropolitan Water District, a government owned
corporation for damages, funeral expenses and attorneys fees for the death of their 14 year old
son, Dominador Ong who drowned in one of their swimming pools.
MWD owns and operated three (3) recreational swimming pools. The main pool is
between two small pools known as Wading Pool and Beginners Pool. There are diving boards
in the Main Pool and the depths of the water at difference parts are indicated by appropriate marks
on the wall, in conspicuous places certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools
are displayed, one of which prohibits the swimming in the pool alone or without attendant/s. It has
a recreational section composed of staff in charge of the safety of its patrons, they do not maintain
a full time physician, however, they have a nurse and a sanitary inspector ready to administer
injections or operate the oxygen resuscitator if the need should arise.
Dominador is a high school student and a boy scout. In the afternoon of July 5, 1952 at
about 1:00 oclock, Dominador and his two brothers went for a swim in one of the MWDs
swimming pools. The boys swam in one of the shallow pools while a few hours later, Dominador
excused himself to get a bottle of coke in the locker, his two brothers then transferred to the bigger
pool/main pool. At around 4:40 4:45 PM, the bathers in the big pool called the attention of the
lifeguard named Abano informing him that somebody has been swimming underwater for quite a
long time, Abano, immediately jumped into the pool and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of
Dominador. He was attended by MWDs recreational section to save his life, but all, to no avail.
ISSUES:
1. WON MWD / its employees had been negligent and could validly be liable for damages
for the death of Dominador under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2080 of the NCC.
2. WON the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance may be applied in the case at bar.
HELD: 1. No. 2. No.
RATIONALE:
ISSUE # 1: MWD NOT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES
There is sufficient evidence to show that MWD has taken all necessary precautions to
avoid danger to the lives of their patrons or prevent accident which may cause death. MWDs pool
has a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom
of the pool is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility, displayed in conspicuous
locations within the area certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools, they have 2
proficiently trained lifeguards on duty on that specific pool where Dominador drowned. Records
also show that all that is humanly possible under the circumstances to restore his life was
performed by its staff.
APPENDAGE:
It was contended by the Dominadors brother Ruben Ong and another witness that at the time
Dominador was drowning, lifeguard was not available or was attending something else which
resulted in his death, that when they called the lifeguards help, Abano did not immediately
respond and waited for the third call before he threw the magazine he was reading and allowed
three to four minutes to elapse before rescuing Dominador.
MWDs DEFENSE: Abano denied the allegations thru his written statements given to the
investigators. Further, it is important to note that in the statements of Dominadors brother himself,
he narrated that after the lifeguard heard the shouts for help, the latter immediately dived into the
pool to retrieve the person under water who turned out to be his brother.
TRIAL COURT: The testimonies of Ruben Ong and Andres Hagad Jr. (another witness) as to the
alleged failure of the lifeguard Abano to immediately respond to their call may therefore be
disregarded, because they are belied by their written statements.
ISSUE # 2: LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOES NOT APPLY
it is not known how Dominador came into the big pool and it being apparent that he went there
without any companion in violation of one of the regulations of MWD regarding the use of pools,
and it appearing that the lifeguard responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was
called and all efforts at the disposal of MWD had been out into play in order to bring Dominador
back to life.
---
LAST CLEAR CHANCE, DEFINED
The negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of
defendant where it appears that the latter by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might
have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence.
OR
A person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third person which is
imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the
accident.
IN A DECIDED CASE:
OMally vs Eagan, 77 ALR 582, 43 Wyo, 223, 350, 2 P2d 1063
The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after
the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of
the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.
SIDE BAR:
BURDEN OF PROOF:
Burden of proof in action for damages founded on culpable negligence lies on the person claiming for damages.
It must be proved that damage was caused thru the fault or negligence of the person from whom damages is
claimed.
ARTICLES MENTIONED IN THE CASE:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to
pay for the damages done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2080. The guarantors, even though they be solidary, are released from their obligation whenever by some act of the
creditor they cannot be subrogated to the rights, mortgages, and preference of the latter (UNCLEAR HOW IT WAS
CONNECTEDIS IT THE LIABILITY OF MWD IN RELATION TO THE ACTS OF THE LIFEGUARD ABANO PLS SEND
ME A PM FOR YOUR THOUGHTS ?)
 prior to the other events in point of time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of
the building. But the violation was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of safety
designed to prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the
building. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become necessary to evacuate
the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under emergency
conditions if there was only one stairway available.
17. Teague vs. Fernandez, 51 SCRA 181 (1973)

Doctrine: Violation of Rules and Statutes
FACTS:
The Realistic Institute situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building, a two-storey, semi-
concrete edifice located at the corner of Quezon Boulevard and Soler Street, Quiapo, Manila was
owned and operated by Teague. The said second floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of
about 400 square meters, and although it had only one stairway, of about 1.50 meters in width, it
had eight windows, each of which was provided with two fire-escape ladders and the presence of
each of said fire-exits was indicated on the wall.
The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the
cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the
manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to
prevent. To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does not
portray the situation in its true perspective; it would be more accurate to say that the overcrowding
at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance intended to
prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one. Under the doctrine of the
cases cited by the respondents, the principle of proximate cause applies to such violation.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

October 24, 1955, around 4pm, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located about ten
meters away from the institute (across the street). Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in
the Realistic Institute shouted Fire! Fire! and thereafter, a panic ensued. Four instructresses and
six assistant instructress of the Institute were present and they, together with the registrar, tried to
calm down the students, who numbered about 180 at the time. The panic, however, could not be
subdued and the students, with the exception of the few who made use of fire-escapes kept on
rushing and pushing their way through the stairs, thereby causing stampede therein. No part of
the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the panic was over, four students, including Lourdes
Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants, were found dead and several others injured on account
of the stampede. The deceaseds five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against
Mercedes M. Teague as owner and operator of Realistic Institute.

CFI found for the defendant and dismissed the case. This was however, reversed by the CA. The
CA held that petitioner was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the
death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the
provision of Section 491 Of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied
with in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building. The alleged violation of
the ordinance consisted in the fact that the second storey of the Gil-Armi building had only one
stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each, although at the time of the
fire the owner of the building had a second stairway under construction.

The petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death of Lourdes Fernandez as
follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a neighboring place; (3) shouts of Fire!, Fire!; (4)
panic in the Institute; (5) stampede; and (6) injuries and death. As thus projected the violation of
the ordinance, it is argued, was only a remote cause, if at all, and cannot be the basis of liability
since there intervened a number of independent causes which produced the injury complained of.
According to the petitioner the events of fire, panic and stampede were independent causes with
no causal connection at all with the violation of the ordinance.

ISSUE: Whether a violation of a statute constitutes negligence

HELD:

It is true that the petitioners non-compliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of and
18. Africa vs. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448 (1966)

FACTS:

A fire broke out at the Caltex service station in Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed
from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving truck where
the nozzle of the hose was inserted The fire then spread to and burned several neighboring
houses, including the personal properties and effects inside them. The owners of the houses,
among them petitioners here, sued Caltex (owner of the station) and Boquiren (agent in charge of
operation).

Trial court and CA found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had
exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees. Both
courts refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur on the grounds that as to its applicability
xxx in the Philippines, there seems to be nothing definite, and that while the rules do not prohibit
its adoption in appropriate cases, in the case at bar, however, we find no practical use for such
doctrine.

ISSUE:

W/N without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should
apply as to presume negligence on the part of the appellees.

RULE:

Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect that where the thing which caused the injury complained
of is shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants and the accident is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation of defendant, that the
incident happened because of want of care.

The aforesaid principle enunciated in Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co. is
applicable in this case. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees,
was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the
neighboring houses. The person who knew or could have known how the fire started were the
appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is fair and
reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care. The report by the police
officer regarding the fire, as well as the statement of the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who
was transferring the contents thereof into the underground storage when the fire broke out,
strengthen the presumption of negligence. Verily, (1) the station is in a very busy district and
pedestrians often pass through or mill around the premises; (2) the area is used as a car barn for
around 10 taxicabs owned by Boquiren; (3) a store where people hang out and possibly smoke
cigarettes is located one meter from the hole of the underground tank; and (4) the concrete walls
adjoining the neighborhood are only 2 . meters high at most and cannot prevent the flames from
leaping over it in case of fire.

Decision REVERSED. Caltex liable.

 defense. For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical in so
far as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition, are extraordinary
events not forseeable or avoidable, "events that could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, were inevitable" (A1174, NCC). It is, therefore, not
enough that the event should not have been fore seen or anticipated, as
is commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to
avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility
19. Republic of the Philippines vs. Luzon Stevedoring, 21 SCRA 279 (1967) to foresee the same.

FACTS: NOTES:

- Barge L-1892 owned by Luzon. was being towed down the Pasig river by two tugboats SC: when a party appeals directly to the Supreme Court, and submits his case there for decision,
"Bangus" and "Barbero (also owned by Luzon). he is deemed to have waived the right to dispute any finding of fact made by the trial Court. The
only questions that may be raised are those of law
- The barge rammed against one of the wooden piles of Nagtahan bailey bridge, smashing the
posts and causing the bridge to list. At the time, the rivers current was swift and the water
was high due to heavy rains in Manila.

- The Republic sued the company for the actual and consequential damages caused
(P200,000).

- Luzon disclaimed liability, on the grounds that it had exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employees; that the damages to the bridge were caused by force
majeure; that plaintiff has no capacity to sue; and that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an
obstruction to navigation.

- CFI held Luzon liable for the damage caused by its employee and ordered it to pay the actual
cost of the repair of the Nagtahan bailey bridge (P192,561.72), with legal interest thereon
from the date of the filing of the complaint.

- Luzon appealed directly to SC, raising questions both of fact and of law.

ISSUES:

WON the collision of Luzons barge with the supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge
was in law caused by fortuitous event or force majeure

o NO. Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and stationary
object and provided with adequate openings for the passage of water craft,
including barges, it is undeniable that the unusual event that the barge,
exclusively controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge supports raises a
presumption of negligence on Luzons part or its employees manning the
barge or the tugs that towed it. For in the ordinary course of events, such
a thing does not happen if proper care is used. In Anglo American
Jurisprudence, the inference arises by what is known as the "res ipsa
loquitur" rule.

o Luzon strongly stresses the precautions taken by it: that it assigned two of its
most powerful tugboats to tow down river its barge; that it assigned to the task
the more competent and experienced among its patrons, had the towlines,
engines and equipment double-checked and inspected; that it instructed its
patrons to take extra precautions; and concludes that it had done all it was
called to do, and that the accident, therefore, should be held due to force
majeure or fortuitous event.

o These very precautions, however, completely destroy the appellant's


20. Ramos vs. Delos Santos Medical Center, 321 SCRA 584 (1999)
FACTS:
June 17, 1985 afternoon: Erlinda Ramos, 47-year old robust woman underwent on an
operation to the stone at her gall bladder removed after being tested that she was fit
for "cholecystectomy" operation performed by Dr. Orlino Hozaka. Dr. Hosaka charged a fee
of P16,000.00, which was to include the anesthesiologist's fee and which was to be paid after
the operation. He assured Rogelio E. Ramos, husband that he will get a
good anesthesiologist who was Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez. Erlinda's hand was held
by Herminda Cruz, her sister -in-law who was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the
Capitol Medical Center together with her husband went down with her to the operating room.
Instead of 9:30 am, Dr. Hosaka arrived at about 12:15 P.M.
Herminda noticing what Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez was doing, saw the nailbed of Erlinda
becoming bluish and Dr. Hosaka called for another anesthesiologist Dr. Calderon.
She went out of the operating room to tell Rogelio that something is wrong.
When she went back she saw Erlinda in a trendelenburg position and at 3 p.m. she was
taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) where she stayed for a month due to bronchospasm
incurring P93,542.25 and she was since then comatosed.
She suffered brain damage as a result of the absence of oxygen in her brain for
four to five minutes.
She was also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse cerebral parenchymal
damage"
Monthly expenses ranged from P8,000 to P10,000
Spouses Ramos and their minors filed against Dr. Hosaka and Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez
RTC: favored the Ramos' awarding P8,000 as actual monthly expenses totalling
to P632,000 as of April 15, 1992, P100,000 atty. fees, P800,000 moral
damages,P200,000 exemplary damages and cost of suit
CA: reversed ordering the Ramos' to pay their unpaid bills of P93,542.25 plus interest
ISSUE: W/N the Ramos' are entitled to damages
HELD: YES. CA modified in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000
actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that
petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000 moral damages, 3) P1,500,000 temperate
damages; 4) P100,000 exemplary damages and P100,000 attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.
The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases presents a question of law
since it is a judicial function to determine whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a
matter of law, permit a given inference.
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony
is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence - applicable in this
case
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon
which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment
As borne by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient
according to witness Herminda
With her clinical background as a nurse, the Court is satisfied with her testimony
Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled
operative procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and professional
irresponsibility
Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of the
subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by the study of recognized authorities
on the subject or by practical experience.
Dr. Jamora, not an anesthesiologist, stated that oxygen deprivation which led to
anoxic encephalopathy was due to an unpredictable drug reaction to the short-
acting barbiturate was not accepted as expert opinion
Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not
determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols
Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as
Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation.
Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the
anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his
patient
private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting
"consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which
respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's condition, the control
exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks
of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages.
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in
instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature of such
cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. The
reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.
They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home without
the aid of professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances,
an award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable.
the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently
changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo through
the years.
Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred. She has been in a comatose
state for over fourteen years now
Ramos' are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim. The family's moral injury
 and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. Award of P2,000,000 in moral damages would be
appropriate.
Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are hereby awarded.
Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees
valued at P100,000 are likewise proper.
However, waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with
an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be
illustrated on the record or by the evidence. A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver
when that person knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an
intelligent decision.

In the case at bar, the widow was not aware of her rights and remedies and thus her election to
claim from the Insurance Fund does not constitute a waiver on her part to claim from the petitioner-
21. DM Consunji vs. Juego, G.R. No. 137873 (2001)
company. Petitioners argument that Art 3 of the New Civil Code, stating that Ignorance of the law
excuses no one cannot stand. The Supreme Court ruled that the application of Article 3 is limited
FACTS: to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be deduced from the language of the provision,
which, notwithstanding a persons ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws.
Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji Inc. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor
fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was immediately rushed to Rizal prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her .
Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on
arrival (DOA) at around 2:15PM.

Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo, performing their work as carpenter
at the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building were on board a
platform. Jose was crushed to death when the platform fell due to removal or looseness of the
pin, which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without
a safety lock. Luckily, Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety.

PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed report
dated Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Joses widow filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages
in the RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to receive support from DM Consunji amounting
to P644,000.

DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent is barred from availing of death benefits under the Civil Code
after recovering from damages provided for under the Labor Code.

Held:

The Supreme Court has already ruled in various cases that a recovery of damages under the
Workers Compensation Act is a bar to a recovery under an ordinary civil action. It ruled that an
injured worker has a choice of either remedies. The Supreme Court allowed some exceptions. In
the case at bar, the CA ruled that the widow had a right to file an ordinary action for civil actions
because she was not aware and was ignorant of her rights and courses of action.

When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies,
the election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy,
in the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar. Equitable in
nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both
parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices. The
purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double
redress for a single wrong. The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver
by election.
 up to Escolta, f or example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop him, although
he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally and
civilly, for the results produced by the acts of his chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a
sudden act of negligence, and without

the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the acts or its continuance, injures a person
or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the
act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of
must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length a time that the owner, by his
22. Chapman vs. Underwood, G.R. No. 9010 (1914) acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.

Facts: In this case, it DOES NOT appear that, from the time the automobile took the wrong side of the
road to the commission of the injury, sufficient time intervened to give the defendant an opportunity
to correct the act of his driver. Instead, it appears that the interval between the turning out to meet
J.H. Chapman visited a man by the name of Creveling, in front of whose ho use the accident and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to
occurred. Chapman wanted to board a certain "San Marcelino" single-track street-car coming charge defendant with the negligence of the driver.
from Santa Ana and bound for Manila. Being told by C reveling that the car was approaching,
he hurriedly, passed from the gate of Creveling s home into the street for the purpose of
signaling and boarding the car. T he car was a closed one, the entrance being from the front
or the rear platform.

Chapman attempted to board the front platform but, seeing that he could not reach it without
extra exertion, stopped beside the car, facing toward the rear platform, and waited for it to
come within reach for him to board. While in this position, he was struck from behind and run
over by Underwood s automobile.

Immediately prior to the incident, Underwood s automobile, which was being driven by his
chauffeur, followed behind a street car from Manila bound to Santa Ana (Opposite direction
of the San Marcelino street-car that Chapman wanted to board). Just before reaching the
scene of the accident, the street car being followed by Underwood took the switched off the
main line to the left.

Thereupon, Underwood s automobile no longer followed that street-car nor went to the left,
but either kept straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to the right. The street-car
which the Chapman intended to board was on the main line and bound in an opposite
direction. When the front of the "San Marcelino" car (the one which plaintiff attempted to
board) was almost in front of Underwood s automobile, the latte r s driver suddenly went to
the right striking and running over Chapman. The trial court rendered decision in favor of the
defendant.

Issue: Is defendant liable in the case at bar?

Held: A careful examination of the record leads to the conclusion that the Under wood s driver
was guilty of negligence in running upon and over the plaintiff. He was passing an incoming car
upon the wrong side. The plaintiff, out to board the car, was not obliged to observe whether a car
was coming upon him from his left

hand. He had only to guard against those coming from the right. He knew that, according to the
law of the road, no automobile or other vehicle coming from his left should pass upon his side of
the car. He needed only to watch for cars coming from his right, as they were the only ones under
the law permitted to pass up on that side of the street car.

Underwood, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his driver, under t he facts and
circumstances of this case. As stated in the case of Johnson vs. Da vid (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the
driver does not fall within the list of persons in article 1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the
defendant would be responsible. The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive
 of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of Dahl- Jensen was sufficiently
established, not that of FILCAR. It should be noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of
Soriano was brought about by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the
vehicle that he was driving was at the center lane. It is plain that the negligence was solely
attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal
liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation therein. ICHcTD

23. FGU Insurance Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.118889 (1998) (Taken from CD-
ASIA)
Facts:
This case involves a collision of two cars. One car is owned by Lydia F. Soriano and driven by
Benjamin Jacildone, while the other car is owned by FILCAR Transport, Inc. and driven by Peter
Dahl-Jensen, as lessee. Consequently, petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation paid Soriano an
amount in accordance with their insurance contract. By way of subrogation, it sued Dahl-Jensen
and respondent FILCAR as well as respondent Fortune Insurance Corporation as insurer of
FILCAR for quasi-delict before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. The trial court dismissed
the case for failure of petitioner to substantiate its claim of subrogation. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Petitioner failed to establish its cause of action for sum of
money based on quasi-delict. In this appeal, petitioner insists that respondents FILCAR and
Fortune are liable on the strength of the Supreme Court ruling that the registered owner of a
vehicle is liable for damages suffered by third persons although the vehicle is leased to another.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONS LIABLE; WHEN CAR OWNER MAY NOT BE HELD LIABLE; CASE AT
BAR. The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of the
negligence on the part of the persons made responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to
exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing
damage. Yet, as correctly observed by respondent court, Art. 2180 is hardly applicable because
none of the circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration. Respondent
FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-
Jensen.
As such, there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent
FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not
being the employer of the latter. We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same
Code which provides: "In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the
former , who was in the vehicle, could have by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune
. . . If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable."
Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the absence of master-driver
relationship between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner has no cause of
action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi- delict; logically, its claim against
respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper. aTE

Ruling:

This petition was denied by the Supreme Court and the dismissal of the petitioner's complaint was
affirmed. The liability imposed by Art. 2180 of the Civil Code arises by virtue of a presumption juris
tantum of the negligence on the part of the persons made responsible thereunder, derived from
their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from
causing damage. Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner
of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no vinculum juris between them as employer
and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of
Dahl-Jensen, the former not being the employer of the latter. The provision of Art. 2184 of the Civil
Code is neither applicable because of the absence of master-driver relationship between
respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; QUASI-DELICT; DEFINED. The pertinent provision is Art. 2176 of
the Civil Code which states: "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . ."

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. To sustain a claim based
thereon, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. We agree with respondent
court that petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence
24. Sanitary Steam Laundry vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 20 (1998)

FACTS:

on August 31, 1980, a Mercedes Benz panel truck of petitioner Sanitary Steam Laundry collided
with a Cimarron which caused the death of three persons and the injuries of several others. The
passengers of the Cimarron were mostly employees of the Project Management Consultants, Inc.
(PMCI). The Cimarron was owned by Salvador Salenga, father of one of the employees of PMCI.
Driving the vehicle was Rolando Hernandez. The driver of the truck claimed that a jeepney in front
of him suddenly stopped. He said he stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and that
this caused his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane. As a
result, his panel truck collided with the Cimarron on the north-bound lane.

RTC: Rendered judgment for private respondents. CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC

ISSUE: Whether or not the driver of Cimarron was guilty of contributory negligence.

SC: First of all, it has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver
contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a
causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of
the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of
violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing
cause of the injury. Petitioner says that driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning
headlight during nighttime certainly increases the risk of accident, that because the Cimarron had
only one headlight, there was decreased visibility, and that the fact that the vehicle was
overloaded and its front seat overcrowded decreased [its] maneuverability.However, mere
allegations such as these are not sufficient to discharge its burden of proving clearly that such
alleged negligence was the contributing cause of the injury.

Furthermore, based on the evidence in this case, there was no way either driver could have
avoided the collision.

25. Aonuevo vs. Court of Appeals, 441 SCRA 24 (2004)
Facts:
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Ave. on his bicycle, while Aonuevo,traversing the opposite
lane was driving a Lancer car owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Aonuevos
brother. Aonuevo was in the course of making a leftturn towards Libertad Street when the
collision occurred.
Villagracia sustained serious injuries and had to undergo four operations. Villagracia instituted an
action for damages against P&G Phils., Inc. and Aonuevo before the RTC. He had also filed a
criminal complaint against Aonuevobefore the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, but the
latter was subsequentlyacquitted of the criminal charge.
Aonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle
or install safety gadgets. He posits that Article 2185 of the Civil Code applies by analogy. Article
2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a persondriving a motor vehicle
has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation.
Issues:
A. Whether or not Art. 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply to non-motorized vehicles,
making Villagracia presumptively negligent.
B. Whether or not Villagracia was negligent for failure to comply with traffic regulations.
C. Whether or not Villagracia is guilty of contributory negligence
Held: No to all.
A. Application of Article 2185
Aonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or
install safety gadgets thereon. He posits that Article 2185 of the New Civil Code applies by
analogy. The provision reads:
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic
regulation.
Aonuevo hypothesizes that Article 2185 should apply by analogy to all types of vehicles [23]. He
points out that modern-day travel is more complex now than when the Code was enacted, the
number and types of vehicles now in use far more numerous than as of then. He even suggests
that at the time of the enactment of the Code, the legislators must have seen that only motor
vehicles were of such public concern that they had to be specifically mentioned, yet today, the
interaction of vehicles of all types and nature has inescapably become matter of public concern
so as to expand the application of the law to be more responsive to the times. [24]
At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array of non-motorized vehicles
ranging from human-powered contraptions on wheels such as bicycles, scooters, and animal-
drawn carts such as calesas and carromata. These modes of transport were even more prevalent
on the roads of the 1940s and 1950s than they are today, yet the framers of the New Civil Code
chose then to exclude these alternative modes from the scope of Article 2185 with the use of the
term motorized vehicles. If Aonuevo seriously contends that the application of Article 2185 be
expanded due to the greater interaction today of all types of vehicles, such argument contradicts
historical experience. The ratio of motorized vehicles as to non-motorized vehicles, as it stood in
1950, was significantly lower than as it stands today. This will be certainly affirmed by statistical
data, assuming such has been compiled, much less confirmed by persons over sixty. Aonuevos
characterization of a vibrant intra-road dynamic between motorized and non-motorized vehicles is
more apropos to the past than to the present.
There is pertinent basis for segregating between motorized and non-motorized vehicles. A
motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion. Is capable of greater speeds
and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the sam etime, motorized vehicles are more
capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an accident or collision. This is due to
a combination of factors peculiar to themotor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative
greater bulk of mass, and greater combustibility due to the use of fuel.
B. Negligience on the part of Villagracia
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by the personal judgment
of the actor in a given situation, but rather, it is the law which determines what would be reckless
or negligent. Aonuevo asserts that Villagracia was negligent as the latter had transgressed traffic
regulations. However, Aonuevo was speeding as hemade the left turn, and by his own admission,
he had seen Villagracia at a good distance of ten (10) meters. Had he been decelerating, as he
should, as he made the turn, Aonuevo would have had ample opportunity to avoid hitting
Villagracia, such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident.
Even assuming that Aonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped
with headlights, such lapse on the cyclists part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to
slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn.
C. Contributory Negligience
To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act
that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health
and body.[60] To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link,
although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal
sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply
a condition for its occurrence.[61]
As between Aonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged Aonuevo assolely
responsible for the accident. The petition does not demonstrate why this finding should be
reversed. It is hard to imagine that the same result would not have occurred even if Villagracias circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle
bicycle had been equipped with safety equipment. registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible
for damages or injuries caused on public highways.

2) NO. The new law, R.A. No. 8556, notwithstanding developments in foreign jurisdictions, do not supersede
or repeal the law on compulsory motor vehicle registration. No part of the law expressly repeals Section
5(a) and (e) of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
Thus, the rule remains the same: a sale, lease, or financial lease, for that matter, that is not registered with
the Land Transportation Office, still does not bind third persons who are aggrieved in tortious incidents, for
the latter need only to rely on the public registration of a motor vehicle as conclusive evidence of ownership.

A lease such as the one involved in the instant case is an encumbrance in contemplation of law, which
26. PCI Leasing and Finance Inc. vs. UCPB General Insurance Co., 557 SCRA 141
needs to be registered in order for it to bind third parties. Under this policy, the evil sought to be avoided is
(2008)
the exacerbation of the suffering of victims of tragic vehicular accidents in not being able to identify a guilty
party. A contrary ruling will not serve the ends of justice. The failure to register a lease, sale, transfer or
encumbrance, should not benefit the parties responsible, to the prejudice of innocent victims.
FACTS:
A Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by UCPB, insured with UCPB General Insurance Co., was traversing
the Laurel Highway, Barangay Balintawak, LipaCity. It was driven by Flaviano Isaac
with Conrado Geronimo (Asst. Manager of said bank), was hit and bumped by an 18-wheeler Fuso Tanker
Truck, owned by defendants-appellants PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc. allegedly leased to and operated by
defendant-appellant Superior Gas & Equitable Co., Inc. (SUGECO) and driven by its employee, defendant
appellant Renato Gonzaga. The impact caused heavy damage to the Mitsubishi Lancer car resulting in an
explosion of the rear part of the car. The driver and passenger suffered physical injuries. However, the driver
defendant-appellant Gonzaga continued on its way to its destination and did not bother to bring his victims
to the hospital.

As the 18-wheeler truck is registered under the name of PCI Leasing, repeated demands were made by
plaintiff-appellee for the payment of the aforesaid amounts. However, no payment was made. PCI Leasing
and Finance, Inc., (petitioner) interposed the defense that it could not be held liable for the collision, since the
driver, Gonzaga, was not its employee, but that of its co-defendant SUGECO. In fact, it was SUGECO, that
was the actual operator of the truck, pursuant to a Contract of Lease signed by petitioner and
SUGECO. Petitioner, however, admitted that it was the owner of the truck in question. RTC rendered
judgment in favour of UCPB General Insurance and ordered PCI Leasing and Gonzaga, to pay jointly and
severally the former. CA affirmed with the lower courts decision.

ISSUES:
1) Whether petitioner, as registered owner of a motor vehicle that figured in a quasi-delict may be held liable, jointly
and severally, with the driver thereof, for the damages caused to third parties.
2) Whether petitioner, as a financing company, is absolved from liability by the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8556, or the Financing Company Act of 1998.

RULING:
1) YES. The principle of holding the registered owner of a vehicle liable for quasi-delicts resulting from its use
is well-established in jurisprudence. As explained in the case of Erezo v. Jepte, thus:

Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by which ownership
in vehicles is transferred, as in land registration cases, because the administrative
proceeding of registration does not bear any essential relation to the contract of sale
between the parties (Chinchilla vs. Rafael and Verdaguer, 39 Phil. 888), but to permit the
use and operation of the vehicle upon any public highway (section 5 [a], Act No. 3992, as
amended.) The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any
accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public
highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered
owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused
accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the
owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these