2011 Institute

International
of International
SocietyRelations
and the Civilizing
and Area ProcessL INKLATER University
Studies, Ritsumeikan 1

International Society and the Civilizing Process

LINKLATER, Andrew*

Abstract

This article develops new connections between Norbert Eliass study of

the civilizing process and English School reflections on the European society
of states and its world-wide expansion. Elias discussed the development of
European ideas about the civilized nature of their society, and he explained
how that sense of civilization made little impression on how Europeans
conducted their relations with each other and with the non-European world.
His writings paid no attention to the emergence of the European society of
states or to how it was influenced by the civilizing process that first
developed within court society . The standard of civilization which
Europeans invented in the nineteenth century to justify the domination of
the non-European world is a clear example of how the civilizing process
shaped the development of the society of states. Although the English School
has analysed such phenomena, it has not considered their relationship with
the civilizing process. By creating new links between Eliasian sociology and
the English School it is possible to explain how the radical transformation of
European societies found expression in the society of states and in policies
that have transformed human society as a whole. An improved
understanding of the prospects for a global civilizing process that does
justice to all cultures can be built on such foundations.

Keywords:
Norbert Elias, civilization, civilising processes, English School,
international society

RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Vol.9, pp.1-26 (2011).

* Department of International Politics Aberystwyth University
Ceredigion SY23 3FE Wales UK
adl@aber.ac.uk
2 R ITSUMEIKAN I NTERNATIONAL A FFAIRS Vol. 9

INTRODUCTION

The argument of this paper is that the development of international

society needs to be seen as part of a much larger transformation of social
and political life over approximately the last five centuries. That is not ex-
actly a novel claim. Advocates of a broadly historical materialist approach
to international relations have long argued that the rise of the modern
states-system has to be understood in conjunction with the development of
industrial capitalism (Rosenberg 1994). The novelty of the claim lies else-
where specifically in the contention that the rise of the modern society of
states needs to be understood in connection with the so-called civilizing
process.

I use the term in the technical sense that can be found in the writings
of Norbert Elias.1) For Elias, the expression refers to the process by which
Europeans came to think of themselves as more civilized than their medie-
val forebears and more advanced than peoples in other regions of the
world. It is important to stress from the outset that Elias s purpose was to
explain how Europeans came to see themselves in that way; his aim was
not to defend that image of cultural superiority.

Before I say more about Elias s thesis and its relevance for the argu-
ment of this paper, it is important to consider its place in the larger dis-
cussion about the place of international relations in the making of the
modern world. There are two points to make in this context. First, Elias s
examination of the civilizing process provides a deeper understanding of
the relationship between the state and world politics than can be found in
many better-known approaches to historical sociology. Pioneering works in

1) A short biography may be in order since Elias is not a well-known authority in the field of
International Relations. He was born in Breslau, in what was then Germany, in 1897. Hav-
ing initially studied philosophy and medicine, he moved to the emerging field of sociology,
before fleeing Germany for first Paris and then London in the 1930s. He published The
Civilizing Process in 1939, but relatively little over the next thirty years. Elias did not
have an academic appointment until joining the Department of Sociology at Leicester Uni-
versity in England in the 1950s. He was prolific in the final years of his life, and published
a number of works that refined the argument of The Civilizing Process and extended the
argument to explain long-term processes of development that had affected the whole spe-
cies from its formation to the present day. Elias died in Amsterdam in 1990. The best in-
troduction to Elias s work is Mennell (1998).
2011 International Society and the Civilizing ProcessLINKLATER 3

that field in the 1970s and 1980s they include the writings of Perry An-
derson, Charles Tilly, Theda Skocpol, Anthony Giddens and Michael Mann
- were mainly concerned with placing the state at the centre of sociological
inquiry. Their chief innovation was stressing its relative autonomy from
various social institutions and practices. Establishing the autonomy of
state power led those writers to emphasise the state s involvement in the
international competition for power and security, and its frequent partici-
pation in, and preparation for, war. Those writings represented an advance
towards a higher level of synthesis in sociology. No longer wedded to en-
dogenous explanations of social development, they focused on, in the case
of Tilly, how state-formation and capitalist development interacted to
shape modern societies; in the case of Giddens, how the modern world had
been shaped by the interplay between state-building, capitalism, industri-
alization and geopolitics; and in the case of Mann how the relations be-
tween economic, ideological, political and military power have shaped so-
cial and political organization since the first state-organised societies
appeared in the ancient Near East.

Those were important breakthroughs in sociology although looking

back on them, they seem less innovative than they did at the time. All of
the analysts mentioned largely ignored one of the most important works
on the relationship between state-formation and international politics
and on how the division between inside and outside emerged in early
modern Europe (Walker 1993). I refer to Elias s The Civilizing Process
which, though first published by an obscure Swiss publisher in German in
1939, was largely unknown until translated into English (in two volumes
that appeared in 1978 and 1982). Since then, that work has come to be re-
garded as one of the most important sociological works of the twentieth
century. In The Civilizing Process, and throughout his later writings, Elias
(1978: 168) was adamant that it was impossible to understand relations
within societies without understanding relations between them. His syn-
optic approach to social science was concerned with the relationship be-
tween, inter alia, transformations of the organization of physical power
and economic life and developments at the level of collective emotions. The
focus was not limited to changes in social and political structures but en-
compassed modified conceptions of the shameful and embarrassing. Cen-
tral to the investigation was the analysis of how conceptions of European
4 R ITSUMEIKAN I NTERNATIONAL A FFAIRS Vol. 9

civilization were evident in changing sensibilities to nakedness and table

manners, and in public attitudes to violence and cruelty. Those develop-
ments were considered in conjunction with processes of state-formation,
the significant internal pacification of society, and related closer economic
and social ties between people that required them to devise new forms of
attunement to each other.

I will say more about those developments later and about their signifi-
cance for my core themes but, for now, let me simply stress that Elias of-
fers a higher level of synthesis than do the authors mentioned thus far.
That is not to say that Elias s analysis of the civilizing process which he
described as preliminary - is free from deficiencies. One limitation is the
failure to consider how the development of international society was con-
nected with the processes that Elias aimed to explain. And here there is
much that Elias and process sociology, as he called it, can learn from the
English school analysis of international society (and vice versa). Broaden-
ing the focus to consider the society of states can extend Elias s argument
about how the rise of states and relations between them form part of the
larger transformation of human society that first occurred in Western Eu-
rope but is evident in all parts of the world.

As noted, the proposed higher level of synthesis can bring benefits to

International Relations where the tendency to isolate the international
from larger patterns of social and political life has been strong and cru-
cial to establishing the credentials of International Relations as a separate
discipline. The tendency is pronounced in Waltz (1979). Whether that ob-
servation is also true of the English School is an interesting question. Cer-
tainly the foundational figures such as Wight (1979: ch. 6) were clear that
changes in world politics were tied up with shifts in the principles of legit-
imacy within states in, for example, the transition from dynastic to na-
tional and democratic principles of government. Analysts of the expansion
of international society have been especially interested in how that pecu-
liar European arrangement has transformed the wider social world. I refer
here to the writings of Bull and Watson (1984), and Jackson (2000) and to
more recent writings including Bain (2003), Keene (2002) and Suzuki
(2009). But none of those works considers the relationship between the
rise and development of the modern society of states and the patterns of
2011 International Society and the Civilizing ProcessLINKLATER 5

change that Elias discussed in The Civilizing Process hence the earlier
claim that the study of international relations has much to learn from
process sociology as well as much to contribute to it.2)

The rest of this paper is organized around the following four aims. The
first is to explain what Elias meant by the civilizing process. The second is
to note what he had to say about international relations in that account.
The third is to explain that he failed to pay much attention to how the rise
of the European society of states was influenced by and influenced - the
civilizing process. The fourth gathers together the main points in the earli-
er sections to show how process sociology and the English School can be
brought more closely together to explain the relationship between the Eu-
ropean civilizing process and the larger transformation of human society.

THE CIVILIZING PROCESS

The civilizing process refers to long-term patterns of change that ac-

celerated in Western Europe between the fifteen and twentieth centuries,
and specifically to how Europeans came to think of themselves as civilized.
Elias focused on processes that had their origins in the late medieval
courts, processes that moved along at a quicker pace as more centralised
states emerged from what Elias called elimination contests between the
preceding survival units . The level of inter-personal violence in the late
Middle Ages was reduced with the emergence of stable monopolies of pow-
er; advances in the pacification of society facilitated the appearance of
closer economic and social relations between people who were drawn to-
gether in larger urban complexes and entangled in longer commercial
webs. Rising levels of interconnectedness made it necessary for people to
become better attuned to one another and more self-restrained in their be-
haviour (Elias 2000: 169). By analysing manners books guides to man-
ners that were published between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries
- Elias traced changing ideas with regard to bodily propriety and daily
conduct that defined the social standards of the emergent civilization.

2) I will go further and argue, though there is no space to defend this here, that breaking
down the divisions between Sociology and International Relations is essential if deeper
analyses of the relations between domestic and international factors are to develop.
6 R ITSUMEIKAN I NTERNATIONAL A FFAIRS Vol. 9

New codes of conduct and new social standards of self-restraint

emerged in the absolutist courts; from there they spread across different
social strata, and indeed across different societies. At the centre of the
analysis is the notion of the taming of the warriors: that is, their transfor-
mation into courtiers who were required to become more restrained in
their conduct, more mannered, and sensitive to the nuances of royal eti-
quette and protocol (Elias 2006: 4; 118). Elias devoted particular attention
to the standard-setting role of the French court under Louis XIV, but the
process of taming the warriors was already apparent in the late medieval
courts in what Elias called the shift from notions of courtesy to civility.
In those circles, a significant number of nobles were brought together un-
der the watchful eye of the territorial lord , and required to moderate con-
duct, speech and gestures given the range of unwarlike administrative
and clerical work that had to be undertaken to ensure effective govern-
ment (Elias 2000:248).

As noted earlier, the civilizing process was most pronounced in the

French absolutist court which stood at the hub of a web of social and politi-
cal relations that extended across Europe through personal ties and chan-
nels of communication that bound different courts together in a larger elite
society (Elias 2000: 189ff). Wars and rivalries between absolutist rulers did
not alter the fact that most courts were keen to emulate the style and man-
ners of Paris; the upper strata in each society identified more closely with
the French court than with the lower strata around them a condition that
would survive until the emergence of bourgeois nationalism in the eight-
eenth century (Elias 2000: 189-90). But absolutism was crucial for what Eli-
as described as changes in human interweaving and interdependence in
conjunction with which conduct and drive structure were altered in the di-
rection of civilization (the new concept that took over from civility in the
eighteenth century, just as civility had earlier taken over from courtesy).3)

3) Elias (2000: 87ff) maintains that the expressions, courtoisie, civilite and civilisation, sym-
bolised three stages of a larger social development. The first concept was central until in
the course of the sixteenth century, civilite replaced it as the dominant term that was
used in the courts during the seventeenth century, only to be replaced in turn by civiliza-
tion in the mid-1770s. The new concept, which found greatest support amongst the upper
classes in France, was linked in the nineteenth century with the idea of a condition of al-
most innate superiority - its long formation having been forgotten - that had to be dissemi-
nated to the unrefined lower strata and to the members of other societies.
2011 International Society and the Civilizing ProcessLINKLATER 7

Absolutism was the source of the civilizing of conduct and the transforma-
tion of the structure of mental and emotional life (Elias 2000: 190-1, 205).

In short, certain movements within societies, and especially within

the French court, led to major changes across Western European societies
that were captured by the emerging notion of civilization (Elias 2000:
190-1). That idea was linked with a heightened sense of social distinctions
between the upper and lower strata. Elias made it clear that, in the pre-
ceding phase, the contrasts between the upper and lower orders were not
as stark as in the absolutist era; expectations of greater refinement in the
courts had the result that everything reminiscent of lower classes, every-
thing vulgar, was kept at a distance (Elias 2000: 421). With the greater in-
terweaving of people across society as a whole, those distinctions gradual-
ly lost much of their importance. People came to identify with each other
irrespective of social origins at least within the same society circum-
stances were rather different in the relations between societies. They did
so as part of the larger transformation of psychological drives that signi-
fied their membership of the same civilization.

What were the psychological changes that Elias discussed? They ex-
tended from new sensibilities with regard to methods of eating (examples
include changing table manners such as rules governing the use of the knife
a weapon of attack and a symbol of death that was gradually civilized).
Regulations governing the use of the knife were symbolic illustrations of
how society at that time was more and more involved in limiting the real
dangers threatening people (Elias 2000: 103ff). The use of the fork became
widespread as a result of distaste for dirtying one s hands . Changing atti-
tudes were evident in the dominant emotional responses to the slaughter of
animals which was gradually moved behind the scenes as a result of the be-
lief that anything that was gory and bloody, and incompatible with civilized
refinement, should be hidden from public view (Elias 2000: 103).

Here it is worth pausing to note the comparison that Elias made with
the civilizing process in China. Many Chinese people regarded the Europe-
ans use of the knife as barbaric (Elias 2000: 107). Repugnance at eating
with swords , Elias speculated, may have reflected the earlier replacement
of a Chinese warrior class by a standard-setting class of scholarly officials
8 R ITSUMEIKAN I NTERNATIONAL A FFAIRS Vol. 9

pacified to a particularly high degree . He added that carving animals be-

hind the scenes and removing the knife from the table occurred much earli-
er and more radically in Chinese civilization than in the West (Elias 2000:
103). Elias emphasised that such features of everyday conduct are connect-
ed with larger processes of social development that influence attitudes to in-
ternational relations. In its foreign political strategy , the Chinese exhibited
very high levels of self-restraint at least on a par with that of the most
highly developed industrial nations , a condition that may have reflected the
continuity of state-initiated pacification which surpasses that of most other
state societies of our time (Elias 2000: 410). What Europeans often regarded
as the unwarlike character of the Chinese had nothing to do with natural
dispositions; it was an example of how the taming of the warriors that
stemmed from courtly forms of civilisation could penetrate society to the
extent that military activity and prowess were no longer highly-respected.4)
Although Elias set out to explain the process of civilization in Europe, the
discussion considered how far similar patterns of development occurred out-
side that continent. Others have asked how far the framework that Elias
developed for his purpose can be used to understand state-building, social
conflict, the taming of warriors and so forth in India, China or Japan (see
Mennell 1996). For the reasons noted, such a discussion immediately raises
questions about the relationship between different civilizing processes and
their attitudes to the conduct of external relations.
Returning to the discussion of Europe, changing attitudes to violence in
relations between people provided further evidence of the gradual transfor-
mation of behaviour and the emotions, (and) the expanding threshold of re-
pugnance (Elias 2000: 71, 102). Pleasure that had been derived from the
painful and public execution of criminals went into decline, as did judicial
torture. People became more easily shocked by acts of violence. An example
was the civilization of parents that is, the creation of new expectations

4) Elias (2000: 540, 547-8) stressed the contrast with Japan where soldiers did enjoy very
high social prestige . Suganami (1984: 196-7) maintains that the fact that Japan was ruled
by a warrior class gave it an advantage over China in dealing with the West, the reason
being that it was highly attuned to the need to import superior Western technology
whereas the Chinese civilian mandarinate had almost no interest in military and techno-
logical matters, and even disdained them (see also the discussion in Ralston 1990: chs. 5
and 6, and in particular the discussion of the significance of the taming of the samurai for
Japan s rapid response to the challenges that resulted from the shock of external influenc-
es, as well as comments on the debates about measures to expel the barbarians ).
2011 International Society and the Civilizing ProcessLINKLATER 9

that parents would refrain from using what came to be seen as cruel and
barbaric ways of punishing children. Other examples from more recent
times spring to mind: they include public concerns about harassment in the
workplace, or bullying in schools, or the brutal treatment of army recruits,
and so forth. To summarise the overall process that Elias described, refer-
ence was made to Caxton s late fifteenth century treatise, Book on Curtseye,
where the author maintained that things that were once permitted are now
forbidden . That comment, Elias (2000: 70-1) added, could stand as the mot-
to for what was about to develop across Europe.

RELATIONS BETWEEN SOCIETIES

Did the same motto apply to relations between as well as relations

within states? Elias (1996: 175) emphasized the processes of state-formation
were Janus-faced; internal pacification was accompanied by readiness for
war; the social standards that inhibited acts of violence within society did
not have the same restraining influence in relations with other societies. As
far as external policy was concerned, Elias argued, we are still living much
as our ancestors did in their so-called barbarism. Modern peoples may take
pride in their condition of civilization and in the high levels of personal se-
curity that many enjoy within pacified societies. But the same people are
threatened by mass incineration as a result of the danger of nuclear war-
fare. It was therefore hard to see how modern international relations dif-
fered fundamentally from primitive warfare in which people were ready to
use poison against each other. True, primitives were brought up with the
expectation that they would torture their captives and would be tortured by
them. The male warrior found pleasure in warfare and in killing. By con-
trast, the inhabitants of modern societies are no longer required to cultivate
a lust for aggression; indeed such dispositions are regarded as unsuited to
the more mechanized forms of military struggle that demand the same pat-
terns of civilized restraints that are required by individuals with specialised
tasks in a complex social division of labour (Elias 2000: 170).

On that account, the civilizing process has suppressed some of the lust
for killing that existed in earlier times.5) But, in reality, all that changed

5) With monopolisation and growing interconnectedness, physical strength lost its impor-
10 R ITSUMEIKAN I NTERNATIONAL A FFAIRS Vol. 9

was the manner of killing and the number of those involved. Elias ex-
plained that phenomenon in broadly realist terms (without drawing ex-
plicitly on any realist works). It was noted earlier that the modern state
emerged from elimination contests between nobles; exactly the same
process affected relations between states. They too had to compete for pow-
er and security not because they necessarily wanted to extend their influ-
ence as far as possible, but because they were forced into competition to
prevent rivals from gaining control of strategically-vital territory. The ar-
gument is similar to defensive realism in International Relations, and to
the notion of the security dilemma . There is a rough parallel with the
neo-realist conception of the self-help system that breeds levels of suspi-
cion and distrust that frequently end in war. Such competition and the re-
sulting elimination contests, Elias (2000: 445-6) argued, might continue
until humanity comes under the dominion of a universal state that pro-
ceeds to pacify world society.

Until then, it was reasonable to suppose that societies would sub-

scribe to a double standard of morality to one set of principles for rela-
tions between members of the same society, and to a more relaxed code in
relations with outsiders. In short, what was impermissible in relations
within political communities was usually not forbidden in relations be-
tween them. Elias qualified that observation in interesting ways, for ex-
ample by arguing in The Germans that modern people were shocked by
the scale of the Nazi atrocities, whereas in antiquity the mass slaughter of
people was regarded as an inevitable aspect of war, and usually went with-
out challenge. It would be counter-intuitive to suppose that the civilizing
process did not spill over national frontiers and influence world politics.
But the essential point, for Elias (2000: 253), was that civilized restraints
crumble quickly when states fear for their security the speed with which
the Bush Administration set aside the torture norm following the terror-
ist attacks of 9/11 illustrates the point. In short, states have always tried
to promote their interests by any means at their disposal unless inhibited

tance for the individual s success: Martial success was a necessary precondition of success
and prestige for a man of nobility , but as human interweaving increased, those attributes
came to be regarded as outmoded, profession and money (became) the primary source of
prestige , and middle-class traits emerged as important means of succeeding in the face of
the new social realities (Elias 2000: 243, 405, 425ff).
2011 International Society and the Civilizing ProcessLINKLATER 11

by external restraints or the fear of retaliation ; only rarely have they re-
alized that it might be in their long-term interests to cooperate to create
restraining international principles (Elias 1996: 137-8).

COURT RATIONALITY, CIVILIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

That last point underlines the realist nature of Elias s argument

and the apparent denial that anything like a society of states exists today,
or has existed at other times. The assumption that there is no such thing
as an anarchical society grows directly from Elias s claim that the civiliz-
ing process rests on a particular network of external restraints (state pow-
er) and internal restraints (as in feelings of revulsion towards open dis-
plays of violence) that is far from the norm in human history. Very few
civilizing restraints have ever existed in world politics.

Of course, realists and neo-realists will find little to quibble with in

that discussion. For members of the English School, however, there is a
clear problem with Elias s approach namely an over-commitment to real-
ism and an obvious lacuna namely the absence of any reference to the
emergence of a European society of states with its civilizing practices (in-
cluding the belief in the inviolability of ambassadors) which spread to all
parts of the world with the positive results that some members of the Eng-
lish School have commented on. (The best example is Jackson s thesis that
the modern society of states which first developed in Europe is the most
successful form of world political organization thus devised for enabling
societies to live together in a condition of civility ).6) For English School
writers, there is such a thing as a global civilizing process that very ex-
pression was used by Adam Watson although coincidentally, it seems, and

6) The full statement is that international society is the most basic and at the same time the
most articulate institutional arrangement that humans have yet come up with in response
to their common recognition that they must find a settled and predictable way to live side
by side on a finite planetary space without falling into mutual hostility, conflict, war op-
pression, subjugation, slavery, etc (Jackson 2000: 181). Jackson prefers civility to civiliza-
tion because it lacks the latter s connotations of superiority and inferiority (but conveys
many of the ideas that have long been associated with a civilized way of life mutual re-
spect, self-restraint, compliance with the rule of law and so forth). One could just as easily
say that the question is how far a global civilizing process has taken place or seems like-
ly to take place that rises above the civilizing processes of different societies or regions
and provides the basis for relations of trust and respect.
12 R ITSUMEIKAN I NTERNATIONAL A FFAIRS Vol. 9

not as a result of the influence of Elias s writings (Linklater 2004). Evi-

dence of that civilizing process can be found in the level of order that ex-
ists even in the condition of anarchy, and which is underpinned by various
international institutions and practices that reflect the pressures on socie-
ties to become attuned to each other s interests and more restrained in
their dealings with each other, and not least because of the destructive na-
ture of modern war.

The question - which to the best of my knowledge has not received

much attention is how far the development of international society was
linked with the broader civilizing process. More specifically, the issue is
how far the rise of court society and the influence of the French court led
to notions of civilized statecraft that signified the existence or emergence
of an international society.7) As we have seen, Elias did suggest that there
were interesting issues to consider here. The European court societies
were linked by a common aristocratic code; a sense of chivalrous or hon-
ourable conduct influenced attitudes to international relations and gave
rise to the belief that war was the international equivalent of the aristo-
cratic duel.8) Elias maintained, as noted earlier, that the moderating influ-
ence of mutual identification between the ruling elites declined with the
rise of the national bourgeoisie. Those comments point to the need for a
closer investigation of the relationship between court society, the civilizing
process and international society.

7) There is no space here to consider the relationship between court society and the diplomat-
ic community in the Renaissance. See Frigo (2008) for further discussion, and the other ar-
ticles in the special issue of the Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies in which
Frigo s article appears.
8) See Bell (2007: 34ff) on how aristocratic custom and politeness applied to the battlefield.
Strachan (1983: 12) maintains that mutual respect between monarchs underpinned limit-
ed war where the aim was to prevail but without destroying the enemy or posing a threat
to the institution of monarchy. Best (1998: ch. 20) argues that the Habsburg aristocratic
military elite, with its close connections with the court, was especially committed to civility
in war, and was possibly the last of the great powers to appreciate that the Napoleonic con-
quests had transformed the conduct of warfare. It is important not to give the impression
that all European societies were incorporated in the society of states in much the same
terms because of their admiration for the French court. Elias (2000) opens with a lengthy
discussion of the distinction between the German idea of Kultur and the French idea of
civilization to explain why many in Germany dismissed the French court on the grounds
that it was concerned with superficialities and appearances. The discussion of Kultur and
civilization was designed to cast light on the different paths of development that France
and Germany followed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
2011 International Society and the Civilizing ProcessLINKLATER 13

Useful sources exist for their purpose, including a work by an author

whom Elias himself mentioned on four occasions in The Civilizing Process,
namely Francois de Callieres (whose reflections on manners were cited as
evidence of the civilizing of conduct).9) Callieres, who was a high-ranking
member of the court of Louis XIV at one point, he held the post Ambas-
sadeur Extraordinaire et Plenipotentiaire - wrote The Art of Diplomacy, a
work that was concerned with the internationalization of the civilizing
process (see Elias 1996: 139ff for some comments on the relationship be-
tween civilization and diplomacy).

Callieres work deserves attention for at least three reasons: first, in

the course of describing and defending diplomacy, it emphasizes many of
the same themes that Elias regarded as central to the civilizing process;
second, it shows how the French court was standard-setting in this as in
other domains; third, it demonstrates that, from the beginning, the civiliz-
ing process found expression in the ideal of an international society al-
ternatively, that the rise of international society was indeed part of a larg-
er civilizing process that has spread beyond Europe to the rest of the
world. Each theme is worth considering in some detail.

9) Mastenbroek (1999) locates Callieres writings within the longer-term trend towards the
control of the emotions that took place not only in diplomacy but in the business sphere as
a result of growing interconnectedness between people. I am grateful to Stephen Mennell
for drawing this article to my attention. Callieres writings need to be seen as part of a tra-
dition of thought that was concerned with civilizing princely rule. Crucial here is Castigli-
one s reflections on the courtier which were first published in 1528 but written around ten
to fifteen years earlier. He had himself been a member of several courts (and of embassies
to England, France and Spain). Book IV of The Book of the Courtier attached great impor-
tance to the courtier s civilizing role in the quest to persuade the prince to govern virtuous-
ly, subordinating passions such as anger to moderation and temperance. A related aim was
to encourage restraint in foreign relations, specifically by ensuring that the populace was
equipped to defend itself from attack but not trained in the art of domination (Castiglione
1959: 310ff). Significantly ancient courts such as Alexander the Great s were standard-set-
ting for the interlocutors in Castiglione s dialogue. Aristotle s influence on Alexander was
noted in a passage that commented on his restraint towards royal women in the Persian
court, and general civilizing influence, it was presumed, in Asia (Castiglione 1959: 42,
242ff, 321, 332-3). Also important was Bernard Du Rosier s 1436 work, Short Treatise
About Ambassadors, which outlined the courtesies of ambassadorial office. According to
Mattingly (1973: 26ff) who provides a short summary of that work, Du Rosier may have
completed it while on a mission to the court of the King of Castile.
14 R ITSUMEIKAN I NTERNATIONAL A FFAIRS Vol. 9

Callieres maintained that it was best that ambassadors were not re-
cruited from the higher nobility with its love of war, or from the military
which was naturally violent and passionate and coarsened by participa-
tion in warfare, but from the court officials that formed the lower nobility
(Callieres 1983: 75, 86, 166ff).10) Experienced in court rituals, they pos-
sessed the civilized qualities required by ambassadors acting as the repre-
sentative of the king; they were less likely to behave in a severe rugged
manner that commonly disgusts, and causes aversion ; they could be re-
lied on to have a civil and engaging carriage , an aptitude for civil conver-
sation that was suited to ambassadorial roles in foreign courts, and a ca-
pacity for flattering others that would find favour and win influence
amongst princes and courtiers (Callieres 1983: 75, 140- 3).11)

In their introduction to Callieres work, Keens-Soper and Schweitzer

(1983: 23) refer to the distinctive conception of diplomatic conduct that
was widely adopted across Europe because of the standard-setting role of
the French court. There is a parallel with Elias s comment that the court
provided the model of civilized conduct that was emulated across most of
Europe (see also Scott and Storrs 1995: 46-49 on the relationship between
the court, aristocracy, diplomacy and the civilizing process).

We can see that in his defence of diplomacy, Callieres defended atti-

tudes that Elias regarded as core elements of the civilizing process. What
is also striking about the former s writings is the explicit conviction that
mutual dependence required new levels of restraint in foreign policy, and a
stronger commitment to compromise. That was to challenge the practice

10) Callieres preference for the more civilized qualities of the lower nobility is an interesting
illustration of Elias s discussion of the relationship between the civilizing process and the
taming of the warrior . See Elias (2006: ch. 5) on the courtly way of dealing with people
which describes the etiquette and ceremony that Callieres regarded as central to the art
of diplomacy. It is worth adding that Elias (2006: 118) states that the idea of diplomacy has
been narrowed to refer to aspects of the relations between communities, but diplomatic
conduct with its emphasis on sensitivity to the rank and situation of other people was cen-
tral to the everyday life of court society .
11) Keens-Soper and Schweizer (1983: 11) state that with 40 ambassadors representing the
acutely status-conscious diplomatic society of Europe, every gesture, ceremonial trifle, offi-
cial or unofficial act outwardly reflected the contemporary hierarchy of States and as such
was a source of tedious disputes and delay . Sensitivity to hierarchy, order of precedence,
and ceremony was a vital ambassadorial quality.
2011 International Society and the Civilizing ProcessLINKLATER 15

amongst princes which was to act on the principle, sic volo, sic jubeo; stat
pro ratione voluntas let the fact that I wish this, be sufficient reason
when moderation could bring benefits to all involved (Callieres 1983: 62).
The contention that impulsive conduct should be replaced by the dispas-
sionate calculation of common interests was anchored not in some version
of political idealism, but on an assessment of the compulsions of intercon-
nectedness that brings to mind the English School claim that most states
have an interest in preserving international society (Bull 1977). Change in
one state, Callieres argued, was capable of disturbing the quiet of all the
others ; in reality, all societies were members of one and the same Com-
monwealth with common interests in the diplomatic art of promoting mu-
tual advantages ; all had to consider the merits of earning and retaining a
reputation for truthfulness and honesty, just as they had to recognise that
deceitfulness could back-fire by ruining faith in the ambassador and dam-
aging his ability to uphold the honour and interest of his Prince (Callieres
1983: 68, 70, 83, 97, 110-11).

To repeat, Callieres uses the language of international society rather

than political idealism.12) In the international system that had replaced
the respublica Christiana, no higher political authority could direct and
control states. Even so, the constituent units were parts of a civilization
that could promote order and adjustment by civilized means (Keens-Sop-
er and Schweizer 1983: 35, italics added). Callieres therefore defended civ-
ilized or restrained behaviour within an anarchical society of states, and
he drew, as noted earlier, on certain themes that Elias regarded as central
to the civilizing process. What Callieres showed was that growing recogni-
tion of the social value of moderation and self-restraint was not confined
to those who were bound together in the same society; states faced similar

12) Callieres has been described as advancing a view of diplomacy in which power politics and
civilized behaviour are considered in unison , rather than in a state of tension (Keens-Sop-
er and Schweizer 1983: 41). There was no sense of a conflict between statecraft and univer-
sal moral principles that could only be solved by transforming international society. Calli-
eres did not comment on the peace schemes that had been advanced by the Abbe de Saint-
Pierre and others (Keens-Soper and Schweizer 1983: 39). But he did believe that
ambassadors should recognise that obedience...has its bounds , and that they should not
countenance promoting rebellion in another state; an ambassador who was instructed to
commit such acts that were against the laws of God and justice should advise the Prince
accordingly and, if rebuffed, ask to be recalled, while observing the duty not to disclose his
master s secret (Callieres 1983: 122-3).
16 R ITSUMEIKAN I NTERNATIONAL A FFAIRS Vol. 9

pressures because of the vulnerabilities that stemmed from increasing in-

terconnectedness. His support for diplomacy as an instrument for mitigat-
ing the consequences of competition for power and security reveals how
the civilizing process influenced relations between as well as relations
within separate states (albeit to a limited extent). Such convictions sug-
gest that the diplomatic culture of eighteenth century international socie-
ty was the creation of court society and its conception of civilized and re-
strained conduct (see also Keens-Soper and Schweizer 1983: 29-31).

THE GLOBAL CIVILIZING PROCESS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF

HUMAN SOCIETY

Callieres writings may indicate then how certain standards of civi-

lized conduct were embedded in the European society of states. Just how
far those standards were observed in the relations between European
states is a large question that cannot be discussed here. But as the stand-
ard of civilization indicates, European conceptions of civilized conduct had
a clear impact on relations with the outside world (see Gong 1984: 132ff on
the tension between standards of civilisation that was evident, for exam-
ple, in the question of whether Europeans were obliged to kowtow to the
Chinese Emperor). Civilized standards of behaviour were important in the
larger transformation of human society, as is clear from European claims
that they had the right to dominate other societies, to stand in judgment
of their practices, and to transform them in their own image. Unequal
treaties and extraterritoriality reflected the belief that non-European soci-
eties had to comply with European standards so that Europeans were
treated properly . Pressures to play by the Europeans rules led the Otto-
mans and others to import Western practices, including the institution of
diplomacy (Gong 1984; Neff 1984). Indeed, the standard of civilisation em-
phasised that compliance with European diplomatic standards was essen-
tial if non-Europeans were ever to be incorporated as equals in the civi-
lized society of states. It is important to stress that the European powers
were offended by non-European societies that assumed they were superior
to them (Bull and Watson 1984). The expansion of international society
and the standard of civilization that was intrinsic to it gradually trans-
formed human society by eroding hegemonic conceptions of world order in
China and elsewhere.
2011 International Society and the Civilizing ProcessLINKLATER 17

It is useful to pause at this point to note Elias s claim in the 1930s

about the most recent phase of the civilizing process. An international es-
tablishment - the European colonial powers stood in judgment of the
outsiders, just as the members of European court societies had looked
down on the lower strata around them (Elias 2000). It is also worth noting
his comment that established groups in society preserve their powers and
privileges when they succeed in encouraging others to internalise beliefs
about their inferiority, and when they persuade them that the main chal-
lenge that lies ahead is how to emulate their superiors (Elias 2008). As
Bull (1984) argued in his analysis of the revolt against the West , non-Eu-
ropean peoples have rejected demands that they rely on the standard of
civilization to define their place in the world. Especially since the Second
World War, such ideas have largely been replaced by the view that civiliza-
tions exist on an equal plane, none more intrinsically valuable than the
others. Indeed, one might say that the most recent phase of the civilizing
process is to be found in the belief that civilisation is not monopolised by
any one people, and in the conviction that further advances in shedding
notions of superiority and inferiority are critical for the successful co-exist-
ence of peoples in the multicultural universal society of states. But it is
important to add that such advances have not been easy and are far from
complete. The 1900 Boxer Rebellion in China was one of many violent re-
actions against the intrusion of Western standards and practices; similar
reactions exist to this day in the anti-Western politics of radical Islamic
groups that draw on earlier conceptions of the division between believers
and infidels. Western societies or particular strata within them have not
shed earlier beliefs in cultural and indeed in racial superiority; notions of
the standard of civilization survive in discourses concerning human rights
and the rationality of market civilization (Donnelly 199; Bowden and Sea-
brooke 2006).

The revolt against the West would not have occurred but for extra-
European resistance to colonial domination. Since the focus of this paper
is on the significance of the civilizing process for international society and
the transformation of human society, it is also important to draw attention
to certain tensions and ambiguities within the European process of civili-
zation which were evident in the first contacts between European and
18 R ITSUMEIKAN I NTERNATIONAL A FFAIRS Vol. 9

non-European peoples in the Americas when opinion divided between

those who assumed that civilization gave the colonial authorities unlimit-
ed - or virtually unlimited - rights over newly-conquered peoples, and
those who thought that Christian society formed part of a larger human
society, and that non-Christians had rights against Christians to be
spared physical cruelty if not colonial efforts to promote religious conver-
sion.13) From those examples, one can see how the idea of civilization was
used by some groups to claim that virtually anything was permitted in re-
lations with barbarians , but also used by others to protest against imperi-
al cruelties, or to argue that the suffering that was caused by the Atlantic
slave trade and slavery should be forbidden.

To go back a step, those who took part in those debates thought they
belonged to a civilized world that was engaged in working out how to deal
with less civilized peoples - whereas now the inclination would be to say
that those were discussions about how one civilization should treat other
civilizations - alternatively, since the notion of civilization seems monolith-
ic and static, how those who are part of different civilizing processes
should behave towards each other.14) However the question is posed, the
political challenges are considerable for all peoples that have been accus-
tomed to think of themselves as superior, or who have been persuaded to
think of themselves as inferior to others. As Elias (2008) argued, most soci-
eties in human history seem to have felt the need to raise themselves in
their own eyes above others; they have found collective meaning and satis-
faction in the supposition that others were inferior to them. So much is
clear from the European civilizing process - from the earliest attempts by

13) Wight (1990: ch. 4) provides interesting insights into the tensions within the civilizing
process by distinguishing between the realist idea that barbarians have no rights , the
revolutionist belief that they are ripe for conversion (and any rights they have fit within
that scheme), and the rationalist conviction that they exist alongside Christian or Europe-
an societies in a wider community of humankind.
14) It is worth adding that Elias s whole method is implicitly hostile to the notion of static, ho-
mogeneous civilizations, and indeed to all process-reducing concepts . The emphasis is al-
ways on processes of civilization. Bull and Watson (1984: 2) maintain that the expansion of
international society incorporated several regional international systems with their dis-
tinctive forms of civilization . But it would be more accurate to argue that it consisted of
several regional civilizing processes. Various works have considered those linkages in more
detail, ranging from Benjamin Nelson s pioneering work in the late 1960s and early 1970s
on civilizational complexes and inter-civilizational relations to John Hobson s recent study
of the eastern origins of Western civilization .
2011 International Society and the Civilizing ProcessLINKLATER 19

the courts to distinguish themselves from the lower strata, to more recent
efforts to judge non-European societies by the standard of civilization. It
might be argued that the European civilizing process had some in-built
checks against an excess of self-congratulation that were evident in the
belief that imperialists had duties to other peoples by virtue of the fact
that all were created by God or were answerable to universal moral princi-
ples. But the point is not to claim any special distinction for the European
civilizing process. Elias was keen to stress that the Eurocentrism of so
much nineteenth century European thought had had its day, adding that
it was an obstacle to learning how to co-exist with others in the context of
rising levels of global interconnectedness. Europe and it was not alone in
this regard faced the problem of detachment: that is, the ability to ac-
quire some distance from its own perspectives, to see itself from afar, from
the standpoint of those who are placed farther along the global web of so-
cial relations. In The Civilizing Process it is noted that the foreign policy
challenge for many societies is precisely how to work out suitable princi-
ples of co-existence and standards of restraint that span very different civ-
ilizing processes (Elias 2000: 410). The study of inter-state activity would
be deficient without understanding those patterns of development (Elias
2000: ibid). Crucial here is the question of how far they can agree on simi-
lar standards of self-restraint with respect to their capacity to harm one
another (see Linklater 2010).

As noted above, some have argued that there has been significant
progress towards an agreement about ideas of civility that span different
cultures and civilizations. Elias was less confident that societies had found
ways of bridging their different conceptions of civilized conduct. It was in-
deed the case that, in the course of being forced together, people have come
under pressure to learn how to be better attuned to the needs and inter-
ests of other people over greater distances. But those are no more than
pressures, and they do not guarantee that societies will agree on the prin-
ciples that should regulate their interaction. Indeed, the more people are
forced together, particularly when bound together by processes they do not
understand and which seem to work to the advantage of others, the more
likely they are to resist what they see as challenges to their power and au-
tonomy. Various rebellions against European encroachment into non-Euro-
pean areas illustrate the point. They suggest that tensions between the
20 R ITSUMEIKAN I NTERNATIONAL A FFAIRS Vol. 9

forces of integration and disintegration are likely to continue. Civilizing of-

fenses that seek to promote respect for human rights may clash with coun-
ter-thrusts that reject attempts to impose alien standards. For that rea-
son, a global civilizing process that enables people to live together without
harming each other over and over again is very far from complete and al-
ways endangered (Elias 1996: 173).

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

It is useful to recall Wight s claim that all societies of states developed

within a common civilization that was aware of its differences from the
rest of the world the less civilized world, and which permitted acts
against barbarian outsiders that were forbidden in relations between civ-
ilized peoples. Whether all systems have developed in that way is some-
thing that needs to be placed to one side. Bull questioned that assumption.
But that does not alter the fact that many states-systems, and they in-
clude the ancient Greek, ancient Chinese and modern European systems,
emerged within regions where at least the elite groups saw themselves as
part of a common civilization.

In Court Society a book devoted to analyzing the French court in the

late eighteenth century - Elias made a specific comment on civilizing proc-
esses that has particular relevance for Wight s argument, and which also
provides a useful starting-point for efforts to bring English School analysis
and process sociology more closely together. The comment was that an in-
quiry into other court societies might cast light on the character of civiliz-
ing processes in other regions and in other eras (Elias 2006: ch. 1). As we
have seen, Elias (2000: 533-4) remarked on the character of the Chinese
civilizing process - specifically on the long tradition in China of rule by a
scholarly class of officials, a condition that reflected the fact that China had
succeeding in taming the warriors well before Europeans tamed the nobili-
ty. The comment drew attention to the need to compare levels of self-re-
straint in different civilizing processes, although Elias did not pursue that
line of inquiry or consider its significance for relations between societies.

To promote that investigation it would be necessary to analyse the re-

lationship between court societies and standards of civilization that
2011 International Society and the Civilizing ProcessLINKLATER 21

shaped attitudes and behaviour towards other groups; it would be impor-

tant to analyse any tensions within civilized self-images between, for ex-
ample, the belief that the civilized could behave more or less as they
pleased towards outsiders, and the conviction that civilization dictated
moderation and restraint in relations with those that were deemed inferi-
or and backward. The central question for such an analysis is what was
permitted and what was forbidden by the prevalent social standards of
self-restraint?

A large literature awaits any scholar who wishes to analyse those di-
mensions of the relations between societies, much of it concerned with in-
teractions between court societies. There is no space to do more than men-
tion a few cases that could provide the starting-point for any future
research in this area.

The first is Bull s reference to Portuguese contact in 1482 with the Af-
rican kingdom of Kongo with its centralized government and court offi-
cials . Bull implies that relations between Europeans and African political
communities were marked by a degree of mutual respect in that period be-
fore the diplomatic practices that are specific to the modern society of
states emerged. He maintains that Kongo tried to emulate various aspects
of Portuguese society in order to gain acceptance. Other examples from
later periods include Siam in the late eighteenth century which was keen
to win recognition as a civilized monarchy by learning directly from the
courts of St Petersburg, London and Berlin, or Japan which was eager to
satisfy Western standards of civilization in external affairs (see Anderson
1983: 27; Gong 1984: ch. 7; Suganami 1984: 198; and Vincent 1984: 244f
who notes Japan s failure to secure Western support for incorporating a
principle of racial equality in the Covenant of the League of Nations).

Second, there was the inter-court competition for power and prestige
in the Italian Renaissance that was linked with the establishment of resi-
dent ambassadors and movement towards the organised balance of power.
The Renaissance courts represented a model for other European ruling
elites, and provided the driving-force behind the diffusion of humanist
learning that was central to the evolution of the modern diplomatic system.
22 R ITSUMEIKAN I NTERNATIONAL A FFAIRS Vol. 9

Third, the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the European

states-system occurred through several stages that seem to have been
common elsewhere - namely the destabilisation of a world-view that had
rested on distinctions between the infidel and the believer as Western-ori-
entated elites decided in the Tulip Period (1703-1730) to emulate Western
practices, and as Europeans reciprocated by travelling to Istanbul to in-
struct the Ottomans in the niceties of diplomatic protocol (Naff 1984).15)

Fourth, studies of Lord McCartney s mission in China in the late

eighteenth century remind us that he was the point of contact between
two courts and their respective civilizing processes (see Gong 1984 who
notes that Europeans regarded Chinese notions of group responsibility
for criminal acts, and methods of punishment such as strangling, as bar-
baric). Fifth, with reference to imperial Japan, Suganami (1984) highlights
the changing attitudes to castaways in the 1830s and 1840s during the pe-
riod of the Tokugawa seclusion edicts . Reference is made to the forced re-
consideration of standard attitudes towards the outside world as a result
of Japan s growing entanglement in longer webs of interconnectedness
(which was symbolized by Commodore Perry s arrival in Japan in 1853,
and his efforts to establish a US consulate in Japan). Crucial too were Ja-
pan s foreign policy efforts around 1900 to behave in ways (including in-
volvement in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion) that could win her a
reputation among the Western Powers as a civilized nation .

No doubt those with the requisite historical knowledge can cast fur-
ther light on those relations (and supply many other examples). They are
listed here simply to stress that over and over again, courts were involved
in judging their relative importance and value - their standing in the light
of their own or others standard of civilization . They were engaged in dis-
tinguishing between societies that deserved respect as equals, societies
that could be looked down as inferior, and societies that had to be emulat-
ed because of their more advanced forms of life. The ways in which the Eu-
ropean courts dealt with each other, with the Ottomans, Japan, China and

15) Here, it is worth noting that Callieres (1983: 172) observed that it was important for the
Ottoman court that the French ambassador was an Ichoglan ( a man bred up at court ) and
not a Cadi ( a churchman ). See Gong (1984: 100ff) on Peter the Great s similar Westernis-
ing initiatives and changes in the Russian court.
2011 International Society and the Civilizing ProcessLINKLATER 23

so forth and the latter s attitudes to them reveal how the society of
states developed and expanded to other regions.16) Modern international
society is not exactly reducible to relations between court societies, but it
was shaped by assessments of moral worth that emerged as part of the
European civilizing process, and reflects the continuing hegemony of West-
ern values (Wight 1966).

The final point is that those observations point to the need for closer
links between English School analysis and process sociology. A synthesis of
core themes can overcome their respective weaknesses: the fact that Eng-
lish School reflections on the emergence of the European international so-
ciety have not considered its relationship with the civilizing process , and
the reality that Elias s examination of that process did not consider its sig-
nificance for notions of civilized statecraft in that society of states, or how
the standard of civilization was used to justify European power and to set
out the criteria that would have to be met before non-European societies
could be considered for membership (a discourse of civilization that has
been resisted as part of the revolt against the West and which has led to
fundamental questions about the principles that should govern post-Euro-
pean international society). International relations no longer revolve
around court societies, but the impact of the period in which they were
centred on such human arrangements is evident in the contemporary soci-
ety of states. That is why questions still arise about how far various West-
ern and non-Western processes of civilization can find common ground in
a global civilizing process that spans all of them a civilizing process that
places restraints on force, reflects the desire to shed doctrines of cultural
superiority, and enables different societies to display levels of mutual re-
spect that have not been the norm either in the development of modern in-
ternational society or in the longer history of international relations.

AUTHOR

Andrew Linklater is Woodrow Wilson Professor of International Poli-

tics at Aberystwyth University. He is the author of Men and Citizens in

16) As far as I know, examples from non-European regions have not been studied in depth in
Western International Relations (see Suganami 1984: 184 on relations between the Kore-
an and Japan courts in the Edo Period).
24 R ITSUMEIKAN I NTERNATIONAL A FFAIRS Vol. 9

The Theory of International Relations (1982/1990), Beyond Realism and

Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations (1990), The Trans-
formation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-West-
phalian Era (1998) and (with Hidemi Suganami) The English School of In-
ternational Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment (2006). His current
research which focuses on harm in world politics builds bridges between
Eliasian sociology and International Relations. The Problem of Harm in
World Politics: Theoretical Investigations, the first of three volumes on that
subject, will be published by Cambridge University Press in 2011.

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