1. Kim v Philippine Aerial Taxi Co.

The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent

2. Bernardo v Legaspi evidence. In this case, there was insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the part of
PLDT. What was presented was just the self-serving testimony of Antonio and the unverified
3. PLDT v CA photograph of a portion of the scene of the accident. The absence of a police report and the non-
submission of a medical report from the hospital where the spouses were allegedly treated have
FACTS not even been explained.
Sps. Esteban were riding their jeep along the inside lane of Lacson Street where they resided [at
25km/hr as Antonio Esteban claimed; CA said jeep ran fast; if the jeep braked at that speed, the
spouses would not have been thrown against the windshield]. The jeep abruptly swerved from
the inside lane, then it ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation
allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. Antonio
failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the darkness and the lack
of any warning light or signs. The spouses were thrown against the windshield. Gloria Esteban
allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek,
while Antonio suffered cut lips. The jeeps windshield was also shattered.
PLDT denies liability, contending that the injuries sustained by the spouses were due to
their own negligence, and that it should be the independent contractor L.R. Barte and Co. [Barte]
who should be held liable. PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte, alleging that under
the terms of their agreement, PLDT should not be answerable for any accident or injuries arising
from the negligence of Barte or its employees. Barte claimed that it was not aware, nor was it
notified of the accident, and that it complied with its contract with PLDT by installing the
necessary and appropriate signs.
RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. CA reversed RTC and dismissed the spouses
complaint, saying that the spouses were negligent. Later, it set aside its earlier decision and
affirmed in totoRTCs decision. (SC declared this later decision null and void. The first decision
already became final and executory because no appeal was taken seasonably.)

ISSUE: WON PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by Sps. Esteban. NO

HELD: The accident which befell the spouses was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio, and
was not imputable to the negligent omission on the part of PLDT. If the accident did not happen
because thejeep was running quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to
swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the accident mound, then Antonio had not
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he
should not have run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights which should have
made him see the accident mound in time. The mound was relatively big and visible, being 2-3
ft high and 1-1/2 ft wide. Also, he knew of the existence and location of the mound, having seen
it many previous times.
The negligence of Antonio was not only contributory to his and his wifes injuries but
goes to thevery cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and
therebyprecludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known to the
spouses. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, Antonio could have avoided the injurious
consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the
part of PLDT.
The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the
excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act
would have prevented the injury. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street
almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there;
hence, the presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the
accident. Furthermore, Antonio had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding
the negligence he imputes to PLDT.
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving
the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof, otherwise, his action must fail.
4. Phoenix Construction Inc. v IAC care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such
damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.
FACTS:
1. In the early morning of 15 November 1975, at about 1:30am, private respondent Leonardo The Last Clear Chance doctrine of the Common Law was imported into our jurisdiction
Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the by Picart vs. Smith but it is still a matter of debate whether, or to what extent, it has found
general manager of a marketing corporation, where he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The doctrine was applied by Common Law
2. He had just crossed an intersection and while driving down the street, his headlights were because they had a rule that contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a
turned off. When he switched on his headlights to bright, he suddenly saw a Ford dump negligent plaintiff. But in the Philippines we have Article 2179 of the Civil Code which
truck some 2 meters away from his Volkswagen car. It was later found out that he did rejects the Common Law doctrine of contributory negligence. Thus, the court in this case
not a curfew pass that night. stated that it does not believe so that the general concept of Last Clear Chance has been
3. The dump truck belonged to co-petitioner Phoenix, and was parked there by the company utilized in our jurisdiction. Article 2179 on contributory negligence is not an exercise in
driver, co-petitioner Carbonel. It was parked on the right hand side of the lane that Dionisio chronology or physics but what is important is the negligent act or omission of each party
was driving on, but it was parked facing the oncoming traffic. It was parked askew so it and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the
was sticking out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were community. To say that Phoenix should be absolved from liability would come close to
no lights nor were there any early warning reflector devices set anywhere near the truck, wiping out the fundamental law that a man must. respond for the foreseeable consequences
front or rear. of his own negligent act or omission. Thus, the Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied
4. Phoenix permitted Carbonel to take home the truck, which was scheduled to be used the because the court thinks that it is not applicable in our jurisdiction.
next morning.
5. Dionisio, upon seeing the truck, tried to avoid a collision by swerving to the left, but it was
too late. His car smashed into the truck.
6. Dionisio suffered physical injuries, including permanent facial scars, a nervous
breakdown and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
7. Dionision filed an action for damages against Carbonel and Phoenix.
8. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to respondents own negligence
in driving at a high speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. It
invoked the Last Clear Chance Doctrine: Dionisio had the Last Clear Chance of avoiding
theaccident and so Dionisio, having failed to take the last clear chance, must bear his own
injuries alone
9. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.

ISSUE(S): Whether the collision was brought by respondents own negligence.

HELD: No. Dionisio is guilty of contributory negligent but the legal and proximate cause of
the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked.

RATIO:
The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful
or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence
of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural
and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and
important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed
come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and hence
of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes
which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Thus, a
defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the
plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is
run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an
automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when
another negligently drives into it.
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the
"immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due
5. Lambert v Heirs of Castillon
Facts: In the evening of January 13, 1991, Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother
Joel Castillon at Tambo, Iligan City and borrowed his motorcycle. He then invited his
friend, Sergio Labang, to roam around Iligan City. Ray drove the motorcycle with Sergio
as the backrider.
At around past 10:00 p.m., after eating supper at Honas Restaurant and imbibing a
bottle of beer, they traversed the highway towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon reaching
Brgy. Sto. Rosario, they figured in an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney, owned by
petitioner Nelen Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot, which was traveling on the same
direction but made a sudden left turn. The incident resulted in the instantaneous death of
Ray and injuries to Sergio.
Respondents, the heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an action for damages with prayer
for preliminary attachment against the petitioner Nelen Lambert. The complaint was
subsequently amended to include the claim by Joel Castillon for the damages caused to the
motorcycle.
On June 29, 1993, after a full-blown trial, the court a quo rendered a decision in favor
of the Castillon heirs but reduced Lamberts liability by 20% in view of the contributory
negligence of Ray. On the claim of Joel Castillon, the evidence shows that he is not the
real owner of the motorcycle. He is not the real party in interest. Accordingly, his
complaint is dismissed.
2. Yes. The SC found it equitable to increase the ratio of apportionment of damages on
account of the victims negligence. Article 2179 reads as follows:
When the plaintiffs negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,
he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate
and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly
responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must
bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only
for the damages actually caused by his negligence.[15] The determination of the mitigation
of the defendants liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case. In the case
at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle
at a high speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two bottles
of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective helmet.[21] These circumstances, although not
constituting the proximate cause of his demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same
result. The contribution of these circumstances are all considered and determined in terms
of percentages of the total cause. Hence, pursuant to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray
Castillon shall recover damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the
damage shall be borne by the private respondents; the remaining 50% shall be paid by the
petitioner.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue/s:
1. Did the CA err in not applying the doctrine of Edna A. Raynera vs. Freddie Hiceta
and Jimmy Orpilla that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are
presumed to be the cause of the accident? In other words, was Lambert negligent?
2. Does the act of tailgating merely constitute contributory negligence?
Lambert insists that the negligence of Ray Castillon was the proximate cause of his
unfortunate death and therefore she is not liable for damages.

Held
1. No. Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first establishing his
right of way, was the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and
injured Sergio. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. The cause of the collision is traceable to the
negligent act of Reynaldo for without that left turn executed with no precaution, the mishap
in all probability would not have happened.

Petitioner misunderstood our ruling in Raynera v. Hiceta. That case also involved a
motorcycle crashing into the left rear portion of another vehicle, and we declared therein
that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the
cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. Raynera, being the driver of
the rear vehicle, had full control of the situation as he was in a position to observe the
vehicle in front of him. Thus, the theory that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of
another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident is, as in this case, sufficiently
contradicted by evidence, which is the sudden left turn made by Reynaldo which
proximately caused the collision.
6. Afialda v Hisole 7. Ilocos Norte Electric Co. v CA

FACTS: Loreto Afialda was employed as a caretaker of the carabaos owned by spouses
Basilio and Francisco Hisole. On March 21, 1947, Afialda was gored by one of the
carabaos, causing injuries which resulted to his death. The mishap was due neither to his
own fault nor to force majeure. Afialdas sister, Margarita, sued Hisole arguing that under
Article 1905 of the Civil Code, The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same,
is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray
away. This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure
or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Hisole, as the owner of the carabao, is liable for the damage caused
to its caretaker.
HELD: No. The law uses the term possessor and user of the animal. Afialda was the
caretaker of the animal and was compensated to tend the carabaos. He, at the time of the
goring, was the possessor and the user of the carabao, and was thus the one who had
custody and control of the animal and was in a position to prevent the animal from causing
damage. It was the caretakers business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or
damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those
circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed
and for which he must take the consequences.
8. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v Reyes Reyes was not able to present witnesses to back up his story; all his witnesses proved only
Cause of action was one for damages brought under the human relations provisions of NCC. that Filart invited him to the party

FACTS: Roberto Reyes (Actor of long standing; co-host of radio program; board member of
Music Singer Composer chaired by Imelda Papin; showbiz coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch;
1992 official candidate for Bohol governor) said he was spotted by his friend Dr. Violeta Filart
in the hotel lobby who approached him. She invited him to join her in the GMs birthday party
at the penthouse. He carried Filarts presenta basket of fruits. When dinner was ready, Reyes
lined up at the table but to his embarrassment, he was stopped by Ruby Lim (Hotel Executive
Secretary). In a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of other guests, Lim told him to
leavehuwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang. Reyes tried to explain
that he was invited by Dr. Filart, but the latter ignored him. He was escorted out by a police
officer.
Ruby Lim said she was the hotels executive secretary for 20 years, and that she was
tasked to organize the GMs birthday party. Mindful of the GMs request to keep the party
intimate, she requested 2 people to tell Reyes to leave, but Reyes still lingered. She had the
chance to talk to Reyes when he was starting to eat, so she told him, Alam ninyo, hindi ho kayo
dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos
kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo. Reyes made a scene by screaming and he threatened to
dump food on her.
Dr. Filart said Reyes volunteered to carry the basket of fruits as he was going to the
elevator as well. When they reached the penthouse, she told him to go down as he was not
invited. She thought Reyes already left but she saw him at the bar. When there was a commotion,
she saw Reyes shouting, and she ignored him, as she did not want the GM to think that she
invited him.
Reyes claimed damages (1M actual damages, 1M moral and/or exemplary damages,
200k attorneys fees). RTC dismissed the complaint, giving more credence to Lims
testimony. RTC also said that Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was
not invited. CA reversed RTC, believing Reyes version of the facts. Lim and Hotel Nikko
contend that they cannot be made liable for damages under the doctrine of volenti non fit
injuria as Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated
in the process) as he was a gate-crasher.
LIM AND HOTEL NIKKO NOT LIABLE TO PAY FOR DAMAGES UNDER NCC 19
AND 21
NCC 19 (principle of abuse of rights) is not a panacea for all human hurts and social
grievances; NCC 19s object is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in
the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties; its elements are the
following:
o Legal right or duty
o Exercised in bad faith
o For the sole intentof prejudicing or injuring another
NCC 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements:
o There is an act which is legal
o But it is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, public policy
o And it is done with intent to injure
Common theme running through NCC 19 and 21act must be INTENTIONAL
o Reyes has not shown that Lim was driven by animosity against him; he had a lame
argument: Lim, being single at 44, had a very strong bias and prejudice against him
possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen
o Manner by which Lim asked Reyes to leave was acceptable and humane
Any damage which Reyes might have suffered through Lims exercise of a legitimate right
done within the bounds of propriety and good faith must be his to bear alone.

DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN

THIS CASE
Volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury)Self-
inflicted injury or consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who
has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing
so
Even if Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners were still under
obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
[NCC 19, 21]

SC FINDS RTCS FINDINGS OF FACT MORE CREDIBLELim did not abuse her right
to ask Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly
Lim, mindful of GMs instruction to keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get rid
of Reyes in the most hush-hush manner so as not to call attention
Reyes was not able to explain why Lim would make a scene; Reyes admitted that when Lim
talked to him, she was so close enough for him to kiss unlikely that she would shout at him
at such a close distance (SC also noted the fact that she has been in the hotel business long
enough as to imbibe virtues of politeness and discreteness)
9. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. v IAC
DOCTRINE: (1) The principle of "the last clear" chance is applicable in a suit between the
owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable
to exempt the negligent driver and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise
guilty of negligence.
(2)In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be
overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles
1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was due
to a fortuitous event.
(3) The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the
contract of carriage. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger,
and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible to the passenger,
even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver. In other words, the carrier can neither
shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver's negligence is
his. Secondly, that would make the carrier's liability personal instead of merely vicarious and
consequently, entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to the driver contradictory
to the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code.
FACTS: At 11am on December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua, Adelaida Estomo,
Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejas boarded the
jeepney owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino
Manalo at Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to spend
Christmas with their families for P 24.00. Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac,
the right rear wheel of the jeepney detached causing it to run in an unbalanced position. Driver
Manalo stepped on the brake, causing the jeepney to make a U-turn, invading and eventually
stopping on the opposite lane of the road (the jeepney's front faced the south (from where it
came) and its rear faced the north (towards where it was going)). The jeepney occupied and
blocked the greater portion of the western lane, which is the right of way of vehicles coming
from the north.
Petitioner Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines claims that almost immediately after the sudden U-turn the
bus bumped the right rear portion of the jeep. Defendants, on the other hand, claim that the bus
stopped a few minutes before hitting the jeepney. Either way, as a result of the collision, three
passengers of the jeepney (Catalina Pascua, Erlinda Meriales and Adelaida Estomo) died while
the other jeepney passengers sustained physical injuries.
A criminal complaint was filed against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide. The case against
delos Reyes (driver of Phil. Rabbit) was dismissed for insufficieny of evidence. Manalo (jeepney
driver), however, was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment.
3 complaints for recovery of damages were then filed before the CFI of Pangasinan. (1) Spouses
Casiano Pascua and Juana Valdez sued as heirs of Catalina Pascua while Caridad Pascua sued
in her behalf Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. (2) Spouses Manuel Millares and Fidencia
Arcica sued as heirs of Erlinda Meriales. And (3) spouses Mariano Estomo and Dionisia
Sarmiento sued as heirs of Adelaida Estomo. All three cases impleaded spouses Mangune and
Carreon, Manalo (jeepney owners), Rabbit and delos Reyes as defendants. Plaintiffs anchored
their suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon and Manalo on their contractual liability. As
against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs based their suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict.
Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. was also impleaded as additional defendant in
the first case only.
The trial court ruled in favour of then plaintiffs, finding defendants negligent and having
breached the contract of carriage with their passengers and ordering them, jointly and severally,
to pay the plaintiffs damages.
The IAC reversed the ruling of the trial court, applying primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear
chance, (2) the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the
cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence, and (3) the substantial factor test
(which concluded that bus driver delos Reyes, NOT jeepney driver Manalo, was negligent).
Issue: Who are liable for the death and injuries of the passenger? - Trial court decision
reinstated with modification. Only Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Filriters
Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. are liable to the victims or their heirs.
RATIO:
(1) The principle of "the last clear" chance is applicable in a suit between the owners and
drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be
inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground
that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
(2) The IAC erred in applying the presumption that the driver who bumps the rear of
another vehicle is guilty and the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other
evidence. This presumption is based on the responsibility given to a rear vehicle of
avoiding a collision with the front vehicle for it is the rear vehicle who has full control
of the situation as it is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of it. Such
presumption is rebutted by the evidence that shows that the jeepney, which was then
traveling on the eastern shoulder, making a straight, skid mark of approximately 35
meters, crossed the eastern lane at a sharp angle, making a skid mark of approximately
15 meters from the eastern shoulder to the point of impact. (Basically, the U-turn was
sudden and delos Reyes could not have reasonably anticipated it even though he was
the rear vehicle)
(3) Likewise, the bus cannot be made liable under the substantial factor test (that if the
actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that
the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the
manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable). Contrary to the
findings of the appellate court, the bus was travelling within the speed limit allowed
in highways. He also had only a few seconds to react to the situation. To require delos
Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much from him. Aside from the time element
involved, there were no options available to him to have avoided the collision.
The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of jeepney driver Manalo and spouses
Mangune and Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely pro
hac vice.
In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be overcome
by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755
and 1756 of the New Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a
fortuitous event.
The negligence of Manalo was proven during the trial by the unrebutted testimonies of Caridad
Pascua, the police who arrived on the scene, his (Manalo's) conviction and the application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur supra. Spouses Mangune and Carreon alleged that their
mechanic regularly maintains the jeepney and on the day before the collision, the mechanic
actually checked the vehicle and even tightened the bolts, thus the incident was caused by a caso
fortuito. The SC upheld the trial courts findings that "in an action for damages against the
carrier for his failure to safely carry his passenger to his destination, an accident caused either
by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver, is not a caso fortuito which
would avoid the carriers liability.

The SC modified the decision holding spouses Mangune and Carreon jointly and severally liable
with Manalo. The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of
breach of the contract of carriage. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the
passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible to the
passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver. In other words, the carrier
can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver's
negligence is his. Secondly, that would make the carrier's liability personal instead of merely
vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to the driver
contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code.
10. PBCom v CA
FACTS:
May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976: Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the
form of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of
depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC with Philippine Bank of Commerce
(PBC)
They were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to Account No. 53-
01734-7 of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas
Romeo Lipana never checked their monthly statements of account reposing complete trust
and confidence on PBC
Irene Yabut's modus operandi was to furnish 2 copies of deposit slip upon and both are
always validated and stamped by the teller Azucena Mabayad :
original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number -
retained by the bank
duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account
holder was left blank
After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the
duplicate copy and change the account number to RMC's account number
This went on in a span of more than 1 year without private respondent's knowledge
Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from PBC the return of its money
and later on filed in the RTC
RTC: PBC and Azucena Mabayad jointly and severally liable
CA: affirmed with modification deleting awards of exemplary damages and attorney's fees
ISSUE:
1. W/N applying the last clear chance, PBC's teller is negligent for failing to avoid the injury by
not exercising the proper validation procedure-YES
2. W/N there was contirbutory negligence by RMC - YES
Here, assuming that RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, yet it
cannot be denied that PBC bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the
injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation
procedure.
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances
of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the
provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. In the
case of banks, however, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father
of a family. Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors,
banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care
2. YES.
it cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking
its monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted
to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. The damage would
definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana,
had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by RMC
amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded
to the private respondent
Article 2179 of the New Civil Code
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded

HELD: 60-40 ratio. only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the PBC
1. YES.
The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting
deposits should not relieve the PBC of responsibility
The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information (Name
of the account holder) should have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard.
Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank
itself in its lack in selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad.
Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank and now
its Vice-President, to the effect that, while he ordered the investigation of the incident, he
never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's
validation procedures until 7 years later
last clear chance/supervening negligence/discovered peril
where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time
than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence
should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof
antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the
supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter,
who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of
due diligence.
11. Tiu v Arriesgado Lastly, with regard to PPSI, the court held that since it admitted to being bound by a
contract with the petitioner, it would be liable as well. However, the said liability would only
Facts: fall within the amount settled in the said contract.
On March 15, 1987, a Truck marked Condor Hollow Blocks and General
Merchandise was on its way to Cebu when its rear tire exploded. The driver Sergio Pedrano Hence, the petition was partially granted.
then parked the truck on the side of the National Highway, left the rear lights on, and instructed
his helper, Jose Mitante, to watch over the truck and place a spare tire on the road a few meters
away from the tire to serve as a warning device as he went and had the faulty tire vulcanized.
After Pedrano left, D Rough Riders passenger bus carrying the respondent, passed
by the same route and hit the truck. The petitioner was injured in the collision and his wife,
Felissa Arriesgado eventually died after sustaining injuries from the same. Hence, he filed a
complaint against the petitioner for breach of contract of carriage, damages and for attorneys
fees against the petitioner, the owner of the bus, William Tiu and his driver, Laspinas.
However, the petitioner filed a third-party complaint alleging that the said truck was
parked in a slanted manner and did not have any early warning devices displayed while it was
left by the driver which resulted to the collision and would therefore make, Benjamin Condor,
the owner of the truck liable as well.
Also, the petitioner included that he was covered by Philippine Phoenix Surety and
Insurance (PPSI) at the time of the incident which would therefore make the same liable for part
of the damages that may arise as well.
PPSI, however argued that it already attended to and settled claims of those who were
injured in the collision and that it could not accede to the claim of Arriesgado because it was
beyond that of the terms of the insurance.
The trial court found that the contention of the petitioner was invalid because the said
truck had left its tail lights open and that the said road was well lit at the time of the accident.
Hence, it was the fault of the bus, for traveling at a fast pace, that the collision happened. The
Petitioner, Tiu, appealed to the CA but was denied which prompted him to seek another
reconsideration.

Issue:
W/N The owner and driver of the Truck, Benjamin Condor and Sergio Pedrano, was
liable due to their negligence in the lack of an early warning device and hence liable to the
respondent as well. (Violation of Sec 34 of LTO Land traffic code.)
W/N Petitioner was negligent
W/N Petitioner was also liable for exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.
W/N PPSI is also liable.

Held:
The court found that indeed, the petitioner, was liable for being negligent while being
engaged in the business of common carriage. The SC could no longer change the facts that were
sustained in the trial court and court of appeals hence, since it was deemed that the bus was
moving in a very fast speed which was the cause of the accident, the SC will have to sustain that
ruling and hold that indeed, there was negligence on the part of the petitioner.
Also, the doctrine of Last Clear Chance is inapplicable to the case because it could
only apply to a controversy between two colliding vehicles. In this case, it was the passenger
and not another driver who was injured and thus, the said doctrine could not be applied.
However, the respondents Pedrano and Condor was found by the court to be negligent
as well. The court found that there was merit in the contention of the petitioner that the said
truck violated Section 34 or RA 4136, wherein they did not have proper warning devices in
accordance with the said law.
12. Lapanday Agricultural & Devt Corp. v Angala he also admitted that he did not step on the brakes even upon seeing the pick-up. He only stepped
on the brakes after the collision.
Doctrine:
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent
act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose
fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who has the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss
but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss.

Facts:
On May 4, 1993, at about 2:45 p.m., Apolonio De Ocampo driving the crew cab bumped into a
1958 Chevy pick-up owned by Michael Raymond Angala and driven by Bernulfo Borres.
Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation owned the crew cab, which was assigned to
its manager Manuel Mendez. De Ocampo was the driver and bodyguard of Mendez. Both
vehicles were running along Rafael Castillo St., Agdao, Davao City heading north towards
Lanang, Davao City.

The left door, front left fender, and part of the front bumper of the pick-up were damaged.
Respondent Angala led an action for Quasi-Delict, Damages, and Attorneys fees against
LADECO, its administrative ocer Henry Berenguel and De Ocampo. Respondent alleged that
his pick-up was slowing down to about ve to ten kilometers per hour and was making a left
turn preparatory to turning south when it was bumped from behind by the crew cab, which was
running at around 60 to 70 kph. The crew cab stopped twenty-one meters from the point of
impact. Respondent alleged that he heard a screeching sound before the impact. Respondent was
seated beside the driver and was looking at the speedo meter when the accident took place.

Respondent testied that Borres made a signal because he noticed a blinking light while looking
at the speedometer, Respondent sent a demand letter to LADEDO for the payment of the
damages he incurred because of the accident but he did not receive any reply, thus respondent
led the case against LADECO, Berenguel, and De Ocampo. The Regional Trial Court of Davao
City ruled in favor of defendant and ordered LADECO and De Ocampo to solidarily pay the
damages. The trial court found that Berenguel was not liable because he was not the owner of
the crew cab. LADECO and De Ocampo led a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied on June13, 1995. Petitioner led an appeal before the Court of Appeals, however the
appellate court armed in toto the trial courts decision, Petitioners led a motion for
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition was led before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance applies in the case at bar?

Held:
Yes. Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear chance applies. The
doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of
one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault
or negligence caused the loss, the one who has the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but
failed to do so is chargeable with the loss.

In this case, De Ocampo had the last clear chance to avoid the collision. Since De Ocampo was
driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he was in a position to observe
the vehicle in front of him. De Ocampo had the responsibility of avoiding from bumping the
vehicle in front of him. A U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and
overturning, compared to running straight ahead. De Ocampo could have avoided the vehicle if
he was not driving very fast while following the pick-up. De Ocampo was not only driving fast,
13. Gatchalian v Delim
Facts: On July 11, 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded as paying passenger a minibus
owned by respondents. While the bus was running along the highway, a snapping sound was
heard, and after a short while, the bus bumped a cement flower pot, turned turtle and fell into a
ditch. The passengers were confined in the hospital, and their bills were paid by respondents
spouse on July 14. Before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers sign an already
prepared affidavit waiving their claims against respondents. Petitioner was among those who
signed. Notwithstanding the said document, petitioner filed a claim to recover actual and moral
damages for loss of employment opportunities, mental suffering and inferiority complex caused
by the scar on her forehead. Respondents raised in defense force majeure and the waiver signed
by petitioner. The trial court upheld the validity of the waiver and dismissed the complaint. The
appellate court ruled that the waiver was invalid, but also that the petitioner is not entitled to
damages.
Issues:
(1) Whether there was a valid waiver
(2) Whether the respondent was negligent
(3) Whether the petitioner is entitled to actual and moral damages
Held:
(1) We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no valid waiver of her
cause of action had been made by petitioner. A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the
first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention
of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually
be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent
to abandon a right vested in such person.
passengers safely "as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
a very cautious person, with due regard to all the circumstances".
The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent had exercised
the extraordinary diligence required by law. The obvious continued failure of respondent to look
after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to
stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from
one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety of the passengers, and
hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his driver.
(3) At the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public school. Her employment
as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the availability of vacancies
for substitute teachers. She could not be said to have in fact lost any employment after and by
reason of the accident. She may not be awarded damages on the basis of speculation or
conjecture.
Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead, is
another matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity
is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages
are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the
condition that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman,
resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to
a legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante.
Moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common carrier is
shown. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must have suffered as a
result of her physical injuries including the permanent scar on her forehead, we believe that the
amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award. Petitioner's claim for P1,000.00 as
attorney's fees is in fact even more modest.

The circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner Gatchalian need to
be considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular
accident when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented to her for
signing; that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other
passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering
to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances, there appears
substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared
by or at the instance of private respondent) she signed and whether she actually intended thereby
to waive any right of action against private respondent.
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained
by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary
diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier.
To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under
circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of
extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that
standard unenforceable. We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy.
(2) In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory presumption arises that the common
carrier was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves that it [had] observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." To overcome this presumption, the common
carrier must show to the court that it had exercised extraordinary diligence to present the injuries.
The standard of extraordinary diligence imposed upon common carriers is considerably more
demanding than the standard of ordinary diligence. A common carrier is bound to carry its
14. Sabena Belgian World Airlines v CA
Doctrine:
Art. 1733 of the [Civil] Code provides that from the very nature of their business and by
reasons of public policy, common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods transported by them.
Art. 1735 establishes the presumption that if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they had observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733.
The Warsaw Convention denies to the carrier availment of the provisions which exclude
or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on
his part as, in accordance with the law of the court seized of the case, is considered to be
equivalent to wilful misconduct, or if the damage is (similarly) caused x x x by any agent of
the carrier acting within the scope of his employment.
Facts:
1. Plaintiff Ma. Paula San Agustin, herein private respondent, was a passenger on board Flight SN
284 of defendant airline originating from Casablanca to Brussels, Belgium on her way back to
Manila. She checked in her luggage which contained her valuables, namely: jewelries valued at
$2,350.00; clothes $1,500.00; shoes/bag $150; accessories $75; luggage itself $10.00; or a total
of $4,265.00, for which she was issued Tag No. 71423. She stayed overnight in Brussels and
her luggage was left on board Flight SN 284.
2. She arrived at Manila International Airport and immediately submitted her Tag No. 71423 but
her luggage was missing. She was advised to accomplish and submit a property Irregularity
Report which she submitted and filed on the same day but when her luggage could not be found,
she filed a formal complaint with defendants Local Manager.
3. Subsequently, plaintiff was furnished copies of telexes of defendants Brussels Office that the
latter found her luggage and that they have broken the locks for identification. Plaintiff was
assured by the defendant that it has notified its Manila Office that the luggage will be shipped
to Manila. But unfortunately plaintiff was informed that the luggage was lost for the second
time.
4. Plaintiff demanded from the defendant the money value of the luggage and its contents or its
exchange value, but defendant refused to settle the claim. Defendant asserts in its Answer and
its evidence tend to show that while it admits that the plaintiff was a passenger with a piece of
checked in luggage, the loss of the luggage was due to plaintiffs sole if not contributory
negligence.
5. Petitioner airline company, in contending that the alleged negligence of private respondent
should be considered the primary cause for the loss of her luggage, avers that, despite her
awareness that the flight ticket had been confirmed only for Casablanca and Brussels, and that
her flight from Brussels to Manila had yet to be confirmed, she did not retrieve the luggage upon
arrival in Brussels. Petitioner insists that private respondent, being a seasoned international
traveler, must have likewise been familiar with the standard provisions contained in her flight
ticket that items of value are required to be hand-carried by the passenger and that the liability
of the airline or loss, delay or damage to baggage would be limited, in any event, to only
US$20.00 per kilo unless a higher value is declared in advance and corresponding additional
charges are paid thereon. At the Casablanca International Airport, private respondent, in
checking in her luggage, evidently did not declare its contents or value, pursuant to Section 5(c),
Article IX, of the General Conditions of Carriage, which states that: Passengers shall not
include in his checked baggage, and the carrier may refuse to carry as checked baggage, fragile
or perishable articles, money, jewelry, precious metals, negotiable papers, securities or other
valuables.
6. The trial court rendered judgment ordering Sabena Belgian World Airlines to pay private
respondent. Sabena appealed but the CA affirmed in toto the trial courts judgment, hence the
present petition for review.
Issue: W/N the airline is liable for the lost luggage
Held:
Yes. Fault or negligence consists in the omission of that diligence which is demanded by the
nature of an obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time, and
of the place. When the source of an obligation is derived from a contract, the mere breach or
non-fulfillment of the prestation gives rise to the presumption of fault on the part of the
obligor. This rule is not different in the case of common carriers in the carriage of goods which,
indeed, are bound to observe not just the due diligence of a good father of a family but that of
extraordinary care in the vigilance over the goods.
The only exceptions to the foregoing extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier is when
the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods is due to any of the following causes:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
Not one of the above excepted causes obtains in this case.
The airline cannot invoke the tort doctrine of proximate cause because the private respondents
luggage was lost while it was in the custody of petitioner. The loss of said baggage not only
once by twice, said the appellate court, underscores the wanton negligence and lack of care
on the part of the carrier. The above findings foreclose whatever rights petitioner might have
had to the possible limitation of liabilities enjoyed by international air carriers under the Warsaw
Convention.
In Alitalia vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court held that the Warsaw Convention
however denies to the carrier availment of the provisions which exclude or limit his liability, if
the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance
with the law of the court seized of the case, is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct,
or if the damage is (similarly) caused x x x by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope
of his employment.
The Hague Protocol amended the Warsaw Convention by removing the provision that if the
airline took all necessary steps to avoid the damage, it could exculpate itself completely, and
declaring the stated limits of liability not applicable if it is proved that the damage resulted
from an act or omission of the carrier, its servants or agents, done with intent to cause damage
or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result. The same deletion was
effected by the Montreal Agreement of 1966, with the result that a passenger could recover
unlimited damages upon proof of wilful misconduct.
The Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of an
airlines liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. It should be deemed a
limit of liability only in those cases where the cause of the death or injury to person, or
destruction, loss or damage to property or delay in its transport is not attributable to or attended
by any wilful misconduct, bad faith, recklessness or otherwise improper conduct on the part of
any official or employee for which the carrier is responsible, and there is otherwise no special
or extraordinary form of resulting injury. Decision appealed from AFFIRMED.