Hintikka - Kant On Existence, Predication, and Ontological Argument

Kant on Existence, Predication, and the Ontological Argument
Author(s): Jaakko Hintikka

Source: Dialectica, Vol. 35, No. 1/2 (1981), pp. 127-146
Published by: Wiley
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Kant on Existence, Predication, and the Ontological Argument*
Hintikka"
byJaakko
Summary
Theontologicalargument ofanoperator
failsbecause order switchbetween(1) 44necessarily
thereisan(existentially) being"and(2) "there
perfect isa being which -
is(existential
necessarily
ly)perfect".Here(1) istrivially
truelogicallybut(2)problematic. SinceKant'scriticisms
were
directedatthenotionofexistence, notatthestepfrom (1) to(2),they aremisplaced. Theyare
alsowrong, because canbea predicate.
existence Moreover, Kantdidnotanticipate claim
Frege's
that"is" ("ist")isambiguous between existence,
predication, identity, To
andclass-inclusion.
restoretheontologicalargument,an extrapremise is needed to theeffect(roughly) thatitis
known whotheexistentially
perfect beingis. Thequestion is raisedwhetherKantcouldhave
meant ofthisextra
thefailure premisebyhisthesis thatexistence isnota realpredicate.
Rsum
La preuve ontologique (del'existence pas caused'unepermutation
deDieu),n'aboutit de
desoprateurs
l'ordre danslesphrases (1) parncessit
suivantes: untrequiest(exis-
ilexiste
parfait
tentiellement) untrequi,parncessit,
et(2)il existe est(existentiellement)
parfait.
De cesdeuxphrases, la premireestlogiquement maiss'avre
vraie, untruisme,tandisquela
seconde estproblmatique. Puisquela critique
dirigeparKantcontre cettepreuve visaitla
notionmme del'existence, etnonlemouvement dela pense
dupremier noncverslesecond,
cettecritiqueestdplace; ellecomporte enoutreuneerreur,parcequel'existencepeuttreun
De plus,Kantn'apasanticip
prdicat. laremarquedeFrege, lemotest(ist)est
selonlaquelle
quivoque, comportant de la prdication,
lessensdel'existence, etde l'inclusion
de l'identit
dansuneclasse.Poursauver la preuve ona besoind'uneprmisse
ontologique, supplmentaire
quiengrosprciserait qu'onsaitquiestcettreexistentiellement Enfin,
parfait. l'auteurse
demande sic'est l'absencedecetteprmissequeKantpensait quel'existence
prtendait
lorsqu'il
n'estpasunvraiprdicat.
Zusammenfassung
Gottesbeweis
Derontologische einen
enthlt deraufeiner
Fehlschuss vonOpe-
Verschiebung
beruht:
ratoren einstillschweigendes
erenthlt gibtesein
von(1)notwendigerweise
Gleichsetzen
Wesen
vollkommenes
(existenziell) und(2) esgibteinWesen,dasnotwendigerweise
(existen-
* The ofthispaperwasmadepossible bya fellowship

fromtheJohnSimon Gug-
writing
genheim Memorial Inwriting
Foundation. it,I haveprofited from
greatly with
discussions Mer-
rillB. Hintikka,Russell
Dancy, andRobert from
Beard,andespecially andcor-
conversations
respondence withRobert
Howell. I alsoprofited from
greatly version
ofanearly
thediscussion of
thispaper attheFourth
InternationalColloquiummBiel,May1-4,1980,andwouldliketothank
allthe inthatdiscussion.
**participants
StateUniversity.
Florida
Dialctica Vol.35,N1-2(1981)
128 Hintikka
Jaakko
ziell)vollkommen ist.DerersteSatzstellteinetriviale Wahrheit

logische dar,whrendderletzte-
reproblematisch ist.Da KantsKritik nuraufdenBegriff derExistenzundnichtaufdenber-
gangvon(1) zu (2)gerichtet ist,kannsienicht Zudem
zutreffen. istsiefalsch, in
weilExistenz
einem natrlichen
Sinne durchaus einPrdikatseinkann. AuchistKantkeinVorluferderFrege-
schen These,dassistmehrdeutig sei,indemesIdentitt,
Prdikation,Existenz
undKlassenin-
klusion bedeutenkann.Umdenontologischen Gottesbeweis brauchen
wiederherzustellen, wirei-
nezustzliche Prmisse,diebesagt,dassesbekannt vollkommene
ist,werdas(existenziell) Wesen
ist.Es stellt
sichdieFrage, ob nicht dieTheseKants,
vielleicht dassExistenzkeinreales
Prdikat
sei,so auszulegensei,alswrde sieaufdasFehlen dieserzustzlichen
Prmissenhinweisen.
The subject matter of my paper can be discussed only against the

backgroundof two larger issues. They loom large both systematically and
historically.They are the ontological argument for God's existence1 and
the Frege-Russellthesisthat "is" is multiplyambiguous2,indeedambiguous
betweenthe "is" of existence, "is" of identity,"is" of predication,and
"is" of genericimplication.These allegedlydifferent meaningscan be illus-
tratedby "God is" or (3x)(God = x), "Jack is JohnJr." or Jack= JohnJr.,
"Jack is blond" or Blond(Jack), and "man is an animal," or
(x)(Man(x) D Animal(x)). Any discussionof Kant's treatment of beingis thus
beingtacitlypresidedover by Anselmand Frege.
As the case is frequently,the crucial aspect of one's discussionof the
historyof an interestingconfigurationof ideas turnsout to be a topical
analysisof theconceptualsituationwhichtheseideas exemplify3. Hence I will
have to spendsometimeand care examiningthelogicand semanticsof theon-
tologicalargument,as well as thelogic of "is" and "being". My paper thus
needs somethinglikethe familiarnineteenth-century Germansubtitle"Eine
historisch-kritischeStudie."
My conclusions concerningKant's relation to these two overreaching
issues are rathernegative.Kant's criticismsof the ontologicalargumentare
misplaced,not to say mistaken.Nor is he an earlyheraldof theFrege-Russell
1 Cf.e. g. TheMany-Faced Argumentyed.byJohn HickandArthur TheMac-

C. McGill,
millanCompany, NewYork,1967;TheOntological Argument, ed. byAlvinPlantingaand
Richard Taylor, Doubleday,GardenCity,N. Y., 1965;DieterHenrich,Derontologische
Got-
J.C. B. Mohr,
tesbeweis, Tbingen, 1960(seconded. 1967);W. L. Gombocz, berE!: Zur
Semantikdes Existenzprdikates und des ontologischen Argumentes, Verbandder
wissenschaftlichen sterreichs
Gesellschaften Verlag,Wien,1974;Jonathan Barnes,TheOn-
Argument,
tological Macmillan,London, 1972.Allthesegivefurther totheliterature.
references
Fora contemporary view,seeTime,
journalistic pp.65-68.
April7, 1980,
2 Cf. mypaper,"'Is', Semantical Games,and Semantical Journal
Relativity", of
Philosophical Logic,vol. 8 (1979),pp. 433-468,whichprovides furtherreferences
to the
literature.
3 Cf.heremyAPApresidential address "GapsintheGreat ChainofBeing:AnExercisein
theMethodology of theHistory of Ideas",Proceedings andAddresses of APA, vol. 49
(1975-76).
KantonExistence, andtheOntological
Predication, Argument 129
thesis,as has been claimed4.The mainstayof Kant's discussion,viz. his thesis

that "existenceis not a predicate," can be shownto be false.
These are big claims,perhapsbiggerthan I can hope to prove in a single
paper. I shall nevertheless
spell out myresultssomewhatmore fullyand in-
dicatewhyI thinktheyare valid.
To put my firstpoint bluntly,most of the criticismsof the ontological
argumenthave been misplaced,Kant's included.The mistakein themainver-
sion of the ontological argument,or what I find by far the best rational
reconstruction of the argument,is an operator-switchfallacy.Considerfirst
the sentence
(1) N(3x)[(y)(y exists D x exists)]
where "N" is the necessityoperator.There are two thingsto be observed
about thissentence.First,it is trivially valid (logicallytrue),and, second,that
it looks verymuchlike a summaryof the ontologicalargument.Let me spell
out thesetwo points.
I have noted beforethat(1) is triviallyvalid completelyindependently of
whatthe "predicate of existence'' used in it is5. I have also claimedthatit is
the logical truthof (1) that makes the ontological argumentso perennially
seductive.In fact,(1) mightseemto expresspreciselythe desiredconclusion,
viz. the necessaryexistenceof an existentially perfectbeing. Indeed, it can
readilybe seen that(1) is closelyrelatedto theontologicalargumentin its ac-
tual historicalversions. What (1) says is that, necessarily,there is an in-
dividualsuch thatif anythingexists,it does, whichnearlysays - or seemsto
say - thatthereis somethingwhichis greatestwithrespectto existence("pre-
eminentin its mode of existence,"to use Kant's words in A 586 = B 614).
Thus the inside conditionalin (1), viz. (y)(y exists D x exists),can be con-
sideredas a characterization of god ( = x), conceivedof as themostpowerful
being with respect to existence.Kant assertswhatis verysimilarto thisinside
conditionalof (1) whenhe says (A 588 = B 616) that "from any givenex-
istence... we can correctly infertheexistenceof an unconditionally necessary
being,"that is, a God. Thus, thewholeof (1) seemsto expressquite wellthe
Anselmianidea thatthemostperfectbeing- a beinggreaterthanwhichcan-
not be conceivedof - mustnecessarilyexist,withthe perfectionin question
restricted to perfectionor maximalgreatnesswithrespectto existence.
4 Seee. g. Jonathan Kant'sDialectic
Bennett, , Cambridge Press,Cambridge,
University
1974, pp.228-240. Bennettevenspeaksinthetitleofhis72of"theKant-Frege view".
5 Seemyessay, "OntheLogicoftheOntological Argument ", inJaakko
Hintikka,Models
forModalities, D. Reidel,
Dordrecht,1969.Thisessaypromteda perceptive
attempttoshowthat
mycriticism oftheontological
argument is related
toKant's;seeHansWagner, "berKants
Satz,dasDaseinseikeinPrdikat", ArchivfrGeschichtederPhilosophie,
vol.53,no.2 (1971),
pp.183-186.
130 Hintikka
Jaakko
From (1) the defendersof the ontologicalargumentin effectfallaciously

infer
(2) (3x)N[(y)(y exists D x exists)].
This quantifierswitchis thecrucialmistakein themostinteresting versionsof
the ontologicalargument.For, appearancesnotwithstanding, it is (2) and not
(1) that Anselm, Descartes & Co. really want to establish.Thus the logical
truthof (1) helpsthemonlyiftheycould take the further step from (1) to (2).
But this further is
step illegitimate. (We shall laterreturn to the questionas to
what furtherpremisesmightserveto validatethe step.)
It remainsto spell out more fullywhatis involvedhere. Firstwhyis it (2)
and not (1) that the ontologicalargumentis calculated to prove? This is
perhaps seen most easily by means of possible-worldssemanticsof (l)-(2).
What (1) says is thatin each worldthereis somethingsuch thatif anythingat
all existsin thatworld,it does. The reasonwhythisis not enoughis due to the
fact that in differentworldssuch individualscan be entirelydifferent from
each other.Indeed, thetriviality of (1) is reflectedbythefactthatanyexisting
individualcan be chosen as thevalue of theexistentially bound variable"x"
in (l)6. We would be able to infer(2) from(1) onlyifwe could assumethatall
theseindividualsare (or can be chosento be) identicalwitheach other.
In contrast,(2) attributesthestatusof existentially greatestbeingto some
one individualin all (nonempty)worlds7.This is obviouslywhattheargument
is supposedto establish.In viewof thevalidityof (1), therightwayof criticiz-
ing the ontologicalargumentis henceto spell out the differencebetween(1)
and (2) and to show how and whythe step from(1) to (2) is fallacious.
A prolegomenonto such a criticismis to point out how naturallanguage
tends to hide the differencesbetween (1) and (2). Indeed, such English
sentencesas
(3) There necessarilyis some individual which is existentiallythe
greatest
are ambiguousbetween(1) and (2). Moreover,considerthe use of anyexpres-
44
e.g., which" in (3) and
sions which rely on grammaticalcross-reference,
"it" in the fullerformof (3), viz. in
(4) There necessarilyis some individualwhichis such thatif anything

exists,it does.
6 Cf."On theLogicoftheOntologicalArgument" (loc.cit.)

1 Thedifference
between a dedicto-de
(1)and(2)isessentially recontrast. discus-
Further
between
sionoftherelation inKantis found
thetwoconstructions inRobert paperin
Howell's
thisnumber ofDialctica.
The use of such expressionsusuallypresupposesthattheirreferenceis well-

definedin all thepossibleworldswhichwe are tacitlyconsidering.Such well-
definednessis, we saw, just whatis neededto move from(1) to (2). How deep
the sourcesof fallacyrun hereis illustratedby the etymologyof the English
existentialquantifierword 4'some" as havingthesame root as "same one".
What is even morepertinentto note hereis thatsimilarlocutionsabound
in philosophicaldiscussions,not theleast in discussionsabout theontological
argument.For instance,Kant speaks of, as we saw, a being(some one being)
whose existencecan be inferredfromany givenexistence.
Apart fromexplainingthetemptationto infer(2) from(1) (or, better,to
assimilatethetwo to each other)whichordinarydiscoursegenerates,thebest
way of defusingthe fallacyseems to me to be to expose the generaltypeof
mistakethatis exemplifiedby the fallaciousderivationof (2) from(1). Pro-
bably the most effectiveway of doing so is to appeal to the informalideas
whichare systematized in mygame-theoretical semantics8.We don't need the
here
systematization except as a backup line of defenseforthe appeal to cer-
tain "iconic" ideas.
In (1), malicious nature(who is tryingto defeatme) chooses a possible
worldw forwhichI willhave to show thatin it thereis somethingsuch thatit
existsin w if anythingat all existsin w. In contrast,in (2) I have to be able to
choose (for(2) to be true)an individualx suchthat,no matterwhatworldw is
subsequentlychosen by nature,the verysame individualx will exist in w if
anythingat all existsin w. As you can see, the differenceis subtle but un-
mistakable.This is one of themanycases whereinformalsemanticalideas can
performa tremendousservice in philosophicalanalysis and philosophical
argumentation.It is perhapsnot at all surprising thatphilosopherswho were
thinkingmuchmorein verbalthanin semanticaltermsshould have been con-
fused about the interrelations of (1) and (2). The earlymedievais,including
Anselm,would presumablybe cases in point.
Moreover,theinformaluse of theidea of possibleworldswhichI reliedon
was deeplyforeignto mostof themedievaltradition.Aristotlesquarelyrefus-
ed to considerany worldhistorydifferent fromour actual one. For him,my
informalexplanation would not have made any sense, because it employs
cruciallythe idea of a multiplicity of possible worlds. AdmittedlyAristotle
operatedfreelywithassortedpossibilia,but they,too, had to provetheirmet-
tle in thecourseof theone actual courseof events9.Even in theabsence of a
8 Seemyessays inEsaSaarinen,
collected Game-Theoretical
editor, , D. Reidel,
Semantics
Dordrecht.1979.
9 SeeheremybooksTimeandNecessity
, Clarendon Oxford,
Press, and(with
1973, Simo
KnuuttilaandUntoRemes) onModality
Aristotle andDeterminism Fennica,
(ActaPhilosophica
vol.29,no.1),North-Holland, 1977.
Amsterdam,
132 Jaakko
Hintikka
detailed historicalinvestigation,it seems clear that Anselm had not disen-

tangledhimselffullyfromAristotle'sactualism. Hence the mistakeis in a
literalsense of the expressiondoubly natural for someone in his historical
position to make. Kant, unfortunately, has much less of an excuse in this
respect.
Althoughthe real fallacyof theontologicalargumentlies in the stepfrom
(1) to (2) and not in (1) itself,most of the actual criticismsof the argument
have to be construedas criticizing(1) and not the transitionfrom(1) to (2).
Kant's thesis that "existence is not a predicate" is a case in point10. It
amountsto an attemptto denythelegitimacyof theway (1) is formulatedin
the firstplace. For (1) will not get off the groundwithoutsome way of ex-
*'
pressingtheexistenceof individuals,i. e. , of using existenceas a predicate' ' .
Hence the Kantian gambit is admittedlyprima facie quite tempting,even
thoughit is misplaced.
Thereis a temptingwayof tryingto smuggleintotheontologicalargument
what amountsto the crucial quantifierswitch.It is to tryto strengthen the
"material implication" in (1) into somethinglike a logical or analytical
"strict" implication.This would indeedturn(1) into(2). It maybe thatKant
was in effecttryingto guardhimselfagainstthismanoeuverwhenhe removed
(Aristotlenotwithstanding) all existentialforce fromessentialpredications.
This is not the crux of the matter,however.If we tryto inserta necessity-
operatorto fronttheinnerconditionalof (1), we lose thetriviallogical truth
of (1). Why?Not, as Kant (and others)seemto have thought,because existen-
tial presuppositionsare not fulfilled,but because we need whatI have called a
uniqueness premiseto justifythe existentialgeneralizationwhich the step
from(1) to (2) in effectis. For suppose "g" (shortfor"a god ") is a singular
termwhichin each worldpicksout the kindof individualwhichis assertedto
existthereby (1). In otherwords,it is truethat
(5) N(3x)(g = x)
Now we know frommodal logic thatthisterm"g" can help to establish(2)
onlyif we have at our disposal the additionalpremise
(6) (3x)N(g = x)f
whereno existentialforceis beingassumed.What (6) expressesis preciselythe
identity(g = x) of g withsome one individual(thex in " (3x) ") in all thepossi-
10Kant'sthesis
hasimplications
beyondwhatisbeing discussed
here.Itcanbeconstruedas
themedieval
criticizing andneo-Platonic
ideasthatexistence
quaexistencecarried
with
itself
in-
attributes
teresting of whichwecanprofitablytheorize.
Theproblem goesbacktoAristotle's
a science
aporiaconcerning ofbeingquabeing.Byandlarge, Aristotle
wasmuch morewary of
sucha sciencethanwerehisfollowers.
Kant'sdenialthatexistence
is a predicate
mayhencebe
viewedas theendofa longneo-Platonic
andscholastic
detour.(Cf.notes13and24below.)
KantonExistence, andtheOntologica!
ble worlds (introducedby "N"). As we saw, the failureof this identityis

preciselythe fatalflaw in the usual versionsof the ontologicalargument.
The auxiliarypremise(6) is analogous to the proposition
(7) (3x) it is knownthat(g = x)

whichsays thatit is knownwho (or what) God is. In factit is (7) and not (6)
thatwe need as an auxiliarypremiseif we wantto establishthatit is known
that God exists. It is no wonder, in view of these observations,that the
literatureon the ontological argumentis full of considerationsof whether
God necessarilyis who he (or she) is, and whetherwe can "conceive of" or
"understand" who God is. As we know,Anselmand Gaunilo were already
discussingthe latterissue. As far as the formeris concerned,the missing
premise(6) seemedto be conveniently suppliedbyExodus 3:13-14,whereGod
says: "I am who I am," presumablymeaningthat He necessarilyis who He
is11. It would divertour purposeto explorethesehistoricallyimportantlines
of thoughthere,however.
I thinkit is the time to lay to rest the myththat "existence is not a
predicate". It is embarrassingly clear what Kant's groundsfor maintaining
thisthesiswere.They werelargelydue to thepaucityof logics and languages
he was contemplating.He envisagedonly two types of judgmentrelevant
here, viz. what I shall here call judgmentsof 'essential' predicationand
judgmentsof existence.(Wherecontingent predicationwas supposedto finda
nichewas not explainedby thegood Immanuel12.)In theformer,exemplified
by "God is omnipotent,"a necessaryconnectionis assertedto obtain bet-
weenthesubjectand thepredicate,withoutprejudicingtheexistenceof either.
As Kant puts it, "the omnipotencecannotbe rejectedif we posit a Deity,for
the two conceptsare identical". But thisjudgmentcarriesno existentialim-
port. . . if we say, 'There is no God', neitherthe omnipotencenor any
otherof its predicatesis given;theyare one and all rejectedtogetherwiththe
subject."
The other kind of judgmentKant mentionsis the existentialone, e.g.,
"God exists". In neitherone is existencea predicate,Kant says in effect.A
judgmentof essentialpredicationhas no existentialforce,whereasin an ex-
istentialone we take a subject as it were all ready-madewith its essential
predicatesand simplyassertthat this particularcomplex of predicatesis in
" Onthehistory oftheinterpretations

ofthispronouncement,
cf.E. Gilson,
Historyof
Christian
PhilosophyintheMiddleAges,Random House,NewYork,1955,pp.3, 69070,92,
579,and591.
149,216,253,293,368,371,438-439,
12Someindications arenevertheless
foundinKant,
Logik,inAcademy vol.9,pp.
Edition,
60-61.
134 Jaakko
Hintikka
factinstantiatedin reality.Here existenceis not one of the configurationof

predicates;it is whatis assertedof the configuration.
Nothingis wronghere. A faithfulAristotelianwould have worriedabout
thetotal absence of existentialimportin a judgmentof essentialpredication,
foron certainconditionsAristotleseemsto have maintainedsuch an import.
He wentso far as to worrylest thiswould lend otherinstancesof copula a
similarexistentialforce,so thatwe could fallaciouslyinferfrom"Homer is a
poet" that "Homer is," i.e., exists13.
However, our worriesare not Aristotelian.Kant's mistakeis not thathe
says somethingfalse,butthathis philosophicaldietis one-sided:he nourishes
himselfon too few kinds of examples. In reality,there is a tremendous
multitudeof formsof propositionwhichgo way beyond the ones Kant en-
visages.Among them,I suggest,we can safelyassume to be includedsome in
which"existence is a predicate" in whateverreasonablesense we can giveto
thisphrase.
The followingargumentmay indicatewhy this assumptionis eminently
natural- and also whytheuse of existenceas a properpredicatehas metwith
such a resistanceamong philosophers.This line of thoughtwould of course
have been rejectedbyKant,but I thinkthatit would have been appreciatedby
Leibniz.
Obviously,we attributeto actual individualsall the timepredicateswhich
turnon what theywould be like in otherpossible worlds,forinstance,what
theycould be or could do. Sometimesthesepredicatesturnon theexistenceor
nonexistenceof theseindividualsin those othercircumstances.For example,
speaking of the necessaryconditionsof life in the case of some particular
organisminvolvesthiskindof predication.All thatis neededto be able to use
actual existenceas a predicate(so as to refuteKant) is thenapparentlya parity
of cases. If we can take an individualin the actual world and assign to it a
predicatewhichinvolvesexistenceor nonexistencein some otherworld,surely
we oughtto be thesame tokenbe able to take a "merelypossibleindividual",
i.e., a denizenof some otherworld,and attributeto it predicatesdefinablein
termsof its actual existence,maybe the "predicate of (actual) existence"
itself.Basically,it seemsto me thatthisargumentis unanswerable.Therecer-
tainlyare conceptsapplied to actual individualswhichcan onlybe definedin
generalin termsof (merely)potentialexistence,e. g., thebiologicalconceptof
fertility.Even thoughwe don't do it often,we surelycan pick out one "mere-
ly possible" individualfromothersby specifyingthat it enjoys the dubious
13Cf.RussellM. Dancy,SenseandContradiction
: A Study
inAristotle
, D. Reidel,
Dor-
1975.(Seeespecially
drecht, AppendixII, pp.153-155.)
distinctionof actual existence.Examples are not veryeasy to come by, but

speakingof the actual Hamlet seems to be good enough. For many of us,
Hamlet is firstintroducedas a merelyfictional"possible individual", and we
learnonlysubsequentlythatthemelancholyDane has a real-lifecounterpart.
(You didn't knowthatHamlet reallyexisted?Yes, he did enjoythepredicate
of existence!)
There are severaldifferent kindsof difficultiesherewhichhave led some
philosophersto denythepossibilityof thesortof returnof an individualfrom
other possible worlds to the actual on which I am envisaging. Some
philosophershave failedto see how we can individuatea merelypossible in-
dividual. Doesn't the verypossibilityof consideringsome one definitein-
dividual (to which predicatesare to be ascribed) presupposeits actual ex-
istence? The fact that philosopher-logicians as eminentas Montague and
Kripke have maintainedthis presuppositionshows that we are not dealing
witha mereidle worry.I cannotherediscussthiscomplexof problemsin its
entirety.A good descriptiveaccount of how merelypossible individualscan
enterinto our discourseis givenby David Kaplan in "QuantifyingIn"M. In
general,I believethatthedenial of merelypossibleindividualsis based on an
unrealisticallynarrowview of how our languageactuallyfunctions15.
There is anotherreason whyrecentlogiciansmay have been waryof the
lineof thoughtI just adumbrated.In it,we took an individualwhichhad been
consideredqua citizenof anotherworld and began to considerit also as a
memberof theactual world.A moment'sreflectionshowsthatin theconven-
tionallanguagesof modal logic thereis no wayof doingso. To consideran in-
dividual initiallyin an alternativepossible world means havingits linguistic
representative withinthescope of a modal operator.But thenwe cannotany
longer consider it as a memberof theactual world,forthatwould presuppose
that its representative occurs outside the scope of all modal operators.But
thatwould mean havingintroducedit initiallyqua an inhabitantof the real
world. In brief,in conventionalmodal logic, you can have only one-way
ticketsfromtheactual worldto itsalternatives; no roundtripsare possible.In
less metaphoricterms,anaphoricback referenceto worldsconsideredearlier
is impossiblein the usual notationof modal logic. This featureof themodal
languages most logiciansare familiarwithseems to have discouragedthem
14In DonaldDavidson andJaakko Hintikka, Words

editors, andObjections,D. Reidel,
Dordrecht,
1969,pp.178-214.
15Cf. also JeromeShaffer,"Existence, andtheOntological
Predication, Argument'',
Mind,vol.71(1962),
pp.307-325.Shaffer
maintainsthat"themostthattheOntological
Argu-
mentestablishes
istheintensional God...
object, Shaffer
Apparently doesnotseeanypro-
blemintheuniquenessofthat"intensional
object".
136 Jaakko
Hintikka
fromthinkingthatindividualsintroducedas membersof thedomainsof other

worldscan subsequentlybe consideredalso as denizensof theactual world16.
David Kaplan used to illustratethispoint by means of the followingfor-
mula:
(8) M[(x)(A(x)] D B(x))
where"M" is the possibilityoperator.Of course (8) is ill-formedin tradi-
tional modal logic. Yet it expressesa perfectly good semanticalsense. It says
thatthereis some alternativepossibleworldsuch thateverything thatis there
A is in fact(i. e., in theactual world)B. The remarkablethingis thatthissense
cannot be expressed by any well-formedformula of conventionalmodal
logic17.
This is nevertheless merelya limitationof one particularkindof notational
systems.One can, as Esa Saarinen has done, introducespecial " backwards
"
looking operatorswhicheffectjust thekindof returnjourneyI was envisag-
ing18.What is more interesting, Saarinen has shown convincinglythat the
kindof anaphora whichtheseoperatorsare calculatedto facilitatedoes occur
frequentlyand importantly in ordinarydiscourse.He has thus removedone
importantobstacle from the way of vindicatingexistence as a genuine
predicate,and incidentallyillustratedhow importantmetaphysicaldogmas
can be embodiedin a perfectly innocent-looking formalism.Althoughfurther
argumentsare stillneeded,I hope to have persuadedyou at least thatthereis
no mistake in consideringexistencea predicate. The mainstayof Kant's
criticismof the ontologicalargumentis simplywrong.
But doesn't Kant deserve at least the honor of anticipatingthe Frege
distinction?I am not sure thatsuch precursorship necessarilyqualifiesas an
honor. I have shownthatthe Frege-Russelldistinctionis not indispensable19.
Thereare correctalternativewaysof dealingwiththesemanticsof "is ", ways
which may even be preferableto the Fregean method for the purpose of
understandingnatural language and arguments conducted in natural
language, includingthe argumentsconducted by virtuallyall pre-Fregean
16Thisobservation helpsinunderstandingother
features
oftheliterature
ontheontological
argument. Forinstance, whydomostoftherecent formal
orsemi-formal oftheon-
discussions
tologicalargument presuppose S5?Because thealternativeness
relationis in
symmetric S5,and
thusallows foranattenuated formof"return " which
journeys a merely
bring individual
possible
backtotheactualworld.
17Evensomeofthemedievais seemtohavebeenawareoftheneedofthekindofreturn trip
logicexemplified by(8); seeSimoKnuuttila andEsa Saarinen,
"Backwards-Looking Operators
inBuridan", inIlkkaNiiniluoto etal., editors,
StudiaExcellentia:
EssaysinHonourofOiva
Kentonen (Reports from theDepartement ofPhilosophy, ofHelsinki,
University 1977,no.3.),
DD.11-17.
18See Esa Saarinen' s owncontributions to Game-Theoretical
Semantics, ed. by Esa
Saarinen, D. Reidel,Dordrecht, 1979.
19Seenote2 above.
philosophers.But even apart fromthisdevaluationof Frege, Kant does not

rate the non-honorof paving the way for Frege. It is amply evidentfrom
Kans own wordsthathe does notthinkof our wordsforbeingas exhibiting
the Frege-Russellambiguity.Seeingthisis nevertheless made somewhatmore
difficultby the factthatKant does not speak of just existence(Dasein, Exi-
stenz), being (Sein), and "is" (ist), but also of "positing" (setzen). What is
this "positing", anyway?Kant's pre-criticalessay on proofs of God's ex-
istenceshows unmistakablythat it is merelyanotherexpressionfor being
("Sein"), and thatit is unambiguous(" einfach"):
Der Begriffder Position oder Setzungist vlligeinfachund mitdem
vom Sein berhaupteinerlei.(Academyed., vol. 2, p. 73.)
In the Critiqueof Pure Reason (A 598 = B 626), Kant says that " 'being' is
obviously[sic]nota realpredicate... It is merelythepositingof a thing,or of
certaindeterminations, as existingin themselves".
The reasonwhyKant introducestheterm" setzen" is probablya desireto
have a termwhichsitsmorehappilywiththecases in which"is" apparently
has a merelypredicativefunction."God is omnipotent"could accordingto
Kant be trueeven if therewereno God. It merelyexpressesa necessaryrela-
tion betweenthe subject and the predicate."God is omnipotent" does not
logicallyimplyfor Kant that "God is", even thoughthe step mightseem
tempting.In orderto avoid thistemptation,it seems,Kant uses his terminus
" "
quasi technicus setzen forpositingsomethingas being - in any sense of
being.
The explanationKant gives of the difference between"God is omnipo-
tent" and "God is" neverthelessshows that we are dealing withthe same
"is " in bothcases. In bothcases, we are "positing" something.The onlydif-
ferenceis thatin the formercase thepositingis relativebut in the lattercase
absolute. Otherwise,it is the same old positing.
[In] theproposition,'God is omnipotent',... thesmall word 'is' adds

no new predicate,but only servesto posit the predicatein its relation
[Kant's italics]to the subject.
Here positingclearlymeans predication.But Kant continues:
If, now, we take the subject (God) withall its predicates. . . and say
'God is', or 'There is a God', we attachno new predicateto the con-
cept of God, but only posit the subject in itself with all its
predicates. . .
138 Hintikka
Jaakko
Here positingclearlymeans to assume existence.The relationof existenceto

predicationis thus merelythatof an absolutepositingto a relativeone. This
observationis confirmedby furtherpassages; witnesse. g. the following:
[In an existentialjudgment]. . . nothingcan have been added to the

concept,which expressesmerelywhat is possible, by my thinkingits
4
object (throughthe expression it is') as givenabsolutely[myitalics].
In theBeweisgrund,Kant puts the same distinctionas follows:
Nun kann etwas als bloss beziehungsweisegesetzt,oder besser,bloss
die Beziehung (respectuslogicus) von etwas als einem Merkmal zu
einemDinge gedachtwerden,und dann istdas Sein, das istdie Position
dieser Beziehung,nichtsals der Verbindungsbegriff in einem Urteil.
Wird nichtbloss diese Beziehung,sonderndie Sache an und frsich
selbstgesetztbetrachtet,so ist dieses Sein sovielwie Dasein. (Academy
ed., vol. 2, p. 73.)
Thus Kant clearlythinksof the ' is ' ' of predication(thecopula) and the 4' is ' '
of existenceas two uses of the same notion. Occasionallyhe even seems to
considerthe copulative"is" (at least in necessaryjudgments)as a variantof
the "is " of identity.He thinksof a necessaryjudgmentlike "God is omnipo-
tent" as expressingtheidentityof a God and an omnipotentGod. "The om-
nipotencecannot be rejectedif we posit a deity. . ., forthetwo conceptsare
identical" (A 595 = B 623). Hence meaningdifferencesbetweenthe first
threeelementsof the Fregeambiguityare rejectedby Kant.
As to the fourthalleged sense of "is" apud Frege and Russell, Kant's
assimilationof it to othersenses(especiallyto the "is " of predication)is seen
fromhis failure(or refusal)to distinguishthesubsumptionof one conceptto
anotherfromthe applicationof a conceptto a particular(in otherwords,this
particular'sfalling under the concept). This is particularlystrikingin the
schematismchapter of the Critique of Pure Reason, as has been often
remarked20.
The insightthatKant did not assume theFrege-Russelldistinctionenables
us to make furtherobservations.Among otherthings,it followsthatKant's
main thesisis expressedsomewhatinaccurately- and in any case verynar-
rowly- when it is said that accordingto him existenceis not a predicate.
What he maintained,and frequently said, is thatbeingis not a real predicate.
This applies bothto existentialand predicativeuses of "is "; predicationis ac-
20Cf.e. g. Henry "Transcendental

Allison, Schematism
andtheProblemofTheSynthetic
A Priori", thisnumber;
Dialctica, Gerold
Prauss, beiKant
Erscheinung , Berlin, p. 103.
1971,
cordinglyforKant as littlea predicateas existenceis. This parityof thetwo is

f coursejust a corollaryto Kant's failure(or refusal)to distinguishthe dif-
ferentFregeansensesof "is" fromeach other.
This helpsto put certainpuzzling-looking statementsof Kant's in perspec-
tive. For instance,one of Kant's main pronouncementson our topic in the
firstCritiquerunsas follows:
' '
Being [Sein]is obviouslynot a realpredicate... In itslogicaluse [im
logischenGebrauch]it is merelythecopula of a judgment.(A 598 = B
626; Kant's emphasis.)
Here Kant makeshis claimabout beingin generaland thengoes on to applyit
to predicationratherthan existence.Indeed, thispredicativeuse is precisely
whathe meansby the "logical use" of being. In otherwords,Kant's distinc-
tionbetweenthelogicaluse and otherrelevantuses of "is " is thesame as his
contrastbetweenthe relativeand absolute positingdiscussedabove. (This is
among otheritemsof evidenceshownby our latestdisplayedquote fromthe
Beweisgrund;see especiallythe wordsrespectuslogicus.) Philosophershave
been puzzled by Kant's remarksas to what happens to "is" in its merely
logicaluse, and declareditirrelevantto Kant's mainthesisthatexistenceis not
a predicate21.Kant's remarksare indeed not directlyrelevant,but only
because theypertainto a different but parallelcase of his moregeneralclaim
thatbeingis not a predicate.
There is one superficialaspect of Frege's and Russell's formalismwhich
misleadinglyencourages the idea that Kant's thesis "existence is not a
predicate" is an anticipationof Frege. In the most literalsense, existenceis
not a predicateforFrege,either,viz. in thesenseof beingan explicitpredicate
of individuals.We cannottakea freesingularterm(Frege's "proper name"),
" "
say b and go on to assert b exists". However,thisis a merelycontingent
featureof Frege's notation.What is more,it partiallyhides one of the most
fundamentalfeaturesof his treatment of existence,viz. that existenceis ex-
pressedonlyby the existential
quantifier.
In fact, the reason why Frege can get along withouta predicateof ex-
istence is that he assumes that all proper names (free singularterms)are
nonempty.This is reflectedby the validityof existentialgeneralizationin
Frege's system:from any propositionF(b) containing"b" we can infer
(3x)F(x). This obviouslypresupposesthat b exists. If we do not make this
21Seeforinstance
S. Morris ' 4Kant's'Refutation'
Engel, oftheOntological
Argument", in
Kant:A Collection
ofCritical ed.byRobert
Essays, PaulWolff, Garden
Doubleday, N.Y.,
City,
pp. 189-208,
1967, pp.193-194.
especially
140 Hintikka
Jaakko
assumption,we have to amplifytheruleof existentialgeneralizationand for-

mulateit as sayingthatfromthe two premises
(9) F(b) and b exists

we may infer
(10) (3x)F(x).
From certain eminentlynatural assumptions one can show (as I have
thatthe extrapremise"b exists" mustbe equivalentwith
demonstrated)22
(11) (3x)(b = x)
Indeed, all we need forthispurposeis in effectthattheotherlogical constants
have their customarysemantics and that the 4'predicate of existence",
whateverit is or may be, is subject to the same substitutivity principlesas
otherexpressionsof first-order logic.
This resultshows thatin a Frege-Russelllogic it is in the last analysisthe
existentialquantifieralone thatneed carryexistentialassumption,contraryto
the misleadingappearance createdby Frege's notation.This idea can be con-
sideredan integralpart of Frege's distinctionbetweenthe "is" of existence
and othersenses of "is". Indeed, this privilegedposition of the existential
quantifierseems to me to be a much more importantfeatureof the overall
Frege-Russellapproach to logic thanthe alleged impermissibility of asserting
the existenceof an individualin Frege's canonical notation.We can now see
that Frege's distinctiondoes not presuppose that "existence is not a
predicate". On the contrary,the fullimportof Frege's approach cannot be
spelled out withouta "predicate of existence". Hence Kant's thesisdoes not
make him into a precursorof Fregeand Russell.
Thus we can likewisesee that in the last analysis we could, and should,
have "a predicateof existence" also for the extremelysimplelanguagesto
whichFrege (and mutatismutandisalso Kant) restricted his attention.Conse-
quently, the reasons forhavingsuch a predicate in one's languageare not ap-
plicable only to the richlanguagesenvisagedabove, but apply also withinthe
present-dayFrege-Russelllanguages.
This observationneverthelessneed not drivea wedge betweenFrege and
Kant. One way of expressingour resultconcerningFregemightbe to say that
22Seemyessay,"On theLogicofExistence" forModalities
inModels (note5 above),
and
cf.my"On theLogicofExistence andNecessity",TheMonist,
vol.50(1966),
pp.55-76.For
Frege,seee.g.RainerStuhlmann-Laeisz, mitderAuffassung
"Frege'sAuseinandersetzung von
' alseinPrdikat
' Existenz derersten
StufeundKantsArgumentation
gegendenontologischen
Gottesbeweis" inChristian Fregeunddiemoderne
Thiel,editor, , Anton
Grundlagenforschung
Hain,Meisenheim amGlan,1975,pp.119-133.
forFregeexistencewas a predicate,but not a normalor "real" predicate.In

its primaryuse, existenceis a second-orderpredicate,sayingthat a certain
first-order predicateis instantiated.The questionwhetherthis second-order
predicatecan be extendedto the trivialfirst-order predicatesof the form
"(b = x)" is of littleinterestto Frege. But if so, thereis afterall a partial
agreementbetweenFregeand Kant. For Kant frequently formulateshis point
by saying, not that existence is not a predicate, but that it is not a real
predicate23.Indeed, Kant must obviouslyallow us to expressnot only the
nonemptynessof common nouns but also the nonemptynessof singular
nouns. Then Kant's injunctionthat existenceis not a real predicatemight
perhapsbe interpreted as sayingmerelythatit mustnot be used in thedefini-
tion of anything24. This is an interestingpoint,but on the reconstruction of
the ontologicalargumentpresupposedhereit is neithernecessarynor suffi-
cientfor a refutationof the ontologicalargument.However, it is far from
clear whatthepreciseimportof Kant's locutionis whenhe speaks of a "real
predicate", and it is not obvious a priorithathis exclusionof existencefrom
thedefinitionof anyone thingcannotitselfbe turnedintoa lineof defensefor
his criticalclaims. We shall returnto thesepointslater.
That Kant's criticismof the ontologicalargumentis largelybeside the
pointcan also be seen in termsof his own system.It is largelya Fremdkrper
in the body of his own transcendental philosophy.Earlier,I quoted Kant as
saying(in A 599 = B 627) thattheconcept"expressesmerelywhatis possible
[myitalics]". Elsewhere,too, he clearlythinksof whatI have called essential
judgments as expressingpossibilities25.In an existentialjudgment, this
possibilityis assertedto be actualized,withoutaddinganythingto theconcept
itself.Now thisis preciselywhatKantcould notsay as hisdefinitive opinionin
thecase of God. For if God werein the fullestsense of the word possible for
Kant, in the sense of being empiricallypossible (possible in experience),he
wouldpresumablybe sometimesactual,and hence(sincewe are dealingwitha
putativelynecessary being) always actual. This possibilityof restoring
somethinglike the ontologicalargumentby means of the additionalpremise
that God is possible had been exploited by Leibniz. Even though Kant
presumablywould have rejected Leibniz' argumentfor other reasons, he
23Forthisissue,cf.Gerold Prauss,Einfhrung zurErkenntnistheorie,Wissenschaftliche
Darmstadt,
Buchgesellschaft, 1979.
24Somewhat surprisingly, Kantis herecompleting a fullcircle
inthehistory
ofphilosophy
andreturningbacktotheviews whosimilarly
ofAristotle, heldthat"beingisnottheessence
of
anything"(An.Post.II, 7, 92b 13-14).
25Cf.A 599= B 627:"Myfinancial is . . . affected
position very bya hundred
differently
realthalers
thanitis bythemere conceptofthem (thatis,bytheir (KempSmith
possibility)".
thisinstead
translates as"...(... oftheir possibility)". Thisisalsogrammatically but
possible,
seemstometowater downKant'sunmistakable point.)
142 Hintikka
Jaakko
could scarcelyaffordto admit God's possibility26. (In orderto see this,we

B
may forinstancerecall 111,whereKant says that "necessityis just the ex-
istencewhichis giventhroughpossibilityitself".)
It is truethatthe step I envisageda momentago fromGod's experiential
possibilityto his actualityis notbacked by anyoutrightassertionsin theCriti-
que of Pure Reason of whatLovejoy called thePrincipleof Plenitude,thatis
to say, of the principlethat each genuinepossibilityis actualizedin the long
run. However, a closer examinationof Kant's positionshows that he could
not reallycountenanceviolation of the Principleof Plenitudeamong full-
fledgedexperientialpossibilities.This examinationI have attempted,jointly
withHeikki Kannisto,in an earlierpaper27.If instantevidenceis desired,suf-
fice it to recall Kant's characterizationof 4'the schema of modalityand its
categories" as "time itselfas thecorrelateof the determination whetherand
how it belongs to time" and of necessity as "existence at all times"
(A 145 = B 185). The last point comes veryclose to assertinga versionof
the Principle("what is always trueis necessary"). Furtherevidenceforthe
presenceof this versionin Kant is obtained fromthe Prolegomena 18-19
and fromB 183. All told, Kant's ambivalencenotwithstanding, his commit-
mentduringhis criticalperiod to somethinglike the Principleof Plenitude
(for experientialpossibilities)was too deep to allow him to restcontentwith
an unqualifiedstatementthattheconceptof God is a merelypossibleconcept.
In general,thereis a (somewhathiddenbut neverthelessunmistakable)con-
nection between Kant's relative degree of adherence to the Principle of
Plenitudeand his willingnessto inferGod's existencefromHis possibility.In-
deed, whenKant arguesthatfrommereconcepts(conceptualpossibilities)we
can neverinferactual existence,he comes veryclose to criticizing one version
of thePrincipleof Plenitude.But as I have shown(withKannisto,see note 27
above), such criticism is much more characteristicof Kant's interim
philosophy(in the sixtiesand earlyseventies)than of his mature"critical"
philosophy.
God's possibility had to be banished from the realm of genuine
transcendental(experiential)possibilitiesfor the outer darknessof the at-
tenuatedpossibilityenjoyedby mereideals of reason. This is a movewe might
have expected fromthe beginningthat Kant the opernican revolutionary
26Somereasons whyKantthought thattheontological

argument cannot Godasa
introduce
being(so thatwecouldmovefrom
butindividuated
possible (1) to (2)) canbegatheredfrom
RobertHowell's
interesting
papers. tothisnumber
Seehiscontribution aswellashis
ofDialctica
paper,"Intuition, andIndividuation
Synthesis, intheCritiqueofPureReason , "Nousvol.7,
pp.207-232.
(1973),
27See Jaakko HintikkaandHeikkiKannisto, "Kanton 'theGreatChainof Being"',
Philosophic vol.2,no.2 (summer
Exchange, 1976),pp.69-86,especiallypp.75-78.
would make. Withoutit,his criticismof theontologicalargumentdoes notdo

the whole job. It is the main link betweenKans criticismof Anselm's and
Descartes' argumentand his own transcendental vantagepoint.
Kant was fullyconsciousof thenecessityof this furthermove in his cam-
paign against God's existenceon the level of experience(intuition)or even
understanding.In A 601-602 = B 629-630he writes:
The conceptof a supremebeingis in manyrespectsa veryusefulidea;

but because it is a mereidea, it is altogetherincapable, by itselfalone,
of enlargingour knowledgein regardto whatexists.It is not evencom-
petentto enlightenus as to thepossibility[Kant's italics] of any ex-
istencebeyondthatwhichis knownin and throughexperience.
Kant was likewiseaware of the specificargumentsthat are lurkinghere,

readyto jump in at a mereadmissionof God's possibility:
And thusthe celebratedLeibniz is farfromhavingsucceededin what

he prided himselfon achieving- the comprehensiona priori of the
possibility[myitalics]of thesublimeideal being. (A 602 = B 630)
Withouttakingup thedetailsof Kant's lineof thoughtin thisdirection,we

can see themain idea clearlyenough.God is a mereideal because He is an ens
realissimum,the sum total of all reality.Few philosophersor theologians
would quarrelwiththisidea, and Kant is perhapsnot so verywrongin seeing
in this definitiona groundfor assigningto God merelyideal existence.The
onlyremarkI wantto make hereis thatKant's move is beside thepointas a
criticismof the originalontologicalargument,on the rationalreconstruction
offeredabove. For on thisinterpretation, nothingturnedon God's beingens
realissimum . God was not assumed (or defined)to embody all perfections.
For my reconstructed argument,it sufficedmerelyto assume that God has
one particularperfection.It sufficesto assume that He is the most powerful
being existentially,in preciselythe sense asserted by Kant. (Cf. the quote
above fromA 588 = B 616.) For thisis whattheinsideconditionalof (1) ex-
presses.Hence the move thatKant uses to undercutLeibniz-stylearguments
for God's existenceis completelybeside the point as an objection to the
originalontologicalargument.Once again, we see how Kant missesthe key
fallacyin the argument.
Perhapstherenevertheless is a charitableinterpretation
of Kant's position
which makes his transcendentalvantage point relevantto a valid line of
criticismof the ontologicalargument.Veryroughly,my initialdiagnosisof
theontologicalargumentmaybe expressedbysayingthatthetroublewiththe
144 Hintikka
Jaakko
argumentis not thatexistenceis not a predicate,but thatwe don't knowwho

God is in the sensethatthedesignation(" definition")of himas existentially
greatestbeingprovidesus withno groundsforconcludingthattheexistential-
ly greatestbeings in different worldsare identical.We may tryto interpret
Kans position(and perhapsevenhis slogan thatexistenceis not a predicate)
as emphasizingthisaspectof thesituation.Kant's slogan is applicablein that
Kant's sayingthatexistenceis nota " real" predicatemayperhapsbe takento
amount to sayingthatit does not help us to determineGod's identityin the
sense of bringingus to know who God is. This idea is relatedto my earlier
observationthataccordingto Kant existencecannotbe a partof thedefinition
of any entity.This would make Kant's discussionrelevantto a valid line of
criticismsagainst the ontologicalargument.For it amounts to sayingthat
Kant was in the last analysisdenyingthe indispensableauxiliarypremiseil-
lustratedby (6).
This highlyinterestingline of thoughtis the thesis of Hans Wagner's
paper (above, note 5). If thereis a kernelof truthin Kant's criticismof the
ontologicalargument,thisundoubtedlyis it. In spiteof the evidenceWagner
marshals,I have nevertheless not quite been convincedthatwe can actually
attributethisidea to Kant. The bestprimafacie evidenceforthisdefenseof
Kant comes from the analysis of his claim that existenceis not a real
predicate,whichwas indicatedbrieflyabove. Undoubtedlya closerexamina-
tion of the textscould yieldsome evidencefor thisview. It findssome sup-
port for instancein C.C.E. Schmid's Wrterbuchzum leichterenGebrauch
der KantischenSchriften(vide Bestimmung ), wherewe finda contrastbet-
ween merelylogical predicatesor accidentsand real predicateswhichcan be
" a determination of a thing" (myitalics). All told, it nevertheless
seemsto
me that this line of thoughtin Kant is so hopelesslyentangledwith other
ideas thatthereis littlehope of reachinga viable defenseof his views. Before
a sharp distinctionis made between(1) and (2), the need of the auxiliary
premiseis not obvious, and thetruetargetof Kant's criticismis impossibleto
establish.
worthaskingwhatpreciselywas meantby Kant whenhe
It is nevertheless
said - as he occasionallydid - thatexistencewas not a real predicate.One
passage in whichhe does so is A 598 = B 626, partiallyquoted above. A fuller
versionof the passage runsas follows:
' '
Being [Sein] is obviouslynot a real predicate;thatis, it is not a con-
cept of somethingthatcould be added to the conceptof a thing.It is
merelythe positingof a thing,or of certaindeterminations, as existing
in themselves.
Kant indicatesthatthispositingcan be of two kinds:

In its logical use, it [sc. being]is merelythe copula of a judgment. . .
[Then] the small word 'is' adds no new predicatebut only servesto
posit thepredicatein its relationto thesubject.
In contrast,
if, now, we . . . say "God is" or "There is a God", we . . . onlyposit
the subjectin itselfwithall its predicates.
Then I am
thinkingits [myconcept's] object (throughthe expression'it is') as
givenabsolutely.
Here we can also see whattheforceof Kant's littleword "real " (in saying
thatexistenceis not a "real predicate") reallyis. Kant is merelyfollowinghis
customarycontrastbetweenwhat is logical and what is real and identifying
the "real" use of "being" to its existentialuse. In other words, what is
"unreal" about thepurelypredicativeuse of "is" is theabsence of existen-
tial presuppositions.In fact,the quoted passage continuesimmediately:
Otherwisestated,the real containsno more thanthe merelypossible.
We have alreadyseen thatKant bracketstogetherthemerelypossible,the
predicative(copulative)use of being,and logic (i. e., theworldof concepts)27.
By contrast,therealor actual shouldgo togetherwiththeexistentialuse of be-
ing. If I may turn Kant's point into a tautology,he is saying that the
predicativeuse of "is" is not its existentialuse.
If thissuggestionis correct,thentheburdenthatmanyphilosophershave
tried to put on "real" in "real predicate" is largely misplaced. Some
philosophershave forinstancetriedto findlinksbetweenKant's criticismof
the ontologicalargumentand his discussionof realityas one of the modal
categoriesin theTranscendentalAnalytic,and assumedthattheyare whatis
highlighted bytheword "real ". Othershave thoughtthattheycould perceive
in Kant a contrastbetweenbeingas a "real" predicate(as a predicateof in-
dividuals)and its "merelylogical" use (as a higherorderpredicate).Thereis
no foundationin thetextforeitherview, and the passage we just examined
suggeststhatwhatKant intendedwas somethingmuchsimpler28.
28Inanycase,itdoesnothelpintrying tovindicate
existence (ifnota "real"
asa predicate
apudKanttoappealtohisuseofexistence
predicate) asoneofthemodalcategories.Kantmain-
tainsthatnoneof the modalcategories is a predicate,either.Indeed,he says (in
A 74 = B 99-100) thatthedistinguishing characteristic
of modalityis that"it contributes
nothingtothecontentofjudgment . . . butconcernsonlythevalueofthecopulainrelation to
thoughtingeneral".
Thusmodalityisbasically alsoa matter
ofdifferent
usesofthecopula,i. e.,
of"being".
146 Hintikka
Jaakko
It mightseem at thispoint thatone part of the Frege-Russelldistinction

does afterall play a major role in Kant, viz. the distinctionbetweenthe ex-
istentialand thepredicativeuses of " is". It is truethatKant putsa premium
on thisdistinction,but we have alreadyestablishedbeyondall doubt thatit is
forhim a differencein use and not a difference in meaning.
Dialctica Vol.35,N<>1-2(1981)

Hintikka - Kant On Existence, Predication, and Ontological Argument

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Kant on Existence, Predication, and the Ontological Argument

Author(s): Jaakko Hintikka

* The ofthispaperwasmadepossible bya fellowship

ziell)vollkommen ist.DerersteSatzstellteinetriviale Wahrheit

The subject matter of my paper can be discussed only against the

1 Cf.e. g. TheMany-Faced Argumentyed.byJohn HickandArthur TheMac-

thesis,as has been claimed4.The mainstayof Kant's discussion,viz. his thesis

From (1) the defendersof the ontologicalargumentin effectfallaciously

(4) There necessarilyis some individualwhichis such thatif anything

6 Cf."On theLogicoftheOntologicalArgument" (loc.cit.)

The use of such expressionsusuallypresupposesthattheirreferenceis well-

detailed historicalinvestigation,it seems clear that Anselm had not disen-

ble worlds (introducedby "N"). As we saw, the failureof this identityis

(7) (3x) it is knownthat(g = x)

" Onthehistory oftheinterpretations

factinstantiatedin reality.Here existenceis not one of the configurationof

distinctionof actual existence.Examples are not veryeasy to come by, but

14In DonaldDavidson andJaakko Hintikka, Words

fromthinkingthatindividualsintroducedas membersof thedomainsof other

philosophers.But even apart fromthisdevaluationof Frege, Kant does not

[In] theproposition,'God is omnipotent',... thesmall word 'is' adds

Here positingclearlymeans predication.But Kant continues:

Here positingclearlymeans to assume existence.The relationof existenceto

[In an existentialjudgment]. . . nothingcan have been added to the

20Cf.e. g. Henry "Transcendental

cordinglyforKant as littlea predicateas existenceis. This parityof thetwo is

assumption,we have to amplifytheruleof existentialgeneralizationand for-

(9) F(b) and b exists

forFregeexistencewas a predicate,but not a normalor "real" predicate.In

could scarcelyaffordto admit God's possibility26. (In orderto see this,we

26Somereasons whyKantthought thattheontological

would make. Withoutit,his criticismof theontologicalargumentdoes notdo

The conceptof a supremebeingis in manyrespectsa veryusefulidea;

Kant was likewiseaware of the specificargumentsthat are lurkinghere,

And thusthe celebratedLeibniz is farfromhavingsucceededin what

Withouttakingup thedetailsof Kant's lineof thoughtin thisdirection,we

argumentis not thatexistenceis not a predicate,but thatwe don't knowwho

Kant indicatesthatthispositingcan be of two kinds:

It mightseem at thispoint thatone part of the Frege-Russelldistinction

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