1.

Effect and Application of Laws

Chapter I, Preliminary Title, New Civil Code, Effect and Application of Laws

When Laws Take Effect

Taada v. Tuvera, (1985)

Facts:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid
and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to
give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of
the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette.
The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be
given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of

due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force and effect.

Taada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as
to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous
publication.

Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as
an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it
might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a
whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and
not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon
the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
Askay v. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179 (1924)

Balbuna v. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150 (1960)

FACTS:

1. Members of the Jehovas Witnesses filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the
CFI of Capiz against the Sec. of Education, et al. It was to prevent the enforcement of Dept.
Order No. 8 issued pursuant to RA 1265 promulgating rules and regulations for the conduct of
the compulsory flag ceremony in all schools.

2. The facts are the same with the Gerona case. It allegedly denies them freedom of worship and
of speech, however, new issues have been raised this time such as:

a. the department order has no binding force and effect, not having been published in the Official
Gazette; and
b. it is an undue delegation of legislative power

3. The petition was dismissed. Hence, appeal to the SC.

ISSUE/S:
1. Does it violate freedom of worship and speech?
2. Is it in accordance with the requirements of publication?
3. Is it unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power?

RULING:
1. Issue on freedom of worship and speech. No.
a. the court maintains that the Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration;
rather, it is a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom,
liberty and national unity;

b. that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance
and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for;

c. that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations is a
prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the
flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they
were attending.

2. Issue on publication. Yes.

 a. Commonwealth Act 638 and Act 2930 do not require the publication of the circulars,
regulations or notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective;

b. said two acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official
Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the government issuing the
same, and of the Bureau of Printing.

c. while it is true that statutes or laws shall take effect fifteen days after publication in the
Official Gazette and it is also true that administrative rules and regulations have the force of law,
the primary factor for this rationale is that such statutes provided for penalties for violations
thereof.

d. in the case at bar, Department Order No. 8 does not provide any penalty against those pupils
or students refusing to participate in the flag ceremony or otherwise violating the provisions of
said order; their expulsion was merely the consequence of their failure to observe school
discipline which the school authorities are bound to maintain.

e. for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute, they were not being
prosecuted under threat of penal sanction; if they choose not to obey the flag salute regulation,
they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow
citizens, nothing more and having elected not to comply, they forfeited their right to attend
public schools.

3. Issue on undue delegation of legislative power. No.

a. the requirements in Sections 1 and 2 of the department order constitute an adequate standard,
to wit, simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the National Anthem.

b. that the Legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is no objection to the
validity of the statute, for all that is required of it is the laying down of standards and policy that
will limit the discretion of the regulatory agency;

c. to require the statute to establish in detail the manner of exercise of the delegated power would
be to destroy the administrative flexibility that the delegation is intended to achieve.

Victorias Milling Company, Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 4SCRA627 (1962)

Facts

The Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 on October 15, 1958 requiring all employers in
computing premiums to include employees remuneration all bonuses and overtime time pay, as well as
the cash value of other media remuneration.
The petitioner (Victorias Milling Company, Inc.) protest against the circular as it is contrary to a
previous Circular No. 7 dated October 7, 1957.

Circular No. 7 excludes overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers and the
employees respective monthly premium contributions.

The counsel questioned the validity of the circular

Social Security Commission overruled the objections

Victorias Miller Company Inc. comes to court on appeal

Issue

Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act
1161 empowering the Social Security Commission to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval
of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes
of this Act

Held

Republic Act No. 1161 before its amendment defines compensation as: All remuneration for
employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than
cash. Except:that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month; bonuses,
allowances or overtime pay; and dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make,
although not legally required to do so.

Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of compensation to: (f) Compensation All
remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than
cash except that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month.

Circular No. 22 was issued to advise the employers and employees concerned with the interpretation of
the law as amended which was Social Security Commissions duty to enforce. The Commission simply
stated their opinion as to how the law should be construed and that such circular did not require
presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. Whereas if it renders
an opinion or a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Administrative interpretation
of law is at best merely advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellant. So ordered.

Judicial Decisions

Lazatin v. Desierto, 588 SCRA 285 (2009)

FACTS:

The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Complaint-Affidavit
charging petitioners (Lazatin) with Illegal Use of Public Funds.

A preliminary investigation was conducted and it was recommened that 14 counts each of Malversation
of Public Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 should be filed against the
petitioners. Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman; hence, 28 Informations were filed before the
Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motions were granted by the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution to re-evaluate the cases against petitioners.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor(OSP) submitted to the Ombudsman its

Resolutionhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/147097.htm - _ftn5 which
recommended the dismissal of the cases against petitioners for lack or insufficiency of evidence.

The Ombudsman ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP Resolution. In a
Memorandumhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/147097.htm - _ftn6, the
OLA recommended that the OSP Resolution be disapproved and the OSP be directed to proceed with
the trial of the cases against petitioners. The Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum, thereby
disapproving the OSP Resolution and ordering the prosecution of the subject cases. The cases were then
returned to the Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal proceedings.

Petitioners filed the instant petition.

Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman had no authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution dismissing the
cases against petitioners because, under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman is clothed only with the power to watch, investigate and recommend the filing of proper
cases against erring officials, but it was not granted the power to prosecute. They point out that under
the Constitution, the power to prosecute belongs to the OSP, which was intended by the framers to be a
separate and distinct entity from the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude that, as provided
by the Constitution, the OSP being a separate and distinct entity, the Ombudsman should have no power
and authority over the OSP. Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of
1989), which made the OSP an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman, should be struck
down for being unconstitutional.

The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has long been settled
that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the Office of the Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and
placing the OSP under said office have no constitutional infirmity. The issue of whether said provisions
of R.A. No. 6770 violated the Constitution had been fully dissected as far back as 1995 in Acop v.
Office of the Ombudsman : The Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in
accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI provides that the Ombudsman
shall exercise such other functions or duties as may be provided by law.

The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the OSP under the Office of
the Ombudsman, was likewise upheld by the Court in Acop. It was explained, thus:
 x x x Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan, to be
henceforth known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor, shall continue to function and exercise its
powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the
Ombudsman created under this Constitution. The underscored phrase evidently refers to the
Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent amendatory legislation. It follows then that
Congress may remove any of the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or
grant it other powers, except those powers conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the
Ombudsman.

Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express mandate of paragraph
8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may exercise such other powers or
perform functions or duties as may be provided by law, it is indubitable then that Congress has the
power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman. In the same
vein, Congress may remove some of the powers granted to the Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and
transfer them to the Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the Special Prosecutor such other powers and
functions and duties as Congress may deem fit and wise. This Congress did through the passage of R.A.
No. 6770.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/147097.htm - _ftn10

The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v.

Guerrero.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/147097.htm - _ftn11 More
recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Valera,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/147097.htm - _ftn12 the Court,
basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling in Acop and Camanag, declared that the OSP is merely a
component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control, and
upon authority of the Ombudsman and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively
suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy
Ombudsman.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/147097.htm - _ftn13 The
Court's ruling in Acop that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was
authorized by the Constitution was also made the foundation for the decision in Perez v.
Sandiganbayan,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/147097.htm -
_ftn14 where it was held that the power to prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the filing of
informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under
the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional powers to the
Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE:

W/n the Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 should be
revisited and the principle of stare decisis be set aside.

RULING:

The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle
things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines.

It was further explained in Fermin v. People as follows:

The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a
country to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That decision
becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine
of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.

In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel
Corporation, the Court expounded on the importance of the foregoing doctrine, stating that:

The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty
and stability of judicial decisions, thus:

Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a
court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et
non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means
that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if
the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first
principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be
decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the
parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of
stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.

The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the Court has ruled that
[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming
virtue of predictability which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the
public's confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished. Verily, only upon
showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by our
judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the courts be justified in setting aside the same.

In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling reason to convince the Court that
the doctrine of stare decisis should not be applied to this case. They have not successfully demonstrated
how or why it would be grave abuse of discretion for the Ombudsman, who has been validly conferred
by law with the power of control and supervision over the OSP, to disapprove or overturn any resolution
issued by the latter.

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Co v. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 444 (1993)

FACTS: Petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn
against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. 1 The
check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason
given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT." A criminal complaint for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged.

He argued on appeal that at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4)
years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of
a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense,
an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice.

ISSUE: whether the decision issued by the Court be applied retroactively to the prejudice of the
accused.

HELD: No. Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our
decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which
provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in
the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale
against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that
have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional.

The weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's decision of September
21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 should not be given
retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the
official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.

De Roy v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 757 (1988)

FACTS:

The firewall of a burned out building owned by Felisa De Roy collapsed and destroyed the tailoring
shop occupied by the family of Luis Bernal resulting in injuries and even to the death of Bernals
daughter. De Roy claimed that Bernal had been warned prior hand but that she was ignored.

In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She appealed but the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC. On the last day of filing a motion for reconsideration, De Roys counsel filed a
motion for extension. It was denied by the CA. The CA ruled that pursuant to the case of Habaluyas
Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended.

De Roys counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should not be applicable because said ruling
was never published in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before they
can be binding.

HELD: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden duty of counsel
as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where
issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court
decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law journals.

Ignorance of the Law

Zulueta v. Zulueta, 1 Phil., 254 (1902)

FACTS:

Don Jose Zulueta and his sister, Doa Francisca Zulueta, are sole heirs under the will of their
father, Don Clemente Zulueta, who died in Iloilo in 1900. In the course of the voluntary testamentary
proceedings instituted in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo by Don Jose, three auditors were appointed
to make a division of the estate under article 1053 of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, of whom Don Jose
and Doa Francisca each nominated one, the third or auditor umpire being chosen by common accord of
the parties. The two auditors nominated by the parties respectively failed to agree, and each rendered a
separate report. The auditor umpire, whose report was filed on March 29, 1901, agreed with and
accepted in its entirety the report of the auditor nominated by Don Jose. The procedure marked out in
articles 1062 and 1067 of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil was then followed, and upon the application
of Doa Francisca, the record was delivered to her for examination. On April 25, she filed her
opposition to the report of the auditor umpire, and a meeting of the interested parties having been had, as
provided in Article 1069 of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, the court, by a providencia of May 4,
directed that the procedure prescribed for declarative actions be followed, and that the record be again
delivered to Doa Francisca in order that she might formulate her demand in accordance with Article
1071 of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil. On petition of Don Jose, the court by a providencia of May 7
fixed the term of fifteen days as that within which Doa Francisca should formulate her demand, which
term was subsequently enlarged seven days on petition of Doa Francisca. On June 5 Doa Francisca
petitioned the court, stating that the new Code of Procedure enacted by the Civil Commission was soon
to become operative, and that she deemed it more advantageous to her rights that the declarative action
which she had to bring should be governed by the new Code rather than that then in force, and asking
that proceedings in the action should be suspended till the new Code went into effect. This petition the
court denied in an auto rendered June 15, declaring, furthermore, that the term fixed for the filing of the
demand having expired, Doa Francisca has lost her right to institute the action. On June 29 Doa
Francisca interposed an appeal against the auto of June 22, which the court declined to admit, on the
ground that it was not presented within three days, as prescribed in article 363 of the Ley de
Enjuiciamiento Civil.

ISSUE:

Whether Doa Francisca is entitled to relief against the consequences of her failure to interpose
her appeal against the auto of June 22 within the period fixed by the law.

RULING:
 The Supreme Court held that the mistake in this instance was her own, but it was a mistake of
law, and while the Court should be unwilling to say that special cases might not occur in which relief
would be afforded in such a proceeding as this against a mistake of law made by a party, The Court is of
opinion that the present is not such a case. Nothing is shown here except the basic fact that the party
acted under ignorance or misconception of the provisions of the law in regard to the time within which
the appeal could be taken, and there is no reason why the general principle, a principle "founded not
only on expediency and policy but on necessity," that "ignorance of the law does not excuse from
compliance therewith" should be relaxed. The framers of Act No. 75 could not have intended to
totally abrogate this principle with reference to the class of cases covered by the act. If such were the
effect of this legislation the court "would be involved and perplexed with questions incapable of any just
solution and embarrassed by inquiries almost interminable."

Petition is denied and the judgment appealed from affirmed, with costs to the appealing party
both as to the petition and the appeal. So ordered.

De Luna et al. v. Linatoc, 74 Phil., 15 (1942)

Relevant Laws/Topic: Article 3 Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Short summary: The wife, who acted as an agent of the husband (De Luna), sold a portion of their
conjugal property during the subsistence of their marriage (The land was under the name of the husband
only because they already partitioned the parcel of land). Under the law, a conjugal property cannot be
partitioned during the subsistence of a marriage unless there was a judicial separation of property.

The spouses, claiming ignorance of the said prohibition, wanted to assail the sale of the land to Jose
Linatoc. The court DID NOT ALLOW such petition because of Article 3 (Article 2 of the CC during the
time the decision was rendered)

FACTS:

P-wife (no name provided eh, si Agustin lang meron) sold a portion of their conjugal property to R. The
parcel of land was the husbands portion of the conjugal property. The wife, with the knowledge and
consent of the husband, sold the lot to R as evidenced by the deed of sale and the deed of recognition
wherein the husband recognized and reiterated his acquiescence to the sale (Art 1416 A conjugal
property can be sold by one spouse if the other spouse consents).

Such sale was prohibited by Art 1432 because partitioning the conjugal property during marriage can
only be done if there was a judicial separation of property, or else it would be illegal and void. The sale
can onl be valid if the land was sold under the name of the conjugal partnership and not of the husband
only.

The Ps assail the validity of the sale to R, claiming that they do not know of such prohibition

ISSUE: WON the sale may be validly annulled by the spouses? - NO

HELD/RATIO:

Mistake of law does not make a contract voidable, because ignorance of the law does not excuse
anyone from its compliance (art. 2, Civil Code; 8 Manresa, 646, 2d ed.). That the petitioners did not
know the prohibition against partition of the conjugal partnership property during marriage (art. 1432,
Civil Code) is no valid reason why they should ask for the annulment of the sales made Exhibits C and
D and recognized in Exhibit I.
Moreover, there is the time-honored legal maxim that no man can take advantage of his own wrong. To
repudiate the sales in question, petitioners are setting up their own wrongful act of partitioning their
conjugal property, which violated article 1432 of the Civil Code. The prohibition in said article affects
public policy, as it is designed to protect creditors of the conjugal partnership and other third persons.
Petitioners shall not, therefore, be allowed thus to rest their cause of action to recover the lands sold,
upon the illegality of the partition which they attempted to make. Otherwise, they would profit by their
own unlawful act.

Silence of the Law

Cerrano v. Tan Chuco, 38 Phil. 392 (1918)

Philippine Bank of Commerce v. De Vera, 6 SCRA 1026 (1962)

The facts of the case, which are undisputed, are briefly stated in the trial court's decision, to wit:

By virtue of a contract (Exh. A), entitled 'Consolidation of First Real Estate Mortgage and Deed of
Assignment, executed on April 26, 1951, defendant Tomas de Vera is indebtedness to the plaintiff in the
total amount of P127,312.24, guarantee by a real estate mortgage of the defendant's land, particular
described in TCT No. 1631 of the Register of Deeds of Pasay City and in TCT No. 37641 of the
Register of Deeds of the City of Rizal (now Pasay City), with the same terms and conditions embodied
in the original Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, both dated February 28, 1947. Presumably, both document
and the document Exh. A, were registered in the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City.

Upon maturity of the defendant's obligation on March 15, 1956, and despite several demands, the
defendant failed to pay the outstanding balance of his obligation in the amount of P.99,033.20 as of
January 31, 1958, under the contract Exh. for which reason, the plaintiff filed a petition with the Sheriff
of Pasay City on March 14, 1956 (Exh. B) to sell the properties subject to the Real Estate Mortgage
executed and duly recorded in the Registry of Deeds on May 17, 1949, for the sum of P150,000.00.
Another document, Assignment of Real Estate Mortgage, was executed on the same day, May 17, 1947,
which two documents, were later on consolidated on April 26, 1951, in the document Exh. A.

The Sheriff acting accordingly, sold at public auction the two parcels of land covered by TCT No. 1631
and No. 37641 to the highest bidder, which was the plaintiff creditor in this case Philippine Bank of
Commerce, for the amount of P86,700.00 and the corresponding certificate of sale was issued by the
Sheriff of Pasay City (Exh. C) dated April 16, 1956. The plaintiff now, thru the present action, seeks to
recover fro the defendant the balance of his obligation after deducting the price of the land sold at public
auction, of which, together with the interest up to January 31, 1958, there remained an outstanding
balance of P99,033.20, as per the Statement of Account (Exhibit D).
On the basis of the foregoing facts, the trial court rendered considered the decision above adverted to.

The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether the trial court acted correctly in holding appellee
Bank en titled to recover from appellant the sum of P99,033.20 a deficiency arising after the
extrajudicial foreclosure, under Act No. 3135, as amended, of the mortgaged properties in question. It is
urged, on appellant's part, that since Act No. 3135, as amended, is silent as to the mortgage's right
to recover deficiency arising after an extrajudicial foreclosure sale of mortgage, he (mortgagee)
may not recover the same.

A reading of the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended (re extra-judicial foreclosure) discloses
nothing, it is true, as to the mortgagee's right to recover such deft efficiency. But neither do we find any
provision thereunder which expressly or impliedly prohibits such recovery. Article 2131 of the new
Civil Code, on the contrary, expressly provides that "The form, extent and consequence of a mortgage,
both as to its constitution, modification and extinguishment, and as to other matters not include in this
Chapter, shall be governed by the provisions of the Mortgage Law and of the Land Registration Law.'
Under the Mortgage Law, which is still in force, the mortgagee has the right to claim for the deficiency
resulting from the price obtained in the sale of the real property at public auction and the outstanding
obligation at the time of the foreclosure proceedings. (See Soriano v. Enriquez, 24 Phil. 584; Banco de
Islas Filipinas v. Concepcion decision e Hijos, 53 Phil. 86; Banco Nacional v. Barreto, 5 Phil. 101).
Under the Rules of Court (See. 6, Rule 70) "Upon the sale of any real property, under an order for
following sale to satisfy a mortgage or other incumbrance thereon, if there be a balance due to the
plaintiff after applying the proceeds of the sale, the court, upon motion, should render a judgment
against the defendant for any such balance for which, by the record of the case, he may be personally
liable to the plaintiff, ...." It is true that this refers to a judicial foreclosure, but the underlying principle is
the same, that the mortgage is but a security an not a satisfaction of indebtedness. As the trial court
correctly observed:

.... the real estate mortgage does not, in any way, limit nor minimize the amount of the obligation. Its
only purpose is to guarantee the fulfillment of said obligation and, in case of default on the part of the
debtor mortgagor, the credit mortgagee may execute the obligation on the real property give as a
mortgage by way of judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure, according to our statutes and procedure.
Therefore, by analogy and applying the same principle of equity, if after the sale the mortgaged property
at public auction, there is a resulting deficiency in the application for the payment of the obligate of the
debtor mortgagor to the creditor mortgagee, the latter may proceed in a proper action against the debtor
mortgagor for the deficiency of the former's obligation. It is of no importance whether the buyer of the
highest bidder in the public auction is the creditor itself.lawphil.net

By following the defendant's theory, there may occur ridiculous situation in which, when the amount of
the loan is very much bigger than the value of the mortgaged property, by abandonment or default of the
debtor mortgagor his obligation may automatically be reduced in quantity, against the will and consent
of the creditor mortgagee, and in prejudice of the latter, which situation is absurd and not contemplated
by Act No. 3135, as amended.

Let it be noted that when the legislature intends to foreclose the right of a creditor to sue for any
deficiency resulting from the foreclosure of the security given to guarantee the obligation, it so expressly
provides. Thus, in respect to pledges, Article 2115 of the new Civil Code expressly states: ".... If the
price of the sale is less (than the amount of the principal obligation) neither shall the creditor be entitled
to recover the deficiency, notwithstanding any stipulation to the contrary." Likewise, in the event of a
foreclosure of a chattel mortgage on the thing sold in installments "he (the vendor) shall have no further
action against the purchaser to recover any unpaid balance of the price. Any agreement to the contrary
shall be void" (Article 1484, paragraph 3, ibid). It is then clear that in the absence of a similar provision
in Act No. 3135, as amended, it can not be concluded that the creditor loses his right given him under
the Mortgage Law and recognized in the Rules of Court, to take action for the recovery of any unpaid
balance on the principal obligation, simply because he has chosen to foreclose his mortgage extra-
judicially pursuant to a special power of attorney given him by the mortgagor in the mortgage contract.
As stated by this Court in Medina v. Philippine National Bank (56 Phil. 651), a case analogous to the
one at bar, the step taken by the mortgagee-bank in resorting to extra-judicial foreclosure under Act No.
3135, was "merely to find a proceeding for the sale, and its action can not be taken to mean a waiver of
its right to demand the payment of the whole debt."

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from of the court a quo, the same is
hereby affirmed with costs against the defendant-appellant. So ordered.

Calalang v. Willams

FACTS:

In pursuance of Commonwealth Act 548 which mandates the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules
and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets to promote safe
transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads, the Director of
Public Works adopted the resolution of the National Traffic Commission, prohibiting the passing of
animal drawn vehicles in certain streets in Manila.

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the
Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn
vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal
Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11
p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission recommended to the Director of Public Works the
adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth
Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on national roads.

The Director of Public Works, in his first endorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman
of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification.

The Secretary of Public Works and Communications approved the recommendation that Rosario Street
and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours
as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.

The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced
the rules and regulations thus adopted.

Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the
Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National
Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary
of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan
Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.

ISSUE:Was the regulation valid?

HELD:Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the regulation as a valid exercise of police power in the interest
of public welfare.

This case is known primarily for the words of Justice Jose P. Laurel in defining social justice:Social
justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to ensure economic
stability of all the component elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est supremo
lex.

AGABON vs. NLRC, November 17, 2004

Facts:
Virgilio and Jenny Agabon were cornice installers of Riviera Home Improvements, a company engaged
in the business of selling ornamental construction materials.

They were employed from January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999, when they were dismissed for
abandonment of work.

The Agabons filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA, who ruled in their favor. The NLRC
reversed on appeal. The CA sustained the NLRCs decision

The Agabons further appealed to the SC, disputing the finding of abandonment, and claiming that the
company did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing.

Issue: WON the Agabons were illegally dismissed

Held: NO
Ratio:
Substantive due process (EEs must be dismissed for just or authorized cause): SC upheld the finding of
abandonment, because the act of the Agabons in seeking employment elsewhere clearly showed a
deliberate intent to sever the ER-EE relationship.

Procedural due process (for just cause, there must be a written notice informing him of grounds for
termination, a hearing or opportunity to be heard, and a final notice of termination stating the grounds
therefor): There was no due process because ER did not send the requisite notices to the last known
address of the EEs. ER only gave a flimsy excuse that the notice would be useless because the EEs no
longer lived there. This is not a valid excuse, they should have still sent a notice as mandated by law.

For not sending the requisite notices, the ER should be held liable for non-compliance with the
procedural requirements of due process.

Reno Foods Inc. vs. Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM)-Katipunan

GR No. 164016, March 15, 2010
TOPIC: SERIOUS MISCONDUCT
FACTS:
Petitioner RENO FOODS (RENO) is a manufacturer of canned meat products of which Vicente Khu is
the president and is being sued in that capacity. Respondent Nenita Capor (Capor) was an employee of Reno
Foods until her dismissal on October 27, 1998. It is a standard operating procedure of petitioner-company to
subject all its employees to reasonable search of their belongings upon leaving the company premises.
On October 19, 1998, the guard on duty found six Reno canned goods wrapped in nylon leggings inside Capors
fabric clutch bag. Reno accorded Capor several opportunities to explain her side often with the assistance of the
union officers of NLM-Katipunan. Unfortunately, Reno terminated Capor. (NLM) Katipunan filed on behalf of
Capor a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims against petitioners. The complaint prayed that Capor be
paid her full backwages as well as moral and exemplary damages.
Labor Arbiter found Capor guilty of serious misconduct which is a just cause for termination (Art 232 of the
Labor Code). he Labor Arbiter found that theft of company property is tantamount to serious misconduct; as such,
Capor is not entitled to reinstatement and backwages, as well as moral and exemplary damages. Moreover, the
Labor Arbiter ruled that consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, an employee who commits theft of company
property may be validly terminated and consequently, the said employee is not entitled to separation pay.
On appeal, NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision but with modification granting an award of financial
assistance in the form of separation pay equivalent to one-half month pay for every year of service. (Both filed
MFRs and both were denied).
The CA affirmed the NLRCs award of financial assistance to Capor.
ISSUE:
Whether the grant of financial assistance to an employee, who was validly dismissed for theft of company
property, is correct.
HELD:
NO. SC upheld Labor Arbiters decision.
The law is clear. Separation pay is only warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the
employees fault, such as those provided in Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as well as in cases of illegal
dismissal in which reinstatement is no longer feasible. It is not allowed when an employee is dismissed for just
cause, such as serious misconduct.
Jurisprudence has classified theft of company property as a serious misconduct and denied the award of
separation pay to the erring employee. We see no reason why the same should not be similarly applied in the case
of Capor. She attempted to steal the property of her long-time employer. For committing such misconduct, she is
definitely not entitled to an award of separation pay.
Length of service and a previously clean employment record cannot simply erase the gravity of the betrayal
exhibited by a malfeasant employee. Length of service is not a bargaining chip that can simply be stacked against
the employer. After all, an employer-employee relationship is symbiotic where both parties benefit from mutual
loyalty and dedicated service. If an employer had treated his employee well, has accorded him fairness and
adequate compensation as determined by law, it is only fair to expect a long-time employee to return such fairness
with at least some respect and honesty. Thus, it may be said that betrayal by a long-time employee is more
insulting and odious for a fair employer.
On the date that the appellate court issued its Decision, Capor filed a Manifestation informing the CA of her
acquittal in the charge of qualified theft. We held that a criminal conviction is not necessary to find just cause for
employment termination. Otherwise stated, an employees acquittal in a criminal case, especially one that is
grounded on the existence of reasonable doubt, will not preclude a determination in a labor case that he is guilty
of acts inimical to the employers interests.

Hodges v. Salas and Salas

63 Phil. 567
Facts:
On September 2, 1923, the defendants executed a power of attorney in favor of their brother-in-law
Felix S. Yulo to enable him to obtain a loan and secure it with a mortgage on the real property described
in transfer certificate of title No. 3335. The power of attorney was registered in the registry of deeds of
the Province of Occidental Negros. Acting under said power of attorney, Felix S. Yulo, on March 27,
1926, obtained a loan of P28,000 from the plaintiff, binding his principals jointly and severally, to pay it
within ten (10) years, together with interest thereon at 12 per cent per annum payable annually in
advance, to which effect he signed a promissory note for said amount and executed a deed of mortgage
of the real property. It was stated in the deed that in case the defendants failed to pay the stipulated
interest and the taxes on the real property mortgaged and if the plaintiff were compelled to bring an
action to recover his credit, said defendants would be obliged to pay 10 per cent more on the unpaid
capital, as fees for the plaintiff's attorneys. The mortgage so constituted was registered in the registry of
deeds of the Province of Occidental Negros and noted on the back of the transfer certificate of title.The
defendants failed to pay at maturity the interest stipulated which should have been paid one year in
advance.Plaintiff therefore brought an action for foreclosure of the mortgage.
The trial court ordered in favor of the defendants and held that the loan and the mortgage were illegal.
Issue:
Whether or not the loan obtained and the mortgage executed by Yulo was valid and therefore defendants
are bound to pay?
Ruling:
Yes. The loan obtained and the mortgage executed by Yulo was valid and therefore defendants are
bound to pay for it.
By virtue of the authority conferred by the defendants by executing a power of attorney, agent Yulo was
authorized to borrow money and invest it as he wished, without being obliged to apply it necessarily for
the benefit of his principals.
DPWH vs. Quiwa et. al G. R. No. 183444 February 8, 2012

Facts:
After the Mt. Pinatubo eruption in 1991, the Department of Public Works and
Highways engaged the services of several contractors for the rehabilitation of affected river systems.
Efren N. Rigor and Romeo R. Dimatulac, owners of Save for Chiara Construction and Ardy
Construction, respectively, signed written agreements with DPWHs project manager, Engineer Philip
Menez.
The contractors completed their rehabilitation works. However, DPWH alleged that their contracts with
the companies were void due to non-compliance with legal requirements and thus refused to pay them.
Because of this, the contractors filed an action for sum of money against DPWH.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that the contracts were valid and required DPWH to pay the contractors.
DPWH filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals who also ruled in favor of the contractors. The petitioner
averred that the respondents failed to comply with the legal requirements concerning government
contracts and in ascertaining the extent of authority of the public official with whom they contracted.
Therefore, the petitioner must not be made to pay huge amounts of money arising from void contracts.

Issue:
Whether or not the contracts between DPWH and the contractors are valid.

Held:
Even with the respondents supposed failure to ascertain the validity of the
contract and the authority of the public official involved in the construction agreements, there is no such
confusion as to the matter of the contracts validity and the equivalent compensation. As found by the
court a quo, petitioner had assured the contractors that they would be paid for the work that they would
do, as even DPWH Undersecretary Teodoro T. Encarnacion had told them to fast-track the project.
Hence, respondents cannot by any stretch of logic, be deprived of compensation for their services when -
despite their ostensible omissions - they only heeded the assurance of DPWH and proceeded to work on
the urgent project.

AGRA vs PNB
PANGANIBAN, J.:
June 29, 1999

Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the November 26,
1997 Decision of the Court of Appeals' judgment rendered in favor of PNB ordering all sureties to
pay PNB jointly and severally.

Facts

On August 30, 1976, an action for collection of a sum of money was filed by the Philippine National
Bank (PNB, for brevity) against Fil-Eastern Wood Industries, Inc. (Fil-Eastern, for short) in its capacity
as principal debtor and against Cayetano Ferreria, Pedro Atienza, Vicente O. Novales, Antonio R. Agra,
and Napoleon M. Gamo in their capacity as sureties.
Plaintiff PNB alleged that on July 17, 1967 Fil-Eastern was granted a loan in the amount
(P2,500,000.00) with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum as evidenced by several promissory
notes and were credited to the account of Fil-Eastern. It was further alleged that as of May 31, 1976 the
total indebtedness of Fil-Eastern and its sureties on subject loan amounted to [ (P5,297,976.17),
excluding attorneys fees. Notwithstanding repeated demands, the defendants refused and failed to pay
their loans.

October 30, 1978, defendant Fil-Eastern was declared in default for its failure to answer the complaint
within the reglementary period

Petitioners Defense in RTC

The cause of action of the complainant is barred by laches and estoppel in that the plaintiff with
full knowledge of the deteriorating financial condition of Fil-Eastern did not take steps to collect
from said defendant corporation while still solvent

Regional Trial Court

ruled against herein petitioners (agra, ferreria, gamo, novales) . On appeal, the CA modified the RTC
ruling by deleting the award of attorneys fees. Hence, this recourse to this Court.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In ruling that petitioners were liable under the surety agreement, the Court of Appeals rejected their
defense of laches. It held that the lapse of seven years and eight months from December 31, 1968 until
the judicial demand on August 30, 1976 cannot be considered as unreasonable delay which would
necessitate the application of laches. The action filed by the plaintiff has not yet prescribed. It is well
within the ten- prescriptive period provided for by law wherein actions based on written contracts can be
instituted.[5]
he Court of Appeals also noted that the prescriptive period did not begin to run from December 31,
1968 as [herein petitioners] presupposed. It was only from the time of the judicial demand on August
30, 1976 that the cause of action accrued. Thus, [private respondent] was well within the prescriptive
period of ten years when it instituted the case in court. The Court of Appeals further ruled that placing
the blame on [PNB] for its failure to immediately pounce upon its debtors the moment the loan matured
is grossly unfair for xxx demand upon the sureties to pay is not necessary.

The appellate court also held that petitioners proved only the first of the following four essential
elements of laches: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or one under whom he claims, giving rise
to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy;

Defense on appeal to SC:

Petitioners admit that PNBs claim, though filed more than seven years from the maturity of the
obligation, fell within the ten-year prescriptive period. They argue, however, that the cause was already
barred by laches, which is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of
time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier warranting a
presumption that he has abandoned his right or declined to assert it.[7] In arguing that the appellate court
erred in rejecting the defense of laches, petitioners cite four reasons: (1) the defense of laches applies
independently of prescription; (2) the cause of action against petitioners accrued from the maturity of the
obligation, not from the time of judicial demand; (3) the four well-settled elements of laches were duly
proven; and (4) PNB v. CA applies in the instant case

Issue:

Whether petitioners may invoke the defense of laches, considering that PNBs claim had not yet
prescribed.

Ruling

Assailing the CA ruling that laches was inapplicable because the claim was brought within the ten-year
prescriptive period, petitioners stress that the defense of laches differs from and is applied
independently of prescription. In support, they cite, among others, Nielson & Co., Inc. v. Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Co.,[8] in which the Supreme Court ruled:
[T]he defense of laches applies independently of prescription. Laches is different from the statute of
limitations. Prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, whereas laches is concerned with the effect
of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a
claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the property or the
relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity; whereas
prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fixed time, laches is not.
True, prescription is different from laches, but petitioners reliance on Nielson is misplaced. As held in
the aforecited case, laches is principally a question of equity. Necessarily, there is no absolute rule as
to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its
particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and
since laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations.[9] Petitioners, however, failed to show that the collection suit against herein sureties
was inequitable. Remedies in equity address only situations tainted with inequity, not those expressly
governed by statutes.

Petitioners failed to prove the presence of all the four established requisites of laches, viz:

(1) conduct on the part of the defendant or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of
which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainants right, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of
defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right
on which he bases his claim; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is
not held barred.[10]
That the first element exists is undisputed. Neither Fil-Eastern nor the sureties, herein petitioners, paid
the obligation under the Surety Agreement.
The second element cannot be deemed to exist. Although the collection suit was filed more than seven
years after the obligation of the sureties became due, the lapse was within the prescriptive period for
filing an action. In this light, we find immaterial petitioners insistence that the cause of action accrued
on December 31, 1968, when the obligation became due, and not on August 30, 1976, when the
judicial demand was made. In either case, both submissions fell within the ten-year prescriptive
period. In any event, the fact of delay, standing alone, is insufficient to constitute laches.[11]
Petitioners insist that the delay of seven years was unreasonable and unexplained, because demand was
not necessary. Again we point that, unless reasons of inequitable proportions are adduced, a delay
within the prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is not considered to be a delay that would bar
relief. In Chavez v. Bonto-Perez,[12] the Court reiterated an earlier holding, viz:
Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are basically courts of law
and not courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist the enforcement of an existing legal
right. We have ruled in Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court x x x that it is a long standing principle
that equity follows the law. Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no
arbitrary discretion to disregard them. In Zabat, Jr. v. Court of Appeals x x x, this Court was more
emphatic in upholding the rules of procedure. We said therein:
As for equity, which has been aptly described as justice outside legality, this is applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas
nunquam contravenit legis. This pertinent positive rules being present here, they should preempt and
prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity.
Thus, where the claim was filed within the three-year statutory period, recovery therefore cannot be
barred by laches.
Petitioners also failed to prove the third element of laches. It is absurd to maintain that petitioners did
not know that PNB would assert its right under the Surety Agreement. It is unnatural, if not unheard of,
for banks to condone debts without adequate recompense in some other form. Petitioners have not given
us reason why they assumed that PNB would not enforce the Agreement against them.
Finally, petitioners maintain that the fourth element is present because they would suffer damage or
injury as a result of PNBs claim. This is the crux of the controversy. In addition to the payment of the
amount stipulated in the Agreement, other equitable grounds were enumerated by petitioners,viz:
1. Petitioners acted as sureties under pressure from Felipe Baby Ysmael, Jr., the headman of the
Ysmael Group of Companies where the petitioners were all employed in various executive positions.
2. Petitioners did not receive a single centavo in consideration of their acting as sureties.
3. The surety agreement was not really a requisite for the grant of the loan to FIL-EASTERN because
the first release on the loan was made on July 17, 1967, or even before the Surety Agreement was
executed by petitioners on July 21, 1967.
4. Petitioners were assured that the Surety Agreement was merely a formality, and they had reason to
believe that assurance because the loan was principally secured by an assignment of 15% of the
proceeds of the sale of logs of FIL-EASTERN to Iwai & Co., Ltd., and such assignment was clearly
stated in PNB Board Resolution No. 407. In fact, while it was expressly stated in all of the eight (8)
promissory notes covering the releases of the loan that the said loan was secured by 15% of the contract
of sale with Iwai & Co., Ltd., only three (3) promissory notes stated that the loan was also secured by
the joint and several signatures of the officers of the corporation. It is to be noted that no mention
was even made of the joint and several signatures of petitioners as sureties. In other words, the
principal security was the assignment of 15% of the contract for the sale of logs to Iwai & Co., Ltd.
5. For reasons not explained by PNB, PNB did not collect the 15% of the proceeds of the sale of the
logs to Iwai & Co., Ltd., and such failure resulted in the non-collection of the P2,500,000.00 demand
loan, or at least a portion of it.
6. For reasons likewise unexplained by PNB, PNB did not make any demand upon petitioners to pay the
unpaid loan of FIL-EASTERN until after FIL-EASTERN had become bankrupt, and PNB was aware of
this fact because it foreclosed the chattel mortgages on the other loans of FIL-EASTERN which were
secured by said chattel mortgages.[13] (Emphasis found in the original.)
These circumstances do not justify the application of laches. Rather, they disclose petitioners failure to
understand the language and the nature of the Surety Arrangement.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner
vs.
The HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SPOUSES FERMIN MAGLASANG
and ANTONIA SEDIGO, respondents.

The Chief Legal Counsel for petitioner.

Fermin S. Maglasang for and in his own behalf and for his wife.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, * now Court
of Appeals, rendered in AC-G.R. CV No. 07678 modifying the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Ormoc City.

The factual background of this case is as follows:

The petitioner, a government banking institution, extended financial assistance to the private
respondents in the form of loans, the total amount of which is P82,682.39 as embodied in the promissory
notes that the latter have executed on various dates from February 5, 1976 to May 18, 1979, the payment
of which to come from the proceeds of sugar sales of the private respondents. The promissory notes bore
12% interest per annum plus 1% interest as penalty charge in case of default in the payments.

On January 16, 1969, the private respondents mortgaged several real estate properties in favor of the
petitioner as security of their loans, which mortgage was amended on December 17, 1969, December 22,
1970 and February 12, 1975, as to the consideration thereof.

When the price of sugar went down in 1977, the private respondents incurred deficits in the payment of
their loans.

On December 1, 1979, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank, by virtue of Presidential Decree No.
116, issued CB Circular No. 705 increasing the ceiling on the rate of interest on both secured and
unsecured loans up to no more than 21% per annum. In view of this development, the PNB Board of
Directors revised its lending interest rates on the medium and long-term loans effective June 1, 1980, per
PNB board resolution dated May 26, 1980.

When the private respondents defaulted in the payments of their loans, the petitioner demanded not only
the settlement of their outstanding obligation but also the payment of the new interest rate of 21% per
annum beginning June 1, 1980 per the PNB board resolution.

For failure of the private respondents to settle their obligation, then in the amount of P84,743.34, the
petitioner foreclosed the mortgage. Since the proceeds of the auction sale, P63,000.00 was not enough to
satisfy private respondents' outstanding obligation, the petitioner filed an action for deficiency judgment
with the Court of First Instance of Leyte against the private respondents.

After due trial, the trial court ** rendered its judgment on February 20, 1985, in favor of the petitioner
and against the private respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants:

1. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the amount of P21,743.34; said amount
shall earn interest at 21 % per annum and 3% penalty charge starting November 27, 1981,
until the whole obligation is fully paid;

2. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount equivalent to
10% of the total amount due as of November 28, 1981;

3. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the amount of P700.00 as litigation
expenses; and ordering the defendants also to pay the costs of this action.

SO ORDERED. (Records, p. 235).

The private respondents appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, docketed as AC-G.R. CV No.
07678.

On June 30, 1986, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification as
follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the appealed decision is hereby

AFFIRMED with modification as follows:

1. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the amount of P12,551.16

which shall earn interest at 12% per annum and 1% penalty charge starting
November 27, 1981 until fully paid; and

2. No other pronouncement as to attorney's fees and costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 28)

Hence, this petition.

In the resolution of September 14, 1987, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice (Rollo,
p. 80).

The main issue in this case is whether or not the revised rate of interest imposed on the loans of the
private respondents is legal.
The petitioner contends that in all the promissory notes executed by the private respondents, it is
stipulated that the loans are to be paid together with the interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum
until paid, which interest rate the Bank may, at any time without notice, raise within the limits allowed
by law, and also 1% per annum penalty charges by way of liquidated damages should the note be unpaid
or is not renewed on due date. Likewise stipulated in the covering Real Estate Mortgage Contracts and
the Amendment to Real Estate Mortgage of February 12, 1979 that "this account is also subject to the
upward revision of interest rate as may be imposed by the mortgagee PNB." By these explicit
contractual clauses, the private respondents fully agreed to an upward revision of interest rates on their
accounts depending on the rule, regulation, or policy that the petitioner may adopt. At the time when
said promissory notes and Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage were executed by private respondent
Fermin Maglasang, Presidential Decree No. 116 (amending further certain sections of Act No. 2655, as
amended, otherwise known as the "Usury Law") had long been promulgated on January 29, 1973, and
was already in full force and effect in the Philippines.

Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 116, the Monetary Board issued Central Bank Circular No. 705 on
December 1, 1979, prescribing the maximum rate of interest on loan transactions with maturities of
more than seven hundred thirty (730) days and shall not exceed twenty-one percent (21%) per annum.
Hence, the upward revision of interest rate as stipulated in the Promissory Notes and Amendment of
Real Estate Mortgage dated February 12, 1975, is in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 116
promulgated on January 29, 1973 and Central Bank Circular No. 705 issued on December 1, 1979, and
the imposition of 21% rate of interest on the loan obligations of private respondents is within the limits
prescribed by law.

On the other hand, the private respondents maintain that the collection of service charge and liquidated
damages in excess of the maximum 12% interest originally agreed, are illegal and void for being
contrary to or prohibited under Section 2 of Act No. 2655, as amended by Act No. 4070.

The private respondents also insist that the Court of Appeals committed mathematical error in
computing the 12% interest due their deficiencies. According to them, their total deficiency is
P45,427.02 and the total 12% interest of the said amount is P15,731.08, hence, their total liability is in
the amount of P61,158.10. Since the proceeds of the sale of their mortgaged properties are P63,000.00,
there is still a residue in the amount of P1,841.90 from the proceeds of the sale which is recoverable or
collectible by them.

The petition is without merit.

In Insular Bank of Asia and America v. Spouses Salazar, (159 SCRA 133 [1988]), the Court ruled that
the Escalation Clause is a valid provision in the loan agreement provided that (1) the increased rate
imposed or charged does not exceed the ceiling fixed by law or the Monetary Board; (2) the increase is
made effective not earlier than the effectivity of the law or regulation authorizing such an increase; and
(3) the remaining maturities of the loans are more than 730 days as of the effectivity of the law or
regulation authorizing such an increase.

Likewise in Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Navarro, (152 SCRA 346 [1987]), the Court
said that for an Escalation Clause to be valid, it must include a de-escalation clause. There can be an
increase in interest if increased by law or by the Monetary Board; and in order for such stipulation to be
valid, it must include a provision for reduction of the stipulated interest "in the event that the applicable
maximum rate of interest is reduced by law or by the Monetary Board," as provided for in P.D. No.
1684, promulgated on March 17, 1980. There is no question that PNB board resolution dated May 26,
1980 contains such de-escalation clause, under paragraph 8 thereof, to wit:

(8) To enable us to adjust interest rates in accordance with CB Circular letter of March
19, 1980, the covering promissory note for all short/medium/long terms loans shall
include the following conditions:

The Bank reserves the right to increase the interest rate within the limits
allowed by law or by the Monetary Board, provided, that the interest rate
agreed upon shall be reduced in the event that the applicable maximum
interest rate is reduced by law or by the Monetary Board: Provided,
further, that the adjustment in the interest rate shall take effect on or after
the effectivity of the increase or increase in the maximum rate of interest.
(Exhibits, p. 77)

Central Bank Circular No. 705, authorizing the increase from 12% to 21% was issued on December 1,
1979. The promissory notes executed by the private respondents show that they are all payable on
demand but the records do not show when payment was demanded. Even granting that it was demanded
on the effectivity of law, it is obvious that the period of 730 days has not yet elapsed at the date the
mortgaged properties were sold at the public auction on November 27, 1981 (Certificate of Sheriff's
Sale, Records of Exhibits, p. 84). Accordingly, as of December 1, 1979, the remaining maturity days of
the loans were less than 730 days. Hence, the increased rate imposed or charged is not valid.

The claim of private respondents that the respondent appellate court committed mathematical error in
computing the 12% interest due their deficiencies is a factual issue.

Absent the recognized exceptions, finding of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties
and Supreme Court on the tenet that this Court decides appeals which only involve questions of law and
that it is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze and to weigh such evidence all over again, its
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court
(Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 159 SCRA 433 [1988]).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Rubio v. Alabata

FACTS:

Petitioners Rufa A. Rubio, Bartolome Bantoto, Leon Alagadmo, Rodrigo Delicta, and Adriano Alabata
(petitioners) and respondent Lourdes Alabata (respondent) were protagonists in an earlier case for
annulment of declaration of heirship and sale, reconveyance and damages before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 43, Dumaguete City (RTC-43). Docketed as Civil Case No. 10153, the case was decided
in favor of petitioner. In its October 31, 1995 Decision, the RTC-43 (1) voided the "Declaration of
Heirship and Sale;" (2) ordered respondent to reconvey the entire subject property to petitioners; (3)
dismissed respondents counterclaim; and (4) ordered her to pay moral and exemplary damages plus the
cost of suit.3

Not in conformity, respondent elevated the RTC-43 case to the CA. She, however, later withdrew her
appeal which paved the way for the RTC-43 Decision to lapse into finality. The CA resolution granting
respondents motion to withdraw became final and executory on June 20, 1997. On August 20, 1997, the
Entry of Judgment4 was issued and recorded in the CA Book of Entries of Judgments.

Unfortunately, the judgment was not executed. Petitioners claim that their counsel at the Public
Attorneys Office, Dumaguete City (PAO-Dumaguete), was never informed that the entry of judgment
had already been issued.5 They pointed out that, initially, their case was handled by the PAO-
Dumaguete, but when the RTC-43 decision was appealed to the CA by respondent, their case was
handed over to the Special Appealed Cases Division (SAC-PAO) at the PAO Central Office in Manila.
They explained that although a copy of the Entry of Judgment was sent to Atty. Ma. Lourdes Naz, the
SAC-PAO lawyer in charge of their case, she failed to inform petitioners of the issued entry of judgment
before she resigned from PAO sometime in November 1997. She also failed to inform PAO-Dumaguete
of the said development. When petitioners followed up with PAO-Dumaguete, it was of the belief that
the appeal of respondent was still pending.6

In November 2007, or more than ten (10) years from the date when the RTC-43 decision was entered in
the CA Book of Entries of Judgments, petitioners found out that the said decision had become final and
executory when their nephew secured a copy of the Entry of Judgment.

On December 5, 2007, petitioners, through PAO-Dumaguete, filed an action for revival of judgment
which was raffled to RTC-42. On February 28, 2008, after respondent filed her Answer with Affirmative
Defenses, RTC-42 granted her Motion to Dismiss and ordered petitioners case for revival of judgment
dismissed on the ground of prescription. Petitioners sought reconsideration, but RTC-42 denied the
motion on April 4, 2008.7

Petitioners then interposed an appeal before the CA. The latter, on November 16, 2011, rendered its
assailed decision denying petitioners appeal and affirming the dismissal by the RTC-42 of their case for
revival of judgment. On September 26, 2012, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

LONE ISSUE
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN STRICTLY APPLYING THE PROCEDURAL RULES ON
PRESCRIPTION AND DISMISSING THE CASE BASED ON THE SAID GROUND, INSPITE [OF]
THE FACT THAT PETITIONERS WILL SUFFER MANIFEST INJUSTICE AND DEPRIVATION
OF THEIR PROPERTY, DUE TO A FAULT NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THEM.8

The Court resolves to grant the petition.

This case falls under Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which states:

SEC.6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory judgment or order may
be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and
before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived
judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter
by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.

The prior case before the RTC-43 involved a reconveyance of a parcel of land in favor of the rightful
owners, the heirs of one Agapito Alagadmo. Petitioners, in instituting the case against respondent,
showed their desire and resolve to pursue and take back what was rightfully theirs. Eventually, they
succeeded in obtaining justice and won back what was theirs. For their sufferings, the trial court saw it
fit to also assess moral damages and exemplary damages against respondent.9

When the case was elevated by respondent to the CA, the PAO continued to represent petitioners cause.
As it was an appealed case, the matter was referred to, and handled by, SAC-PAO in Manila.

For reasons known only to her, the respondent withdrew her appeal, which resulted in the RTC-43
Decision becoming final and executory. The petitioners, however, never knew of this because when they
followed up the case with PAO-Dumaguete, they were informed that the appeal was still pending.10

It appears from the records that a copy of the Entry of Judgment was sent to Atty. Ma. Lourdes Naz, the
SAC-PAO lawyer in charge of their case, who had resigned. Unfortunately, she failed to inform
petitioners of the said entry of judgment before her resignation in November 1997. She also failed to
inform PAO-Dumaguete of such development.

It was only in November 2007, when petitioners actually discovered that their victory was already final
after their nephew secured a copy of the entry of judgment from RTC-43.

Indeed, both the RTC-42 and the CA were acting in accordance with the rules and jurisprudence when
they dismissed the action for revival of judgment. Section 6 is clear. Once a judgment becomes final and
executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five (5)
years from the date of entry of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a
motion after the lapse of five (5) years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be
enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within ten (10) years from the time the
judgment becomes final.11

An action for revival of judgment is governed by Article 1144 (3), Article 1152 of the Civil Code and
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:

xxxx

(3) Upon a judgment

Article 1152 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligations declared by a
judgment commences from the time the judgment became final.

To allow a strict application of the rules, however, would result in an injustice to petitioners considering
(1) that respondent decided not to contest the RTC-43 decision and withdrew her appeal and (2) that no
fault could be attributed to petitioners.

Petitioners could not afford to engage the services of a private counsel and so were represented by the
PAO. As has been repeatedly stated all over the records, PAO, SAC-PAO in particular, failed them.
SAC-PAO never informed them of the abandonment by respondent of her appeal or of the entry of
judgment. Under the circumstances, they could not be faulted for their subsequent actions. They went to
PAO-Dumaguete and they were told that the case was still pending on appeal. Due to their penury and
unfamiliarity or downright ignorance of the rules, they could not be expected to bypass PAO-
Dumaguete and directly verify the status of the case with the SAC-PAO. They had to trust their lawyer
and wait.

No prejudice is caused to respondent because she withdrew her appeal.1wphi1 Withdrawing her appeal
means that she respected the RTC-43 Decision, which voided the "Declaration of Heirship and Sale,"
dismissed respondents counterclaim, and ordered her to reconvey the entire subject property to
petitioners and to pay moral and exemplary damages plus the cost of suit. Since the decision became
final and executory, she has been in possession of the property which rightfully belongs to petitioners.
She will continue to hold on to the property just because of a technicality.

Due to the peculiarities of this case, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, relaxes the rules
and decides to allow the action for the revival of judgment filed by petitioners. The Court believes that it
is its bounden duty to exact justice in every way possible and exercise its soundest discretion to prevent
a wrong. Although strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is
warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice; and that it is
a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute
of limitations or the doctrine of !aches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result.12

Thus:

"x x x procedural rules may, nonetheless, be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel
bind the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the outright
deprivation of the client's liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.13

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 16, 2011 Decision and the September 26,
2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02497 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.

Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, China Banking Corporation

and Greg Bartelli y Northcott
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997

Torres,Jr., J,:

Facts:
On February 4-7, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, detained and repeatedly
raped Karen Salvacion, a 12-year old the victim, in the apartment of the accused in Makati City. That,
on the 4th day of detention, Karen was finally found by the policemen after a neighbor heard her crying
and screaming for help. The accused was immediately arrested within the premises of the building, and
eventually brought to Makati Municipal Jail.
After thorough investigation and medical examination, the victim, as represented by her parents,
together with the Fiscal filed criminal cases against Greg Bartelli y Northcott for Serious Illegal
Detention and for Four (4) counts of Rape. The petitioners also filed a separate civil action for damages
with preliminary attachment against the accused that had several dollar accounts in COCOBANK and
China Banking Corporation. On February 24, 1989, the day there was a hearing for Bartellis petition
for bail the latter escaped from jail.
The deputy sheriff served Notice of Garnishment on China Banking Corporation but the latter
declined to furnish a copy as it invoked R.A. No. 1405. The sheriff again sent a letter stating that the
garnishment did not violate the bank secrecy law as it was legally made by virtue of a court order but
China Banking Corporation invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, that dollar accounts
are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever. The Central Bank sent a reply after a
demand from the court asking if the Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.960 is absolute in nature
of which it replied in affirmative.
After the accused was declared in default, the court rendered a judgment in favor of the
petitioners based on the heinous acts of the accused and the grave effects on social, moral and
psychological aspects on the part of the petitioners. China Banking Corporation refused the Writ of
Execution of the court. Thus;
Petitioners file a Petition for Relief in the Supreme Court.
Issues:
Whether the dollar accounts of the Accused is absolutely exempt from attachment, garnishment
or any other order or process of any court?
Held:

While it is true that the protective cloak of confidentiality over foreign deposit accounts would better
encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits, lending capacity of the government and would help
financial stability and the national development, what would be the relief of someone claiming damages
against a person with foreign deposit accounts? More so against a person who heinously and feloniously
committed an offense in the territory of the Philippines? As in this case, the accused deemed liable for
the damages based of the heinous acts according to the testimonies of the victim and the witnesses.

It is the duty of the government to encourage foreign currency deposits and to comply by giving
confidentiality but in the correct argument of the Solicitor General, foreign currency deposits of a tourist
or transient is not the one encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1305 on the ground that said accounts is
temporary and only for a short period of time.
The application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. If we rule Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No.960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to
foreign transient , injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused
Greg Bartelli.
Article 10 of the New Civil Code provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of
laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. Simply stated, when
the statute is ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to
vehement urge of conscience.
It would be unthinkable that Section 113 of CB circular 960 would be used as a device by the accused
for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty as the expense of the innocent. The situation calls
for fairness against legal tyranny.
We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the ends of justice.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No.960 and PD No.1246, insofar as
it amends Section 8 of RA 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its
peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of execution
issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214 RTC Makati, and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of
respondent Greg Bartelli y Nothcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.

TAMAYO v. GSELL

WHEN & WHERE:

December 22, 1916, Manila
OPERATIVE STATUTE:
Philippine Bill of 1902
SYLLOGIM:
Act No. 1874, Employers Liability Act
FACTS:
An action for damages against Gsell (employer) for personal injuries suffered by Braulio Tamayo, minor
son of plaintiff asking for P 400, without costs except P 25 for the attorney of the Bureau of Labor.
Braulio is a minor about 11 or 12 years old who is employed as a workman in the match factory located
in Sta. Ana, Manila. He met an accident which consisted of an injury caused by the knife of one of the
machines of the factory which cut the little ring fingers on the right hand, the latter of which was
severed. The accident arose by reason of him being assigned by Eugenio Murcia, a foreman employed in
the same factory to perform work which he was not accustomed. He was not given any instruction and
was put in the new task only on the day of the accident. He was assigned to clean the part of the machine
where pieces of wood from the strips were stuck, he was caught by the knife of the machine and his righ
finer was served. He was thereupon brought to the General Hospital.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in rejecting the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory
interpose by the defendant and whether or not damages should be awarded to Tamayo?

HELD:
Applying the foregoing principles (cited in the decision are many American cases in relation to the case
and Act No. 1874, Employers Liability Act), which are founded upon reason and justice, it is concluded
that the trial court did not err in rejecting the defense claim. Tamayo is also awarded damages for the
injury cost on him on the negligence of the part of the foremen to warn Tamayo or to give instructions
and consideration to his age, skills and capabilities & for pecuniary loss occasioned by the injury as well
as his diminished capacity resulting from the injury.

LATIN MAXIMS:
1 LEGIS INTERPRETATIO LEGIS VIM OBTINET
Judicial construction and interpretation of a statutes acquires the force of the law
B2- AMBIGUITAS VERBORUM PATENS NULLA VERIFICATIONE EXCLUDITUR.
A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence
Anything that can shed light should be used
**36E- EX ANTECEDENTIBUS ET CONSEQUENTIBUS FIT OPTIMA INTERPRETATIO
A passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes and follows it.

DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO

G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948

FACTS:
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be
remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner
might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the
strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The accused, assisted by counsel,
appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of
the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not
guilty. Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses
could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law. The fiscal and the
private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. In view
thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence, and the
justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Justice of the Peace court of Masantol committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record.

HELD:
Evidence is the mode and manner of proving competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies
to establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings. It is fundamentally a procedural law. The
Supreme Court that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the
peace on the matter. Said section defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the preliminary
investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of
justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth.
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the majority and
denied even any discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary
investigation to compel the complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.

FERIA, J., dissenting:

I am sorry to dissent from the decision.

The petitioner in the present case appeared at the preliminary investigation before the Justice of the
Peace of Masantol, Pampanga, and after being informed of the criminal charges against him and asked if
he pleaded guilty or not guilty, pleaded not guilty. "Then the counsel for the petitioner moved that the
complainant present her evidence so that her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the
manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected to petitioner's motion
invoking section 11, Rule 108, and the objection was sustained. In view thereof, the accused refused to
present his evidence, and the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.

The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the Court of First Instance praying that the
record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace of Masantol, in order that the petitioner might
cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony. The motion was
denied, and for that reason the present special civil action of mandamus was instituted.

It is evident that the refusal or waiver of the petitioner to present his evidence during the investigation in
the justice of the peace, was not a waiver of his alleged right to be confronted with and cross-examine
the witnesses for the prosecution, that is, of the preliminary investigation provided for in General Order
No. 58 and Act No. 194, to which he claims to be entitled, as shown by the fact that, as soon as the case
was forwarded to the Court of First Instance, counsel for the petitioner filed a motion with said court to
remand the case to the Justice of the Peace of Masantol ordering the latter to make said preliminary
investigation. His motion having been denied, the petitioner has filed the present action in which he
squarely attacks the validity of the provision of section 11, Rule 108, on the ground that it deprives him
of the right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, contrary to the
provision of section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution.

In the case of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, No. L-1336, we did not discuss and decide the
question of validity or constitutionality of said section 11 in connection with section 1 of Rule 108,
because that question was not raised therein, and we merely construed the provisions on preliminary
investigation or Rule 108. In said case the writer of this dissenting opinion said:

It may not be amiss to state that, modesty aside, the writer of this dissenting opinion, then a
practising attorney, was the one who prepared the draft of the Rules of Court relating to criminal
procedure, and the provisions on preliminary investigation in the draft were the same as those of
the old law, which gave the defendant the right to be confronted with and to cross-examine the
witnesses for the prosecution. But the Supreme Court approved and adopted in toto the draft,
except the part referring to preliminary investigation which it modified, by suppressing said right
and enacting, in its stead, the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 in its present form. I prefer the
old to the new procedure. But I can not subscribe to the majority decision, which is a judicial
legislation and makes the exercise of the right of a defendant to be confronted, with and cross-
examine the witnesses against him, to depend entirely upon the whim or caprice of a judge or
officer conducting the preliminary investigation.

But now the question of the validity of said section 11, Rule 108, is squarely presented to this Court for
decision, we have perforce to pass upon it.

Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution prescribes that "the Supreme Court shall have power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, but said rules shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights." The constitution added the last part of the above-
quoted constitutional precept in order to emphasize that the Supreme Court is not empowered, and
therefore can not enact or promulgate substantive laws or rules, for it is obvious that rules which
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, are substantive and not adjective laws or rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure.

It does not require an elaborate arguments to show that the right granted by law upon a defendant to be
confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecuted in preliminary investigation as well
as in the trial of the case is a substantive right. It is based on human experience, according to which a
person is not prone to tell a lie against another in his presence, knowing fully well that the latter may
easily contradict him, and that the credibility of a person or veracity of his testimony may be
efficaciously tested by a cross-examination. It is substantive right because by exercising it, an accused
person may show, even if he has no evidence in his favor, that the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution are not sufficient to indicate that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and
he is guilty thereof, and therefore the accused is entitled to be released and not committed to prison, and
thus avoid an open and public accusation of crime, the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial,
and the corresponding anxiety or moral suffering which a criminal prosecution always entails.
This right is not a constitutional but a statutory right granted by law to an accused outside of the City of
Manila because of the usual delay in the final disposition of criminal cases in provinces. The law does
not grant such right to a person charged with offenses triable by the Court of First Instance in the City of
Manila, because of the promptness, actual or presumptive, with which criminal cases are tried and
disposed of in the Court of First Instance of said city. But this right, though not a constitutional one, can
not be modified, abridged, or diminished by the Supreme Court, by virtue of the rule making power
conferred upon this Court by the Constitution.

Since the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 as construed by this Court in several cases, (in which the
question of constitutionality or validity of said section had not been squarely raised) do away with the
defendant's right under discussion, it follows that said section 11 diminishes the substantive right of the
defendant in criminal case, and this Court has no power or authority to promulgate it and therefore is
null and void.

The fact that the majority of this Court has ruled in the above cited case of Dequito and Saling
Buhay vs. Arellano, that the inferior or justice of the peace courts have discretion to grant a defendant's
request to have the witnesses for the prosecution recalled to testify again in the presence of the
defendant and be cross-examined by the latter, does not validate said provision; because to make the
exercise of an absolute right discretionary or dependent upon the will or discretion of the court or officer
making the preliminary investigation, is evidently to diminish or modify it.

Petition is therefore granted.

Case Digest: Primicias vs Municipality of Urdaneta

Facts:

On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when he was
found violating Municipal Order 3, Series of 1964 for overtaking a truck. The Courts of First Instance
decided that from the action initiated by Primicias, the Municipal Order was null and void and had been
repealed by Republic Act 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code

Issues:

1. Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of Urdaneta is null and void

2. Whether or not the Municipal Order is not definite in its terms or ambiguous.

Held:

1. Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is an explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per general rule,
the later law prevails over an earlier law and any conflict between a municipal order and a national law
must be ruled in favor of the statute.
2. Yes, the terms of Municipal Order 3 was ambiguous and not definite. Vehicular Traffic is not
defined and no distinctions were made between cars, trucks, buses, etc.

Appealed decision is therefore AFFIRMED.

JAIME TAN, JR. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and JOSE A. MAGDANGAL and ESTRELLA MAGDANGAL
G.R. No. 136368
January 16, 2002

FACTS:
On January 22, 1981, Jaime Tan, for a consideration of P59,200.00, executed a deed of absolute
sale over the property, parcel of land, with an area of 34,829 square meters, situated in Bunawan, Davao
City in his name, in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal. Simultaneous with the
execution of this deed, the same contracting parties entered into another agreement whereunder Tan
given one (1) year within which to redeem or repurchase the property.
Albeit given several opportunities and/or extensions to exercise the option, Tan failed to redeem
the property until his death on January 4, 1988.
On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the Regional Trial Court at Davao City a suit against the
Magdangals for reformation of instrument. The complaint alleged that, while Tan and the Magdangals
denominated their agreement as deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to conclude an equitable
mortgage.
Barely hours after the complaint was stamped 'received,' the Magdangals were able to have Tan's
title over the lot in question canceled and to secure in their names TCT No. T-134470. This development
prompted the heirs of Tan, who were to be later substituted by Jaime V. Tan, Jr. (Tan, Jr.) as plaintiff, to
file a supplemental complaint. On June 4, 1991, Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City
rendered judgment finding for Tan, Jr. wherein the judgment was rendered that the plaintiff is ordered to
pay the defendants within 120 days after the finality of this decision.
The Magdangals appealed to this Court and in a decision promulgated on September 28, 1995,
this Court, thru its then Special Third Division, affirmed in toto the appealed decision of the lower
court.
On March 13, 1996, the Clerk of this Court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment the
Decision has, on October 21, 1995, become final and executory.
On March 21, 1996, the Magdangals filed in the lower court a MOTION FOR
CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF POSSESSION, therein alleging that they did not appeal from the
aforesaid decision of this Court, adding '[T]hat the appealed judgment of the Court of Appeals has
become final and executory 15 days from October 5, 1995 or up to October 20, 1995, which the 120
days redemption period commences.
In opposition to this motion, Tan, Jr. alleged, among other things, that until an entry of judgment
has been issued by the Court of Appeals and copy thereof furnished the parties, the appealed decision of
the court a quo in this case cannot be considered final and executory. Pressing the point, Tan, Jr.,
citing Cueto vs. Collantes, infra., would then assert that the period of redemption on his part commenced
to run from receipt of entry of judgment.
 Meanwhile, Tan, Jr. via a motion for execution dated March 27, 1996, which he filed directly
with this court, prayed this court to direct the court a quo to issue the corresponding writ of execution of
the civil case. In a related move, Tan, Jr. filed on April 16, 1996, a MANIFESTATION AND MOTION
therein advising the court a quo of his intention to redeem the property in question and of the fact that,
on such date, he has deposited with its clerk of court the repurchase price, plus interest, as required by its
original decision. By way of relief, Tan, Jr. prayed that the Magdangals be ordered to claim the amount
thus deposited and the Register of Deeds of Davao City, to reinstate the title of Jaime Tan and Praxedes
Tan.
Jointly acting on the aforementioned MOTON FOR CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF
POSSESION of the Magdangals, MANIFESTATION AND MOTION of Tan, Jr., the court a
quo presided by the respondent judge denied the motions for lack of merit.
The respondent judge wrote in the same order:
'Following the ruling of the Supreme Court in Cueto vs. Collantes, et al., 97 Phil. 325, the 120
days period for plaintiff to pay the amount of P59,200.00 plus interest x x x should be reckoned
from the date of Entry of Judgment x x x which was March 13, 1996. The plaintiff made a
deposit on April 17, 1996 well within the 120-day period mandated by the decision of this Court.'
In due time, the Magdangals moved for a reconsideration. However, the respondent judge denied
the motion for being proforma and fatally defective.

ISSUE:
What rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably obtained in the trial court by the
petitioner.

RULING:
From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule that governs finality of judgment
is Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide:
"SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. - If no appeal or motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution
shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the
judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The
record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by
the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final resolution has become final and
executory. (2a, R36)
SEC. 11. Execution of judgment. - Except where the judgment or final order or resolution, or a
portion thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory, the motion for its execution may only be
filed in the proper court after its entry.
In original actions in the Court of Appeals, its writ of execution shall be accompanied by a
certified true copy of the entry of judgment or final resolution and addressed to any appropriate
officer for its enforcement.
In appealed cases, where the motion for execution pending appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals
 at a time that it is in possession of the original record or the record on appeal, the resolution
granting such motion shall be transmitted to the lower court from which the case originated,
together with a certified true copy of the judgment or final order to be executed, with a directive
for such court of origin to issue the proper writ for its enforcement."
This rule has been interpreted by this Court in Cueto vs. Collantes as follows:
"The only error assigned by appellants refer to the finding of the lower court that plaintiff can
still exercise his right of redemption notwithstanding the expiration of the 90-day period fixed in
the original decision and, therefore, defendants should execute the deed of reconveyance required
in said decision. Appellants contend that, the final judgment of the Court of Appeals having been
entered on July 8, 1953, the 90-day period for the exercise of the right of redemption has long
expired, it appearing that plaintiff deposited the redemption money with the clerk of court only
on October 17, 1953, or, after the expiration of 101 days. Appellee brands this computation as
erroneous, or one not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the rules of court.
Appellee's contention should be sustained. The original decision provides that appellee may
exercise his right of redemption within the period of 90 days from the date the judgment has
become final. It should be noted that appellee had appealed from this decision. This decision was
affirmed by the court of appeals and final judgment was entered on July 8, 1953. Does this mean
that the judgment became final on that date?
Let us make a little digression for purposes of clarification. Once a decision is rendered by the
Court of Appeals a party may appeal therefrom by certiorari by filing with the Supreme Court a
petition within 10 days from the date of entry of such decision (Section 1, Rule 46). The entry of
judgment is made after it has become final, i.e., upon the expiration of 15 days after notice
thereof to the parties (Section 8, Rule 53, as modified by a resolution of the Supreme Court dated
October 1, 1945). But, as Chief Justice Moran has said, 'such finality *** is subject to the
aggrieved party's right of filing a petition for certiorari under this section,' which means that 'the
Court of Appeals shall remand the case to the lower court for the execution of its judgment, only
after the expiration of ten (10) days from the date of such judgment, if no petition for certiorari is
filed within that period.' (1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., p. 950) It would
therefore appear that the date of entry of judgment of the Court of Appeals is suspended when a
petition for review is filed to await the final entry of the resolution or decision of the Supreme
Court.
Since in the present case appellee has filed a petition for review within the reglementary period,
which was dismissed by resolution of July 6, 1953, and for lack of a motion for reconsideration
the entry of final judgment was made on August 7, 1953, it follows that the 90-day period
within which appellee may exercise his right of redemption should be counted from said date,
August 7, 1953. And appellee having exercised such right on October 17, 1953 by depositing the
redemption money with the clerk of court, it is likewise clear that the motion be filed for the
exercise of such right is well taken and is within the purview of the decision of the lower court."
The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on finality of judgment by
providing in section 1, Rule 39 as follows:
"Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution shall issue as a matter of
right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the
expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. (1a)
 If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be
applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith
certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced
and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires,
direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution."
The rationale of the new rule is explained by retired Justice F.D. Regalado as follows:
"1. The term 'final order' is used in two senses depending on whether it is used on the issue of
appealability or on the issue of binding effect. For purposes of appeal, an order is "final" if it
disposes of the action, as distinguished from an interlocutory order which leaves something
to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case (De la Cruz, et al. vs.
Paras, et al., L-41053, Feb. 27, 1976). For purposes of binding effect or whether it can be
subject of execution, an order is 'final' or executory after the lapse of the reglementary
period to appeal and no appeal has been perfected (see Perez, et al. vs. Zulueta, L-10374,
Sept. 30, 1959; cf. Denso [Phil.], Inc. vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 75000, Feb. 27, 1987; Montilla vs.
CA, et al., L-47968, May 9, 1988).
Under the present procedure, the prevailing party can secure certified true copies of the judgment
or final order of the appellate court and the entry thereof, and submit the same to the court of
origin with and to justify his motion for a writ of execution, without waiting for its receipt of the
records from the appellate court. That motion must be with notice to the adverse party, with a
hearing when the circumstances so require, to enable him to file any objection thereto or bring to
the attention of said court matters which may have transpired during the pendency of the appeal
and which may have a bearing on the execution sought to enforce the judgment.
The third paragraph of this section, likewise a new provision, is due to the experience of the
appellate courts wherein the trial court, for reasons of its own or other unjustifiable
circumstances, unduly delays or unreasonably refuses to act on the motion for execution or issue
the writ therefor. On motion in the same case while the records are still with the appellate court,
or even after the same have been remanded to the lower court, the appellate court can direct the
issuance of the writ of execution since such act is merely in the enforcement of its judgment and
which it has the power to require."
It is evident that if we apply the old rule on finality of judgment, petitioner redeemed the subject
property within the 120-day period of redemption reckoned from the appellate court's entry of judgment.
The appellate court, however, did not apply the old rule but the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
In fine, it applied the new rule retroactively and we hold that given the facts of the case at bar this
is an error.
There is no dispute that rules of procedure can be given retroactive effect. This general rule,
however, has well-delineated exceptions. We quote author Agpalo:
Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing
rights or obtaining redress for their invasion; they refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying
laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. They include rules of pleadings, practice and evidence.
As applied to criminal law, they provide or regulate the steps by which one who commits a crime is to
be punished.
The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to
procedural laws. It has been held that "a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or
impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or
attaches a new disability, in respect of transactions or considerations already past. Hence, remedial
statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take
away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights
already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule
against the retroactive operation of statutes." The general rule against giving statutes retroactive
operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of contract or to disturb vested rights does not prevent
the application of statutes to proceedings pending at the time of their enactment where they neither
create new nor take away vested rights. A new statute which deals with procedure only is presumptively
applicable to all actions - those which have accrued or are pending.
Exceptions to the rule.
The rule that procedural laws are applicable to pending actions or proceedings admits certain
exceptions. The rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication
provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or where to apply it to pending
proceedings would impair vested rights. Under appropriate circumstances, courts may deny the
retroactive application of procedural laws in the event that to do so would not be feasible or would work
injustice. Nor may procedural laws be applied retroactively to pending actions if to do so would involve
intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the courts."
We hold that Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should NOT be
given retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner.
Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right.
Petitioner followed the procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the
reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for
petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied retroactively
would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive
application of this procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss
of the subject lot when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period of redemption when he
made the redemption. The subject lot may only be 34,829 square meters but as petitioner claims, "it is
the only property left behind by their father, a private law practitioner who was felled by an assassin's
bullet."
Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of procedure on the
date of reckoning of the period of redemption is inequitous. The manner of exercising the right cannot
be changed and the change applied retroactively if to do so will defeat the right of redemption of the
petitioner which is already vested.
The decision of the Court of Appeals are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The Orders of the
RTC of Davao City are REINSTATED.
Principle in this Case:
COJUANGCO, JR. VS. PALMA

FACTS:
To practice law is a privilege one. It is only for those who can pass the bar and pass the standards
sets- out which are indispensible. One of the requirements to admit the bar is to have a satisfactory
testimonial of good character. Such good moral character must be maintained throughout his life as a
lawyer.
In this case the complainant is a client of Angara Concepcion Regala & Cruz Law Offices
(ACCRA), who assigned the case to Atty. Palma, the respondent. The former hired the latter as his
personal counsel for his business. The same becomes very close to the family, dine and goes with them
abroad. He even tutored, complainants 22-year old daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco (Lisa).
On June 22, 1982, respondent married Lisa in Hongkong without the knowledge of the
complainant despite the facts that the former is already married and with three (3 ) children.
Complainant sends his two sons to persuade Lisa to go home with them, which she did. In the
celebration of respondents marriage with Lisa he misrepresented himself as a bachelor.
On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of First Instance, a petition for declaration
of nullity of the marriage and which was granted. Subsequently complainant filed a disbarment
complaint on the ground of grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Respondent in his answer filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action. As he contends
that complaint fails to allege acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or violation of his
lawyers oath.

ISSUE:
WHETHER or not respondents acts constitute deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office,
grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer that would warrant his disbarment.
RULING:
There is no question that respondent as a lawyer, is well versed in the law, fully well that in
marrying Maria Luisa he was entering into a bigamous marriage defined and penalized under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code. The respondent betrayed the trust reposed in him by complainant. He
was treated as part of the family and was allowed to tutor Maria Luisa.
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct
and violation of his oath as a lawyer, and it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) years and which later lessen to one (1) year.
According to IBP:
At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards
among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyers
professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as
to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, not only his professional activities but
even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the
profession and the courts, may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper
authorities.
Professional competency alone does not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral
character is always an indispensable requirement.
 The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
is that they shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. This is founded on the
lawyers primordial duty to society as spelled out in Canon 1 which states:
CANON 1. A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.
And the suspension of 1 year which is previously 3 years is not commensurate to the gravity of
his offense, thus he is disbarred from the practice of law.

III. State and Government

A. The State

1. What is a State?

Collector of Internal Revenue v. Campos Rueda

42 SCRA 23 Political Law Definition of State

FACTS: In January 1955, Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, Morocco (an international zone [foreign
country] in North Africa). At the time of her death, she was a Spanish citizen and was a resident of
Tangier. She however left some personal properties (shares of stocks and other intangibles) in the
Philippines. The designated administrator of her estate here is Antonio Campos Rueda.
In the same year, the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) assessed the estate for deficiency tax
amounting to about P161k. Campos Rueda refused to pay the assessed tax as he claimed that the estate
is exempt from the payment of said taxes pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code which provides:

That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his
death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any
character in respect of intangible person property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of
the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer
taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not
residing in that foreign country.

Campos Rueda was able to prove that there is reciprocity between Tangier and the Philippines.
However, the CIR still denied any tax exemption in favor of the estate as it averred that Tangier is not a
state as contemplated by Section 22 of the Tax Code and that the Philippines does not recognize
Tangier as a foreign country.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tangier is a state.
HELD: Yes. For purposes of the Tax Code, Tangier is a foreign country.
A foreign country to be identified as a state must be a politically organized sovereign community
independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory,
acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. The stress is on its being a nation, its
people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its
sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality.
Further, the Supreme Court noted that there is already an existing jurisprudence (Collector vs De Lara)
which provides that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality
in the sense, did fall under the exempt category provided for in Section 22 of the Tax Code. Thus,
recognition is not necessary. Hence, since it was proven that Tangier provides such exemption to
personal properties of Filipinos found therein so must the Philippines honor the exemption as provided
for by our tax law with respect to the doctrine of reciprocity.
Democratic State

Tolentino v. Commission on Elections

41 SCRA 702 Political Law Democracy

FACTS: The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite concerning only the
proposal to lower the voting age from 21 to 18. This was even before the rest of the draft of the
Constitution (then under revision) had been approved. Arturo Tolentino then filed a motion to prohibit
such plebiscite.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper.
HELD: Yes. If the advance plebiscite will be allowed, there will be an improper submission to the
people. Such is not allowed.
The proposed amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for ratification. Election here is singular which meant that the
entire constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the people were
not given a proper frame of reference in arriving at their decision because they had at the time no idea
yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution would ultimately be and therefore would be unable to
assess the proposed amendment in the light of the entire document. This is the Doctrine of Submission
which means that all the proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to the people for
the ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT piecemeal.

B. The Philippine Government

1. What is a Government?

United States v. Dorr

Administrative Law Case Digests

Arellano University School of Law
aiza ebina/2015

US vs DORR
2 Phil 332
Administration as an Organization Distinguished from Government
FACTS: The defendants have been convicted upon a complaint charging them with the offense of
writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government of the United States and
the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands. The complaint is based upon section 8 of Act No. 292
of the Commission, which is as follows:
"Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels
against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, or
which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, or which tend to instigate
others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies
or riots, or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or to disturb the peace of the
community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices,
shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding two
years, or both, in the discretion of the court."
The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of the "Manila Freedom" of April 6, 1902,
under the caption of" A few hard facts."

ISSUE: Whether or not the article be regarded as embraced within the description of "scurrilous libels
against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands"

RULING: No. The important question is to determine what is meant in section 8 of Act No. 292 by the
expression "the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands." Does it mean in a general and abstract
sense the existing laws and institutions of the Islands, or does it mean the aggregate of the individuals by
whom the Government of the Islands is, for the time being, administered? Either sense would doubtless
be admissible.
We understand, in modern political science, by the term "government", that institution or aggregate of
institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are
necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that
society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them. Government is the aggregate
of authorities which rule a society. By "administration" again, we understand in modern times, and
especially in more or less free countries, the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins of
government are for the time being (the chief ministers or heads of departments)." (Bouvier, Law
Dictionary, 89l.) But the writer adds that the terms "government and administration" are not always
used in their strictness, and that "government" is often used for administration. The article in question
contains no attack upon the governmental system of the United States, and it is quite apparent that,
though grossly abusive as respects both the Commission as a body and some of its individual members,
it contains no attack upon the governmental system by which the authority of the United States is
enforced in these Islands. The form of government by a Civil Commission and Civil Governor is not
assailed. It is the character of the men who are intrusted with the administration of the government that
the writer is seeking to bring into disrepute by impugning the purity of their motives, their public
integrity, and their private morals, and the wisdom of their policy. The publication of the article,
therefore, no seditious tendency being apparent, constitutes no offense under Act No. 292, section 8.

RATIO: Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society. By "administration" again, we
understand in modern times, and especially in more or less free countries, the aggregate of those persons
in whose hands the reins of government are for the time being (the chief ministers or heads of
departments). The terms "government and administration" are not always used in their strictness, and
that "government" is often used for administration.

2. Parens Patriae

Government of the P. I. v. Monte de Piedad

 35 Phil. 728 Political Law Parens Patriae
In June 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The Spanish Government then
provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it was received by the Philippine Treasury. Out of the
said amount, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it was then invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which in
turn invested the amount in jewelries. But when the Philippine government later tried to withdraw the
said amount, the bank cannot provide for the amount. The government then filed a complaint. The bank
argued that the Philippine government is not an affected party hence has no right to institute a complaint.
The bank argues that the government was not the intended beneficiary of the said amount.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the
respondent bank.
HELD: Yes. The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de Piedad, this is
in accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of
the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No
other party has been entrusted with such right hence as parents of the people the government has the
right to take back the money intended for the people.

3. Type of Government / Separation of Governmental Powers

Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936)

63 Phil. 139 Political Law Judicial Review Electoral Commission

In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted
for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On
Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15,
1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8
confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far
been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against
the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as
the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss
arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by
claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and
that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the
several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the
only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional
boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
 That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of
the other two departments of the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.

o While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who
will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority
leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority
leader.
o Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President and
House Speaker
o Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature
o Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation,
modification and waiver by the body adopting them

FACTS:

During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both nominated
to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected
Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly
the only other member of the minority, he was assuming position of minority leader. He explained that
those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him,
the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP Party number 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader.
Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of respondent as
Senate minority leader
o Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative procedure

RULING:

The petition fails.

The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority

The term majority has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number
out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total.
The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate
President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it
thereby delineate who comprise the majority, much less the minority, in the said body. And there is
no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these
terms.

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who
will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority
leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the
minority leader.

xxx

Majority may also refer to the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes, not necessarily
more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is a group, party, or
faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority. Between two unequal parts or
numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority, while the
lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to
say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government
with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there
could be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the dominant
minority party for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present
Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or
statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents or a combination
thereof has the right to select the minority leader.

Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President and
House Speaker

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it
is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All
that the Charter says is that [e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power to determine the rules of its
proceedings. xxx

Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders.
Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of
creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long
practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules,
this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative
thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in
the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do
its work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that
where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a
real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts
may intervene.

Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation,
modification and waiver by the body adopting them

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them. Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no
concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon
the concurrence of a majority.

In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it
may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for
the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that
exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold
-- the very duty that justifies the Courts being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the
sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the
Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and
judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.

To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, a
clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the
petition would easily fail.

IV. The Constitution

A. What is a Constitution?

Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justices Johns, Villamor, and Ostrand in Lopez
v. De los Reyes, 55 Phil. 170 (1930)

B. Interpretation of the Constitution

Generally

Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284 (1987)

Facts:
Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila Regional Trial Court seek to prohibit the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their
salaries or compensation for such would tantamount to a diminution of their salary, which is
unconstitutional. Earlier however, or on June 7, 1987, the Court en banc had already reaffirmed the
directive of the Chief Justice which directs the continued withholding of taxes of the justices and the
judges of the judiciary but the SC decided to rule on this case nonetheless to settle the issue once and
for all.

ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of income tax.

HELD: No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their deliberations, was
NOT to exempt justices and judges from general taxation. Members of the judiciary, just like members
of the other branches of the government, are subject to income taxation. What is provided for by the
constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased during their continuance in office. They have
a fix salary which may not be subject to the whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries of the
judges shall be subject to the general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.

But may the salaries of the members of the judiciary be increased?

Yes. The Congress may pass a law increasing the salary of the members of the judiciary and such
increase will immediately take effect thus the incumbent members of the judiciary (at the time of the
passing of the law increasing their salary) shall benefit immediately.

Congress can also pass a law decreasing the salary of the members of the judiciary but such will only be
applicable to members of the judiciary which were appointed AFTER the effectivity of such law.

Filoteo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222 (1996)

Facts:
Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police District in Metro Manila,
an old hand at dealing with suspected criminals. A recipient of various awards and commendations
attesting to his competence and performance as a police officer, he could not therefore imagine that one
day he would be sitting on the other side of the investigation table as the suspected mastermind of the
armed hijacking of a postal delivery van. Filoteo admitted involvement in the crime and pointed to three
other soldiers, namely ,Eddie Saguindel, Bernardo Relator and Jack Miravalles (who turned out to be
adischarged soldier), as his confederates. At 1:45 in the afternoon of May 30, 1982,petitioner executed a
sworn statement in Tagalog before M/Sgt. Arsenio C. Carlos and Sgt. Romeo P. Espero. Peitioner
however sought later that his confession be inadmissible evidence, saying that the law should favour him
as an accused.

Issue:
Whether or not Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution shall be given a retroactive effect
and petitioners extrajudicial confession be held as inadmissible evidence.

Ruling:
No, since what he did was not a penal offense. Under the penal law, a person guilty of felony who is not
a habitual criminal may be given favour by the law.

Who interprets the Constitution?

Lopez v. Roxas, et al., 17 SCRA 756 (1966)

FACTS: Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the candidates for Vice President in the 1965
elections. Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed his loss before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET). The PET was created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law that:

There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the Vice-president elect of the Philippines.

In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez assailed the law and he
sought to enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding with the case. Lopez averred that the PET is
unconstitutional for it was not provided for in the constitution. Also, since the PET is composed of
the Chief Justice and the other ten members of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be validly
appealed before the SC or that there may be conflict that may arise once a PET decision is appealed
before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body.
HELD: Yes. In coming up with the PET, the Congress merely conferred a new function to the Supreme
Court. Such is within its power, the Constitution allowed Congress to determine which body should
decide controversies relating to the election of the President or the Vice President. RA 1793 did not
create another court within the SC for pursuant to the Constitution, the Judicial power shall be vested
in oneSC and in such inferior courts as may be established by law
The Supreme Court went on to emphasize that the fundamental law vests in the judicial branch of the
government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but the judicial power under our
political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or all of said power, except, only, so much as the
Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the Senate and those of the House of
Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the
House Electoral Tribunal, respectively.
Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such
rights. The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such enforceable
and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the court
with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal.
For this reason, the Constitution ordains that Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental
law.
The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793 merely added the courts
jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by Congress. It merely conferred upon the SC additional
functions i.e., the functions of the PET. This is valid because the determining of election contests is
essentially judicial.

Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936)

I. THE FACTS

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the
National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly
passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest
prior to the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against
the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December
9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any
election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the
dismissal of respondents protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

II. THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the
time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
 The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the
Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.

The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in
character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. Where a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one
or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision
relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.

2. Construction Limitations

Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936)

*see digest above*

Endencia v. David, 93 Phil. 696 (1953)

Statutory Construction Who May Interpret Laws

FACTS: Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor
Endencias and Justice Fernando Jugos (and other judges) salary pursuant to Sec. 13 of Republic Act
No. 590 which provides that
No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered
as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
The judges however argued that under the case of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are exempt from taxation
this is also in observance of the doctrine of separation of powers, i.e., the executive, to which the
Internal Revenue reports, is separate from the judiciary; that under the Constitution, the judiciary is
independent and the salaries of judges may not be diminished by the other branches of government; that
taxing their salaries is already a diminution of their benefits/salaries (see Section 9, Art. VIII,
Constitution).
The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR, states that the decision in Perfecto vs Meer was
rendered ineffective when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The said provision is a violation of the separation of powers. Only courts have the power to
interpret laws. Congress makes laws but courts interpret them. In Sec. 13, R.A. 590, Congress is already
encroaching upon the functions of the courts when it inserted the phrase: payment of which [tax] is
hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
Here, Congress is already saying that imposing taxes upon judges is not a diminution of their salary.
This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase which shall not
be diminished during their continuance in office, found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution,
referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof
by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory
of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative
definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise,
the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term.
The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province
and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally
provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition,
thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given
in a case by the highest court of the land.

3. Language

J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary

194 SCRA 317 Political Law Ex Officio Officials Members of the Cabinet Singularity of Office
EO 284
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members
of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or
positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties
Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO
284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7
of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the
Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3,
par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President,
Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure
multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution
itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio
capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of
Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general
rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot
override the constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not
more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to
hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
La Bugal BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 421 SCRA 148 (2004)

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule that
participation in the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be
construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.

FACTS: RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of
RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares
of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the
Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later
repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.

Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and
WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like
WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII
Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.

In January 2001, WMC - a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company - sold its whole
stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned
by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the
FTAA in Sagittarius name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending
before the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider
and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements
involving wither technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization
of minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may
execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA would
violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of Australian
investments.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-
owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a service contract
that permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
HELD:

First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional

RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned
corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.

Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that All
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State. The same section also states that, the exploration
and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of
the State.

Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the
State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or
utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public
domain through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.

Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of
exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control
by the concessionaire over the countrys natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to
exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.

The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase management or other forms of assistance in
the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only technical and financial assistance. The
management and the operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the
service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that
participation in the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such
provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is
invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase
financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions
actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors
contrary to the fundamental law.

The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the
mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to
manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial
ownership over the nations mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but
bare title thereto.

The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally
ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation,
development and utilization of Philippine natural resources.

When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations,
inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as
a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or
connected, must fail with them.

Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely
technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.

Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract

The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the
agreement itself is a service contract.

Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to
explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the
contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing,
technology, management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.

These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP
beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the
benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the
vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the
contract from which they spring must be struck down.

Perfecto v. Meer, 85 Phil. 552 (1950)

Facts:
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income
tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he
instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his
salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of
the Constitution.

Issue:
Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution thereof?

Held:
Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of judges are not
included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may
additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines
1913, taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from
diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have
been transplanted here ; and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935)
the prohibition against diminution of the judges' compensation, the Federal principle was known that
income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them.

This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon buying
gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real property, they
pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only
when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official
stipend that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the fundamental charter.

Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and block
encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial
salaries is not a mere privilege of judges personal and therefore waivable but a basic limitation
upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest (Evans vs. Gore).

Rules of Construction

Sarmiento v. Mison

156 SCRA 549 G.R. No. 79974 December 17 1987 [Appointing Power]

FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of
the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento
assailed the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison,
without submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full
authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers,
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with
the consent and confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule in
constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not
enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group
require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of
those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is
required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora

G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]

FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President
Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each
other for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the
validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is,
likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to
these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme
over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the
civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military
in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

Marcelino v. Cruz

121 SCRA 51 Political Law Constitutional Law Period to Resolve a Case from Date of Submission
Promulgation vs Rendition of Judgment Constitutional Period to Decide not Mandatory
FACTS: Bernardino Marcelino was charged for the crime of rape. On August 4, 1975, the prosecution
finished presenting evidence against Marcelino and rested its case. On the same date, the attorneys of
both parties in the criminal case moved for time within which to submit their respective memoranda.
The presiding judge, Fernando Cruz, Jr., gave them 30 days or until September 4, 1975. Only Marcelino
submitted a memoranda.
On November 28, 1975, Judge Cruz filed with the Clerk of Court a copy of his decision, his decision
bears the same date of November 28, 1975. The promulgation of the decisions was scheduled in January
1976. Marcelino is now contending that the court can no longer promulgate judgment because by
January 1976, the 3-month period (90 day period) within which lower courts must decide on cases had
already lapsed, thus, the lower court lost its jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Cruz had resolved the case within the allotted period.
HELD: Yes. The case is deemed submitted for decision on September 4, 1975 (date of last day of filing
of the memoranda by the respective parties). From that day, the 3-month period begins to run so Judge
Cruz had until December 4, 1975 to rule on the case. Judge Cruz made a rendition of his decision on
November 28, 1975. The date of rendition is the date of filing of the decision with the clerk of court.
Hence, Judge Cruz was able to rule on the case within the 3-month period because November 28, 1975
was merely the 85th day from September 4, 1975.
The date of promulgation of a decision, in this case it was set in January 1976, could not serve as the
reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at a later date.
Is the period to decide provided for by the Constitution mandatory?
Section 11 (1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that upon the effectivity of this constitution,
the maximum period within which case or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its
submission shall be; 18 months for the Supreme Court, 12 months for the inferior courts and 3 months
for lower courts. In practice, the Supreme Court is liberal when it comes to this provision. The provision
is mandatory, its merely directive. Extensions can be granted in meritorious cases. To interpret such
provision as mandatory will only be detrimental to the justice system. Nevertheless, the SC warned
lower court judges to resolve cases within the prescribed period and not take this liberal construction as
an excuse to dispose of cases at later periods.
Co v. Electoral Tribunal

Aids in Interpretation

Doctrine: citizenship
Date: July 30, 1991
Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident
of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative
district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following
grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was,
however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue:
WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:
The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the
Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang,
Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the
then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was
brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the
province of Samar.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he
absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the
years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in
love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948.
Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware
store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in
Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an
unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino
citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring
the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may
already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a
certificate of naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private
respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the
customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better
education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent
looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an
examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila.
In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the
Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to
derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly
declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The
Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship
since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
 SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph
3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of
Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question was
enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an
alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born
of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If
one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords
natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they
elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when
he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a
citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been
naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old.
He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in
1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957.
In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old
In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and
the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.
Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen
because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondents father of
his citizenship after his death. An attack on a persons citizenship may only be done
through a direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of
Philippine citizenship to respondents father as null and void would run against the
principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest
Legaspi v. Minister of Finance

Amnesty Does not Need Concurrence from Congress if the President Acts Pursuant to His Power to
Legislate
FACTS: In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim
Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840 granting tax amnesty and filing of
statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes unconstitutional. He argued that said decree
was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution (T)he Legislative power shall be vested in
a Batasang Pambansa (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only with
concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa. In this case, there was no concurrence given by the IBP.
Legaspi averred that since Martial Law is already lifted, the president can no longer arbitrarily enact
laws. At the same time, Legaspi averred that Amendment No. 6, which provides legislative powers to
Marcos, is invalid because that is no longer allowed after the lifting of the ML.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly grant tax amnesties w/o the concurrence of the Batasan
Pambansa.
HELD: SC ruled PD 1840 to be valid. Legaspi argued that PD 1840 is invalid for it did not enjoy the
concurrence of the Batasan. He relies on Article 7, Sec 11 of the Constitution which provides that
The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit
fines and forfeitures and with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty.
The SC noted that Article 7, sec. 11, applies only when the President is exercising his power of
executive clemency. In the case at bar, PD 1840 was issued pursuant to his power to legislate under
Amendment No. 6. It ought to be indubitable that when the President acts as legislator as in the case at
bar, he does not need the concurrence of the Batasan. Rather, he exercises concurrent authority vested
by the Constitution.

Montejo v. COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of
Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it
violates the principle of equality of representation.

The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd district
is composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi,
Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba.

Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of Republic Act No.
2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the municipalities comprising the subprovince:
Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories
comprised therein.

On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran became a regular
province. (The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite.) As a consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district
composed the new province of Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce the 3rd district to five
municipalities (underlined above) with a total population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census.

To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the
province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent
representatives of the province and other interested parties and on December 29, 1994, it promulgated
the assailed resolution where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the 2nd
district and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of Leyte.

Issue:

Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and
reapportionment is valid or not.

Held:

Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set aside.

The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows that COMELEC was denied
the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Regarding the first
elections after the enactment of the 1987 constitution, it is the Commission who did the reapportionment
of the legislative districts and for the subsequent elections, the power was given to the Congress.

Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution as the source of
its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. Said
ordinance states that:

Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments to the
reapportionment herein made.

Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be createdThe number of Members apportioned to the
province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so
increases, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections
but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election.

Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district. Examples include error in the
correct name of a particular municipality or when a municipality in between which is still in the territory
of one assigned district is forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to make minor
adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to
transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by section 3 to
the respondent is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities.)

La Bugal BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos

Facts: The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the constitutionality of
(1) Republic Act No. [RA] 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (DENR Administrative Order No. [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the FTAA dated March 30,
1995,6 executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP). On
January 27, 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision granting the Petition and declaring the
unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA
executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts
prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to
service contracts, which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently denounced
for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed
foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation. The
Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had criticized service contracts for, inter alia,
vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive management and control of the enterprise, including
operation of the field in the event petroleum was discovered; control of production, expansion and
development; nearly unfettered control over the disposition and sale of the products
discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at the point of extraction; and
beneficial ownership of our economic resources. According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution
(Section 2 of Article XII) effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently, respondents filed
separate Motions for Reconsideration. In a Resolution dated March 9, 2004, the Court required
petitioners to comment thereon. In the Resolution of June 8, 2004, it set the case for Oral Argument on
June 29, 2004.

Issue: Whether or not the FTAA issued were valid.

Held: Yes. The notion that the deliberations reflect only the views of those members who spoke out and
not the views of the majority who remained silent should be clarified. We must never forget that those
who spoke out were heard by those who remained silent and did not react. If the latter were silent
because they happened not to be present at the time, they are presumed to have read the minutes and
kept abreast of the deliberations. By remaining silent, they are deemed to have signified their assent to
and/or conformity with at least some of the views propounded or their lack of objections thereto. It was
incumbent upon them, as representatives of the entire Filipino people, to follow the deliberations closely
and to speak their minds on the matter if they did not see eye to eye with the proponents of the draft
provisions.

In any event, each and every one of the commissioners had the opportunity to speak out and to vote on
the matter. Moreover, the individual explanations of votes are on record, and they show where each
delegate stood on the issues. In sum, we cannot completely denigrate the value or usefulness of the
record of the ConCom, simply because certain members chose not to speak out.

However, it is of common knowledge, and of judicial notice as well, that the government is and has for
many many years been financially strapped, to the point that even the most essential services have
suffered serious curtailments education and health care, for instance, not to mention judicial services
have had to make do with inadequate budgetary allocations. Thus, government has had to resort to
build-operate-transfer and similar arrangements with the private sector, in order to get vital
infrastructure projects built without any governmental outlay.
The drafters whose ranks included many academicians, economists, businessmen, lawyers,
politicians and government officials were not unfamiliar with the practices of foreign corporations
and multinationals.

Neither were they so nave as to believe that these entities would provide assistance without
conditionalities or some quid pro quo. Definitely, as business persons well know and as a matter of
judicial notice, this matter is not just a question of signing a promissory note or executing a technology
transfer agreement. Foreign corporations usually require that they be given a say in the management, for
instance, of day-to-day operations of the joint venture. They would demand the appointment of their
own men as, for example, operations managers, technical experts, quality control heads, internal auditors
or comptrollers. Furthermore, they would probably require seats on the Board of Directors all these to
ensure the success of the enterprise and the repayment of the loans and other financial assistance and to
make certain that the funding and the technology they supply would not go to waste. Ultimately, they
would also want to protect their business reputation and bottom lines.

Self Executing Provisions

Taada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997)

Summary: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Philippines acceding to the World Trade
Organization for being violative of provisions which are supposed to give preference to Filipino workers
and economy and on the ground that it infringes legislative and judicial power. The WTO, through it
provisions on most favored nation and national treatment, require that nationals and other member
countries are placed in the same footing in terms of products and services. However, the Court brushed
off these contentions and ruled that the WTO is constitutional. Sections 10 and 12 of Article XII
(National Economy and Patrimony) should be read in relation to Sections 1 and 13 (promoting the
general welfare). Also, Section 10 is self-executing only to rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony but not every aspect of trade and commerce. There are balancing
provisions in the Constitution allowing the Senate to ratify the WTO agreement. Also, the Constitution
doesnt rule out foreign competition. States waive certain amount of sovereignty when entering into
treaties.

Facts:
This case questions the constitutionality of the Philippines being part of the World Trade
Organization, particularly when President Fidel Ramos signed the Instrument of Ratification and
the Senate concurring in the said treaty.
Following World War 2, global financial leaders held a conference in Bretton Woods to discuss
global economy. This led to the establishment of three great institutions: International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), International Monetary Fund and International
Trade Organization.
However, the ITO failed to materialized. Instead, there was the General Agreement on Trades
and Tariffs. It was on the Uruguay Round of the GATT that the WTO was then established.
The WTO is an institution regulating trade among nations, including the reduction of tariff and
barriers.
 Petitioners filed a case assailing the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled
by Filipinos, to give preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote the preferential use of
Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.
It is petitioners position that the national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO
Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos
and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy of the Constitution. They
allegedly render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Issue 1: Does the petition present a justiciable controversy? YES!

In seeking to nullify the Senates act as being unconstitutional, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. It becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute

Issue 2: Do the provisions of the WTO Agreement contravene Section 19, Article II and Section 10 &
12, Artilce XII of the 1987 Constitution? NO!

Petitioners Contentions:
Petitioners argue that the letter, spirit and intent of the Constitution mandating economic
nationalism are violated by the so-called parity provisions and national treatment clauses
scattered in parts of WTO Agreement
o This is in view of the most-favored nation clause (MFN) of the TRIMS (trade-related
investment measures), TRIPS (Trade Related aspects of intellectual property rights),
Trade in Services, and par. 4 of Article III of GATT 1994.
o shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of
national origin
Sec. 19, Art II:The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Sec. 10, Art XII: Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation
of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos.
Sec. 12, Art XII: The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.

Ruling:
These provisions are not self-executing
o Merely guides in the exercise of judicial review and in making laws.
Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in
said article, especially Sec. 1 and 13:
o A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
o A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services
o An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life
The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or
not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the
Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO
Agreement. And we hold that there are.
 WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies
o Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the
Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality,
with each members vote equal in weight.
Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries
o Tariff reduction developed countries must reduce at rate of 36% in 6 years, developing
24% in 10 years
o Domestic subsidy developed countries must reduce 20% over six (6) years, developing
countries at 13% in 10 years
o Export subsidy developed countries, 36% in 6 years; developing countries, 3/4ths of
36% in 10 years
Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
o Encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets
The Court will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an
economic policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate
committed grave abuse of discretion

Issue 3: Does the text of the WTO and its Annexes limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative
power by Congress? NO!
A portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution.
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic
level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines,
expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.
The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain
restrictions enter into the picture: limitations imposed by the nature of membership in the family
of nations & limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 (1997)

Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 (1993)