Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.

Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to
prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They
also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the
GRP from signing the same.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;

2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public
concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991)

3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
would be binding itself

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),

particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,

RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their
mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act
of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by
any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in
David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.

In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:

x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action,
the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act .
Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty.x x x x

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal
of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the
dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.

That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters
of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991).

(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information,
while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.
The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its
complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject
only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.

The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest
in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and
negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as
to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.

E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and
local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned
sectors of society.

3.

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in
the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.

The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having
an associative relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers
that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government.
It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however,
does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less
does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the
Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship
with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed,
BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity
to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of
Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept
of association runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE
being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific
provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the
Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term autonomous region in the constitutional provision just
quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the
existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact
and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework, implying an amendment of
the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the
MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to
preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to
allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or
revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the
proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation
need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose constitutional amendments,
she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in
place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals
as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),

particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,

RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous
peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines
Bangsamoro people as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and
their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only
Moros as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao
and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples
shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined.
The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the Bangsamoro homeland, the ownership of which is
vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both
parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public
domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut
procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other
things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive
Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices
to conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human
ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in
such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally
and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could
pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion
when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3,
Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD
was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to
a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross
evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship
envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes
that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

3 SCRA 351 Political Law Constitutional Law Treaties vs Executive Agreements

Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which imports from Japan onion and garlic
into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture
of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45.
The said circulars were pursuant to Executive Order 328. On the other hand, EO 328 was the
implementing law of the Trades and Financial Agreements, an executive agreement, entered
into between the Philippines and Japan. The said executive agreement states, among others,
that all import transactions between Japan and the Philippines should be invoiced in dollar. In
this case, the said items imported by EST from Japan were not invoiced in dollar.

EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the executive agreement that the EO
was implementing was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the
Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to the concurrence by the Senate.

HELD: No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at
least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall
short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in
our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments treaties and conventions.
They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal
documents denominated agreements or protocols.

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and
agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or
otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to
undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from
time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the
trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to
be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not
anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in
our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive
without the approval of the Senate.

They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping
profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally,
international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some
of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with
policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff
acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims against
foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.
Case Digest: G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000. 342 SCRA 449

BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a Junk VFA Movement, Bishop Tomas Millamena
(Iglesia Filipina Independiente), Bishop Elmer Bolocan (United Church of Christ of the Phil.), Dr.
Reynaldo Legasca, Md, Kilusang Mambubukid Ng Pilipinas, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Gabriela,
Prolabor, and The Public Interest Law Center, petitioners, vs. Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon, Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado, Brig.
Gen. Alexander Aguirre, Senate President Marcelo Fernan, Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Blas
Ople, Senator Rodolfo Biazon, And Senator Francisco Tatad, respondents.

Facts: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military
Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine
territory by United States military personnel. In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a
possible extension of the military bases agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine
Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in
effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. On July 18,
1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific
Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary
Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on the complementing strategic interests of the
United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides discussed, among other
things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). Thereafter,
then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public
respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On October 5,
1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the
VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of
Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

Issues (justiciable controversy): (1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing as concerned
citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA; (2) whether the
VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution; (3) and whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.

Ruling: (1) No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining
any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not
established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On
this point, it bears stressing that a taxpayers suit refers to a case where the act complained of
directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.

(2) Yes.The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII,
and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial. For in
either case, whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental
law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict
constitutional requirements.

(3) No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents,
the Court as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel of the rights of the
people is then without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs purely
executive and legislative in character and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the
distinct boundaries and limits the metes and bounds within which each of the three political
branches of government may exercise the powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it by
law.

Plaridel M. Abaya vs. Hon. Secretary Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr.

FACTS:

On May 7, 2004 Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) issued a Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012. It was approved by DPWH Acting
Secretary Florante Soriquez. This resolution recommended the award to China Road & Bridge
Corporation of the contract for the implementation of civil works for Contract Package No. I (CP
I), which consists of the improvement/rehabilitation of the San Andres-Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga road,
with the lengt of 79.818 kilometers, in the island province of Catanduanes.

This Loan Agreement No. PH-204 was executed by and between the JBIC and the Philippine
Government pursuant to the exchange of Notes executed by and between Mr. Yoshihisa Ara,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the Philippines, and then Foreign
Affairs Secretary Siazon, in behalf of their respective governments.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Loan Agreement No. PH-204 between the JBIC and the Philippine
Government is a kind of a treaty.

HELD:
The Loan Agreement No. PH-204 taken in conjunction with the Exchange of Notes dated
December 27, 1999 between the Japanese Government and the Philippine Government is an
executive agreement.

An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with the
private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the
parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other.

treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols, declarations, memoranda of

understanding, modus vivendi and exchange of notes all are refer to international instruments
binding at international law.

Although these instruments differ from each other by title, they all have common features and
international law has applied basically the same rules to all these instruments. These rules are
the result of long practice among the States, which have accepted them as binding norms in
their mutual relations. Therefore, they are regarded as international customary law.

That case was dismissed by the SCORP last Feb. 14 2007.

What the petitioners wanted was that Foreign funded projects also undergo the procurement
process.

The dismissal of the case somehow gave justification for the delay of the implementing rules for
foreign funded projects (IRR-B) of the procurement law If we recall the decision of the Abaya vs
Ebdane was used by the DOJ when the DOTC Secretary was asking for an opinion from the
former, during the ZTE controversy.as ruled by the Supreme Court in Abaya v. Ebdane, an
exchange of notes is considered a form of an executive agreement, which becomes binding
through executive action without need of a vote by the

Senate and that (like treaties and conventions, it is an international instrument binding at
international law,

The second issue involves an examination of the coverage of Republic Act No. 9184, otherwise
known as the Government Procurement Reform Act. Section 4 of the said Act provides that it
shall

apply to: the Procurement of infrastructure Projects, Goods and Consulting Services,
regardless of source of funds, whether local or foreign, by all branches and instrumentalities of
government, its departments, offices and agencies, including government-owned and/or -
controlled corporations and local government units, subject to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 138. Any treaty or international or executive agreement affecting the
subject matter of this Act to which the Philippine government is a signatory shall be observed.

Secretary of Justice vs Lantion and Mark Jimenez

Facts:

On January 18, 2000, petitioner was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter reasonable period within
which to file his comment with supporting evidence. Private respondent states that he must be
afforded the right to notice and hearing as required by our Constitution. He likens an
extradition proceeding to a criminal proceeding and the evaluation stage to a preliminary
investigation.

Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration assailing the mentioned decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process

Ruling:

No. Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage
of the extradition process.

An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The process of
extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt
or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a
rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an
accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still
undergoing evaluation.

P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords an extraditee sufficient
opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for
the extraditee to know the basis of the request for his extradition is merely moved to the filing
in court of the formal petition for extradition. The extraditees right to know is momentarily
withheld during the evaluation stage of the extradition process to accommodate the more
compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be
precipitated by premature information of the basis of the request for his extradition. No less
compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to
the judgment of a co-equal branch of the government, the Executive, which has been endowed
by our Constitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign relations.

All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in light of their intent.
Nothing less than the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to which the Philippines is a
signatory provides that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object
and purpose.

It ought to follow that the RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that will minimize
if not prevent the escape of extraditees from the long arm of the law and expedite their trial.
The submission of the private respondent, that as a probable extraditee under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty he should be furnished a copy of the US government request for his
extradition and its supporting documents even while they are still under evaluation by
petitioner Secretary of Justice, does not meet this desideratum. The fear of the petitioner
Secretary of Justice that the demanded notice is equivalent to a notice to flee must be deeply
rooted on the experience of the executive branch of our government. As it comes from the
branch of our government in charge of the faithful execution of our laws, it deserves the careful
consideration of this Court. In addition, it cannot be gainsaid that private respondents demand
for advance notice can delay the summary process of executive evaluation of the extradition
request and its accompanying papers.

Ichong vs Hernandez

Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations
and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business, filed to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
unconstitutional contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of
the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international
and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against
the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those
requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the
retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of
the Constitution.
Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives
of their liberty and property without due process of law

Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to
prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory
within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
824-825.)

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of
the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislatures purpose; is it not
unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection
with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can
the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified
interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process
test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the
guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.
There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can
neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive
persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be
classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law.
The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded
on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and
means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for
said distinction.
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation
regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and
recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects
their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us
to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary
and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose
power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the
provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has
not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said
to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been
entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any
treaty or any other conventional agreement.

Lim v. Executive Secretary

FACTS:

Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the armed
forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan 02-
1 on January 2002. The Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of joint military
maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into
by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The exercise is rooted from the international
anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the 3 commercial
aircrafts hijacking that smashed into twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City
and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. allegedly by the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama
bin Laden that occurred on September 11, 2001. Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as
citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the
constitutionality of the joint exercise. Partylists Sanlakas and Partido Ng Manggagawa as
residents of Zamboanga and Sulu directly affected by the operations filed a petition-in-
intervention.

The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is based only on a fear of
future violation of the Terms of Reference and impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain
a question of fact specifically interpretation of the VFA whether it is covers "Balikatan 02-1 and
no question of constitutionality is involved. Moreover, there is lack of locus standi since it does
not involve tax spending and there is no proof of direct personal injury.

ISSUE: W/N the petition and the petition-in-intervention should prosper.

HELD: NO. Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to
the filing of a new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court -
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts

Doctrine of Importance to the Public

Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the
Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of
the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws that
they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of
procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition.

Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the
doctrine of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the department of the government a
becoming respect for each other's act, this Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of
the instant petition.

Interpretation of Treaty

The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities,"
the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide
scope of undertakings subject only to the approval of the Philippine government. The sole
encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States
personnel must "abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in
particular, from any political activity." All other activities, in other words, are fair game.

To aid in this, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31 SECTION 3 and Article 32
contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements. It is clear from the
foregoing that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which
is presumed to verbalize the parties' intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be
used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as
well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context. According
to Professor Briggs, writer on the Convention, the distinction between the general rule of
interpretation and the supplementary means of interpretation is intended rather to ensure that
the supplementary means do not constitute an alternative, autonomous method of
interpretation divorced from the general rule.

The meaning of the word activities" was deliberately made that way to give both parties a
certain leeway in negotiation. Thus, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises.
Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion
that combat-related activities -as opposed to combat itself -such as the one subject of the
instant petition, are indeed authorized.

The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I stipulates that US exercise
participants may not engage in combat "except in self-defense." ." The indirect violation is
actually petitioners' worry, that in reality, "Balikatan 02-1" is actually a war principally
conducted by the United States government, and that the provision on self-defense serves only
as camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise. A clear pronouncement on this matter
thereby becomes crucial. In our considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign
troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory. Under the salutary proscription
stated in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties and
international agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of the
1987 Constitution especially Sec. 2, 7 and 8 of Article 2: Declaration of Principles and State
Policies in this case. The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers of the Chief
Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Even
more pointedly Sec. 25 on Transitory Provisions which shows antipathy towards foreign military
presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed
entry into the Philippines only by way of direct exception.

International Law vs. Fundamental Law and Municipal Laws

Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our obligations arising from international
agreements.

Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: Withal, the fact that international law has been made
part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over
national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most
countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national
legislation.

From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law
pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is
not allowed to "invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform
a treaty."

Our Constitution espouses the opposing view as stated in section 5 of Article VIII: The Supreme
Court shall have the following powers: xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and order of lower courts in:

(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
is in question.

Ichong v. Hernandez: provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment

by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State

Gonzales v. Hechanova: our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when
it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited / from engaging in an
offensive war on Philippine territory.

PIMENTEL VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts:

On December 28, 2000, the Philippines through the Charge d Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the
Philippine Mission to the United Nations, signed the Rome Statute which established the
International Criminal Court. Thus, herein petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the
respondents the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs
to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines for ratification.

Issue: Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a
ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate for ratification the copy of the Rome Statute signed
by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the
President.

Held:

The Supreme Court rule in the negative.

The President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external
relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of
foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys mouthpiece with respect to international
affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and
governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties,
and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the
President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
It should be emphasized that under the Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the
President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited
only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within
the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its
consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it.

Spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino vs Jose Cuisia

During the Corazon Aquino regime, her administration came up with a scheme to reduce the
countrys external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring
programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts they are basically buyback
programs and bond-conversion programs. The spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes
Constantino, as a taxpayers, and in behalf of their minor children who are Filipino citizens,
together with FFDC (Freedom From Debt Coalition) averred that the buyback and bond-
conversion schemes were onerous and they do not constitute the loan contract or
guarantee contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. VII of the Constitution. And assuming that the
President has such power, unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President,
the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the
President, hence, the respondents herein, Central Bank Governor Josse Cuisia et al, cannot
incur debts for the Philippines or such power can be delegated to them. Constantino argue that
the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the
President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior
concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitutionthe Monetary Board
reinforces the submission that not respondents but the President alone and personally can
validly bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the said
scheme.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines can validly delegate her debt power to
the respondents.

HELD: Yes. There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the President
may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country with prior concurrence of the
Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be
onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the President can delegate this power to her direct
subordinates. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision
of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the
process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the governments debt is deep
within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the
required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign
debt management goals. If the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the
foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough
to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of
incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that may be
taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate,
obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated
deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the
documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of
cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and
would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government. The act of the
Cuisia et al are not unconstitutional.

Exception:

There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval
or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the
Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of
approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person.
Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law
and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy).

There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if
exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the
supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of
government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the
accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of
the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a
showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v Duque III

Facts:

Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR)
of E.O. 51 (Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that
are not constitutional and go beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued
by President Cory Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986. One of the preambular
clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the Intl Code of
Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health
claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR.

Issue:

Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent intl agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law of the
land and may be implemented by DOH through the RIRR. If yes, W/N the RIRR is in accord with
intl agreements

MAIN: W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution by
promulgating the RIRR.

Held:

Sub-issue:

Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, intl law can become domestic law by transformation (thru
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation) or incorporation (mere constitutional
declaration i.e treaties) The ICBMS and WHA resolutions were not treaties as they have not
been concurred by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as required under Sec, 21, Art 8. However,
the ICBMS had been transformed into domestic law through a local legislation such as the Milk
Code. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS.

No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that the provisions
pertinent WHA resolutions are customary intl law that may be deemed part of the law of the
land. For an intl rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is
being followed by states because they consider it as obligatory to comply with such rules
(opinion juris). The WHO resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were
enforced or practiced by at least a majority of member states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby
legislature enacted most of the provisions into the law via the Milk Code, the WHA Resolutions
(specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to 24
Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes) have not been adopted as
domestic law nor are they followed in our country as well. The Filipinos have the option of how
to take care of their babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be classified as SOFT LAW
non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Soft law is not part of
intl law.
Main issue:

Yes. Some parts of the RIRR were not in consonance with the Milk Code such as Sec. 4(f) -
>advertising, promotions of formula are prohibited,

Sec 11 -> prohibitions for advertising breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young
children uo to 24 months

And Sec 46 -> sanctions for advertising .

These provisions are declared null and void. The DOH and respondents are prohibited from
implementing said provisions.

Bayan Muna vs. Romulo - GR No. 159618 Case Digest

Facts:

Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the
marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was
impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the
International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for
the most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the
national criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave
under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of
aggression.

On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome
Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory
states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear
to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not
among the 92.

RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral
agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the RP.

Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the
RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals
embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with the US
government. In esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as persons
of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and
defense partnership between the two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral
agreements have been effected by and between the US and 33 other countries.

The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:

1. For purposes of this Agreement, persons are current or former Government officials,
employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party.

2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the express
consent of the first Party,

(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any purpose,
unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, or

(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or expelled
to a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any international tribunal,
unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council.

3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the Philippines to a
third country, the [US] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third
country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN
Security Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines [GRP].

4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the [USA] to a
third country, the [GRP] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third
country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN
Security Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the [US].

5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one party notifies
the other of its intent to terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall
continue to apply with respect to any act occurring, or any allegation arising, before the
effective date of termination.

In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-
surrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the
exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under international law;
and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US
Senate.

In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding

and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least
declared as without force and effect.

Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for contracting
obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized
principles of international law.

Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.

Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being
that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.

Petitioners contentionperhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international

doctrines, practices, and jargonsis untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation,
as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law and international jurisprudence as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An
exchange of notes falls into the category of inter-governmental agreements, which is an
internationally accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty
Collections (Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:

An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities with the
private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the
parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other. Under the
usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent.
The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads.
The technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy
procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval.
In another perspective, the terms exchange of notes and executive agreements have been
used interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that
becomes binding through executive action. On the other hand, executive agreements
concluded by the President sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times
that of more formal documents denominated agreements or protocols. As former US High
Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of
Trade Agreement Acts:

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and
agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise
begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. x x x

It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03be it viewed as the Non-
Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to
be boundis a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international written contract
among nations.

Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance

with Principles of International Law

Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral
obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of
international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner
would put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that
deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering an
American criminal to the [ICC] x x x.63

The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position, which, as already
discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its
sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute,
contrary to international law principles.

The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement,
as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try
and punish crimes under its national law. x x x The agreement is a recognition of the primacy
and competence of the countrys judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and
dispense justice fairly and judiciously.

Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow
Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial
and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized
under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with
the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities
necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the
Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international
tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute
the crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or
violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal
jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by
both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.

THE PAQUETE HABANA, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)

Facts:

These are two appeals from decrees of the district court of the United States for the southern
district of Florida condemning two fishing vessels and their cargoes as prize of war.

Each vessel was a fishing smack, running in and out of Havana, and regularly engaged in fishing
on the coast of Cuba. It sailed under the Spanish flag and was owned by a Spanish subject of
Cuban birth, living in the city of Havana. It was commanded by a subject of Spain, also residing
in Havana. Her master and crew had no interest in the vessel, but were entitled to share her
catch.

Her cargo consisted of fresh fish, caught by her crew from the sea, put on board as they were
caught, and kept and sold alive. Until stopped by the blockading squadron she had no
knowledge of the existence of the war or of any blockade. She had no arms or ammunition on
board, and made on attempt to run the blockade after she knew of its existence, nor any
resistance at the time of the capture.

The Paquete Habana (1st vessel) was a sloop and had a crew of three Cubans, including the
master, who had a fishing license from the Spanish government, and no other commission or
license. She left Havana and was captured by the United States gunboat Castine.

The Lola (2nd vessel) was a schooner and had a crew of six Cubans, including the master, and
no commission or license. She was stopped by the United States steamship Cincinnati, and was
warned not to go into Havana, but was told that she would be allowed to land at Bahia Honda.
She then set for Bahia Honda, but on the next morning, when near that port, was captured by
the United States steamship Dolphin.
Both the fishing vessels were brought by their captors into Key West. A libel for the
condemnation of each vessel and her cargo as prize of war was filed. Each vessel was sold by
auction (the Paquete Habana for the sum of $490 and the Lola for the sum of $800). There was
no other evidence in the record of the value of either vessel or of her cargo.

Issue:

Whether or not the fishing smacks were subject to capture during the war with Spain.

Held:

No. By an ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually
ripening into a rule of international law, coast fishing vessels, pursuing their vocation of
catching and bringing in fresh fish, have been recognized as exempt, with their cargoes and
crews, from capture as prize of war. (The case then discussed instances throughout history
where fishing vessels were captured.)

It will be convenient to refer to some leading French treatises on international law as

determined by the general consent of civilized nations.

'Enemy ships,' say Pistoye and Duverdy, in their Treatise on Maritime Prizes, published in 1855,
'are good prize. Not all, however; for it results from the unanimous accord of the maritime
powers that an exception should be made in favor of coast fishermen. Such fishermen are
respected by the enemy so long as they devote themselves exclusively to fishing.'

De Cussy, in his work on the Phases and Leading Cases of the Maritime Law of Nations, affirms
in the clearest language the exemption from capture of fishing boats, saying, that 'in time of
war the freedom of fishing is respected by belligerents; fishing boats are considered as neutral;
in law, as in principle, they are not subject either to capture or to confiscation.

Ortolan, in the fourth edition of his Regles Internationales et Diplomatie de la Mer, after stating
the general rule that the vessels and cargoes of subjects of the enemy are lawful prize, says:
'Nevertheless, custom admits an exception in favor of boats engaged in the coast fishery; these
boats, as well as their crews, are free from capture and exempt from all hostilities. The coast-
fishing industry is, in truth, wholly pacific, and of much less importance in regard to the national
wealth that it may produce than maritime commerce or the great fisheries. Peaceful and wholly
inoffensive, those who carry it on, may be called the harvesters of the territorial seas, since
they confine themselves to gathering in the products thereof; they are for the most part poor
families who seek in this calling hardly more than the means of gaining their livelihood.' Again,
after observing that there are very few solemn public treaties which make mention of the
immunity of fishing boats in time of war, he says: 'From another point of view the custom which
sanctions this immunity is not so general that it can be considered as making an absolute
international rule; but it has been so often put in practice, and, besides, it accords so well with
the rule in use in wars on land, in regard to peasants and husbandmen, to whom coast
fishermen may be likened, that it will doubtless continue to be followed in maritime wars to
come. (A lot of opinions of other writers were also included which will not be mentioned in this
digest.

This review of the precedents and authorities on the subject appears to us abundantly to
demonstrate that at the present day, by the general consent of the civilized nations of the
world, and independently of any express treaty or other public act, it is an established rule of
international law, founded on considerations of humanity to a poor and industrious order of
men, and of the mutual convenience of belligerent states, that coast fishing vessels, with their
implements and supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed and honestly pursuing their peaceful
calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt from capture as prize of war.

The exemption, of course, does not apply to coast fishermen or their vessels if employed for a
warlike purpose, or in such a way as to give aid or information to the enemy; nor when military
or naval operations create a necessity to which all private interests must give way.

Nor has the exemption been extended to ships or vessels employed on the high sea in taking
whales or seals or cod or other fish which are not brought fresh to market, but are salted or
otherwise cured and made a regular article of commerce.

This rule of international law is one which prize courts administering the law of nations are
bound to take judicial notice of, and to give effect to, in the absence of any treaty or other
public act of their own government in relation to the matter.

By the practice of all civilized nations, vessels employed only for the purposes of discovery or
science are considered as exempt from the contingencies of war, and therefore not subject to
capture. It has been usual for the government sending out such an expedition to give notice to
other powers; but it is not essential.

To this subject in more than one aspect are singularly applicable the words uttered by Mr.
Justice Strong, speaking for this court: 'Undoubtedly no single nation can change the law of the
sea. The law is of universal obligation and no statute of one or two nations can create
obligations for the world. Like all the laws of nations, it rests upon the common consent of
civilized communities. It is of force, not because it was prescribed by any superior power, but
because it has been generally accepted as a rule of conduct. Whatever may have been its origin,
whether in the usages of navigation, or in the ordinances of maritime states, or in both, it has
become the law of the sea only by the concurrent sanction of those nations who may be said to
constitute the commercial world. Many of the usages which prevail, and which have the force
of law, doubtless originated in the positive prescriptions of some single state, which were at
first of limited effect, but which, when generally accepted, became of universal obligation.'

In the case, each vessel was of a moderate size, such as is not unusual in coast fishing smacks,
and was regularly engaged in fishing on the coast of Cuba. The crew of each were few in
number, had no interest in the vessel, and received, in return for their toil and enterprise, two
thirds of her catch, the other third going to her owner by way of compensation for her use.
Each vessel went out from Havana to her fishing ground, and was captured when returning
along the coast of Cuba. The cargo of each consisted of fresh fish, caught by her crew from the
sea, and kept alive on board. Although one of the vessels extended her fishing trip, we cannot
doubt that each was engaged in the coast fishery, and not in a commercial adventure, within
the rule of international law.

The case was adjudged that the capture was unlawful and without probable cause ordered that
the proceeds of the sale of the vessel, together with the proceeds of any sale of her cargo, be
restored to the claimant, with damages and costs.

Suzette Nicolas vs Alberto Romulo

On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against Nicole. He was
convicted of the said crime and was ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith was a
US serviceman convicted of a crime against our penal laws and the crime was committed within
the countrys jurisdiction. But pursuant to the VFA, a treaty between the US and Philippines, the
US embassy was granted custody over Smith. Nicole, together with the other petitioners
appealed before the SC assailing the validity of the VFA. Their contention is that the VFA was
not ratified by the US senate in the same way our senate ratified the VFA.

ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-executing.

HELD: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its provisions to be
enforceable, precisely because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings
under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented
and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce Smith before the
court during the trial.

The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of
the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their
ratification be immediately implemented. The SC noted that the VFA is not like other treaties
that need implementing legislation such as the Vienna Convention. As regards the
implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given
under it and this can only be done through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another
form of implementation of its provisions.

Saguisag vs Executive Secretary

Facts:

Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC the
constitutionality of EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement entered
into by the executive department with the US and ratified on June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA,
the PH shall provide the US forces the access and use of portions of PH territory, which are
called Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access and to use the Agreed Locations, the US
may undertake the following types of activities within the Agreed Locations: security
cooperation exercises; joint and combined training activities; humanitarian and disaster relief
activities; and such other activities that as may be agreed upon by the parties.

Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement with US
violated the constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA involves foreign
military bases, troops and facilities whose entry into the country should be covered by a treaty
concurred in by the Senate. The Senate, through Senate Resolution 105, also expressed its
position that EDCA needs congressional ratification.

Issue 1: W/N the petitions as citizens suit satisfy the requirements of legal standing in
assailing the constitutionality of EDCA

No. In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing as citizens may
dodge the requirement of having to establish a direct and personal interest if they show that
the act affects a public right. But here, aside from general statements that the petitions involve
the protection of a public right, and that their constitutional rights as citizens would be violated,
the petitioners failed to make any specific assertion of a particular public right that would be
violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do so, the present petitions cannot be
considered by the Court as citizens suits that would justify a disregard of the aforementioned
requirements.

Issue 2: W/N the petitioners have legal standing as taxpayers

No. Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA is neither meant to be a tax measure,
nor is it directed at the disbursement of public funds.

A taxpayers suit concerns a case in which the official act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Here, those challenging the act
must specifically show that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
public money, and that they will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
assailed act. Applying that principle to this case, they must establish that EDCA involves the
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A reading of the EDCA, however, would
show that there has been neither an appropriation nor an authorization of disbursement.

Issue 3: W/N the petitions qualify as legislators suit

No. The power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an institutional

prerogative granted by the Constitution to the Senate. In a legislators suit, the injured party
would be the Senate as an institution or any of its incumbent members, as it is the Senates
constitutional function that is allegedly being violated. Here, none of the petitioners, who are
former senators, have the legal standing to maintain the suit.

Issue 4: W/N the SC may exercise its Power of Judicial Review over the case

Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise matters of transcendental importance
which justify setting aside the rule on procedural technicalities. The challenge raised here is
rooted in the very Constitution itself, particularly Art XVIII, Sec 25 thereof, which provides for a
stricter mechanism required before any foreign military bases, troops or facilities may be
allowed in the country. Such is of paramount public interest that the Court is behooved to
determine whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive
Department.

VINUYA VS. SEC. ROMULO

FACTS:

This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the
Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization
registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by
Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the
DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and
military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the
Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and
took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had
already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to
espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them;
and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international
tribunals.

Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war
were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations
Agreement of 1956.

On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine government signed a
Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort
women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development.

ISSUE:

WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

RULING:

Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the
exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.

Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.

One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-
established that the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislativethe politicaldepartments of the government,
and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.
They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose
welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly
possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However,
the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against
a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive
all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The
wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.

The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which
prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential
sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical
to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby
creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive
Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a
coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally
committed.

From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an
extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our consideration
the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of
espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners
and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether
further steps are appropriate or necessary.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a
claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a
government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. By taking up the case of one of its
subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf,
a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the
rules of international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by
whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is
asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their
rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do
is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or
obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not
affect the position internationally.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis.
Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus
cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute
perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of
jus cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a
legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole.
Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the
international community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of
the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory
authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered
peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be
modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

TANADA v. ANGARA

Facts :

This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their
capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the
reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus,
provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with
exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in
the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and
impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of
the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Held:

In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy
of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which
are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international
agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but
creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.

Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute
because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines
joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept
of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to
determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial
inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO
allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it
should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable
structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international
trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the
people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.

Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.