15. Gan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44264 (1988) Held and Ratio: YES.

Doctrine: EMERGENCY RULE. A corollary rule is what is known in the law as The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act
whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this:
the emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of
Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is
danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be
attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to
of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty on the doer
adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
to take precaution against its mischievous results and the failure to do so
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his
constitutes negligence.
own negligence."
Applying the emergency rule (as defined above), petitioner is not guilty of the
Prior Proceedings:
crime. The amount of time afforded to the petitioner to react to the situation
CFI Manila- Gan was convicted of Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence.
she was in should be taken into account for it is undeniable that the suggested
CA- Judgment modified, Homicide thru simple imprudence.
course of action presupposes sufficient time for appellant to analyze the
SC- Reversed CA, acquitted Gan.
situation confronting her and to ponder on which of the different courses of
Facts of the Case:
action would result in the least possible harm to herself and to others.
Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo,
Under the circumstances narrated by petitioner, we find that the appellate
Manila. While in front of house no. 694 of North Bay Boulevard, there were
court is asking too much from a mere mortal like the petitioner who in the blink
two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney parked on one side of the road, one
of an eye had to exercise her best judgment to extricate herself from a difficult
following the other about two to three meters from each other.
and dangerous situation caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle.
Petitioner certainly could not be expected to act with all the coolness of a
As the car driven by the accused approached the place where the two vehicles
person under normal conditions.
were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed
by another which tried to overtake and bypass the one in front of it and thereby
The danger confronting petitioner was real and imminent, threatening her very
encroached the lane of the car driven by the accused.
existence. She had no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough time
to heed the very powerful instinct of self-preservation.
To avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle, the defendant
swerved to the right and as a consequence, the front bumper of the Toyota
Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that the petitioner was driving her
Crown Sedan hit an old man who was about to cross the boulevard from south
car within the legal limits. We therefore rule that the "emergency rule"
to north, pinning him against the rear of the parked jeepney.
enunciated above applies with full force to the case at bar and consequently
absolve petitioner from any criminal negligence in connection with the incident
The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney to move forward hitting the
under consideration.
rear of the parked truck ahead of it.

The pedestrian was injured, the Toyota Sedan was damaged on its front, the
jeep suffered damages on its rear and front parts, and the truck sustained
scratches at the wooden portion of its rear. The body of Isidoro Casino was
immediately brought to the hospital but was (pronounced) dead on arrival.

Issue: Did the CA erred in holding that when the petitioner saw a car travelling
directly towards her, she should have stepped on the brakes immediately or in
swerving her vehicle to the right should have also stepped on the brakes or
lessened her speed, to avoid the death of a pedestrian?

16. McKee vs. IAC, 211 SCRA 517 (1992)
FACTS:
It was the 8th of January in 1977, at around 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning, somewhere
between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga. Jose Koh was driving his
daughter, Araceli Koh McKee, and her minor children, Christopher, George, and Kim,
as well as Kims babysitter, Loida Bondoc, from San Fernando, Pampanga in the
direction of Angeles City (northward) in a Ford Escort.
Meanwhile, a cargo truck owned by Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo, driven by
Ruben Galang, was headed in the opposite direction, from Angeles City to San
Fernando (southward), going to Manila. The cargo truck was considerable in size as it
was carrying 200 hundred cavans of rice, which weighed 10 metric tons.
As the Escort approached one Pulong-Pulo Bridge from the southern portion, 2 boys
suddenly ran from the right side of the road into the Escorts lane. As the boys were
going back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way or turn back, Jose blew his
horn. He was then forced to swerve left and into the lane Galang was driving in. Jose
switched his headlights on, applied his brakes, and attempted to return to his lane.
However, he failed to get back into the right lane, and collided with the cargo truck. The
collision occurred on the bridge.
The collision resulted in the deaths of the driver, Jose, the one-year-old, Kim, and her
babysitter, Loida, on whose lap she was sitting. Loida was seated in the passenger seat.
Araceli, Christopher, and George, who were sitting in the back of the Escort, received
physical injuries from the collision.
An information was filed against Ruben Galang, charging him for reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide, physical injuries, and damage to property. He was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges in the information. The conviction was
affirmed by the CA and achieved finality after the denial by the CA of his MR and the
denial by the SC of his Petition for Review.
Two civil cases were filed. The first one, by the wife and children of Jose Koh, and the
second one by Araceli and her husband for the death of Kim and injuries to Araceli and
her other children. The respondents were impleaded against as the employers of Ruben
Galang Galang was not included. The cases here are based on quasi-delict. These
cases were eventually consolidated.
The trial court dismissed the civil cases and awarded the respondents damages and
attorneys fees.
On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the dismissal was reversed. This was
1
The court said he could not be an accommodation witness (WUT) because he was the first to arrive
at the scene and, in fact, brought one of the injured passengers to the hospital, as opposed to a witness
presented by the respondents (Roman Dayrit who allegedly lived across the street but it happened
on a bridge tho.... :/) who didnt even help and said he wanted to call the police but his phone hadnt a
based on its finding that it was Galangs inattentiveness or reckless imprudence that
caused the accident. However, upon filing by the respondents of an MR, the IAC set
aside its original decision and upheld that of the trial court because the fact that Kohs
car invaded the lane of the truck and the collision occurred while still in Galangs lane
gave rise to the presumption that Koh was negligent.
ISSUE: Was the IAC correct in reversing their original decision?
HELD: NO. The petition has merit.
Procedural (not important): Given the circumstances, the cases (civil and criminal)
should have been consolidated to prevent separate appreciation of the evidence. To be
fair, the petitioners did move to adopt the testimonies of the witnesses in the criminal
case but the motion was denied. The non-consolidation resulted in two conflicting
decisions. In any case, the guilty verdict of Galang was deemed by the Court as
irrelevant to the case at bar.
On the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately concluded
that it was Jose Kohs negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the
collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners
convincingly shows that the car swerved into the trucks lane because as it approached
the southern end of the bridge, two boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk
into the lane of the car.
Aracelis testimony was pretty much what was stated in the facts plus the fact that when
Jose swerved to the left, the truck was immediately noticed. This is why he switched his
headlights on to warn the trucks driver to slow down and let the Escort return to its
lane. When asked as to how she could tell that the truck did not slow down, Araceli said
that the truck just kept on coming, indicating that it didnt reduce its speed. She posited
that if it did, there wouldnt have been a collision. Her testimony remained intact, even
upon cross-examination that Joses entry into Galangs lane was necessary to avoid
what was, in his mind at the time, a greater peril death or injury to the two idiots. This
is hardly negligent behavior.
Her testimony was corroborated by one Eugenio Tanhueco1, who was an impartial
eyewitness. He said that the truck, moving at 50 to 60kph, only stopped upon collision.
Also, when the police investigated the scene of the collision, they found skidmarks under
the truck instead of behind it. This indicated that Galang only applied the brakes
moments before the collision. While Galang claimed that he had stopped when the
Escort was within 10 meters of the truck but this only served to substantiate Tanhuecos
statement that he stopped only upon collision, considering the speed at which he was
dial tone. NOTE: None of the respondents witness testimonies were given credence simply because
one was the passenger of Galang (who the court expects would naturally take the side of the person she
is associated with) and the other one was an accommodation witness
 going2. reasonable man finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid
the car instead of meeting it head-on.
On the basis of the definition3 and the test4 of negligence, no negligence can be imputed
to Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running o Negligence of Galang apparent in the records: He himself said that his truck
over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the
mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge52 is only 30 kilometers per hour.
course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed
meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
to the oncoming car.
2. Last Clear Chance Doctrine: A doctrine in the law of torts which states that the
THE EMERGENCY RULE: one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if
and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party.
adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof. A person who
own negligence. Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation. has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding
This means he cannot be considered negligent. the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent
is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. The
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT JOSE WAS NEGLIGENT, THE COLLISION STILL doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or
WOULD NOT BE IMPUTED TO HIM BECAUSE: antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the
1. Proximate Cause: that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred. Basically, the last clear chance was with Galang, as can be gleaned from the
evidence presented
Galangs negligent act of not slowing down or stopping and allowing the
Therefore, respondents are found, under Article 2180, directly and primarily
Escort to return to the right lane was the sufficient intervening cause and the
responsible for the acts of their employee. Their negligence flows from the
actual cause of the tragedy (failure to take the necessary measures and the
negligence of their employee. Such presumption is juris tantum (rebuttable) and
degree of care necessary to avoid the collision)
not juris et de jure (conclusive). They did not present evidence that showed that
o The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to employee5, Galang.
slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the respondent
Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was
Court of 3 April 1984 is SET ASIDE while its Decision of 29 November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV
the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck
Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED.
driver continued at full speed towards the car. The truck drivers negligence
becomes more apparent in view of the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide
while the car measures 1.598 meters and the truck, 2.286 meters, in width.
This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by side with a
clearance of 3.661 meters to spare. Furthermore, the bridge has a level
sidewalk, which could have partially accommodated the truck. Any

2
He said he was going only 30 (unclear whether he meant miles or kilometers per hour) as opposed to 4
Picart v. Smith: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that (reasonable care and
the 50-60kph speed limit was 30kph caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?) If not, then he is
3
Layugan v. IAC: The omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those guilty of negligence.
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Corliss v. Manila Railroad: Negligence is
want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and 5
Their only possible defense
its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably require.

17. Delsan Transport Lines vs. C&A Construction, Inc., G.R. No. 156034
(2003)
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time
to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he
fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, UNLESS the
danger in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.
FACTS:
Respondent C & A Construction, Inc. was engaged by the National Housing Authority
(NHA) to construct a deflector wall at the Vitas Reclamation Area in Vitas, Tondo,
Manila. The project was completed in 1994 but it was not formally turned over to NHA.
October 9, 1994: M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by petitioner Delsan
Transport Lines, Inc., anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of installing a
cargo pump and clearing the cargo oil tank.
October 20, 1994, 12:00 mn: Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express
received a report from his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon was going to hit
Manila in about eight (8) hours.
October 21, 1994, 8:35 am: Capt. Jusep tried to seek shelter at the North Harbor but
could not enter the area because it was already congested.
October 21, 1994, 10:00 a.m: Capt. Jusep decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas
mouth, 4 miles away from a Napocor power barge. At that time, the waves were already
reaching 8 to 10 feet high.
Capt. Jusep ordered his crew to go full ahead to counter the wind which was dragging
the ship towards the Napocor power barge.
To avoid collision, Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel. He succeeded in
avoiding the power barge, but when the engine was re-started and the ship was
maneuvered full astern, it hit the deflector wall constructed by respondent. The damage
caused by the incident amounted to P456,198.24.
Respondent demanded payment of the damage from petitioner but the latter refused to
pay.
Consequently, respondent filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila.
In its answer, petitioner claimed that the damage was caused by a fortuitous event.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that petitioner was not guilty of
negligence because it had taken all the necessary precautions to avoid the accident.
Applying the "emergency rule", it absolved petitioner of liability because the latter
had no opportunity to adequately weigh the best solution to a threatening
situation. It further held that even if the maneuver chosen by petitioner was a wrong
move, it cannot be held liable as the cause of the damage sustained by respondent was
typhoon "Katring", which is an act of God.
The Court of Appeals, reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. It found
Capt. Jusep guilty of negligence in deciding to transfer the vessel to the North Harbor
only at 8:35 a.m. of October 21, 1994 and thus held petitioner liable for damages.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition contending that Capt. Jusep was not negligent
in waiting until 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994 before transferring the vessel to
the North Harbor inasmuch as it was not shown that had the transfer been made earlier,
the vessel could have sought shelter.
ISSUE(S): Whether Capt. Jusep was negligent.
HELD: Yes! Petition denied.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict.
The test for determining the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated
as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care
and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation?
If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Capt. Jusep was negligent in deciding
to transfer the vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994. As early as 12:00
midnight of October 20, 1994, he received a report from his radio head operator in Japan
that a typhoon was going to hit Manila after 8 hours. This, notwithstanding, he did
nothing, until 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994, when he decided to seek shelter
at the North Harbor, which unfortunately was already congested.
The finding of negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have
sought refuge at the North Harbor even if the transfer was done earlier. It is not the
speculative success or failure of a decision that determines the existence of negligence
in the present case, but the failure to take immediate and appropriate action under the
circumstances.
Capt. Jusep, despite knowledge that the typhoon was to hit Manila in 8 hours,
complacently waited for the lapse of more than 8 hours thinking that the typhoon might
change direction. He cannot claim that he waited for the sun to rise instead of moving
the vessel at midnight immediately after receiving the report because of the difficulty of
traveling at night. The hour of 8:35 a.m. is way past sunrise. Furthermore, he did not
transfer as soon as the sun rose because, according to him, it was not very cloudy and
there was no weather disturbance yet.
When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding reasonable foresight of harm,
Capt. Jusep showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent
person would have observed in the same situation.
Had he moved the vessel earlier, he could have had greater chances of finding a space
at the North Harbor considering that the Navotas Port where they docked was very near
North Harbor. Even if the latter was already congested, he would still have time to seek
refuge in other ports.
The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule. Under this rule, one who suddenly
finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to
have been a better method, unless the danger in which he finds himself is brought about
 by his own negligence. Clearly, the emergency rule is not applicable to the instant case
because the danger where Capt. Jusep found himself was caused by his own
negligence.
18. Farolan vs. Solmac Marketing Corp., G.R. No. 83589 (1991)
FACTS:
Ramon Farolan was then the Acting Commissioner of Customs. He and a Parayno were
sued in their official capacities as officers in the government.
Solmac Marketing Corp was the owner of an importation of Clojus Recycling Plastic
Products of what is technically known as polypropylene film used chiefly in making
fibers, films, and molded and extruded products. The subject importation, consisting of
seventeen (17) containers, arrived in December, 1981.
Upon application for entry, Customs asked respondent SOLMAC for its authority from
the government to import the goods described in the bill of lading. However, upon
examination of the shipment, it turned out that the fibers of the importation were oriented
in such a way that the materials were stronger than what they claimed to be. In other
words, the Clojus shipment was not OPP film scrap, as declared by the assignee
respondent SOLMAC to the Bureau of Customs and BOI but oriented polypropylene the
importation of which is restricted, if not prohibited, under Letter of Instructions of the
BOC and BOI.
Considering that the shipment was different from what had been authorized by the BOI
and by law, petitioners Parayno and Farolan withheld the release of the subject
importation. Parayno wrote the BOI asking for the latter's advice on whether or no t the
subject importation may be released.
August 17, 1982 - the BOI agreed that the subject imports may be released but that
holes may be drilled on them by the Bureau of Customs prior to their release.
January 20, 1983 - counsel of private respondent wrote to Customs asking for the
release of the importation. The importation was not released, however, on the ground
that holes had to be drilled on them first.
November 8, 1983 - BOI wrote a letter to the BOC stating that the subject goods may
be released without drilling of holes.
February 1, 1984 - Commissioner Farolan wrote the BOI requesting for definite
guidelines regarding the disposition. As of now, they were being held at the BOC.
Respondent Solmac filed the action for the unconditional release of the subject
importation. It also prayed for actual damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees
holding FAROLAN AND PARAYNO liable personally because not releasing the
importations was irregular and devoid of legal basis, hence, not done in the regular
performance of official duty.
RTC release but no damge; CA release AND pay damage in personal capcitie
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners acted in good faith in not immediately releasing the
questioned importation, or, simply, can they be held liable, in their personal and private
capacities, for damages to the private respondent?
HELD AND RATIO: We rule for the petitioners.
We had reviewed the evidence on record carefully and we did not see any clear and
convincing proof showing the alleged bad faith of the petitioners. On the contrary, the
record is replete with evidence bolstering the petitioners' claim of good faith. First, there
was the report that, contrary to what the respondent claimed, the subject importation
was not OPP film scraps but oriented polypropylene, a plastic product of stronger
material, whose importation to the Philippines was restricted.
Second, the petitioners testified that, on many occasions, the Bureau of Customs sought
the advice of the BOI on whether the subject importation might be released. Third,
petitioner Parayno also testified during the trial that up to that time (of the trial) there
was no clear-cut policy on the part of the BOI regarding the entry into the Philippines of
oriented polypropylene (OPP), as the letters of BOI respectively, ordering the release
of the subject importation did not clarify the BOI policy on the matter.
It can be seen from all the foregoing that even the highest officers of the BOI themselves
were not in agreement as to what proper course to take on the subject. The confusion
over the disposition of this particular importation obviates bad faith. Thus the trial court's
finding that the petitioners acted in good faith in not immediately releasing the Clojus
shipment pending a definitive policy of the BOI on this matter is correct.
When a public officer takes his oath of office, he binds himself to perform the duties of
his office faithfully. In the case at bar, prudence dictated that petitioners first obtain from
the BOI the latter's definite guidelines regarding the disposition of the various
importations. But even granting that the petitioners committed a mistake in withholding
the release of the subject importation, nonetheless, it is the duty of the Court to see to
it that public officers are not hampered in the performance of their duties or in making
decisions for fear of personal liability for damages due to honest mistake.
Whatever damage they may have caused as a result of such an erroneous
interpretation, if any at all, is in the nature of a damnum absque injuria. Mistakes
concededly committed by public officers are not actionable absent any clear showing
that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.

19. BPI Express Card Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No. 120639 (1998)
FACTS:
Marasigan, a lawyer, is a BPI credit card holder. His contractual relations with
BPI went on smoothly until October 1989, when his statement of account
amounting to P8,987.84 was not paid in due time. BPI demanded immediate
payment, and required him to issue a check in favor of BPI, otherwise his card
will be suspended. Marasigan issued a post-dated check (PDC) in favor of
BPI.
BPI, having been informed of the PDC only a week after receipt, already sent
a letter to Marasigan, informing him of the temporary suspension of the
privileges of his card. He was also told to refrain from using his card to avoid
any inconvenience/embarrassment and that unless he settles his outstanding
account within 5 days from receipt of the letter, his membership will be
permanently cancelled.
On the other hand, confident that he had settled his account with the issuance
of the postdated check, Marasigan invited some guests at Caf Adriatico
(there is also no showing that he received the letter from BPI before he went
to Caf Adriatico). When he presented his credit card to paythe bill, the it was
dishonored and one of his guests paid the bill by using her own credit card.
Marasigan asked BPI to withhold the deposit of his postdated check and to
return the said check to him because according to him, BPI violated their
agreement that once Marasigan issues the check to the to cover his unpaid
account, BPI will not suspend the effectivity of the card.
Marasigan filed a complaint for damages against BPI before the trial court,
and the trial court ruled in favor of him. The decision was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N BPI had the right to suspend the credit card of the Marasigan. Yes
2. W/N the trial court and CA erred in holding BPI liable for damages. Yes
RATIO:
Under the terms and conditions of the credit card, signed by Marasigan, any
card with outstanding balances after 30 days from original billing shall
automatically be suspended. Marasigan admitted that he did not pay within 30
days for his original billing. BPI could automatically suspend his credit card.
Even though there was an arrangement between the parties (that upon
issuance of a check, the card wouldnt be suspended) the court found that
Marasigan was not able to comply with his obligation.
The purpose of the arrangement between the parties was for the immediate
payment of Marasigans outstanding account, in order that his credit card
would not be suspended. As agreed upon by the parties, on the following day,
private respondent did issue a check. However, the check was postdated 15
December 1989. Settled is the doctrine that a check is only a substitute for
money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself
operate as payment. This is especially true in the case of a postdated check.
Thus, the issuance by the private respondent of the postdated check was not
effective payment. It did not comply with his obligation under the arrangement
with BPI. BPI corporation was therefore justified in suspending his credit card.
While Marasigan suffered damages as a result of the cancellation of his credit
card, there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the
illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results
from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded
for the damage suffered.
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss
or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In order that a plaintiff
may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must
establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant
owed to the plaintiff. In the case at bar, it was Marasigan's failure to settle his
obligation which caused the suspension of his credit card and subsequent
dishonor at Caf Adriatico.

20. Amonoy vs. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 140420 (2001)
FACTS:
A Special Proceedings for the settlement of the estate involving six (6) parcels
of land was filed. Petitioner Sergio Amonoy was the counsel Francisca
Catolos, Agnes Catolos, Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formida. The
partition of the estate was approved and two (2) of the said lots were
adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. The Attorney's fees
charged by Amonoy was P27,600.00 and on 20 January 1965 Asuncion and
Alfonso executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the said two (2) lots in
favor of Amonoy to secure the payment of his attorney's fees. But by the time
the estate was declared closed on Aug. 1969, both Asuncion and Alfonso
were both dead. Among the heirs of the latter was his daughter, plaintiff-
appellant Angela Gutierrez.
Because his Attorney's fees secured by the two lots were not paid Amonoy
filed for their foreclosure. The heirs opposed, contending that the attorney's
fees charged [were] unconscionable. Judgment was rendered in favor of
Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay within 90 days and failure to do so would
result to the sale of the two (2) lots in a public auction.
The attorneys fees remained unpaid and so the lots were sold in a public
auction where Amonoy was the highest bidder. The CFI on 25 July 1985
issued a Writ of Possession and pursuant to which a notice to vacate was
made on 26 August 1985. On Amonoy's motion orders of 25 April 1986 and 6
May 1986 were issued for the demolition of structures in the said lots, including
the house of the Gutierrez spouses.
On 27 September 1985 the petition for Certiori was filed by several persons
including respondent Angela Gutierrez). A temporary restraining order was
then granted by the SC on 2 June 1986 enjoining the demolition of the
petitioners' houses.
On October 5,1988 the certiorari was granted enjoining the sheriff from
demolishing the houses in the subject lots including that of Sps. Gutierrez and
ordering Amonoy to return the lot to the Sps. Gutierrez among others.
But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the abovementioned
Decision, respondents' house had already been destroyed, supposedly in
accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court.
Thus, a Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their
house was filed by respondents against petitioner. The RTC dismissed
respondents' suit. On appeal, the CA set aside the lower court's ruling and
ordered petitioner Amonoy to pay respondents P250,000 as actual damages.
Amonoyr then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was also denied.
ISSUE:
"Whether or not tAmonoy is liable to Sps. Gutierrez for respondents for damages.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner invokes the legal principle damnum absque injuria wherein
damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a person's rights is a loss
without injury for which the law gives no remedy. He maintains that he was
merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC.
Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case.
True, petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents' house on May 30,
1986 under the authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. But the
records show that a TRO enjoining the demolition of respondents' house, was
issued by the SC on June 2, 1986. The CA also found, based on the Certificate
of Service of the SC process server, that a copy of the TRO was served on
petitioner himself on June 4, 1986. Petitioner, however, did not heed the TRO
of this Court. We agree with the CA that he unlawfully pursued the demolition
of respondents' house well until the middle of 1987.
Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outsset,
their continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious
abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith. Had he
not insisted on completing the demolition, respondents would not have
suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the RTC. Verily, his acts
constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right that
had been suspended when he received the TRO from this Court on June 4,
1986. By then he was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition.
"Artilce 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the
exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties.These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due;
recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the
norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
held responsible xxx."
Clearly then, the demolition of respondents' house by petitioner, despite his
receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of
 such right. In insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this Court's
Order and wittingly caused the destruction of respondents; house.
21. Orchard Golf & Country Club, Inc. vs. Yu, G.R. No. 191033 (2016) READ
FULL TEXT (Different ruling ito, pang-Corp Law)
FACTS:
Yu and Yuhico were set to play golf at the Orchard Golf and Country Club with
one more member of the club. Unfortunately, this other member cancelled at
the last minute. Because of the Clubs policy, which prohibited twosomes
from teeing off on weekends and public holidays before 1pm, petitioners
requested management to look for another player to join them. When a third
player could not be found, petitioners requested that they be allowed to play.
The Club refused, but they played anyway, in violation of the Clubs rules. As
a result, an incident report was filed with the Clubs Board of Directors. The
Board resolved to suspend both members for 3 months.
Petitioners filed complaintswith the Securities Investigation and Clearing
Department of the Securities and Exchange Commission, at that time the
tribunal vested by law with jurisdiction to hear and decide intra-corporate
controversies. The SICD-SEC issued a TRO effective for 20 days, restraining
the Club from implementing the suspension. 2 days before the TRO would
lapse, however, the SEC issued guidelines wherein parties would be allowed
to file their cases before August 8, 2000 but any provisional remedies the SEC
granted them were to be effective only until that date. On August 7, 2000, the
SIDC-SEC issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents from
implementing the suspensions.
RTC Ruled in favor of Respondents, ordered Orchard Golf Club to pay
damages.
CA Affirm
ISSUE: WON the suspension was valid?
RULING:
Respondents were suspended in accordance with the procedure set forth in
the Club's By-laws. There is no merit on their insistence that their suspension
is invalid on the ground that the affirmative vote of eight (8) members is
required to support a decision suspending or expelling a Club member.
Both the provisions of Articles of Incorporationand By-Lawsof the Club
expressly limit the number of directors to seven (7); hence, the provision on
suspension and expulsion of a member which requires the affirmative vote of
eight (8) members is obviously a result of an oversight. Former Senator
Helena Z. Benitez, the Honorary Chairperson named in the Membership
Handbook, could not be included as a regular Board member since there was
no evidence adduced by respondents that she was elected as such pursuant
to the Corporation Code and the By-laws of the Club or that she had the right
and authority to attend and vote in Board meetings. In addition, at the time the
Board resolved to suspend respondents, the affirmative votes of only six (6)
Board members already sufficed.
The testimony of Jesus A. Liganor, who served as Assistant Corporate
Secretary, that Rodrigo Francisco had not attended a single Board meeting
since 1997 remains uncontroverted. The Court agrees with petitioners that the
Club should not be powerless to discipline its members and be helpless
against acts inimical to its interest just because one director had been
suspended and refused to take part in the management affairs.
Lastly, contrary to respondents' position, the recommendation of the House
Committeeto suspend a Club member is not a pre-requisite. Section 1, Article
XIV,not Section 2 (b), Article XI, of the By-Laws governs as it outlines the
procedure for the suspension of a member. Even assuming that the
recommendation of the House Committee is mandatory, respondents failed to
prove, as a matter of fact, that petitioners acted in bad faith in relying on the
subject provision, which employs the permissive word "may" in reference to
the power of the House Committee to recommend anytime the suspension of
a Club member.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions
dated September 16, 2009 and January 21, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 106918, which reconsidered and set aside its Resolution dated
January 15, 2009, granting petitioners a fifteen-day period within which to file a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules, is ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.
SEC Case Nos. 001-01 and 002-01 filed and raffled before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 21 of Imus, Cavite are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Respondents are ORDERED TO RETURN to petitioners the total amount of
P9,200,000.00 or P4,600,000.00 each, within THIRTY (30) DAYS from the time
this decision becomes final and executory. Thereafter, said amount shall earn legal
interest of six percent (6%) per annum until fully paid. SO ORDERED.

22. Juntilla vs. Fontanar, G.R. No. L-45637 (1985)
FACTS:
Jeepney was driven by Berfol Camoro from Danao City to Cebu City. It
was Clemente Fontanar but was actually owned by defendant Fernando
Banzon.
When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire exploded causing
the vehicle to turn turtle. Roberto Juntilla was sitting at the front seat was
thrown out of the vehicle.
o Upon landing on the ground, he momentarily lost
consciousness. When he came to his senses, he found that he had
a lacerated wound on his right palm. He also injured his left arm,
right thigh and on his back.
Because of his shock and injuries, he went back to Danao City but on the way,
he discovered that his "Omega" wrist watch worth P 852.70 was lost. Upon
his arrival in Danao City, he immediately entered the Danao City Hospital to
attend to his injuries, and also requested his father-in-law to proceed
immediately to the place of the accident and look for the watch.
Roberto Juntilla filed for breach of contract with damages
o Respondents: beyond the control since tire that exploded was newly
bought and was only slightly used
RTC: favored Roberto Juntilla
CA: Reversed since accident was due to fortuitous event
ISSUE: W/N there is a fortuitous event
HELD: NO. CA reversed, RTC reinstated.
passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident
o at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right
rear tire blows up
passenger jeepney was overloaded
o 3 passengers in the front seat
o 14 passengers in the rear
caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics:
(1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure
of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the
human will.
(2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso
fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid.
(3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill his obligation in a normal manner.
(4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation
of the injury resulting to the creditor.
In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence
was not independent of the human will. The accident was caused either
through the negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the
tire. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles,
not to exceed safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures
to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times
the source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage, and
by entering into the said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely
as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
a very cautious person, with a due regard for all the circumstances. The
records show that this obligation was not met by the respondents
respondents likewise argue that the petitioner cannot recover any amount for
failure to prove such damages during the trial
o findings of facts of the City Court of Cebu

23. Gotesco vs. Chatto, 210 SCRA 18 (1992)
FACTS
- Plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, Lina Delza E. Chatto went to
see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco
Investment Corporation.
- Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed.
The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued.
- Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they
were able to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were
confined and treated for one (1) day.
- The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in
said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11.
- Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, plaintiff went to Illinois,
USA in July 1982 for further treatment. She was treated at the Cook County Hospital in
Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for about three (3) months during which time
she had to return to the Cook County Hospital five (5) or, six (6) times.
- Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater
was done due to force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any
structural or construction defect.
- The trial court awarded actual or compensatory and moral damages and attorney's fees
to the plaintiffs.
- Respondent Court found the appeal later filed to be without merit.
- Its motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the respondent
Court, petitioner filed the petition in the SC.
ISSUE
WON the collapse of the ceiling was caused by force majeur
HELD NO
- Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to
force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim
Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed." Having
interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed
caused by force majeure. That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply
force majeure.
- Definitions of force majeure as cited in Pons y Compaia vs. La Compaia Maritima:
o Blackstone, in his Commentaries on English Law: Inevitable accident or
casualty; an accident produced by any physical cause which is irresistible;
such as lightning. tempest, perils of the sea, inundation, or earthquake; the
sudden illness or death of a person.
o Escriche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudenci,:
- The event which we could neither foresee nor resist; as for example, the lightning stroke,
hail, inundation, hurricane, public enemy, attack by robbers; Vis major est, says Cayo,
ea quae consilio humano neque provideri neque vitari potest. Accident and mitigating
circumstances.
o Bouvier: Any accident due to natural cause, directly exclusively without human
intervention, such as could not have been prevented by any kind of oversight,
pains and care reasonably to have been expected.
o Corkburn, chief justice, in a well considered English case, said that were a
captain uses all the known means to which prudent and experienced captains
ordinarily have recourse, he does all that can be reasonably required of him; and
if, under such circumstances, he is overpowered by storm or other natural
agency, he is within the rule which gives immunity from the effects of such vis
major. The term generally applies, broadly speaking, to natural accidents, such
as those caused by lightning, earthquake, tempests, public enemy ,etc.
- -The real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he
did not actually conduct the investigation or that he isincompetent. He is not an
engineer, but an architect who had not even passed the government's examination.
- Verily, post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the present
proceedings. What is significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by the
respondent Court, that the collapse was due to construction defects. There was no
evidence offered to overturn this finding.
- The building was constructed barely 4 years prior to the accident in question. It was not
shown that any of the causes denominates as force majeure obtained immediately
before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have been easily
discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and
maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no
adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident.
- That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City
Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all
prove that there were no defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling,
considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all.
- It is settled that: The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly
warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe for the
purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other exception
or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable
by ordinary or reasonable means.
- This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that: Where a patron of a theater or other
place of public amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and
exclusively under the control and management of the defendant, and the accident is
such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had
been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of
negligence on the part of the defendant.
- That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner.
- Even assuming that the cause of the collapse was due to force majeure, petitioner would
still be liable because it was guilty of negligence, which the trial court denominated as
 gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force
majeure for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have exercised
care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence. Disposition Judgment was
denying the instant petition with costs against petitioner.
24. Southeastern College vs. CA, G.R. No. 126389 (1998)
FACTS:
- Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay while petitioner
owns a four-storey school building along the same College Road. That on October 11,
1989, a powerful typhoon hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of
the petitioners building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying
portions of the roofing of private respondents house. When the typhoon had passed,
an ocular inspection of the destroyed building was conducted by a team of engineers
headed by the city building official.
- In their report, they imputed negligence to the petitioner for the structural defect of the
building and improper anchorage of trusses to the roof beams to cause for the roof be
ripped off the building, thereby causing damage to the property of respondent.
- Respondents filed an action before the RTC for recovery of damages based on culpa
aquiliana. Petitioner interposed denial of negligence and claimed that the typhoon as
an Act of God is the sole cause of the damage. RTC ruled in their favor relying on the
testimony of the City Engineer and the report made after the ocular inspection.
Petitioners appeal before the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence this present appeal.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents resulting
from the impact of the falling portions of the school buildings roof ripped off by the
strong winds of typhoon Saling, was, within legal contemplation, due to fortuitous
event?
(2) Whether or not an ocular inspection is sufficient evidence to prove negligence?
HELD:
1. Yes, petitioner should be exonerated from liability arising from the damage caused by
the typhoon. Under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, Except in cases expressly specified
by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the
obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
- In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that
he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may
have been occasioned. 12
- An act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who has been guilty of
gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences. When a
persons negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to
another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate or
proximate cause of the damages or injury was a fortuitous event. When the effect is
found to be partly the result of the participation of man whether it be from active
intervention, or neglect, or failure to act the whole occurrence is hereby humanized,
and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
- In the case at bar, the lower court accorded full credence to the finding of the
investigating team that subject school buildings roofing had no sufficient anchorage to
hold it in position especially when battered by strong winds. Based on such finding, the
trial court imputed negligence to petitioner and adjudged it liable for damages to private
respondents.
- There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural occurrence
which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of foresight, diligence or
care. In order to be exempt from liability arising from any adverse consequence
engendered thereby, there should have been no human participation amounting to a
negligent act. In other words; the person seeking exoneration from liability must not be
guilty of negligence. Negligence, as commonly understood, is conduct which naturally
or reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. It may be the failure to observe that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justify demand, or
the omission to do something which a prudent and reasonable man, guided by
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do.
2. It bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the negligence of another has
the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss.
The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent
evidence, 19 not merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact.
Private respondents, in establishing the culpability of petitioner, merely relied on the
aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of
petitioners school building after the typhoon. As the term imparts, an ocular inspection
is one by means of actual sight or viewing. What is visual to the eye through, is not
always reflective of the real cause behind.
In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation was conducted to
determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of petitioners school building.
 The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the
same. Petitioners failed to show that they were free from any negligence to
the loss of the pawned jewelry.

25. Sicam vs. Jorge, G.R. No. 159617 (2007)
Facts:
- Lulu Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry with Agencia de R. C. Sicam
located in BF Homes Paraaque, Metro Manila to secure a loan.
- On October 19, 1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop and took away
whatever cash and jewelry were found inside the pawnshop vault. Sicam sent
Lulu a letter informing her of the loss of her jewelry due to the robbery incident
in the pawnshop on the same date.
- Respondent Lulu then wrote back expressing disbelief, then requested Sicam
to prepare the pawned jewelry for withdrawal on November 6, but Sicam failed
to return the jewelry.
- Lulu, joined by her husband Cesar, filed a complaint against Sicam with the
RTC of Makati seeking indemnification for the loss of pawned jewelry
amounting to P272, 000.00, and attorney fees (AF) of P27, 200.00.
- The RTC rendered its decision dismissing respondents complaint as well as
petitioners counterclaim. Respondents appealed the RTC Decision to the CA
which reversed the RTC, ordering the appellees to pay appellants the actual
value of the lost jewelry and AF. Petitioners denied, hence the instant petition
for review on Certiorari.
- In order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that
one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned
the loss. The very measures which petitioners had allegedly adopted show
that to them the possibility of robbery was not only foreseeable, but actually
foreseen and anticipated.
- In connection to Article 1173 of the Civil Code further provides: The fault or
negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of time and of the place.
- When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201,
paragraph 2 shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence
which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a family shall be required.
- The records show that the petitioners failed to exercise reasonable care and
caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation. Sicams testimony revealed that there were no security measures
adopted by petitioners in the operation of the pawnshop.
- It was also established that there is no sufficient precaution and vigilance that
were adopted by petitioners to protect the pawnshop from the robbery
because Sicam admits that the vault was open at the time of robbery. Hence,
Petitioners were guilty of negligence in the operation of their pawnshop
business

Issue: W/N the petitioners liable for the loss of the pawned articles in their
possession?

Held: Yes. The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

- Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides: Except in cases expressly specified
by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature
of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen or which, though
foreseen, were inevitable.

- Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or

avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event should not have been
foreseen or anticipated, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid.
 only on April 29, 1982, the date of the decision of the board become final.

- RTC ruled in favor of petitioners holding that in ascertaining negligence

26. Kramer vs. CA, 178 SCRA 518 (1989)
Facts:
- On April 8, 1976, F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the petitioners was
navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon
Island and Cape Santiago, the boat collided with an inter-island vessel, the
M/V Asia Philippines, owned by the private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping
Lines, Inc.
- F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch. The captains of both vessels
filed their respective marine protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the
Philippine Coast Guard. The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose
of determining the proximate cause of the maritime collision.
- On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea
and its fish catch was attributable to the negligence of the employees of the
private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines during the
collision. The findings made by the Board served as the basis of a subsequent
Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29,
1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended
from pursuing his profession as a marine officer.
relating to a maritime collision, there is a need to rely on highly technical
aspects attendant to such collision, and that the Board was constituted
precisely to answer the need. CA reversed the decision, holding that it is clear
that the cause of action of the petitioners accrued from the occurrence of the
mishap because that is the precise time when damages were inflicted upon
and sustained by the aggrieved party. It said that if the tolling of the
prescriptive period would hinge upon the discretion of a government agency,
said alternative could entail hazards. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the action for quasi-delict is barred by prescription.
Held: Yes.
- Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi- delict
must be instituted within four years. The prescriptive period begins from the
day the quasi-delict is committed.
- The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists
of 3 elements, namely:
a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever
law it arises or is created;
b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and
c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right
of the plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place
that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen.

- On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against
the private respondent in the RTC. The private respondent filed a Motion
seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription. He
argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, the prescriptive period for
instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime
collision is four years. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their
Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accrued,
i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, and that
accordingly, the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the
four-year prescriptive period.

- Petitioners contended that maritime collisions have peculiarities and

characteristics which only persons with special skill, training and experience
like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and
resolve. The petitioners argued that the running of the prescriptive period was
tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued
27. Allied Bank Corp. vs. CA, 178 SCRA 526 (1989)
 - Art. 1566. The vendor is responsible to the vendee for any hidden faults or
defects in the thing sold, even though he was not aware thereof.

- This provision shall not apply if the contrary has been stipulated and the
28. De Guzman vs. Toyota Cubao, Inc., G.R. No. 141480 (2006) vendor was not aware of the hidden faults or defects in the thing sold.

- Art. 1571. Actions arising from the provisions of the preceding ten articles
shall be barred after six months from the delivery of the thing sold.
FACTS: - Wherefore, the SELLER is not liable for the defects and a redhibitory action
for violation of an implied warranty against hidden defects has been time-
- On November 27, 1997, BUYER purchased from SELLER a brand new barred.
vehicle. The vehicle was delivered to BUYER two days later. On October 18,
1998, BUYER demanded the replacement of the engine of the vehicle
because it developed a crack after traversing Marcos Highway during a heavy
rain. As BUYER knows no reason why the vehicle's engine would crack just
like that, the same could only be due to the fact that said engine and/or the
vehicle itself was defective even from the time it was bought. BUYER asserted
that respondent should replace the engine with a new one based on an implied
warranty. SELLER refused to answer for this defect saying it is not covered
by the vehicle's warranty. It refused to replace the vehicle as BUYER
demanded (or at least its engine, or even repair the damage). He further
alleged that the BUYER's cause of action had prescribed as the case was filed
more than six months from the date the vehicle was sold and/or delivered.

ISSUES:

1) Whether the SELLER is liable for the redhibitory defects of the vehicle.

2) Whether the BUYER's cause of action had prescribed.

RULING:

- The pertinent provisions of the Code set forth the available remedies of a
buyer against the seller on the basis of a warranty against hidden defects:

- Art. 1561. The vendor shall be responsible for warranty against the hidden
defects which the thing sold may have, should they render it unfit for the use
for which it is intended, or should they diminish its fitness for such use to
such an extent that, had the vendee been aware thereof, he would not have
acquired it or would have given a lower price for it; but said vendor shall not
be answerable for patent defects or those which may be visible, or for those
which are not visible if the vendee is an expert who, by reason of this trade
or profession, should have known them. (Emphasis supplied)