Pragmatic Reservation:

The Kennedy Administrations Record on Civil Rights

Seth Jernigan
SOCS 461
April 24, 2017
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Introduction and Brief Historiography

John F. Kennedy is arguably one of the most iconic presidents in the history of the

United States. He had just under a thousand days in office, but in those few days he was forced

to deal with some of the biggest decisions and dilemmas that the nation had faced. Among many

others, he dealt with the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Cold War, and the civil rights movement.

Many times Kennedy handled these difficult issues with the tact of a seasoned politician, while

other times his actions reminded everyone of how young and inexperienced he truly was. He has

been given credit for bringing civil rights to every citizen, no matter the color of their skin. He is

oftentimes given too much credit for the seemingly magnanimous nature in which he lent his

support. Kennedy certainly helped facilitate the conversation, but his pragmatic self-preservation

always took precedence over the needs of others.

There are three major schools of thought concerning the Kennedy administrations

policies on the civil rights agenda. The first group of works was written by those closest to him,

including his aides and advisors. Their accounts depicted Kennedy in a favorable light, which is

understandable, and even permissible, given the traumatic nature of his assassination. These

books and memoirs were written almost as tributes to a fallen colleague and friend. The next

generation of writers on the subject was far more critical of Kennedys record. They did not

afford him the grace that others had. They gave much attention to Kennedys reactionary and

pragmatic policies and criticized him for interceding on behalf of the federal government only as

a last option. They pointed out that the issue of civil rights remained on the periphery of the

focus of the administration. Some even believed that the Kennedys exploited civil rights
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activists to win the presidential election, and once in power did little to support the movement.1

The third group of scholars to publish work in the area aimed to develop a less polarized account

of the administrations record relating to the rights of African Americans. Most of these authors

concluded that Kennedy took a lukewarm and pragmatist approach to the issue, and oftentimes

had to be pushed in order to take a strong stance on civil rights.

The first group of authors undoubtedly had biased perspectives when it came to writing

about their friend John Kennedy. This group includes Theodore Sorenson, Arthur Schlesinger,

and Harrison Wofford. Each of them was connected to the administration in different ways:

Sorenson was a speechwriter, Schlesinger was a problem solver, and Wofford played a key role

in securing the black vote for Kennedy.2 These gentlemen gave Kennedy as much credit as they

could, claiming that he was sensitive to the movement from the outset of the campaign, knowing

that it would likely be an issue to deal with in the White House.

The next generation of research was vastly different in its treatment of Kennedys

actions, or in their opinion, inactions in regards to civil rights. This group includes major works

from Victor Navasky, Nick Bryant, and Malcolm Smith. Titles like The Bystander: John F.

Kennedy and the Struggle for Black Equality and John F. Kennedys 13 Great Mistakes in the

White House permeated the field of works on Kennedys record. One of the groups biggest

criticisms of Kennedy was his reactive nature to civil rights events, claiming that he was

incapable of anticipating them and was just barely able to react to them.3
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As the pendulum of Kennedys credibility continued to swing, it most recently found

itself closer to the middle ground. This group of writers sought not to praise nor vilify the

Kennedy record on civil rights, but to contend that Kennedy took a more pragmatic approach to

the issue. 4 These writers, referred to as revisionists, consist of Irving Bernstein, James Hilty,

and others who found themselves more towards the middle. Kennedy knew that he would have

to deal with civil rights, but he did so in a way that would not affect other areas of his agenda.

It is important to understand what all of these schools of thought bring to the table when

studying Kennedys record on civil rights. There are multiple perspectives on the same record

and the main thing that has changed between them is the passage of time. As historians were able

to gain more information and perspective on the subject, their answers began to change. Instead

of a valiant leader for the cause of civil rights, historians found Kennedy dealing with this issue

out of necessity. It was not at the top of his agenda to begin the presidency, but it eventually

found itself there.

Chapter 1: An Eye Opening Campaign

John Kennedy had a few things on his mind when he headed into his presidential

campaign in 1960. At the forefront of his mind was his relative obscurity and lack of name

recognition in comparison to his republican challenger. Richard M. Nixon had the notable

experience over Kennedy of being vice president during the relatively uneventful and peaceful

Eisenhower administration. Nixon was able to hone his skills under Eisenhower and learn much

about foreign policy during his time as vice president. Despite all of Nixons experience

however, Kennedy had been raised with a will to win as well as the backing of his familys
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political machine that would eventually outmatch Nixons experience.5 Looking ahead at what

might await him in office, it is likely that Kennedy saw himself addressing things like the Soviet

Union and the space race, not a domestic crisis.

Neither candidate, however, was particularly prepared to address the civil rights issue

because it had not played a significant roll in any election before. Nixon at least had a notion that

the issue might be important as his predecessor had to deal with it by sending in federal troops to

integrate Little Rock Central in 1957. Nixon was certainly more aware of the issue due to the

fact that he had witnessed Eisenhower almost completely transform his disposition on race

relations during his terms as President.6 Kennedy desperately needed the black vote but also

could not afford to lose the southern white vote by speaking out in support of black equality.

Prior to this election, it was rare that a presidential candidate had to confront civil rights in such

a manner as was necessary for this one.7 There was no model for either candidate to follow as to

how to best maintain white southern voters confidence while endearing the oppressed black

voter. Kennedy would eventually choose to approach this issue as he did most other issues

pragmatically.

John Kennedy was no doubt a man of opportunity. He was not deeply attached to any

sort of ideology or political school of thought.8 Most people today consider Kennedy a marquee

member of the liberal ideology; however, this idea is not universally agreed upon. One of his

aides even said, He had no ideology and, if anything, was put off by too far reaching ideas.9

This same aide would later conclude that idealism or liberalism was uncongenial to

Kennedy.10 The regular remedy for his campaign when confronting an issue or ideology was
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compromise. This particular approach to politics enabled Kennedy to shift his policies when

necessary, further enabling his will to win to dictate his stance and policy from issue to issue. He

eventually came to be known as a pragmatist when it came to many issues, but especially with

civil rights. Merriam Webster defines pragmatic as relating to matters of fact or practical affairs

often to the exclusion of intellectual or artistic matters: practical as opposed to idealistic11

Kennedys lack of conviction on the issues made him dependent on his advisors and

family members when it came to campaigning. He had the financial backing of his father Joe P.

Kennedy and his younger brother Robert was always by his side. He had hired a large staff,

including his two main speechwriters Theodore Sorenson and Richard Goodwin. But this large

entourage was often conspicuous, so much so that he was described as drenched by his family

and drowned by his aides.12 The same people who helped in the campaign were also those

who worked closely with him throughout his presidency. Robert was named attorney general and

Sorenson went on to become one of Kennedys closest aides and eventual biographer. One of the

key pieces in securing the black vote in the south was the work of Harris Wofford. Wofford was

born in the south and became the first white man to graduate from the historically black Howard

University School of Law. He was also friends with Martin Luther King Jr. and had traveled

with him throughout India. Wofford turned down the initial offer from Kennedy to work on the

campaign, but later eased into the idea and worked part time on the campaign before eventually

becoming a full time advisor in 1960.13

The next piece of the puzzle in securing the White House was a nominee for vice

president. Kennedy needed help amongst white voters in the south who were uncertain of his
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Catholic background and questioned his ability to separate church and state.14 There had never

been a Catholic elected to the office of the president, and the Protestant majority was not sure if

they were ready for that to happen. The eventual answer came in the form of a powerhouse

senator from Texas, Lyndon B. Johnson. He was a match for Kennedy for many reasons,

including his pragmatism when it came to the civil rights issue. Johnson had worked both sides

of the issue but ultimately aligned with the southern progressives like himself. Johnson used race

when it suited him best in order to further his objectives but left the issue alone when it was of no

use.15 But this decision to run him as vice president was not received well by everyone in the

campaign. Those on the campaign staff were astonished at the selection of Johnson, especially

after Robert Kennedy had reassured other democrats that it officially is not Johnson.16 This

announcement came right after Kennedy had won the nomination. This was one of the few times

that the two brothers were not on the same page, yet Johnson was the obvious pick for the

campaign no matter how much Bobby detested him. 17 Johnson had years of legislative

experience in both the House and Senate; he planned on using his position in the Senate to

secure the democratic nomination for president. The base of the delegates Johnson planned to

use to run for the nomination would be primarily come from the south, which would be apparent

after Kennedy won the nomination on the first ballot. Kennedy won with 806 votes with Johnson

coming in second at 409. Of the votes Johnson won, 351 came from southern states.18 Johnson

embodied all of the experience and southern connections that Kennedy did not, and there was
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hardly anyone better to have on the ticket as vice president than someone described as the

shrewdest political fox in the race.19

Now that Kennedy had the white southern vote all but counted, he turned his attention to

the black civil rights leaders in order to help secure the black vote in the south. In this, he was

met with almost immediate opposition. Jackie Robinson, the first African American to play

major league baseball, wrote an article for the New York Post in which he said that Kennedy is

not fit to be President.20 The Kennedy campaign did not take this criticism lightly and quickly

fired back with a letter to the editor of the New York Post, citing Kennedys repeated

introduction of federal anti-lynching and anti-bombing legislation as well as being the first

member of either house from New England to appoint a Negro to his staff.21 However, this was

about all of the experience that Kennedy had with the issue. Kennedy even admitted this saying,

You know Im way behind on this because Ive hardly known any blacks in my life. It isnt and

issue that Ive thought about Ive got to learn a lot and Ive got to catch up fast. This

detached approach to the subject was concerning for many civil rights leaders of the day. Martin

Luther King Jr. was particularly concerned with Kennedys lack of moral perception of the

issue.22 If Kennedy wanted to sway the opinion of black voters, there had to be some sort of

change, or at least perceived change, in Kennedys attitude towards civil rights. These changes

came, pragmatically of course, throughout the rest of his campaign. The first, and perhaps most

divisive change, was the directive to add an incredibly liberal and strong civil rights plank to the

democratic platform, which enraged the southern democrats. This decision was somewhat
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smoothed over in the south by Johnsons nomination as vice president.23 Kennedys civil rights

advisor, Harris Wofford, encouraged him to promise the use of his executive power to eliminate

some of the segregation that existed in federal housing once he was in office.24 There was

enormous untapped potential in executive actions that could bypass Congress and give direct

credit to Kennedy if utilized. These promises gave more hope to black leaders, but there was a

major event that had yet to occur which would endear black leaders and voters alike to Kennedy.

When Martin Luther King Jr. was arrested on October 22 in Atlanta for protesting, Kennedy was

presented with a golden opportunity to show his concern for the civil rights struggle. At the

suggestion of Wofford and Sargent Shriver, an in-law of the family, Kennedy called Kings wife

Corretta to offer his sympathy and services.25 This call changed many minds within the black

community, including Martin Luther King Sr., who was popular amongst black Baptist

preachers. He was ready to swing his support in spite of Kennedys Catholicism saying Ill take

a Catholic or the devil himself if hell wipe the tears from my daughter in laws eyes. Ive got

suitcase full of votes - my whole church- for you to give to Senator Kennedy.26 This event was

pivotal in winning the votes of the black community and, fortunately for Kennedy, did not

become a big story amongst white southern voters. Kennedy was able to paint himself as a

Candidate with a Heart when compared to Nixon, who did not do or say anything about

Kings arrest.27 This sequence of events was a fortunate opportunity for Kennedy, which he

made the most of and was rewarded with many black votes after he humanized himself by

reaching out to Kings wife.

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Chapter 2: Smoldering South

Those black votes turned out to be very important in delivering Kennedy the presidency,

as he just barely beat Richard Nixon. Kennedy won the election without winning the majority of

the popular vote, winning 303 electoral votes compared to Nixons 219. Some of the states

results were suspect, but Nixon decided not to protest the results.28 More than seventy percent of

the black vote went to Kennedy and more blacks were voting democrat than ever before.29 Now

that Kennedy had won the office he so desperately wanted and impatiently waited for, he had to

prove that, no matter how close the election had been, the good of the country was more

important than a recount. He met with Nixon in Florida a few days after the election to solidify

and demonstrate the peaceful transition of power to a world that was looking to the United States

as the face of democracy during the Cold War.30

While Kennedy was saving face in Florida with grand gestures, the black people of the

south continued their wait to see if the newly elected president would come through on his

promises. Segregation was alive and thriving even after the integration of Little Rock Central

High School under the previous administration. The south was still encased in a thick blanket of

segregation conformity when Kennedy took office, and he had promised to break it up.31 Now

that Kennedy had the office and knew the narrow margin of victory, he sought to avoid the

problems of a group that he had promised so much to.32 More often than not, Kennedy perceived

the issues that many black citizens faced as general issues that anyone could face, no matter their

skin color. Because of this perception, Kennedy did not pay particular attention to the race issue

of the civil rights problem, which is why the black leaders did not trust him. In Kennedys mind,
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if he wasnt an active racist himself, then he was on the right side of the issue.33 This kind of

mentality not only continued to impede Kennedys ability to see the civil rights issue as a moral

one, but also further incensed civil rights leaders who wanted to see change sooner rather than

later. While Kennedy continued to slowly evolve toward a moral conviction, Harris Wofford

continued to advise the president on what steps to take in order to keep the civil rights leaders at

bay, for the time being. He recommended three executive orders once the President took office

ending discrimination in federal operations and showing compliance in ninety days, ending

discrimination in federal housing, and stipulating that federal aide given to universities be

nondiscriminatory.34 Kennedy delayed action on these recommendations for a few years rather

than acting quickly. He instead chose to take token action every now and then rather than use his

executive power.

For instance, during his inauguration, Kennedy noticed that the Coast Guard honor guard

was an all-white unit and demanded that it be changed because all of the other branches were

integrated. This event was not widely publicized, but it gave the black citizens who did know

about it some hope.35 However, this was one of the last things for a while that gave the civil

rights leaders hope that they had the presidents attention. In Kennedys first State of the Union,

just ten days after his inauguration, he backed off considerably from his promises during the

campaign. Instead, the nations economy and the Cold War took center stage, which left very

little time to talk about such divisive issues as race and civil rights. He mainly suggested that the

laws necessary for civil rights were already in place and needed only to be enforced and that

what laws were not there could be taken care of simply by executive action or litigation.36
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Kennedy had always been more focused on foreign policy issues when he was in the senate and

even more so now as president with the Cold War perpetually casting its shadow.37 If the civil

rights leaders did not already suspect that their federal support was waning, they would soon

know firsthand. A few weeks after his inauguration, Kennedy sent his brother, recently

appointed attorney general, to meet with King to express that it was much too soon to push any

legislation on civil rights.38

When Kennedy turned his attention to the world and left the civil rights leaders waiting,

they began working on the issues themselves in such a way that it forced the president into

action. The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) was formed by James Farmer to challenge the

routine violation of the Supreme Court ruling that desegregated bus terminals.39 The only

option for civil rights leaders was to create a moral and constitutional crisis that the president

would be forced to get involved in. This came after the lethargic pace of change in both

legislative and executive action.40 The only legislative initiatives aimed at addressing race

relations early in the presidency were the extension of the Civil Rights Commission by two years

and the long promised executive order on federal housing desegregation. Kennedys

pragmatism only allowed for this small amount of action so he would not risk further weakening

his relationship with an already fragile southern democratic party.41

The Freedom Rides started in early May in Washington, D.C. and the organizers planned

on arriving in New Orleans towards the middle of month.42 The peaceful protest quickly turned

violent as the bus headed further south. The buses were torched in Anniston, Alabama and the

Freedom Riders barely escaped. Then the riders were beaten in Birmingham as they exited the
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bus under the impression that they would have police protection from the mob but none was

found. One of Bobby Kennedys staff members was knocked unconscious in Montgomery

during the rides.43 The president was presented with an infringement of the riders constitutional

rights and dispatched 500 federal marshals to protect Martin Luther King Jr. and the Freedom

Riders at a meeting in a church.44 The president chose to take this on as a legal issue but it was

certainly more than that. There was a moral element to the issue he faced, but he continued to

neglect that element until much later in his presidency. He chose to emphasize the right to free

interstate travel rather than appeal to the very evident moral issue of racism that was at the heart

of these incidents. The administration, in seeking to avoid further conflict, asked the riders not to

continue on towards New Orleans and to allow the situation to cool off.45 And in an effort to

avoid the specter of reconstruction in the south, Kennedy ordered that the marshals wear

business suits and did not carry rifles when protecting the freedom riders.46 The classic Kennedy

pragmatism persisted as the administration promised that they would not endorse the Freedom

Rides but would continue to provide them with protection, as long as their constitutional rights

were being infringed upon.47 Kennedy always wanted to have it both ways, especially early on in

his presidency as he always kept his narrow margin of victory and his fragile relationship with

Congress at the forefront of his mind when it came to decisions about the south.48

Chapter 3: Mississippi Burning

After the catastrophe of the Freedom Rides for the Kennedy administration, they realized

that they would have to take this issue as seriously as they did economic and international issues.

The approach the administration eventually took on was that of glacial change.49 They wanted
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to avoid public confrontation with state and local politicians in order to evade the possibility of

publicly pitting the states against the federal government, something Kennedy criticized

Eisenhower for during the campaign. This approach to policy further proves the fact that

Kennedy was ultimately a pragmatist and had few, if any, ideological ties to any issue. Whatever

action made the most gain for the most people was the path that Kennedy chose to follow. But

this approach did little good for him because it told the southern segregationists that the

administration was against them and it told the civil rights leaders that their support was limited

at best.50 Leaders like Martin Luther King Jr. decried this approach as intolerably slow and

stated that it played just as much to the black minority as it did to the white segregationist.51

With this chosen course of glacial change, the administration began to shift the focus to

black voter registration. Public protests like the Freedom Rides were much too effective at

forcing the administration to act with federal force. The attorney general met with civil rights

leaders to make them aware that the administration thought that these protests were unproductive

and that activists would have the full support of the administration for voter registration.52

Reelection was always on the horizon, but in this case, it was so the federal government could

stay hands off. If enough black citizens registered to vote, they could file for a redress of

grievance, which would keep the federal government out of the equation altogether.53 This sort

of response to the Freedom Rides showed the public a few things about the administration, first

of which was that the federal government would not be bullied by the states or by mob rule.54 It

also showed that more often than not Kennedys political pragmatism far overshadowed his
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moral resolve in this area.55 It would not be long though before Kennedy had another public

and highly controversial showdown with a southern state over segregation.

The next major civil rights even the Kennedy administration faced was deep within the

south and involved higher education. The ongoing battle to end segregation continued at the

University of Mississippi. But before this issue arose, Kennedy chose inaction at another

peaceful protest that took place in Albany, Georgia. Martin Luther King Jr. and his colleagues in

the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) put together a multitude of sit-ins in

Albany to force its desegregation. The local officials would not change their minds and the

movement found no help from the federal government, which infuriated King.56 Fortunately

for King, another young civil rights activist had also been incensed by Kennedys lack of

attention to the civil rights movement. When James Meredith, an Air Force veteran and grandson

of a slave, heard Kennedys inaugural address and did not hear explicit mention of civil rights,

he immediately sprang into action. He sent in an application for admission to the University of

Mississippi, which had not admitted a black student at any point in its one hundred and fourteen

year history. He did so in hopes to put pressure on John Kennedy and the Kennedy

administration to live up to the civil rights plank in the Democratic platform. Meredith was

challenging one of the most stalwart institutions of segregation in one of the most segregated

states in the country. The struggle for the black citizen in Mississippi had actually gotten worse

since the beginning of the civil rights era. The state had 22,000 registered black voters in 1952,

but only seven years later there were just 12,000. A black clergyman had tried to enroll at the

university before and was not only thrown off campus by state troopers but also thrown into a
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mental institution, by order of the governor, for trying to return.57 The mantle that James

Meredith was taking up to help create change carried heavy implications.

As aforementioned, the president had denounced President Eisenhowers use of federal

troops in the integration of Little Rock Central High School, so President Kennedy was naturally

a little gun shy when it came to the use of federal troops. He was quite determined not to let this

situation in Mississippi get to such a level. When Meredith was predictably denied admission to

Ole Miss, he immediately began litigation against the university at the federal level with help

from lawyers with the NAACP. The decision was repeatedly delayed in the Fifth Circuit Court

of Appeals, so Meredith took the matter to the Supreme Court. The court ruled on September

10th that James Meredith was to be admitted to the university the following fall semester.58 The

governor of Mississippi Ross Barnett was not about to have the Christian ideals and principles

that our forefathers handed down to us be tainted by admitting a black student to the states

most prestigious university.59 The governor was determined to interpose his state sovereignty in

order to block Meredith from being admitted, and all but implemented marshal law in an address

to the state. He gave the state police the authority to keep the peace and govern themselves

accordingly to do so and also publically denied Meredith admission to the university.60 Barnett

had publically defied a Supreme Court ruling in the New York Times. Meredith had gotten

exactly what he had hoped for, pressure on the Kennedy administration to stand on their civil

rights plank. The president could not let a governor openly defy the federal government in this

way so he gave him a call, which turned into a series of around twenty phone calls throughout
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the crisis.61 During one call in particular, Kennedys pragmatism shone through in an attempt to

handle the situation. On September 22, 1962 the president was talking with Barnett about the

logistics of integrating Meredith into the university and he said

Listen I didnt put him in the university, but on the other hand, under the constitution, I
have to carry out the orders of the carry out that order, and I dont want to do it in any
way that causes difficulty to you or anyone else. But Ive got to do it. Now, Id like to
get your help in doing that. 62

Governor Barnett had just publically defied the federal government and Kennedy reached out to

him like this. Kennedy was keen on the idea of not having a public confrontation with Barnett

for many reasons, one of them being that Barnett was likely going to challenge a more moderate

senator for his seat in 1964 and Kennedy did not want to lend any strength to his position in that

election.63 One of the agreements they came to was to let Barnetts state policeman handle most

of the security, but the president and attorney general kept a constant vigilance to try and keep

the situation from escalating.64 It took Meredith multiple attempts at registering for classes

before he was finally successful on the fourth; however this does not mean that the fourth

attempt was easy. Merediths fourth and final attempt came on September 30, 1962, when he

arrived on a sparsely populated campus because of an away football game.65 The word was

quickly sent out to those on campus after an announcement came from the loudspeakers to stay

away from the administration building. What started as a crowd of only a hundred to two

hundred students quickly rose to over 2,500 and the two hundred and fifty marshals tasked with

protecting Meredith were under siege from the bricks and bottles being thrown by the students.

The marshals were eventually driven inside until reinforcement arrived to safely get Meredith

enrolled in the university. Students and citizens protesting the integration met the reinforcements
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at the airport, and it was not until the next morning, after the military police had arrived, that

Meredith was able to register and attend class. 66 Before the rioting began in response to

Merediths class attendance, two people had been killed, hundreds more had been injured and

over 20,000 troops were used to get Meredith registered.

Kennedy had to say something to try and get control of the situation in Mississippi,

knowing that the rioting would only get worse now that Meredith had been enrolled. He decided

to address the nation after getting federal troops involved and he went on television and radio to

tell the citizens why he had sent in federal troops. Kennedy emphasized Barnetts feelings that

the governor was above the law and that if the governor had used the state police to help secure

his enrollment instead of blocking it, there would have been no need to federalize the Mississippi

National Guard. He then apologized for having to use an executive order in order to resolve this

crisis and finally concluded that the record on this issue could, and should, be quickly and

quietly closed so that the nation could stand united in their pledge to freedom.67

No matter how much pressure James Meredith ended up putting on the administration it

ultimately caused no change in Kennedys attitude towards intervention in the civil rights battle.

It did not cause him to backtrack, to accelerate his existing programs, or even to develop new

ones, but it did prepare him for the inevitable run-in with the University of Alabama, which

was just as racially exclusive as Ole Miss and had already been taken to court because of it.68 As

Kennedy saw it, his reactionary and pragmatic policies had served him well thus far and would

continue to do so and might even become more effective with more experience.

Chapter 4: Confronting King

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Martin Luther King Jr. was frustrated with the president and with the relative

ineffectiveness of his protests in the south. There had been little, if any, progress with civil rights

legislation almost three years into a presidency that had promised to change everything. Black

Americans had hoped for this administration to change the country in such a way that it would

become the most hopeful, the most encouraging period for racial progress in U.S. history.69

They founded those hopes in all of the promises that Kennedy had made on the campaign trail,

but by 1963 much of that hope had eroded from his former supporters.70 There was significant

backlash in the Deep South against Kennedys use of federal troops and the black southerners

were being treated accordingly to the outrage. Black activists were becoming more and more

militant in an effort to further their cause and this would eventually get the attention of the

president, even if Governor Barnett denying a qualified black veteran admission to Ole Miss had

not done so.

King had to revise some of his tactics in order to be effective and he saw some success in

his new focus in Birmingham. This city was known as the most segregated city in the south

and was home to one of the most iconic opponents of the civil rights movement, Eugene Bull

Connor. King had several thousand school children march through the streets of Birmingham

and Bull Connor unleashed hell on them. He used dogs, nightsticks, and water cannons that

knocked children off their feet and tore the clothes from their body. Protests and riots began to

happen after the images from Birmingham made global news. Over 75,000 black citizens

nationwide took to the streets and it was very unlikely that anyone would be able to get them

off.71 This sort of public violence against black citizens had struck a chord with more militant
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civil rights leaders. They were losing their patience and as one of the most notable militant

leaders, Malcolm X, said, The day of non-violent protest is over.72

This sort of ominous tone coming from what had formerly been a nonviolent and

peaceful group of people signaled to the administration that something else had to be done and

quickly. Kennedy had proposed new legislation to Congress earlier that year before the events in

Birmingham had unfolded. This legislation was supposed to regain him the confidence of the

black citizens who had grown weary of empty promises, but after the events that unfolded in

Birmingham, Robert Kennedy was convinced that more legislation was required.73 But it did not

come soon enough because after Birmingham there would be the march from Selma. During the

march to Selma, white citizen volunteers were deputized to control, and ended up brutally

beating the group of more than five hundred demonstrators marching fifty miles in order to have

their voting rights recognized.74 But even after all of these events, President Kennedy did not

find that there were sufficient grounds to bring federal troops into the equation because there

was seemingly no constitutional question to be dealt with.75 Kennedy did go on a tour of the

south to try to settle down the upheaval. He spoke at Vanderbilt University about the legal and

moral problem that the country was facing everywhere.76 Over the course of that spring, over

14,000 demonstrators were arrested throughout the south.77

It took another headstrong governor denying black students admission to a state

institution of higher learning for Kennedy to finally fully embrace the civil rights issue as a

moral one. On May 21, 1963 the federal court ruled that the University of Alabama at

Tuscaloosa must admit two black students for the summer semester.78 Outrage across the south
 21

was immediate, and George Wallace, the governor of Alabama, was not going to let this

overstep of the federal government happen. He immediately announced that he would bar the

students from enrolling, following suit with Ross Barnett, in nullification and directly defying

the federal government. This was the defining moment in which John F. Kennedy finally

declared the civil rights issue as moral one in an address to the nation. The speech that Kennedy

gave was put together quickly and was edited right up until the president went on air to give it.

Theodore Sorenson, the drafter of the speech, noted the marked change in commitment to the

issue and the hasty manner in which it manifested itself. It also marked the beginning of the

Federal Governments full scale commitment to the fight against all discrimination He decided

at the last moment to address the nation anyway79 Kennedy had to address civil rights as a

moral issue at this moment because there would likely soon be another story on the headlines

that would take away the national attention. The attitude of the civil rights activists was also

growing increasingly volatile. Even though the decision to make the speech had come late,

Sorensen suggested that the speech had been in the works for some time, claiming that the,

speech had been in preparation by the President himself for some time. It drew on three years

of evolution of his thinking80 It instead came from the fact that the administration had

actually managed a crisis instead of merely reacting to it. 81 The speech was scheduled to go live

at 8:00 P.M. EST, and the president and the speechwriters did not have much time to prepare.

By the time eight oclock rolled around, the team barely had a rough draft ready and Kennedy

realized that he might have to improvise some of the speech, which in fact he did. The entire
 22

conclusion of the speech was off the cuff, but the only way one might have noticed that was that

the president did not look down at his papers as he had before. The speech called for

congressional action on legislation that the president proposed and stated that the time for token

action was over. He also asked for the help of every American citizen noting that this was not a

sectional issue it was not specific to the north or south, but it was an issue that had to be

addressed in every home and in the everyday lives of every American citizen. He specifically

stated that the nation was facing a moral issue that was as old as the scriptures and a clear as the

constitution.82

So the president had finally stepped over the edge and done what he had hesitated to do

for the first half of his presidency. There was no questioning what the president meant in the

brief message, and the public, especially the civil rights leaders, were happy to finally hear the

president speak so directly about what must be done. The speech was not just about

desegregation in Alabama but about the rights of citizens all across the nation. The citizens heard

the hard facts that presented the stark contrast between the future of a black baby and a white

baby born in the same place on the same day. They heard the hope of calling for an end to the

protesting in the streets and believed that the violence might actually subside with this call to

action.83 The president had spoken with a passion and emotion that he had never before

demonstrated when speaking about civil rights. He had successfully delivered an eloquent,

cohesive, and passionate speech that called on every branch of government and every citizen to

consider their role in ending discrimination.84

 23

The president received mixed reviews but for the most part they were positive other than

the ones that came from the south. More importantly he won the support of the civil rights

leaders. Martin Luther King Jr. called the speech a hallmark in the annals of American

history.85 But the response from Congress indicated that the passage of this legislation would

not come easily. The south obviously opposed such a quick pace in legislation and saw it as the

federal government openly challenging the southern way of life. But on the whole, the message

was widely well received, even being called the most important speech of his presidency. The

press noted how different this speech was in comparison to the one he had given on the

integration of the University of Mississippi. The president had abandoned the lofty realms of

the law and talked about the moral issues involved in treating human beings differently because

of the color of their skin.86 The main criticism was that the speech had taken so long to happen

in the first place. But no matter its timing, the speech happened, and it changed the course of the

national agenda on civil rights. But that change did not come without some resistance in

Congress over what was passed and how it was implemented.

Chapter 5: Spectral Conclusions

Kennedy himself, though, did not fight this uphill battle. The impending tragedy of his

assassination ultimately fought the battle for him along with the guidance of his vice president

and shrewd congressional fox, Lyndon B. Johnson. The ghost of Kennedy and the shock of the

nation all but ensured the passage of his civil rights omnibus bill that was eventually passed in

his memory under Johnson. The battle was not all that difficult for Johnson because he did not

hesitate in his action on the bill. In fact, the morning after he became president, he let his staff
 24

know that the first priority was getting the civil rights bill passed.87 For everything that Kennedy

had not done for civil rights, Johnson was going to use the late presidents memory to make up

for it. In a nationally televised address only five days after the assassination, Johnson used

Kennedys ghost to appeal for support, saying no memorial or eulogy, could more eloquently

honor President Kennedys memory than the earliest possible passage of the civil rights bill for

which fought so long.88 The late president had not fought for very long for this issue, only a

few months in all reality; however, that did not matter because the nation was still in shock and

black citizens were worried that the new president, a southern democrat, would abandon the civil

rights plight after the passage of this bill.89 Kennedy was the picture of youth, and the nation

wanted to honor him in any way that they could, and the passage of this bill honored the most

recent memory they had of him.

It is easy to speculate whether or not the bill would have passed without the presidents

assassination, but there can be no definite answers found in speculation. Answers can be found

in the presidents record, but multiple outside forces shape his record. There were going to be

implications in Congress for any political decisions that he might have made after winning the

office by such a narrow margin. Had he taken a strong moral stance on such an issue as civil

rights at the beginning of his administration, he would have almost ensured his own failure

throughout the rest of his first term and run for reelection. His own pragmatic self-preservation

changed his mind, and it is also likely that it was a gradual shift over the course of his term that

changed his mind. The whole time, Kennedy remained focused on negation and tangible results

instead of regularly involving himself in the moral arguments that so many were concerned with
 25

at the time. This approach had served him well since the beginning of his political career, and his

use of symbolic action and token recognition carried him to the presidency.90 He shied away

from civil rights because at most times it was unpredictable, and he did not speak morally on it

until he could not wait any longer. Kennedys inexperience coupled with such complex issues

created a multitude of instances where he needed to provide strong leadership but was unable to

do so because of his need for self-preservation and practicality. His meticulously measured and

reserved emotions served him well in the Cuban Missile Crisis but made him appear detached

when it came to more emotional issues like civil rights.91

Had he pushed the decision to embrace the movement he risked becoming a follower

rather than a leader in government action.92 Civil rights leaders were distrustful of the political

elites, which was a key part of John Kennedys identity, and it took a speech such as the one on

the Alabama integration to gain the trust of those leaders. The president had run out of time with

executive action now and legislation later promises, and now the issue had become the

nations decisive domestic issue which he could no longer ignore. Now that the issue had

captured national attention, Kennedy had to define it as a moral one so as to appeal to conscience

of every citizen and not demonize one section of the nation or to pit region against region. 93 If

the issue had not been thrust to the forefront of national attention, Kennedy likely would have

continued to give it the measured attention he had before. The perpetual push from civil rights

leaders and liberals within the party eventually brought him to a place where he made the change

from legal to moral rhetoric.94

 26

In summation, John Kennedys policy on civil rights is complicated at best and evolved

throughout his administration. He was almost certainly committed on a personal level to the idea

of black equality but his political ideology, or lack thereof, and his fear of confrontation kept

him from fully committing to the cause95 It is impossible to say what he might have done for the

cause if he had won a second term, but based on his attitude towards the issue at the end of his

presidency, he more than likely would have continued to advocate for equality. He cannot,

however, be given credit for what he might have done. He aided the civil rights movement

reluctantly in the beginning and allowed his personal convictions and public opinion to guide

him more and more as time went on. He certainly helped begin the governmental aid of social

equality, but did so at a pace that likely cost the lives of some and his legacy as a leader for civil

rights.
 27

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 30

1 Todd Saucedo, The Fire Within: The Baldwin Meeting And The Evolution Of The Kennedy
Administrations Approach To Civil rights (B.A., University of Central Florida, 2004) 16. This
historiography uses Saucedos masters thesis historiography as a blueprint and follows the same
general outline.
2 Jason Zengerle, The Man Who Was Everywhere, New Republic, last modified 2014,

accessed February 11, 2017, https://newrepublic.com/article/120160/harris-wofford-20th-

centurys-most-serendipitous-man.
3 James W Riddlesperger and Donald Wilson Jackson, Presidential Leadership And Civil rights

Policy, 1st ed. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995), 115, quoted in Saucedo, 23.
4 Saucedo, 21.
5
David Niven, The Politics Of Injustice, 1st ed. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press,
2003)2-3.
6
Harry Golden, Mr. Kennedy And The Negroes, 1st ed. (Cleveland: World Pub. Co, 1964) 9-10.
7
Todd E. Saucedo, The Fire Within: The Baldwin Meeting And The Evolution Of The Kennedy
Administrations Approach To Civil rights (M.A., University of Central Florida, 2017) 41.
8 Niven, 4.
9
Ibid..
10
Ibid.
11
"Definition Of PRAGMATIC", Merriam-Webster.Com, last modified 2017, accessed April
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12
Henry Fairlie, The Kennedy Promise, 1st ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973)36-37.
13
Mark Stern, Calculating Visions, 1st ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press,
1992) 21-22.
14
Thomas J. Carty, A Catholic in the White House? Religion, Politics, and John F. Kennedys
Presidential Campaign (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 2-6, quoted in Saucedo, 40.
15
Stern, 115-116.
16
Joseph L. Rauh, Oral History Interview , Larry H. Hackman, 23 July 1969, 2:18, Lyndon B.
Johnson Library, quoted in Stern, 27.
17
ibid, 27-29.
18
Ibid, 150.
19
Ibid, 29.
20
New York Post June 3, 1960, quoted in Saucedo, 45.
21
Allen Taylor, Letter To Editor Of New York Post, Letter (Boston, MA, 2017), Papers of
John F. Kennedy. Pre Presidential Papers. Presidential Campaign Files, 1960, John F. Kennedy
Presidential Library.
22
Garth E Pauley, The Modern Presidency & Civil rights, 1st ed. (College Station: Texas A &
M University Press, 2001)109.
23
Stern, 150.
 31

24
Harris Wofford, Of Kennedys And Kings, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1980)
58.
25
Stern, 33-34.
26
Carl M Brauer, John F. Kennedy And The Second Reconstruction, 1st ed. (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1977) 48.
27
Ibid, 50.
28
Michael Levy, United States Presidential Election Of 1960 | United States Government,
Encyclopedia Britannica, last modified 2014, accessed March 10, 2017,
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29
Stern, 39.
30
Nancy Gibbs and Michael Duffy, The Presidents Club, 1st ed. (New York, New York: Simon
& Schuster, 2012) 111-115.
31
Irving Bernstein, Promises Kept, 1st ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) 46.
32
Stern, 40.
33
David Halberstam, The Children, (New York: Random House, 1998), 253, quoted in Pauley,
109.
34
Bernstein, 49.
35
Niven, 25.
36
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1962 - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, Jfklibrary.Org, last modified 2017,
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003.aspx.
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Presidential Library & Museum, Jfklibrary.Org, last modified 2017, accessed March 11, 2017,
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38
Evan Thomas, Robert Kennedy: His Life, (New York: Simon Schuster, 2000), 128, quoted in
Saucedo, 59.
39
Steven R. Goldzwig and George N. Dionisopoulos, John F. Kennedys Civil rights
Discourse: The Evolution From Principled Bystander To Public Advocate, Communication
Monographs 56, no. 3 (1989): 182.
40
Saucedo, 19.
41
Goldzwig, 182.
42
Saucedo, 59-60.
43
Goldzwig, 183.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
Brauer, 105.
47
Saucedo, 61.
48
Stern, 41.
 32

49
Niven, 36.
50
Ibid, 36-37.
51
Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 1st ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 930.
52
Thomas, Robert Kennedy, 132, quoted in Saucedo, 63-64.
53
Edwin Guthman, Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words, (New York: Bantam Books, 1989),
201, quoted in Saucedo, 64.
54
Brauer, 110
55
Goldzwig, 184.
56
Saucedo, 65.
57
Nick Bryant, The Bystander, 1st ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 331.
58
Ibid.
59
Claude Sitton, Gov. Barnett Steadfast Against Integrating U. Of Mississippi, New York
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60
Ross Barnett, Barnetts Proclamations, New York Times, 1962, accessed March 18, 2017,
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EDE.
61
Goldzwig, 185.
62
Caroline Kennedy and Ted Widmer, Listening In: The Secret White House Recordings Of
John F. Kennedy, 1st ed. (New York: Hyperion, 2014), 101.
63
Bryant, 332.
64
Kennedy, Listening In, 107-110; Goldzwig, 185.
65
Goldzwig, 185.
66
Thomas Buckley, Tear Gas And Sticks Repel Wild Student Charges, New York Times,
1962, accessed March 18, 2017,
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67
John F. Kennedy, Radio And Television Report On Situation At The University Of
Mississippi, 30 September 1962, Speech (Boston, MA, 1962), Papers of John F. Kennedy.
Presidential Papers. Presidents Office Files., John F. Kennedy Presedential Library.
68
Brauer, 204.
69
Simeon Booker, What Negroes Can Expect From Kennedy, Ebony, Jan., 1961, 33.
70
Pauley, 117.
71
Malcolm E Smith, John F. Kennedys 13 Great Mistakes In The White House, 1st ed.
(Smithtown, N.Y.: Suffolk House, 1980), 169.
72
Goldzwig, 187.
73
Ibid, 189.
74
Wofford, 178.
 33

75
Goldzwig, 189.
76
Ibid.
77
Schlesinger, 964.
78
Ibid.
79
Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, 1st ed. (New York: Konecky & Konecky, 1965), 493.
80
Ibid, 495.
81
Bryant, 421.
82
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84
Brauer, 259.
85
Ibid, 263.
86
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87
Stern, 160.
88
Ibid.
89 Pauley, 159.
90
Bryant, 466.
91
Ibid, 467-468
92
Bernstein, 103.
93
Ibid.
94
Goldzwig, 193-195.
95 Bryant, 469.