The Discovery of Freedom

Everyman’s guide to an ethical, prosperous society

By Sanjeev Sabhlok, practitioner of public policy and political philosophy. Author. Aspiring reformer.
Just another human.

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Freedom Team of India Breaking Free of Nehru

DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT

Thanks for downloading this draft manuscript. I seek your comments on this work.
Please send them to me at sabhlok AT yahoo DOT com. Comments incorporated in the book will
be duly acknowledged.

I used a similar approach (of public comments on a draft manuscript) with my first book,
Breaking Free of Nehru (Anthem Press, December 2008). I was pleasantly surprised by the
calibre of feedback I got, and made many good friends in the process. I hope to receive similar
feedback from the many ordinary educated people of the world whose robust common sense is
not constrained by the tunnel vision that marks many academics.

In commenting, please focus on the structure and main arguments. Do not worry about
the language and the MANY typos littered throughout this draft since significant improvements
will take place in that aspect in the coming months, and also before finally being published.
(Note that many shortcomings of language (including typos) in this book are exacerbated by my
use of speech recognition software (which I use because of my severe typing injuries, or RSI).

I expect to make two further revisions of this manuscript by early-2011 before sending it to
some publisher for approval. There is no guarantee that this work will be published by anyone.
While the entire manuscript is currently online, I’ll need to incrementally reduce the public
content from end-2010 to enable me to negotiate an appropriate agreement with a publisher
(they dislike having to publish books which are available freely, in full, on the internet).

As a courtesy, please do not cite this work, being work in progress. My views at the
moment are tentative excursions into the truth. Only the published version will contain my final
views to the extent that any liberal’s views can ever be final.

Do delete this draft after reading.

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© Sanjeev Sabhlok, 2008, 2009, 2010
All rights reserved.

Version 0.231 dated 17 August 2010 – available on the internet at

http://discovery.sanjeev.sabhlokcity.com/.
Version record: http://sanjeev.sabhlokcity.com/book2/version.html (version record not updated for months, if not years!)

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 Dedication

This book is dedicated to:

your success;
your family’s success;
your country’s success; and
the success of everyone on Earth.

Dedicated most importantly,

to your freedom to think and to be.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

FRONTISPIECE: FREEDOM BOUNDED BY ACCOUNTABILITY ................... 9

PREFACE............................................................................................... 10

INTRODUCTION.................................................................................... 19

PART 1 A THEORY OF FREEDOM............................................................ 23

CHAPTER 1 KNOW THYSELF.................................................................. 24

1. Creation, stardust and carbon ................................................................................. 25

2. Our ‘racial’, tribal, and national identities ............................................................... 29

2.1 ‘Race’ ................................................................................................................. 30
2.2 Languages, religions, and cultures .......................................................................... 31
2.3 Tribes and nations ................................................................................................ 31

3. How our brain affects our behaviour ....................................................................... 33

3.1 The body manager: our lower brain ........................................................................ 35
3.2 Our motive force: the middle brain ......................................................................... 35
3.3 Our rational and aspirational higher brain ................................................................ 35
3.4 Consciousness ..................................................................................................... 37

4. Which part of our brain predominates? ................................................................... 37

5. Human nature ......................................................................................................... 40

5.1 Individual and group nature................................................................................... 41
5.2 Underlying needs, motivations, and intent ............................................................... 41
5.3 Range of behaviours ............................................................................................. 43
5.4 Regularities ......................................................................................................... 44

6. The initial condition: State of nature ....................................................................... 49

6.1 Deductions from human nature .............................................................................. 50
6.2 Evidence from primitive tribes and breakdown of order .............................................. 51

7. Two approaches to political society ......................................................................... 52

7.1 Collectivism......................................................................................................... 52
7.2 Individualism, or liberalism .................................................................................... 53

8. Imagining the future ............................................................................................... 56

CHAPTER 2 THE MEANINGS OF FREEDOM ............................................. 60

1. The dictionary meanings of freedom ....................................................................... 60

2. Further exploration of the meaning of freedom ....................................................... 63

2.1 Inner vs. outer freedom ........................................................................................ 63
2.2 Negative vs. positive liberty ................................................................................... 64
2.2.1 Liberty of person and the absence of unnecessary constraints (negative liberty)...... 64
2.2.1 Self-determination and self-realisation (positive liberty)....................................... 66

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3. A definition of freedom ............................................................................................ 67

4. The challenge of ensuring a free society.................................................................. 70

CHAPTER 3 TWO MODERN THEORIES OF JUSTICE AND FREEDOM ........ 72

1. Overview of the theories of freedom ....................................................................... 72

2. Two major theories of freedom and justice ............................................................. 75

2.1 Rawls’s conception of ‘social’ justice ........................................................................ 76
2.2 Nozick’s extrapolations from self-ownership.............................................................. 84

3. Where does this lead us? ......................................................................................... 90

CHAPTER 4 A THEORY OF FREEDOM .................................................... 92

Proposition 1. Life is the yardstick of ultimate value ................................................... 94

Conditions for taking human life ................................................................................... 97

Proposition 2. We are born free, and must remain free ............................................... 99

Equal maximal freedom ............................................................................................ 100
We are not free to injure ourselves ............................................................................. 102

Proposition 3. Freedom comes with matching accountability .................................... 106

The loop of accountability.......................................................................................... 108
Accountability (attribution) as the basis of property rights.............................................. 109
Accountability for one’s responsibilities........................................................................ 110
The processes and principles of accountability .............................................................. 112
Illustrations of accountability ..................................................................................... 118

Proposition 4. To defend our freedom we need a collective fortress.......................... 120

Primacy of group self-defence .................................................................................... 121
Relations with other nations ...................................................................................... 121

Proposition 5. Within the fortress we need a modern social contract ........................ 122
Reasonable equal opportunity and the social minimum .................................................. 128
A note on utilitarianism and neo-classical economics ..................................................... 133

Further explorations of theory................................................................................... 134

The happy slave? ..................................................................................................... 137

The institutions (i.e. the pillars) of freedom .............................................................. 138

PART 2 THE ‘PERSONAL’ PILLARS OF FREEDOM ................................. 142

CHAPTER 5 INDEPENDENT THINKING ............................................... 143

1. The value of oppositional thinking ......................................................................... 144

1.1 Oppositional thinking in India – Charvaka, Buddha .................................................. 145
1.2 Oppositional (dialectical) thinking – Socrates .......................................................... 150
1.3 Systematic doubt – Peter Abelard ......................................................................... 150
1.4 Opposing authority – Reformation ......................................................................... 154

2. Not taking oneself too seriously ............................................................................ 157

CHAPTER 6 CRITICAL THINKING................................................................ 158

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1. The liberating torch of logic and science ............................................................... 158
1.1 Dialectical method ...............................................................................................159
1.2 Deductive method ...............................................................................................160
1.3 Scientific method ................................................................................................160

2. The package of critical thinking............................................................................. 163

CHAPTER 7 ASPIRATION FOR A MORAL LIFE .......................................167

1. The quest for a moral life ...................................................................................... 167

1.1 The natural (strategic) incentives for a moral life .....................................................167
1.2 The role of good governance in ensuring moral behaviour .........................................170
1.3 Religions have no monopoly over morality ..............................................................172

2. Self-realisation ...................................................................................................... 174

3. Happiness.............................................................................................................. 175

PART 3 THE POLITICAL AND MARKET PILLARS OF FREEDOM............................177

CHAPTER 8 THE PILLAR OF TOLERANCE......................................................178

1. The limits of tolerance........................................................................................... 179

2. Tolerance, and intolerance within religions ........................................................... 181

2.1 Tolerance, and intolerance in Christianity................................................................182
2.2 Tolerance, and intolerance in Islam........................................................................186
2.3 Tolerance, and intolerance in Hinduism...................................................................188

3. Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 195

CHAPTER 9 THE PILLAR OF LIMITED POWERS ...............................................196

1. Conceptions about the proper role of government................................................. 196

1.1 The social contract and strong state .......................................................................196
1.2 The basic functions of the state .............................................................................199
1.3 Limiting other roles .............................................................................................199

2. Reforming bad rulers............................................................................................. 201

2.1 Flattery and petitions ...........................................................................................201
2.2 Preaching to the ruler ..........................................................................................201
2.2.1 Religious preaching .......................................................................................202
2.2.2 Strategic political counsel ...............................................................................204

3. The advance of popular sovereignty ...................................................................... 205

4. Options against tyranny ........................................................................................ 208

4.1 Civil disobedience................................................................................................208
4.2 Violent revolution ................................................................................................210
4.3 Exit ...................................................................................................................210

CHAPTER 10 THE PILLAR OF DEMOCRACY ..........................................211

1. Precursors of modern democracy .......................................................................... 212

1.1 Greek city states (and the Roman republic).............................................................212
1.2 Indian republics and panchayats............................................................................213

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2. The evolution of modern democracy ...................................................................... 215
2.1 The growing power of the early British parliaments (1265-1688) ............................... 215
2.2 The Glorious Revolution of 1688 ........................................................................... 217
2.3 The American Declaration of Independence, 1776 ................................................... 218
2.4 The right to vote ................................................................................................ 219

3. Citizen-leadership in democracy ............................................................................ 220

3.1 Citizen assertion, and vigilance ............................................................................. 220
3.2 Leading the society: forming the government ......................................................... 221

CHAPTER 11 THE PILLAR OF THE RULE OF LAW................................. 222

1. A law must be known in advance........................................................................... 222

2. The same rules for all ............................................................................................ 223

3. The right to be produced before a court................................................................. 224

4. Separation of law-making and adjudication........................................................... 224

CHAPTER 12 THE PILLAR OF PROPERTY RIGHTS ............................... 225

1. Claims of nations to territory (The Fortress) ......................................................... 225

1.1 The emergence of nations.................................................................................... 225
1.2 The curse of jingoism .......................................................................................... 226

2. Property rights ...................................................................................................... 227

2.1 Theories about citizens’ rights in property .............................................................. 230

CHAPTER 13 THE PILLAR OF EQUAL TREATMENT............................... 235

1. Equal individual sovereignty .................................................................................. 235

1.1 I’m not your ‘population problem’! ........................................................................ 235
1.2 No foreign aid, please! We are not beggars ............................................................ 238
1.3 Sovereignty over our body: No more slavery! ......................................................... 239

2. The end of racism .................................................................................................. 242

3. Equal freedom for women...................................................................................... 246

4. Ending stereotypes ................................................................................................ 247

5. A social minimum and economic dignity for all ...................................................... 248

CHAPTER 14 THE (MANY) OTHER PILLARS OF FREEDOM ................... 249

1. Freedom of expression .......................................................................................... 249

2. Free markets, free banking and public finance in the free society ......................... 250
2.1 Free markets ..................................................................................................... 250
2.2 Free trade ......................................................................................................... 251
2.3 Free labour markets............................................................................................ 255
2.4 Free banking...................................................................................................... 258
2.5 Paying for the social contract: public finance .......................................................... 261

PART 4 WHAT LIES AHEAD ................................................................ 265

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CHAPTER 15 MODERN SOCIETIES EMERGE INTO FREEDOM ................266

1. ‘Sovereignty’ of nations: The end of imperialism ................................................... 266

2. Shunning utopias like the plague! ......................................................................... 267

3. Where are we going?............................................................................................. 269

1 APPENDIX 1...................................................................................271

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 Frontispiece: Freedom bounded by accountability

Freedom
(to act)

Accountability
(including attribution*)

*A free person is always accountable for his or her actions (or inaction).

‘The essence of liberty has always lain in the ability to choose as you wish to choose, because
you wish so to choose, uncoerced, unbullied, not swallowed up in some vast system; and the right
to resist, to be unpopular, to stand up for your convictions merely because they are your
convictions. That is true freedom, and without it there is neither freedom of any kind, nor even
the illusion of it.’ Isaiah Berlin, in Freedom and Its Betrayal. 1

‘Liberty in thought and action is the only condition of life, growth and well-being: Where it does
not exist, the man, the race, and the nation must go down.’ – Vivekananda. 2

1 Berlin, Isaiah, Freedom and its Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty, London: Pimlico, Random House, 2003,
p.103.
2 Cited in Modern India. 1986.NCERT. p. 218.

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Preface

‘The inherent vice of capitalism is the unequal sharing of the blessings. The inherent
blessing of socialism is the equal sharing of misery.’ – Winston Churchill

Imagine that each letter in this book represents a person, a living human with dreams,
emotions, feelings. Over 100 people already! But include all characters in this book (about one
million in all). Imagine you ‘own’ the lives of these one million people. Now imagine buying 200
copies of this book and becoming the ‘owner’ of these lives. Now burn them all! Destroy! Kill off
these millions of people. Then buy another 600 copies of this book and damage those books as
well, pouring water on them, throwing them into a drain. Injure or harm those 600 million
people!
This extraordinary gory bout of violence against 800 books may be imaginary but the killings
of 200 million people and harm to at least 600 million others is a reality of the twentieth
century. Ideologies opposed to freedom have killed or severely harmed hundreds of millions of
people. Freedom may not sound like a glamorous thing, and it probably is not. But it matters
more than any glamorous thing.
To highlight the significance of freedom, I once thought of starting this book with something
exciting, possibly with a beautiful world famous actress languidly entering her bedroom after
putting the children to sleep. This woman would then say: ‘I love freedom, dah..ling!’ (The
inimitable Ayn Rand would have done perfectly for this role: if only wishes were horses!)
But while I am passionate about freedom – you’ll soon find out – I’m equally passionate
about oxygen. Yes. Oxygen. I dislike having to get up from bed without enough oxygen to
breathe. The point I’m trying to make is that freedom must form a basic part of our life. Like
oxygen it should be neither heard nor seen; it should exist without a fuss, an omnipresent
invisible authorisation to exist, a fragrance in each breath we breathe.
* **
Think I’m over-doing this topic? So now how about I tie your hands behind your back and
throw you inside a small black box with a small hole in it, just big enough to let you breathe: just
a little bit, just enough? You’ll soon realise what I’m talking about, won’t you! The fact that
freedom is not glamorous but is important, and all that stuff.
Would you care for more oxygen or more freedom, Sir? Lady? – Now that I’ve also gagged
you, and you can’t really speak?
No injury caused. I’ve only totally taken away your freedom. Harmless? Just a small
inconvenience? You’ll be here for the rest of your life.
How does it feel? Sir? Lady?
What was it you said?
Please speak up. I can’t understand your grunts.
* **
This book is a tome on moral and political philosophy. Lucky for you, though, you’re not
dealing with any famous philosopher with long-winded arguments but a regular everyday
human who understands what it is to be human. In this book I’ll talk to you about something
really basic in everyone’s life, including yours: freedom. So let me untie you now and release you
from lifelong bondage.
Let’s talk freedom!
There is, you’ll perhaps agree by how, unparalleled, breath-taking, immense, unique, and
universal power in freedom. Nothing more important than it exists, perhaps barring oxygen. The

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ability to do what one wants is a power that exceeds the great mystery and attraction of
romantic love. Freedom is the stuff that lets us be (and become) who we are. It must pervade
whatever we do, it must accompany us wherever we go.
This book is a political pamphlet. It is a proposal that you stop interfering in my life, and I’ll
stop interfering in yours.
Isaiah Berlin noted that the central question in society is this: ‘Why should anyone obey
anyone else?’ 1 You and I ‘obey’ someone else at least at some point in our daily life. If nothing
else, we obey the traffic policeman. 2 Why? Why should a policeman interfere with my life? Who
makes these rules? Why is it that I have to follow them? Why are some societies rich, and others
poor? These and many other related issues are what this book rakes up and questions.
Let me enter the deep end now, before taking you through the necessary steps on a journey
to that end of the pool. Join me in browsing through the cumbersome definition of freedom,
below. This is my definition. I made it up. It is just one of many possible definitions. So don’t
read it twice, just savour it once. Think how clumsy and difficult it is. Wonder whether there’s
any underlying sense in it. (Trust me, there is! That’s what this book is about.)
Freeedom, a definition: Freedom is a state of independent, self-directed thought and self-
determined but self-restrained voluntary action of adults whose behaviour, such as the ability to
trade, demonstrates strategic capability and thus at least a modest level of rational thought.
Where this state of freedom impacts on others, it is limited by countervailing accountabilities
informed both by moral law as variously understood and relevant empirical evidence; and agreed
upon either through implicit or explicit bilateral understandings of negotiation or, where
potential claims can be made on a society’s resources, through social consent usually evinced
through laws.
While this is a mouthful, what it is saying is quite simple. It is saying that when used in
consonance with our internal moral compass, and subject to social agreements and laws, the
word ‘freedom’ tells us unambiguously what we can or cannot do. At each instant, the karma
yogi considers options for action for their long term consequences. Freedom of thought leads like
an arrow towards moral action. The free man acts with deliberation, aware of the potential
consequences of his actions, always committed to being held to account. In advancing his self-
interests though responsible action, he contributes to the welfare of mankind and of all life on
earth. Note that this self-interest is broad, not narrow. It is competitive self-interest, at times,
but is never unethical and does not harm others nor decimate them. It creates, preserves and
fosters.
* * *
Both my previous book, Breaking Free of Nehru (BFN) and this one, started life together in
February 2005 as different sections of a single book. This bond was broken 18 months later
because the initial book was becoming unwieldy. I snipped it into three parts: (a) the theory of
freedom, (b) the history (or, rather story) of long-term trends in freedom, and (c) India’s recent
history of unfreedom. Then I combined these into two books. The first, comprising part (c), being
of a more urgent nature, became BFN. That I finished and published, first. This book comprises
the other two parts which can (potentially) be published separately as two different books. These
two parts together provide the background for to my message in BFN, particularly the
philosophical and historical underpinnings of the political and economic reforms outlined in that
book. Although intended as a stand-alone book, I don’t intend to repeat many detailed
arguments I’ve already made in BFN, and will reference BFN appropriately. Since BFN is
readily available as a free e-book, you can look up the relevant reference even if you don’t own a
personal copy of that book.
A few of words at the outset on style. Although I’m now an overseas Indian citizen 3 (i.e. I’m
not a ‘full’ Indian citizen), I continue using the same voice with which this book began in 2005 –

1Berlin, Isaiah, Freedom and its Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty, London: Pimlico, Random House, 2003, p.1.
The essays were delivered initially as lectures in 1952 on the BBC.
2
3 Which is an Indian citizen without the right to vote

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of a citizen. That would not only be consistent with my original conceptions, but be aligned with
the style used in BFN. In this book, I’ve show-cased my ideas, which were built without
reference to most of the detailed literature that I cite, by putting them in the context of previous
thinkers. I therefore cite number of authors in great detail. While this slows down this book, I’d
rather let those who have influenced humanity significantly speak in their own voice, than
paraphrase badly in my own. I also cite, without reference, my personal public domain
contributions, such as my write-up on wikipaedia on the contribution of India to the conception
of the (implicit) social contract.
My intended audience for this book is much broader than the audience BFN was aimed at.
This book is meant not only for Indians but for citizens from all other unfree countries. China,
Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal readily come to mind, but there are hundreds of others. Most
Western societies are also only half-free. So they too can benefit.
This book is particularly long as it covers a vast canvas of issues. My coverage of like our
biology may not seem to have much to do with freedom, but I believe a theory of human freedom
must be built on the deep understanding of human nature, which can only be founded on
understanding what and who we are, and how our brain works. While such extensive coverage
will make this book a little longer than it perhaps could have been otherwise, I think it is
necessary for me to tell my story.
Capitalism, the system I advocate
This book continues my unequivocal, unambiguous, proud advocacy of capitalism, not
necessarily of the sort that many Indians (or others) imagine, but one in which our freedom is
limited both through self-restraint and through the laws we jointly create to ensure
accountability. I continuously refer to accountable freedom as I did in BFN, not to unbridled
freedom, and because there is no unbridled freedom there is no unbridled capitalism. 4
Capitalism cannot also have, by this definition, any exploitation. Every action is voluntarily
undertaken.
Capitalism gives ferocious battle to socialism on behalf of our liberties. In doing so it doesn’t
ask us to be perfect. Instead, it ensures that our incentives (rewards and punishments) nudge us
towards ethical outcomes. Not by preaching but through good systems can a society achieve
ethical outcomes.
Capitalism is the political and economic system that supports (natural) liberty. Through
democratic participation capitalism creates frameworks for justice and accountability that
defend our equal freedoms. As Paul Starr notes, ‘By opening up courts, legislatures, and political
debate to the public at large and insisting on public justification of decisions, constitutional
liberalism [i.e. capitalism] has made power more transparent and subjected it to scrutiny and
disagreement. Power in the liberal state has …been questioned, criticized, resisted, and
constrained – and, as a result, made more legitimate.’ 5

I advocate capitalism because it is a moral system and hence intrinsically superior, but also
because it eliminates both systemic and structural poverty. The first is a deontological reason: of
superiority in itself; the second is consequentialist, being related to an instrumentalist or
utilitarian outcome. I believe the deontological reason stands on its own right as the better
reason, but it is also necessary to explain the value of freedom to people in concrete terms. We
naturally tend to believe that a good theory will also make us richer. And indeed, it does.
Therefore the importance of the consequentialist reason. Of course, there are many other
reasons as well: e.g. that it punishes the criminals and the corrupt; that it lets divergent views
flourish; and so on. Capitalism is a pluralistic and democratic platform that supports a moral,
peaceful and prosperous society. What more can we ask for?

4 See my article, ‘Unbridled Capitalism’, published in Freedom First in October 2009.

5 Starr, Paul, Freedom’s Power, New York: Basic Books, 2007, p.31.

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 My glowing praise for capitalism, I am well aware, is at considerable odds with commonly
held views in India (even, surprisingly, in academia in the West). The word ‘capitalism’ thus
conjures negative connotations in many parts of the world. Many Indians associate it with (an
imagined) free-for-all market economy where the rich are free to exploit the poor. Of course, that
form of ‘capitalism’ does exist: a mafia-driven mercantilist anarchy of the sort found in Russia
(and to some extent in Italy and Greece) where the government is controlled by the rich and the
corrupt. But that is not capitalism but its total travesty. A genuinely free society has clear lines
of accountability. Capitalism allows us the freedom to do good, to achieve our highest potential.
Even the best-governed free society, however, can only minimise deviant behaviour; it cannot
guarantee that such behaviour shall never arise in the first place. And so while some
exploitation and unscrupulous behaviour may occur even under the best of situations, driven by
flaws in human nature, such things are sharply nipped in the bud under capitalism and cheats
are quickly identified and punished. The capitalism I talk about is therefore not something the
understanding about which can be extrapolated from examples of the corrupt mercantilist
societies (like Russia) found in the world today. Also, showing me bad eggs in capitalist Western
societies doesn’t prove that this is what capitalism does.
The capitalism I have in mind is based on a well-thought out theory of freedom and refers
only to the genuinely free society. Now, of course, you’ll spurn this argument, for after all who
can distinguish ‘true’ capitalism from its imposters; and if all ‘true’ ‘isms’ were to be thus allowed
to be distinguished from real-life examples, then wouldn’t socialism be a great philosophy, as
well? But let me finish this book and you can make up your mind yourself. Never take anyone’s
claims at face value, including mine. Critically examine my ideas and claims (but keep an open
mind) and accept only things that make sense to you. Trust only yourself!
But I am deeply aware that many Indians will probably not read this book with the open
mind. The problem is that Nehru’s influence is all pervasive in India, even today. He basically
crushed all conceptions of liberty in India, and I won’t repeat the arguments made in BFN. In
any event, the ideas underpinning liberty have tended to grow very slowly, even sporadically,
over the centuries, and have often faced a hostile reception. Most Indians are therefore likely to
write off this book, saying:
We fought for independence and created a democratic landscape under Nehru’s banner of
socialism. To have someone like you, who has left India, possibly for good, and who now sits in a
comfortable corner of the world in a society built around greed and exploitation, tell us that
hundreds of millions of Indians were wrong for almost a hundred years is absurd!
True, you have a few academic qualifications from India, USA and Australia, and extensive
experience of working in the Indian bureaucracy and in these countries as well, but that is quite
worthless if what you end up telling us doesn’t fit with our pre-existing views.
We’d rather believe in our gods – Nehru and his totally corrupt progeny – than in you. Goodbye!
Not only that, who knows – you’ve probably been paid by some fat monopolist to write this junk
and pull wool over our eyes! Be gone, Sanjeev! We don’t want to read what you are trying to tell
us. Don’t destroy our religion – of socialism.
And not that such a clarification is even remotely needed, but just for the record, let me note
that not only has no one paid me to write this book but I have paid an enormous personal cost
(both physical and financial) to write it and to do the many other things I have been doing over
the course of the years to bring freedom to India. I do not see such costs that I have incurred, as
a sacrifice. Indeed, I never sacrifice. I despise those who claim to ‘sacrifice’. Instead, I do this
work as part of living my life meaningfully. By trying to fix the most significant gap in the fabric
of India’s social, economic, and political frameworks, I optimise my contributions to India and
avoid wasting my extraordinarily precious and unique life in the pursuit of trinkets and trivia. 6

6 Digression: In due course I hope to write a book on the causes and cure of severe repetitive strain injury (RSI) which
I’ve suffered for years now because of the excessive typing I undertook as part of my promotion of freedom and ethical
governance in India. The financial costs I incurred have been very high, as well.
For instance, by leaving a decent job in the Indian Administrative Service just a few years before completing 20
years of service and thus becoming ineligible for financial entitlements like ‘gratuity’ (and losing all contributions
made towards a potential pension, contributions which in countries like Australia are not confiscated like they are in

13
 This book speaks deeply from within my heart, just like BFN did. I have no desire not any
interest whatsoever in trying to cheat you or giving you a false picture about capitalism, nor do I
fear any consequences for stating my views exactly as I see them. What you see is what you get:
the plain truth from my perspective. In the interest of full disclosure I must add that while I
have no axe to grind, I am very clear about my credentials to lead India to freedom and
prosperity, along with a team of other, similarly qualified leaders. It takes a lifetime to build the
knowledge and experience necessary for building a free society, and I have gone through a very
hard grind to develop these qualities. In making this claim, let me also assert that my happiness
is not in any way bound with whether India (or anyone else anywhere, anytime) will implement
any of the suggestions I make in this book or in BFN, or use my personal services to advance
good governance. I live my life purely and solely my own way. I detest those who claim to live
first their country, and would never trust such hypocrites.
Given my rather precious and prickly attitude, as some may choose to call it, so-called ‘good’
people may well ask (as one of my friends did): ‘Can we not build a society on something more
admirable than selfishness?’ But please note! I am not talking about selfishness. I am talking
about enlightened self-interest. Doing the best we can for ourselves is the best way for each of us
to contribute to the society. The greater the quality of services we provide, the greater the
rewards we receive. We can’t do well for ourselves without doing well for ourselves. If, instead of
doing so, we were to live for others’ sake, then the society will soon enter the quicksand of moral
confusion, incompetence and hypocrisy.
* * *
India is a Third World country today because some its worst people have been –
democratically – elevated to the highest positions. It is a Third World country because it follows
the system of socialism which destroys freedom and hence wealth. Socialism necessarily
criminalises entire societies. India has thus been its own worst enemy. This book therefore
recommends the philosophy of freedom that India should consider in the design of its
governance. I am not into making arm-chair recommendations alone. I would like to return
home one day (if feasible) to take part in the mammoth challenge of taking India to freedom and
greatness. However, till the desire for freedom awakens in the heart of Indians, I must remain in
Australia.
But it is not only India I care about. I am determined to participate in the destruction of all
vestiges of socialism, fascism, and religious absolutism from the world. I am not built to be a
mere spectator. I can’t spend my life watching the creative potential of millions of people being
reduced to ashes. Some of the ‘rulers’ of these destructive societies do not hesitate to use force
against their fellow citizens, and to confiscate property in their mad quest for equality other
delusions such as social justice or religious salvation. I aim to fight all such misguided people –
through persuasion.
* * *
I have other reasons to write this book, as well. We have the responsibility of giving battle to
all intolerant and erroneous ideas, It wasn’t long ago when a handful of people – Hitler,
Mussolini and Japanese leaders – joined hands through the Tripartite Pact of 1940 to hold the
world to ransom. In that moment of unprecedented danger, human life became cheap: almost
expendable. If for nothing else but to ensure that such men never feel emboldened to raise their
heads again, and if they do, to make sure that humanity comes together to destroy them before

India from those who work less than 20 years in the government). While this was a hard decision, it had become clear
to me by then that I could not improve India’s governance system and policies from within. I therefore took the plunge
and quit, landing in Australia without a job and virtually no savings – a truly precarious financial situation in an
environment hostile to my entire managerial background. Moreover, barely touching a computer keyboard
exacerbated extreme burning sensations, numbness, and shooting pain across my entire upper body.
By accepting whatever job I got and starting virtually at the bottom of the ladder, I finally clawed my way back to
a respectable (but still fragile) financial situation. The losses I have faced in my determination to do the right thing
have been serious and extremely disruptive. No one has paid me to write BFN or this book! Indeed, had the things I
am suggesting in these books even remotely been in place in India, I would not have needed to leave India at all. And
these books would have been irrelevant, and not therefore even attempted.

14
they become Frankenstein’s monsters, we have the obligation to teach our children about the
extremely arduous, tortuous, and often bloody, history of human freedom.
I find that I am unable to lay my hands on a couple of books that would adequately
represent what I stand for. Too many unscientific and intolerant ideas float around the world
these days, ideas that can easily mislead. I therefore need to give my children (and other
children) something that might (if they do read what I write!) prevent their being ensnared by
superstition and life-long error.
Indeed, this is the way of the future. Too much specialisation has cost mankind dearly.
Confusion prevails in the minds of specialists. They are almost invariably the purveyors of
lopsided delusions. It is time for laymen with experience and contemplation to write books or
otherwise pass on their insights to the future generations. This will lead to, and indeed,
democratise wisdom. We, the people of this lonely, remote planet, have had a brutal history
behind us, an inhuman history that casts a dark shadow over our brow and brings us great
shame as a species. We don’t yet know why we do the dastardly things we do, or what we should
do to overcome our brutal nature. Pointing fingers at others, we imagine that Hitlers and Idi
Amins are exceptions to our human nature. We imagine ourselves to be saints and think that
others are born criminals. But inside each one of us lurks clear and present danger. In our
complex human nature and deep ignorance about ourselves must surely lie the explanation for
the terrors, hatreds, misgovernance, corruption, and chaos we often see around us. It is crucial
for us to look within, for only that will ultimately set us free from our bondage to our flawed
impulses.
There can never by any freedom to impact the world adversely. And so freedom can only be
about the liberty to impact the world in a positive manner. (Note I do not take this perspective to
the extreme, as Rousseau did. To restrict freedom only for this purpose would destroy freedom
entirely. Accountability allows the gap to be met: we can sort out the problem by punishing bad
behaviour, not by coercing the expression only of good behaviour.)
We are also responsible (jointly with others) to ensure the workability and integrity of our
society’s social contract (I must state at the outset that despite opposition from many significant
classical liberals like David Hume and J.S.Mill, 7 I believe there is much value in this concept,
and will elaborate on these implicit contractual arrangements later). The theory of freedom
insists that we take responsibility primarily only for our personal and family interests. If
everyone were to help himself or herself (ethically), there would be no poverty nor any need for
charity or even the police. But we also have a broader responsibility to ensure justice and
security in society: our society’s governance is definitely our responsibility, albeit a join and
collective responsibility. This also includes fixing problems created by our predecessors: things
like India’s communal and caste tensions or the intractable Kashmir problem. We are not in any
way accountable for these things, but it is in our interest to take responsibility for resolving
things that adversely impact our lives. The democratic nature of the social contract also
demands that we persuade others to reform and to adopt greater freedom. This book is partial
fulfilment of my shared responsibility to resolve social problems, and to advance greater freedom
in India.
* * *
Apart from presenting a theory of freedom, this book outlines a brief story of freedom. I have
formed a particular view about human history based on my rather limited readings. Thus,
events or concepts I consider seminal may not be as highly valued by others. In any event, it is
virtually impossible for any two people to draw the same conclusion about such things. There are
no copyrights on freedom and it does not belong to any one person or to any particular group.
Ideas relating to it have waxed and waned through history, advancing under favourable
circumstances and dying off in others – to be rediscovered elsewhere hundreds of years later.
Most Western writers have a (natural) bias towards contributions made in the West. Believers in
Christianity are biased towards contributions made by Christianity (which I will show, however,

7Mill, J.S. [1861], ‘On Liberty, On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, World Classics
Paperback 1991, p.83..

15
to have been more harmful than helpful to freedom). Our biases and limited knowledge impact
our views about history. I speak therefore from the deep ignorance of my own biases. Let that be
known in advance.
Having said that, I will show clear evidence in this book about how many concept about of
freedom first arose in India and moved to Greece. This may well surprise quite a few readers
who may therefore consider me to be excessively biased! To resolve such issues, I would
encourage you, throughout this book, to read (or continue reading) as widely as possible to
achieve your own understanding about freedom. I should mention at the outset that the reader
familiar with this topic may be surprised at the omission of many well-regarded contributors to
the theory of liberty. It should be obvious that this book makes no claim to comprehensive
coverage, and hence would suggest that readers continue their own extensive reading. (To assist
in a wider reading on the topic, I have provided a simple reading list on my web site 8.) Despite
this book not being (even remotely!) the last word on freedom, I do hope that I have successfully
presented its key message. It is not quantity but quality that matters where knowledge is
concerned. Heraclitus said: ‘Knowing many things doesn’t teach insight.’ 9 Our aim is insight, not
mere information.
Francis Fukuyama saw the end of history, with liberty getting more widely accepted. 10 I
can’t see how freedom can spread merely by writing books. Lord Acton’s message of citizen
vigilance has not become redundant. Why will the ‘rulers’ of this world, wherever they are, allow
greater freedom without a fight? I believe that the history of freedom has barely begun. A long
journey awaits, a journey that may never end.
* * *
Writing is perhaps the best way to learn. In writing this book I have been forced to challenge
not only my assumptions, but those of rather eminent philosophers as well. By demanding
cogency in the ideas of others I have been forced to refine mine. A good amount of reading was
also necessitated as part of writing this book, well beyond what I have learnt in my academic
studies. But my experience of working inside the bureaucracy in India and Australia has been
absolutely pivotal in the formation of my views. Watching people react (as predicted) to
incentives has been the greatest source of learning. As a result I advocate freedom because it is
based on a realistic application of models of human nature.
Many people in India are perhaps perplexed by the great importance people like me give to
freedom. They may well ask: Isn’t India free already? I definitely know of those who claim: But
freedom doesn’t work. Other Indians suggest that freedom is bad for us since its main
philosophers are Western. These are all bad arguments. In particular, what about our doctors to
ignore modern science because most of it arose in the West? Why become paranoid in the case of
political science and economics? Why not take the best ideas from everywhere, regardless of
their source? Surely, only obtuseness prevents us from seeing the value of getting the best ideas
from everywhere.
The advocacy of liberty won’t always lead to things that we like. Its implications often
oppose some of our long-held beliefs. For example, I think that marriage should only refer to a
relationship between a man and woman. I also do not support public nudity, tasteless ‘fashion’,
or the increasing trend towards foul language in daily discourse. And yet, I must necessarily
demand that a government should view such things only through the lens of liberty. We are
required to abide by the implications of liberty, no matter where they lead us. For that alone is
the ethical way. If something does not directly harm others we must learn to tolerate it even if
we do not personally support it. If others don’t harm us directly, then no matter how offensive
their dress, language, or behaviour, we must let them do their thing. Tolerance is the kingpin of
freedom. As J.S. Mill noted, ‘If [someone] displeases us, we may express our distaste, and we
may stand aloof from a person as well as from a thing that displeases us; but we shall not

8 [http://www.sanjeev.sabhlokcity.com/readings.html] – currently under development.

9 Translation used in Roger von Oech (2001). Expect the Unexpected (Or You Won’t Find It). Free Press. p.12
10 Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Avon Books, 1992.

16
therefore feel called on to make his life uncomfortable. 11‘ This includes things that we abhor on
some high moral ground. But let this person harm us directly and we shall be entitled to
compensation.
***
Even though freedom is a powerful concept, its power not self-evident. To see that we must
link at least three aspects of freedom: (a) freedom as the philosophy of tolerance (and justice), (b)
freedom as the model of voluntary (often economic) choice, and (c) freedom as the limitation on
the powers of government. I have found the last of these to be particularly hard to internalise.
Being an ‘insider’ in the machine of government (as I continue to be), I have often been
ambivalent about my role in society. If you work inside government agencies, it appears quite
natural to assume that you are particularly well placed to plan the activities of the unwashed,
superstitious ‘masses’. How half-baked this conception is, is not self-evident because the ‘masse’
are so far removed from one’s decision-making process. In general, bureaucrats look down upon
not only the ‘common’ man but also upon theoreticians (of liberty or otherwise), even as they
wallow in the simplistic anecdotal outpourings of management ‘gurus’. 12
Thus, the models of public choice, which examine how bureaucrats respond to various
incentives, came as a rude shock. Upon dispassionate reflection about my own behaviour and
that of my peers it became obvious that James Buchanan (a leading public choice theorist and
Nobel laureate) was actually correct – as indeed were many other pen-pushing academics. After
painful rumination it became evident to me that I was among the least qualified to ‘plan’
villages, towns, states, or national economies – not that anyone else was better qualified. Thus,
the more economics I learnt the more I came to realise that economists never had any basis for
centralised economic planning, and hence no basic to join organisations like the Planning
Commission (of India). The genuine problem we face is that even simple concepts like the
invisible hand can take years to internalise (if ever!), and need excellent teachers – who are
invariably in short supply. (So how can the lay person, who actually votes in the elections,
understand the concept of freedom? – well, that is why more books like this one are needed,
perhaps?)
The linkages between many seemingly unrelated manifestations of freedom came together
inside my head only in 1997. At that point, of course, I had no choice but to do something about
it, for the theory of freedom forces you out of your comfort zone: it challenges you, compels you,
to actively participate in your society. This book is only a small part of the many actions I then
initiated. But transmitting my simple message has not been easy. The liberal, however, cannot
give up, for that would amount to giving up on himself (and thus on humanity itself). And so I
have not only finished this book (not easy while under pain, and while in a full-time job) but
continue to undertake all reasonable efforts that I can, to promote good governance in India
Indeed, by February 1998 it became clear to me that I must get more actively involved in
designing and even ‘controlling’ India’s governance to ensure that my own interests (including
security) as a citizen are well defended. It would no longer be feasible for me to merely work as
an agent of corrupt governments. I must become the government.
Unfortunately I couldn’t find, despite a lot of effort, even a handful of Indians interested in
jointly sharing this task of reform. Policy advocacy, political reforms, or direct political action are
anathema to most Indians who prefer to live subservient lives, like sheep, or like clerks. Finding
educated Indians to be totally disinterested in the affairs of their society, I left India in 2000 and
pledged not to return, unless a movement for freedom could be established. The liberal is clear
on one thing: at all times our highest obligation must be to ourselves, to advance our personal
ends first. We do not live our life twice. It would be entirely immoral to ‘sacrifice’ our personal

11Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty, 1859, Chapter 4.

12In addition, the LBSNAA at Mussoorie virtually blanked out the ideas of people like Hayek and Friedman; at least
none of their concepts were discussed as possible models. Similarly, meaningful insights from economics, such as from
public choice theory, were not heard of. I therefore came across Hayek for the first time only in 1995 while doing
microeconomics in the USA. More commonly discussed in the Academy (at least in the 1980s) were people like EF
Schumacher who wrote Small is Beautiful, a book I reviewed in my rather confused state of mind and without much
guidance, somewhat sympathetically, comparing it favourably to Ayn Rand’s Capitalism, the Unknown Ideal (!).

17
priority for the relatively distant claims of a nation – particularly for a nation the citizens of
which are disinterested in their own freedoms.
After three failed attempts I gave up all hope in 2005. Somehow my interest was (modestly)
revived as part of completing BFN in which I proposed the concept of a Freedom Team of India
that would provide a platform for at least 1500 outstanding leaders willing to contest elections
under the banner of freedom. In late 2007, I launched the platform which now has its own
website [http://freedomteam.in]. While progress has been made, it is too small at present to
make any difference to India. The demand for freedom in India remains very low. Not many
people are fussed about dishonesty, either. A gentleman responded to in an email to me that
‘Corruption is not unique to India’ 13. Such willingness to live with and even justify corruption is
typical of the ‘educated’ Indian. So much for claims that education builds character.
I have the aspiration that my book will clarify many concepts in the minds of Indians (and
others who are interested in good governance). At the minimum, I hope that the picture I paint
in this book will guide your journey to a clearer understanding of freedom in a shorter space of
time than it took me to arrive at. Although economic theory underpins many of my arguments,
this is not a book on economics. As Frank Knight wrote, ‘it ought to be the highest objective in
the study of economics to hasten the day when the study and the practice of economy will recede
into the background of men’s thoughts.’ 14 Economic imperatives are a small (albeit important)
part of the various implications of freedom. While the system of natural liberty (capitalism)
generates economic benefits, these instrumentalist goals alone are not its raison d’être.
This leads to a fundamental question. Why do so many people refuse to value and promote
freedom? Why do North Korean leaders give their people so much grief? And why does India
refuse to change the nightmarish outcomes of socialism and adopt capitalism? Does this imply a
strong streak of irrationality in humans? If we were perfectly rational, we would presumably
seek out all opportunities for material advancement and the most obvious one is to emulate
wealthy nations.
No doubt there is the problem of ignorance I’ve already referred to. It remains extremely
difficult to understand the value of freedom. But there are other aspects, as well. We are
imperfectly rational. Even where we can see the better solution, the pathway may require
persuading too many people, becoming difficult even to attempt. Also, people respond to local
incentives and local knowledge in a strategic manner. Corrupt people often come to power in
part due to the ‘strategic’ indifference of their fellow citizens. It is individually rational for each
of us to mind our own business (and how much does one vote matter, anyway, we argue). Once
the corrupt are in power they place barricades around them and establish laws that de-motivate
potential reformers. The powers of government are used to emasculate, even decapitate the
opposition. Further, it is individually rational for scientists or bureaucrats to join the corrupt
system than to oppose or complain about it, thus losing a promising career. On top of that, many
‘experts’ are trained by universities to develop a genuine affinity with dictatorial and socialist
regimes. Honest ‘experts’ with a poor ethical sense and low self-respect, like Manmohan Singh,
are readily found in all countries to support even the most criminal political institutions.
Criminal regimes therefore flourish for quite a while.
* * *
Each writer expects something from his readers. I hope this, that by enhancing your
understanding of freedom, you will take greater responsibility for your society’s governance and
help to expand freedom in India and the rest of the world. If you are from India, do also consider
joining FTI. It needs citizens, a category of human that can only exist in a free society. And so let
us join hands to spread freedom.

13 Sanjay Sinha, 28 January 2010.

14 Knight, Frank H., The Economic Organization, New York: Harper Torchbooks, p.5.

18
Introduction

‘I believe that liberty is the only genuinely valuable thing that men have invented, at least in
the field of government, in a thousand years. I believe that it is better to be free than to be not
free, even when the former is dangerous and the latter safe. I believe that the finest qualities
of man can flourish only in free air – that progress made under the shadow of the policeman’s
club is false progress, and of no permanent value. I believe that any man who takes the liberty
of another into his keeping is bound to become a tyrant, and that any man who yields up his
liberty, in however slight the measure, is bound to become a slave.’– H. L. Mencken 1

The ascent of man from ape to God as god-king with divine rights and his descent back to
almost an ape has happened too quickly for us to fully appreciate its implications and impacts.
Half of mankind perhaps still doesn’t know of this dénouement.
It would also seem that the less said about Darwin’s demotion of our species to a primate,
the better. And the even lesser said about our erstwhile alpha males (male Brahmins, white
Europeans) the better as well. These eminences have fallen from grace steeply indeed; their
‘superiority’ over blacks, yellows, Harijans, and women given short shrift today. These poor
things were found to be just as flawed as the rest: equivalent, shockingly, at the genetic level, to
‘common’ humans. We are therefore all commoners now. It is in deep shock that we males find
ribbon-wearing girls regularly outperforming boys in the school. They’ve managed to get a semi-
black US president, and there are now whispers about a woman US president. Next thing – they
may talk about a harijan woman Prime Minister for India! One cherished myth after another is
being whitewashed out of existence, and rapidly.
Our sense of place has also shifted dramatically. Once a proud species to serve the spiritual
needs of which God Himself or at least his children or privileged messengers used to come down
fairly regularly to Earth; once a proud species whose existence was found to be at very centre of
the universe; we are now orphaned from grace: almost insignificant particles of dust we have
become now. First that horrible man Copernicus demoted our universe (Earth) into an ordinary
planet, placing the sun in the centre of the world. He tried to play down the damage done to our
price by suggesting that ‘although it [the Earth] is not at the centre of the world, nevertheless
the distance [to that centre] is as nothing in particular when compared to that of the fixed
stars’ 2. Regardless, the truth soon came out. Someone came along and demoted our sun into a
common run-of-the-mill star swirling about on the outer periphery of the Milky Way, just one
out of its hundred billion stars. Carl Sagan seemed to revel in this ruinously bleak picture of our
Earth being a ‘dim and tiny planet in an undistinguished sector of an obscure spiral arm’ of the
Milky Way. 3 The Milky Way is today merely one out of a hundred billion galaxies rapidly
expanding outwards.
As if this were not enough, there are nasty people with us today who want to make our
universe just one of countless universes in dimensions unknown (I’ll talk about this in more
detail a bit later): a prospect enough to send shivers of anonymity down our highly self-absorbed
spines. And yet it does appear that most of us haven’t stopped strutting about in our self-
satisfied gait and hugely inflated ego! Such sweet delusion!
As though our measly insignificance wasn’t challenging enough to cope with (at least for
those who were paying attention to this decline), a massive plethora of competing philosophies

1 Mencken, H.L., ‘Why Liberty?’, Chicago Tribune, January 30, 1927.

2 Cited in Barrow, John D. and Frank J. Tipler, The Anthropological Principle, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996
[1986], p.49.
3 From his book, Pale Blue Dot, as cited in Andrew Ferguson, ‘How Steven Pinker's Mind Works’ in Human Life

Review, Spring 1998. [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3798/is_199804/ai_n8787548]

19
jostle for our attention, beguiling us with their ‘charms’ and delusions of perfection. Many of
these are totally worthless, being incapable of scientifically providing even the most elementary
evidence to justify their puffed up claims (but we seem to hang on to even the most worthless
ideas, as we would to curiosities in a museum; junk collectors we are). In addition new theories
keep sprouting. And so we have Gnosticism, Jansenism, Kantianism, Buddhism, Christianism,
Hinduism, Muslimism, Socialism, Communism, Freedomism, Capitalism, Realism, Objectivism,
Determinism, and a thousand other ‘isms’. Our growing understandings of science, together with
social, cultural, religious and political change, threaten to brew into a cyclone that will smash
the ship of tradition on the sands of time, spilling out for re-examination everything previously
thought, or known. This much is clear now, that we would be foolhardy to rely solely on our
parents’ beliefs for finding our place in the universe. Too much has changed, and is changing too
rapidly, for their beliefs to be of more than incidental value.
Even as competing ideas jump through hoops to gain our attention, one thing has definitely
not changed – our body, with its computational and emotional machinery of the mind, remains
the same as it was thousands of years ago. The brain architecture, emotions, our inner self, have
all remained almost fixed in time. Man therefore continues to be ‘a marvellous, vain, diverse and
undulating object’, which, ‘in all things and throughout, is but patchwork and motley’
(Montaigne 4). Our new knowledge and experience is super-imposed upon a static body and mind;
our mind continues its usual turbulent mix of thoughts, emotional states, and desires. And this
chaotic mix is now the basis of our humanity, our pleasures, and our suffering.
Glorious contradictions live within us. Gandhi’s ability to magically control violent
communal mobs through sheer will power fascinates us. The Buddha who abandoned his family
in order to search out the middle path (- one that he did not take!), beguiles us with his pithy
nuggets of wisdom. We envy the great warriors – Alexander the Great, Attila the Hun, and
Chengiz Khan – and wonder what it must have been to be like them. There are therefore as
many different worlds on Earth as there are people; indeed, more worlds than there are people,
for within us are Heaven and Hell. A veritable Mahabharata is each of us, our personal lives an
endless drama – at least to ourselves!
Within this great chaos we are forced to ask, almost in desperation that surely, just as the
laws of physics are inviolable, there must be some fundamental truths about our existence to
which we can hitch our wagon; some sturdy argument to which can anchor our lives and beliefs.
I suggest that such a conception does exist, and is provided by the principle of accountable
freedom that I advocate in this book. Exploring this principle is the sole task of this book.
* * *
Imagine that aliens landed last week on Earth to conduct a reconnaissance for their distant
galaxy. The report they filed back probably looked something like this:
Took flying saucer for a spin and spent five minutes in each major town and village on
Earth. A fascinating people, these Earthlings. They display faint traces of intelligence such as a
(weak) capacity to think strategically, as well as a modest moral sense. They cover their
weaknesses with a robust sense of humour, excellent language and musical skills, and even
spirituality. As evidence of spirituality they respectfully bury or oteh5rwise dispose their dead. 5
They also negotiate, barter, and trade, peacefully for the most part.
But they are riddled with contradictions. A conceited bunch are they! Each thinks himself
superior to others. Many believe that their particular world-view is the only way the world
should run. Each group claims that their gods are loving, but then hates others’ gods with a
vengeance, often demolishing others’ places of worship.
We found extremes of wealth and poverty, with most poverty concentrated in socialist
countries. Sadly, we also witnessed thousands of people killing each other without any cogent
reason: exploding bombs, burning each other’s houses, maiming children… a level of brutality
that is surely beyond belief and never seen in our civilisation in the last 20 million years.
Based on these preliminary findings we suggest that the Earth not be colonised. Humans
are at the stage when they could self-destruct, blowing themselves up with nuclear weapons or

4 Cited by Mishra, Pankaj, An End to Suffering, Picador, 2005 paperback [2004], p.192.
5 Closely related species like the Neanderthal buried their dead as well, though their burials were less elaborate.

20
 otherwise poisoning the Earth, even destroying all life. Even if they do manage to survive, by
adopting the ideals of capitalism which some of them seem to be now beginning to understand, it
is likely that will remain an unruly bunch for the next million years, too hard to manage. Let’s
not waste time on this planet, and collect the promethium we need from unpopulated galaxies.
Voltaire’s Candide and Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels do far greater justice to
mankind’s amazing behaviour than my proposed ‘alien’ report above, but the point is clear: we
are a highly challenged species, driven by vanity, pretence and ignorance, living on a beautiful
planet that we treat with disdain. And yet there are amazing advances we have made. We can
create new life by cloning, or modifying its shape and characteristics at the genetic level, but we
can’t find a way to live in peace. During the adolescence of our brave new species we killed each
other with swords. Today, as young adults, we kill with nuclear weapons. Had nuclear weapons
been available to Hitler, he would certainly have taken the whole world along with him in his
nihilism. 6 And we have brought Nature onto its knees, poisoning it so badly, and destroying so
many species, that it may never recover. Not very charming, are we?
But not everything is bad news. There are good tidings. There is capitalism, and increasing
freedom. As a result pockets of peace and healthful environment are increasing being created.
There are societies in the world today where people go to work each morning to produce or
invent new things. Bombs of terror do not punctuate the daily chatter of life in these societies.
Corruption and moral decadence does not sap the will and confidence of these people. These
societies, founded on the principles and philosophy of freedom (but not fully, as I will show in
this book), are found primarily in the West. They often transcend the ‘beast’ within us;
sometimes releasing our ‘angel’. Their quality of life fills us with hope that we will overcome.
We are now entering the maturity of our species, with nuclear weapons in one hand and the
philosophy of freedom in the other. It is equally probable that we will annihilate our species (and
others as well) as it is that we will live in harmony with each other and also preserve nature.
The world is clearly at a crossroads: we can either self-destruct or take wing. But self-
destruction is not an option. We must find the way to freedom. We must find the only way of
preserving ourselves and our planet through due regard to our nature, and building
accountability into our societies.
By studying centenarians we get clues about the causes of longevity. So also by studying
Western societies we get clues on how to create wealth and even, hopefully, preserve life. The
happy circumstance in the West is essentially the result of the philosophy of freedom and its
attendant system of justice. There is no great secret out there: they are liberal societies.
Freedom is not license to lie, cheat, steal, plunder, injure, or kill. It is built on the precisely
matching concept of accountability. Without it we achieve license, not freedom. Societies that
destroy freedom (and wealth) are essentially based on equality or some form of collectivism:
ideologies like socialism and fascism. But equality rebels against our nature, for our soul is built
for success, not for equality. Nature has built us for great passions and deeds of competition (and
cooperation). No burden of equality was ever put upon us.
If a 12-year old child were to tell us that he wanted to grow up only as rich as the average
Indian, we’d surely wonder what kind of parents this child had! We want our children to be
sturdy and ambitious, to aim for the gold medal in every race of their life. The niggardly thought
of economic equality saps our morale and energy. Capitalism, on the other hand, challenges us to
become the best we can. Nothing less is expected. Freedom thus sends a shiver of life coursing
through our veins. It unleashes our ambitions and passions. It commands us to live like men, not
cockroaches that aspire for leftovers. It says that only if each of us aims for greatness will our
collectives – the nations, humanity itself – achieve greatness. I therefore prefer the strongly
evocative word ‘capitalism’ to reflect the aspirational nature of freedom. It reaches out – both
inward and outward.
Capitalism is like the smell of fresh leather in a brand new Mercedes care. It smells and
feels of wealth and success, both material and intellectual. We must have it! No one wants

6 See a powerful discussion of Hitler’s nihilism in Camus, Albert, The Rebel, Vintage, 1956, p. 247.

21
stinking socialism which reeks of the splattered blood of millions of people killed in its name,
and of disgusting poverty. Man was not built to be poor.

22
Part 1 A theory of freedom

23
Chapter 1 Know thyself

Something exceptional happened in Europe in around 1750 AD. This year is only a rough
marker, though, for the underlying causal events had a history spanning at least a hundred
years. Richard Easterlin tells us that ‘back before the industrial revolution it would take
millennia for living standards to double, yet today we have grown used to our material
prosperity doubling every thirty years.’ 1 Entire societies from since about 1750 erupted from
poverty to wealth, and from early death to longevity. Not long before that, only the politically
powerful could aspire to riches. Today, millions are dramatically better off. For millennia, life
expectancy remained at 30 years or less, primarily because about half the children born would
die before reaching the age of five. But science dramatically changed all this. Health outcomes of
mothers and children improved, and people started living longer. Today, in some countries, the
average newborn can reasonably expect to live for over eighty years. This was not all. As Andrew
McIntyre points out, modern civilisation ‘has been not only a material triumph for mankind …
but an ethical triumph as well.’ 2 Modern free societies not only forbid slavery, they do not
tolerate racism or the oppression of women. Ethical standards and expectations have risen
dramatically, at least across the Western world.
The essence of the change was noted by Ayn Rand, that ‘[c]ivilization is the progress toward
a society of privacy. The savage’s whole existence is public, ruled by the laws of his tribe.
Civilization is the process of setting man free from men.’ 3 That: freedom, is what underpinned
the change. Who caused this to happen? What drove this reform from feudalism and superstition
to freedom and wealth?
A lot of things had something to do with this. The revival of ancient Greek philosophy, the
knowledge of the Indian number system, and the Chinese invention of printing and gun powder
had something to do with this. But many of these had been known for thousands of years
without really creating a spurt in wealth. The main reason is that societies were too primitive at
that stage to take advantage of these changes. Their assumptions about society, about the ways
of thinking were primitive, often plain wrong,
Religion definitely did not motivate this transformation even though although Protestants
(and not entirely without reason) and even Catholics stake claim to being influential. But the
reality is both Protestants and Catholic persecuted scientists and innovative thinkers. They
were mostly the enemies of freedom. It was not belief but the neutralisation of belief, and a
considerable increase in doubt, that led to modern civilisation. Freedom and liberalism was ‘born
in a political struggle …to escape from the political authority exercised by the Church. To win
this emancipation …it was necessary … to neutralize the Church’s tendency to intervene in
political life.’ 4 It was the advance of liberal thinking, the advance made by non-religious
thinkers, that finally brought about this change. In any event, by 1750, parts of humanity had
broken away from tribal ways of thinking and come to the realisation that we are born free.
Citizens in these parts of the world, like England, started thinking of themselves as distinct,
even sovereign, individuals. And in so thinking we entered the stage of human civilisation where

1 J. Bradford DeLong, ‘Review of Richard Easterlin's Growth Triumphant: The Twenty-First Century in Historical
Perspective (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1997)’, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Mar., 1998),
pp. 278-280.
2 McIntyre, Andrew, ‘The Modern Imperative’, Australian Financial Review, 14 January 2005.
3 Rand, Ayn, The Fountainhead, 1943.
4 Berkowitz, Peter, ‘Book review of Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, Princeton University, 1996’,

The Boston Book Review, March 1995. [http://www.peterberkowitz.com/rediscoveringliberalism.htm]

24
both morality and wealth started increasing at regular intervals. And thus dawned the concept
of progress, if not monotonic then at least trending upwards towards something better.
The discovery of freedom begins by discovering ourselves. We find, unfortunately, that
becoming free is not a trivial task. Our hardwiring makes it easy for us to become dictators, not
democrats; oppressors, not team players. But the key contribution of liberal philosophers was to
ground the study of society in the study of human nature. And the study of human nature must
begin with a study of what are we made of, where we come from. Know thyself, for only then will
you know how to change the world.

1. Creation, stardust and carbon

The world around us is bewitching: absurdly spectacular. Images of galaxies from the
Hubble telescope are beyond beautiful. The life force is amazing. But of everything we know, so
far, the Big Bang is surely the most magical moment of all.
Science tells us, with a reasonably high level of accuracy, that our universe began with a
bang 13.7 billion years ago and that it still has quite a while to go (far, far, more than the (only)
six billion years available to our solar system). At the moment of its commencement an almost
infinite amount of energy spewed out, creating matter and space, presumably from nothing: a
singularity smaller than the smallest pinhead imaginable. Where this energy came from can be
‘explained’ in two ways: the mechanical (and scientific) way, or the semi-mechanical (and
spiritual, or teleological) way.
The creation of a universe may well turn out to be a routine cyclical event in which the total
quantity of energy in the entire world (multiple universes) remains constant 5, and new
universes are created as existing ones collapse upon themselves (into black holes). This idea was
perhaps first articulated (in a really primitive form) in the Jain cosmological views 2 500 years
ago, according to which the world has no beginning and no end, being infinitely cyclical. But the
idea of cyclical creation and destruction has (at least for the moment) been ruled out by most
scientists. The current view is that the universe is on a one way outward journey, without end.
The universe will therefore expand indefinitely and the mass will simply ‘hang on’ in space for
ever as galactic speeds incrementally slow down.
A different model, of an infinite chain of inter-linked universes, has been proposed in a 2010
paper suggests that singularities do not exist (they have always been hard to visualise). Instead,
matter is apparently sucked through black holes into other dimensions where a new universe
immediately springs into being (‘[O]ur own Universe may be the interior of a black hole existing
inside another universe’ 6). This would imply that the sum total of energy across all universes is
constant, but a particular universe might well continue to receive some extra energy over time
and leak some of it into other universes, as well.
And yet, even if we ultimately figure out all the laws of the universe, we still won’t be able to
explain how the energy required to create the universe came into being in the first place. Note
that not only new energy can’t be created, energy is indestructible. A light wave travelling
towards us for over eight billion years, from a star expanding outwards, remains possessed of its
original energy. All that happen is that because of the Doppler effect, we receive it as microwave.
More routinely, energy changes form, but it is never destroyed. So who created this amazing
indestructible energy that remains the same for tens of billions of years? Mechanistic
explanations seem to be able to only go so far.

5 That energy cannot be created or destroyed in a closed system is a revolutionary idea very hard to digest. I often mix
the idea of entropy with the idea that energy is continuously reduced. But the total amount of energy in the universe
is constant being created only once, i.e. at the point of Big Bang. The world is cooling not because the energy is fading
out but because with the expansion of the universe, the same energy is distributed across a much larger volume.
Entropy is quite a different matter, altogether, essentially saying that energy is transferred from higher energy
system to the lower energy system. Energy transfer does not imply any destruction of energy
6 Popławski, Nikodem J. ‘Radial motion into an Einstein–Rosen bridge’, Physics Letters B, Volume 687, Issues 2-3, 12

April 2010, Pages 110-113.

25
 At this stage a range of creationist arguments step into place. There are teleological
arguments (including the anthropic principle, both weak and strong 7, being a form of
‘biofriendliness) that appear to suggest some underlying purpose. These arguments depend on
hundreds of physical constants that are found to have values which, had they been even slightly
different, would have totally eliminated the possibility of this particular universe (and therefore
human life) existing. In addition, the coincidences which have occurred to create humans (it does
appear impossible to replicate a specific human-type intelligence anywhere else), ostensibly
show us that there is a ‘planner’ who has worked out all the details and then launched this
universe in a particular way. Things are simply too perfect and well-balanced, at each level of
detail. This can lead us to the ‘plain vanilla’ or garden variety creationist or theistic view, being
similar to the strong anthropic principle. God is brought in to explain the dramatically
improbable existence of everything.
I do find this attractive, but unfortunately, it is not only tautological but shifts the problem
one step back. If we posit that God created this energy with its properties that inevitably evolved
into what we are today then we are required to explain who created God. Merely proposing God
doesn’t tell us much, given the absence of objectively measurable evidence about God (subjective
evidence may well ‘exist’ but that is never enough on a topic where we must persuade others
with reason). An anthropic principle approach also militates against rational thought. As Lee
Smolin notes:
But when it comes to the biofriendliness of our universe, we have at least three
possibilities:
1. Ours is one of a vast collection of universes with random laws.
2. There was an intelligent designer.
3. There is a so-far-unknown mechanism that will both explain the biofriendliness of our
universe and make testable predictions by which it can be confirmed or falsified.
Given that the first two possibilities are untestable in principle, it is most rational to hold
out for the third possibility. Indeed, that is the only possibility we should consider as
scientists, because accepting either of the first two would mean the end of our field. 8
Even though we still don’t know what caused the Big Bang and don’t know most of the next
steps either, we must be content to remain un-edified, and plod on in our search.
The third proposal merges the mechanistic and theistic views, making it (potentially)
unnecessary to explore the source of the creation. It is the pantheistic view, in which the world
and the ‘spirit’ become one. We then don’t need to explain the ‘origin’ of the universe. God (if
such a word is used) is not a separate ‘entity’ outside the universe, in the manner of ttypical
theological religions, but is the energy indestructible of the universe. The Indian tradition of
Advaita believes that all energy is one and, in addition, possesses innate consciousness.
Perception of consciousness is subject to combining the ‘gross body’ with the ‘subtle’ body. The
consciousness we experience is a subset (atman), or more appropriately, a reflection, of the
consciousness of God (Brahman). Arthur Schopenhauer noted that ‘most original, finest, and
most thorough European expositions of it’ by Bruno, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Scotus Erigena
did not, ‘of course, …bear comparison with the Upanishads of the Vedas’ 9. This view, being the
most plausible of all, has considerable merit, although I’m personally unable to commit to any of
these views, for each of them raise more questions than they address. I am attracted to
anthropic views which suggest a steady flowering of the spirit, through greater freedom, but I’m
often disheartened at the evidence provided by human history against harbouring such a
teleological (even Hegelian) approach towards human history.
No matter which view one adopts, the actual progression (if any) of the universe must abide
by invariant laws. We have no evidence of random laws operating in this universe (despite
allegations about the existence of ghosts and spirits – none of which has been found to hold up to

7 Barrow, John D., and Frank J. Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
8
Smolin, Lee, The Trouble with Physics, London: Penguin Books, 2008 [2006], pp.164-65.
9 In Parerga and Paralipomena, Vol. I, ‘Sketch of a History of the Doctrine of the Ideal and the Real’, 1851.

26
even the slightest scientific scrutiny). The laws in our universe do not differ across different
stars and galaxies, even though we do not fully understand these laws yet.
Matter as an energy trap
Through a process which (currently) currently has no mechanical explanation in terms of a
‘unified field theory’ that could explain the ultimate properties of energy, some of this massive
‘initial’ energy ‘condensed’ into sub-atomic particles (energy and matter being the same), and
these particles later combined into atoms, some with rather unique properties. Theoretical
physicists have been grappling with this problem for quite a while now, without success.
Mark Wise is a leading theorist working on particle physics beyond the standard model. At a
recent seminar … he talked about the problem of where the masses of the elementary particles
come from. "We’ve been remarkably unsuccessful at solving that problem," he said. … [W]e have
no idea why neutrinos (or any of the other particles) have mass. 10
The more I think about it, it is obvious to me that mass is an energy trap. The only raw
material available at the time of creation of the universe was energy. Nothing else. If energy is
the only raw material, and energy has just a few properties (e.g. waves travel in a straight line
and are limited by the speed of light), then mass can only be explained as a combination of
energy and space. Mass simply can’t spring up from ether! It is therefore made up of energy and
space.
Intense energy is trapped inside a tiny, warped, space bubble, and travels at the speed of
light in a straight line inside it for ever. This warped space bubble distorts nearby space and
creates the property of attraction and replusion that gives us the appearance of mass. There is,
in this model, no mass, only energy. Mass is irrelevant, being only a property of high-intensity
energy. It would seem to me that this theory is fully compatible, in principle, with quantum
theory and the uncertainty principle. 11
Atomic formation
Two of the most unique elements that formed initially were hydrogen and carbon. One of the
most unique of all atoms is carbon with its unique ability to bond with a number of elements in a
manner that helps create long chained ‘organic’ chemicals, the underlying constituents of life.
Without carbon we would not exist.
The amount of energy inside atoms is mind-bogglingly large. The mere splitting of an atom
(not its total destruction into constituent energy!) creates energy that we can barely visualise.
For instance, the energy found inside a tiny pinch of atoms is sufficient to power our house for
an entire lifetime. The problem is that the entire mass of matter found in the universe explains
only a fraction of the energy spewed out by the Big Bang. We don’t yet understand what became
of the rest of that huge amount of energy! Some hypotheses explain it through higher than
current speed of light in the initial micro-seconds of creation; others explain it through ‘dark
matter’ or ‘dark energy’ that we can’t see, but there could well be entirely other causes.
In any event, powered by the release of stupendous amounts of energy (the entire energy in
the universe!) in a micro-second, our universe started growing rapidly, creating additional space
(volume) as it grew. It now comprises 100 billion galaxies each with about 100 billion stars. The
first atom created from energy was uni-protoned hydrogen (element 1). Over time, through
fusion and repeated cycles of destruction through explosive supernovas, bigger elements like
helium (element 2), carbon (element 6), nitrogen (element 7), oxygen (element 8), phosphorus
(element 15), potassium (element 19), calcium (element 20), and iron (element 26) – all these
vital to our existence – got created. These elements are the stuff our bodies are made of (we use
heavy chemicals as well, but only a few of them). Other, more heavy elements like gold and
uranium were also created.
One proton or one neutron is precisely the same as another, but when they combine they
create elements with properties that are quite unique, much as combinations of atoms into

10 Smolin, Les, The Trouble with Physics, London: Penguin, 2006, p. xi, xiii.
11 More details at: http://sabhlokcity.com/2010/06/why-does-energy-travel-in-circles-inside-an-atom/

27
molecules create matter with distinct properties. The entire array has essentially been built out
of the common building blocks of energy, which never decays, merely transfers form.
Our earth is a remnant of previous stars. It is made of stardust; we are also made of
stardust. The earth, formed 4.5 billion years ago, is no doubt a very special place, but that life
has developed on it is perhaps not unique. If each star in the universe is surrounded by ten
planets (including large asteroids) on average, then there are at least 100 billion x 100 billion x
10 planetary bodies in the universe – equal in number to the particles of sand on the beaches of
13,000 earths. 12 Out of this enormous number of planetary bodies, at least a handful, if not a few
million, could potentially be similar to the earth, given that the laws of nature are the same
everywhere. Indeed, this seems to now have been confirmed. 13 The probability of finding
intelligent life forms or habitable planets, though, is much lower. In the first instance,
intelligent life is not necessarily well adapted to changing environment. Most hominids on earth
therefore went extinct. We were a lucky one that somehow survived a once dramatic reduction in
population. Therefore the probability of finding intelligent life even remotely similar to humans
elsewhere in the universe is asymptotically close to zero.
It is inappropriate, however, to justify this low likelhihood of non-human intelligent through
the anthropic principle which thinks about progression in life forms. Apparently, creating
intelligent life of our type is the goal of the universe! Surely a cockroach that survives a nuclear
holocaust is equally the ‘end’ of life, as is an Albert Einstein. The arguments of the anthropic
principle are tautological and not worth considering.
The stellar body of greatest importance to us is the Sun, a small pulsing star that provides
us with all energy on earth not derived from previous stellar explosions (energy captured inside
the magma), or nuclear or chemical reactions (fossil fuels are formed from plants, built from the
sun’s energy through photosynthesis; hydroelectric energy also comes entirely from the sun,
which warms water and re-circulates it through the planet; wind energy from the sun, as well).
The sun is the supplier of energy to most life on earth (except life found near undersea geysers).
Carbon by itself would have done little to create intelligent life. We are carbonaceous stardust
warmed by the sun.
About four billion years ago, early into our earth’s existence, crude life forms began to self-
assemble (‘why’ it assembled leads us back to the same issues discussed above about the Big
Bang). While we broadly understand the mechanics of how this might come about, we are still
unable to re-create life from scratch. Life is extremely flexible about its living conditions. Having
oxygen around is it not mandatory. Sulphur can substitute for oxygen. Oxygen is actually toxic
for obligate anaerobes and the purple sulphur bacteria which thrive on sulphur. As a result life
is found in the most unlikely places on earth, and most probably is found in hostile conditions
even on other planets (e.g. some scientists are now convinced that bacterial life existed on Mars
in the past – a claim not yet widely accepted, though). 14
Given the ease with which life emerges, the life force can be thought of as a self-replicating
packet of energy capable of overcoming the chaos of entropy, and characterised by persistence
and vigour. Life is a very successful entrepreneur, creating opportunities for survival in the most
unexpected circumstances through mutation (and hence, adaptation). It changes into a bird or
fish or human, to suit. But despite its abundance, life is nothing short of miraculous, like the Big
Bang. In comparison to explaining its initial creation, however, explaining the diversity of life
forms on earth is a relatively trivial matter. During these past four billion years, life has
colonised all nooks and crannies of earth and evolved into tens of millions of species – the vast
majority of which went extinct a long time ago, being superseded by better adapted species.
Our immediately related, or cousin species (and there were dozens of them in the past,
evolved two to three million years ago. Chimpanzees are not our first cousins, but our second

12 Hawaii University calculations show that there are 7.5 x 1018 sand particles:
[http://www.hawaii.edu/suremath/jsand.html]
13
O'Neill, Ian: “Kepler Scientist: 'Galaxy Is Rich In Earth-Like Planets'”, Jul 26, 2010, Discovery News,
[http://news.discovery.com/space/kepler-scientist-galaxy-is-rich-in-earth-like-planets.html]
14 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/1190948.stm]

28
cousins, having branched off before this date (i.e. we are definitely not monkeys). Finally,
between 100 000 and 150 000 years ago, a mutation created our particular sub-species, Homo
sapiens sapiens. Box 1 describes our biological specifications.
Box 1
The biological specification of Homo sapiens sapiens
At the moment, scientists broadly agree on the following specification of our
species, noting that it may change as our knowledge expands.
Class: Mammalia.
Order: Primates
Genus: Homo (likely date of splitting from main branch: 1.8 million years ago).
Species: Sapiens (likely emergence: 1 million to 500 000 years ago).
Sub-species: sapiens (likely emergence:100 000 to 150 000 years ago 15; likely place of
origin: Africa).
Likely date of migration outside Africa: 60 000 years ago. 16
Oldest pure lineage of humans outside Africa: In Andaman & Nicobar Islands
and Australia.
Closely related species: A close cousin species, the Neanderthal, evolved 300 000
years ago in Europe became extinct upon coming into contact with modern humans 30
000 years ago.
Average brain volume: 1400 cubic centimetres.
Height: Generally between 5 to 6 feet as an adult. 17

Many people do not accept this specification, which says we are an animal on ‘top’ of an
evolutionary tree. Of course this idea of there being a ‘top’ or ‘bottom’ to the evolutionary tree
makes no sense. But that we are animal is inescapably clear. The laws of genetics and
physiology apply to us in their entirety. Our physiology and anatomy is similar to many other
animals. We are born from inside our mother’s womb, like mammals. As infants, mucus oozes
out of our nose and food dribbles out of our mouth. As adults we fidget, pick our nose, and
generate unpalatable smells. Thirst, hunger, warmth, cold: at each moment our animal body
reminds us about who (or what) we are. We are unequivocally a part of nature. We may not be
‘ordinary’ animals, but we are a type of animal, nevertheless.

2. Our ‘racial’, tribal, and national identities

During the last 5 000 generations since our sub-species came into being, we have spread
across the planet through countless migrations. We have split into groups with various cosmetic
differences. Among these are people’s perceptions about ‘race’ as well as (real) differences in
religion, language and culture (I enclose the word ‘race’ in inverted commas throughout this
book since it is a fictitious concept, with no biological grounding). These cosmetic (and cultural)
differences divide us politically, sometimes almost into different species (which is odd – for there
doesn’t seem to be any obvious adaptive advantage of such aggressive behaviour). We are
characterised at the political level more by disunity than by unity. Our common great-great- - -
grandmother, an African lady, would never have imagined that her progeny would split into so
many different groups which would then incessantly battle each other. In the rest of this section,

15 Hirschman, Charles, ‘The Origins and Demise of the Concept of Race’, Population and Development Review, Vol. 30,
No. 3, (Sep. 2004), p.386.
16 ‘New DNA studies suggest that all humans descended from a single African ancestor who lived some 60,000 years

ago.’ cited in Mayell, Hillary, ‘Global Gene Project to Trace Humanity's Migrations’, National Geographic News, April
13, 2005) [http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/04/0413_050413_genographic.html]
17 The height of our species has varied with the primary occupation. Hunters and gatherers were taller but then

shrunk to 165 cm by the time of Shakespeare (cited in Callaghan, Greg, ‘Bigger, Taller, Wider’, The Weekend
Australian Magazine, April 5-6, 2008). Further, adult pygmies in parts of central Africa are a bit shorter, at around
150 cm.

29
I explore some of these alleged differences, for only then can we comprehend the political
constraints under which we work, and suggest an approach to address them.
2.1 ‘Race’
Evolution is unrelenting. It never stops – even for a simple generation. Thousands, if not
millions of mutations occur in each generation, as if the life force were actively engaging in
experiment. The overwhelming majority of the mutations fortunately do not survive. Thousands
of unsuitable foetuses are aborted by nature every year; some that are born, quickly die. Only
the ‘good’ mutations (those that give competitive advantage) survive. With human ancestors
roaming the earth in a variety of environments, only the best adapted children survived. The
examples below show how the minor cosmetic differences due to such climatic adaptation
(differences that underpin ‘race’) emerged over tens of thousands of years.
• Less sunlight falls in higher latitudes, This makes it harder for those with a darker skin to
produce vitamin D. We have all descended from dark skinned African forbears – adapted to
equatorial sunlight. In higher latitudes, though, more children with a mutation that helped
them produce less melanin (i.e. produced a lighter skin) survived than darker skinned
siblings, so as to be able to absorb more sunlight and create Vitamin D. Over time, the so
called ‘white race’ evolved in a few pockets. Note that evolution does not lead to exactly the
same outcome everywhere. 18 In particular, given the Northern Hemispheres had a larger
area, more such mutations survived.
• Children with a mutation for longer hair survived better in higher latitudes than those with
short, curly hair because long hair reduces the loss of body heat through evaporation (the
opposite hair condition is successful in hot Africa). Some mutations had other reasons as
well. Once these emerged they were selected for their ‘popularity’ (sexual adaptation).
• A wide range of other adaptations have also emerged over the years. For instance, Europeans
with a mutation that protected them from bubonic plague survived the Black Death, while
those that did not have it, died. The progeny of their survivors (Europeans who are alive
today) are therefore far more resistant to the bubonic plague than ‘normal’ human
populations.
These and hundreds of other adaptations have led to numerous minor differences across
human populations. Overall, however, these differences account are extremely insignificant,
accounting for less than 0.01 per cent of the variation in the human genome. We are therefore
similar to each other in 99.99 per cent of our genes. Detecting differences among different
humans is therefore extremely hard work. Indeed, scientists tell us that ‘[i]t is impossible to look
at people’s genetic code and deduce whether they are Black, Caucasian or Asian.’ 19 That is
because the variation amongst individuals within a so-called ‘race’ is greater than the variation
among individuals across so-called ‘races’. ‘[M]odern human genetics … deliver[s] the salutary
message that human populations share most of their genetic variation and that there is no
scientific support for the concept that human populations are discrete, non-overlapping
entities.’ 20 But even though scientists such as the anthropologist Ashley Montagu exploded the
myth of the race as long as ago as in 1942 in his book, Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy
of Race, most laymen still believe in this spurious concept. It is high time that mankind grows
out of this misconception called ‘race’; the use of such a term is a really bad habit, for it creates
categories where there are none, and distorts the political discourse.

18 E.g. Johan Moan, of the Institute of Physics at the University of Oslo, said in a research paper: "In England, from

5500-5200 years ago the food changed rapidly away from fish as an important food source. This led to a rapid
development of ... light skin." The Australian, 31 August 2009.
[http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,,26004285-26040,00.html]
19 Henderson, Mark, ‘Gene tests prove that we are all the same under the skin’, Times Online, October 27, 2004,

[http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/health/article499598.ece]
20 Lynn Jorde and Stephen Wooding of the University of Utah, cited in Henderson, Mark, ‘Gene tests prove that we

are all the same under the skin’, Times Online, October 27, 2004.
[http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/health/article499598.ece]

30
 Our exceptionally high biological uniformity as a species confirms that we are one big family.
Scientists are now asking the opposite question: Why are we so similar? William James
Burroughs believes that ‘[g]iven the length of time humans have existed, there should be a wide
range of genetic variation, yet DNA from people throughout the world is surprisingly similar.’ 21
There are many competing theories about this extreme similarity. One possible explanation is
that human population declined to around 5 000 to 10 000 people around 70-80 000 years ago
before clawing back from near extinction. 22 If that explanation is true, then despite our
subspecies being traced back 150 000 years, we have actually evolved from a single tribe, or a
handful of tribes, in North Africa about 75 000 years ago. Just one big African family.
As expected, the story is complex and we are still learning about it. Thus, in a twist, it
appears that some inter-mingling of homo sapiens with Neanderthal populations took place in
Europe, leading to influence of Neanderthals on all humans who are not directly descended from
Africa. 23
In any event, racism has no legs to stand on. Even if there were different ‘species’ of
intelligent, self-conscious humans, it would not be acceptable. However, human ignorance means
that this mis-conception won’t go away easily. Today it seems to also have transmutated to the
concept of ethnicity, which is a combination of ‘race’ and culture. In Chapter I will discuss the
origins of ‘race’, and what can be done to banish it.

2.2 Languages, religions, and cultures

As noted above, appearance is just one of the many things that divide us. We stereotype each
other in many other ways, as well. Thousands of languages, hundreds of cultures, and tens of
religions divide us. We differ from each other in what and how we eat, in how we dress, in how
we marry, in the gods we believe in, and in how we bury or cremate our dead. In most of these,
as with race, superficial differences seem to matter a lot. For instance, differences among
religions have created great havoc (Chapter 8 explores these further).

2.3 Tribes and nations

Humans have lived in tribal groups for most of their history. Despite drawbacks of this
arrangement – such as headhunting, cannibalism, human sacrifice, slavery and inhuman torture –
organising ourselves into groups has been very useful in defending ourselves against other groups,
as well as in organising food and other needs. Within tribes, as Charles Darwin noted, there are
evolutionary pressures to develop morality. ‘Although a high standard of morality gives but a
slight or no advantage to each individual man and his children over the other men of the same
tribe ... an advancement in the standard of morality will certainly give an immense advantage to
one tribe over another.’ 24 Morality leads to cooperation which significantly improves the ability
of tribes to defend themselves. This form of organisation – namely tribal – organises human
society even today. No political principle can presently work outside its ambit. Even as village
tribes become irrelevant, stronger tribes – nations – have taken their place.
While belonging to a tribe gives us a sense of identity, it imposes significant costs. Incessant
tribal warfare (and now, nations) is an inevitable consequence. Tribes can be extremely brutal,
even predatory, in their relations with other tribes. As such, while the concept of tribe unites
within the tribe, it is extremely divisive for mankind as a whole. Even within modern nations,
ancient tribal loyalties lead to perennial unrest. For example, virtually every group or tribe in
India wants its separate state (or district). When powerful nations collapse, the underlying tribal
centrifugal tendencies usually resurface. Indeed, when they collapse, big nations and empires

21 Burroughs, William James, Climate Change in Prehistory: The End of the Reign of Chaos, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005, p.138. Google books.
22 Transcript of Cusack, Sinead, ‘Supervolcanoes’, BBC2 9:30pm Thursday 3rd February 2000.

[http://www.bbc.co.uk/science/horizon/1999/supervolcanoes_script.shtml]
23 Dayton, Leigh, ‘Neandertal genetics study shows there's a caveman in us all’, The Australian, 7 May 2010,

http://tinyurl.com/3867btg
24 Darwin, Charles, The Descent of Man, 1871.

31
tend to split along tribal lines (such as after the fall of the Roman empire and the erstwhile
USSR). ‘The weird fact that many men’s emotional life rotates around a ball – baseball,
basketball, or football – seems to spring from the … community instinct’. 25
Human tribal groups resemble shrewdnesses of apes 26 in many ways. A group of apes has an
‘alpha’ male at the centre of power. Human tribes similarly have alpha males (or, occasionally,
alpha females) who play a dominant role. Such dominance relationships or pecking orders have
existed since times immemorial 27 and are manifest in politics, organised religion, in workplaces;
even inside families. Indeed, this drive for relative power (status) inside groups is extremely
strong within humans, rivalling the most basic biological needs in its intensity. Physical prowess
has much to do with this. ‘Better fighters have higher rank, and men who look like better
fighters have higher rank. Sheer height is surprisingly potent.’ Thus ‘the taller candidate won
twenty of the twenty-four [American presidential] elections between 1904 and 1996.’ 28
Dominance relationships can be coercive or non-coercive (and merit-based). Non-coercive
dominance relationships can be thought of as a form of ‘leadership’, noting that true leadership
is about ideas and vision, not about dominance. 29 The result – self-leadership – can transcend
dominance relationships. In this, everyone not only gets to choose voluntarily but is allowed to
participate as an equal in all decision making. Irrespective of whether or not a relationship is
coercive, some sort of structured, even hierarchical, frameworks are an integral part of social
relationships. An unstructured society is not viable. Someone does have to make the final
decision in each family, group, or tribe, even if that decision is wrong. If nothing, a team of
decision makers can take this role. Problems only arise with such a model when blind obedience
is demanded and critical thinking is blocked. Such repressive actions pose a threat to our
freedom, dignity, even life itself.
There is another extremely strong characteristic of tribes: peer pressure. On July 13, 1942,
53-year old major Wilhelm Trapp informed the 500 middle-aged German policemen under his
command that he had received orders from higher authorities to shoot down nearly 1000 Jews
women and children. Trapp, however, gave his men the choice of not doing so. Only 12 stepped
out. Later, detailed studies of their testimonies failed to find any cogent reason to explain this
barbaric action by the majority of policemen, even though they were given a genuine choice to
avoid it. The study concluded that ‘based on how men in uniform identify with their comrades’,
the explanation was that the men felt ‘the strong urge not to separate themselves from the group
by stepping out’. ‘Stepping out meant losing face by admitting weakness and leaving one’s
comrades to do more than their share of the ugly task.’ 30 This what Gerd Gigerenzer calls the
‘don’t break ranks rule’. We stand in line at the school assembly and are systematically
indoctrinated into doing as our peers do. This peer pressure overwhelms not only teenagers (as
is commonly believed!) but grown up men who quickly lose their identity (and it would appear
moral sense as well) under certain group circumstances. (Gigerenzer points out that peer
pressure can be minimised by re-phrasing a situation. For instance, if Major Trapp had asked
those who ‘felt up to the task’ to step out, then perhaps only a handful (at most!) would have
stepped out. 31 Peer pressure – or accepting the current reality – is a significant dampening
influence on our behaviour.
This is also the reason why tribes come together so strongly during war. Thus, ‘most tribes,
religious groups, or nations advocate virtues of patriotism, loyalty, and heroism, and individuals
from time immemorial have sacrificed their lives for their ingroup. In times of war, “support our
troops” is the prevailing patriotic feeling, and criticizing them is seen as betrayal’ 32. And indeed,

25 Gigerenzer, Gerd, Gut Feelings, London: Penguin, 2007, p.210.

26 Groups of apes are called ‘shrewdness’.
27 Eg. Dutton, Denis, ‘Hard-wired for the ups and downs’, The Australian, 12 March 2008.
28 Both these quotations from Pinker, Steven, How the Mind Works, London: Penguin Books, 1999, p.495-96.
29 The modern conception of ethical leadership (e.g. Collins, Jim, Good to Great, Harper Business, New York, 2001) of

people like Abraham Lincoln and Gandhi, for instance, is moving our expectations to leadership by the best.
30 For the case study, and the quotations, refer to Gigerenzer, Gerd, Gut Feelings, London: Penguin, 2007, p.179-181.
31 Gigerenzer, Gerd, Gut Feelings, London: Penguin, 2007, p.192.
32 Gigerenzer, Gerd, Gut Feelings, London: Penguin, 2007, p.188.

32
I strongly support such tribal sentiment as part of the design of the fortress that I’ll refer to in
chapter xx. I’m not a pacifist! Instead, I agree with Charles Darwin that this is adaptive in the
evolutionary sense:
A tribe including many members who, from possessing [a high degree of] the spirit of patriotism,
fidelity, obedience, courage and sympathy, were always ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice
themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be
natural selection. 33
However, problems arise when tribes seek6 to expand territory. That is where conflict
becomes irrational and harmful. Sadly, the history of tribes and nations reads like a history of
oppression, coercion, violence and war. We should note, however, that despite their warlike
stance, primitive village based tribes were never as dangerous as modern ideological groups are.
So-called ‘modern’ Europeans (e.g. Nazis), ‘modern’ Asians (e.g. Pol Pot regime), ‘modern’
Africans (Idi Amin and his followers), and similar modern groups have displayed brutality that
was perhaps not even imagined earlier. When tribal hates (e.g. the Christian hatred of Jews)
combine with jingoism, the mix is incendiary. Collectivist ideologies inflame our base tribal
instincts and motive us to kill innocents and destroy property.
Adolf Hitler asked the Germans to think of themselves as Aryans and stop thinking they
were separate individuals, exhorting them, thus: ‘If in its historical development the German
people had possessed the unity of herd instinct by which other peoples have so much benefited,
then the German REICH would probably be mistress of the globe to-day.’ 34 Benito Mussolini
wrote in 1932:
The keystone of Fascist doctrine is the conception of the State, of its essence, of its tasks, of its
ends. For Fascism the State is an absolute before which individuals and groups are relative.
Individuals and groups are "thinkable" in so far as they are within the State… [F]or the Fascist,
everything is in the State, and nothing human or spiritual exists, much less has value, outside
the State. In this sense Fascism is totalitarian, and the Fascist State, the synthesis and unity of
all values, interprets, develops and gives strength to the whole life of the people. …[W]hen one
says Liberalism, one says the individual; when one says Fascism, one says the State. 35
Albert Camus noted that the fascists ‘never dreamed of liberating all men, but only of
liberating a few by subjugating the rest.’ 36 Marxists similarly ‘aimed at liberating all men by
provisionally enslaving them all’ (Camus). This idea – of advancing freedom by provisionally
enslaving people – beggars belief. Collectivist religious fanatics, similarly, want us to forget that
others are also human, and therefore destroy others of their property in the name of religion.
(The demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 by barbaric hordes of Hindu fanatics comes to mind,
but there are many other even more frightening actions by religious fanatics).
Human brutality goes well beyond the worst possible animal ‘brutality’. Few animals have
tortured other animals or revelled in the wanton destruction of other’s property. Indeed, the last
ten thousand years (including perhaps the next ten thousand) will perhaps become known as an
extremely primitive period in our development, given the record of mass brutalities that
continue even till today.
Any sensible philosophy must propose mechanisms to overcome our extremely violent tribal
nature. It must find a way to ensure that we value each other as individuals, albeit who are
accountable at all times for our actions.

3. How our brain affects our behaviour

Social groups are easily susceptible to mob psychology because our brains are excellent
receptacles for group excitement and passion. We bond with groups like newly hatched ducklings

33 Darwin, Charles, The Descent of Man, 1871.

34 James Murphy’s translation of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf on Project Gutenberg.
[http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks02/0200601.txt]
35 Mussolini, Benito, Fascism: Doctrines and Institutions, Encyclopaedia Italiana, 1932. Cited in Adams, Ian and R.W.

Dyson, Fifty Major Political Thinkers, London: Routledge, 2003, p.178, verified at
[http://library.flawlesslogic.com/fascism.htm].
36 Camus, Albert, The Rebel, Vintage, 1956, p. 247.

33
bond with the first thing that moves in front of them. We bond with the first group that we come
across in our childhood. If we find Christians around us, we will become Christians (or favour
Christianity). We prefer the food we ate in our childhood. We affiliate with cultural activities we
participated in during our youth. Our brain absorbs the characteristics of the group we are born
into: until one fine day we start speaking with the group’s mind. Our brain is a creature of ‘path
dependence’; as Edward de Bono describes it, our brain is a self-organising system which adds
new perceptions onto existing patters and beliefs. Just as the drop of water which falls on a
surface takes the shape of that surface, our recent perceptions fit into existing grooves of
perception. Our brain does not evaluate new information independently, but then fits into
existing frameworks.
Socialisation and subliminal indoctrination goes well beyond mimicking, of course. We do try
to understand – at least in outline – how things really work. Implicit models of the working of
the world are useful to help predict others’ actions or reactions. While nearly 98.7 per cent of our
genome is identical with that of chimpanzees, we are different from chimps in the way we think.
Steven Pinker, professor of psychology in the Department of Brain Cognitive Sciences at MIT,
explains this as follows:
A friend of mine lived and worked with a chimpanzee for several years, and tells the story of how
the chimp loved to imitate things that she did. For example, after she washed the dishes the
chimp would wash the dishes, but the chimp’s idea of washing the dishes was very different from
ours. It went through the same muscle movements; it would pick up the sponge, let the warm
water roll over his hands, would rub the sponge on the plate, but didn’t get the idea that the
point of washing the dishes was to get the dishes clean. It just liked the feel of rubbing a sponge
over the plate. It could wash the same dish over and over again, it could rub some of the dirt off
and not get all of it off, because what it was imitating was the particular physical sequence.
What it didn’t think about was what was the goal of the human performing the action. And the
ability to guess what other people’s goals are is a key part of human intelligence, and it makes
us very different from our primate cousins. 37 [New studies show that this view of chimpanzee
behaviour is perhaps a bit too limiting, for chimpanzees may actually possess advanced
‘thinking’ abilities such as the ability to conceive the past and plan for the future. 38]
Indeed, there is a more intriguing difference: Humans are not just conscious; they are self-
conscious. We watch our mind work and distinguish ‘ourselves’ even from our body and mind.
Does this mean that we have a soul? I’m more inclined to believe it as the property of our brain
but we have no proof either way. These differences between us and lower primates boil down to
the large size of the human brain – much larger than the chimp brain, in proportion.
When the first hominids branched off about six million years ago, their brain size was
around 350 cc – roughly as big as the brain of the modern chimp. During the last three million
years, however, hominid brains have almost tripled in size. An intermediate species, Homo
habilis which lived approximately two million years ago and walked on its feet, had a brain
volume of around 750 cc. Our direct ancestors, Homo sapiens, who came into existence three to
four hundred thousand years ago, had a brain size of just over 1200 cc. Our own sub-species,
Homo sapiens sapiens, has a bigger brain, of around 1400 cc. Some of us have brains as large as
2000 cc. (Note that brain volume of all human ‘races’ – including that of the pygmies and the
taller Caucasians – is very , again disproving the concept of ‘race’). There is evidence that the
human brain is still growing, with the only constraint being our delicate spine: its ability to hold
more weight on the head being highly limited.
Among people with an approximately similar brain capacity, intellectual calibre is
determined by a range of factors. Thus, the Neanderthal man’s brain was larger than ours by
around 100 cc, but there is no evidence that Neanderthals were ‘smarter’ than us. Similarly,
men have slightly larger brains than women but men aren’t necessarily smarter than women.
Indeed, girls generally outperform boys in school and university these days (men perhaps make

37 In an interview filmed by PBS for the film: ‘Evolution: The Mind’s Big Bang’, 2001. Transcript available online.

[http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/evolution/library/07/2/l_072_03.html]
38 Osvath, Mathias, ‘Spontaneous planning for future stone throwing by a male chimpanzee’, Current Biology, 19:5, 10

March 2009 [http://www.cell.com/current-biology/abstract/S0960-9822(09)00547-8]

34
better taxi drivers, having evolved a larger spatial area to help them trace their whereabouts,
but thus advantage is now lost with the coming of the GPS). It would appear that once the brain
has become large enough, it is the density and extent of connections between brain cells that
matter more than the sheer number of cells in the brain. The fetal girl’s brain cells also sprout
more connections in the communication centers and areas that process emotion.’ 39 If this is true,
we may find a way ultimately to intellectually stimulate appropriate brain areas and make
children smarter – by building more connections within the brain.
We now just a little bit closer look at our brain. I’d like to note here that I use the Triune
brain model for its simplicity, noting its various limitations later.

3.1 The body manager: our lower brain

Evolution is very efficient. It innovates only where necessary, preferring to work with
whatever has already worked in the past. Mechanical features that successfully worked millions
of years ago live on within us. Among such components from the past is most of our lower brain,
also called the ‘reptilian’ brain, given that it first evolved in reptiles around 500 million years
ago. 40 It comprises the spinal cord, brainstem and diencephalon – all these being located below
the more modern parts of our brain. The lower brain takes care of basic functions like breathing
as well as maintaining our blood pressure, body temperature and blood sugar. It signals hunger,
thirst, our need for sleep, even our body’s readiness to reproduce; and it responds rapidly in
emergencies. Its actions are almost entirely involuntary. That is the reason why breaking ‘bad
habits’, which create strong links with our lower brain, is so difficult.

3.2 Our motive force: the middle brain

The next layer of the brain – the middle brain – comprises the cerebellum and limbic brain.
It came into existence about 400 million years ago. It acts as the connecting layer between our
consciousness and our deeper “animal” structures. It takes care of proprioception (the awareness
of our body’s location in space) and controls our muscles and physical movements. It is
particularly important because it contains an almond shaped region called the amygdala 41 which
signals our feelings and emotions: things like fear and aggression. Emotions are crucial to our
survival, particularly in the wild, for they make our bodies do things. (Many other animals have
an amygdala and possibly experience somewhat similar feelings as well, such as of joy and
sorrow.)
The amygdala’s response determines which of our memories, which are stored in the higher
brain, we will retain. Things or events that evoke strong emotions are generally retained longer
than others. The middle brain is crucial in our socialisation. It helps us bond with our family and
tribe. Research indicates that the amygdala is larger (and thus perhaps ill-formed?) in autistic
children. 42 This part of our brain is the driving force behind much human discord and drama,
but also behind eloquent poetry, art and music. 43 Our subconscious mind – a mix of reasoning,
imagination and hidden memories – of which we sometimes get a glimpse in our dreams,
sincerely has links to the middle brain as well.

3.3 Our rational and aspirational higher brain

The cerebrum (also called the cerebral cortex or neocortex) is the main component of our
higher brain. Our higher brain is like icing on a cake, not crucial for our basic survival, but
significant in the overall scheme of things. On the other hand, damage to the more ‘primitive’
parts of our brain can lead quickly to death. Within the neocortex, the frontal lobe is the most
significant, although it has little to do with ‘technical’ intelligence. Thus, when it is excised,

39 Brizendine, Louann, The Female Brain, New York: Morgan Road Books, 2006, p.14.
40 Bergland, Christopher, The Athlete's Way: Sweat and the Biology of Bliss, Macmillan, 2007, p.80.
41 Famous for its role in our emotional life—already pointed out in chapter 1.
42 Research in the May 2009 issue of the Archives of General Psychiatry [http://tinyurl.com/nr4rv4].
43 ‘Why music?’ The Economist, December 18 2008.

35
traditional IQ scores are barely affected, but dramatic changes occur in our social behaviour,
personality, and learning ability. 44.
The higher brain is responsible for our cognitive skills and self-consciousness. Its advanced
development distinguishes us from other species (note that it is possible that not all intelligence
necessarily resides in the cerebrum, for in different species, different parts of the brain can
perform slightly different functions).
The cortex commenced its evolutionary journey last among our brain parts, about 200
million years ago. It is found, although in far less developed form, in many other animals as
well. These animals can also therefore ‘think’, perhaps feebly or differently. Our neocortex is
much larger in volume relative to other animals, though. Its relative size among our various
brain components is also disproportionately large, and within it our forebrain (frontal lobe) is
huge (relative to early hominid forebrains). To overcome the space constraints within our skull
or cranium, the number and depth of convolutions in our neocortex has also dramatically
increased, expanding our brain’s surface area dramatically and increasing its processing power.
Many other things have changed. Pinker explains in his book, How the Mind Works, how our
olfactory bulbs (for smell) as well as cortical areas for vision and movement have shrunk, while
the areas for hearing have expanded (listening and speech related). The prefrontal lobes, as
already indicated, have blown up considerably. Brain areas that were earlier used for certain
purposes have been taken over by new functions. 45
As Robin Dunbar (an evolutionary psychologist) notes, it is in the front of the brain ‘where
information from the rest of the brain is interpreted’. This ‘capacity to interpret information
underlies social interactions.” 46 Citing Robin Dunbar, Jane Bradbury hypothesises that ‘the
number of problem-solving cognitive tasks you can do may well depend on how much frontal lobe
volume you have and how it is organised.’ 47
As a result of these refinements, our brain is fine-tuned to perform complex functions of
speech, logic and memory. This gives us strategic abilities – to consider the consequences of our
actions and anticipate the response of others. The prefrontal cortex also plays a crucial role in
our (partially hardwired) moral sense. Note that much of this happens without the use of
conscious thought. As Gerd Gigerenzer has pointed out, ‘[r]easoning rarely engenders moral
judgement; rather it searches to explain or justify an intuition after the fact’ 48.Similarly we
think (or intuit) about justice. Other animals simply can’t think this way, although some of them
do display a rudimentary sense of fairness. 49 We are also able, with our brain, to exercise at least
some control over our emotions. We can even change our habits upon being rationally convinced
(of course, complete self-control remains a distant dream for the best of us).
The human mind remains a great mystery. The conscious mind is a machine that
continually generates thoughts without let or pause, but far more difficult to explain is the sense
of self, which seemingly sits outside these thoughts and controls which of these thoughts is
allowed to run. There is a wholeness to the end product which is hard to explain, an overarching
power of integration of the brain experience that exceeds even the integration of the normal
consciousness; a kind of organising ‘self’ or pure consciousness. Yogis and some others have
achieved a level of control over their mind and body well outside the realm of ordinary conscious
experience. Knowledge (including yogic practice and experience) of this self can help us
systematically control our mind and prevent our rational brain from tying us into knots or
overwhelming us with temporary inconveniences (easier said than done!). We also have the

44 Stuss, D. et al., ‘Subtle neuropsychological deficits in patients with good recovery after closed head injury’,
Neurosurgery, 17, 1985, pp. 41-47.
45 Pinker, Steven, How the Mind Works, London: Penguin Books, 1999, p.183-84.
46 Both citations from Bradbury, Jane, ‘Molecular Insights into Human Brain Evolution’, PLoS Biology, 3:3, March

2005. Available in full on the internet.

47 Bradbury, Jane, ‘Molecular Insights into Human Brain Evolution’, PLoS Biology, 3:3, March 2005.
48 Gigerenzer, Gerd, Gut Feelings, London: Penguin, 2007, p.191.
49 Dogs have recently been found to display a sense of envy (Carroll, Rebecca, ‘Dogs Can Feel Envy, Study Suggests’,

National Geographic News, December 8, 2008 [http://news.nationalgeographic.com.au/news/2008/12/081208-dogs-

envy.html]

36
ability, through yogic routines, to tune our mind as a mechanic tunes a car. Thus, we can
achieve high amplitude alpha and theta brain waves (instead of the high frequency beta and
delta waves) through yogic practice 50. Always able to return to our calm inner self, we are then
better able to explore the truth about the world. Today, science is attempting to explain how this
consciousness is generated. No doubt we will be able to determine its mechanics soon enough. 51
Most of us will hardly explore these powers. But it is worth noting that such ‘spiritual’ or ‘soul’
powers are simply not found among animals, and set us apart.
It is worthwhile to pause here for a moment and consider the limitations of the Triune model
of the brain that I have described. As Pinker notes, ‘the forces of evolution do not just heap
layers on an unchanged foundation. Natural selection has to work with what is already around,
but it can modify what it finds.’ 52 The simplistic three-part brain model I have outlined does
injustice to the complex machinery of the brain. However, for purposes of this book, I believe this
is a reasonably good approximation. The key is to remind us of the biological context which
underpins human nature. Regardless of the precise machinery of the mind, it does impact on our
nature and potential.
It is important, though, not to assume a deterministic view about ourselves. The structure
and limitations of our brain inevitably impact the limitations of our thoughts and actions, but we
always remain free within this framework to choose most of our actions that impact others.
Without free will, we will not be able to visualise create a philosophy of freedom, nor attribute
any responsibility to anyone.

3.4 Consciousness
I noted above that ‘the higher brain is responsible for our cognitive skills and self-
consciousness’. That may well be the case, but consciousness is not made out of brain material: it
transcends it. The brain may supply the piping, the memory, the sensing and measuring
equipment (camera, thermometer, etc.), with the body supplying the energy to the brain
‘computer’ system, but the result of these sensing machines and complex equipment is extra-
material, i.e. beyond material. How does raw energy from the Big Bang, that creates ‘mass’, then
combine into such a fine-tuned machine that results in consciousness, indeed, in self-
consciousness, which is the hallmark of the human mind?
A discussion of this would take us well into the depths of philosophy and I’m not yet
prepared to do that. Such a discussion won’t add too much value to this book, either, which is
more of a practical discourse about human society than philosophic exploration of the universe.
Suffice it to note that this issue is non-trivial and will require the best of brains to re-create in
the laboratory. A conscious robot will perhaps be the first true demonstration of how this
happens.

4. Which part of our brain predominates?

‘The collective expression for hominoids, “a shrewdness of apes,” tells a story. Primates are
sneaky baldfaced liars. They hide from rivals’ eyes to flirt, cry wolf to attract or divert
attention, even manipulate their lips into a poker face. … One chimp, shown a set of boxes
with food and one with a snake, led his companions to the snake, and after the fled
screaming, feasted in peace.’ – Steven Pinker 53

Despite the enormous computational capacities of the brain, its perceptual capacity and
capacity for good judgement is often limited. The higher brain does not always dominate. I’m not
referring to simple things like optical or other illusions here, but to serious ‘failures’ that can
impact on our judgement. The sciences of neuropsychology and neuroeconomics are at the

50 Hoffmann, Erik, ‘Mapping the brains activity after Kriya Yoga’, Bindu, No. 12, likely 1998-99.
[http://www.yogameditation.com/articles/issues_of_bindu/bindu_12/mapping_the_brains_activity_after_kriya_yoga]
51 E.g. see Pinker, Steven, How the Mind Works, London: Penguin Books, 1999.
52 Pinker, Steven, How the Mind Works, London: Penguin Books, 1999, p.371.
53 Pinker, Steven, How the Mind Works, London: Penguin Books, 1999, p.193.

37
frontier of such analysis. Thus, in their Nobel Prize winning studies, Kahneman and Tversky
found that we often draw erroneous conclusions based on the way information is presented to us.
These are the biases of anchoring, availability, framing and representativeness. Other biases
include the base rate fallacy, conjunction fallacy, loss aversion, peak-end rule, preference
reversal, status quo bias and fundamental attribution error. We easily slip into logical fallacies,
as well. Our mind doesn’t always seem to think as rationally as it could, upon colder reflection. A
recent study demonstrated that we make systemic errors in purchase decisions which are
framed as special deals. 54
[For a fascinating discussion of these and other human biases, and to find out why our
decisions are often flawed, I suggest reading Jason Zweig’s book, Your Money & Your Brain
(2007), and Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s at times plain wrong but also at times insightful books,
Fooled by Randomness (2001) and The Black Swan (2007).]
Rephrasing some of the situations that lead to these failures of rationality in a more
‘intuitive’ manner has been shown to overcome some of them (e.g. see Pinker, p.343-348). In
other cases, it has been demonstrated that these failures only occur under new circumstances,
but humans quickly realise the rational solution and don’t repeat the mistake. It is therefore not
sufficient to use this information to claim that we are not rational. Rationality itself needs
careful understanding about what it represents.
There is a constant tussle in our minds between what we know is the more rational decision
against what our emotions dictate. Most of us don’t invest in shares even though over the long
run it is almost certain that these will yield the highest returns. We are more afraid of a low
possibility of loss than the hooked on to the pleasure that we might get with a high rate of
return. Loss aversion is the sinking feeling in our guts when we lose money, no matter how
small in magnitude. To avoid that feeling we often take a seemingly irrational option such as
investing in bonds compared with the rational and apparently more superior option of investing
in shares. But it is arguable whether rationality can be so narrowly construed. When the crunch
comes and we are the one at the receiving end of loss, then the concept of probabilities doesn’t
work. We have lost out and we are the one to suffer the consequences. In the evolutionary sense
we are better off by being conservative and eliminating all chances of becoming worse off, first,
before we indulge in pipedreams. Of course, with good economics education, one can take
calculated risks that minimise downside risks while allowing upside gains. And so, rationality
can work in tandem with emotion to yield the most satisfactory outcome.
It is now becoming clear that just like our cerebellum undertakes extremely fine-tuned
movements by implicitly making enormously complex mathematical calculations that would
defeat most computers that have been designed so far, so also our behaviour is often driven by
what can perhaps be best described as super-rationality. Even our irrational or emotional
behaviours like love, for instance, have deeply rational reasons, which would take us many more
decades of work to understand fully.
For instance, Gerd Gigerenzer shows how love at first sight is actually the best and most
rational solution to the problem of finding a mate, and how it prevents the seemingly rational
search for partners that inevitably becomes counter-productive. In 1611, ‘after an arranged and
unhappy first marriage, Kepler began a methodical search for a second wife.’ He ‘‘investigated
eleven possible replacements within two years. Friends urged him to marry candidate number
four, a lady of high status and a tempting dowry, but he persisted with his investigation.
Insulted, this suitable match rejected him for toying with her.’ 55 Indeed, dynamic programming
(a recent advance in economic theory) finds that the solution to the simple ‘parking problem’, i.e.
deciding whether to park in the first empty spot, or to move on and find a closer spot to one’s
venue, might be enormously complex to represent mathematically. The problem of marriage is a
problem of two-sided parking problem, with both sides searching for a match. Even the rational
solution might turn out to be, once we have done the mathematics properly, to be to decide

54 “The Impact of Price Frames on Consumer Decision Making”, Office of Fair Trading, UK May 2010
[http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic_research/OFT1226.pdf]
55 Gigerenzer, Gerd, Gut Feelings, London: Penguin, 2007, p.58.

38
within the first three or four opportunities that we get. Hence humans tend to marry within the
first few partners they have, with ‘a third of Americans born even as recently as the 1960s and
early 1970s’ marrying their first partner 56. Love is that supra-rational innate calculation that
guides them to the solution to this extremely complex dynamic programming game. As
Gigernzer notes, ‘gut feelings themselves have a rationale based on reasons’ 57. Unconscious
reasoning (or implicit rationality) is at the heart of our rapid-fire gut feelings.
One would argue therefore that the rational part of our brain dominates our actions, even if
it uses ‘irrational’ emotion or even if it all happens intuitively and we don’t understand the
immediate logic. With limited time available, we weigh various options in some form or manner
and make the best decision we can within the limits of our knowledge and ability. This desire to
make the best decision for oneself – however flawed from the perspective of another – is itself a
rational outcome. Even supra-rational things like love, are a whole-body-mind method of
decision making to find the best outcome for an individual. Models of rational choice used in
‘standard’ economics therefore remain the best way to model human behaviour as a first
approximation. Taleb is therefore exaggerating when he says that: ‘Legions of empirical
psychologists of the heuristics and biases school have shown that the model of rational
behaviour under uncertainty is not just grossly inaccurate but plain wrong as a description of
reality’. 58 He is wrong, not the models, for they are an initial approximation. Rationality is not
perfection. A decision that, in retrospect and for ever after, is perfect and accurate, is not what
rationality guarantees. Its standard is lower: a process of rationally arriving at a conclusion or
decision.
Most of what we do is based on ‘unconscious’ reason: our brain clicking away through a
range of strategies and calculations to arrive at a reasoned outcome. The simplest example is
body movement. We can’t possible move our body correctly without our brain undertaking
almost impossibly complex calculations. It is reason that helps us drive a car, or to return a fast
moving tennis ball while we are running all over the court. The only thing is that this reason is
unconscious. The demand that we always come to the right answer if we are rational is like
asking why don’t tennis games go on for ever: because no one should ever return anything
imperfectly. Reason, or rationality, is no guarantee of truth. We can reason wrongly! We can
draw the wrong conclusions. No one is infallible. Perfection is not the standard of rationality.
If the meaning of rationality is so confined to being reasonable at some underlying level,
almost all human behaviour is demonstrably rational at some level. There is a by now large
stream of literature, including the seminal work of Gary Becker, which demonstrates that major
aspects of individual behaviour can be explained by assuming rationality. For instance, even the
behaviour of drug addicts, criminals (and even animals in some instances) has been shown abide
by predictions of rationality. Economic models therefore continue to provide great value (see
David M. Kreps’s introduction to his 1990 book, A Course in Microeconomic Theory). Models of
rational choice are aware of their limitations: of not being able to perfectly predict human
behaviour. Others who convincingly demonstrate how rationality explains most human
behaviour include: Steven Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner’s (Freakonomics, 2005 and
SuperFreakonomics, 2009) and Tim Hartford (The Logic of Life, 2008). There is an army of other
thinkers who demonstrate similar things.
Ronald Coase pointed out a great flaw of traditional economic analysis in undertaking an
analysis of firms. He showed that if transaction costs are not zero, then outsourcing or
contracting out becomes expensive; hence companies prefer to do many things internally which
they could have otherwise outsourced. Similarly, one can easily show that decision-making is not
cost-less in terms of time. People often rationally choose to take a quick decision which may not
be perfectly correct, because their time is valuable. Similarly, teenagers instinctively know that
the fun they are having at the moment won’t come again, so they ignore things that may need
them to forego this fun. We must therefore assume that despite the complexity of the human

56 Gigerenzer, Gerd, Gut Feelings, London: Penguin, 2007, p.54.

57 Gigerenzer, Gerd, Gut Feelings, London: Penguin, 2007, p.192.
58 Taleb, Nassim Nicholas, The Black Swan, London: Penguin Books, 2007, p.185.

39
brain and our many flaws, we are predominantly rational and strategic beings. The concept of
strategic behaviour is a particularly significant manifestation of rationality.
But even though our higher brain is important, its role is often subordinated to the power of
our mid- and lower brain. Rational thought takes a lot of time and effort and is not suitable for
most day-to-day decisions. Instead, we need to decide many things rapidly based on ‘gut feel’.
Our midbrain decides quickly, forming impressions and perceptions on the run. Our mid-brain
also observes many things subliminally – things that do not register on our conscious brain.
Therefore, we mostly live by perception, not by logic. The entire story-telling industry (including
novels and films) lives off our emotional, not rational, brain. The very act of ‘falling in love’
seems to be a sub-conscious block over all rational thinking, which generally creates doubt.
Purely rational people may possibly never marry, beset by so many doubts about the future they
would be. Some irrationality may therefore be ‘rational’, at least in the interest of the
reproduction of the species. Indeed, were we to factor in all possible information, we may well
find that ‘[o]ften what looks like a reasoning error from a purely logical perspective turns out to
be a highly intelligent social judgment in the real world’ 59. Given the complex rational
computations that our brain undertakes to propel us around in the real world, it is impossible to
imagine that our social responses are actually unreasonable.
Our lower and mid-brain can, however, in moments of extreme irrationally, lead us astray,
even in some cases to suicide. We are the only animal that takes its own life, albeit in some
extremely rare cases. That is perhaps the curse of rationality being mixed with deep emotion.
Peculiarly human miasmas seem to beset us: worries, self-consciousness, and stress. As a result
of the effects of our lower and mid-brain, advocates of hatred tend to have a gala time. Zealots
and bigots of religion, ‘race’, or ‘history’ flourish because we drop our guard when listening to
their wild exhortations. Our rational mind is overpowered; we join in their irrational
glorifications of whatever it is they seek to glorify.
Our brain should therefore be seen as a two-edged sword. With the great motivational power
of emotion but an imperfect ability to think and plan, we are led to heroic deeds and great
poetry, or to terrible crime. Chimpanzees cannot inflict the harm that humans can. But they
can’t also build skyscrapers. Without emotion the romance, drama, poetry, art and ‘colour’ will
drain out of our lives, leaving an insipid and boring package behind. We are a unique entity,
with potential both for good and for evil. Evil includes justifications for power at the expense of
all morality 60. There is a philosophy on every possible worldview. We are capable of justifying
everything. Political principles must recognise and build on this confounding nature of the
human mind.

5. Human nature
With this background information we can now find out who we actually are. ‘Know thyself’,
as they say. Without this knowledge, designing a society is as futile as trying to design an
enclosure for birds without knowing if the birds fly. 61 Given our heritage and construction, we
clearly do have what can be broadly called ‘human’ nature, like a lion has ‘lion nature’ and a
sheep, ‘sheep nature’. Even though Gandhi and Hitler seem to be poles apart, both were human;
of that much we can be sure.
Donald Brown assembled, in Human Universals, the following traits found in all human
cultures: ‘prestige and status, inequality of power and wealth, property, inheritance, reciprocity,
punishment, sexual modesty, sexual regulations, sexual jealousy, a male preference for young
women as sexual partners, a division of labour by sex (including more child care by women and
greater public political dominance by men), hostility to other groups, and conflict within the

59 Gigerenzer, Gerd, Gut Feelings, London: Penguin, 2007, p.103.

60 In this category would be the ‘extreme rationality’ -based thinking attributable to Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger: the
kind of thinking which ultimately created Hitler. Evil does not believe it is evil. Sometimes evil does not even agree
that there are values.
61 A number of good books discuss human nature, e.g. Loptson, Peter, ed, Readings on Human Nature, Peterborough

(Canada): Broadview Press, 1998.

40
group, including violence, rape, and murder.’ 62 This is a useful preliminary list, informing a
further exploration of human nature.

5.1 Individual and group nature

We behave differently in different roles. We act as self-interested persons in some cases, and
in others as self-interested members of a group. In other cases, we could even totally submerge
our personality to the group ‘mind’. Thus, individuals accidentally walking together in a street
do not constitute a group at all, being purely self-interested persons. There must be some
conscious theme or purpose for a group to form. Human groups that do form can become quite
significant part of our lives. ‘[P]eople in all cultures feel that they are members of a group (band,
tribe, clan, or nation) and feel animosity toward of the groups’. 63 Groups can range in their
nature from polite group applause at the end of a stage performance, to armies marching in
unison.
Group nature is often confrontational or competitive. As Pinker points out, ‘[o]ften the best
way to benefit one’s group is to displace, subjugate, or annihilate the group next door.’ 64 Thus,
‘[j]ingoism is alarmingly easy to evoke.’ 65

Individual human nature and group human nature

Individual Individual-group Group human nature

human nature human nature - group acting as a single
- individual as an - individual with a unit, e.g. a mob.
independent unit specific role in a group

Nature doesn’t seem to ‘care’ for individuals, who are in the scheme of things, relatively
dispensable, at least compared with the species which is often best preserved through groups: at
least that appears to be the case in some species. There are reasons to argue that the tension
between freedom and collectivism is ingrained in the human condition. Modern society pushes
towards individualism, pushing the frontier and testing group survival.

5.2 Underlying needs, motivations, and intent

Individual needs
Our needs arise from our specific body and brain structure. Abraham Maslow proposed that
these needs constitute a sort of hierarchy, a pyramid starting from physiological needs at the
base and moving up incrementally, in lesser urgency, towards safety, love, belonging and
esteem, all the way to self-actualisation. 66 I would suggest that the most basic need is not
physiological but the need for freedom, for merely being fed but in solitary confinement is not
sufficient. In addition, equal freedom such as reasonable equality of opportunity, and justice 67
are basic needs. The other, this time a higher need, is about values-based leadership, being the
hope of influencing the world for the better.
We can look at these needs based on the behaviour they lead to. These needs can lead to
competition, indifference, or co-operation.

62 Cited by Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works, London: Penguin Books, 1999, p.427.
63 Pinker, Steven, How the Mind Works, London: Penguin Books, 1999, p.509.
64 Pinker, Steven, How the Mind Works, London: Penguin Books, 1999, p.406.
65 Pinker, Steven, How the Mind Works, London: Penguin Books, 1999, p.513.
66 Maslow, A. H., ‘A Theory of Human Motivation,’ Psychological Review, 1943, 50, pp. 370-396.
67 E.g., Taylor, A. J. W., ‘Justice as a basic human need,’ New Ideas in Psychology, Vol. 21, Issue 3, December 2003, pp.

209-219.

41
a) When the quantity of something we need (i.e. something desirable) is fixed, its need can only
be met at the expense of someone else’s fulfilment of that need. These are zero-sum needs. For
instance, if I want a particular job, so does someone else. These needs lead to competition in
society and to the possibilities of aggression, even violence (the popularity of violent computer
games indicates our competitive spirit: we are hard-wired to win scarce resources, sometimes at
all costs). Theory X of human motivation 68 is based in part on such a harsh perspective about
human nature., It assumes that the average person dislikes work and will seek to avoid it; and
that he is self-centred and does not care about organizational goals. Theory X also postulates
that the average person resists change, is gullible, and not particularly intelligent. Economic
theory sees humans as opportunistic (i.e. driven by ambitious or strategic self-interest with the
potential for deception).
b) Non-zero-sum needs are those which can be met without reducing the chances of others’
fulfilling their similar need. For example, when I buy bread I am indifferent to other customers
who want to buy bread at the same time, provided there is plenty of bread to go around for
everyone. (Under conditions of scarcity, our strategic, competitive side reverts to the fore.) While
there is price competition for the bread among sellers, customers simply choose the bread they
don’t want, and don’t usually compete directly. Such needs lead to indifference (or peace). It is
possible that we may, at times, feign indifference while being competitive.
c) Collaborative non-zero-sum needs can only be met by actively collaborating with others.
For instance, I can meet my need for justice only by working closely with others to create an
appropriate social contract. Such needs lead to cooperation. At times, we may co-operate on the
surface but remain competitive at another level. For instance, workplace teams cooperate, but
each member also aims to do better than others in order to be promoted.
Douglas McGregor’s theory Y suggests that our need for self-esteem and self-actualization
motivates us to levels of achievement that take us beyond raw competition. Thus, people have
driven themselves to extremes of effort throughout history in search of the truth, or meaning in
life. Inquisitiveness, creativity and ingenuity reside in each of us, and beyond a point neither
money nor fame matters. We live to exceed ourselves. Monks, scientists, adventurers and
mountaineers do things that can’t be explained by any form of greed, lust, power, or competitive
urge. Thomas Alva Edison used to become so immersed in his inventions that he would even
forget to eat. Charles Darwin was the first to rush out from The Beagle (the ship he travelled in
for five years) to collect specimens each time it stopped somewhere on the way. Not money, nor
fame drove him – only sheer curiosity. Theory X fails to account for our greatest achievements.
Theory Y, instead, suggests that we are all driven by some higher motives and to get the best out
of others, we must treat them with respect as people who want to achieve their best.
The reality is that people display a mix of cooperation and competition, based on the
situation. Frederick Herzberg’s theory of hygiene factors (1959) would suggest that our
competitive urges must first be at least partially satisfied before we can start to cooperate with
others. Thus, each of us must achieve a reasonable economic and social status (maintenance
factors) before we will happily cooperate with others. Economic theory would call this minimum
level the participation constraint. If we do not feel ‘settled’ enough, we will compete hard (even
viciously) till we are ‘settled’ or valued. After competition has brought us respectability, we are
will be ready to look beyond and focus on social issues.
Group needs
Group needs are conceptually similar to individual needs, only more complex. To begin with,
groups need a reason to come into existence (e.g. a common belief, objective or activity). They
need a place of some sort to exist (could be a website), and they need leaders. After they are
formed, groups seek to expand by inducting new members, no matter how restrictive their
criteria may be. Thereafter groups behave like individuals in many ways. They too seek some
form of validation, even power. Individuals bargain with each other in the marketplace; groups
bargain with other groups – through group nominees. Individuals maximise self interest; groups

68 McGregor, Douglas, The Human Side of Enterprise, 1960.

42
maximise group interest. Groups behave competitively or cooperatively (with other groups)
depending on whether they seek a zero sum outcome (e.g. groups that compete for the same
territory) or non-zero sum outcomes (e.g. groups that perform physical exercises together, such
as group classes of yoga).
Groups tend to build commitment by creating stories and rituals. When someone cooks up
myths (e.g. becomes delusional or mentally sick) we isolate that person, but when groups become
delusional (mentally sick), very little can be done. Things quickly go pear shaped. At some stage
such delusional group members may stop behaving as rational, self-interested humans, and
morph into fearsome and dangerous mobs. Once hatred or fear has been stoked in an entire
group, the human brain changes, perhaps chemically – like grasshoppers that morph into locusts
on their bodies being irritated through over-population. Human mobs often become devilish
killing machines. Seemingly ‘ordinary’ people get infected – not just ‘bad’ people. Gangs of
religious fanatics roam the streets of India during communal riots, generating violence that
feeds up on itself, as one group retaliates against the other. The brain chemistry of group
members seems to change to such a great extent that when group members look at members of
other groups they no longer see humans but insects to be crushed. Thus, in his book, Mien
Kampf, Adolf Hitler compared Jews with maggots who feast on a dead body. The only way to
prevent group madness is through love and reasoning, but those infected by hatred become
incapable of love or reason. Group violence has to be cured with counter-violence. Fasting to
bring sense into the group is not viable without Gandhi’s amazing love of others. But even that
can’t always work. When mob frenzy finally subsides, its members must surely wonder how they
ever lost their head.
Does this mean that those who participate in group behaviour are not accountable for their
actions because their brain chemistry has (presumably: or hypothetically) changed? Are they
therefore not to be punished for their crimes? Of course not. A citizen must always retain control
over his faculties. Participating in dangerous group activities is ultimately a personal choice.
Freedom means being able to look a fanatic group in the eye and not blink.

5.3 Range of behaviours

As Pinker points out, ‘The mind has many parts, some designed for virtue, some designed for
reason, some clever enough to outwit the parts that are neither.’ 69 It ‘accommodates not only
ugly motives but love, friendship, cooperation, a sense of fairness, and an ability to predict the
consequences of our actions’ 70. Given the underlying individual and group needs outlined above,
human nature can displays a wide-ranging repertoire of behaviour. Each of us can vary,
depending on our internal and external conditions, along the entire human spectrum. A table in
Appendix 1 lists a few dimensions of human nature. Such dimensions can be assumed, for
simplicity, to be distributed ‘normally’ (figure below). One would even argue that the variance on
each of these dimensions can be quite large, with the extremes scattered quite widely.

The extensive repertoire of

human nature

Opposite extreme, Most of us are in the One extreme,

e.g. brutal violence middle most of the time e.g. total calmness
Potentially
Beneficial or, at least, harmless
dangerous

69 Pinker, Steven, How the Mind Works, London: Penguin Books, 1999, p.424.
70 Pinker, Steven, How the Mind Works, London: Penguin Books, 1999, p.518.

43
 Human nature can be visualised as the set of all these traits and dimensions, either
weighted by their prevalence or (more appropriately) by their impact, with the negative end
weighted disproportionately more. Thus, H = T1 { ∞
−∞
, T2
∞
−∞
,..., Tn
∞
−∞
} where H represents human
nature and Ti represents the various traits, distributed normally, that are mapped onto a
comparable cardinal scale of intensity. It is primarily the negative extremes that concern a
political philosophy, noting that this conception has little in common with conceptions of
‘abnormal psychology’, a discipline that identifies and treats people with ‘abnormal’
psychological characteristics such as neuroses and psychoses. The ‘middle’ range shown above
may reflect the assumptions of economic theory but does not to explain the behaviour of
extremes, and hence only partially models human behaviour.
On a given day, most of us will be found somewhere in the mid-range of most traits. Each
mid-range therefore tells us something about the average person. In general, an average person
is keenly self-interested and competitive, but is also willing to volunteer and cooperate. He is
generous in many ways but also short-sighted and somewhat prejudiced. When all is said and
done, though, he is quite harmless. We must be concerned, therefore, only with extreme
characteristics, particularly those on the negative extremes. Many obnoxious crimes occur with
monotonous regularity: things like murders, throwing children into the sea, incest, even
cannibalism. Worse, people like Hitler, Stalin, Mugabe and Osama bin Laden who may be are
‘normal’ from the psychiatric perspective and who may not commit crimes personally, may inflict
severe damage to entire societies, even humanity. Political theory must understand dangerous
people so that danger they pose is detected and hopefully eliminated before they can cause
devastation.

5.4 Regularities
If human nature is so complex and diverse, how can there be any regularities that predict
social phenomena, and given these significant variations in behaviour, are we being sensible in
taking its predictions into account? There is great value in looking at the negative extremes of
behaviour, but also considerable utility in studying the average person. Such a study would help
us make useful assumptions about human response to incentives, and thus design the society for
the average person, even while being particular to pick out and pin down aberrant behaviour. So
what are the main regularities?
Our hallmark: deep ignorance
John Locke noted long ago that:
Our minds are not made as large as truth nor suited to the whole extent of things… It will become
us better to consider well our own weakness and exigencies, what we are made for, and what we
are capable of, and to apply the powers of our bodies and faculties of our souls, which are well
suited to our condition, in the search of that natural and moral knowledge, which, as it is not
beyond our strength, so is not beside our purpose, but may be attained by moderate industry, and
improved to our infinite advantage. 71
Our deep ignorance, which marks us as ‘only human’, is a regularity that few will admit to,
at least the so-called experts. While each of us is the best judge of our local circumstance, we are
predominantly besieged by false knowledge and false premises. We possess limited personal
knowledge (or have forgotten much of what we learnt earlier, and reverted to making the same
errors that had been ironed out earlier). But more importantly, at least half of what we think we
know ‘know’ if false or will (ultimately) be found to be false, or only partially correct. Thus, in the
past perhaps 99 per cent of what mankind thought it ‘knew’ was surely false. With the advance
of the scientific method and critical thinking, this mass ignorance has steadily been reduced, but
large chunks of ignorance remain.
Self-interest is king

71Locke, John, ‘KNOWLEDGE, ITS EXTENT AND MEASURE’, Quod volumus facile credimus, Feb. 8, 1677, in The

Life and Letters of John Locke, with extracts from his Journals and Common-place Books, by Lord King, London:
George Bell & Sons, York Street, Covent Garden. 1884, Google Books.

44
 We are self-interested. ‘A small knowledge of human nature will convince us, that, with far
the greatest part of mankind, interest is the governing principle; and that almost every man is
more or less, under its influence’ (George Washington 72). Acting in a self-interested manner has
much to commend itself. As Thomas Jefferson observed, ‘Self-interest, or rather self-love, or
egoism, has been more plausibly substituted as the basis of morality’.
The disciplines of psychology and economics examine our self-interested behaviour and
arrive at many useful conclusions. Psychology finds that our needs are similar, and a study of
our subconscious mind shows how deeply self-interest is embedded in our psyche. Economics
makes four key assumptions about our self-interested rationality from which innumerable
testable predictions about our behaviour have been derived and tested. These assumptions are: 73
a) We are able to choose across everything, i.e. our preferences are complete. We therefore know
our mind and can discriminate across all goods and services. Given that we generally have
an opinion on everything under the sun, this assumption is perhaps not too far fetched.
b) We are able to discriminate consistently across our preferences, i.e., our preferences are
transitive. If we prefer apples to bananas, and bananas to oranges, then we should prefer
apples to oranges. This is clearly a more stringent assumption than the first one, and
sometimes fails.
c) We prefer more of a ‘good’ thing to less of it. No one has perhaps yet been born who will take
Rs. 10 when Rs. 20 is also a choice. This assumption is as robust as the response of our hand
to fire (the hand immediately withdraws!). If our eyes come into contact with a Rs.100 note
lying on the street, our hands immediately stretch towards the note. This is an iron law of
nature.
d) We prefer more variety to less. We are therefore willing to give up things of which more of, in
order to get things of which we have only a little. If I have 1000 tonnes of wheat but only one
chocolate, I will give up some wheat for an additional chocolate.
When combined in mathematical form with our ‘budget constraint’, these assumptions lead
to a number of useful predictions. Most of these predictions hold well (on average) at the
aggregate level. That our (micro-economic) behaviour as a species can therefore be predicted
confirms that human nature has many regularities, which are often put to use, for instance, by
the discipline of marketing. Note that these assumptions apply to everything scarce and
expensive, including time. Therefore, economic analysis is able to predict even non-economic
behaviour. For example, my doctoral dissertation examined the number of children parents
want, based on an analysis of the costs and benefits they experience. 74 I tested a rational choice
model empirically and found its predictions statistically valid. Who would ordinarily think that
people have children in an implicitly rational manner – but they do.
But were the primitive tribals who bartered ivory for glass beads irrational? Since they could
not make the glass beads themselves but enjoyed having the variety of ornament, they were
rational in giving up ivory of which they had plentiful supplies in exchange for more glass beads.
This is certainly no more bizarre than the farmer who gives away wheat in return for Swiss
chocolate.
It is crucial to emphasise that our post-facto ‘rationality’ is actually based on some simple
heuristics. We do not calculate using the complex models that economics makes use of. We
instinctively reach for ‘better’ decisions. In that process, while most of our ex-ante decisions are
found to be ex-post rational, some aren’t. For instance, if all of us thought through certain
positions rationally, all of us would arrive at (on average) similar choices regarding organ
donation, investment options, or certain insurance options. But we don’t. We accept default
options, and are unlikely to change them. That would appear to indicate a deep-seated
resistance to think! ‘Many people would rather avoid making an active decision, even if it means

72 From The Writings of George Washington, cited by Morgenthau, Hans J., and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics

among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers, 1985, p.11.
73 These assumptions are paraphrased from Frank, Robert H., Microeconomics and Behavior, Boston: Irwin McGraw-

Hill, 1997, pp.73-78.

74 See my PhD dissertation online. [http://www.sanjeev.sabhlokcity.com/almaak/Dissertation/dissertation.html].

45
life or death’. 75 It would be misplaced, therefore, to imagine that we understand human thinking
processes sufficiently well at this stage to conclusively model human behaviour through complex
mathematical equations. Some of this might happen because of the way we adopt to uncertainty,
or indeed, adapt to our environment, no matter what it is. Just as we treat a certain
temperature around us as a ‘given’, we set our expectations to policy options that are given to us
by experts. It perhaps demonstrates our trust in others; it possibly means that we prefer to live
life than to engage in unnecessary transaction costs.
Opportunism and strategic behaviour
A corollary of self interest is strategic behaviour and opportunism. People seek to maximise
their power and wealth. Those in positions of power do so by oppressing others, those not in
positions of power do so by colluding with those that have it.
Indeed, in all their interactions with others (sometimes within the family itself), people try
to squeeze out whatever potential advantage they can get. Strategic behaviour forms the basis of
the game-theoretic balance of powers conception of the social contract that I suggest in Chapter
4. Everyone aims to grab just a little bit more. Deception, self-deception, and counter-deception
is the norm. And yet, despite these limitations the highest ethical standards can (and do) emerge
from self-interested games.
A few remarks on deception (including self-deception 76) are perhaps in order here. This is
one of the most subtle aspects of human nature. The need to detect deception in others perhaps
explains the rapid and massive growth in human brain size over the past million years.
‘Deception and belief manipulation are key aspects of many strategic interactions, including
bargaining, poker games, military operations, politics, and investment banking.’ 77 Common
idioms betray the great suspicion with which we hold each other, and often for good reason: ‘wolf
in sheep’s clothing’, ‘munh mein Ram, bagal mein churi’ (one who takes the name of God Ram
but has a hidden knife waiting to attack when one’s guard is down), ‘the fool and his money are
soon parted’, etc. People in positions of power, including priests, often display extremely
deceptive behaviour. The Roman Catholic church is suffering the outcome of such deception
practiced by some of its priests.
Deception (including stealth) is a vital skill in the tactics of war. Strategic deception should
be treated as a basic characteristic of human nature, making it difficult (if not impossible) to
always decipher people’s underlying motives. Sometimes it is even possible that a person may
not know of his or her own motive, or sub-consciously bury it deep inside.
Given half a chance, virtually everyone will deceive. Ethics doesn’t drive human behaviour.
We can safely predict that the son of a mafia chief won’t question his father and will join the
gang (that Rahul Gandhi would never give up the advantage arising from the corrupt wealth of
his family, is a given. Literally all socialists deceive. That, too, is also a given. Even liberals are
not averse to deception. I know a good number of well-known liberals (many being libertarians)
who have demonstrated rather weak moral standards. I could go into details here, but don’t wish
to, for their behaviour is consistent with human nature. Not a pretty sight. Everyone is the
same.
If deception represents complex human rationality, strategic opportunism, and intelligence
of some sort, gullibility is its opposite. Both traits are often found in the same person. That is the
reason why both honest magicians and dishonest tricksters (like the infamous Uri Geller)
flourish, why ‘faith healers’ get away with great lies on stage, and why religious ceremonies are
focused on choreography and musical chants to apply pressure on our gullible sense and dampen
our inquisitive spirit.
In a strategic world, conceptions about ‘rights’ are a questionable construct. Ask the people
of Zimbabwe or North Korea about their rights: they have none! Why do so many people on this

75Gigerenzer, Gerd, Gut Feelings, London: Penguin, 2007, p.185.

76Pinker, Steven, How the Mind Works, London: Penguin Books, 1999, p.421-22.
77 Ettinger, David and Philippe Jehil, ‘A Theory of Deception’ in The American Economic Journal:

Microeconomics,2010, 2:1, p.1.

46
planet not have rights if these are innate? In this game, there are no pre-determined outcomes –
hence definitely no rights. Think of the strategic problems faced by an ordinary chess player and
multiply these a million-fold. Note that while a chess player may try to anticipate the other
player’s moves, that doesn’t guarantee that he will succeed. The actions of others – i.e. the level
of competition – is critical. The results of the strategic game of life can’t be calculated in
advance. No one has a choice to not play this ‘game’. And it must be played to win.
Novels and stories are full of strategic, opportunistic and deception-riddled behaviour.
Courting someone for marriage is a common illustration of strategic human enterprise. The
intermingling of emotion, natural instinct and rationality is seamless. The outcomes are self-
driven perhaps by our deepest biological needs. Our actions are strategic but seemingly natural,
and no one questions the underlying complexity of behaviour. The wooed girl – who will become
a dominant matriarch after marriage – blushes naturally (but, at a deeper level, strategically).
Nature works its charms for a clear reason. The furtive glances are part of the game of loved
designed in self-interest. The subtlety needed to design a robot that behaves like a human being
boggles the mind. Human nature is profoundly complex, often based on motivations not obvious
even to us. Strategic is perhaps the best word to summarise.
Strategic behaviour has an underbelly, being not only self-interested but opportunistic, even
evil. Should opportunities present themselves, people tend to make use of them, often
disregarding the stringent moral imperatives involved. This includes changing their prior plans.
Sometimes this involves deception, cheating, lying: hiding the truths as they manipulate
circumstances or people to achieve their goals. People also try to capture the benefits of a
particular act while passing on costs to others. Thus, strategic people might prefer to pollute
others’ property.
Fortunately, no one is perfectly strategic, being boundedly rational. Neither can we visualise
the future perfectly, nor prevent our emotions from driving our behaviour. We make mistakes.
Think chess. We are not all equally good at picking the responses (reaction functions) of others.
We could perhaps beat 100 players in a row but the 101st player comes from nowhere and beats
us, because he reacts differently or we make a mistake. A single mistake can often be decisive.
We are competing against our peers, and against our own shortcomings. One single mistake can
make the difference between success and failure.
Drive for (relative) status
Economic theory, for the sake of simplicity (which is easier to model mathematically),
usually does not capture many of our persistent and pesky – almost irrational – traits. For
instance, we seem to prefer to be the king of a small and insignificant mountain or a village than
a well off cog in the wheel of a large nation. It is possible that we will forego income for this
trivial privilege, as this example shows (from an article by Robert Frank):
Consider a choice between these two worlds:
World A: You earn $110,000 per year, others earn $200,000.
World B: You earn $100,000 per year, others earn $85,000.
The income figures represent real purchasing power. Your income in World A would command a
house 10 percent larger than the one you could afford in World B, 10 percent more restaurant
dinners and so on. By choosing World B, you’d give up a small amount of absolute income in
return for a large increase in relative income.
So which would you pick? A majority of Americans, it turns out, choose World B. 78
Then consider this:
As a young man, I served for two years as a Peace Corps volunteer in Nepal. The one room house I
lived in had no plumbing or electricity, and its thatched roof leaked during heavy rains. At no
time, however, did I feel it was unsatisfactory in any way. Yet I could not live in that same house
in the U.S., even in the poorest neighborhood, without experiencing a profound sense of
humiliation.(ibid.)

78 Frank, Robert H., 'Why Living in a Rich Society Makes Us Feel Poor’, The New York Times Magazine, October 15,

2000.

47
 These behaviours seemingly violate the third assumption (c) we discussed above. But it is
merely telling us that people may value relative status more than sheer money, after a bare
subsistence is achieved. That has good evolutionary fitness reasons, the status equipping a
person to attract a better partner. Such things presumably shouldn’t matter to people who
are at peace with themselves and have their strong self-respect. But even Swamis and gurus
can be envious of those who pull more crowds. Self-knowledge doesn’t get ride of the trait of
envy, We ignore this regularity of human behaviour only at our peril.
Strategic altruism
Psychologists have conducted numerous experiments over the years and concluded that “[in]
contrast to other primates, we humans not only give and share outside our families or when
sharing proves costly, but we can get angry if someone does not” 79. Despite some concerns about
whether these experiments were conducted properly [CITE], there is a universal puzzle that
confronts game theorists, for instance, who find that the rational predictions of their models do
not eventuate (e.g. the caterpillar game-CITE). The only explanation for this is that humans
sense a super-rational self-interest, or enlightened self-interest, which allows them to appreciate
that there would be situations in which they might need to be the beneficiaries of such largesse,
and that it is therefore optimal for them, rationally, to give at lest something to others, even to
total strangers. The risk of incurring others’ wrath is perhaps the key to this behaviour.
The weakest link of all: our moral sense
James Q. Wilson believes that many of our ‘intuitions’ (like out moral sense) are hardwired –
leading to similarities across people. For instance, many moral norms seem to be held commonly
across societies. These include the belief that parents should take care of their children; taboos
against incest; and prohibitions against homicide. Future research will perhaps show us how our
(weak) moral sense leads to evolutionary fitness. While our moral sense may check our extreme
tendencies, at least in many cases, it is tenuous and intermittent:
Mankind’s moral sense is not a strong beacon light, radiating outward to illuminate in sharp
outline all that it touches. It is, rather, a small candle flame, casting vague and multiple
shadows, flickering, and sputtering in the strong winds of power and passion, greed and
ideology. But brought close to the heart and cupped in one’s hands, it dispels darkness and
warms the soul. 80
There are other regularities as well. We are similar in how we grow and develop, how we
learn, why we conform with ‘group norms’. Rewards and punishments work similarly
everywhere, too, even if the specific incentives used differ. At the philosophical level, we value
many things similarly as well: like freedom, justice, and morality (although this is simplistic; for
instance conceptions about morality are often culture-specific). We also have similar perceptions.
We can watch a movie without subtitles in a language that we don’t understand and still get the
essence of the story by merely observing the expressions and actions of the actors. In sum,
human nature is predictable to a large extent, with many common traits that everyone possesses
in almost similar ways. Indians are no different to others. Arguments that make a special case
for Indians are valid only to the extent these arguments refer to Indian institutional constraints
and historical path dependence. But such institutional constraints are not permanent and can be
modified.
It would, of course, be a gross exaggeration to claim that the laws of human nature are
perfectly regular like the laws of physics. Nevertheless, these are not to be scoffed at. All of us
respond virtually similarly to incentives, including across nations. Only human nature is
(statistically speaking) permanent. Having evolved over millions of years, human nature has not
readily changed and is likely to remain unchanged for another hundred thousand years. As
Hans Morgenthau noted, ‘Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not
changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavoured to discover

79 Gigerenzer, Gerd, Gut Feelings, London: Penguin, 2007, p.67.

80 Wilson, James Q., The Moral Sense. New York: The Free Press, 1995, p.251.

48
those laws.’ 81 All the philosophers and all the religious teachers of the world – like Moses, Jesus,
Buddha, Confucius, Lao Tse, Mohammed, Gandhi, and Indian rishis of yore – have all singularly
failed to change us. Indeed, people have often killed each other in the name of these very
teachers! Any excuse to kill is good enough for us, so desperate and blood thirst are some of us!
To hate others seems to be the highest value, the leitmotif, of our species. It is crucial, therefore,
to build a theory of society on the known facts about human nature, rather than an imagined
ideal.
In particular, human nature is a huge obstacle to the defence of our freedoms. While our
desire for a good reputation enables most daily economic and social transactions to be conducted
with mutual respect, note everyone cares about his reputation. Cheating and deception is not
rife, but not uncommon. Many otherwise reputed organisations falsify their accounts, report
half-truths to their stakeholders, under-supply, over-invoice, provide false or misleading
information to consumers, and try to present a better image of themselves than they really are.
For decades all tobacco companies continued to mislead about the dangers of the use of tobacco.
Researchers are motivated by drug companies to falsify test results in order to obtain approvals
for the sale of drugs that may either be ineffective or harmful. Mining companies often take
shortcuts on safety, thus injuring, even killing, their workers. Not all restaurants take care to
avoid spreading disease through poor hygiene, often harming their trusting customers quite
badly (I’ve been a repeated victim to such harm).
While only a few businesses are truly corrupt and dangerous, there are a lot of ‘bad eggs’ out
there. These lead to the ethical failures which are misleadingly termed by economists as ‘market’
failures. But when such things happen, the entire society is obliged to pay a price (through
regulation – which imposes costs on everyone, good or bad) for problems that are created only by
a few. Regulation imposes a further spillover cost: of potentially corrupt and ineffective
regulation. Government regulators are themselves subject to flawed human nature, leading to
unethical or incompetent outcomes often called ‘government failure’.
Achieving a free society is therefore thankless, never ending hard work. The good thing
about capitalism is that it does not make utopian or heroic assumptions about human nature. By
accepting that some people will be excessively greedy, and possibly evil, capitalism builds and
strengthens mechanisms of accountability. We will waste our time in trying to eliminate the bad
side of human nature through lectures. Instead, we should design systems to curb the expression
of this bad side. Consequently, only the good side of human nature will be allowed expression,
giving us a decent society, although at considerable expense. There is no free lunch in life.
Human nature extracts heavy costs.

6. The initial condition: State of nature

In designing a society we must keep all these complex and wide-ranging considerations in
mind. The ideal human society must be true to our deepest needs, interests, and compatible with
our reasonable and harmless behaviours. Some amount of expression of tribalism and
collectivism must perhaps be given expression, as well, through sporting events.
Armed with this knowledge, we are now ready to start building the society we want. We
need information regarding its initial condition, though. What would a ‘society’ look like and feel
without deliberate organisation? It would presumably be a state of anarchy, being the natural
order or, rather, disorder. But how do we find data on the state of nature? Two methods suggest
themselves. First, we can study humanity and human nature as we know of it today and make
deductions. Secondly, we can study primitive groups that exist today and can act as proxies for
the state of nature. Societies where modern political structures have broken down can also throw
light on this question.

81 Morgenthau, Hans J., and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New

Delhi: Kalyani Publishers, 1985, AN EARLY PAGE – CHECK.

49
6.1 Deductions from human nature
The study of human nature leads us to two basic states of nature.
Theory A: Competitive state
According to this view, people are predominantly self-seeking (in a negative sense) in the
state of nature. They are cunning, egoistical, brutal, covetous, and aggressive. 82 Our competitive
traits predominate. This belligerence leads to chronic warfare. Family, power, sexual, inter-
group, and other rivalries are rife. As war and conflict builds its own history, the inevitable cycle
of revenge leads to never-ending sordid disruption of human life. While this view is daunting
and unpleasant, it does appear to explain human history quite well. A prediction of this view
would be that a desperate demand for a strong ruler would build up; someone who could reduce
these conflicts. That, too, is confirmed even by a cursory reading of human history. Civilisation
only emerged after strong rulers established themselves and enforced the law to ensure justice
no matter how rudimentary and whimsical.
It is egotism and strategic competition that turns towards aggression. Xenophobia
(tribalism) and ethnocentricity is also part of this mix. Rivalries between neighbouring tribes for
natural (and human) resources are rife. Therefore people, including tribes, will, at times, try to
forcibly acquire the wealth that others have worked hard to produce, in the state of nature.
Plundering, historically, is a celebrated way to success.
Ancient Hindu literature believe this is a proper representation of the state of nature. Thus,
Bhishma says in the Mahabharata (a Hindu scripture written between 3000-300 BC): ‘A
kingdom in which anarchy prevails becomes weak and is soon afflicted by robbers.’ He added: ‘It
hath been heard by us that men, in days of old, in consequence of anarchy, met with destruction,
devouring one another like stronger fishes devouring the weaker ones in the water.
In the West, Niccoló Machiavelli (1469-1527) was one of the earliest proponents of such a
view. In his 1517 book, The Discourses, he wrote:
For whenever men are not obliged to fight from necessity, they fight from ambition; which is so
powerful in human breasts, that it never leaves them no matter to what rank they rise. The
reason is that nature has so created men that they are able to desire everything but are not able
to attain everything: so that the desire being always greater than the acquisition, there results
discontent with the possession and little satisfaction to themselves from it. 83
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) extended this insight further. Recognised at least by some 84
(including me) as the founder of classical liberalism, Hobbes founded his theory of political
society on the scientific observation and analysis of human nature. He thus established politics
as a science, not as a branch of fiction as it was prior to him for the most part in the West. In his
forthright and pitiless analysis, he noted the chronic competition for power in society (‘power’ to
him included wealth and status). Arising from this ‘perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power
after power, that ceaseth onely in Death’ 85, there is perpetual war ‘where every man is enemy to
every man’ 86. This leads people to seek whatever security they can with ‘their own strength, and
their own invention’. 87 In this state man sleeps like a dog, one eye open and ears always alert.
This misfortune, of war and competition, has been with us throughout human history. Thus,
A.L. Basham noted that in ancient India it was a custom that ‘[a]s soon as a king has
established himself on the throne he should, as a matter of course, attack his neighbours’. In a
similar vein, Kautilya wrote that ‘[t]he king who is weaker than “the other” should keep the
peace; he who is stronger should make war.’ 88

82 Kapur, Anup Chand, Principles of Political Science, Delhi: Premier Publishing, 1957, p.54.
83 From a translation attributed to Henry Neville, first published in 1675 and reprinted in 1772.
[http://www.constitution.org/mac/disclivy.txt]
84 Such as by Pierre Manent and John W. Danford.
85 Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, Ch. 11, Project Gutenberg. [http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext02/lvthn10.txt]
86 Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, Ch. 13, Project Gutenberg.
87 Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, Ch. 13, Project Gutenberg.
88 In Arthashastra. See Basham, A.L., The Wonder that was India, Fontana, 1971, p.127 and 126, respectively.

50
 Along with Hobbes, John Locke (1632-1704) is often acclaimed as the founder (in my view
the co-founder) of liberalism. Fearing persecution he was forced to publish his most important
book, Two Treatises of Government (1689) anonymously. He also had to flee to Holland for five
years, being able to return only after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, in motivating which his
ideas were particularly influential. In his book, Locke at first appears to criticise Hobbes by
arguing that the state of nature is not a State of War but is characterised by ‘peace, good will,
mutual assistance and preservation’ 89. In such a situation it would presumably be unnecessary
to hand over control over one’s liberties to a sovereign. However, this is merely a sleight of hand,
for soon after praising our cooperative spirit, he eases into Hobbesean conclusions, noting that
the state of nature is in fact ‘a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual
dangers’. 90 These dangers arise from chronic exposure ‘to the Invasion of others’ 91 and corruption
and ‘vitiousness of degenerate men’ 92. We therefore face both external attack as well as crime
within society.
Theory B: Cooperative state
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Karl Marx and Robert Nozick, among many others, view humanity
far more charitably, believing that we are predominantly cooperative. Peace is natural to man.
In such a cooperative and happy state of nature, the benefits of living together in a community
are widely shared. The advantages of co-operation include better division of labour, more
friendships, and shared community life including religious and cultural festivities. People can
apparently be relied on to work cooperatively without external control. They cooperate to hunt,
grow food, educate their children, and participate in cultural beliefs and festivals. Bad behaviour
is apparently only very rare and sporadic, and agreed methods of dispensing justice are used in
the rare instances where these are needed.
While cooperation is plausible for some time, I believe it is not sustainable without
deliberate organisation. Thus, Theory A above, being based on theory X of human nature, is far
more plausible than the cooperative state. The optimal state must seek to prevent the negative
effects of competition from overpowering the possibilities of cooperation.

6.2 Evidence from primitive tribes and breakdown of order

Evidence from breakdown of order suggests Theory A, not Theory B. In March 2003, Iraq
degenerated into mass looting, theft, even murder, minutes after the fall of Saddam Hussain.
Criminal elements come out from the woodworks the moment the political order breaks down
and the police are out of the way. It appears that is the costs of crime, namely punishment,
reduce, ‘rational’ criminals pull out their guns and mayhem begins. Gangsters are bide their
time patiently, waiting for an opportunity to loot. Similarly, looting from shops and people’s
homes under cover of darkness also occurs frequently in the aftermath of natural calamities –
even in modern ‘civilised’ societies.
Other evidence, from existing tribes also confirms this view. Before stringent state control
could be exercised over their delinquent behaviour, India’s North Eastern (NE) tribes lived
largely in peace within their group but engaged in frequent internecine wars. Thus, the great
scholar of NE tribes, Verrier Elwin wrote about the ‘age-old heritage of war’ in the North East
Frontier Agency, which:
meant that many villages have been established for security reasons on the tops of hills and
widely separated from each other. … The heritage of war has given the tribesmen spears,
swords, the ubiquitous and invaluable dao, the cross-bow and the ordinary bow, and has made
them good marksmen and expert hunters. …In certain tribes it has stimulated the corporate
men’s dormitories, which were originally guard-houses for warriors. 93

89Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government, Chapter III, s.19,

[http://socserv2.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/government.pdf]
90 Two Treatises of Government, Chapter IX, s.123.
91 Two Treatises of Government, Chapter IX, s.123.
92 Two Treatises of Government, Chapter IX, s.128.
93 Elwin, Verrier (1957), A Philosophy for NEFA, Shillong: G.C.Ray, p.8.

51
 Theory A wins therefore wins hands down both in the deductions made from human nature
and the test of evidence from proxies of the state of nature. Hobbes was right. The state of
nature is more likely to be violent and brutal than idyllic and peaceful.

7. Two approaches to political society

If the state of nature is punctuated by murder, rape, war and theft, how can we possibly live
in peace and bring up our children? Being devious and strategic, humans have always found
some solutions to their problems. The evidence is that the species has survived. We have
managed to live despite turmoil created by our nature. Some of these strategic methods include
the suggestions of the Hindu scripture, Srimad Bhagavatam (also known as the Bhagavad
Purana). According to this book, the tools include saama, ‘diplomacy’ or pacifying; daana, or
charity (possibly financial incentive); bheda, or the policy of divide and rule; and danda, or
punishment. 94 Machiavelli suggested that human behaviour be manipulated through money,
fear and choreographed shows of grandeur. (Stalin and Hitler were particularly adept at grand
displays.) Modern theories (principal-agent and public choice theories) make use of a range of
incentives (carrot) to elicit cooperation, and use punishments (the stick) to discourage aggressive
behaviour. 95 Many of these ideas have been absorbed into the system of capitalism which
includes the design of relevant institutions of governance.
But not all philosophers have believe in Theory A. Therefore two sharply contrasting views
about political society exist, with dramatically different prescriptions about social organisation.
The individual-centric view (capitalism) defends freedom and extends it as far as possible,
within the bounds of accountability. The society-centric view (collectivist, socialist) which takes a
rosy view of human nature ends up riding rough-shod over the individual and either glorifying
the state (Hegel) or entirely rejecting he state (anarchy). Since I will discuss libertarian anarchy
(or excessively minimal state) in Chapter 3 while discussing Robert Nozick’s views, I focus on
collectivism here.

7.1 Collectivism
Collectivism idealises the common man even as (with socialism) the wealthy are portrayed
as anti-social exploiters. But more fundamentally, collectivism treats the individual as a cog in
the wheel of society: a cog to be moulded to suit the ‘purposes’ and direction of the society, or the
wheel. Thus, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels believed in man’s innate goodness but were,
paradoxically, unwilling to trust this goodness to lead to good outcomes on their own, i.e. without
external direction. They argued that the state must actively mould its citizens (influence their
sensations) to ensure that their private interests coincide with so-called social interests:
There is no need for any great penetration to see from the teaching of materialism on the original goodness
and equal intellectual endowment of men, the omnipotence of experience, habit and education, and the
influence of environment on man, the great significance of industry, the justification of enjoyment, etc., how
necessarily materialism is connected with communism and socialism. If man draws all his knowledge,
sensation, etc., from the world of the senses and the experience gained in it, then what has to be done is to
arrange the empirical world in such a way that man experiences and becomes accustomed to what is truly
human in it and that he becomes aware of himself as man. If correctly understood interest is the principle
of all morality, man’s private interest must be made to coincide with the interest of humanity. 96
Unfortunately, theories that depend on collaboration usually lead us into all kinds of
problems. Conflict between so-called (economic) ‘classes’ and among religions and nations is
fostered by perspectives where within-group collaboration is forcibly advanced at the expense of
inter-group rivalries.
It would be perhaps useful at this stage to clarify the difference (if any) between socialism
and communism – a matter that comes up often. John Stuart Mill defined these terms, thus:

94 7.5.19, [http://srimadbhagavatam.com/7/5/19/en]
95 Jensen, M.C., and W.H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure’,
Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 1976, pp. 305−360.
96 Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels (1845), The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno Bauer

and Company. 1956 English translation is by Richard Dixon and Clement Dutts.
[http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-family/index.htm]

52
 Socialism: ‘The word Socialism, which originated among the English Communists, and was assumed
by them as a name to designate their own doctrine, is now [1849], on the Continent, employed in a
larger sense; not necessarily implying Communism, or the entire abolition of private property, but
applied to any system which requires that the land and the instruments of production should be the
property, not of individuals, but of communities or associations, or of the government.’ 97
Communism: ‘the Communistic doctrine, which forms the extreme limit of Socialism; according to
which not only the instruments of the land and capital, are the joint property of the community, but
the produce is divided and the labour apportioned, as far as possible, equally.’
Careful reflection shows that these terms are synonymous, being two shades of black. Both
prioritise the collective interests over individual interests. Both advocate, even glorify the theft
(or redistribution of property, being the same thing) of private property for social ends. Of these
two, communism has led to state-led violence (e.g. Stalin’s USSR). Socialism has led
governments to kill of people indirectly through corruption and incompetence (e.g. with India).
There is therefore not much point in laboriously distinguishing between these two, and I use
these terms interchangeably in this book.
Collectivist ideas are uniquely compatible with statism, the glorification of the state. This
perspective can perhaps best be attributed to Hegel, although he had precursors. This view
believes that we are all vicious competitors, seeking to put our own stamp on world history, and
manipulating the collective to suit our needs. ‘For him, such questions as whether the great
man, the earth-shaker, is good or virtuous or just are absolutely meaningless, and indeed petty,
for the values implied by these words are themselves created and superseded by those very
transformations of which the great man is the Herculean agent.’ 98 He urged that individuals be
reduced by the state into abstract elements of a social pattern. He celebrated ‘the authority and
power and the greatness of the State … against the whims or individual inclinations of this or
that citizen or subject’. 99 Amoral Hegelian approaches were therefore very influential in driving
collectivist manias like communism and fascism. While we may not like Hegel’s perspectives,
one thing is clear, though: varieties of liberalism or libertarianism that merely preach are
worthless and useless to mankind unless they find a way to take control of the state. What use is
preaching liberty if socialists or fascists are allowed to run the world? Liberty must not forget
some of the key, evolutionary and competitive messages of Hegel.
We must not forget that collectivism can also take religious forms. The crusades and jihads
have been among the many crimes committed against humanity. Religions also build oppressive
and unethical hierarchies like the caste system.

7.2 Individualism, or liberalism

The other perspective, classical liberalism, or capitalism in short, derives essentially from a
competitive perspective about the state of nature. It places the individual at the centre, with the
society at the periphery. Unlike Hegelian views, however, it does not promote the exploitation of
this competitiveness through mindless statism, It believes, instead, that under a good system,
people will work cooperatively even as they are being competitive. It argues there is little to be
gained and much to be lost by idealising humans or promoting mindless ‘greatness’ for the sake
of greatness. It does not glorify man as the superman unlike Hegel or Friedrich Nietzsche (‘I
teach you superman. Man is a something that shall be surpassed’ 100). The liberal does not fawn
on ‘great men’, knowing that everyone is flawed in many ways. There is none whom we can
follow uncritically; none to be trusted blindly. The theory of individualism or liberalism is the
theory of the everyday man, not of the great man. We don’t want this delusion called ‘great’ man.
We want everyone to be great, well-behaved and accountable. It is far better to be a nation of
shopkeepers than a nation of Nazi lunatics.

97 Mill, J.S., Principles of Political Economy, Chapters on Communism and Property, respectively.
98 Berlin, Isaiah, Freedom and its Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty, London: Pimlico, Random House, 2003,
p.93.
99 Ibid, p.94.
100 From, Thus Spake Zarathustra, 1883, cited in Durant, Will, The Story of Western Philosophy, London: Ernest

Benn Ltd., 1948 [1947] p.360.

53
 Capitalism focuses on building checks and balances to ensure that people can trust each
other better. And while not denying the importance of the nation state it sees it as a creature of
our convenience; definitely not an end for which we live. The state is our creation, the
government our servant. Freedom, it argues, is about moving away from collectivism to
individualism (Figure UU).
Figure UU:
Growth of freedom as the shift from collectivism to individualism

Individual at the periphery Society at the periphery

Society Individual
Total
at the theft Total
at thetheft
centre centre

Rob the ‘rich’ Partially rob the ‘rich’ State as a contract No state

Fabian Welfare Classical Liberal

Communism
socialism socialism liberalism anarchy
(Marx, Lenin, Mao)
(John Rawls – John Locke, J.S. Mill, (M.K. Gandhi,
(Harold Laski)
although he Ayn Rand Robert Nozick,
Fascism believed he was not Bastiat)
(Hitler, Mussolini) a welfare socialist)
‘Our life and liberty ‘We all seek
‘Our life, liberty, ‘Our belong to us and we to be good
and property property ‘Our talents create the state to and can
belongs to the belongs to belong to defend these through manage
state’ the state’ the state’ a contract’ without a
state’

An evaluation
Which of these world-views makes better sense? I clearly believe that classical liberalism is
the wiser of the two. I believe that socialists and communists delude themselves. We can never
have a society whose citizens put the interests of others ahead of their own interest. Nature
compels us to seek our own happiness before helping others. The happy coincidence is that in
advancing our own interests we advance the best interests of society. Self-interested behaviour
also leads to ethical outcomes, particularly when supported by a strong justice system. In the
main, our reputation drives ethical outcomes. Reliability and honesty is crucial for our
reputation. But while such ethical behaviour is often in our self-interest, it doesn’t rule out
opportunism and even crime. Always on our watch we need to be.
Further, socialism assumes that while we are good and cooperative, we are envious. That
means we care, above all, for economic equality. Of course envy is a feature of human nature.
But by focusing on the ‘demands’ of this trait, the entire society becomes rancid, a place where
success is hated, choking the life out of the society. Socialism and communism, and fascism
(various forms of collectivism) have thus been directly implicated in killing or harming millions
of people. Rudolph Rummel found that non-democratic governments – being predominantly
collectivist (whether socialist or fascist) managed to kill over 262 million people in the 20th
century. 101 I believe this estimate is too low. Millions of Indian lives have been cut short by
Nehruvian socialism through poverty that was not attended to, through poor health, poor
occupational and traffic safety, and so on. In socialist India, the mafia, the wealthy, and the
powerful (these three groups often merging into one) are almost never held to account by the
police and justice system. Bribery gets you virtually anything in India. Since I have outlined
India’s many problems at length in BFN, I won’t repeat them here. But it should always be
crystal clear that collectivist ideas invariably lead to collective suicide. Only policies of freedom
can assure us of our dignity and enable conditions that lead to prosperity.
The evaluation of these perspectives clearly leads us to liberalism. We need to observe what
people do, not what they say. I’ve not seen too much intrinsic goodness among humans. I have,

101 R.J. Rummels’ website. [http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/]

54
instead, seen a good amount of goodness motivated by the carrot and stick. Classical liberalism
is what we want. It demands that everyone should be freed to roam this world and do whatever
they wish subject only to the constraints of accountability. This emphasis on freedom and self-
determination has many implications:
• Freedom leads to prosperity. While wealth should not be the primary reason for our demand
for freedom, such are its welcome by-products. Through freedom of speech, freedom of trade,
democracy and scientific inquiry, the free society leads to a decent, even wealthy, lifestyle.
• Freedom promotes healthy competition (and also cooperation). A society needs the edge of
competition in order to advance. As Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) wrote, ‘Man wishes concord;
but nature knows better what is good for his species: and she wills discord, in order that man
may be impelled to a new exertion of his powers, and to the further development of his
natural capacities.’ 102 Freedom lets everyone put their best foot forward.
• Freedom doesn’t exhort us to change but leads to moral outcomes. It asks us not to renounce
the world. Instead, we are left free to seek our self-interest which then impels us to co-
operate with others and through the need to protect our reputation, to achieve moral
outcomes. For only by serving others’ interests can we hope to maximise our own interests.
Self-interest in this broader sense can be thought of as enlightened self-interest. It is not
about shallow selfishness or its national counterpart, mercantilism or jingoism. Enlightened
self-interest is the act of rationally evaluating the (long-term) consequences of our actions.
A deep understanding of human self-interest is vital in our leaders. Gullible pacifists can
harm by not establishing necessary checks against deception. For instance, as Morgenthau
noted, Neville Chamberlain was inspired by good motives, but ‘his policies helped to make the
Second World War inevitable, and to bring untold miseries to millions of people.’ On the other
hand, Winston Churchill was interested in ‘personal and national power, yet the foreign policies
that sprang from these inferior motives were certainly superior in moral and political quality.’ 103
Similarly, Robespierre is said to have been saint-like, but his actions (just after the French
Revolution) led to the needless loss of thousands of innocents lives. Practical and strategic
people, not dreamers, are needed to lead humanity to freedom. Having a Gandhi as the British
leader during World War II could well have decimated Britain, making Hitler the ruler of the
world. There is no guarantee that the ‘good’ will win. The strategic may.
Liberalism believes that everyone has the potential to be both good and bad. It therefore
aims for an incrementally better, never perfect, society. For perfect is the enemy of the good.
Indeed, maintaining the status quo is itself a huge challenge, given the constant pressures from
immoral people. It is a constant challenge to reduce crime through an effective law and order
machine. The society with accoutrements of liberty such as reasonable equality of opportunity,
equality under the law, free press, and tolerance, is incomparably better than other alternative
systems, even though it is never perfect in any way. That is the best we can aspire to, given
human nature.
At Nehru’s behest, the majority of my fellow countrymen came to believe that capitalism
stifles competition and empowers the rich at the expense of the poor. Also, apparently, under
capitalism, mean-minded village moneylenders charge exorbitant interest rates and squeeze out
the last drop of blood from the poor. Gandhi strengthened this mindset by suggesting that the
world has enough for everybody’s needs, but not for anyone’s greed. (He obviously hadn’t read
Julian Simon, who, of course, was born only in 1932 and wrote his magnum opus, The Ultimate
Resource, well after Gandhi was dead). Our leaders alleged that the path of property rights, free
markets and individual justice is chosen only by those who don’t care for the poor. It was argued
completely contrary to Adam Smith, who showed otherwise, that freedom and capitalism won’t
give a single loaf of bread to the poor. By falsely demonising capitalism Indians have got used to
heartbreaking and dehumanising poverty, created (or at least sustained) by socialism. BFN and
this book demonstrate unequivocally that no political system which does more for the poorest of

Immanuel Kant, cited in Durant, Will, The Story of Philosophy, London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1948 [1947], p.250.
102

Morgenthau, Hans J., and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New
103

Delhi: Kalyani Publishers, 1985, p.6.

55
the poor than capitalism. Hopefully, my books will remove the befuddlement created in the
minds of Indians by Nehru.

8. Imagining the future

It is not obvious that history has meaning, leave alone direction. Despite teleological
arguments and Hegelian hypotheses of continuous progress, there is no obvious reason to believe
that the world will inevitably become more free or happier in the future. Marx thought that
there his proposed communism was an inevitable progression over capitalism. It was not. It took
the whole world backwards and cost millions of innocents their lives. Deluded ideas of this
nature can’t be prevented from arising without constant battle in favour of freedom. The future
is not secure.
Five billion years into the future – approximately 170 million generations from now – our
Sun will burn out its entire stock of energy and become a red star first, then a white dwarf. By
then the Earth would not only have become totally uninhabitable, it would have vapourised.
Well before that, it will be high time for us to leave and find a home somewhere else – in a
somewhat similar, habitable planet: or we’ll have to transform the chemistry of some other
planet to suit our needs. Given the great scarcity of Earth-like places in the universe, this will
involve a voyage of millions of years. In the end, billions of years beyond that, it is almost certain
that even intergalactic migrations won’t help, as the universe cools down and eternal silence
descends.
Julian Simon, the optimist, did think we are now well placed to write the history of the
future the way we want it to be. ‘We now have in our hands—really, in our libraries—the
technology to feed, clothe, and supply energy to an ever-growing population for the next seven
billion years.’ 104 The great problem which he too recognised, of course, was that science or
technology don’t limit us but failures of governance do. Failures to design society that is
compatible with human nature mark humanity today. Institutions to ensure freedom with
accountability don’t exist in large parts of the world. Before we can be assured of a free and
prosperous future, we need to ensure that places like India attain good governance.
Instead of bothering about the billions of years ahead of us, we need to focus on the next few
centuries. If we don’t find ways to mitigate the risks to our survival, then a few deranged people
could well destroy us long before we truly ‘settle down’ on Earth. We can’t afford wars, given the
ready availability of nuclear weapons. We have to, instead, as Ayn Rand said, save man from
men. By overcoming the tribal man within us, man will live.
Despite all its shortcomings, the world is incredibly fortunate that USA, and not Hitler’s
Germany or Stalin’s USSR or Mao’s China gained global ascendency after the decline of the
British empire. We now watch with great trepidation the political rise of a pseudo-communist
China, a country without a strong history of freedom. A world dominated by China could find its
liberties significantly curtailed, unless China becomes free. Similarly, the world faces a serious
threat from Islamic tribalism and fanaticism.
The sooner the world is able to adopt the principles of freedom and justice, the better for
everyone. In any event, those who are richer and healthier will ultimately better survive future
challenges, and only free societies can possibly become richer and healthier. That perhaps shows
the evolutionary fitness of freedom.
But understanding freedom and justice is very hard. Emotive concepts like economic
equality and socialism grab people’s attention more quickly. The arguments in favour of freedom
are often counter-intuitive and intellectually demanding. Freedom therefore remains a relatively
recent discovery, always in danger of being lost. It took us 50,000 years to arrive at this
principle. In its absence, poverty and war, leading to ‘brutish and short lives’ was the norm.
Others oppose freedom because it gives us ‘too many’ choices and leads to incessant change,
but surely it is better to have the turbulence of ideas and choices than the certainty of violence,

104 Simon, Julian L, ‘The State of Humanity: Steadily Improving’, Cato Institute: Cato Policy Report,

September/October 1995.

56
corruption, and poverty. Freedom may not give us happiness but it won’t lead to premature
death either.
In any event, as John Stuart Mill pointed out, advances in freedom occur very slowly.
The entire history of social improvement has been a series of transitions, by which one custom or
institution after another, from being a supposed primary necessity of social existence, has
passed into the rank of a universally stigmatized injustice and tyranny. So it has been with the
distinctions of slaves and freemen, nobles and serfs, patricians and plebeians; and so it will be,
and in part already is, with the aristocracies of colour, race, and sex. 105
For instance, it was a momentous occasion when, on 4 July 1776, the American Declaration
of Independence, affirmed that ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.’ But in affirming that ‘all men are created equal’,
its authors meant only white, propertied men. Poor white men, women, and blacks (mostly
slaves then), were at least tacitly excluded. Even as this Declaration spoke about liberty its
signatories owned tens of slaves, a contradiction that might have jarred the senses at least of a
few of them in their calmer moments. But hypocrisy was rife in 1776 in the USA.
First slavery had to be comprehensively abolished in 1865. But the sunlight of freedom was
still far away for the blacks. While the 1870 (the 15th) Amendment of the US Constitution gave
male African Americans the right to vote and prohibited state or local governments from
denying this right, the states imposed obstacles (such as literacy tests, payment of poll taxes and
the like) for almost a hundred years, to prevent blacks from casting their vote. This discrepancy
between the legal rights of the blacks and what they actually experienced was finally resolved
only in 1965 with the Voting Rights Act. Similarly, Native Americans – in the original
Americans – got their vote only around 1947. On the other side of the world, Australia’s
Immigration Restriction Act, 1901 (White Australia policy) which stayed on till the 1970s.
Martin Luther King, Jr. said, ‘I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live
out the true meaning of its creed: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal”‘ [italics mine]. It took nearly 190 years from 1776 to 1965 for even the basic
equality to be given to blacks.
Despite its many failings, however, the USA has been the world’s most significant torch
bearer of liberty for the past 230 years, a haven of freedom amidst an ocean of bloodshed,
tyranny and atrocity. Yet most Western governments don’t yet fully understand the concept of
freedom. Most of them display considerable paternalism towards the ‘masses’. The more the
degrees and diplomas the people acquire the more they seem to think they have received a
licence to constrain others’ liberties, purportedly for their own good. Also, Western societies like
the UK continue with monarchy, a system totally antithetical to equal freedom.
As Hayek noted, ‘[t]here has never been a time when liberal ideals were fully realized, and
when liberalism did not look forward to further improvement of institutions.’ 106 The world
awaits an even more powerful beacon of freedom to lead. Can India step up to this task? One
way would be to use indicators of freedom as the primary measure of welfare, instead of GDP.
These indicators could be based on the pillars of freedom discussed later in this book (Initial
attempts have already been made by the Freedom House and Heritage Foundation 107). Even
though measuring freedom is fraught, its measure, howsoever imperfect, will signal a society’s
future progress, since prosperity is dependent on freedom.
Given the current feeble stage of world freedom, it may well take another 200 years or more
for policies of freedom to be more widely adopted. But things are beginning to look up. The
philosophy of freedom is beginning to be more widely voiced, heard, and appreciated (Box YY).
Box YY

105 Mill, J.S. [1861], ‘Utilitarianism’, On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, World Classics

Paperback 1991, p.200

106 Hayek, Friedrich A., ‘Why I am not a Conservative’, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago: Chicago University Press,

1960. Copy of essay available online. [http://www.fahayek.org/]

107 See [http:// freedomhouse.org/] and [http://heritage.org/]

57
 People are starting to speak out for freedom
Below are a few quotations about freedom.
• ‘We know what works: Freedom works. We know what’s right: Freedom is right. We know
how to secure a more just and prosperous life for man on earth: to free markets, free speech
about free elections and exercise of freedom unhampered by the state.’ – George Bush (Sr.)
108

• ‘The truth is found when men are free to pursue it’. – Franklin D. Roosevelt 109
• ‘Everything that is really great and inspiring is created by the individual who can labor in
freedom’. – Albert Einstein 110
• ‘Freedom is not worth having if it does not connote the freedom to err’. – M.K. Gandhi 111
• ‘Liberty is the possibility of doubting, the possibility of making a mistake, the possibility of
searching and experimenting, the possibility of saying ‘No’ to any authority - literary,
artistic, philosophic, social, and even political.’ – Ignazio Silone 112
Societies have changed dramatically, given this increased advocacy for freedom. Not only
has slavery come to an end, as noted above, racism is rapidly declining. Economic growth and
prosperity is increasing. Mankind generally lived, till around a century ago, an ignorant, violent
and fear-stricken life. Not very long ago, humans revelled in brutality towards each other and
towards animals. Public displays of brutality were treated as ‘entertainment’. In the Roman
Colosseum death by stoning, burning at the stake, breaking people at the wheel (including
breaking joints with hammers), gagging people’s tongues and chopping off body parts were part
of the customs of ‘normal’, so-called even ‘advanced’, human societies. Only now are such things
(even including bull fighting and torture of animals) slowly becoming extinct.
World security has also tended to get better, albeit inconsistently. Recall Rudolph Rummel’s
estimate 113 that 262 million people were directly killed by governments in the 20th century.
Steven Pinker arrived at a smaller figure, of ‘only’ 100 million. Whichever figure we use, these
are low in historical context. Pinker found that ‘[i]f the wars of the 20th century had killed the
same proportion of the population that die in the wars of a typical tribal society, there would
have been 2 billion deaths, not 100 million.’ 114 Wars and genocides were more common in the
past although not as vivid, given the absence of TV and the internet. The world is much less
violent today. While refinement of methodologies could change these estimates, the overall trend
of diminishing brutality is likely to remain.
Based on this, Pinker asks a different question altogether: ‘Why is there peace?’ Ruling out
the possibility of our having changed genetically significantly over the past few hundred years,
he finds that Western institutions of governance have been instrumental in reducing the
expression of our brutality. I think he underestimates the role played by philosophers of freedom
in bringing about these institutional arrangements. Also, institutions of freedom have not arisen
exclusively from ‘Western’ thought. If anything, these have emerged by reclaiming what the
West had long rejected – namely ancient Greek thought which, in turn, turns out to have been
strongly influenced by India. (It is somewhat laughable that some Western writers think that
ancient Greek thought is ‘Western’, for till as recently as 20 years ago the West looked with
racist contempt on the Greeks.) The key point is that institutions of freedom are broad-based,
arising from experiments and thoughts that involve the entire world in some way. China, India,
and even Islam (now reviled for the violence practiced by some of its followers) have played an
absolutely crucial role in the development of the ideas of freedom which blossomed, finally, in
Western Europe, more precisely in England. And never should we forget that the most powerful

108 George Bush (Sr.) in his inaugural address, 20 January 1989.

109 Franklin D. Roosevelt, in a speech at Temple University, Philadelphia, 22 February, 1936.
110 Albert Einstein (1950) in Impact.
111 M.K. Gandhi quoted in Saturday Review, 1 March 1959.
112 Ignazio Silone (1950) in The God That Failed.
113 R.J. Rummel keeps track of such data online. [http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/welcome.html]
114 In ‘Man's Inhumanity to Man’, The Age, 26 May 2007.

58
influence on peace and freedom in the 20th century was not any Westerner but an Indian named
M.K. Gandhi whose non-violent approach and firm opposition to imperialism and racism has
played an absolutely crucial role in the advance of freedom as we know of it today.
We can’t afford to be sanguine about this advance of freedom, nor reduce our battles for
freedom. The 100 (or 262, or more) million people killed in the 20th century by collectivist
ideologies in non-democratic governments are a reminder that peace on earth is still a distant
dream. These people died, and thousands continue to die today, because we failed to control the
evil, utopian elements of human society. To put an end to these mindless massacres, the entire
humankind will need to internalize the message of freedom. Good education, the advancement of
self-knowledge, and of humility will be is needed.
In BFN I outlined the many benefits of freedom. This book focuses on the theory and
institutional frameworks of the free society. Let’s now launch into the main explorations by
examining the meanings of the word ‘freedom’.

59
Chapter 2 The meanings of freedom

‘The God who gave us life gave us liberty at the same time.’ – Thomas Jefferson 1

Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid
it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty or
give me death! – Patrick Henry (American, 1736-99), March 23, 1775.

Liberty means different things to different people. At a broad level, there are two main
connotations of freedom: one that leads to self-respect, independence, and free choice; and the
other that leads to theft (and even murder) by the collective. That is quite startling: so much
variation in the meanings attributed to this word. With the former, we stand tall and proud; the
latter makes us grovel and beg. The former is the powerful protector of our life. It has got rid of
slavery and racism, and becomes, in the hands of people like Gandhi, a sudarshan chakra for
ensuring the dignity of all peoples. The latter, where it has operated, reduces people to begging –
for the ‘right’ to a job, for the ‘right’ to food.
I want a meaning of freedom I can live with and believe in. I want a conceptual framework
for which, when the time comes, I can fight for. To imagine that my interpretation of freedom
represents the only ‘true’ meaning would be beyond presumptuous: it would be arrogant, but I do
hope it will be found sufficiently clear and coherent for us to learn to tolerate each other, and to
live and prosper – together. Hence I’ll now dissect the meaning of freedom in order to extract
what is of value, and discard the rest.

1. The dictionary meanings of freedom

The English language is relatively new. These words – freedom and liberty – are also
relatively new, about seven to eight hundred years old. Both represent the same concept, and
despite pedantic debates about alleged differences 2, I use them interchangeably in this book. We
can begin by asking: What is the etymology of these words, i.e. their history? Where do they
come from? That could perhaps give us a clue about their original meaning.
Liberty comes from the Latin root, liber which comes from an earlier Italian, or Venetic,
leudheros. The free man in Rome was liberos. The Greek branch of the Italian root then led to
the word eleutheros which is in use in Greek even today to represent either of ‘to go as I wish’ or
‘citizenship in a polis’ – both strongly related to modern conceptions of liberty. A Greek
variation, eleutheria (ελευθερία), stands precisely for democracy, confirming the strong affinity
of liberty with democracy. Later European derivatives include the Italian libertà, Portuguese
liberdade, Spanish libertad, and French liberté. Anglo-Norman tribes who migrated to England
from medieval France later converted it to the English liberty. Clear the concept of liberty has a
long history.
The word freedom belongs to the Indo-European group of languages, with an equal, or even
more hoary, ancestry. The verb pri, or ‘to love’, evolved in Gothic into ‘free’ 3 and through Anglo-
Saxon migrations became the English word freedom. Its north European derivatives include:
German die Freiheit, Danish frihed, Dutch vrijheid, Icelandic frelsi or frjálsræði, Norwegian
frihet, and Swedish frihet. Hindi, with strong roots in proto-Indo-European languages, has words
closely related to this form. Priya, or beloved, is clearly related ‘to love’. But there are related

1 Jefferson, Thomas, A Summary View of the Rights of British America, 1774. University of Virginia E-text.
[http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/]
2 An example of the debates: Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel, ‘Are Freedom and Liberty Twins?’ Political Theory, 1988, 16(4).
3 See discussion in Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel, ‘Are Freedom and Liberty Twins?’ Political Theory, 1988, 16(4).

60
branches such as riha (which means to release from captivity) that takes us back to the root
meanings of freedom. (Note that riha it becomes baree in Assamese, much closer to ‘pri’).
Armed now with these clues, we can look at modern dictionary meanings of these words. I
have derived the following clusters of meaning from an examination of various English
dictionaries.
Negative liberty
1. Liberty of person; protection against abuse of power. This is about ‘civil liberty’ and
requires the absence of slavery, unnecessary detention, arbitrary exercise of authority and
physical oppression.
2. Unhampered. This is very similar, and relates to being free of restraints, i.e. being
unimpeded. It includes the capacity (including the authority and power) to act without external
interference. In a related sense, referring to looseness or openness, it means the unhampered
facility of movement. And finally, it refers to unrestricted use or access.
Positive liberty
3. Self-determination. This meaning refers to the capacity or power to choose, and therefore
exercise one’s free will. It includes self-rule (as a society) and the ‘right to be a participant in
government’ (Hannah Arendt 4).
These three groups of meaning reasonably approximate the commonly understood meanings
of freedom. If either of these are taken out of context, however, these meanings can contradict
each other. In particular, the concept of freedom must be integrated with accountability, else it
degenerates quickly into license. We are never ‘free’ to steal, pollute, kill, hold slaves, or libel.
Freedom and justice go hand in hand.
There are a few other meanings as well, that don’t concern us. The first of these relates to
the political independence of nations. Thus, when people talk of India’s ‘freedom’ movement, or a
book is entitled, Freedom at Midnight, the reference is to national independence, not to someone
running about freely on the streets at midnight. I won’t talk much about this connotation in this
book because independence has little or nothing to do with freedom. Stalin’s Russia, Mao’s
China, and Nehru’s India were all independent but their people were definitely not free.
Freedom can also relate to ‘an exemption from unpleasant or onerous conditions’.
Unfortunately, this meaning often gets used in very misleading ways in political discourse. We
should remember that etymologically such usage is closer to the Latin apathia or Greek apatheia
(referring to ‘freedom’ from suffering), and has nothing to do with the root meanings of freedom.
For instance, Amartya Sen refers to poverty as unfreedom, believing that ‘economic unfreedom,
in the form of extreme poverty, can make a person a helpless prey in the violation of other kinds
of freedom.’ 5 But this interpretation is wrong. Freedom does not mean ‘freedom from poverty’.
Slavery is unfreedom, of course; not poverty. Indeed, only unfree societies generate poverty.
Unfreedom is therefore the cause of poverty, and by no stretch of imagination the same thing as
poverty! If poverty were a test of freedom, we could test it on Amartya Sen by enslaving him
while giving him the food and shelter he needed to survive. That might make Sen feel a bit more
‘free’ and happy according to his definition, but no one else will be bought so easily!

4 Cited in Barber, Benjamin R., ‘Shrunken Sovereign: Consumerism, Globalization, and American Emptiness’, World
Affairs, Spring 2008.
5 Amartya Sen’s autobiography at the Nobel Prize website.

[http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1998/sen-autobio.html]

61`
 Figure HH Food without freedom is pointless.
Unlike some economists, we are not farm chicken. 6
To clarify further, consider ‘freedom from hunger’, a phrase bandied about carelessly these
days. Note that nature has ordained that each creature that has been created must find its own
food: there is no free lunch. Manna doesn’t drop from Heaven. Only death can therefore ‘free’ a
living creature from hunger, but surely that is not what people mean by asking for freedom from
hunger. This approach imposes obligations on society to feed the hungry, but that is wrong. Yes,
we must feed the hungry but as part of a well-designed social insurance scheme that provides
equal opportunity, a concept based on equal freedom, and which requires significant work to
operationalise through an appropriate social contract, not because anyone has any ‘right’ to
‘freedom from hunger’. Making it into a right encroaches on the real right, to freedoms.
This is not just semantics, for such meanings can quickly lead to the demand for an alleged
‘right’ to work, which then implies a job should fall onto our lap regardless of our suitability, or
effort. But not only must we meet job requirements, we must also wait to be asked to provide a
particular service. We can’t barge into someone’s factory and demand to be put to work, for that
would violate the employer’s freedom to undertake his livelihood by hiring only those whom he
finds suitable. The concept of freedom as ‘an exemption from unpleasant or onerous conditions’ is
therefore deeply flawed, and we must reject it outright. In general, advocates of rights quickly
become the greatest enemies of liberty. As Edmund Burke said, ‘by having a right to everything
[men] want everything’ 7.
While we are examining the meanings of words, we can also examine the significant word,
capitalism. This word was not created by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, or Adam Smith (Smith
called his system of wealth generation the ‘system of natural liberty’). It would appear that the
utopian, William Godwin, first used this term in 1793 when he wrote, ‘The landed proprietor
first takes a very disproportionate share of the produce to himself; the capitalist follows, and
shows himself equally voracious.’ 8 Karl Marx used this word, capitalist, in this pejorative sense
in his Communist Manifesto, claiming that capitalists enslave labour through machines and
‘overlookers’, and ‘[t]he more openly this despotism proclaims gain to be its end and aim, the
more petty, the more hateful and the more embittering it is.’ Marx then coined the word
capitalism in his book, Capital (Volume 1, 1867) as shorthand to refer disparagingly to the based
entrepreneurial and industrial system of free markets, a system he staunchly opposed. Since it
would have sounded bad to say that he opposed ‘natural liberty’, so he coined capitalism, a word
on which he successfully smeared a lot of mud.
Today, however, we know that the system of natural liberty is the greatest friend of workers,
and the word capitalism is the best short-hand to describe it. Ayn Rand and Milton Friedman,
among many others used it extensively in this sense during the 20th century. Regardless of its
dubious origins, this word now bears strong connotations of freedom and prosperity. I therefore

6 Even chicken perhaps do not deserve to be kept in such conditions, either.

7 Burke, Edmund, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p.151 [CHECK]
8 William Godwin in Book VI: Of Opinion Considered as a Subject of Political Institution, of his book, Enquiry

Concerning Political Justice, published in 1793.

62
use it extensively to represent the system of natural liberty. In giving direct battle to socialism,
capitalism destroys it like a potent missile would. And as I have repeatedly emphasised, the
word capitalism does not refer to a system of exploitation. There is no unbridled capitalism. 9

2. Further exploration of the meaning of freedom

We can now begin a more detailed inquiry into the concept of freedom. Rousseau famously
said that ‘Man is born free, yet he is everywhere in chains.’ 10 But Victor Frankl argued the
opposite (after his bitter personal experience in Hitler’s concentration camps): ‘Everything can
be taken from a man but ... the last of the human freedoms – to choose one’s attitude in any
given set of circumstances, to choose one’s own way.’ We are presumably ‘free’ in some way even
when bound in chains. So who exactly is right? To address this issue we must need to demarcate
the various types of freedom.

2.1 Inner vs. outer freedom

First, note that our actions can be of two types: voluntary or involuntary. Freedom
meaningfully applies only to things over which we exercise some control, in other words, only to
our voluntary actions. Thus, we may not be free (unless we maser special yogic skills) to control
our heart’s beating, or our thoughts (and in some cases, even actions such as sleep-walking)
during sleep.
Of these voluntary actions, some only affect us. They, however, may affect others, as well.
Thus, our private thoughts during a quiet walk in a remote jungle, or brushing our teeth in the
morning, are purely inner-oriented. These neither interact with nor impact others, at least not
directly. Victor Frankl was talking about these voluntary inner actions and thoughts. Even in
solitary confinement we are free to choose our attitude and inner self (although this does require
great strength of character). For most of us, this is an untested proposition, but we hope that
Frankl was right. Indeed, on a more routine basis, how we use this inner freedom forms a
crucial part of our physical and mental well-being.
J.S. Mill spoke about this freedom when he talked of the ‘inward domain of consciousness;
demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling;
absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific,
moral, or theological.’ This includes, ‘liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life
to suit our own character; of doing as we like’ so long as it affects only us.
I exclude the consideration of inner freedom in this book, for what one thinks or pursues in
such manner is purely personal, and nothing should, indeed, can, limit its extent, at least in
matters that are purely of a mental character. Thus, Charles Darwin can think anything he
likes but it concerns us only when he publishes his opinions: and thus acts to inform or influence
others. At that stage that freedom needs to be examined by society and appropriate limits
established. Of course, as with any artificial classification, many boundary problems exist.
Distinguishing between inner and outer freedoms is difficult where actions that are intended to
impact only on us also start impacting on others. Smoking is one such example, but self-harm,
more generally, falls into this category.

9 See my article, ‘Unbridled Capitalism’, published in Freedom First in October 2009.

10 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, The Social Contract, 1762.

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 Free Totalitarian
society society

Outer
freedom Level of
(interactions

y
freedom

tar
with others)

lun
Vo
Inner freedom
Actions directed at oneself
(e.g. eating, exercising) – out of scope
ry
nta

Irrelevant to a discussion on freedom

olu

(e.g breathing, sleeping)

Inv

Choice, and therefore freedom, not applicable

Figure YY: Freedom only exists meaningfully in our relationships with others

Figure YY clarifies that freedom is always found (even in some truncated form) in all
societies (except where we happen to be a Robinson Crusoe marooned on an island). Coercive
forces of the government and even widely accepted social norms automatically limit our
freedoms. That is what Rousseau meant when he suggested that we are born free but are
everywhere in chains. He suggested, though, that if we create these chains ourselves then we are
presumably free! But no social contract should chain us. As well, the option to exit must be
included in the contract (noting that exit is not always easy, but out-migration or secession have
almost universally been available to mankind). In the end, all that the citizen of a free society
can hope is to asymptotically revert to the level of freedom he was born with.
In fact, we choose, through a social contract, to reduce our maximal possible freedoms in
order for everyone else to achieve the optimal level of equal freedom – a level where our
freedoms don’t reduce other people’s freedoms. As Montesquieu wrote, ‘In a true state of nature,
indeed, all men are born equal, but they cannot continue in this equality. Society makes them
lose it, and they recover it only by the protection of laws.’ 11 The question is therefore all about
the recovery of our freedoms from the state and society. This book focuses on eliminating any
unnecessary reductions in our freedoms.

2.2 Negative vs. positive liberty

Since I have already touched upon the meaning of these two forms of liberty already, we can
now proceed to a detailed exploration of this extremely significant distinction that applies to our
external liberty.
2.2.1 Liberty of person and the absence of unnecessary constraints (negative liberty)
The liberty of person is the most fundamental meaning of freedom. This is a sharp
distinction between bondage and freedom. Thus, in ancient Greece a free citizen was sharply
distinguished from slaves. 12 Isaiah Berlin noted that the ‘fundamental sense of freedom … [is]
freedom from chains, from imprisonment, from enslavement by others. The rest is an extension
of this sense.’ 13 He included in his concept of negative liberty the absence of coercion, where
‘[c]oercion implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I
could otherwise act.’ This is precisely what David Hume (1711-76) meant when he wrote:
By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the
determinations of the will; this is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move,

11 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, Bk. VIII, Ch. 3.

12 Discussed further in Patterson, Orlando, Freedom in the Making of Western Culture, New York: Basic Books, 1991.
13 Cited in Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel, ‘Are Freedom and Liberty Twins?’, Political Theory, 1988, 16(4), p.544.

64
 we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is
not a prisoner and in chains. Here, then, is no subject of dispute. 14
Negative liberty is an extremely strong condition. For instance, being outside the four walls
of a prison is not enough. Even threats to reduce our freedom are an act of coercion. The ever
present threat, in communist Russia, of being separated from one’s family and sent to Gulag is
an example. Wary of state-based coercion, we become subservient to authority, thus destroying
the very possibility of freedom. The entire society becomes a prison. People under such duress do
things they do not want to. Our private and public preferences and beliefs no longer match. 15
‘Unforeseen’ political revolutions, like the 1991 break up of the USSR, are an outcome of this
dissonance; an outcome of the unrelenting will to freedom. Decades of suppression do not destroy
or even diminish the human will.
Countries like China, Cuba, Myanmar, North Korea, Saudi Arabia and Iran are ripe for
revolution, which will inevitably occur, albeit in ways unpredictable. The miserable dictators
who have imprisoned Aung San Suu Kyi for over fourteen years are merely buying time. Their
fate was sealed the day they denied basic freedoms to the people of Myanmar.
It is not physical coercion alone that we object to. We don’t want to be prevented from setting
up our business and trading with others, or fixing the price for the services or goods we may
choose to provide, or living in any city within our country, or marrying whom we wish. John
Locke (1632-1704) thus recognised that people need the ‘perfect freedom to alter their Actions,
and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of
Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man.’ 16
Freedom means being able to flap one’s ‘wings’ without colliding with other’s ‘wings’. To be
free to act is to be free to choose 17 and to receive the consequences of our choices. This includes
the freedom to invent new choices, new ideas, new objects, and products. The state can’t be
allowed to restrict our political views (India unfortunately only allows socialists to contest
elections 18). We can’t be free if we can’t create our theory of society. We can’t be free if we are
compelled to hold beliefs that our parents (society) hand down to us. To be free nothing must
constrain us, not even tradition. Freedom is not merely the absence of any physical, social, or
political barrier, it is the absence of any barrier to our innate humanity. Freedom to act, in its
fullest, widest and most complete range, must be our minimum negotiating position in political
society. No constraint can be placed on us except on the grounds of accountability.
Having complete freedom not merely empowers us; it allows life energy to course freely
through our veins, it allows us to experience the wholesomeness of life. Only then can we seek
our own purposes. This is a fiercely independent, self-reliant world-view. We are deeply offended
by those who offer us charity when we are able to feed and clothe ourselves, no matter how
feebly or scantily, with our own effort. To those with such unwanted intentions of charity we
command: ‘Begone you heedless destroyer of freedom! Don’t demean us with charity. You don’t
owe us anything. Impart us the knowledge (should that be something you have) and let us
thereafter seek our own fortune. We want our own respect first and foremost, no matter how we
choose to live. We will find our way. Let us make our own destiny, unaided. Let us take risks
and make our own mistakes.’
If we happen to be particularly unlucky, we may not have much choice but to hold out our
hands for help. But were we to do so, our soul would desert us and a beggar’s soul enter in its
place. I don’t want to imply that beggars, some hapless and suffering despite their having spared
no effort, and others well-fed like the Indian bureaucrats and politicians who sell India’s soul to

14 Hume, David, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, chapter 8.

15 Kuran, Timur, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification, Cambridge: Mass.
Harvard University Press, 1995.
16 Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government, Book II, para 4.
17 Are our actions determined by forces outside our control or do we ‘really’ choose them? I would agree with S.

Radhakrishnan (in his An Idealistic View of Life) that ‘It makes little difference whether the self is moved from
without or from within.’ There is a bustling literature on metaphysical issues surrounding the self, freedom, cause and
consequence.
18 The law in India forbids political parties which are not avowedly socialist.

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world organisations, begging for food or money – are not human. But surely something
important, the spark of tough and resilient pride in one’s independent being, must elude all
beggars. Beggary can never attract the free man who would always prefer to die than to beg. [On
these lines I discuss the problems with the White Man’s Burden (foreign aid) in chapter 13, and
show why foreign aid is abominable from first principles.]
2.2.1 Self-determination and self-realisation (positive liberty)
The other kind of ‘liberty’, as we have already noted, is the so-called positive liberty – but
there is nothing really positive about it. It is about the things we would want to do were we not
chained. It refers to our powers of self-determination and self-expression. As Isaiah Berlin notes,
positive liberty ‘derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master.’
Obviously, one can’t dispute the broad intent of this concept. After all, we do want to determine
our fate and choose our own values. Self-determination is pivotal to liberty, being the obverse of
paternalism. We definitely don’t want to be shielded from our follies, for as Herbert Spencer
noted: ‘The ultimate result of shielding men from the effects of folly is to fill the world with
fools.’ 19
But there is something even more important. What we do with (negative) liberty thorough
our self-determination is a matter exclusively for us to consider. It may lead us to self-
realisation, self-knowledge and greater self-awareness. Or it may lead us to perdition. Whatever
it does, we must be the one to decide, no one else. While I may believe that setting challenging
goals for ourselves could help us steadily tend towards wisdom, what each of us does with our
freedom must always remain a private matter for each one of us. We must be permitted to meet
the challenges of life, to discriminate between various choices, and to take responsibility for
ourselves, and our families. Nature made us into self-sufficient beings. Let us all ensure that our
liberty to be whatever we wish to be, is defended,
So far so good. The problem with positive liberty is the belief that additional intervention is
needed by the state to help us achieve our goals. But the state can have no role in our lives
beyond ensuring our security and negative liberty, and perhaps a modicum of equal opportunity.
Unfortunately, many people believe that we should provide conditions to enhance people’s
capability for self-determination. They argue that without eliminating all intellectual,
psychological, and economic handicaps, people cannot genuinely master their destiny, and
therefore, the society must apparently ensure positive conditions of liberty.
While it is legitimate claim to a modicum of equal opportunity does exist in a free state
(including basic education and emergency health care for all), we must resist with our greatest
might the going overboard of the state towards welfarism and statism, for such extensions
conflict directly with true (negative) liberty. Even simple things like making school education
compulsory impinges on parental liberty to not educate their children if that is what they want
to do. Indeed, for tens of thousands of years, parents were not or forced to educate their children
– there were no schools in the first place. Just because we now have schools, doesn’t mean we
can criminalise the choice of those parents who don’t want to send their children to schools.
Persuade them, but not coerce them. Let there be no culture of coercion in a free society. Instead,
people ought to learn and grow.
For coercion is paternalism, and paternalism is statism, the opposite of liberty. Things can
become seriously dangerous at that stage. It was Rousseau who, with his battle cry for ‘liberty
equality, fraternity’, founded the school of thought that glorifies while ending up, through a
series of false deductions, authorising the collective to determine what is good for the individual.
Hegel followed this route even further, and soon this line of thinking became more and more
amoral, delinked from any ethical considerations about the value of life. This stream of positive
liberty motivated Marx, Lenin, Nietzsche and Heidegger, these statist and power-focused views
leading to some of the most significant collectivist massacres in human history.

Spencer, Herbert, Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative, vol. 3, 1891, STATE-TAMPERINGS WITH MONEY
19

AND BANKS. [First published in The Westminster Review for January 1858]. [http://bit.ly/dpgYvt]

66
 For instance, Marx opposed the concept of rights on the ground that the French Declaration
of the Rights of Man ‘legitimised the “withdrawal” of bourgeois man from society, thereby
undermining his communal life and eroding his civil responsibilities.’ He wrote, along with
Engels:
If man is unfree in the materialistic sense, i.e., is free not through the negative power to avoid
this or that, but through the positive power to assert his true individuality, crime must not be
punished in the individual, but the anti-social sources of crime must be destroyed, and each man
must be given social scope for the vital manifestation of his being. 20
From this stated goal – of taking us towards our ‘true individuality’ – followed, however, the
statist superstructure of communism with its disastrous consequences. We must sun positive
liberty like the plague. Yes, by all means people should experience positive liberty, but that is
their life-long personal enterprise. It is not for the state to force such things down people’s
throats.

3. A definition of freedom
Different writers have highlighted different aspects of liberty, either negative or positive.
Most of their explanations of freedom, as we shall soon see, are associated with a variety of
shortcomings. Consider definitions that emphasise negative liberty.
Milton Friedman said: ‘The essence of political freedom is the absence of coercion of one man
by his fellow men.’ 21 This definition, however, fails to spell out the critical importance of
accountability and can, if taken literally, prevent us even from detaining murderers.
So let’s try Lord Acton’s definition: ‘By liberty I mean the assurance that every man shall be
protected in doing what he believes his duty against the influence of authority and majorities,
custom and opinion.’ 22 But doing what we believe is our duty need not be always defensible.
Hitler could well have believed it to be his ‘duty’ to kill Jews. The critical importance of
accountability is missing from the equation.
Consider now those who emphasise positive liberty. William Howard Taft’s definition is that
‘Liberty is the means in the pursuit of happiness.’ 23 While this is a simple definition, it takes a
rather instrumentalist approach, nor does it refer to the crucial importance of negative liberty.
Whose pursuit of happiness are we talking about, anyway? Socialists would like us to live only
for others’. At a more fundamental level, a ‘happy’ slave (someone who wants to be a slave)
might believe that his happiness is achievable only through slavery. No free society could allow
this, for it would contradict the basic (re: negative) meaning of liberty. Worse, Hitler may find
his happiness only in the mass-killing of Jews. This definition is a disaster.
Consider Giuseppe Mazzini’s definition: ‘Liberty, misunderstood by materialists as the right
to do or not to do anything not directly injurious to others, we understand as the faculty of
choosing, among the various modes of fulfilling duty those most in harmony with our own
tendencies.’ 24 Tacit in this view is a socially approved set of ‘duties’ (or else, how can we know
what freedom is?) and socially endorsed ways of selecting those ‘in harmony with our own
tendencies’. If we were free to create duties ourselves and choose among them then this view is
consistent with an individual-centric perspective of liberty. But Mazzini seems to be trying to get
the society to define our duties for us. If so, we are in trouble, for as J.S. Mill cautioned us: ‘The
only purpose for which power can be rightly exercised over any member of a civilised community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a

20 Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels (1845), The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno Bauer
and Company. 1956 English translation is by Richard Dixon and Clement Dutts.
[http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-family/index.htm]
21 Milton Friedman, The New Liberal's Creed: Individual Freedom, Preserving Dissent Are Ultimate Goals (1961)

[CHECK – got from wiki]

22 John Emerich Edward Dalberg, Lord Acton, The History of Freedom and Other Essays, ed. John Neville Figgis and

Reginald Vere Laurence (London: Macmillan, 1907). [http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/75]. Chapter 1.

23 In a speech in Fresno, California, 10 October 1909.
24 In On the Unity of Italy (1861).

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sufficient warrant.’ 25 We really need only one thing above all – to be left alone. We will define
our duties (if any) and choose what we do (or don’t). It is not Mazzini’s or anyone else’s business
to tell us what these duties should be. Mazzini’s liberty in paternalistic, and must be shunned.
Better definitions than these exist, but these too are inadequate. Consider J.S. Mill’s view:
‘The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursing our own good in our own way, so
long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.’ 26 No
doubt this is good, but it places insufficient emphasis on our social relationships and it doesn’t
tell us how we will determine whether our free actions deprive others of their freedom. While we
may not want to deprive others of their liberty, they may inadvertently get harmed, or feel
harmed. For instance, I am free to eat and sell beef. But am I also free to establish a beef shop
outside a Hindu temple? Where are we to draw a line? Can a liquor vendor or brothel be
established just outside a school gate? Mill’s definition fails to limit freedom and becomes almost
libertarian in its vision.
And yet, Mill also believes that ‘as one criterion of the goodness of a government, the degree
in which it tends to increase the sum of good qualities in the governed, collectively and
individually’ 27. This is a paternalistic view and indeed informs at least part of the ‘progressive’ or
positive liberty perspectives of Mill, which then violates the requirements of negative liberty.
And so let me list below (without comment) a few other definitions that seem to be broadly
valid, but fail, upon critical examination, to persuade, being insufficient, incomplete, or
unsatisfactory, particularly when considered in the broader context of the author’s writings.
• J.S. Mill: ‘The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a
nuisance to other people.’ 28 Also: ‘The individual is not accountable society for his actions, in
so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself’ 29, and ‘for such actions as are
prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subject either
to social or legal punishment, if society is of the opinion that the one or the other is requisite
for its protection’. 30
• F.A. Hayek: ‘Liberty not only means that the individual has both the opportunity and the
burden of choice; it also means that he must bear the consequences of his actions. ... Liberty
and responsibility are inseparable.’ 31
• Abraham Lincoln: ‘My faith in the proposition that each man should do precisely as he
pleases with all which is exclusively his own lies at the foundation of the sense of justice
there is in me.’ 32 Elsewhere, he wrote: ‘Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for
themselves.’
• Frederick Nietzsche: ‘Then what is freedom? It is the will to be responsible to ourselves’. 33
• Walt Whitman: ‘The shallow consider liberty a release from all law, from every constraint.
The wise see in it, on the contrary, the potent Law of Laws’ 34
• Daniel Webster: ‘Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint.’ 35
And so, without further ado, let me re-introduce my definition which I’ve already unveiled in
the introductory chapter. It is based on the analysis so far, as well as some of the discussions to
be held in the next couple of chapters. Aspects of this definition will therefore become clearer
only after the reader completes chapter 4. My definition focuses on negative liberty and self-

25 In his On Liberty (1859).

26 Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty, 1859.
27 Mill, J.S. [1861], ‘Considerations on Representative Government’, On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford

University Press, World Classics Paperback 1991, p.227.

28 Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty, 1859.
29 Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty, 1859.
30 Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty, 1859, Chapter 5.
31 In his 1960 The Constitution of Liberty.
32 Abraham Lincoln in a speech in Poria, Illinois, 16 October 1854
33 ‘Skirmishes in a War with the Age’ in Twilight of the Idols (1888)
34 Walt Whitman (1881) in ‘Freedom’, Notes Left Over.
35 Daniel Webster in a speech at the Charleston Bar, 10 May 1847.

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direction, with an exceptionally strong emphasis, rarely found in any key thinker on liberty, on
accountability. This emphasis is significant since I believe this aspect has rarely been given the
pre-eminence it deserves. To the extent any of my work is original, it is perhaps this: the highly
focused emphasis on accountability. Liberalism matters little to me if liberals behave unethically
and unaccountably.
This definition also outlines the process for arriving at the relevant accountabilities. While
this definition is longwinded, I believe anything less will mislead. Wherever, therefore, I refer to
freedom, I always intend it to be used in this holistic sense.
Freedom is a state of independent, self-directed thought and self-determined but self-restrained
voluntary action of adults whose behaviour, such as the ability to trade, demonstrates strategic
capability and thus at least a modest level of rational thought. Where this state of freedom
impacts on others, it is limited by countervailing accountabilities informed both by moral law as
variously understood and relevant empirical evidence; and agreed upon either through implicit
or explicit bilateral understandings of negotiation or, where potential claims can be made on a
society’s resources, through social consent usually evinced through laws.
While I explore aspects of this definition in Chapters 3 and 4, a few initial remarks are
perhaps in order. This definition gives us the principles by which the meaning and boundaries of
freedom can be determined. It also summarises the processes relevant to ensuring our freedoms.
It makes note that a free citizen will generally live in self-restraint either (a) on purely moral
grounds, in order, for instance, to live the ‘right life’ (deontological morality); or (b) because the
good reputation consequent to self-restraint will improve his opportunities in life (this being
consequential, or strategic, morality).
However, it also acknowledges that these forces may not be enough. It is not sufficient (nor
indeed acceptable) to exhort people to behave with wholesome self-restraint. We need social
frameworks that accept only good behaviour, failing which penalties are imposed. The society’s
governance system must complement our natural tendencies towards self-restraint. The
definition therefore highlights the importance of the social norms and the system of laws even
which create a secondary, but strong, incentive for self-restraint. This system of accountabilities
broadly consistent with moral law must, of course, be created only through our consent.
The definition also talks about potential claims that may be made by someone on a society’s
resources. This suggests that our choice to harm ourselves can generally not be subject to social
intervention unless, upon having harmed ourselves, we demand that others (taxpayers) pay up
in order to ‘fix’ us. Over-eating, excessive drinking, or addictive listening to loud music are
behaviours where a society can’t intervene so long as we commit to paying the full cost of the
harm we cause ourselves. The moment drunkards and drug addicts start expecting the taxpayer
to pay for their operation for their rehabilitation or operating on their cirrhosis of the liver, then
all such freedoms (for self-harm) must end. At that point, the society is obliged to intervene with
the liberty of everyone who drinks excessively, given the difficulty of distinguishing between
those who will pay for themselves and those who won’t. The society can impose penalties on
everyone who drinks excessively (and definitely those who drink in excess and drive).
Our freedom is never absolute. We have no right to others’ resources, particularly of those
who exercise self restraint and work hard to earn their livelihood. The grasshopper cannot make
claims on the ant, else the ants will need to regulate all grasshoppers. Where citizens do not
exercise self-restraint and, instead, latch on to taxpayer support, the state must necessarily
become a nanny. This is the moral hazard problem, due to which in most cases the state grows
larger than it should. People cheat. The appropriate level of governmental interference needed in
any particular case must be evidence-based.
We are obliged to mind the effects of our actions on others. We may, for instance, verbally
criticise someone or his beliefs, but only to the extent that our claims are accurate.
Demonstrating a modicum of respect for others is essential. It is therefore reasonable to regulate
the time and place for certain types of human expression or action. The use of foul language can
thus be proscribed for TV programmes meant for children, but such language must be tolerated
(not welcomed) in pay TV programmes rated for adults. Similarly, a flimsily clad woman can
dance on a table in a nightclub but not on the table of a Supreme Court judge.
69`
 With the greater spread of the principles of freedom, self-restraint and personal
responsibility will perhaps become more widespread. At that stage, governments will perhaps
only need to maintain a watching brief, as a night watchman. What a boost that will give to
human productivity! But one shouldn’t hold one’s breath. This is unlikely to happen any time
soon.

4. The challenge of ensuring a free society

The capitalist society doesn’t arise naturally – unlike the belief of anarcho-capitalists.
Capitalism generates obvious benefits for everyone, and if we were all perfectly rational, this
would perhaps actually occur, but human nature prevents this from happening. Ideologies like
socialism, communism, and fascism are key barriers, along with various social and religious
norms and beliefs. And governments, of course, often create barriers to freedom. Table CC lists
some of the barriers to freedom, reminding ourselves that the existence of a particular barrier
does not necessarily give the government a role in addressing it.
Table CC. Illustrative barriers to freedom (particularly in India)
Choice Freedom thwarted Barrier to freedom Primary role in
removing barrier
To become - bonded labour Social customs, Social reformers
educated; to - child labour ignorance; poverty
study
- girls prevented from studying
Religious - people killed if they do not convert to a Misguided religious Social reformers
belief particular religion leaders
- Harijans prevented by force from Misguided religious
converting to Buddhism or other religions fanatics
Selecting our - opposition leaders arrested or killed Dictators of all types Civil society
political - ballot boxes stuffed and booths captured Government
leaders
- families exercise control as monarchies Powerful dynasties Civil society
Social events - Valentine’s Day cards burnt; those Misguided political Social reformers
observing this event threatened groups
Books to read; - direct or indirect censorship of literature Many governments Civil society
movies to and art to appease politically vocal and across the world
watch violent groups
Occupation or - punitive actions against members of the Religious scriptures Social reformers
livelihood ‘lower caste’ if they gain knowledge
Freedom of - Harijans prevented from drinking from Members of the so- Social reformers
movement the village well or entering temples called ‘high castes’
Clothes to - women threatened with violence if they Some student Social reformers,
wear wear ‘non-traditional’ attire organisations in NE Government
India
- Muslim girls prohibited from wearing a Governments in Social reformers
head-dress. France and Turkey
Whom to - inter-caste or inter-religion marriages Fanatic followers of Social reformers
marry opposed, often viciously some religions
J.S. Mill was perhaps the first to point out in his essay, On Liberty, that not only the stats,
but even society, through its social norms, adversely impacts our liberty. In BFN, however, I
showed clearly that the role of social reformer and government must always be kept separate. In
this book I do talk about social reforms (e.g. the elimination of the caste system) but I d not
envisage a direct role for the government in actually implementing the reforms. Its role should
be to ensure equal opportunity under the law, particularly in areas of government employment.
As far as the rest of the society is concerned, it is a matter for social reforms to address. Of

70
course, like Mill advocated, the state can ensure tolerance, which is a partial solution to social
tyranny, through the law.
Most of the focus in this book is on the role of the government in ensuring and enforcing
individual accountability. By regulating workplaces for safety and punishing employers for
negligence, capitalist societies reduce unnecessary injuries and death. The rates of injury among
workers in capitalist societies are therefore far lower than comparable rates in socialist societies.
Similarly, by regulating the sale of food, the production, sale and use of potentially dangerous
chemicals, and ensuring prudential regulation of banking and insurance, the capitalist society
minimises harm and foul play, clarifying the limits of our freedom.
The abuse of power by businesses is relatively mild, however. Abuse of power by the
politically powerful remains the greatest threat to our freedoms. As Hayek noted, ‘The power
which a multiple millionaire, who may be my neighbour and perhaps my employer, has over me
is very much less than that which the smallest fonctionnaire possesses who wields the coercive
power of the state, and on whose discretion it depends whether and how I am to be allowed to
live and work.’ 36 He elaborated that: ‘The greatest danger to liberty today comes from the men
who are most needed and most powerful in modern government, namely, the efficient expert
administrators exclusively concerned with what they regard as the public good.’ 37 Our rulers can
become our greatest enemies.
The politically powerful, heady in their own self-importance, often become disrespectful of
the ‘masses’. So-called VIPs in India with their flashing red lights block traffic to get precedence
in the traffic over others. For someone who is seriously ill, getting stuck in the traffic jam under
such circumstances can mean the difference between life and death. Further, many Indian
Ministers and bureaucrats allow their cars to be driven at reckless speed on narrow village
roads, often killing or maiming people, even as their masked bodyguards bark out arrogantly:
‘Hey you stray dog, get out of the way!’ (‘or get crushed under the carcade!’). And the chronic
corruption in Indian politics and government is well documented. The government literally
treats the property of Indians as a personal fiefdom. And demagogues are becoming the norm:
those who threaten violence against political opponents and even entire social groups. Political
power has rarely been exercised benevolently, and oppression is typical in most pre-modern
societies. We must always be wary of political leaders. We can’t let our guard down.
I now move on to a discussion of the theory and institutions of freedom. These will include a
discussion of how one can prevent tyranny.

36 Hayek, in his 1944 The Road to Serfdom.

37 Hayek, in his 1960 The Constitution of Liberty

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Chapter 3 Two modern theories of justice and freedom

[A] right to life is not a right to whatever one needs to live; other people may have rights over
these other things – Robert Nozick 1
‘To employ the coercive apparatus of the state in order to maintain manifestly unjust
institutions is itself a form of illegitimate force that men in due course have a right to resist.’ –
John Rawls 2

A theoretical discussion of freedom should perhaps consider existing theories first, before
attempting a new or revised model. I believe that two moral and political philosophers are
particularly worth exploring in the context of what I’m going to advocate. One, John Rawls
(1971), stands within the so-called social liberal or ‘modern’ liberal tradition, to the ‘left’ of what
I stand for. The other, Robert Nozick (1974), stands within the libertarian, even anarcho-
libertarian tradition, to the ‘right’ of what I believe is the appropriate position. Both these have
been pre-eminent in the proposals they have made in the 20th century, and while I could have
simply discussed Locke and Hayek, for instance, whose views I generally support, and which
represent what is best known as classical liberalism, I think there is great value in critiquing
Rawls and Nozick, for in doing so I aim to tease out issues that will inform my far subsequent,
far more cogent theory of freedom. Before focusing on these two, a brief overview of the main
philosophers and theorists of freedom would perhaps help set the scene.

1. Overview of the theories of freedom

Classical liberalism has precursors, some of which go back more than 2 500 years. Indeed
many early contributions to freedom arose in early India where sceptical thought preceded and
influenced Greek sophistry which led to Socratic dialectical thinking (I’ll explain the concept of
dialectical thinking in Chapter 6). 3 Given strong resistance from Vedic Hinduism, India’s
intellectual prowess soon faded away, even as its students in Greece pushed ahead. But even
Greek ideas faded away when Christianity brutally suppressed pagan (i.e. Greek) thinking and
philosophy. It was much later – around 800 years ago – that Greek (and indirectly ancient
Indian) ideas were rediscovered in Western Europe. The discovery of freedom then resumed.
Many ‘mind-expanding’ ideas about human freedom arose in England between the 15th and
17th centuries. In the 18th century these were refined, and extended, in newly established USA.
Thereafter, in the 19th century, first the British and then the Austrians created the formal
foundations of political economy (now called economics). Our understandings about freedom
grew further in the 20th century, mostly from within the portals of academia in the USA. As a
result, the torch of liberty has now been lit across the West (though it doesn’t shine clearly
through the haze of welfare socialism and social democracy). Unfortunately, large parts of the
world, including India, lag behind.
Over this period, thousands of thinkers and doers, like the ancient Indian sceptics, the
Buddha, the authors of Hindu scriptures and epics, Socrates, Aristotle, and later, St. Aquinas,
Machiavelli, Francis Hotman, Thomas Hobbes, John Milton and John Locke, among many
others, helped to either plant the seeds of freedom, or to water them and help them grow,
Thomas Hobbes should be declared as the Father of Capitalism or the Father of Freedom, jointly
with John Locke, who came a few decades later.
This elevation of Hobbes to this stature is perhaps not something that everyone agrees with,
but I believe that arguments for the free society were first brought together in Hobbes’s so called

1 Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974, p. 179.
2 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (1971), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1999, p.342.
3 Rahula, Basnagoda, The Untold Story about Greek Rational Thought: Buddhist and Other Indian Rationalist
Influences on Sophist Rhetoric, PhD dissertation, December 2000, Texas Technical University.

72
laws of nature. Hobbes was particularly concerned about accountability. His was a modern
analysis based on a study of human nature. Thus, his second law of nature recognises our
strategic behaviour. A man should ‘be willing, when others are so too, … to … be contented with
so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself.” 4 Tit-for-tat
liberty. He is best known for his advocacy of the social contract, which was taken further by
Locke (and, later, by Rousseau – although Rousseau’s was a dead end of sorts). Without a strong
state we are susceptible to the beasts within human society, for ‘during the time men live
without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war;
and such a war as is of every man against every man’ 5.
His third law hits out at ‘fools’ who think they have liberty of action without regard to
justice:
The fool hath said in his heart, there is no such thing as justice, and sometimes also with his
tongue, seriously alleging that every man’s conservation and contentment being committed to
his own care, there could be no reason why every man might not do what he thought conduced
thereunto: and therefore also to make, or not make; keep, or not keep, covenants was not against
reason when it conduced to one’s benefit.
Hobbes’s focus on justice requires ‘men [to] perform their covenants made’ 6. We must meet
our commitments. The laws of nature can therefore be ‘contracted (summarised) into one easy
sum, intelligible even to the meanest capacity; and that is: Do not that to another which thou
wouldest not have done to thyself’ 7. His is firm about the Golden Rule, a fundamental principle
of justice.
His theory of justice loses its momentum somewhat, thereafter, because he argues in favour
of rehabilitation, not for punishment equivalent to the magnitude of crime. Thus, ‘we are
forbidden to inflict punishment with any other design than for correction of the offender, or
direction of others.’ I believe, however, that punishment must aim to ensure precise
accountability. Other elements like reform and deterrence are only secondary.
His ninth law is about political equality across the entire society. He asks every one to
‘acknowledge another for his equal by nature.’ 8 This means that no one is entitled to special
privilege: ‘no man can … reserve to himself any right which he is not content should he reserved
to every one of the rest’ 9. He then handed over this individual equality and sovereignty at least
partially to the sovereign, who then was thought to become above the law. That is another area
where one can differ with Hobbes.
Overall, however, virtually every major thought in classical liberalism was first brought
together in the writings of Hobbes. Without Hobbes, there would be no scientific theory of the
liberal state. A few decades later, John Locke (1632-1704) elaborated on Hobbes’s views, and
became, arguably, more influential than Hobbes 10. Locke similarly focused on the importance of
accountability in society. Thus, in his Two Treatises of Government, he wrote:
that ‘though this be a State of Liberty, yet it is not a State of License, though Man in that State
have an uncontroleable Liberty, to dispose of his Person or Possessions, yet he has not Liberty to
destroy himself, or so much as any Creature in his Possession, but where some nobler use, than
its bare Preservation calls for it.’
Indeed, not to advocate accountability as the main condition for society would amount to
advocating the State of License, not the State of Liberty. Anarchists are among those who ignore
this fundamental requirement, but Hegelians and many other statists do that as well. However,
it is intolerable to have a society where people are not accountable for their actions. The state

4 Leviathan, 1651, Chapter 14 http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hobbes/thomas/h68l/chapter14.html

5 Leviathan, 1651, Chapter 13 http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hobbes/thomas/h68l/chapter14.html
6 Leviathan, 1651, Chapter 15 http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hobbes/thomas/h68l/chapter15.html
7 Leviathan, 1651, Chapter 15 http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hobbes/thomas/h68l/chapter15.html
8 Leviathan, 1651, Chapter 15 http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hobbes/thomas/h68l/chapter15.html
9 Leviathan, 1651, Chapter 15 http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hobbes/thomas/h68l/chapter15.html
10 His writings include A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), Two Treatises of Civil Government (1690), Some

Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest, Raising the Value of Money (1692), and A Vindication
of the Reasonableness of Christianity (1695).

73`
must therefore be strong enough to ensure accountability, but not empowered to reduce anyone’s
freedoms without justifiable cause.
Locke’s conceptualisation of the state of nature is somewhat optimistic, compared with
Hobbes – at least on the surface. He seems to suggest, like many utopians, that people live in
harmony with each other even without a government. Danford thinks that Locke chose, in the
early part of his book, to temper Hobbes’s blunt message deliberately in order to avoid agitating
theologicians unnecessarily. He therefore begins his book on an optimistic note, but soon enough,
repeats almost all of Hobbes’s arguments, and arrives basically to the same conclusion, that we
need a strong social contract to defend our liberties. 11 The main difference between Hobbes and
Locke, which we must agree with, is that according to Hobbes once we hand over our liberties to
the sovereign, we can no longer retrieve them, whereas Locke said that our liberties continued,
and were unalterable.
Locke’s was not, however, as could logically be expected of such an early piece of work, a
completely consistent philosophy. Indeed, no completely satisfactory understanding of freedom
yet exists. Our ideas are evolving, being refined by new thinkers in each generation, and by a
deeper understanding of human nature. That is the nature of all science. We are indebted to
hundreds of thinkers who followed Hobbes and Locke, including, in particular: Richard Cantillon
(1680-1734), Voltaire (1694-1778), David Hume (1711-1776), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-
1778), Adam Smith (1723-1790), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Edmund Burke (1729-1797),
Thomas Paine (1737-1809), Baron de Montesquieu (1743-1797), marquis de Condorcet (1743-
1794), Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), James Madison (1751-1836), Jean Baptiste Say (1767-
1830), Henri-Benjamin Constant (1767-1830), Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), David
Ricardo (1772-1823), Frédéric Bastiat (1801-1850), Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882), John
Stuart Mill (1806-1873), Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862), Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), Lord
Acton (1834-1902), Carl Menger (1840-1921), Eugen Bohm-Bawerk (1851-1914), Ludwig von
Mises (1881-1973), Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992), Ayn Rand (1905-1982), Isaiah Berlin (1909-
1997), Milton Friedman (1912-2006), Peter Bauer (1915-2002), James Buchanan (1919-), Murray
Rothbard (1926-1995), Gary S. Becker (1930-), and Robert Nozick (1938-2002), among many
others.
The above list is quite eclectic, and includes authors whose views could well conflict with
those of others. It is also incomplete. It is worth noting that I’ve consciously excluded social (or
modern) liberals like T.H. Green (1836-1882) and John Rawls (1921-2002). Deliberately excluded
are advocates of statism Hegel and Nietsche who extrapolated from Kant and Rousseau (Isaah
Berlin doesn’t think that Rousseau was liberal) to advocate positive liberty and ended up, in that
process, destroying liberty entirely and leading to communism and fascism.
I can be reasonably asked why I include Rousseau here, for his views underpinned the
socialist and collectivist tendencies of the nineteenth century. Heinrich Heine recognised this in
1834 when he wrote: ‘ Note this, you proud men of action, you are nothing but unconscious tools
of the men of thought … Maxmilean Robespierre [whose authoritarianism we shall come across
later when we look at the French Revolution] was nothing but the hand of Jean-Jacques
Rousseau’. Rousseau’s interpretation of freedom (positive liberty) is odds with the classical
liberal view, yet I’m willing to accept certain elements of Rousseau’s thought, which, if sampled
carefully, allow for the defence of individual freedom.
Particularly worth highlighting as an outstanding thinker is Ayn Rand, not often considered
part of the classical liberal pantheon, who has been exceptionally influential in advancing liberty
the 20th century, while staying away from academic portals or even active political life. A
Russian by birth, she left communist USSR for USA at age 21. As a citizen of America she wove
the logic of capitalism into outstanding novels like Atlas Shrugged (1957). Her clearest
articulation is perhaps found in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal (1946) 12 through arguments

11Danford, John W., Roots of Freedom, Washington: ISI Books, 2000, p.90.
12One of the contributors to her book, Alan Greenspan, is perhaps more widely known in some quarters than even
Ayn Rand is.

74
that shine a razor-sharp beam on the value of liberty. She was particularly good at exposing
flaws in collectivist thinking.
It goes without saying that no single writer is the final word on liberty. All writers also
inevitably reflect the prejudices of their times. Some were racist and supported slavery; others
believed that women could not be trusted to vote sensibly (Of course, the brilliant Ayn Rand has
shattered that myth for eternity!). I would be hard pressed, though, to find even one writer with
whose views I fully agree with. Indeed, I’m not even fully familiar with all the views of those
indicated above. But it was surely from their thoughts, filtered through my life experience, that I
have finally arrived at certain views about freedom. In any event, the final word on freedom has
not yet been written, and will never be written. Each of us, in each generation, must rediscover
the meaning and value of freedom and mould it into our own life as an active, living principle.
Indeed, many of early ideas about liberty were later found to be flawed, sometimes in their
technical detail. For example, Adam Smith’s theory of value was premised on the amount of
physical labour used in the production of a good or service. That incorrect view led Marx down
the garden path, falling into monumental blunders in his book, Capital. These blunders were
corrected by Carl Menger (1840-1921) who showed, or rather, rediscovered independently an
idea that had been articulated by the Scholastics 13, in his Principles of Economics (1871), that
‘there is no connection between the value of a good and ... quantities ... [of] labor ... applied to its
production.’ Value is determined by our independent, subjective judgements. It is, like beauty,
largely in the eyes of the beholder.
Consider a hypothetical example, which I give here at the risk of publicly undermining my
not inconsiderable skills in fine art. Let’s assume that Pablo Picasso and I were given the same
materials and time to make a painting. It appears to me to be more than likely (despite my hope
that you’ll change your mind once you see my talents!) that you would pay Picasso lots more for
his absent-minded scribbles than for my genuinely beautiful piece of art, despite both of us
putting in the same amount of ‘labour’. While I am entitled to believe that I have a genuine gift
for fine art, the reality is that it is you who determine the worth of my paintings, not I. That is
the first lesson of the free market – that price is the resting point between supply and demand.
Three people will perhaps raise their hand to buy Picasso, while perhaps only one will may want
to buy mine. I won’t labour this further but the point is that early knowledge and insights of
philosophers been refined over the years, and this book benefits from such improvements.
This overview can’t possibly substitute for first-hand reading of these writers. The good
thing is that most of their books are now available freely online: such are the many blessings of
the internet. To assist you in your readings I have built a small reading list for you to refer to. 14
As a beginning, though, let me suggest an excellent overview by James Buchanan in his paper
entitled Soul of Classical Liberalism. 15

2. Two major theories of freedom and justice

I now assess two theories – of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. I do not intend to provide an
extensive overview of their work. Instead, by summarising my findings first, you’ll soon get an
understanding of what I’m trying to get at.
There is no doubt that as Nozick said, Rawls’s book, ‘A Theory of Justice is a powerful, deep,
subtle, wide-ranging, systematic work in political and moral philosophy which has not seen its
like since the writings of John Stuart Mill.’ 16 But as Nozick soon found, Rawls’s approach to
liberty is not satisfying. Indeed, I think that Rawls’s advocacy of limited property rights is
indefensible; even reprehensible. Redistribution, that Rawls advocates, never achieves its
intended outcomes, anyway, for the greatest means of production is our brain, and human
brains can’t be redistributed. So how (even at the practical level) can Rawls suggest that people
be deprived of their comprehensive ‘right to own … means of production’? For the greatest means

13 CITE THE 15 AUSTRIAN ECONOMISTS BOOK

14 Under construction: See [http://sanjeev.sabhlokcity.com/book2/bk2reading.html]
15 (2000). Found at [http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_05_1_buchanan.pdf]
16 Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974, p. 183

75`
of production is inside our head. Further, his concept of the alleged ‘social basis of self-respect’,
based on our relative economic and social status reflected by inter-personal comparison, leaves
me quite cold. This is a totally inappropriate driver of social philosophy policy. It is not proper
for policy makers to recognise, leave alone elevate as a policy variable, our emotion of envy. Let’s
grow up and learn to deal with envy, not make it a yardstick for policy. That a philosopher of
ethics can even consider our lowliest emotion as being worthy of driving a philosophy should be a
matter of concern.
Nozick’s (1974) ideas are far more conducive to liberty, and are founded on the primacy of
property rights. Unfortunately, one can’t agree with his conception of liberty fully, either,
because, as I will presently demonstrate, his ideas end up potentially undermining life itself
which must, in my view, form the most fundamental building block of moral philosophy. And by
denying the possibility of equal opportunity, and thinking of taxation as ‘forced labour’ 17, Nozick
goes outside the bounds of any cogent and functional social contract. Taxes are a legitimate and
democratically agreed concomitant of our liberty, being the dues we pay for our security and
justice delivered under the social contract to which we jointly agree. It is certain that people will
pay far more under anarchy for a much smaller basket of services. Indeed, I believe that
democratically imposed progressive taxes, on the pattern of a price-discriminating monopolist,
are the most efficient and effective way for the state monopoly to charge for the security and
services it supplies. With transparent and representative tax-setting processes, taxation is not
theft, but the price we pay for the security of our liberty.
In 1989 Nozick identified and addressed certain gaps in his (1974) theory: ‘[T]he libertarian
position I once propounded now seems to me seriously inadequate, in part because it did not knit
the humane considerations and joint cooperative activities it left room for more closely into its
fabric.’ 18 To the extent this view refers only to social capital formed through voluntary
association, this does not amount to a significant shift in perspective. To the extent it even
remotely suggests an implicit social contract, then it may indeed represent a genuine shift, but I
doubt if that is what happened in this case.

2.1 Rawls’s conception of ‘social’ justice

Martha Nussbaum, a distinguished philosopher herself, referred to John Rawls in 2001 as
‘the most distinguished moral and political philosopher of our age.’ 19 But the field competing for
such a ‘title’ is actually rather large. The existence of the likes of F.A. Hayek, Murray Rothbard,
and Ayn Rand, among many others, rules out such pre-eminence being accorded to Rawls. While
Rawls’s work is elegant and his ideas wide-ranging, there are reasons why his influence is
relatively modest compared with others like Hayek, and definitely far less than classical liberals
like John Locke, Adam Smith, and J.S. Mill. But he is an important thinker, nevertheless, whose
ideas present a mixed bag and confuse many.
Rawls is perhaps best known for a thought experiment that he devised in his 1971 book, A
Theory of Justice. This experiment explores the principles of ‘social justice’, or justice across the
society (a concept that Hayek rightly said belonged not to ‘the category of error but to that of
nonsense’ 20). At its heart, A Theory of Justice is a pitch for economic distribution. Rawls can
perhaps be thought of as a latter day Marx, for according to him:
persons are not indifferent as to how the greater benefits produced by their collaboration are
distributed, for in order to pursue the ends they each prefer a larger to a lesser share. A set of
principles required for choosing among the various social arrangements which determine this

17 Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974, p. 169
18 Nozick, Robert, The Examined Life, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989, pp.286-87.
19 Nussbaum, Martha, ‘The Enduring Significance of John Rawls’, The Chronicle Review, 20 July 2001.

[http://chronicle.com/free/v47/i45/45b00701.htm]
20 Hayek, F.A. Law, Legislation and Liberty Vol. 2: The mirage of social justice, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1982 ,

p. 78.

76
 division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper distributive shares
[emphasis mine]. 21
While he appears to be more sympathetic to our liberties than Marx was, his approach and
conclusions are similarly weighted towards redistribution, and do not amount to a defence of
liberty. (Box PP collates a smattering of his ideas.)
Box PP
A sampling of Rawls’s thoughts
• ‘[T]he plans of individuals need to be fitted together so that … they can all be carried
through without anyone’s legitimate expectations being severely disappointed.
Moreover, the execution of these plans should lead to the achievement of social ends in
ways that are efficient and consistent with justice’ [emphasis mine].
• In his second principle (listed below) he wrote about social and economic inequalities
being arranged to achieve certain ends.
• He specifically ruled out ‘the right to own certain rights to property (e.g., means of
production) and freedom of contract as understood by the doctrine of laissez-faire.’ 22
Rawls thus split property into two: personal – which he allowed; and means of
production and contracts – which he disallowed.
• He advocated that ‘[a]ll social values – liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and
the social basis of self-respect – are to be distributed equally unless an unequal
distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage’ [emphasis mine]. 23
• At another place, he says: ‘there is no more reason to permit the distribution of income
and wealth to be settled by the distribution of natural assets than by historical and
social fortune’ [emphasis mine]. 24
From some of the statements in Box PP we readily begin to see why Rawls’s approach can be
quite alarming. To talk about ‘legitimate expectations’, ‘arranging’ economic inequalities, and
ensuring equal distributions is frightening enough. But the reference to ‘social ends’ perhaps
takes the cake. His is unequivocally a collectivist approach at its heart, inclined towards positive
liberty, and rebelling against basic freedoms. A society can have no business to determine our
ends for us. We delegate our absolute animal powers under the implicit or explicit social contract
to a government so that we can better achieve our personal ends, of life, liberty, and our self-
determined pursuit of happiness. This delegation does not in any form or shape authorise
anyone whosoever to tell us what our goals ought to be. Our representatives must remember
that they are our agents, not our masters. Else we will chop off their heads (and this statement
is not made in jest).
As individuals we, of course, must remain free to promote even collectivist concepts such as
nationalist or religious, or any other such concepts. So Rawls is surely free to preach his views. I,
too, promote a Great India quite shamelessly, because I think that it will be good for me and my
family, hence for the world since I am a microcosm of the world. People can join me in working
towards this goal, such as through the Freedom Team of India 25, or they may work towards their
other collectivist goals. That’s all fine. The key is that we must not impose our personal
aspirations and plans on others on anyone. Our views about society cannot become ‘social’ goal.
The very idea of society is disputable – particularly its permanence and hence its relevance
to our lives. As Margaret Thatcher famously put it, ‘there is no such thing as society’ 26.

21 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (1971), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1999, p.4.
22 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (1971), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,

1999, p.54.
23 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (1971), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,

1999, p.54.
24 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (1971), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,

1999, p.64.
25 [http://freedomteam.in/]
26 Prime minister Margaret Thatcher, in an interview published in Woman's Own magazine on 31 October 1987.

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Individually, we are the only thing permanent till we die. Nations may outlive us, but societies
are always temporary, like water flowing down a river. Its banks may be permanent but what
passes through it is temporary. Just as we can’t step into the same river twice, so also one can’t
experience the same society twice. In any event, societies exist for our convenience. We always
remain free to navigate our way across various societies (nations, religions, associations) as
many times as we wish. Thus, many people hold multiple citizenships, and many change their
religion. Societies are dynamic, and we can’t let rapidly changing entities tell us what to do.
Freedom is a process. What use it should be put to is nobody’s business but ours. All we must
ensure is that in a civilised free society we remain accountable for whatever it is that we choose
to do.
But Rawls saw himself and society differently. He seems to have thought of himself as a
wise philosopher, even a central planner, empowered to act on our behalf, and to tell us what our
‘ends’ must be. He tells us that redistribution will increase our self-respect and thus make us
happier. But such paternalism is inimical to liberty, and is inappropriate for anyone, whether
philosopher, economist, or politician. We must to be left alone to plan for, and to live our lives
the way we please. We delegate specific tasks to governments, and it must remain, at all times,
our servant.
Indeed, ‘social justice’ is also a vacuous concept because there is no concept of social liberty
and hence no conception of social accountability. Principles of justice must maximise our
individual freedoms, subject to accountability. Justice is a property of the actions of individuals,
not of groups. ‘[O]nly situations that have been created by human will can be called just or
unjust’, 27 as Hayek said. He thus showed how the complex pattern of property holdings in a free
society are the resultant product of actions of all of us operating in our own self-interest, not of
any single human will (as would need to be the case if ‘social ends’ were to determine such
interests). Hayek pointed out, for instance, that it would be the height of confusion to apply
notions of justice across the relative holdings of people across an entire society. He thus
suggested that ‘the prevailing belief in ‘social justice’ is at present probably the gravest threat to
most … values of a free civilization’. 28 Elsewhere, he wrote that ‘nothing has done so much to
destroy the juridical safeguards of individual freedom as the striving after this mirage of social
justice.’ 29 If the fundamental conception of Rawls is so badly misplaced, surely his entire theory
must be questioned.
Deliberate redistribution of wealth can never fall within the scope of a free society, being a
form of theft by the state. However, it is legitimate to talk about social insurance as part of the
social contract, as part of the requirements of equal freedom (see Chapter 4). But there can be no
redistribution in the free society. Distributions (or more precisely, property ownership, since a
distribution implies a ‘distributor’ but there is none) based on historical outcomes, including
chance and voluntary exchange, are part of the natural order of things. It is crucial to note that
when the liberal insists (as I do in BFN) on eliminating poverty and educating everyone to year
12, he does so not on the basis of social justice but as part of the imperative of reasonable equal
opportunity, which, however, is a second order function of the state, and is relevant only after
security and justice has been ensured.
Rawls’s theory is badly bogged down in envy. He assigns considerable value to people’s
‘severe disappointments’ and to their ‘legitimate expectations’ (whatever these things may be).
The great problem I have with this approach, apart from the indefensible emphasis on envy, is
that a philosophy that draws its foundations from anything other than liberty always ends up
harming us. Worrying about people’s ability (or inability) to deal with their own emotions can
only result in grievous injustice, as ad hoc decisions to purportedly address such ‘issues’, replace
the rule of law.

27 Hayek, Friedrich August, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol.2, 1973, Routledge, p. 33.
28 Hayek, F.A. Law, Legislation and Liberty Vol. 2: The mirage of social justice, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1982 ,
pp. 66-7.
29 Hayek's Wincott Memorial Lecture (1973) entitled, "Economic Freedom and Representative Government" published

by IEA, p.13.

78
 Rawls picks on another of these fuzzy concepts, asserts that self-respect is the primary good,
‘On several occasions’, he emphasises, ‘I have mentioned that perhaps the most important
primary good is that of self-respect’ 30. Obtaining this good requires us, apparently, to pursue our
plans ‘with pleasure’. Apparently, without this ‘nothing may seem worth doing’. So he asks the
society to make sure that ‘our person and deeds [are] appreciated and confirmed by others who
are likewise esteemed and their association enjoyed.’ But this begs the question: Why must a
society ensure such a thing? And the market already does this to an extent, on a daily basis,
valuing us for the services we render or for the goods we produce. A society can have no business
to interfere in our private matters such as the company we keep. And Rawls seems to treat us
like mentally unstable teenagers who are driven by the urge receive trinkets, baubles, or
awards, and prone to depression should a pat on their back not be forthcoming at regular
intervals.
But the approbation of others, although welcome (we can all do with some flattery), is no
substitute for their money. A prize or paper certificate without money is simply a bauble. What
we are looking for in each case is a fair exchange: money earned in return for services performed.
And once we have earned our living, we must be left free by the society to live our life as we
please. We also remain free to provide services without expecting or requiring ‘fair exchange’, for
performing certain things might give us sufficient value in itself. Alexander Solzhenitsn did not
write the Gulag Archipelago to seek our approbation or to get a Nobel Prize, but to fulfil his
personal need to speak out about the brutalities of communist USSR. Indeed, he knew well
enough that he could be jailed, even murdered, if he expressed the truth. But he did not flinch,
for he did not care. He was fighting for freedom, and wan not a teenager, seeking approbation.
The society’s recognition of our worth is a truly piffling matter. The free man, with fierce pride
in himself, and sense of dignity that over-rides whatever society may have in store for him, cares
not the least for what others may think about him. The free man, unlike sissy collectivist
intellectuals, is not a whimpering puppy seeking that his back be rubbed by every passerby.
Indeed, we may prefer only to work for those who value us; but that is not the foundational
principle of moral and political philosophy. Since when did pursuing our plans ‘with pleasure’
become a yardstick for the free man? The free man cares for the good, as he defines it – not for
pleasure (or the pleasant). As the Kathopanishad (I-ii-1) says:
The good is one thing, the pleasant another. These two lead to very different ends. The wise are
not deceived by the attraction of the pleasant. They choose the good. Fools are snared into the
mere pleasant and perish. 31
Rawls doesn’t address the even more basic issue: Why would money, pleasure or others’
approbation mater if we are not free? Many officials from communist Russia – presumably well
rewarded – defected to free nations to start life at the bottom of the ladder. Without any
remorse, I too abandoned the prestige of the powerful civil service in socialist India to work in a
humble role – indeed, any role – in free Australia. Approbation means nothing if you are not
free. The free man cares only for the approbation of those whom he respects; and there is no one
worth being respected in socialist or communist countries.
Respect is not bequeathed to us by the state: it is earned by our efforts. And clearly no one
can impinge on our self respect if we respect ourselves. Our economic or social status can have
absolutely nothing to do with respect. There are Presidents (like Robert Mugabe) who are spat
upon, while there are people without any formal title and few or no possessions (like Mahatma
Gandhi) who are deeply revered. The society is not obliged to respect us if we do not deserve
respect.
Sliding down this slippery slope, Rawls advocates complete equality of income, wealth, and
the like, calling these the fundamental attributes of social justice. But if someone earns
something through hard work, merit, or chance, what justice requires the distribution of his

30 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (1971), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1999, p.386.
31 Rajagopalachari, C. Hinduism: Doctrine and Way of Life, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavawan, 1959, p116.

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earnings to others? Would John Rawls give away his salary and book royalties so that he could
achieve the economic standard of the average American?
Despite all these flaws, Rawls does arrive at some relatively sensible recommendations. He
asks us to visualise a situation where existing economic and social structures will be dismantled
and rebuilt from scratch behind a veil of ignorance. This position of uncertainty and ignorance
he calls the ‘original position’, being a distant cousin of the ‘state of nature’. Under this veil:
no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his
fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.
I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special
psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This
ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcomes
of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. 32
Existing roles are randomly reassigned and everyone is re-born into the newly assigned
roles. The principles of justice applicable in the new world are those that have been determined
behind the veil. Before looking at the principles that Rawls arrives at, it is useful to consider the
many problems with this thought experiment.
• The view of ignorance excludes consideration of human nature and its potential impacts on
the society.
• The real world has no veil of ignorance. Using vivid imagination to inform political principles
almost certain result in great folly. We must observe the behaviour of real people and use
that information to formulate principles of a society.
• Even a rudimentary belief in equal freedom (democracy) would require real people to decide
their own fate, not those behind an imaginary veil. Rawls’s original position’ is deeply flawed
because it doesn’t allow for democratic decision-making behind the veil. If democratic
considerations were allowed, Rawls’s conclusion would almost entirely be designed
differently fail. Under his experiment, Rawls is the sole dictator who arrives at rules
applicable to everyone.
• The ‘results’ of Rawls’s experiment have been falsified when empirically tested. Whenever
his difference principle (I will explain momentarily what it is), has been experimentally
tested, 33 albeit necessarily in a contrived manner, Rawls’s conclusion have not been
supported. Thus:
‘The main results of these experiments can be summarized as follows: (1) experimental
groups are able to reach unanimous agreements, (2) most of the groups choose the same
principle of income distribution, and (3) the most often chosen principle is not the Rawlsian
principle of distributive justice. Instead, a mixed principle that maximizes the income of the
average member of the group, subject to a constraint that the lowest income does not fall
below a certain level, has been the most popular alternative in the earlier experiments. 34
A 2004 experiment confirmed ‘that the veil of ignorance does not generate Rawlsian
choices.’ 35 Real people want their incomes to be maximised even as the society cares for those
who fail to achieve a social minimum. People’s desires are consistent with maximisation of
freedom with equal opportunity, advocated by classical liberals.
Human nature is extremely complex, and models of ‘social justice’ that fail to even consider
human nature and incentives can never work in real life. In particular, Rawls does not consider

32 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (1971), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1999, p.11.
33 Eg. Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Eavey 1987a, 1987b; Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1990; Lissowski, Tyszka, and

Okrasa 1991; Bond and Park 1991; Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1992; Jackson and Hill 1995; de la Cruz-Doiia and
Martina 2000; Oleson 2001 – as cited in ‘The Role of Information in Choices over Income Distributions’ by Kaisa
Herne and Maria Suojanen, in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48 (2). April 2004), pp. 173-193.
34 ‘The Role of Information in Choices over Income Distributions’ by Kaisa Herne and Maria Suojanen, in The Journal

of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48 (2). April 2004), p.183.

35 ‘The Role of Information in Choices over Income Distributions’ by Kaisa Herne and Maria Suojanen, in The Journal

of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48 (2). April 2004), p.183.

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strategic behaviour. The Rawlsian contract is ‘unstable since people may well break the contract
as soon as they know their own position in society.’ 36
Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings, let us explore his conclusions, namely his
principles of social justice. The first of these is that:
each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties
compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. 37
Rawls modified this principle in his 1993 Political Liberalism, to read thus:
Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of basic rights and liberties, which
scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political
liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value. 38
One can’t quarrel much with this principle, except that the concept and the language of
‘rights’ is, as explained at length in chapter 2, inappropriate. Rawls partially addressed this
problem by renaming ‘rights’ as ‘claims’ in his 1993 formulation. Wherefrom do these claims
arise? (The only claims that can legitimately in a society are strictly linked to accountability.)
But there is another problem, as well. As part of this principle, Rawls explicitly notes a
number of freedoms:
• freedom of thought;
• liberty of conscience (‘liberty as applied to religious, philosophical, and moral view of our
relation to the world’ 39);
• political liberties (including representative democratic institutions, freedom of speech and
free press, and freedom of assembly);
• freedom of association;
• freedoms specified by the liberty and integrity of the person (such as freedom from slavery
and serfdom and freedom of movement and choice regarding occupation); and
• and political rights and liberties covered by the rule of law.
Leaving aside the mystery of how he could arrive at them under a veil of ignorance, we can
agree with these. But Rawls explicitly excludes key aspects of property rights from his list.
Rawls is stepping into dangerous territory here through his personal and whimsical
interpretations of freedom. This is inappropriate. We don’t need anyone’s whims to truncate our
freedoms. Only justice can call us to account.
It is his second principle that is, however, rather badly flawed. Two of its formulations are:
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest
expected benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 40
A slightly refined version in the same book, reads:
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest
benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 41
The difference principle (being the first part of this second principle) is baffling. It might
seem somewhat plausible on the surface as a statement of Rawls’s good intentions, but when the
implications drawn from it are considered, it ends up in total confusion. No doubt equal freedom
can motivate the state to ensure reasonable equal opportunity (as a second order, not primary
function – and I will explain this in Chapter 4) – but what Rawls is talking here is not about

36 A comment by Hans O. Melberg on the internet.

37 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (1971), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1999, p. 53.
38 Political Liberalism, p.5-6.
39 Political Liberalism, p. 311.
40 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (1971), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,

1999, p.72.
41 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (1971), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,

1999, p. 266.

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equal opportunity that ensures a reasonably level playing field. What he demands is equal
outcomes, at least in principle.
Now assume for a moment that I suffer from severe intellectual disability that prevents my
growing into a Bill Gates. Rawls seemingly requires not only that I must be educated well
enough (by the state) but that I must be given special priority in relation to Bill Gates at every
step of my life to equalise, as far as possible, the outcomes I achieve in my life with those of Bill
Gates. While not insisting on perfect equality, he calls upon the state to interfere with market-
based outcomes continually in order to shift the relative status of weaker persons incrementally
upward (‘continually to correct the distribution of wealth’ 42). That is a purely socialist argument,
giving the state a blanket cheque to interfere in our lives. This is central planning at its worst:
an attempt to fiddle with the outcomes of each of our voluntary interactions.
Everyone is unique and hence unequal in many ways – in abilities, circumstances, and
opportunities. This is a basic truth that no one can change, no matter how many ‘original
positions’ we cook up. Inequality is built into, and deeply embedded into the human condition.
Equalising opportunities must therefore be done in a manner compatible with everyone’s self
interest. And no self-interested person will agree to Rawls’s difference principle, for not only
would it destroy all incentives for work, it would destroy our liberties as comprehensively as
communism would. It would entirely nullify and make useless Rawls’s first principle.
Yet another problem: The word ‘least-advantaged’, as used in the difference principle, is
loaded with intense subjectivity. First, why are we responsible in any way for the least
advantaged, whoever they are? Did we bring them into this world? Second, who are least-
advantaged in a society? And who will determine that? And how? It is not as if this ‘state’, of
being disadvantaged, is static. Being ‘least-advantaged’ is relative to others and that situation
can change. And what about the future? I may be somewhat poor today but because I am smart,
I am almost guaranteed to become rich in the future. How justified will it be, under these
circumstances, for the state to pay me today so I end up well above the poverty line? Consider
the opposite case: I might be rich today but if a stroke paralyses me, I could become disabled for
the remaining twenty years of my life, leaving me unbearably disadvantaged, a disadvantage
that no amount of money can possibly fix. Disadvantage that is not even visible to others and
cannot be measured with any machine can cause very significant grief. 43 The concept of ‘least
advantaged’ is therefore simply not amenable to rational discussion or measurement, and is
therefore worthless as a tool of social policy.
The liberal believes that if everyone is provided a reasonably level playing field (reasonable
equality of opportunity) then there is no further need to tax people to identify and deal with the
‘least-advantaged’ or to provide them with the ‘greatest benefit’.
Consider the provision of ‘greatest benefit’. Trade increases wealth, being Pareto optimal.
Resources are allocated between two traders such that neither can become better off without
making the other trader worse off. If we want to introduce the ‘greatest benefit’ concept in trade,
all bargaining processes would be destroyed. Ignorant and arrogant bureaucrats may arbitrarily
be required to certify whether each transaction in our life has met the greatest benefit to the
least advantaged requirement. Few more foolish policies can be designed.
In any event, people don’t seem to really care too much about economic inequality, anyway.
When Arthur Brooks of Syracuse University asked people if inequality bothered them, he was
surprised. ‘[F]ew expressed any shock and outrage at the enormous wealth of software moguls
and CEOs. On the contrary, they tended to hope that their kids might become the next Bill

42 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (1971), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1999, p.245.
43 I have gone though nearly eight years in extreme, shooting, pain in my upper body as part of the RSI I spoke of in

the acknowledgements in BFN. I struggled through my job, not sure if I would have the mental resources to want to
live beyond the following month. All this while, my pain was totally invisible to others, and simply not measurable. I
may have been intelligent enough to somehow get and to hold on to a job—and thus appear to be without
disadvantage, but I was battling for survival.

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Gates.’ 44 This is the way real people actually think. Where sufficient opportunities exists,
‘[r]ising inequality can even raise our happiness by demonstrating the success that our future
may hold.’ 45 Brooks confirmed that ‘economic inequality doesn’t frustrate Americans at all. It is,
rather, the perceived lack of economic opportunity that makes us unhappy.’ As he pointed out: ‘If
the egalitarians are right, then average happiness levels should be falling [since income
inequality has been increasing in the USA]. But they aren’t.’
People are therefore enthused (not disheartened) by economic inequality – provided it signals
opportunity. Not for nothing do people from across the world make a beeline for USA, the
greatest land of opportunity. Migrants are aware that they will have to start at the bottom of the
ladder, but they are willing to give that a go, knowing that merit will be soon recognised in the
USA. As Brooks noted, ‘To focus our policies on inequality, instead of opportunity, is to make a
grave error’. 46 We don’t need sermons from philosophers who do not display even the basic
understanding of human nature.
Consider now another problem with Rawls’s analysis. In his view, it was an open question
whether his principles would be ‘best realised by some form of property-owning democracy or by
a liberal socialist regime.’ 47 Indeed, he veered towards property-owning democracy as ‘an
alternative to capitalism’ 48 in his later 2001 Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, in which he
extensively cited Nobel Laureate James Meade’s (1964) proposals in Efficiency, Equality and the
Ownership of Property 49.
Meade thought that, ‘ownership of property in property-owning democracy could be equally
distributed over all the citizens in the community’ 50, although he did not explain how such equal
economic distribution would survive for more than five minutes after the normal functioning of
society (including trade) was restored. Given the embedded inequality of human ingenuity and
opportunity inequality can’t be sustained. As argued by Janet Albrechtsen, ‘People with bright
ideas, or who work harder to get ahead, are more successful more quickly.’ 51 So how can Meade
or Rawls possibly prevent the smartest farmers from buying off their less efficient brethren? To
equalise farm lands again, and yet again would be coercive and indistinguishable from
communism.
Meade advocated a highly aggressive tax on inheritance. We could, in consequence, acquire
wealth for ourselves but not be permitted to pass it on. That is simply unacceptable. We live
through our children, and while we may not work only for their sake, we have in mind the
continuity of our life that our children represent. Our children are us. Rawls wanted the ‘wide
dispersal of property’ as part of property-owning democracy. This, he believed, ‘is a necessary
condition … if the fair value of the equal liberties is to be maintained.’ 52 But that’s not true!
Indeed, were such forced dispersal of property to occur, there would be no liberties left because
such dispersal is unnatural and coercive. He also wrote, confoundingly, that ‘One naturally
imagines that the greater wealth of those better off is to be scaled down until eventually
everyone has nearly the same income. But this is a misconception, although it might hold in
special circumstances’ 53. This view significantly contradicts his more fundamental statement

44 Arthur C. Brooks (Professor, Syracuse University) ‘What Really Buys Happiness?’ in City Journal Summer 2007.
[http://www.city-journal.org/html/17_3_economic_inequality.html]
45 Arthur C. Brooks (Professor, Syracuse University) ‘What Really Buys Happiness?’ in City Journal Summer 2007.

[http://www.city-journal.org/html/17_3_economic_inequality.html]
46 Arthur C. Brooks (Professor, Syracuse University) ‘What Really Buys Happiness?’ in City Journal Summer 2007.

[http://www.city-journal.org/html/17_3_economic_inequality.html]
47 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (1971), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,

1999, p.xv.
48 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001),

p. 136 - CHECK
49 James Meade, Efficiency, Equality and the Ownership of Property, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1964).
50 J.E. Meade. Liberty, Equality and Efficiency. The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1993, pp. 41
51 ‘Don’t get sniffy at ‘affluenza’’, in The Australian, July 31, 2007, [http://tinyurl.com/lkc39l].
52 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (1971), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,

1999, p. 245.
53 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (1971), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,

1999, p.252.

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that ‘[a]ll social values – liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the social basis of self-
respect – are to be distributed equally’ [emphasis mine]. To thus say that Rawls’s work is replete
with confusion would be an understatement, with the implications of his second principle
destroying his first principle. And basic puzzles remain. Why would anyone labour their whole
life if they were unable to pass on the fruits of this labour to their children? Transfers of assets
from one generation to another should be treated seamlessly, ruling out all inheritance taxes
(this is also fundamentally a problem on the ground that those families that tend to die at an
average age of 50 would be taxed far more heavily than those that die at age 90).
To implement the difference principle, Rawls suggests an extremely roundabout method–
that each generation should put aside a ‘suitable amount of real capital accumulation’ or savings
for the common use of society. But, he is then forced to admit that this is not a workable concept
as ‘it is not possible … to define precise limits on what the rate of savings should be.’ 54 The
central planner is exposed. He has no basis to determine a rate of savings. Rawls fails to note
that through individual optimisation decisions, the entire society will achieve an appropriate
rate of savings. People trade in their savings and borrowings over a lifetime to smooth out their
consumption and achieve an optimal level of capital accumulation. All that is needed for this to
happen is a well-founded belief that today’s laws will also apply tomorrow, and the country’s
money will not be degraded to inflation. We have no need for central planners to tell us how
much to save for an entire society’s future. In such bizarre ways does Rawls’s model attempt a
series of ex-post redistributions and appropriations of property by the state. This is a Marxian
perspective with a huge amount of red tape.
Rawls is only very superficially attached to the idea of freedom – and that with a positive
liberty perspective. Nowhere in his book does he exhibit much trust in the outcomes of
freedom. 55 The regulatory regime he prefers will only lead us to a deeply statist, if not
totalitarian, socialist state. We must therefore exclude Rawls from the lineage of classical
liberalism. True, Rawls is not Marx. There are things he says that one can agree with. We can,
for instance, agree with him on safeguards against political corruption through state funding of
elections. But such recommendations have little or nothing to do with the concepts of justice – at
least in the form he has suggested.
This critique of Rawls’s theory highlights that all we really need is equal freedom, which
once ensured, we leave us free to find our own way in life, success being defined by each of us,
not subject to anyone else’s jurisdiction.

2.2 Nozick’s extrapolations from self-ownership

Now to Nozick’s theory of the state which is largely expounded in his book, Anarchy, State,
and Utopia. I will examine this only from a few angles, enough to draw useful conclusions for my
purposes, not therefore providing a definitive or fuller exploration or critique of Nozick’s world
view.
Nozick’s views reflect the conceptions of Locke. They also mirror some of the early views that
Edmund Burke (1729-1797) expressed in his Vindication of Natural Society, and Frédéric
Bastiat’s views found in The Law. Nozick moved away quite far from Locke, though, to propose a
libertarian theory, compared with what would be called classical liberal today. The difference in
his model is attributable almost entirely to his failure to analyse human nature. He assumed our
underlying goodness, rationality, and ability to manage voluntary contracts amicably (Nozick is
however, overly sceptical of governments, but should his views be valid, then all of us are made
of the same clay and there should be no reason to be particularly sceptical about government
functionaries).
a) The matter of rights

54 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (1971), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,

1999, p.252-3.
55 Quentin P. Taylor, in ‘An Original Omission? Property in Rawls’s Political Thought’, The Independent Review, v.

VIII, n. 3, Winter 2004, p. 387-400. [http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_08_3_taylor.pdf]

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 Nozick begins his book thus: ‘Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or
group may do to them (without violating their rights).’ 56 Nozick admits, though, that his ‘book
does not present a precise theory of the moral basis of individual rights’. This is indeed true, for
it doesn’t outline the basis of these rights. 57 We need not only the moral but the practical basis of
rights, else they will become entirely meaningless. He observes this challenge, noting: ‘The
major objection to speaking of everyone’s having a right to various things such as equality of
opportunity, life, and so on, and enforcing this right, is that these “rights” require a substructure
of things and materials and action; and other people may have rights and entitlements over
these.’ 58 But he doesn’t explore this further. Rights must be embedded in a social contract, else
they are sheer hot air. And as Bentham noted so colourfully:
Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense,—
nonsense upon stilts. But this rhetorical nonsense ends in the old strain of mischievous nonsense:
for immediately a list of these pretended natural rights is given, and those are so expressed as to
present to view legal rights. And of these rights, whatever they are, there is not, it seems, any one
of which any government can, upon any occasion whatever, abrogate the smallest particle….
Right, the substantive right, is the child of law: from real laws come real rights; but from
imaginary laws, from laws of nature, fancied and invented by poets, rhetoricians, and dealers in
moral and intellectual poisons, come imaginary rights, a bastard brood of monsters, “gorgons and
chimæras dire.” 59
We should sharply distinguish the conception of rights from an understanding of our animal
powers. When Nozick talks about ‘rights’, he is actually talking about what I refer to as animal
powers. Remember Hobbes? He wrote about ‘the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power,
as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and
consequently, of doing anything, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, he shall conceive to
the aptest means thereunto’. 60 This liberty is founded on our animal powers. And, indeed, Nozick
himself notes that ‘[i]n a state of nature an individual may himself enforce his rights, defend
himself, exact compensation, and punish.’ 61 Clearly, he means animal powers when he speaks
about rights.
Our inborn physical power to ensure our survival and freedom; our power to enforce the
ownership of our property – through unlimited use of force if needed – is our endowment as
animals, not as civilised men who have agreed to be bound by a social contract. The society is
always an artificial creation. ‘Rights’ can only be jointly agreed to, subject to the power of joint
enforcement.
Try telling a woman who has been brutally stoned for suspected adultery by the Taliban (or
by ancient Jews who used barbaric punishments – see Deuteronomy 22:13-29) that Nozick
believes she has rights and should therefore take it easy, for all will be well. No one is an island
unto himself – except in the state of nature, in complete isolation. Within a society, though,
others constrain our ‘rights’. Therefore true rights are only agreed and enforceable legal rights,
never so-called moral or innate rights. We jointly create enforceable legal rights because we
know that if everyone were to exercise animal powers, the society will crumble, being mired in
perpetual conflict and retributory cycles of honour killing 62. Our natural powers inform these
legal rights, but as ‘off-equilibrium’ threats (i.e. by the implicit threat that if society won’t
enforce our entitlements, we will take the law into our hands).

56 Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974, p.12.
57 Den Uyl, Douglas J. and Douglas B. Rasmussen, ‘Self-Ownership’, Good Society Journal, Pennsylvania State
University, Volume 12:3, 2003, pp. 50-57.
58 Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974, p.238.
59 Bentham, Jeremy, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John

Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 2. Chapter: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, Accessed from http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/1921/114230 on 2010-05-29
60 Carnoy, Martin, The State and Political Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p.16.
61 Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974, p.12.
62 William Ian Miller, Eye for an Eye, Cambridge University Press, 2006 discusses the chronic cycle of honour killings

in

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 Our legal ‘rights’ restrict our freedoms dramatically, for instance, our powers of seeking
revenge. In the wild, I will hunt down and kill my child’s killer (if any) without let or restriction,
but in civilised society we don’t permit such premeditated revenge. The law rules us all.
Retaliation is subjugated to due processes of justice. To be acceptable (and hence sustainable),
this system of justice must be evidence-based and administered independently, i.e. without bias.
If it doesn’t happen, all bets on social contract are off. Our animal powers are always absolute
and boundless, and we can take these back whenever we believe that society is incapable of
dispensing justice.
But Nozick denies the very possibility of the social compact, noting, quite logically at first
glance, that historically there is no evidence of any ‘unanimous agreement to create a
government or state.’ 63 But then he misses the point entirely and categorises the concept of
social contract in the realm of tautology, a trite re-statement of a fact that can never be
disproven. He mocks the concept. Such agreement, he says, would presumably even have to
dictate ‘the distribution on a given evening in a given city of who is in what movie theatre,
sitting where’ 64. (And of course many others have mocked this concept, from David Hume
onwards.) But he is mistaken. This concept is not devoid of meaningful content.
Real social contracts, as I have mentioned elsewhere, are not always explicit. Historically,
social contracts have largely been implicit. In most cases we implicitly accord consent to the
rules of the society we are born into by not opposing them. David Hume, for instance, objected to
the social contract on the grounds that we cannot deduce social consent on the grounds that
people have not left a particular society. But the existence of options under extreme
circumstances matter. The off-equilibrium threat of departure or secession matters. The endless
chain of refugees that flow from failed states every year are testament to failed social contracts.
Even primitive tribes are built on implicit social contracts, being a shared understanding about
what is acceptable, given everyone’s future strategies, plans, beliefs, and objectives. While a
referendum to formally agree a social contract is desirable, it is not at all necessary. Most of the
time, the power of the people exercised through their representatives, or in compliance with
harsh political ‘realities’, creates an implicit contract, that is well understood by everyone
involved. There might be resentment, but without action to organise a revolution, the
resentment is effectively meaningless.
John Stuart Mill knew about the significance of enforcement, as well. He noted that a ‘right’
is ‘something which society ought to defend me in the possession of’ 65 [the ‘ought’ implies that
‘rights’ are not a given, but something that ought to be aimed for in a free society]. Without
enforceability, Nozickian ‘rights’ will remain a pipedream, an idle assertion of no consequence. A
society based on his wishful thinking is liable to soon fall prey to the first mafia ring leader to
attract and organise power. Good governance that ensures rights is never a trivial matter to be
brushed under the carpet, as Nozick does. It requires considerable effort to develop and foster
appropriate institutions (some of which I’ll discuss in the second half of this book).
b) The idea of the minimal state, i.e. without public goods or infrastructure
Nozick then move from a (tribal) state of nature to a form of modern society, a minimal state
that doesn’t provide anything but security. He assumes that people’s ‘rights’ are mutually
respected in the state of nature, and that ‘generally people will do what they are morally
required to do’ 66. A market-based, i.e. invisible hand logic then leads these rational people to the
minimal state visualised as the dominant protection association. Apparently the voluntarily
protection associations that arise initially do not provide coverage to everyone, but through a
complex ‘market-based’ process that (in my view) has no bearing with to the evolution of real
social behaviour and which fails to account for the complications that inevitably impact on

63 Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974, p. 132
64 Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974, p.132
65 Mill, J.S. [1861], ‘Utilitarianism’, On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, World Classics

Paperback 1991, p.189.

66 Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974, p. 119.

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actual transactions to provide security, the minimal state, being a dominant commercial
protection agency with monopoly in the use of coercive force, somehow comes into being.
Wishful thinking, this is, for I believe that this contrived evolution of the minimal state will
rapidly deteriorate into either feudalism or anarchy, or worse. The absence of any consideration
of the imperatives of human nature, and the absence of powerful checks and balances are fatal
failures in this model. Security is not a tradable good in the traditional sense. Such trade has
never occurred anywhere, and will never inform the real evolution of any society.
This minimal state that Nozick conjures through ‘logic’ differs quit a bit from the social
contract proposed by Hobbes, Locke, or Rousseau who justified (a) limitless powers of the
(implicitly) agreed sovereign (Hobbes), (b) sovereign powers of the democratic collective
leadership (Locke), or (c) (problematically) the power of the state to undertake significant
restructuring of distribution in society (Rousseau). Nozick’s state, for instance, can’t tax people
in any way except for charging them for the protection of property and provision of justice.
Provision of public goods is ruled out, and the idea of equality of opportunity specifically
disputed. In restricting the state so tightly, many potential benefits from cooperation must fail to
be realised in Nozick’s proposed ‘state’.
If Nozick’s minimal state is capable of maximising our freedoms, his model may still be of
some value. But in my view, Nozick’s minimalist state is unlikely to succeed in protecting
property rights or protecting freedom, because human incentives are often far extremely urgent
and can’t wait for demoktesis or for private protection associations to be organised (demoktesis is
a conception that apparently leads to some form of democracy, whereby each person possesses a
share of ownership in others). Why would anyone care to build ‘private’ protection associations
when even the most primitive tribes naturally provide this function? Not even the meanest
society exists without some form of organisation for the protection of the life of its members.
Tribes represent the natural ‘social contract’, and as we explore the formation of such contracts,
we find no barter or trade: simple coercive force authorised and used by the patriarch.
Nozick notes that democratic rule (presumably a consequence of demoktesis) does lead to
outcomes contrary to what he advocates. Democracies tend towards middle class welfare
(redistribution!). 67 If so, why would this redistribution not be anticipated, blocking all possibility
of democracy? After all, many eminent philosophers have not been fans of democracy.
More attractive models of the social contract are therefore needed, and I present one such
model in chapter 4. A desirable model could extend the reach of the minimal state to the point
when competing strategies and incentives (including those towards middle class welfare) are
sufficiently balanced with a focus on justice, to allow a stable equilibrium to develop.
I believe that a small shift from Nozick’s minimal ‘state’ can succeed where Nozick’s model
fails. Nozick admitted in 1989 that his earlier model had failed to fully extract the value to be
obtained from ‘humane considerations and joint cooperative activities’. We want to extract the
greatest value from our association with others (positive externalities), without having to see
poverty-stricken scavengers picking rubbish from garbage heaps, or leprous beggars in every
street corner (negative externalities). We want a decent society, not a place comprising asocial
narcissistic individualists who robotically trade with others when they need to, otherwise
counting their pennies like Scrooge, indifferent to moral sentiments. We want a humane society,
where high walls do not partition us from the rest of the world. We do also want common assets
like roads and bridges.
People in Nozick’s society believe that tax is theft, therefore they don’t collaborate, even to
build public goods. But we know that free markets supply such products sub-optimally, given
free rider problems. Residents of Nozick’s society therefore live in splendid isolation and in
relative poverty. Anything requiring collaboration is generally too complex for them to
undertake because they incur huge transaction costs each time in establishing the governance
structures, not having any existing institutions to facilitate such outcomes, and excessive
competition or duplication of activities due to a multitude of suppliers leads to a terrible waste of

67 Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974, pp.274-5.

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scarce resources. And while there is charity, the children of handicapped beggars roam the
streets. One can say this because there has never been a time in history when charity has been
sufficiently forthcoming in quantum to feed and educate all the poor. The classical liberal state,
of course, takes care of all these issues are quite effectively through social insurance. Nozick’s
society is therefore over-optimistic and ill-thought out. It displays deep ignorance about how
collective projects work.
It is true that government provision of public goods and a social minimum will displace some
voluntary communitarian efforts, and charity. But the Nozickian failure is acute. It is a mistake
to imagine that generosity towards others is a basic human trait (generosity, where it exists, is
usually strategic). Indeed, the world is full of hypocrites, such as those who claim to help poor
children even as they exploit them. Fagins abound. Institutional charities (including the church)
have black sheep in their midst. Humans – as a species – are not always nice. Because of the
natural absence of trust in societies without effective government, people cooperate less than
they would otherwise do. Having a good government encourages cooperation, leading ultimately
to the moral utopia that Nozick would like us to aim for without such a government.
Nozick’s state is inconsistent with the historical record, never having existed. Nor have
market-based protection associations ever arisen either on their own or on the basis of Nozick’s
proposals. Instead, societies have always started out as collectivist tribes and moved towards
even more centralised modes of organisation through monarchies (which are essentially
dictatorships). The liberal republican state, with its modern ‘rights’ (including some Nozickian)
emerged only after many kings had been beheaded and many bloody revolutions done with. The
modern state is much stronger than the tribe and hence better able to protect us from predators
– both internal and external. Citizens in modern societies prefer the strong state to a less
structured tribal or feudal society. They also provide voluntary consent to other taxes through
democratic representation. Most modern societies voluntarily legislate for common
infrastructure and reasonable equality of opportunity. There are therefore good reasons why
modern states are so effective.
Two main reasons prevent private associations from supplying public goods – free riding and
transaction costs 68. The latter costs are non-trivial. Each citizen in the Nozickian minimal state
needs to invest time and energy to enter into separate contracts, individually, for each public
good. There is the added cost of monitoring and enforcing these contracts, and excluding those
who have not signed up for the public good and ensuring regular payment from those who have
signed up, for ongoing maintenance of these public goods. It is far cheaper that everyone in
society be forced through a government mechanism to pay for the necessary public goods
through a price discriminating taxation system, saving everyone time and money, and enabling
an optimal quantum of public goods to be made available. It is true that aggregation of
individual choices is difficult, and so the government provision may be found unsuitable by some
(I refer to this conflict between some such utilitarian objectives and freedom in chapter 4).
There is no reason why the government that we have already created (for our defence) can’t
also provide a few additional services at a relatively low marginal cost and under democratic
oversight. Classical liberalism extends Nozick’s minimal state to provide infrastructure and
reasonable equality of opportunity. A liberal society thus becomes a decent, enabling society.
c) Self-ownership (and hence ownership of our property)
According to Nozick, property rights arise from the basic fact that we ‘own’ ourselves – our
body, mind, and abilities (self-ownership). With this separateness as basis, Nozick asserts that
we are free to do whatever we please with our body and mind (and hence property). But it is not
clear how property rights can arise simply through self-ownership. Who will defend these
‘rights’, and why? In any event, I believe that a view of society based primarily only on our
separateness is grossly insufficient to inform a theory of man that lives in society.
According to Nozick, it is from self-ownership that our freedoms arise. In thus giving
primacy to property rights, liberty is seen as a derivative. In doing so Nozick (seemingly) picks

68 E.g. see Stevens, Joe B., The Economics of Collective Choice, Bounder, Colarado: Westview Press, 1993, p.170.

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up on Rousseau who believed that property was ‘the most sacred of the all the rights of citizens,
and more important in certain respects than freedom itself.’ 69
Nozick thought he was extending Locke’s theory of property. The fact, however, is that Locke
saw freedom as the prior principle:
[W]e must consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to
order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the
bounds of the law of Nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man. 70
While our person, possessions, and liberty are deeply inter-related, it is not tenable to argue, as
Nozick does, that property ‘rights’ take primacy over liberty. Indeed, Nozick argues that self-
ownership gives us unlimited power to do as we please. Thus, a prostitute ‘may choose to offer
his or her sexual services to anyone who chooses to purchase them; it is her (or his) body, and it
is up to her (or him) to decide who may use it, in what ways, and at what price.’ 71 This is not
sensible, not being bounded by accountability. Should a prostitute be able to set up shop in the
open on a beach or park, or next to a school? Taking this even further, Nozick believes that we
must be allowed to even sell ourselves into slavery if we wish, thus extinguishing our liberty
entirely. 72 Such primacy of property rights can therefore lead to extremely perverse outcomes,
for the free society cannot countenance slavery, being totally incompatible with liberty.
Instead, the free society must aim to seek to reduce the supply of prostitutes by providing
equal opportunity (e.g. by eliminating poverty and providing education), thus reducing economic
pressures or ignorance that could lead to such an occupational choice (noting, however, that such
circumstances are not an excuse to take to prostitution: not every poor and uneducated person
makes such a choice). With the supply of prostitutes motivated by economic and social pressures
thus eliminated, only those genuinely interested in such a profession will enter. Being well-
educated, they will also be far more capable of defending not only their own body but preventing
the spread of disease. If someone chooses to become a sex worker under such enlightened
circumstances, we would deem that to be the free choice of the person in the Nozickian sense.
The lifelong seedy reputation and loss of at least some opportunities for her children would be
her conscious decision. But accountability will still apply. The voluntary prostitute still won’t be
free to harm others by spreading disease. She would also need to insure her health, and won’t be
entitled to taxpayer funding for damage to her health caused by this choice. Subject to these
constraints, we will be able to live with Nozick’s interpretation of her freedom.
It is our innate urge for life and liberty, along with our animal rights or powers to enforce
trespasses against our life and liberty, that ultimately underpin our negotiated rights. Property
is merely a derivative right. One must agree with David Hume’s justice based perspective on
property and that of Milton Friedman. Friedman, for instance, believes that, ‘property rights are
matters of law and social conventions’. 73 But of course, such a position, inappropriately qualified,
can become dangerous! Friedman is, however, talking here about precisely negotiated social
definitions of property. Thus, he asks: ‘Does my having title to land … permit me to deny
someone else the right to fly over my land in his airplane?’ 74, concluding that ‘the existence of a
well specified and generally accepted definition of property is far more important than just what
the definition is.’ 75 As he further notes, the ‘definition and enforcement [of property rights] is one
of the primary functions of the state.’ 76
And now a few brief remarks on a quaint element in Nozick’s theory, borrowed from one of
Locke’s incidental arguments, are perhaps in order. This is the Lockean proviso, or what Nozick
calls the compensation principle. The view here is that those who come later to a ‘scene’ where

69 Carnoy, Martin, The State and Political Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 22.
70 John Locke (1690). Two Treatises on Government. ‘Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil
Government’, Chapter 2, section 4. [http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/7370]
71 [http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/professor-robert-nozick-729710.html]
72 Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974, p. 331.
73 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982 [1962]. p. 162.
74 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982 [1962]. p. 26.
75 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982 [1962]. p. 27.
76 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982 [1962]. p. 162.

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earlier settlers have acquired all available property from nature, should be compensated by
these earlier settlers. I discuss this further in Chapter 12, but it is sufficient to note at this stage
that this principle is not sustainable on the basis of the animal powers arguments that Nozick
uses (or that I think he uses). No animal ever compensates future ‘settlers’ for what it may take
from nature. Our animal powers are amoral, absolute, and totally unrelated to anyone else’s
survival or arrival on the scene. We can accept no artificial requirement (outside of the
negotiated social contract) that restricts what we can do with our property. Plus, this is an
impractical idea. It is impossible to trace such human settlements tens of thousands of years
back. The commencement date of such a clause would therefore be arbitrary. That would make it
impossible to administer except for a few new settlements. Making such an arbitrary rule would
violate the rule of law – of general rules applicable to everyone. Hence Nozick’s argument is not
sustainable.

3. Where does this lead us?

It may be useful to summarise one’s findings in this chapter in the context of commonly held
debates about socialism. There is a commonly held view among superficial thinkers that
countries in Europe are ‘socialist’. That is actually a mistake. The simplest way is to think about
socialism is as a system of equal outcomes, which can only be achieved through (a) the abolition
of property rights, and (b) incessant redistribution. But property rights are protected in Europe
and all of them have (relatively) free markets. Yes, there is a strong welfare system which
amounts to incessant redistribution. They are social liberal or modern liberal, not socialist. So if
we ignore socialism we can compare three theories of liberty: social liberalism (e.g. social
democracy), classical liberalism, and libertarianism.
Most Western societies are social liberal in their make up, operating a range of welfare
schemes. John Rawls and T.H. Green are the Godfathers of social liberalism, which involves a
property-owning democracy with extensive redistribution. While there is some merit in Rawlsian
conceptions of equality of opportunity, his difference principle goes seriously overboard,
impinging on our liberties. A society is not free to take away and redistribute other’s property.
The second of these is Nozickian libertarianism. This is a broadly utopian framework which
imagines that people will mystically formulate all kinds of perfect contracts and supply
themselves with security and infrastructure. Robert Nozick, and to an extent von Mises, are the
Godfathers of libertarianism. And possibly Ayn Rand. The society in these cases is very close to
anarchy, and any extension in its fundamental precepts would lead to anarcho-libertarianism.
But we neither want the socialistic (or welfare) oriented state of Rawls with its fuzzy conceptions
of social justice and endless redistribution, nor the extreme individualism of Nozick which
diminishes social capital and rebels against our underlying tribal nature.
As a result we have ended up vindicating the traditional, or ‘classical’, philosophers of liberty
– of the 17th to 19th centuries: Adam Smith, John Locke and J.S. Mill. We have seen that modern
advocates of liberty like Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek also speak a meaningful
language. However, there is perhaps no society in the world today which follows classical
liberalism. F.A. Hayek is perhaps the Godfather of modern classical liberals. Others include
Milton Friedman and, of course. Freedom, in this sense, must be restricted to acts of goodness,
else it is license. We also want strong property rights that ought to be precisely defined, all the
while carefully balancing the accountabilities involved. Classical liberals also accept a state
operated social insurance scheme with a tightly defined social minimum. But they oppose all
forms of redistribution. Social justice is not their keyword.
Figure RR depicts different philosophies on the scale of human independence and
cooperation.

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 The optimal position:
Classical liberals
Robert Nozick, Hobbes, Locke,

Independence of thought
Von Mises Adam Smith, J.S.Mill,
Murray Rothbard Hayek, Friedman;
Rajaji, Masani
John
Rawls:
neither fish
and action

nor fowl
Marx: what he Marx: what he
achieved aspired for
Synergies from cooperation
Figure RR: Classical liberalism maximises our equal freedoms
and facilitates cooperation, thus building social capital

In the next chapter I synthesise the ideas outlined so far, and propose a simple theory of
freedom.

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Chapter 4 A theory of freedom

Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest
barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being
brought about by the natural course of things – Adam Smith 1

We’ve done quite a bit of context setting by now. We have looked at the debates about
alternative conceptions of freedom (positive or negative), and whether it originates in God’s law,
natural law, or man-made law. In the end, these debates must be tested on the touchstone of our
self-interest. We do not care for anything – whether masquerading as philosophy or economic
analysis – that doesn’t make simple and logical sense to us, appeals to us and delivers what we
need. This may appear to be an instrumentalist approach to freedom, whereby we care about the
outcomes of freedom, not about its moral merits – but that is why we studied human nature so
extensively – to recognise the strategic and complex, holistic conceptions about human life, and
to remind ourselves that unlike mathematical concepts which can live on their own in books,
known only to a few, social and political concepts must be acceptable to the everyday man.
Freedom must make sense. It must not only be good in itself, but it must deliver on our needs.
So we should now open the debate with the big and blunt questions. What are we really
trying to achieve in our individual lives? What do we really want from our interactions with
others?
It would seem to me that the most important thing we want is the quiet opportunity to be
ourselves, in peace. We want to be able to do things we like: pottering about in our garden
without disturbance. We want the freedom to read the books we like: to celebrate our family
occasions; to merely ‘stand and stare’. To be able to do these mundane things, which are the
essence of life, we essentially need these conditions:
• Security. We don’t want to be attacked while watering our plants either because of civil
unrest or because of some other random situation. If such things happen then all bets are off.
At that moment we will revert to our limitless animal powers both to defend ourselves and to
fight – tooth and nail – for our survival, for liberty, and for peace: for the freedom to tend to
our garden.
• Freedom (and choice). Everything in our lives must be negotiated and agreed by us. We want
to be treated with respect and persuaded by others, not coerced. The laws of our society must
be negotiated by our representatives in parliament. We must have the right to reject
anyone’s offer to sell us things; and the right to not sell the things we produce. We must have
the right to interact with others on terms and conditions we agree.
• Compliance with agreed commitments, and justice. When others agree (such as by an implicit
or explicit contract) to do something for us, we want them to do it! If someone commits to
delivering cement on the day when the floor of our new house is to be laid, we want the
cement to arrive in time. Alternatively, we want the option to sue (and seek to penalise) the
supplier for the loss we incur. If a society fails to enforce them then our allegiance to that
society is over. Justice is fundamental. If necessary, we will revert to our innate powers to
achieve justice, regardless of the violence that may eventuate.
If a ‘theory’ of society supplies us with these basic conditions then we will examine it further;
else not we don’t care about the adulation a theorist may have earned from the fluffy headed and
paternalistic intelligentsia.

1 Adam Smith (1755). In a manuscript he presented to a society of which he was a member. Discussed in the
introduction to Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, University of Chicago Press, 1976, p.xl.

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 Fortunately, these desired conditions are at the heart of the philosophy of freedom. It lets us
retain our differences on religious beliefs and customs, and how we dress or eat. So long as
others don’t attack us, so long as they keep their promises (and consequently recognise property
rights), then we must let them do whatever they want to. We can live in peace if these basic
conditions are met. It is that simple, really.
Individual as the basic unit of society
The theory of freedom begins with individual sovereignty. As Calvin Coolidge pointed out,
‘Liberty is not collective, it is personal. All liberty is individual liberty.’ 2 We are unique – each of
us – born separately and assured of dying separately, on our own. It is self-evident that we are
not born for others, nor others for us. We are part of the chain of life on earth, but we exist in
ourselves. Even though others can empathise with our pain, they can’t feel it. Our independent
lives and liberties are thus inseparable. This comprehensive sovereignty has implications.
On the other hand, a society is a transient group of individuals who chose at a given moment
to participate, or continue to participate in their self-interest, as a seemingly related group. Being
merely the sum total of participating individuals, the society is not over and above any of its
participating constituents in any way. It is true that as Aristotle thought, ‘Man is by nature a
political animal. Whoever is outside the state is either greater than human or less than human.’ 3
It is also true that in team sports, theatre, or ballet, among others, our social activities lead to
the creation of a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. But after its limited task is done
(participation in the state or communitarian activities), our relationship with the society is done,
and we withdraw into ourselves. In any event, our mere voluntary participation in such
activities does not make the group or society in any form or shape ‘higher’ or more important
than the constituent individuals.
This importance given to the individual has been objected to by Loren Lomasky according to
whom the ‘liberal rights to self-determination are a thin gruel that fails to provide the spiritual
sustenance and sense of a meaning to ones life that are afforded by communal ideals and
commitments.’ 4 Clearly, however, this view is misplaced, for it imagines that asserting the
priority of the individual excludes social engagement. But individualism is not an other name for
asocial narcissism. The free person accepts a significant role for group activity. Indeed, he is not
less concerned than anyone else about communitarian values. It is, instead, likely that the
liberal is a genuine patriot with great pride in the advances in freedom in his nation.
A deep student of society, the liberal never hesitates to immerse himself in social issues.
This should be obvious, that advancing our self-interest is best done through good humour, even
camaraderie and trust. The liberal is also keenly inspired by the diverse contributions others
bring to the table. He recognises that social engagement is not only beneficial in many ways, it is
essential if our children are to grow up into well-adjusted citizens. Things like religion or
debates against religion, culture and sports form an integral part of the free society. The
primacy and emphasis given to individual freedom and accountability is not, and was never
intended as a demand to isolate individuals. Indeed, this book is the product of my personal,
strongly communitarian project to help reform India’s governance. Nothing would please me
more than to hear late into my old age that this book did make a useful contribution – even if
small – in this communitarian enterprise. There is no disconnect between asserting our
freedoms and aspiring for a great society – these are essentially one and the same. It is crucial,
however, that we always retain the choice of participating (or not participating) in collective
enterprises. Our social interactions must always be voluntary and not coerced.
In contrast, world views like socialism or fascism entirely subordinate the individual to
collective goals, not only diminishing but even oppressing, the individual. Deception and violence
naturally follows from these ideologies, as the allegedly prior claims of the ‘nation’ are forced
down the throat of the citizens. The theory of freedom demands that no one should set goals for

2Calvin Coolidge, in a speech in Washington, DC, 21 September, 1924.

3Aristotle, Politics, 1:2) CHECK.
4 Loren E. Lomasky, ‘Nozick’s Libertarian Utopia’, in David Schmidtz (ed.) (2002). Robert Nozick. Cambridge

University Press, p.60.

93
us; that must always remain our prerogative. The idea of a ‘social goal’ is abhorrent; simply
unacceptable. All we can agree collectively on that all of us should be free subject to being
accountable. What we choose to do with our liberty is entirely our business, not that of the
society or nation, as long as we commit to remaining accountable.
* * *
I have consolidated my conceptions about liberty into five foundational propositions. Where
appropriate, I highlight similarities and differences between my propositions and those of others
in the literature. It is crucial that on a matter as important as our life and liberty, which affects
each of us personally, we must insist on something that we can readily understand. In doing so, I
am conscious that I may have glossed over some potentially important elements. Where such
inconsistencies are pointed out, I am happy to review and tighten the arguments accordingly.
It is useful, in conceptualising general principles about liberty to imagine that we were been
born without any knowledge and grew up in isolation. In other words, the question then would
be: What would I, an ordinary human being (not Hindu nor even Indian) want of a society? To
this general membership of humanity, if I were to then add my current understandings of
human nature and human history, then what would I want? I believe this is a scientific
approach to freedom – not restricted to ‘my’ country, ‘my’ religion, or even ‘my’ personal
attributes.

Proposition 1. Life is the yardstick of ultimate value

John G. Gill believes that ‘life-affirmation … [is] at the base of any consistent system.’ 5
Indeed, life affirmation is the foundation of the theory of liberty. We an agree at the outset with
Protagoras (c.490-420 BC) that ‘Man is the measure of all things.’ 6 Human life is of ultimate
value, mankind’s survival being of the greatest interest. This precedes everything else: beauty,
morality, truth: even freedom. Without my existing and being able to bring up my children,
there can be no value in the universe. I am the reason the world exists. Without me, it doesn’t
matter if it exists or not. This is a basic truism. Similarly, one must surely agree with Albert
Schweitzer who said: ‘Reverence for life affords me my fundamental principle of morality,
namely that good consists in maintaining, assisting, and enhancing life, and that to destroy, to
harm, or to hinder life is evil’. (One may argue this matter, of course – for is ‘reverence’ the right
word to use? How can we possibly ‘revere’ the life of, say a Hitler?)
This tells us that we ought first to act in order to protect and enable the maximum number
of human lives. By no means is this a religious or spiritual view, although religions do place a
singular emphasis on life. This does not mean, either, that all lives are of equal value under all
situations: but more on that presently. If human life is of ultimate value then it must be treated
as an end in itself. We must agree with Immanuel Kant that we need to ‘[a]ct in such a manner
as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case and at
all times as an end as well, never as a means only.’ 7 That means respecting other human lives.
Ideologies that oppose life
Given widespread consensus about this proposition, it is hard to believe that there can exist
entire philosophies that directly (or indirectly) devalue and dishonour human life. These include
socialism, communism, fascism, and various kinds of religious intolerance. Their followers
assume the role of judge, jury and executioner, all rolled up in one. Socialist regimes advocate
class divisions whereby the rich are seen as the enemies of the working class. Marx advocated
the dictatorship of the proletariat (workers) as a transitional step ‘to the abolition of all classes’.
The capitalist society is basically classless anyway, due to the provision of equal opportunity –
and so the socialist case fails. But calling for dictatorship of the proletariat and provoking
physical violence against the rich is totally reprehensible and destructive of life and liberty.

5John G. Gill (1971). ‘The Definition of Freedom’, in Ethics, Vol.82(1). October 1971. p.13.
6 By Protagoras (c.490– 420 BC), cited in Laszlo Versenyi, ‘Protagoras' Man-Measure Fragment’, The American
Journal of Philology, Vol. 83, No. 2, (Apr., 1962), pp. 178-184.
7 Cited in Anton-Hermann Chroust, ‘About a Fourth Formula of the Categorical Imperative in Kant’ in The

Philosophical Review, Vol. 51, No. 6, (Nov., 1942), pp. 600.

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 It has been suggested that Marx did not intend communism to take the shape it took in the
USSR or China. True, but once the concept of envy germinates, brutal violence is inevitable. And
so, hundreds of thousands of kulaks were killed during Stalin’s terrorist regime. Mao’s followers
similarly brutally attacked the rich (during these processes, a vast number of ordinary people
died, as well). In the end, the poor didn’t benefit anyway. Only the elites among the so-called
‘working class’ benefited, holding all important positions in society.
Hegelian perspectives in particular have led to the growth of statist and power-crazed views
which came to their own with communism and fascism. Thus a person like Mao Zedong could
say that: ‘[t]he seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central
task and the highest form of revolution,’ 8 and that ‘all political power flows out of the barrel of a
gun’. 9 Fascism divides people into (often religion-based) groups and advocates the overarching
supremacy of the state of one of these groups (e.g., as Hitler wanted to achieve the supremacy of
the so-called Aryans). In doing so, fascism denies equal freedom, often, in this process, treating
these other groups as lower life forms (like insects) – to be exterminated. Thus it quickly
becomes genocidal.
And then there are some Muslims who, imagining erroneously that in doing so they defend
Islam, regularly kill others (see Box HH).
Box HH
Does Islam authorise the wanton destruction of life?
Islamic organisations across the world have by now become hoarse, telling us that
terrorists do not represent Islam. Tens of Muslim organisations and leaders have, on the
internet, repeatedly condemned terrorist activities conducted in the name of Islam. These
views aren’t reported in the news, hence few people hear of them. 10 To illustrate these
arguments, consider Benazir Bhutto’s writings in Reconciliation.
Let us look specifically at the issue of terrorism. Muslim jurists developed a specific body
of laws called siyar that interprets and analyses the just causes for war. Part of the law
indicates that ‘those who unilaterally and thus illegally declare a call to war, attack
unarmed civilians and recklessly destroy property are in flagrant violation of the Islamic
juristic conception of bellum justum. Islamic law has a name for such rogue militants,
muharibun. A modern definition of muharibun would very closely parallel the
contemporary meaning of ‘terrorists’. The acts that these muharibun commit would be
called hiraba (‘terrorism’).’ [citing Asma Afsaruddin, “Competing Perspectives in Jihad:
Jihad and Martyrdom in Early Islamic Sources”] Thus all terrorism is wrong. There is no
‘good terrorism’ and ‘bad terrorism’. Osama bin Laden’s creed that ‘the terrorism we
practice is off the commendable kind’ is an invented rationalisation for murder and
mayhem. In Islam, no terrorism - the reckless slaughter of innocents - is ever justified. (p.
27.)
Bin Laden’s utter disregard for the value of human life, especially his doctrine of
including innocents in the senseless carnage, is un-Islamic. Bin Laden is not
representative of Islam, or any civilisation, for that matter. (p.29)
Muslim global terrorists, including Osama bin Laden, display a striking ignorance of
Islam. They distort the message of Islam while at the same time using the name of
religion to attract people to a path to terrorism. (p. 37)
Muslim terrorists, of course, promptly killed Benazir Bhutto for holding such views.
Islam is not the ideology of death, but at least some of its followers have made it so. It is
also clear that some scriptural statements of Islam are easily amenable to
misrepresentation. These are used by some Muslims as an excuse to kill others (True,
similar violent statements are found in all religions: hence my opposition to organised

8 Mao Tse-tung's concluding speech at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party (1938),
as reported by the Maoist Documentation Project. [http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-
works/volume-2/mswv2_12.htm]
9 Madsen, Richard, Review of David E. Apter and Tony Saich’s book Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic,

Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 25 No. 2, 1996, p.187.

10 [http://www.sanjeev.sabhlokcity.com/terrorism.html]. .

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 religions more generally).
Despite there being virtually no scope for religions to review their scriptures, Islam
could particularly benefit from a review of the way its scriptures are interpreted.

What do we mean by life?

We need to be clear about what life means if we are to talk about the ultimate value of
human life. Is a human embryo or foetus of ultimate value? Does stem cell research using
embryonic cells violate this proposition?
Science tells us that till the 11th week of its life the human foetus has only grown into a 3-
inch long bundle of cells with a 1½ inch head. Its brain has by then grown in the developmental
order reminiscent of the three parts of the brains discussed in chapter 1. Its cerebral cortex is
built last of all, being completely smooth (i.e. undeveloped) by this stage. It is not yet a ‘sensing’
being by any stretch of imagination. By the 20th week, over 200 billion neurons have been
created, although only six weeks later, 100 billion of them die, leaving 100 billion cells that will
survive into adulthood. While the brain hardware has been laid by the 26th week, no connections
have been made, nor (hence) any information stored to allow for consciousness. The brain kicks
into life only at this stage – by the 26th week – when the first brainwaves 11 can be detected. Prior
to the 24th week, the foetus can’t feel pain, either. 12 The Foetus is a sensing being, able to sense
sound, albeit at some semi-conscious, soporific, subconscious level. Uncertainty regarding the
precise moment when human awareness lights up, implies that the mother of the foetus is the
best judge of the future of the foetus till around the 26th week, after which the law should
formally protect the foetus as a conscious human being.
The point behind my extensive discussion on this topic was to highlight that our
interpretations must be based on evidence and science, and not become driven by uni-
dimensional ideology (such as that of the Church on this matter) which can become excessively
onerous and impractical, as well as violate the freedoms of the mother to decide whether she
wants to bring a particular child into the world.
The brain of a newborn weighs 350-400 grams and will grow four times into its adulthood
through increased cellular connections, not increased number of cells. These connections, that
reflect the child’s socialisation and upbringing, will ultimately define us as individuals. But
almost all of these develop after birth, not before. At birth we are almost genuinely a tabula
rasa.
Proposition 1 implies a level of concern for animal and plant life, noting that some animal
and plant life is our food. The use of other life forms as sources of energy to keep us alive is fully
consistent with the value of human life, provided we don’t eat an entire species into extinction. 13
It can be argued that treating animals that we will consume as food should not be treated with
unnecessary cruelty. No justification exists for inflicting undue pain on any creature. Killing
pests and creatures that inadvertently harm us must also be done with due regard to this
principle. Having said this, it is clearly inappropriate to give animals or plants similar ‘rights’ to
ours, although it may be useful for practical purposes to legally specify animal ‘rights’ in order to
avoid needless misinterpretation or confusion about the implications of proposition 1.
Other implications
Proposition 1 also has other implications, a few of which I outline here. This does not
contradict the theory of price or the instantaneous market value of objects or people’s skills in a
market place. This is a broader test, asking if the object or person should exist in the first place.
Market values will always be extremely variable, depending entirely on the supply and demand.

11 Anand, K.J.S., and P.R. Hickey, ‘Pain and its effects in the human neonate and fetus’, The New England Journal of
Medicine, Vol. 317, Number 21, 19 November 1987, pp. 1321-1329. [http://www.cirp.org/library/pain/anand/]
12 Henderson, Mark and Francis Elliott, ‘Human foetus feels no pain before the age of 24 weeks, says new scientific

study’, The Times, June 25, 2010 [http://bit.ly/9Q3QoK], reporting on an expert study commissioned by Britain's
Department of Health.
13 Morell, Virginia, ‘Island Ark: A Threatened Treasure’, National Geographic, August 2008, p.82. This article

discusses how drills (a rare monkey) are potentially being eaten to extinction in Boko Island, Equatorial Guinea.

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For instance, in some situations, a glass of drinking water is cheaper than an equivalent
quantity of diamonds, and in others, more expensive. When man migrates to a distant galaxy in
the distant future, as he must, market values of things will be considerably different to what
they are today. But no matter what the instantaneous market value of a product, the
fundamental value of life remains the same.
It does not even need to be mentioned, perhaps, being self-evident, that taking innocent lives
is wrong. However, terrorists routinely break allegiance with humanity [irrespective of whatever
they seek] when they kill people without giving them a fair and robust trial. Human life is not a
means to someone’s ends. This is simply unacceptable and must be punished.
Another implication is that while the free society can reasonably demand is that we tolerate
each other, and let others be, it can’t expect that we go overboard and ‘love’ humanity – although
that is the natural propensity of the liberal. Gandhi remains a genuine ideal in this area. This
proposition also shows that suicide is unacceptable. Nozick’s claim, that since we own our body,
we are free to take our life – is simply not viable. For had we created our own life we might have
possibly had that claim, but we can’t destroy a life – without good reason – that we didn’t create,
being born without our prior consent. In any event, if suicide (representing significant violence
against human life) were acceptable in any form or shape, then arguments against suicide-
bombing would weaken entirely, as well (for how does it matter to us, when our own death – by
our own hands – is admissible, for us to unleash it on others while on our way out?). On the
other hand, euthanasia can be justified in a few rare cases after due diligence, as I’ll touch upon
shortly.
Valuing life does not mean support for a runaway process of multiplying a particular person’s
life. What I mean here is that Proposition I does not authorise cloning (of human life) in any
form or shape.
I have noted earlier that there are no natural ‘rights’, not even to life (rights can only exist if
they are negotiated, accepted, and enforced). Even Nozick did finally admit that the ‘right to life
is not a right to whatever one needs to live’ 14. Thus, no one is obliged to look after us. Our
parents, who brought us into this world, must look after us and bring us up to be responsible
citizens. We can’t expect to be spoon-fed by the society.

Conditions for taking human life

While human life is priceless, not all lives deserve the protection of the free society. A strong
argument exists both for capital punishment and for decisively killing an opponent in defensive
war. Justice must allow for the option of taking human life after due process. Duly appointed
judges (or a jury) can, after fair trial, and where absolutely necessary, authorise the destruction
of a particular human life as part of the principles of accountability. Such destruction would
potentially save innocent lives in the future as well, by signalling that the society holds heinous
murderers to account. A murderer cannot turn around and ask for his or her life to be protected.
An exception should be made for those who have killed because of a seriously deficient brain,
or defective brain chemistry, not with ‘reasoned’, malicious intent. But the science behind such
arguments is usually weak and unsuitable. Exceptions of this sort therefore need to be
considered only in extremely obvious cases. Unfortunately, there is now a trend to seek
exceptions even for otherwise normal criminals, particularly on the ground that the society
failed to bring them up properly. According to this view: ‘The criminal, as a rule, is a product of
social conditions’. 15 But these are dangerously collectivist arguments, for they place an
accountability on the general society than on the individual, or even on some other particular,
specific individual. Who precisely is responsible, and to what extent – is never made clear. Such
broad-brush accountabilities are dangerous, and undermine the very possibility of freedom.

14Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974, p.179n.
15De Leon, Daniel, ‘Reforming Prisoners’, Daily People, New York, 22 April 1904, being an organ of the Socialist
Labor Party.

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 We need also to be extremely wary of claims of projects to reform, rehabilitate, re-educate,
re-socialise, or reintegrate criminals. While a modicum of humane treatment, even of heinous
prisoners, is necessary, the punishment must be actually felt in order to ensure accountability.
The criminal must be provided the opportunity to reflect upon his actions through the period of
punishment and encouraged to reintegrate with society after active self-realisation. ‘[S]ignificant
change can result only from the individual’s own insight and uses dialogue to encourage the
process of self-discovery. Humanistic rehabilitation offers inmates a sound and trust-worthy
opportunity to remake their lives.’ 16 Such an approach would encourage prisoners to learn new
things to express themselves better and to handle their emotions better. This is not
rehabilitation in the sense typically intended, but training in responsibility. As a result, when
they finish their prison term, they would be capable of reverting to normalcy. Of course, it is
important that on completion of such a sentence, the (erstwhile) criminal be treated normally.
the crime having been ‘cleansed’, and therefore the person accorded a second chance.
While humane treatment is fine, even necessary, taxpayers are under no obligation to
reform heinous criminals. But the life of murderers is often held to be sacrosanct: some countries
have even abolished capital punishment, ignoring entirely the inhumanity of murderers, and
destroying the concept of accountability entirely. An approach that protects heinous murderers
is quite reprehensible, to say the least, apart from its destroying all prospects of justice. Capital
punishment for heinous murder is entirely valid, in addition to signalling a deterrent effect and
therefore preventing at least a few innocents from being killed by such maniacs. Opponents of
capital punishment effectively ask innocent taxpayers to shelter, clothe, and feed murderers –
even as many other citizens live in poverty. Justice must be clinical, like a surgeon: never
squeamish. The accounts must be settled. Justice cannot display equal sympathy towards good
and evil.
The situation during war is only slightly different. The instantaneous decision of a soldier to
kill enemies (including civilians who come in the way) during war must still be have a justifiable
foundation. An unjust war violates justice, hence freedom. The war against Nazi Germany was,
by this yardstick, an entirely just war. All non-Germans on earth might have been enslaved if
the Allies had not fought Hitler. Indeed, the Allies should have entered the battlefield much
earlier to nip Hitler’s life-threatening ideology in the bud. Churchill was right to issue his early
warning in 1930 to the British about the dangers of not exterminating Hitler: ‘If a dog makes a
dash for my trousers, I shoot him down before he can bite.’ 17 Early action would have saved tens
of millions of innocent lives. But squeamishness and risk aversion meant that clinical justice
was not administered, and the disease spread so deep that the final cost to destroy it was
humungous.
When basic considerations of humanity are breached on a large scale, determined global
action is necessary. The claims of national sovereignty weaken considerably when nations
destroy their own citizens. Nations are not innately sovereign, only people are. National
sovereignty is derived sovereignty, a secondary calculation in the bigger picture of human
affairs. We live in nation states for our convenience, not because nations are of fundamental
consequence. Where humans are being massacred in large numbers by their ‘leaders’ then other
nations are obliged to step in and overthrow such killing machines. It is not possible nor hence
sensible to exhort Adolf Hitler or Saddam Hussein to behave well towards their people. They
must be captured, tried and beheaded. Not doing so makes the rest of humanity an accomplice to
mass-murder.
Making a decision to intervene early in such circumstances may well pose deep challenges,
and create a major conundrum for democratic societies. Intervening too early might make it
difficult to adduce counterfactual evidence about killings that have been prevented. Politicians
who intervene early are likely to be criticised about their ‘over-reaction’. Such considerations

16 Rotman, Edgardo, ‘Do Criminal Offenders Have a Constitutional Right to Rehabilitation?’, The Journal of Criminal
Law and Criminology, Vol. 77, No. 4 (Winter, 1986), p. 1026.
17 Quoted in The Last Lion: Alone (1939-1940) by William Manchester.

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make it hard for most ordinary politicians to initiate an early response. Such is the tragedy of
democracy, which leaves us vulnerable to the worst elements of humanity.
In similar vein, not shooting rioters during a communal riot, or not engaging Naxalites or
other terrorists in battle, or not destroying communists who claim that ‘power flows from the
barrel of a gun’, amounts to conniving at the destruction of innocent human life. Our inaction
can be tantamount to action in favour of evil.

Proposition 2. We are born free, and must remain free

What use is life to us if we are born into slavery or as second-class citizens? What use is it if
we are discriminated against on grounds of caste, skin colour, or creed? We need to be assured of
equal dignity and allowed the freedom to try to become whatever it is we wish to be. We need the
freedom to choose our means of livelihood. On a broader level, we need the freedom to undertake
any lawful act. Next to life – if not on par with it – liberty is the thing we value the most. Will
Durant rightly spoke about ‘freedom as [being] the very essence of our inner selves’ 18.
But how are we born free? Is a newly born infant free in any meaningful way? Clearly, John
Milton thought so: ‘No man who knows aught’, he said, ‘can be so stupid to deny that all men
naturally were born free.’ 19 But of course, calling others ‘stupid’ may not be the best way to get
their agreement to our suggestions. We need to offer robust reasons.
And, indeed, this proposition is true. Upon some reflection it will become clear that even
infants are free – at least in two critical ways. At the most basic level, they are free because
nature doesn’t create ‘slave humans’ unlike worker bees which are created to work for other
bees. Infants are born free with a powerful brain that is already built and ready to be used for
independent thinking. Also, the infant’s experience of freedom is complete, without the exercise
of voluntary restraint. There is no embarrassment, no hiding of its feelings, emotions, needs. We
will never again achieve that wholeness of being. But of course, infants are not free in a
fundamental sense – to defend themselves. They depend on their parents. A loud cry brings their
defence force rushing to their rescue. This lack of direct freedom is not therefore an
insurmountable deficit in the argument. The infant’s security is part of its parents freedom –
and hence it is protected. And thus it is free.
This sovereign and complete freedom we are born with can only be diminished by taking bits
of it away. No additional freedom can ever be created. So the demand for a more free society is
not a demand for new freedoms, but a demand that our freedoms which were taken away by the
state, be returned.
The second part of this Proposition asserts that we must remain free. Not doing so would
amount to deliberately asking for restrictions on our freedoms. But except for the hypothetical
‘happy slave’, we maintain the view that imprisonment or any other restriction on our freedoms
is a barrier to our existence; a form of punishment. Not just us: even animals don’t appreciate
being imprisoned in a cage – as their joy when released confirms. It surely is unsurprising that
in 5,000 years of recorded human history no slave has written a paean in celebration of slavery,
nor has solitary confinement been commended as entertainment.
But if freedom is so crucial to our sense of identity and wellbeing, why did Maslow (in
defining his hierarchy of needs) not talk about it at all? He was focused, I believe, on our urgent,
not our important needs. While freedom does not appear, at least on the surface, to be urgent
compared with our physiological needs (air, water, food, security), without it none of the other
needs matter. Therefore, when ranked in the order of importance, life and liberty always ranks
first.
The poorest villager would prefer to amble about freely as a tramp, at liberty to enjoy the
sunset in quiet dignity, than live in solitary confinement inside a large house with golden
cutlery, lavish food and a silken bed – but a house without windows, books, companionship or
any possibility of awareness about the outside world. Our physiological needs are dramatically

18 Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy, London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1948 [1947], p.245.
19 John Milton, British poet (1608-74), in his The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1649).

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unimportant in compared with freedom. Getting up at the spur of a moment and driving off to
the nearby hills for a walk must always be an option for the free man. Maslow’s hierarchy must
be modified, or at least suitably qualified. Well before physiological and security needs, comes
the need for freedom. As Pearl S. Buck so eloquently wrote in 1943, ‘Men would rather be
starving and free than fed in bonds’. 20
There is another vital argument here – that liberty is necessary for us to develop a moral
personality. Without freedom, we can never distinguish right from the wrong. Our actions can
only be tested on the yardstick of ethics if they are made in freedom. Let us remember what
Bastiat so eloquently said: ‘Life, liberty, and property do not exist because men have made laws.
On the contrary, it was the fact that life, liberty, and property existed beforehand that caused
men to make laws in the first place.’ 21

Equal maximal freedom

While contesting against Abraham Lincoln, Stephen A. Douglas said:
He [Lincoln] says that he looks forward to a time when slavery shall be abolished everywhere. I
look forward to a time when each state shall be allowed to do as it pleases. If it chooses to keep
slavery forever, it is not my business but its own; if it chooses to abolish slavery, it is its own
business – not mine. I care more for the great principle of self-government, the right of the
people to rule, than I do for all the Negroes in Christendom. 22
Douglass’s claims about freedom actually destroy the very possibility of freedom. Such
illegitimate interpretations of liberty can only be opposed by insisting on equal freedom; by
requiring the powers of self-determination to be available to everyone. Equality of freedom must
imply that all human relationships must be voluntary, negotiated; on equal footing.
So who can be free? Everyone who can be held to account. Societies generally nominate an
age, say 18, when a person can be considered accountable for his actions and hence becomes
officially free. Everyone else must have the legal rights to equal freedom (including supervised
but genuine freedom for those below 18 years of age), except those with severe intellectual
disabilities or with an extreme but (perhaps) curable psychological disturbance. Those above 18
are usually given equal power to participate in the affairs of their society. Those who can’t
evaluate their options for actions and be mindful of their accountabilities, can’t be allowed to be
totally free. But we mustn’t go overboard, for only those with extremely significant intellectual
or psychological deficits can be exempt from the dictates of freedom. Thomas S. Szasz discovered
that too many psychiatrists are willing to accept deterministic explanations for people’s
behaviour, providing shelter even to criminals from accountability. Such an approach has also
led, perversely, to incarcerating healthy and innocent people in hospitals against their will. 23 For
the vast majority of people, no particular distinction or exemption in their equal freedoms is
justified.
Unfortunately, the educated have a strong tendency to downplay others’ capacity for
freedom. Even J.S. Mill, the great champion of liberty, wrote:
Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind
have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. … we may leave out of
consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its
nonage. …Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end
be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. … Until then, there is
nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to
find one. 24
Mill implied that barbarians were not entitled to the same liberties that more advanced
societies like England were. Vast parts of the globe were therefore apparently not yet ready for

20 Buck, Pearl S., What America Means to Me, 1943.

21 Bastiat, Frédéric, The Law, internet edition at the Foundation for Economic Education, p.7
22 Political Debates Between Hon. Abraham Lincoln and Hon. Stephen A. Douglas (1860), Columbus: Follett, Foster

and Company, p.238. Digitised at Google Books.

23 Chapter on Involuntary Commitment in Powell, Jim (2000), The Triumph of Liberty, New York: The Free Press.
24 Mill, J. S., On Liberty, pp. 9-11 CHECK.

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freedom. Such paternalistic views were later reflected, for instance, in Winston Churchill – who
thought that the proud people of an ancient civilisation like India were not yet ready for
democracy. Even today, some people argue that freedom is not suitable for the ‘lower castes’ or
women. The Roman Catholic Church thinks that women are incapable of the spiritual excellence
relevant to priesthood (apparently women can become saints, though, a higher calling!). Many
Islamic societies, in similar vein, keep women on a tight leash, treating them more like dogs or
chattel than independent human beings. And not just Islamic nations do so. For a long time,
women were legally treated like chattel in the USA (‘Kentucky in 1890 was the last state to
consider women as chattel property, who could not own the clothes they wore’ 25).
But paternalism never goes away easily. There are some allegedly super-rational people who
argue that ‘common’ people are easily manipulated by advertising and political propaganda, and
that therefore their choices are not genuine. For instance, when the Germans committed ghastly
crimes against the Jews and followed Hitler into perdition, we are told that they were not
responsible, having been allegedly ‘manipulated’ by propaganda. But only where a threat of
violence is attached to such propaganda can we accept this argument. Else the Germans who
supported Hitler in his brutality can’t be exonerated. In general, people must be held responsible
for their actions. To claim that our free will and responsibility can be diluted merely because
someone has advertised a product would be to think of ourselves as teenagers. We must resist
arguments that deny free will, and hence deny responsibility.
Some argue that smokers, even murderers are ‘helpless’, being conditioned by their
circumstances. Some smokers have sued and won enormous monetary ‘compensation’ for the
cancer they wrought upon themselves on such unsustainable grounds. Adults can’t be permitted
to make such claims. Attempts to dilute accountability destroy the very possibility of freedom.
Our obligation to learn from our mistakes is the first casualty. When it is easy to blame others
for our failures, why put in any effort to reform?
Some people argue that the ‘common public’ shouldn’t be free because people can be
dangerous. David Livingstone Smith found that we are all potentially hardwired to kill others –
in war or as gangs. 26 Also, under duress or extreme stress, we all can do unpredictable,
dangerous things. We can become temperamental, angry and ‘difficult’. These are the grounds
used to argue against liberty. As a solution to this apparent problem, such people advocate
paternalistic government to monitor us. From Plato’s time – who argued for an aristocracy in his
Republic, the more arrogant philosophers have sought to create meritocracies. This penchant for
benevolent dictatorship is particularly deep rooted in religious traditions. For instance, in Hindu
mythology, Lord Rama and Krishna, being apparently flawless, were considered fit to rule over
the laity. Such mythology is bolstered by the unquestioning faith people have in those who are
‘representatives’ of God. Indeed, the king himself, in most traditions, was considered to be the
direct representative of God, and his word became the law. Kings apparently magically know
more than the common man, and were of perfect character.
Plato sorts humans into two: one type (possibly white, handsome and male?) is presumably
fit to control the destiny of the second type, effectively therefore carrying the ‘white man’s
burden’. But, of course, there is no known way to distinguish character and capability through
someone’s appearance, for all of us, including the king and pauper, have practically the same
genes. But can’t we tell the good from the bad through academic examinations – maybe an
examination that selects civil servants in India? Isn’t it true that there are no drunkards or
corrupt people among members of these elite civil services! This method clearly can’t work,
either.
There is therefore no way that permitting different types of people different levels of freedom
can be justified. When even Gandhi admitted to many flaws, no ordinary mortal (meaning
everyone) can ever come close to perfection. Surely there are millions of people of good character,
but no one is good enough to be elevated above us. Yes, we can listen to the doctor but choosing

25University of Louisville: [http://library.louisville.edu/ekstrom/special/suffrage/suffrage.html]

26David Livingstone Smith (2007). The Most Dangerous Animal: Human Nature and the Origins of War. St. Martin’s
Press.

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to comply with his advice is our decision. We can’t take anyone’s word for granted. Plato was
incorrect: we must be all equally free. Instead of dreaming up aristocratic utopias let us build
systems of governance that check each other’s powers and ensure justice This will restrain our
bad side, allowing expression only of the good.
These first two propositions refer to our equal claims on our own life and liberty that none
should deprive us without very good reason. William O. Douglas’s view captures their flavour:
‘In fascist, communist, and monarchical states, government is the source of rights: government
grants rights; government withdraws rights. In our scheme of things, the rights of man are
unalienable. They come from the Creator, not from a president, a legislature, or a court.’ 27 Life
and liberty are innate, even if they must be guaranteed through a man-made social contract, in
order to be enforceable. No government has an innate claim to diminish these rights: it must do
so only according to the social contract.

We are not free to injure ourselves

I may be generalising too widely (given that morality is often culture-specific), but it would
appear that all conceptions of morality ultimately hinge on these two propositions for
sustenance. Albert Schweitzer’s approach (sanctity of life) is a useful entry into the conceptions
of morality as long as we don’t go overboard, but consider it as one of the key factors along with
liberty. Together, they inform a good starting position on moral questions. The Golden Rule and
Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative, both of which reflect these two basic principles provide
further insight (Golden Rule: ‘Do unto others what you would have them do unto you’; Kant’s
categorical imperative: ‘Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it
should become a universal law’ 28).
We can now test the implications of Propositions 1 and 2 by asking: What happens if these
two propositions come into conflict? Are we free, for example, to harm ourselves? More bluntly,
can our liberty destroy our life?
a) Suicide
We are the only creature that is known to take its own life. No other creature self-destructs
(although behaviour that remotely resembles depression is displayed by outcast primates). Since
no predominantly rational argument for suicide can be made, it can perhaps be considered as the
price our species pays for its complex brain that sends mixed signals. The motivation for suicide
never arises from our purely rational brain. It only arises when conflicting signals from the mid-
and lower- brain – things like emotional distress, depression, or guilt – mingle with the rational
capacity of the brain to plan and enact a specific technique of suicide. No healthy and wealthy
person has ever got up from bed one fine day to rationally declare: ‘I own my healthy body and
happy mind, thus I have the theoretical choice of killing myself – and so, today, instead of going
on my planned holiday with my beautiful wife and children whom I adore, let me go and kill
myself’. This kind of a thing never happens. Someone who is happy or content never commits
suicide.
The existence of suicide, indeed the monotonous regularity of the world’s suicide rate, poses
a serious conundrum. Suicide rates in USA and India are similarly comparable – both being
quite high and unrelated to wealth levels. Suicide is therefore not related to the level of freedom
in a society, either. 29 Roughly between ten to twenty million people attempt suicide globally each
year, of which about a million ‘succeed’ in killing themselves. Indeed, ‘More people die from
suicide [in an average year] than in all of the several armed conflicts around the world’ 30 (noting
that this claim conflicts with the much higher rate of killing in war and genocides, reported by
Rudolph Rummel).

27 Douglas, William O., An Almanac of Liberty, London: Comet Books, 1954, p.12.
28 Cited in Anton-Hermann Chroust, ‘About a Fourth Formula of the Categorical Imperative in Kant’ in The
Philosophical Review, Vol. 51, No. 6, (Nov., 1942), pp. 600.
29 [http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide/country_reports/en/index.html]
30 [http://www.who.int/entity/mental_health/media/en/382.pdf]

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 The emotional factors that may lead to suicide are predominantly matters for sociologists
and psychiatrists to address. Let me, instead, examine some underlying philosophical issues.
The question to address is: Does being free ‘entitle’ us to commit suicide at one’s will?
David Hume (1711-76) thought it does, arguing that ‘no man ever threw away life, while it
was worth keeping’. Also: ‘I am not obliged to do a small good to society at the expence of a great
harm to myself; why then should I prolong a miserable existence, because of some frivolous
advantage which the public may perhaps receive from me?’ 31 Hume seems to have assumed that
people are always rational and will carefully determine whether their life is worth prolonging
but no suicide (excluding euthanasia) is based on reasoning that is even remotely rational. It is
irrational under almost all circumstances to not strongly defend one’s life. Hume perhaps had an
irrational moment while thinking through his position on suicide!
But Nozick’s strong version of self-ownership also responds to this question in the
affirmative. Even J.S. Mill seems to suggest that this is correct. Thus, he writes:
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or
moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it
will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of
others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him,
or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or
visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is
desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the
conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the
part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over
his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. 32 [bolding mine]
And so, if we were to possess absolute self-ownership, then we must have all such rights,
including the right to euthanasia. 33 But Mill doesn’t permit that. He denies us the freedom to
dispose ourselves into slavery: ‘The principle of freedom cannot require that … [a person] should
be free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate … [a person’s] freedom’. 34 And if
we are not free to become slaves, we surely are not free to commit suicide, which would alienate
all our future freedoms. But Mill also wanted the state to abolish the purportedly voluntary form
of self-immolation that Indian women undertook on the funeral pyre of their husband (sati):
Suttee, or the voluntary burning of widows on the funeral piles of their husbands, after having
been long discouraged by every means short of positive prohibition, was finally made a criminal
offence in all who abetted it, by a legislative Act of Lord W. Bentinck’s administration, and has
now entirely ceased in the provinces subject to British administration. … Various other modes of
self-immolation practised in India,—by drowning, burying alive, or starvation,—have been, with
equal success, prohibited and suppressed. 35
Clearly, while Mill believed that our self-ownership did not translate to the right to suicide.
Rawls and Nozick both supported euthanasia. Recall that Rawls advocated personal property,
that includes a weak form of self-ownership – noting that he believed that our talents belonged
to the entire society. Therefore he broadly agreed with Nozick on this matter. But both allowed
reasonable restrictions to be imposed to prevent on irrational attempts at euthanasia. Thus, the
‘[s]tates have a constitutionally legitimate interest in protecting individuals from irrational, ill-

31 Hume, David, Essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul, 1783.
[http://www.infidels.org/library/historical/david_hume/suicide.html]
32 On Liberty, Chapter 1.
33 Eg. See Peter Singer, ‘Law Reform, or DIY Suicide’, Free Inquiry, 25, no. 2 (Feb/Mar 2005), pp. 19-20.

[http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/200502--.htm]
34 Mill, J.S. [1861], ‘On Liberty’, On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, World Classics

Paperback 1991, p.114.

35 ‘MEMORANDUM OF THE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF INDIA DURING THE LAST

THIRTY YEARS 1858’ in The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, XXX - Writings on India - November 1868, ed. John
M. Robson, Martin Moir, and Zawahir Moir (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1990).
[http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=264&chapter=21825&layout=html&Ite
mid=27]

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informed, pressured or unstable decisions to hasten their own death.’ 36 For grievous self-harm to
be a valid option from a moral perspective, the decision must at least be made rationally, in full
command of one’s rational faculties. One should have the ability to provide a coherent, detailed
justification of one’s self-harm proposal. Nozick, it would thus appear, did rule out the ‘right’ to
emotionally driven suicide, thus significantly weakening his self-ownership argument. Being
irreversible, the decision for euthanasia must necessarily be argued more rigorously than for
day-to-day decisions. Ideally, it may require public discussion, or at the least a discussion by
experts and philosophers before being agreed.
John Locke, however, was explicitly against suicide.
[T]hough this be a State of Liberty, yet it is not a State of License, though Man in that State
have an uncontroleable Liberty, to dispose of his Person or Possessions, yet he has not Liberty to
destroy himself, or so much as any Creature in his Possession, but where some nobler use, than
its bare Preservation calls for it. 37 [emphasis mine]
Kant’s categorical imperative also requires the rejection of suicide. Suicide would thus be
permitted only if it can be demonstrated that it is good also for everyone else in the world to
commit suicide! Suicide is necessarily an immoral act from this perspective. It also violates our
accountabilities (refer: Proposition 3). That is because it can harm others in many ways, not just
psychologically. An attempted suicide can permanently disable the person, including permanent
damage to the brain. It can therefore impose a significant economic burden on the (now) disabled
person’s family. This can lead to a demand on the taxpayers for support. On the other hand, if a
teenager successfully commits suicide, he would have effectively destroyed the enormous value
of time and money invested by his parents in bringing him up, not to speak of the severe
emotional loss involved. We do not get to choose to be born but we do become accountable for our
actions if we were happy to be born. Since I have yet to come across any infant who is not
pleased with his life, I would argue that we are all accountable in some form or shape for our
parents’ investments in our upbringing. The free society must therefore put strong brakes on our
alleged ‘freedom’ or right to kill ourselves.
While it is true that our innate physical animal power to destroy ourselves can’t be taken
away except through imprisonment, the free society must prevent suicides by providing
emergency counselling services – possibly as part of a publicly funded social insurance scheme.
This service will assist those who have become so emotionally distraught that they are actively
considering suicide. When our brain’s rational circuits become overwhelmed with emotion, it
may even be necessary to temporarily lock up the suicidal person. The defence of our life must
generally take precedence over our claims of liberty.
b) Mahasamadhi, and fasting to death for a cause
Some other ways of self-harm raise prickly questions. A mahasamadhi is (apparently) an
event in which someone, as part of his religious beliefs, wills himself to death. Whether this is at
all feasible without causing violence to one’s body is a question I’d like to reserve for another
time (noting my deep scepticism of such possibilities). The issue before us here is that people
who have the purported power to ‘commit’ mahasamadhi are usually highly revered by many
people in society. This act of self-destruction though (presumably) sheer will power is charged
with moral and spiritual properties. The other such method of self-harm is fast unto death.
When Gandhi undertook his relatively frequent fasts unto death, he did so transparently with
full public disclosure. In each case his aim was to prevent communal or other mass violence. His
aim was to protect, not harm life.
Since both these acts lead to the loss of life or can lead to such loss, they appear to violate
Proposition 1. And yet these acts, performed after deep contemplation of the consequences and
with public awareness and disclosure, cannot be treated quite on par with garden variety
suicide. Proposition 1 aims to maximise the welfare of mankind by protecting everyone’s life.

36 ‘Brief of Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thomson

as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents’, in Issues in Law & Medicine, Fall, 1999.
[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m6875/is_2_15/ai_n25026585/print]
37 Locke, in his second Treatise.

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Therefore, for exceptional people following a certain moral path, to undertake such acts of self-
destruction could plausibly be argued to be moral acts in themselves. It will be very hard for any
formal system of justice to adjudicate on such matters, however. If it is established even
remotely that such actions are in someone’s vested personal interest, or the truth has been
distorted in the process, then arresting and force-feeding the fasting person would be perfectly
appropriate.
c) Sacrificing one’s life to save someone else
Yet another way to harm oneself is by sacrificing one’s life in an attempt to save another’s.
This clearly needs to be treated differently from typical suicide. Even though one’s life is lost, the
loss was unintended and not motivated by the thought of self-harm. Indeed, saving another life
is an exceptionally moral act, sending as it does a life-validating message to the rest of
humanity. In doing so, if one’s life is lost, one becomes a true hero.
d) Euthanasia
Where there is simply no hope of relief from totally unbearable pain and suffering, and one
has otherwise lived long enough and well, and met one’s obligations to others. Euthanasia can
be, in some cases, a moral option. In choosing death the person who is suffering from pain could
still end up harming others, although such a claim would be weakened where pain is extremely
severe. Even one’s loved ones can become better off through one’s peaceful death under such
circumstances. The real problem, of course, is that except for the most extreme cases, we still
hope that science will discover a way to ease the pain.
On a practical level, the determination of potential processes to authorise euthanasia remain
a major problem. Even if the concept of euthanasia has merit in rare cases, how can we ensure
that it is not used as an escape route by the clinically depressed or by those without adequate
rational capability? Experts in psychology almost invariably differ in their diagnoses of
‘patients’, as well. And it is not always obvious whether the pain someone is experiencing is
‘severe enough’ to warrant a rational death. Worse, murder and euthanasia can become
bedfellows. We must ensure that opportunistic psychologists or doctors can’t be bribed to kill.
Given the risks attendant on the likely practice of euthanasia, Rawls and Nozick both agreed
that the state should institute stringent procedures for this purpose, thus:
[The state] may not deny [terminally-ill patients in agonizing pain who feel doomed to an
existence they regard as intolerable] … the opportunity to demonstrate, through whatever
reasonable procedures the state might institute – even procedures that err on the side of
caution. 38
If cast iron processes can be devised, then euthanasia can potentially be legitimised. To
control for the risks outlined above, the processes would have to be transparent and judicious.
Expert evidence would need to be considered carefully, perhaps by a randomly selected jury to
avoid bias. An authorisation for euthanasia would need diligent inquiry broadly on par with a
murder trial, far albeit more expeditious and empathetic.
Euthanasia has already been legalised in the state of Oregon in USA in 1997 through the
Death with Dignity Act. Under this act the following steps must be fulfilled by the ‘patient’ who
seeks lethal medicine:
1) the patient must make two oral requests to the attending physician, separated by at least 15
days; 2) the patient must provide a written request to the attending physician, signed in the
presence of two witnesses, at least one of whom is not related to the patient; 3) the attending
physician and a consulting physician must confirm the patient’s diagnosis and prognosis; 4) the
attending physician and a consulting physician must determine whether the patient is capable
of making and communicating health care decisions for him/herself; 5) if either physician
believes the patient’s judgment is impaired by a psychiatric or psychological disorder (such as
depression), the patient must be referred for a psychological examination; 6) the attending
physician must inform the patient of feasible alternatives to the Act including comfort care,

38‘Brief of Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thomson
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents’, in Issues in Law & Medicine, Fall, 1999.
[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m6875/is_2_15/ai_n25026585/print]

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 hospice care, and pain control; 7) the attending physician must request, but may not require, the
patient to notify their next-of-kin of the prescription request. A patient can rescind a request at
any time and in any manner. 39
Careful empirical studies and evaluations of this system in the coming years can help arrive
at a system that can be globally adopted. Indeed, such a study, published in 2007, reported that
there was ‘no evidence of heightened risk for the elderly, women, the uninsured, people with low
educational status, the poor, the physically disabled or chronically ill, minors, people with
psychiatric illnesses including depression, or racial or ethnic minorities, compared with
background populations’. 40 That is a very positive sign, and confirms that euthanasia can be
well-managed under an appropriate governance system (I therefore wouldn’t recommend it for a
country like India at the moment, where governance is in shambles).

Proposition 3. Freedom comes with matching accountability

‘Freedom is only part of the story and half the truth. ... That is why I recommend that the
Statue of Liberty on the East Coast be supplanted by a Statue of Responsibility on the West
Coast.’ – Victor E. Frankl. 41

‘I think of a hero as someone who understands the degree of responsibility that comes with
his freedom.’ – Bob Dylan. 42

No one can ever be free to harm others. That is such a basic thing, but its significance is
often forgotten. No injustice or harm should be inflicted upon us, and if it is, then it must be
avenged. Retribution is crucial. It is the soul of our independence, our freedom. It may be well
and good for saints to preach forgiveness (and indeed, forgiveness has much to commend itself),
but to ‘forgive’ grievous assault upon our body or soul will, in most cases, only encourage more
assault. Similarly, while non-violent protest could work even against tyrants, non-violent protest
won’t possible prevent everyday or garden variety crime. Therefore non-violence, when faced
with violence, is simply not an option.
Retribution (or recompense) is our fundamental need that can’t be wished away merely by
donning the cloak of civilisation. Tribal honour killings or the ‘rough justice’ of the street exist
because of the human need for accountability. If a society won’t deliver us with justice, we will
get it regardless of any rules or laws, disregarding any consequences. This insistent claim on
justice helps deter those who would exploit us. This fear of retribution must be instilled in
everyone to deter violence and ensure successful cooperation. The provision of justice is therefore
absolutely crucial to the free society. As Hans J. Morgenthau notes, ‘Liberty cannot be defined
without justice.’ 43 Freedom always comes attached with its matching accountability. That is all
that Proposition 3 is suggesting.
So what precisely is the remit of this concept of justice? It is essentially the process of closing
the loop of accountability; of closing the accounts of a transaction. The principles of justice are
uses to precisely determine accountabilities. These must those that a society is willing to
enforce, a willingness obtained either formally or informally. Classical liberal philosophers have
always strongly emphasised this feature, of accountability. Adam Ferguson, a friend of Adam
Smith, wrote: ‘Liberty or Freedom is not, as the origin of the name may seem to imply, an
exemption from all restraints, but rather the most effectual applications of every just restraint
to all members of a free society whether they be magistrates or subjects.’ 44 Restraint emanates
from the concept of accountability, which also underpins Herbert Spencer’s view that: ‘Every

39 [http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/faqs.shtml#whocan]
40 Battin, P. et al., ‘Legal physician-assisted dying in Oregon and the Netherlands: evidence concerning the impact on
patients in "vulnerable" groups’ in Journal of Medical Ethics 2007;33:591–597.
41 In his Man’s Search for Meaning. (originally 1946). 1984. New York: Touchstone Books. p.134.
42 Cited in Moral Intelligence by Doug Lennick and Fred Kiel. Wharton Business School, 2005. p. 93.
43 Hans J. Morgenthau (1957). ‘The Dilemmas of Freedom’, in The American Political Science Review, 51(3), p.715.
44 cited in The Fatal Conceit by Hayek, p.3)

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man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other
man.’ 45 Adam Smith explained the requirement of accountability in the marketplace, thus:
If I owe a man ten pounds, justice requires that I should precisely pay him ten pounds, either at
the time agreed upon, or when he demands it. What I ought to perform, how much I ought to
perform, when and where I ought to perform it, the whole nature and circumstances of the
action prescribed, are all of them precisely fixt and determined. Though it may be awkward and
pedantic, therefore, to affect too strict an adherence to the common rules of prudence or
generosity, there is no pedantry in sticking fast by the rules of justice. 46
John Stuart Mill wrote about accountability in the criminal context as follows: ‘A person may
cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly
accountable to them for the injury.’ 47 We can also hark back to Hammurabi’s law No. 200
(Hammurabi, as we may recall, was the sixth king of the Amorite Dynasty of Old Babylon in 18th
century BC): ‘If a man knock out the teeth of his equal, his teeth shall be knocked out’ 48. This
was a prescription for the most precise form of accountability; as precise as an equation.
Such precise accountability leads to cooperation and other desirable outcomes. According to
this, everyone is required to free to do whatever they wish to do – whether for good or for bad –
but thereafter they must settle the accounts, taking the reward or rap for their actions. If I
provide you with an agreed service, I am entitled to the agreed reward. If I injure you, you are
entitled to compensation. We can all live with this simple, common sense rule. In a Computer
Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournament that he organised, Robert Axelrod found that the most
successful strategy was the simplest: tit for tat which is ‘merely the strategy of starting with
cooperation, and thereafter doing what the other player did in the previous move’ 49. This rule,
which is essentially a mechanism of accountability, turns out to be an excellent way to achieve a
harmonious society. Justice works. When everyone clearly understands that harming others
won’t pay off, a peaceful and productive Nash equilibrium is achieved.
Accountability is a moral principle as well. It leads naturally to the Golden Rule, being also
compatible with Kant’s categorical imperative. Note that our actions can be perceived differently
by different observers. The requirements of accountability require us to consider the impacts of
all our actions on others. Our actions can have a range of impacts including those that we did
not intend. We are, however, obliged to be aware of them, and aim to minimise potential
misunderstandings. The possibility of retribution by those we may hurt also makes us extra-
careful. This puts a brake on the negative elements of our nature and allows only the good ones
to be expressed. It also leads to strategic behaviour which then creates our demand for the social
contract (Proposition 5).
John Rawls thought that principles of justice:
can be viewed as those principles which mutually self-interested and rational persons, when
similarly situated and required to make in advance a firm commitment, could acknowledge as
restrictions governing the assignment of rights and duties in their common practices, and
thereby accept as limiting their rights against one another. 50
While he derived a plethora of unworkable rules, as we have already discussed, it is possible
to argue that under the veil of ignorance, self-interested people (who understand human nature)
will agree on the obvious tit-for-tat rules of justice. Common law is widely accepted because
people agree with such principles. Accountability includes the consideration of:
• the precise nature of an action (or inaction);
• whether the said action was called for and appropriate;
• the existence and nature of the attendant responsibility;

45 In his The Principles of Ethics. Part IV. Chapter 6. ‘The Formula of Justice’.
46 The Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith (1759). Part III, Chap. VI.
47 Mill, J.S. [1861], ‘On Liberty’, On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, World Classics

Paperback 1991, p.15.

48 Translated by Leonard William King, 1910 [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Codex_Hammurabi_(King_translation)]
49 Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, 1984, p. viii.
50 John Rawls (1957). ‘Justice as Fairness’, in The Journal of Philosophy, 54 (22). pp.653-662.

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• whether the said action was duly carried out;
• what were consequences; and
• to whom did the consequences apply: namely, the attribution and precise debiting or
crediting of the results to specific individuals, of the action.
Justice
Justice thus becomes both the process and outcome of settling accounts. It is an ideal,
because it demands a transparent and justifiable process, as well as an accountable outcome.
The principles of accountability underpin justice, both its process and outcome. A few issues
relating to justice are outlined below.
• The principles of accountability apply to individuals, not to aggregates such as an entire
society. The concept of ‘social justice’ is bereft of meaning. Only individuals can be held
accountable for their actions or inactions.
• Accountability is determined ex-post. We must first act (or not), and only then can we become
accountable. However, if a potential harm can empirically be shown to be preventable
through ex-ante preventative regulation (such as a requirement to wear seat belts in order to
reduce fatalities) the society can restrain our freedom to an extent.
• An accountability can be recognised either formally or informally; explicitly or implicitly.
Such recognition is part of the social contract through social norms or the common law.
• Accountabilities may be compatible with some moral laws (whatever these may be) but such
compatibility is an incidental consideration. Belief systems (or morality) in one society need
not entirely match belief systems in other societies. While political philosophy has moral
dimensions, and a good system will lead to moral outcomes, its main purpose is to build a
free, not moral, society. The free society doesn’t exhort or preach. All it does – by rewarding
good behaviour and punishing the bad – is to increase the incentives for moral behaviour,
and hence, indirectly achieves a moral society.

The loop of accountability

Accountability thus underpins the enterprise of the free society. The market system,
property rights and the system of justice are all based on ensuring accountability. A simple
concept – the loop of accountability, to be presently described – clarifies what this means.
Note that accountability must (implicitly) recognise of the attribution (or imputation 51) of
consequences. Attribution is the arrow that points unerringly to the person responsible for a
particular consequence. Thus, for instance, who won a race, who owns a particular piece of land,
or bread? It is clear that the one who runs the fastest should be rightly declared the winner of a
race, not someone well-connected with the judge. When deserts are not properly attributed, and
rewards (or punishments) pre-determined through bias, we must object to the diminution of
justice entailed.
I call this package – comprising free choice and its accompanying accountabilities (including
attributions), the loop of accountability (see Figure TT). The Yin-Yang symbol in the
frontispiece is an alternative schematic representation.

Accountability
(including
attribution)

Action,
Free human or lack
51 E.g., McGill., V.J., ‘Conflicting Theories of Freedom’, in Philosophy and Phenomenological
thereof Research, in 20(4), 1960,
p.449.

Freedom 108
to act

The loop of accountability

 Consider an example. Let’s say that I walk into a grocery shop and ask for bread (my first
action). The grocer hands me the bread of which I take possession (my second action). Note that
by asking for bread and taking its possession, I become (instantaneously) accountable to pay for
it. I therefore settle my accounts with the grocer (my third action). With this, the loop of
accountability has now closed; there is no outstanding residue of accounts. The matter has
ended. Life can move on. Note also that the moment I hand over the relevant money, the
ownership of bread changes hands, now being attributed to me. I thereafter become free to do
with it whatever I please – to give it to the birds in the pond. To an account keeper of freedom,
the accounts would appear in the form of Table GG:
Table GG: The accounts spreadsheet
Action Results Attribution ‘Residue’ of Any
accountability, if any responsibility
created?
‘A’ asks for ‘A’ could be supplied 1) It is ‘A’ who is Zero. No liabilities Yes. Supplier
bread from bread by the grocer if asking for bread. created. Only must provide
the grocer the grocer so chooses. 2) It is the grocer who expectation of future a safe
may (or may not) liabilities. environment.
choose to supply the Buyer must
bread. behave
decently.
‘A’ receives ‘A’ has taken It is ‘A’ who is taking Deficit. The cost of the Yes –
bread from possession of the possession of the bread is now due to Supplier
the grocer. bread (but has not bread, and it is the the seller, under the must supply
assumed its grocer who is handing implicit contract to safe product.
ownership). it over. transfer property Buyer must
rights. pay.
‘A’ pays for ‘A’ now assumes It is ‘A’ who is the Zero. ‘A’ has closed the
the bread ownership of the new owner of the loop of accountability.
bread bread
It is an expectation in a free society that we close the loop of accountability for each of our
actions. All accounts must balance. No residue should remain. Accountability is always as
precise as a mathematical equation. Most transactions in society do take place without any
dispute, implying that the loop of accountability is usually closed. Indeed, if no one broke the
loop of accountability, we would not need the state. But unfortunately, that will never be the
case because of human nature. People do default on their accountabilities, even in the free
society.
Note that if any portion of this chain of accounts breaks down, then freedom gets
compromised. For instance, if a government forces me to buy bread only from a particular shop,
or a shopkeeper forces me to pay for bread I didn’t receive, or if the bread I paid for is declared
public property and confiscated by any passing government functionary, then my freedoms come
undone. A careful examination of the loop of accountability can pinpoint the loss of freedom, if
any.

Accountability (attribution) as the basis of property rights

It is not merely the freedom to act that we insist on, but also that the relevant attribution or
ownership of consequences (and thus of property) is precisely recognised. I cannot truly be free if
someone is able to sustain a false claim over my produce, or if a Fairy steps in and pays for the

109
damage I cause. We don’t like the idea of the basic equations of freedom being disrupted. Proper
attribution is vital. The responsible individual must be identified.
Property rights are the result of this process of attribution. Even children understand this
concept when they say: ‘He started it!’ That’s an attribution. Similarly, stories written for
children sometimes describe a character who runs through the street, shouting ‘Chor, chor!’
(thief, thief!). Such stories highlight the illegitimacy of the thief’s claim to property. Even
children readily can comprehend this.
Some property rights are nominated the moment we are born. We can agree with Nozick
that ‘things come into the world already attached to people having entitlements over them’.
These include our brain, being our greatest asset, as well as rights in our ancestral property that
we may receive in the future. As we grow older, we create most of our property during the
exchange we undertake of the services and goods we produce. All property therefore comprises
consists of appropriately attributed assets, regardless of whether these were received by us as a
gift or earned. The system of justice keeps track of property ownership. Our parents’ property
emerged from similar processes, and so all property boils down to appropriate attribution.
Attributions, however, are meaningless unless these are recognised by others, and enforced
by the society. There is no ‘natural right’ to the recognition of attribution (and hence no ‘natural’
right to property). A society must necessarily enforce it, along with other principles of justice, if
it has to be meaningful. The system of justice must provide a protective space around our lives
and possessions. To achieve this, the social contract must allow everyone keep the rewards they
earn (or gifts they receive), even as we require punishment to be imposed for violations of
accountability. Suitably defined inside this social contract, property ‘rights’ become a living and
integral part of our existence.
Unfortunately, entire schools of philosophy (mostly in the socialist tradition but also from
the divine rights stream of thought) deny individual property rights, thus denying attribution,
and hence denying justice and freedom. If a valid chain of accounts exists, from a (generally
arbitrary) starting point (the statute of limitations avoids having to re-litigate things that
happened a long time ago, no matter how ‘unjust’ these things were from today’s standpoint),
then no matter how unequal the resultant ‘distribution’ of wealth and property, it is perfectly
just according to the principles of freedom and justice, and hence must be defended.
Arguments are sometimes made hat bequests aren’t sacrosanct, and must be taxed. But how
can anyone be free in his lifetime if he is not free to pass on his property to those he wishes to,
upon his death? The resultant distribution of property may well become more unequal than it
already was, but equality has no moral claims; freedom does. As Dan W. Brock noted: ‘No one
merits or deserves being born with superior intelligence or wealthy parents. This does not mean,
however, that these inequalities are … unjust. They are simply the natural circumstances of
human life, present to some degree among any group of persons living together.’ 52 To be human
is to be different, and to be different is to be, by default, unequal.
In the end, all that we can ask is for is the equal freedom to face the challenges of life. Equal
opportunity helps in achieving that – by enhancing equal freedom. That should suffice to achieve
the best possible outcome for everyone. Indeed, in a free society the initial distributions correlate
poorly with (and thus do not predict) future distributions. Being born with a silver spoon in one’s
mouth is no guarantee of success in life, for bequests can apply only to physical assets, while the
most important assets are intellectual ability and character. Parents pass on these even more
important bequests without making a will. Interfering with bequests is unnatural and violative
of our most basic freedom.

Accountability for one’s responsibilities

How does any responsibility arise, and what’s the difference between accountability and
responsibility? A responsibility is perhaps best seen as an implicit or contingent liability that

52In his review of Rawls’s The Theory of Justice, in The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 3. (Spring,
1973), pp. 486-499.)

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arises as a consequence of our freely undertaken (or agreed) actions. Each responsibility is
essentially a liability (obligation) that we must discharge. Without a clear responsibility there
can be no conception of accountability, noting that not all responsibilities necessarily lead to a
socially sanctioned accountability [GIVE AN EXAMPLE].
Accountabilities are a subset of responsibility. Note that an accountability exists for each
responsibility, but many of these are ‘below the radar’ or insignificant accountabilities, such as
those between a husband and wife, or between colleagues working on a team project. These are
informal, not socially mandated through law. I restrict attention in this book primarily to legal
or socially mandated accountabilities.
Three cases arise:
a) Where accountabilities match responsibilities. This occurs with things like the exchange of
goods and trade. The grocer is responsible for supplying us with a good egg in exchange for the
money we pay. Once a good egg ((not rotten) is supplied, no further responsibility accrues, hence
no accountability.
b) Where accountabilities are a subset of responsibilities. This is usually the case with complex
transactions, such as employment contracts. For instance, when I am hired as a pilot, I amd
given and I therefore assume responsibility for a wide range of things, including passenger
safety. If I fail to discharge these responsibilities appropriately, I then become accountable for
the resulting harm, some of which could potentially be catastrophic. My accountability is,
however, primarily to my employer, and indirectly to the passengers (even though I remain
responsible for them).

Accountabilities Responsibilities
Towards self (not
drinking while on duty;
Hires maintaining technical
Airline competence)
Pilot
(employer)
Accountable for Towards passengers
responsibilities Towards staff
Towards employer

Similarly, if I marry and beget a child, a wide range of responsibilities emerge. While I (as
an adult) am free to marry and beget children, I am not free to abandon my family. The society
would hold me to account were I to do so. Responsibilities of this nature are often limited only by
our death. 53 Note that social accountabilities for our actions are limited to big issues, such as
ensuring we don’t harm others or our children. We are not, however, accountable for the
relatively minor adverse consequences of our interactions with our own children (although this
zone of accountability is being currently expanded. In New Zealand you can’t smack your child,
although some sharp conversations are not restricted)- CHECK).
c) The commons: where there are no accountabilities but only responsibilities. A society where
people are accountable for nothing but responsible for everything quickly decays, due to the
problem of the commons. In such a situation no one looks after anything since accountability
can’t be pinned down on anyone. Appropriate allocation of the property in the commons would
ensure accountability.
Corporate social responsibility and our general responsibilities
I’ve noted earlier that we are not born for each other’s sake. However, the link of
responsibilities (and accountabilities) binds us all. We are responsible (and accountable) for the
goods and services we may choose to trade with each other, but these responsibilities are limited
by contract, not lifelong commitments. Thus, a pilot is responsible for passenger safety for a
particular flight, not for their entire lifetime. I therefore trade things with you, but having done
the trade, I can go home and look after my family. I am not responsible for you or your family in

53 Accountability must be individual; it cannot pass on to people who have not directly caused a consequence.

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any material sense. In the absence of a contract, we are responsible at all times for not harming
others but we owe them no positive obligation or responsibility. The concept of ‘social
responsibility’ or ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR) is misplaced because there is no such
broader or non-contractual responsibility. Yes, we definitely have a joint responsibility along
with everyone else to ensure that our social contract, and the law, is upheld. We are surely
responsible for being good citizens, but that about covers it all.
Let’s say I chance upon a beggar on my way home after shopping for my family. What is my
responsibility towards the beggar? Clearly, since I didn’t bring him into the world nor steal
anything from him or hurt him in any way, I have no accountability towards him. Clearly, also,
no responsibility accrues. Since, however, I feel some sympathy towards him, I may choose to
give him something without in any way committing to his lifelong care. As a good citizen I would
also work towards a social contract that eliminates the possibility of beggary by ensuring social
insurance and equal opportunity.
As far as the concept of CSR is concerned, a business is accountable first to its shareholders
and, second, to the community to the extent its actions comply with the laws. But it is not
responsible for spending shareholders’ money on the community. Any decision to spend on the
community must be made individually by each shareholder out of their personal income. The
only ethical position in this case is for each shareholder to decide what they want to do with the
profits that accrue to them. The job of a company board of directors is purely to make a profit in
the conduct of a business specified within its memorandum of association.
Other related issues
What should our responsibility be for things we did not ask for but received, and took
advantage of? Thus, if we enjoy living sufficiently enough to continue to want to live, and to even
(in some cases) further propagate life by having our own children, then it is evident that we have
gained significant value from our being born. Having received this unsolicited but invaluable
gift, it behoves us (not being our accountability, however) to compensate our parents, our
siblings, and even our society in general for the services received. Paying for unsolicited valuable
things can perhaps be called a duty – something not necessarily an obligation but a good thing to
do. Duty can thus be seen as a responsibility even though it is not an accountability.
Vivekananda’s comment therefore resonates with us: ‘So long as the millions live in hunger and
ignorance, I hold everyman a traitor, who having been educated at their expense, pays not the
least heed to them.’ 54 While the poor may not have paid directly for our education, they
contributed to the society in which we grew up in many ways, and we have a moral obligation
towards them.
What about our duty (responsibility; even accountability) for things that others ‘choose’ for
us? For instance, in India, many young people let their parents choose a spouse for them. Who,
then, is accountable for the success of the marriage? – the parents, or the young couple? That the
prospective partners have delegated their decision ‘upwards’ in no way absolves them of the
responsibility for agreeing to the marriage. Indeed, during the conduct of the marriage, the
personal decision of the couple to marry each other is publicly, even ritually, affirmed. And so,
just because we may choose to abide by our society’s customs will not dilute our accountabilities.
In like manner, if we choose to follow the caste system, then we are individually responsible for
having made this decision; we can’t then blame our ancestors or parents for the our decisions we
take.

The processes and principles of accountability

It is easy for me to declare in a book that free people are accountable for their actions. But
how is this accountability identified and realised? What does it look and feel like? How much is
it? Who decides when the accountability is created, and when is it satisfactorily met? These
matters are at the heart of the system of justice, and hence of freedom.
Only ‘outer’ freedom in scope

54 Vivekananda, cited in Modern India. NCERT, 1986. p.219.

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 Virtually everything we do comes with matching attribution and accountability. This applies
to our internal thoughts and actions as much to those that affect others. Indeed, our interactions
with others only form a small part of our actions: most of our actions and thoughts relate only to
ourselves.
Thoughts are actions too, since they leave a chemical trace somewhere in the brain and
body). For instance, when we meditate, endorphins are released that relieve stress, if we plot
revenge, adrenalin and is released. Exercising our body strengthens or stretches our muscles;
lack of it atrophies them. Nature holds us to account for every thought and action, without fail.
There is no respite from accountability (which is nothing but cause and consequence). Repetitive
thoughts and actions have meta consequences, building things like character and health.
Whether it is the Hindu karma theory, the Buddhist theory of the middle path, or the Christian
theory of sin, each postulates that our personal choices and actions determine our character. The
good thing is that we can choose our character, our health, and our reputation. Freedom’s is a
positive philosophy. As Ian Harper points out: ‘Our choices have consequences, not just for our
material but also for our moral well-being. Our choices live on in us to shape our characters.
Good choices make us virtuous while bad choices make us vicious.’ 55 Even in the most collectivist
totalitarian society we remain at least partly free to pursue our personal character and moral
goals.
But out internal thoughts do not purely concern those to whom we sell our products and
services. Our character or health may be of interest to them to the extent they need to evaluate
the products we sell, but our inner thoughts do not concern them. Hence the theory of freedom
focuses almost entirely on our outer (i.e. relational) freedom.
Identifying and specifying accountabilities
While religious laws have much to say on the nature of our accountabilities, the
determination of accountabilities cannot be the domain of religious or moral laws. Moral laws
often differ, and sometimes considerably, with each other. It is important that not only are our
accountabilities widely understood but that these are unique and precise; or else baffling
uncertainty will overcome the society. Socially agreed laws specify our accountabilities precisely,
having resolved various competing arguments. As H.L.A. Hart has noted, the system of man-
made laws must be given ‘priority over other standards’ 56.
In an ideal world people would act with self-restraint and no laws would be needed. Self-
regulation would be the norm. ‘True freedom ... is the freedom to be virtuous’. 57 As John Danford
said, ‘the only kind of restraint compatible with genuine freedom is self-restraint.’ 58 Thus, I can
express my views freely, but only to the extent that these views are true. If, later, I find that the
views I expressed were false, I must retract these views. And indeed, there are many pressures
within a free society to require virtue and the truth to predominate. Our desire to build good
relationships can only be fulfilled if we maintain a good reputation. This is the biggest drivers of
self-regulation, a natural check on bad behaviour. Citizens in the free society therefore do not
run to their nanny (government) wanting to be regulated. Instead, the free society government is
a very reluctant regulator, intervening in exceptional circumstances where there is not only a
clear failure to self-regulate but it has been demonstrated that the government will be able to do
a better job. But natural checks on accountability don’t always work, and hence we need laws.
The laws need not specify all accountabilities in great detail, given the enormous expense of
creating (and enforcing) them. It is enough that the laws deal only with our most significant acts
– in areas where self-regulation doesn’t work effectively. Broad principles and guidance is
generally sufficient for the rest of our accountabilities. Within this broad framework, people
should be free to agree a range of accountabilities through mutual negotiation.

55 Harper, Ian, ‘Christian Morality and Market Capitalism: Friends or Foes?’, 5th Annual CIS Acton Lecture on
Religion & Freedom, Sydney: Centre for Independent Studies, 2003.
56 Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997 [1994], p.249.
57 Ian Harper (2003). ‘Christian Morality and Market Capitalism: Friends or Foes?’ 5th Annual CIS Acton Lecture on

Religion and Freedom. Centre for Independent Studies, Sydney.

58 Danford, John W., Roots of Freedom, Washington, Delaware: ISI Books, 2000, p.xviii.

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 It is important for the laws to make sense. Not only must the laws be easy to understand,
they should be compatible with ‘common sense’. Hence accountability must, in a sense, be
intuitive. Richard Epstein made the case in his 1995 book, Simple Rules for a Complex World,
that only six simple laws are needed to operate a free society! People will then be prepared to
accept the laws which represent their views in an abstract form, and thus what Jean Jacques
Rousseau called the general will: a shared public opinion, or understanding across the society.
Without convergence between laws and willingness to accept them, pressures build for non-
compliance. Now this task is not as easy as it sounds. It is impossible to arrive at any ordering of
society’s aggregate preferences that genuinely represent the general will (cf. Arrow’s
Impossibility Theorem). Modern societies circumvent this by having their democratically elected
representatives vote on difficult policy debates, thus bringing them to a close. Nonetheless, it is
crucial that we don’t elevate the idea of the general will above the individual. No majority
opinion should be allowed to crush another’s liberty.
Codified laws that have just been legislated through a democratic process, provide us with
‘guides to human conduct and standards of criticism of such conduct’ 59, i.e. to our
accountabilities. The free society doesn’t really care about the specific religious or moral laws
that people follow so long as they comply with these democratically negotiated laws. Having a
codified system of laws doesn’t diminish our freedom, clarifies limits and allows it fuller and
unhindered expression within these limits. ‘Within the known rules of the game,’ Hayek pointed
out, ‘the individual is free to pursue his personal ends and desires.’ 60
It is crucial that the laws are enforeable. As H.L.A. Hart pointed out, a system of laws must
allow ‘for the identification, change, and enforcement of its standards’ 61. Getting agreement to
the standards of accountability is one thing. Ensuring compliance with them is quite another.
Laws are only as good as their enforcement. The laws must be enforceable, and hence enforced.
Citizens must, at all times, believe that their laws are well enforced, – and uniformly. They must
also have reason to believe that these laws won’t change abruptly or whimsically, thus assuring
them of stability while planning long-term projects.
Since laws are man-made, accountabilities can, and do, change over time. While murder will
certainly remain illegal for all times to come, the extent and manner of punishment for murder
will continuously change. Laws must be open to change through periodical review through which
our freedoms can continuously seek to expand. Such opportunities for improvement can also
arise from new technology, knowledge, and other forms of innovation.
The determination of harm
Accountabilities must reflect the precise level of harm. Once the broad principles of law are
established, it is the facts of each case that must lead to the relevant accountability. The level of
harm must be determined objectively.
But determining the level of harm (or good) is often not obvious. Acts of God and other such
random, unpredictable events make precise attribution extremely difficult. Actions are not
always linked (through attribution) to the outcome through a precise causal pathway.
Unanticipated events, unintended consequences and sheer ‘white noise’ (i.e. luck) riddle the path
from action to consequence. A person may become wealthy through sheer luck, such as by
winning a lottery, but then quickly become poor as well, such as by losing an uninsured boatload
of fish in stormy weather. Many risks can be insured against, of course, in modern markets. In
general, we are in a position in most cases attribute the ownership of outcomes through diligent
empirical inquiry and careful discernment.
So what exactly do we mean by harm? Harm is an adverse setback experienced to our body,
mind, time, property or reputation. It has to be real and measurable for it to be considered by
the legal system. Even harm to the mind, e.g. post-traumatic stress disorder, must be
measurable in some way. We cannot claim to have been harmed if our distress is not objective or
measureable. Our measuring apparatus may not, of course, be always capable of detecting the

59 Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997 [1994], p.249
60 Hayek, F.A. The Road to Serfdom. Routledge, 2001 [1944], p.76. Google books.
61 Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997 [1994], p.249.

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harm. This does not mean that the harm is imaginary. It only means that it may not be
practicable to consider claims against such harm.
An attempt has been made below to classify harm in a simple tabular form, even though
harm is multi-dimensional. Different approaches to regulation will respond to different kinds
and levels of harm. (Note that this discussion is not a substitute for careful determination of the
implications of law in each case.)

Immediacy, harm to property, body

Second order harm First order harm First order harm

(civil) (civil or criminal) (criminal)

Third order harm Second order harm First order harm

(civil) (civil or criminal) (civil or criminal)

Third order harm Third order harm Second order harm

(civil) (civil) (criminal)

No intent Intent
Figure DD
Figure DD depicts a possible harm classification. The combination of factors relevant to the
determination of accountability can give us a reasonable logic of harm (Table DD).
Table DD: The logic of harm
Type of harm Level of harm Dimension 1: Dimension 2: Examples
(0-10) Intent Immediacy
First order (or 6-10 Intent to harm, but High Murder, assault,
major) harm - to not necessarily robbery, terrorist
body or property directed at the attack
harmed person
Second order harm: 1-5 None Low to moderate Negative
usually to property externalities,
or incidental to body commercial harm,
or mind psychological harm
Third order harm: 0-0.9 None Low Imagined slight
minor harm only to from an artist’s
property work

Relatively quick acting, significant physical harm can be called first order harm. It is
intentional but may not necessarily be directed at a particular individual. For example a
terrorist bomb causes first order harm even though its impact may not be intended against the
specific individuals affected. Common forms of first order harm include murder, assault,
robbery, and terrorist attack. Terrorist destruction purely of buildings would qualify, as well.
Major harm to our property, such as cases where an investment firm runs away with our money,
will qualify. If someone slanders us and ruins our employment prospects, that too would be first
order harm. The threat to commit first order harm is also first order harm provided the
capability to enforce the threat exists. Thus, if someone incites a mob to communal violence, that
act would amount to a first order harm since that person’s intent was clearly to harm others,
and if implemented, could have caused major damage. Hitler may not have personally, with his
own hands, killed any Jew, his incitement of such killings, making him responsible for the death
millions of people meant he was guilty of first order harm.
Second order harm is smaller in its magnitude, and either unintentional or, if deliberate,
then it is slow-acting. Most commercial, economic or psychological harm falls into this category,
including the stress people may experience from being belittled or bullied, which can cause
bodily harm over the long haul, reducing longevity. Typical negative externalities are another
example. The value of my property is adversely impacted if a new garbage dump is built on

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adjacent land. My health outcomes can also be adversely affected from slow acting proximity to
pollutants. On the other hand, if aware of these consequences, I choose to build my house next to
an existing garbage dump, I can’t then claim to have been harmed. Similarly, if I choose to
smoke, having been made aware of its strong links with cancer, I cannot then claim to have been
harmed.
Thus, and assuming CO2 pollutes (which I am not convinced about), Australia can’t say that
its share of global carbon ‘pollution’ is only a small proportion of world pollution (being clearly
one of the highest on a per capita basis) and that therefore its pollution doesn’t matter. Its total
level of pollution may not ‘matter’ but it becomes incumbent on all nations, including Australia,
to come together and hold themselves jointly to account. The cumulative harm caused by small
acts can sometimes become excessively high. Hence, if CO2 is proven to be a pollutant, even that
small damage may need recompense, perhaps through a generic Pigovian tax. Unfortunately,
these taxes don’t work effectively across the globe in a situation where foreign exchange rates
are administered by governments, not determined by market forces. In such a case, trading
pollution within a fixed overall cap may be the better solution. As another (unrelated) example,
note that suicide or self-harm often causes at least some second order harm to others.
Third order harm is a much weaker version of second order harm. It can include temporary
loss of sleep because someone has, say, attacked our beliefs in a book or through an object of art.
For instance, if I am a Muslim and someone writes critically about Islam, my sentiments may be
deeply hurt. However, if the writing is part of an analytical exposition, and is not therefore
intended to harm me in particular (i.e. a specific individual), then my claim for recompense will
become extremely weak, for the benefits of critical analysis to society far outweigh any perceived
harm to one’s sentiments (cf. J.S. Mill’s arguments in his essay, On Liberty). Most alleged third
order harm cannot therefore be held to the test of accountability.
Beyond these is perhaps a category called fictitious harm. An example would be a claim for
harm made against someone who has done something that has benefited us! This is not as far
fetched as it sounds. Quite the contrary. Consider a price rise. If OPEC raises oil prices but I still
choose to drive to work I drive to work only if the net gain from going to work is greater than the
net gain from working in a place closer to home (in which case, I may receive a lower salary, or
need to pay a higher rent). Our voluntary economic choices can’t qualify as harm just because
the net benefit from our choice is positive but has reduced (a reduction in consumer surplus does
not impact Pareto optimality). When push ultimately comes to shove, we will get up early and
walk to work, or ride a bicycle. Changing price levels call for adjustments. It doesn’t amount to
harm. As a general rule, therefore, price levels are not relevant to a discussion of harm (see Box
GG). If someone can’t afford food, the social minimum should take care of that. But the free
society can’t protect against changes in price. Prices should be able to move flexibly and inform
our opportunity set, or our options for action.
Box GG
Why increases in price don’t qualify as harm
Assume for a moment that I own an oasis in a remote desert. Being without a
consistent revenue source, I decide to offer the oasis water cheaply in order to attract
new residents to the oasis. And so a healthy migration takes place and a small city
comes up next to my oasis. But then I then become greedy and decide to raise the
price of water tenfold. Have I gone beyond the limits of my freedom in doing so, i.e.,
have I harmed anyone?
To response to this question would require a consideration of the contract for
supply of water that people have signed with me. If I had promised cheap water
forever, then I have clearly violated my commitments and am liable to be sued for
compensation (noting that this is not a criminal act, no matter how despicable). But if
I had not committed to any such thing, then (at least technically) I am entitled to set
whatever price I choose.
There is a proviso, however. Even though I may be legally free to raise the price it
may be inappropriate for me to do so suddenly, for if I do so, someone may well die of

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 thirst, not being able to purchase enough water (or die of hunger, since his limited
money is forced to be spent on water). I can circumvent this by selling water cheaply
for the first few litres to each consumer – thus ensuring their survival. But more
generally, justice would require me to give sufficient notice of the forthcoming price
rise to allow competitors sufficient time to bring in new supply of water though trucks
or pipes, or to allow the residents to pack their bags and leave (which would leave me
with no one to sell to – and since I know this, I would be very foolish to raise the price
of water indiscriminately).
In sum, that someone possesses a monopoly over a scarce resource is not sufficient
reason to claim that one has been harmed, or – worse! – to argue for forcibly divesting
someone of their property rights (noting that in practice most monopolies are directly
created or enabled by the government).
Picasso, in his capacity as a monopolist, used to charge a very high price for his
paintings (which were not in particularly short supply, either). Should such prices be
set by bureaucrats, as well? And what about the monopoly that someone enjoys by
virtue of their beauty or brain power? Where does the theory of monopoly end, noting
that the human mind is the ultimate resource? Clearly if we wish to abolish
monopoly, we must abolish Edison and Einstein as well.
Claims of ‘market power’ are not sufficient reason to interfere with people’s
freedom to set the price for their brainpower, physical resources, and outputs.

Considerations for determining accountability

The principles of accountability can now be discussed. Accountability (being a branch of the
rules of conduct) must first be underpinned by propositions 1 and 2, of life and liberty. In other
words, the principles of accountability must allow people to maximise their freedom within the
guides to conduct or rules of the game established by the people themselves. We must note that
while ‘[t]he law is the expression of the general will’ (Rousseau), it is crucial that this so-called
general not be allowed to override life and liberty. The social contract, being a meta-law, must
therefore allow for a judicial review that is able to strike down laws that violate the basic
demands of life and liberty without providing exceptionally strong, or particularly temporary,
reasons for such violations. Thus, majority rule cannot be permitted to over-ride freedom (or only
in very exceptional cases, for reasons directly related to the defence or national security). Else
one fine day we’ll find that a Hitler has emerged, using the democratic machinery, and started
killing off the citizens he doesn’t like. All laws must therefore refer to the primacy of the defence
of our life and liberty in their statement of objectives. Thus, a law may well require (in order to
protect life), that food offered for sale should be free of disease-causing bacteria. Such a law
would not, under normal circumstances, need to prescribe how this goal is to be achieved, nor
deprive anyone of their freedom to eat whatever they wish to eat. Thus, I would remain free not
to eat pork or beef (if eating these violates my religious beliefs) without preventing others from
eating them.
In addition to aligning with the principles of life and liberty, legislators can seek useful
guidance from a range of information, such as social norms, religious laws, moral philosophy,
and science, to inform their concepts of accountability. Indeed, there are many moral principles
that most people will agree with, such as the Golden Rule and the Categorical Imperative. In
similar vein, the Bhagavad Gita talks about the ideal person as ‘one who does not hate any
creature, who is friendly and compassionate, free from (the notion of) “I” and “my”, even-minded
in pain and pleasure, forgiving’ 62. But moral philosophy and religions can should never become
the sole determinants of accountability, for they are assertions that are not necessarily based on
the scientific analysis of human nature. This does not mean, of course, that their conclusions are
necessarily incorrect; for it is quite possible to use wrong methods of analysis to arrive at the
correct conclusion. Nor are these conclusions based on a concern for maximising our freedoms.

62 Bhagvad Gita 12:13, translated by Ramanand Prasad of American Gita Society, 1988,
[http://eawc.evansville.edu/anthology/gita.htm]

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These conclusions may not address all (or even most) situations, but the legal framework of a
society must aim to provide for almost all situations. Most problematically, though, these types
of conclusions give us radically different answers on many issues (e.g. on abortion). And while
religious scriptures cannot be revised, moral understandings are constantly updated. For
instance, child marriage was considered quite acceptable at one time, but no longer. At one time
racist ideas even had so-called ‘scientific’ backing, not any longer. Scriptures, in comparison, are
fixed in stone. That is why laws must be flexible and informed by scientific knowledge and
current moral analysis. It should be possible to amend accountabilities through democratic law-
making processes. Almost no rule is valid for all time.
General matters related to accountability
We have noted that the level of accountability must be proportionate to the effects of an
action. A murderer should be jailed for life or (legally) killed. A thief should be jailed for a
duration related in some way to the magnitude of theft and to the way in which it was
conducted. The broad principle of ‘eye for an eye’ (not in the literal sense! – for that would be
particularly barbaric) can help to determine an appropriate level of accountability for a given
situation. Second, it is crucial that the principles of accountability must apply equally. Equal
application is very important. Indeed, as Hayek pointed out, and as we shall discuss further in
chapter xx, ‘[t]he great aim of the struggle for liberty has been equality before the law’. 63 The
rule of law must prevail.
Closer observer to adjudicate
One of the most basic principles of enforcement of accountability is that the determination of
our accountability should be made by the institution that is closest to the action – either
physically or in terms of technical expertise. We’d like the contractor who builds a small local
road in our community to be held to account by the local government, even as accountability for
a large freeway can be vested with the state government. This gives us the subsidiariaty
principle 64. Similarly whether accountabilities have been met in relation to a particularly
complex interpretation of a financial or computer-manufacturing contract should be made by the
body of experts in that area, not by the local counsellor.

Illustrations of accountability
The examples (below) are intended to clarify how these principles may apply:
a) Stem cell research
Stem cells can be retrieved, among other methods, from excess embryos discarded as part of
in vitro fertilisation. Does harvesting stem cells this way violate the accountability of scientists?
In response, note that stem cell research is life-enhancing, not life-denying. These embryos
would have been discarded unsung and totally wasted, but their cells now benefit (or may
benefit) one or more real lives. Saving lives in at no extra loss of life is miraculous, and why
would that be harmful? Instead, this is a resounding affirmation of life, and a validation of
Proposition 1. Second, if a scientist harvests discarded embryos with appropriate permission
then no one’s liberty is violated. It would appear to me that while democratically elected
representatives may well choose to prohibit stem cell research, the courts of the free society are
obliged to throw out such a law. Legislators can’t reduce the freedoms of those who are causing
no harm to anyone.
b) Theft of small things
If I walk out from a shop without paying for the bread I have picked up, I would have
committed theft, unless I do so absentmindedly or in error (imagining that my wife has already
paid for it). Any intent to steal would have to be treated as first-order harm which borders on
second order harm, despite the small magnitude of harm. Accountability case might require a
short jail term.

63Hayek in his 1960 The Constitution of Liberty.

64The principle of subsidiariaty is that ‘a central authority should have a subsidiary function, performing only those
tasks which cannot be performed effectively at a more immediate or local level’ (Oxford English Dictionary)

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c) Perceived injury
Consider the case in which someone feels injured because he thinks that my writings about
his religion are inappropriate. Given the absence of specific intent to injure a specific person,
this is best thought of as third order harm. In response, the offended person could prove in his
article that I was advocating a false position. He could (even) pillory my beliefs in public –
potentially causing me to lose sleep! Debating the truth in this manner may persuade me to
change my opinion, and even apologise. An alternative would be for the affected person to
become more tolerant: ‘Sticks and stones may break my bones but words will never hurt me’.
Words are mere explorations in human understanding. But if the person is truly offended, he
could sue me in civil court for compensation. But then he would need to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that he or she has, directly in consequence of the said offensive writing, unable to, say,
sleep for a night. It will not be sufficient to run to the courts, seeking compensation, merely
because of a vague feeling of unrest because of a piece of writing. Voltaire is said to have
commented: ‘I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it’. We
therefore need to ensure that freedom of speech is not reduced by those who find the criticism of
their beliefs offensive. J.S. Mill’s arguments in On Liberty (which I’ll not go into detail here), are
worth re-reading.
d) Smoking
It is now largely undisputed that smoking is a major cause of lung cancer and other serious
diseases. From my quick review of a few research papers and government publications it
appears to kill, directly or indirectly, about a third of long-term smokers. My discussion below
assumes that further research will re-confirm these findings. The World Health Organisation is
no so much against tobacco that it argues:
[T]obacco is a unique consumer product that could not be introduced into the market today
under any known consumer regulations if it were not already established worldwide among a
variety of substantially dependent populations. Products that prematurely end lives or lead to
the death of the consumer when used as intended by the manufacturer have no place in a
civilized society. 65
Smoking cigarettes thus amounts to imbibing poison. It can be classified as self-harm –
attempted slow-acting suicide. Despite this, one must argue that people should be free to smoke
as long as they take full responsibility for the harm they cause. If they will pay for their own
treatment and not demand taxpayer support, we would have little to object to their foul habit.
But we can never totally isolated anyone from society.
Even if smokers have provided for their family’s future and looked after the expenses for
their own treatment, dying prematurely could increase the risks to their family’s well-being;
risks that can’t be prevented merely by throwing money at them. Smoking can thus lead to
second-order harm. Smokers also litter the environment with cigarette butts containing toxins
and fibres that harm wildlife. Indeed, this part even smokers who live in total isolation are likely
to be guilty of.
What does all this tell us about the alleged ‘right’ of smokers to smoke in public places?
Some people have objected to ‘the ... increasing scope of public places where smoking is being
prohibited.’ 66 But freedom is not independent of accountability. People can smoke only so long as
they don’t harm others.
But how can accountability be attributed where a smoker causes only a small, totally
indistinguishable harm? How do we know whose puff of second-hand smoke finally inflicted the
lung cancer which killed the restaurant worker? The cumulative (and random) nature of the
effects of something means that it is not possible to identify particular smokers as the causal
agents. Given this difficulty, the society is left no choice but to ban smoking in public places
altogether, effectively treating all smokers as potential killers.

65 World Health Organisation, The Scientific Basis of Tobacco Product Regulation, WHO Technical Report Series 945,
2007, p.14.
66 Mitra, Barun ‘Smoking Freedom: The smoke alarm's jammed’, Delhi edition of Hindustan Times, 1 June 2006.

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 It would even be reasonable for society (given the evidence we now have) to ban smoking
entirely; to destroy all tobacco crops. But such bans, no matter how justifiable, are not
operationally feasible. They will have to be enforced without exception, else smuggling will
invariably follow; or not imposed at all.
e) Riding a motorcycle without helmet
Consider the freedom of motorcycle riders to ride without a helmet. In May 1978, Milton
Friedman wrote in favour of this ‘freedom’, thus:
I had a debate ... with the great saint of the US consumer. Ralph Nader. I posed the question of
state laws requiring people who ride motorcycles to wear helmets ... That law is the best litmus
paper to distinguish true believers in individualism ... because the person riding the motor cycle
is risking only his own life. He may be a fool to drive the motorcycle without a helmet, but part
of freedom ... is the freedom to be a fool. 67
This view, unfortunately, disregards the idea of accountability, thus undermining freedom. A
motor-cycle rider who refuses to wear a helmet surely retains his liberty to be a fool, but he must
do so only at his expense. He can’t harm others during the exercise of his freedom. And so, if
there was only one motorcyclist in the world (and no one else) we could agree with Friedman.
But in reality, such a motorcyclist could impose real, irrevocable harm of the following types:
a) Psychological. When a motorcyclist not wearing a helmet comes screeching into my car’s
path and splatters his brain on my car’s windscreen, not merely committing hara-kiri in his
relentless folly but causing me significant grief and loss of sleep as I re-live that nightmarish
experience, then his freedom to be a fool conflicts with my freedom to live without such folly.
The psychological grief he causes his family and friends is potentially greater.
b) Financial. Such fools have no right to disrupt my precious time in explaining to the cops
that I am an innocent party in the accident. They also have no right to make me pay for
their brains to be hosed off my car. (I’m not counting the time I’ll need to invest to get my
insurance company to fix the damage to my car, noting that some damage will be caused
under such circumstances even if they use a helmet). Diverting my time into things that I
have no interest in diminishes my life (and our time equals our life). Worse, it is certain that
not all these dead fools would have fully insured themselves and their families. Harming
their family financially would amount to second order harm. By potentially plunging their
families into poverty, they may even force me – the ordinary taxpayer – to support their
family. And if these fool motorcyclists do not all die but are seriously injured or disabled,
they will likely end up imposing a lifelong burden on others in society, including a publicly
funded medical system, if any.
In brief, people are most welcome to be the fools they wish to become, but on their own
private planet, or at least in their private backyard. One must therefore disagree with Friedman
on this matter. It has now been conclusively proven that using a helmet minimises head injuries
and minimises unnecessary harm. The free society must therefore force all motorcyclists to wear
a helmet. Such coercion is not violative of freedom.

Proposition 4. To defend our freedom we need a collective fortress

Man is a social animal. We’re not rhinos that prefer a solitary existence except when mating.
We have a strong need of companionship and close relationships. We hold on to our mates and
children in a close (sometimes extended) family unit. We work co-operatively with others for a
common cause, we meet others over a business lunch to foster commercial relationships; or we
may just come together to laugh or cry together, party animals that we are.
But living a social existence is not easy. Strife is rife. Might is right. In the state of nature
nothing is forbidden, whether ‘good’ or ‘evil’ (such concepts are meaningless in the state of
nature). Biologically, Nature doesn’t care if a baby is born out of incest or whether we murder
our neighbour in a fit of rage. The laws of nature are amoral. Nature never sheds any tear of
sorrow for anyone. Therefore, in the state of nature someone will sooner or later assault us or

67 In ‘ Which Way for Capitalism?’

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make a grab for our property, leaving us with no choice but to retaliate. That, in turn, will
almost certainly set of a chain of events leading to incessant warfare across, and often within,
tribes. Under such circumstances, no one will find the time or energy to study nature, to explore
science, to just sit back and think. And as a result, we will not only remain at the mercy of
Nature, we will remain poor and helpless; almost certain to die young. Whichever way we look at
it, human history, a good proxy for the state of nature, is a saga of rape, pillage, war, killings,
disease, and agony. I agree with Thomas Hobbes, who wrote:
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre [war], where every man is Enemy to
every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than
what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition,
there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no
Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no
commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much
force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society;
and which is worst of all, continuall feare [continual fear], and danger of violent death; And the
life of man, solitary, poore [poor], nasty, brutish, and short. 68
If we were to live only by animal laws, our greatest gift – of the potential for rational
thought – will remain grossly under-utilised. The free society, with its enormous potential,
therefore comes into being only after mindless barbarism has been overcome. Freedom can only
begin when we succeed in preventing assault by external groups and assaults within our own
group.
Even assuming that we know how to live within our tribe peacefully, we must first ensure
that other tribes or groups won’t easily think of attacking us. It is, of course, inevitable that a
tribe which experiences peace and prosperity for an extended duration will attract envious
interest from its neighbours. Therefore, we must first build a collective fortress from inside
which we can mount a collective defence, with the help of well-trained, well-armed fighters. In
general, a small tribe or nation is unlikely to have the wherewithal to defend itself and must
either build alliances (to the extent these can be trusted) or simply merge with other territories.
Weakness in such a basic thing as defence will lead to the guaranteed destruction of freedom.
While it is possible to subsume this idea (of a fortress) into the broader concept of a social
contract, I prefer to separate these two conceptions (propositions 4 and 5). In that way, I hope to
emphasise that the social contract is essentially meaningless without a strong defence. Defence
of territory has to be secured as a pre-requisite to liberty. Nozick has argued that a private
libertarian protection association would naturally arise to ensure such defence, but this is an
implausible idea. There has never been a libertarian protection association. Instead, our tribal
nature ensured that each tribe sought and defended its territory. Not rational debate was
involved, it being largely instinctive, hence universal. Rationality comes in much later, only with
advanced social contracts. Defence through the tribe is ingrained into our DNA.

Primacy of group self-defence

Individual freedom is premised on assured national security. If we choose to live in a free
society or nation then its defence becomes our first social responsibility, indeed, an
accountability. Conscription cannot therefore violate freedom. Instead, if an able-bodied person
refuses to participate in a defensive war when called upon to do so regardless of his social or
economic ‘class’, then such person’s freedoms can be reasonably revoked. There is no innate right
to free-ride on other’s valour and blood. There is no license to the benefits of freedom without
paying its costs. In addition, if attacked by foreigners then our freedoms may also need to be
reduced appropriately to secure the national defence.

Relations with other nations

How should a free society deal with other nations? Morgenthau examined this issue, thus:

68 Chapter 13 of Leviathan

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 Both individual and state must judge political action by universal moral principles, such as that
of liberty. Yet while the individual has a moral right to sacrifice himself in defense of such a
moral principle, the state has no right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringement of
liberty get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of
national survival. There can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without
consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action. 69
National self-interest requires the exercise of prudence. Human nature being what it is,
there are no hard and fast rules that apply regarding our relationships with other societies and
nations. It is reasonable for alliances to be fostered, and customs or monetary unions formed
with similar, freedom-loving nations. But we can never let down our guard. Nor must we
interfere needlessly in the affairs of other nations or societies. A nation can promote freedom and
democracy in other nations by supporting their votaries of freedom, but in doing so it should not
expose its own citizens to undue risk. By the same token, however, if any external force that can
potentially threaten liberty in our own nation is growing strong (e.g. like Hitler’s, perhaps), then
a very strong pre-emptive action is warranted. Territorial boundaries must be respected, but our
life and liberty are far more important, and national decisions in such matters will need to strike
the right balance.

Proposition 5. Within the fortress we need a modern social contract

Proposition 4 (territorial defence) was a strategic proposition, based on a (web) of reaction
functions, which are essentially ‘balance of powers’ conceptions. Being strategic can be seen as
maximising long term net benefits (both life-long and beyond – i.e., in relation to our progeny);
not just the direct or immediate net benefits. In doing so we account for all current and future
reaction functions. A simple strategic model regarding the social contract is used by Robert Dahl
who uses the interaction of three criteria: personal choice, competence and economy, to arrive at
the optimal social contract. 70 Being strategic, is more complex, however, involving a combination
of these three criteria and many others!
In a pure fortress only self-regulatory processes apply, and the delivery of justice is
constrained. No doubt, under certain conditions, voluntary associations and guilds (even castes)
can pass on useful information about the character of their members, thus weeding out
undesirable people. But self-regulation doesn’t always work. There will always be some who
don’t uphold their accountabilities voluntarily and, indeed, even attack others, or steal. We can’t
remain free when some of us, armed with guns, knives, poisonous arrows or spears, lurk in
shadowy alleys, waiting to enslave or strangle us. Primitive tribal societies fail to mete out
rewards and punishments appropriately, prompting retaliation to settle accounts. This leads to
considerable risk to people’s life and limb. Tribal groups that (temporarily) formed in order to
defend themselves, must have found it to be in their strategic self-interest to build a society that
assures justice and other paraphernalia. Out of a range of unreliable self-regulatory systems (i.e.
basically forms of anarchy) arose the well-regulated modern society.
First to try to fill the gap in justice was religion. It spoke optimistically about the possibility
of morality and justice in this life. Hypotheses like karma theory, heaven and hell, and the Last
Judgment Day were advanced to support the notion of accountability being managed by divine
forces. We were assured that all accounts would be settled – of course, after our death. In
Hinduism, for instance, every micro-deed has a consequence:
[E]very deed that we do leads to a double result. It not only produces what may be termed as its
direct result (phala) - the pain or pleasure following from it according to the karma theory, but it
also establishes in us a tendency to repeat the same deed in the future. This tendency is termed
samskara. … There is nothing in the doctrine which either eliminates responsibility or
invalidates self effort. 71

69 Morgenthau, Hans J., and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New

Delhi: Kalyani Publishers, 1985, p.12.

70 Dahl, Robert A. After the Revolution? New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970 pp.8-56.
71 Hiriyanna, M., Outlines of Indian Philosophy, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1932 [1976]. p.129.

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 Such models of justice are plausible on the surface but what they do is to pass on
responsibility for justice onto a Supernatural Account Keeper (God), thus making justice
impossible to achieve in our lifetime, and indeed, opaque, not subject to a public inquiry. We
can’t be sure that justice will be done. If our family member has been criminally assaulted, or
our irreplaceable belongings stolen we can’t be sure about the outcomes. But we do need justice
in our lifetime! We can’t wait for it till we are dead and gone. No man in his right senses will
therefore rely on religion for justice.
In real life, justice can be delivered in many different ways by different providers. Contracts
for mobile phones are structured a variety of ways; so also, social ‘contracts’ that provide security
and justice (and frills like infrastructure) can differ in cost and coverage. The concept of ‘design’
in this case may not necessarily refer to deliberate design, and can refer to the natural evolution
of institutions and norms. Such institutions arise, as David Hume pointed out, and Hayek
emphasised, spontaneously: a spontaneity underpinned by strategic behaviour and rationality.
Which of the set of social contracts is ‘optimal’ from the perspective of freedom? Let’s assume
first, along with Rawls, that members of the pre-contractarian tribe are predominantly rational:
Imagine … that the persons in this society are rational: they know their own interests more or
less accurately; they are capable of tracing out the likely consequences of adopting one practice
rather than another and of adhering to a decision once made; they can resist present
temptations and attractions of immediate gain; and the knowledge, or the perception, of the
difference between their condition and that of others is not, in itself, a source of great
dissatisfaction. 72
Being boundedly rational, we don’t expect anyone to think through to a perfectly optimal
social contract. Real-life social contracts have therefore evolved through iterative improvements
and can never be perfected. We do know, for sure, that tribal chieftains (or kings) emerged
universally from primitive hunter-gatherer groups once mankind settled into agriculture. The
entire mankind evolved similar social organisation, where someone (the king) had the authority
to dispense justice.
This strategic agreement of a hierarchical governance organisation, found in all societies, is
a Nash equilibrium and hence an optimal social contract. This equilibrium, albeit instantaneous
and often fragile, balances everyone’s self-interest in a dynamic, repeated non-zero sum game
with incomplete information and uncertain payoffs (Box EE), based on a web of reaction
functions. It is a repeated game because in a closed society (the entire world is almost a closed
society today, with globalisation) people interact repeatedly with each other, and in determining
their strategies, take into account others’ strategies. It is a non-zero sum game because the
outcomes from cooperative synergies engendered by such a contract are preferable to leading an
isolated, brutish life. It is evolutionary in the sense that solutions that best protects life and
liberty will tend to dominate those that do not. ‘[T]he numbers kept alive by differing systems of
rules decide which system will dominate’ 73 (Hayek).
A good example of the equilibrium is the contract implicit in property rights. As Hernando
do Soto noted: ‘Remember, it is not your own mind that gives you certain exclusive rights over a
specific asset, but other minds thinking about your rights in the same way you do.’ 74 (The same
thing holds for paper money: there must be implicit agreement and mutual recognition, else now
on will accept a mere piece of paper you of a real asset.)
Box EE
The concept of Nash equilibrium
The idea of Nash equilibrium won John Nash the Swedish central bank’s Prize in memory
of Alfred Nobel (not technically a ‘Nobel prize’). This idea is very simple, based on strategic
anticipation and reaction. A chess player must anticipate his opponent’s future moves in
response to his own moves. This informs how he will play his immediate move.

72 John Rawls (1957). ‘Justice as Fairness’, in The Journal of Philosophy, 54(22). p.655.
73 Hayek, F.A., The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988/1991, p.130.
74 de Soto, Herndando, The Mystery of Capital, Bantam Press, London, 2000, p. 160.

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 Similarly, we anticipate others’ reactions to our actions (or inactions) in all our
interactions. This anticipatory knowledge (howsoever incomplete, imperfect and uncertain) of
others’ action-reaction possibilities helps us to choose our preferred (optimal) strategies. The
set comprising everyone’s current and future strategies about any action that has social
impacts can be said to be in Nash equilibrium if no participant has any incentive to alter his or
her strategy. If any reason exists to cause someone to change his strategy, then the Nash
equilibrium has not been achieved. (Robert Gibbon’s book, Game Theory for Applied
Economists, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, provides a good introduction to game
theory.)
The idea of Nash equilibrium is easily often illustrated by the simple ‘game’ known as the
Prisoner’s Dilemma. In this game, two persons who have been suspected of having
collaborated in a theft are arrested and placed in separate prison cells. The police don’t have
perfect evidence and need clear confessions if they are to achieve successful convictions.
So the police offer to them separately the following deal: Each is asked to implicate her
partner. If each implicates the other, then each goes to jail for a while. If one implicates the
other but it not implicated, the first gets off (and gets a greater share of the loot), while the
one implicated goes to jail for a longer period of time. 75
In this ‘game’, each prisoner suspects that the other will testify against her and get out of
prison. Both prisoners therefore implicate each other, ending up with the worst outcome (for
them, not for the society!). Betrayal is therefore optimal for both prisoners, and constitutes the
Nash equilibrium, namely, the outcome that is consistent with these assumptions.
There is a related concept worth noting here – of competitive general equilibrium – that is
used in economic theory extensively and represents a balance between competing forces of
supply and demand across all markets. It is similar in some ways to the Nash equilibrium,
being, as Hayek describes it, part of an ‘extended order’ of which no one knows the beginning
or end. The price vector that equilibrates all demands and supplies represents a Nash
equilibrium at the instant of trade. This idea, however, fails to represent strategic behaviour,
understanding which is necessary for representing the social contract. It is important to
remember that just because certain strategies lead to a Nash equilibrium does not imply that
the such outcomes are the ‘best’ in any moral sense, or that the equilibrium is permanent. The
social contract evolves and changes.

Aware (even if imperfectly) of the interests of all others, and anticipating their responses,
people in a free society support a particular social contract as representing their optimal
strategies. If everyone implicitly or explicitly agrees to a particular social contract then it can be
said to be in Nash equilibrium. It includes the off-equilibrium threat (the Damocles sword) of
reversion to the state of nature in which everyone’s payoffs could reduce. Even cheaters and
looters don’t like being killed off through violent, uncontrolled retaliation, and would much
rather have a objective justice system.
As noted in the earlier section on accountabilities, the social contract won’t persist unless a
credible threat of enforcement is in place. If the system of detection of crime and enforcement of
punishments is lax, the costs of plunder will become low and the contract will be laid waste.
Deterrence, preferably on the ‘tit for tat’ pattern (i.e. proportionate and directly related to the
quantum of the offence) is a crucial part of the sustainable cooperative order. 76 Of course,
punishment is not the only way to achieve deterrence: socially embarrassing options can be used
in simpler cases, as well, and indeed, might turn out to be more effective 77. Where detection is
particularly difficult or expensive then disproportionately high penalties might be justified to, on
average, achieve proportionality of punishment with the crime. Alternatively certain actions
could be uniformly forbidden.

75 This game has many versions. This version is from David M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory, New Delhi:
Prentice-Hall of India, 1992, p. 503-4.
76 Robert Axelrod (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation.
77 Gigerenzer, Gerd, Gut Feelings, London: Penguin, 2007, p.223.

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 By now it should be obvious that a formal (i.e. written) social contract is merely one of many
possible Nash equilibria. More generally, a social contract is any generally agreed process or
institutional structure that secures, jointly, the defence of our life and liberty within the fortress.
Most historical social contracts were implicit. Written constitutions have only been a recent
phenomenon – and often not worth the paper they are written on (as with many African and
Middle-Eastern ‘nations’).
Social contracts can never be perfectly stable because of their underlying complexity and
dynamics. Our ignorance about their true impacts on our lives can only be resolved over the
course of time, as people’s details strategies are revealed, based on the contracts’ incentives.
Despite a social contract that looks fine on the surface, a society might get overwhelmed by
corrupt, vile, and violent forces because of distorted incentives. We cannot anticipate all
unintended consequences of the contract’s incentives. This must necessarily lead to a re-
adjustment of the contract. New generations must therefore have the opportunity to redesign
their social contract, else things may become so bad that one fine day people could simply walk
away.
The issue before us is therefore of contract design, knowing that our design will always be
imperfect; its consequences subject to challenge. To minimise the likelihood of an ineffective
contract, it must acknowledge human nature, such as our tendency to be opportunistic, and the
likelihood of rebellion equal opportunity is not fostered, our moral sense and altruistic
tendencies, the inclination of politicians to throw largesse at voters, and so on. Only when its
assumptions are compatible with human behaviour, can it possibly work. This is where the
liberal democracy succeeds while other models fail. Monarchies assume that kings are perfect,
religions ask the people to be perfect (even as their own priests display questionable behaviour.
Liberal democratic republics, on the other hand, do not exhort, but everyone checks and balances
each other (Figure WW).
The liberal democratic contract is generally more successful than others in producing larger,
healthier, and wealthier populations. The innovation and competition that is fostered through
market forces in free societies gives them an economic advantage over others. Since success
tends to breed success, and crowds out failure, liberal democratic republics have been spreading
faster than other forms of social contract. In the end they may even replace these other forms.

Kingdoms or Kingdoms Kingdoms Liberal

Tribal
totalitarian with incipient with liberal democratic
chiefs
states rule of law democracy republics
Justice Whimsical Attempted More Democratically
(often ‘justice’ – with control over systematic governed
cruel) possible whimsical control over societies with
dependent genocides as justice, e.g. kings, e.g. rule of law,
on the kingdoms England with England systematic
whim of become its Magna today justice, and
the ‘chief’ larger Carta freedom

Figure WW. The evolving human social contract

Features of the modern social contract include democratic decision making process
compatible with the principle of subsidiarity. The social contract enables the society to decide its
rules of accountability and methods of enforcement through consent. Doing so ensures that the
laws represent the general will. Once they have participated in rule making, the citizens are
more likely to agree to abide even by the rules they personally disagree with. It gives citizens
some comfort that they retain the option of democratically the laws, should a change in laws be
of significant importance to them. Such social contracts are more likely to be seen as legitimate.
Other features include a comprehensive system of checks and balances in the institutions of
government and justice to minimise the misuse of powers, systems to detect significant
violations of accountability and to ensure that gaps in accountability are closes. Further,
recognition of specific freedoms, such as the freedom of occupation (e.g. trade), property rights,
belief (religious and political), association (including non-violent protest), is part of such a

125
contract. Finally the contract permits the collection of an agreed level of taxes that are uniformly
applied to all citizens, albeit with generic thresholds. I discuss some of these, and related
elements of the social contract, later in this book.
Viewing the social contract as a Nash equilibria has been a relatively recent phenomenon (I
discovered some academic work in this area 78 after I starting thinking of social contracts in this
way). I suspect (though it is never rational to predict such things!) that it won’t be easy to create
internally consistent models to mimic the effects of different types of social contract on human
incentives and hence on the outcomes experienced by societies. Till such models can be created,
though, we must be content to think about the social contract more broadly. Thus, in Box KK I
hint at a crude expression (not a working model!) of a possible social contract. The mathematical
expressions proposed are another way of saying, ‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto
you’. You can readily skip the mathematical expressions in the Box KK without significant loss
of understanding.
Box KK
A possible social contract
Consider n citizens living inside a fortress at time t. Based on the recognition of human
nature, the off-equilibrium threat to revert to the state of nature, and to anticipations about
others’ reactions (assuming perfect information), these citizens pick a strategy that, when
considered together with the strategies of other citizens, leads to the Nash-type equilibrium.
(Note that this representation is different from Rawls’s experiment in that this represents a
real-life, strategic contest). This equilibrium includes a perfect enforcer with zero enforcement
costs. Everyone’s freedom is therefore maximised subject to everyone being fully accountable.
One of the many possible equilibria is depicted below, noting that we can make this depiction
more realistic by adding relevant costs (such as enforcement or transaction costs).
The social contract for a closed society would ensure the following:
[max{f 1k } { } {
( x1k , o1k ) mk=1 , max f 2 k ( x2 k , o2 k ) mk=1 ,..., max f nk ( xnk , onk ) mk=1 }]
t

(
subject to f 1k ( x1k ) = ai1 + ai 2 + ... + a ij ) N N
i =1 j =1 k and oik ≥ Ok , where

• Ok ∈ (0, ∞) is the social minimum for type of action k, noting that a society is not obliged to
provide an opportunity > 0 to everyone for each type of action. For instance, it is neither
feasible (except through genetic manipulation) nor desirable, to provide everyone with a
minimum level of talent in painting or singing (and who are we to ‘provide’ such things
anyway?). Further, while most social minima are bounded above, some elements of these
minima are unbounded, for instance, everyone is entitled to as much air as they need in
order to breathe;
• f ik ( xik , oik ) is the freedom function, where xik is a vector of the level and frequency of
actions chosen by individual i for type of action k, and oik is the vector of opportunities
available to i ;
• ai1 ( f1 ( x1k ), r1 ( x1k )) is the vector of actual (not imagined) accountabilities (positive and
negative) of individual i in favour of individual 1 upon i undertaking an action (or
inaction) x1k , of type k. The accountability so created is a function both of the action x and
the real (or perceived) reaction (r) to action x of the individual towards whom the
accountability is created. In this formulation, we are accountable to all others for all
consequences we directly cause, including the perceptions we may create. Of course, many
of these are null accountabilities (being in some cases responsibilities without social
import). But theoretically, even the smallest accountability can be real.
This expression covers all negative externalities, no matter how small. Where individually

78E.g. Skyrms, Brian, Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge University Press: 1996, and Binmore, K. G., Game
Theory and the Social Contract: Playing Fair. Vol. 2. MIT Press, 1998.

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 small (but cumulatively large) accountabilities are generated by individuals who are not
easily identified, towards others who similarly cannot also be identified, the state may
need to aggregate these accountabilities and (potentially) discharge them centrally. This
social contract does not permit for the aggregation of accountabilities except for the type of
case just discussed.
Social contract in an open society
No society is an island in itself. Open societies, in particular, trade with others. Each of the
N people on Earth can potentially be accountable towards all the remaining (N-1) people. Of
course, enforcement mechanisms in this case could be considerably weaker, leading to
unsustainable outcomes. In particular, enforcing accountability for negative externalities will
become very hard.
A social contract with animal ‘rights’
The Earth’s ecology is made up of many closely inter-related species. Ensuring the survival
of all forms of life on earth is one of the best ways to ensure our own survival. Animal health is
indirectly related to our own health. Not for nothing were canaries used in mines in the past,
to confirm the health of a mine. In addition, scientists regularly find new uses for plant and
animal products. Necessity, good sense, self-interest and ethical analysis will therefore compel
us to widen the social contract to include consideration of other life forms. We can do so in the
equations above by including uni-directional accountabilities towards animals in our social
contract (i.e. not from animals back to us) that require us to live and let live, and to restore to
animals a reasonable approximation of their natural habitat.
Additions and refinements
We can also now add useful elements to this contract to mimic reality. We can introduce
dynamic change – where peoples’ strategies change based on the resolution of uncertainty and
their own ignorance. This would include Bayesian considerations and, where applicable,
conditional probabilities. The Nash equilibrium could then update itself continuously. Over
and above the basic strategies one can add an overlay of deception to mimic real life. One could
also evolutionary fitness requirements and many others (I don’t have the time to develop an
exposition of details necessary to depict reality). Indeed, it would appear to me that a perfect
model of the social contract is intractable, given the uncertainties involved. Hence people
perhaps engage in satisficing, not optimising behaviour. They will tend to pick conservative
strategies, not risky ones.
It will suffice perhaps for me to note that just like a chess player is not required to
understand the underlying mathematics of their move, nor billiards players the underlying
physics of their game, so also people have absolutely no need to understand the mathematical
representation of their continuously evolving strategies. As evidence, social contracts were
created through strategic interaction before the ideas of Nash equilibrium were discovered.
Does the contract outlined above (in Box KK) make sense? Let’s take an example. Let A’s
opportunity set comprise a fast car and awareness of the consequences of speeding. A wants to
drive his car beyond the speed limit in a busy street to show off to his girlfriend (a possible
benefit). He will also get a sense of exhilaration out of this, regardless of what his girlfriend
thinks about speeding (a benefit). The social contract outlined above does not physically prevent
A from speeding, particularly as this will be his first time. It allows A’s exhilaration on payment
of a speeding ticket (accountability) – if caught. If, in this process, A injures or kills someone,
then A is required by the social contract to, in addition, cool his heels in prison for
manslaughter. The optimal freedom that A would choose if he was reasonable is to drive
carefully, within the speed limit. Doing so would reduce harm and balance his freedoms and
accountabilities with those of others in society.
Similarly, a poor man (with a bicycle, perhaps) will be to able to ride on the street, And both
will get equal access to public roads. Note that since the poor man doesn’t own a car, he won’t
have the option of seeking exhilaration through speeding. But the social contract doesn’t oblige

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taxpayers to give a fast car to everyone. The social contract does not require equality of talents,
equality of outcomes, or equality of all opportunities. It only requires equal treatment of all.

Reasonable equal opportunity and the social minimum

‘Probably nothing has done so much harm to the liberal cause as the wooden insistence of
some liberals on certain rough rules of thumb, above all the principle of laissez faire.’ – F.A.
Hayek, in The Road to Serfdom.

Reasonable equality of opportunity was referred to as the social minimum in Box KK ( O k ).

What is the reason for this contractual condition? How can taking money from the rich to feed
the poor, to educate their children, to even build a road that a poor person – who has not
contributed funds to the construction of the road – can use, possibly be justified? Wouldn’t this
concept take us straight down the path of socialism?
The claims of philosophers
F.A. Hayek (among other like-minded liberal philosophers) well understood the logic behind
a social minimum or social insurance. He observed that, ‘There can be no doubt that some
minimum of food, shelter and clothing, sufficient to preserve health and capacity for work, can
be assured to everybody’ (in The Road to Serfdom). In his 1973 Wincott Memorial Lecture 79 he
wrote: ‘We can of course in a free society provide a floor below which nobody need fall, by
providing outside the market for all some insurance against misfortune.’
Similarly, Von Mises noted, while arguing against claims that social policy should create
happiness, ‘All that social policy can do is to remove the outer causes of pain and suffering; it can
further [advance] a system that feeds the hungry, clothes the naked, and houses the homeless.’ 80
And Milton Friedman proposed a direct system to operationalise the concept of (economic) equal
opportunity through a negative income tax. 81
Jean Jacques Rousseau emphasised tax-payer funded education: ‘Public education … is …
one of the fundamental maxims of popular or legitimate government.’ 82 Even John Locke was
argued that ‘[m]en, being once born, have a right to their Preservation, and consequently to
Meat and Drink, and such other things, as Nature affords for their subsistence.’ 83 This idea of
Locke sounds suspiciously like ‘right to life’ – a dangerous concept that we have repudiated
earlier. Locke even insisted that ‘everyone must have meat, drink, clothing, and firing’ 84,
significantly broadening the scope and implications of liberalism, at least in his own mind.
Locke even let property rights be overridden when faced with extreme want: ‘charity gives
every man a title to so much out of another’s plenty as will keep him from extreme want, where
he has no means to subsist otherwise’. 85 Of course, he was referring only to our ‘animal rights’.
The starving man has no option but to procure food by any means, an amoral action not
comparable in any sense with theft.
But where do all these conceptions and claims about the social minimum or a title to our
plenty come from. Mustn’t the social contract solely focus on defending our life and liberty?
Would not compulsion to look after others distort our liberty? We need far more robust
justification. Some reasons offered for such claims are examined below.
1) The starving man obeys no laws

79 ‘Economic Freedom and Representative Government’, 31 October 1973, London: IEA, p. 17

[http://www.wincott.co.uk/main.htm]
80 Von Mises, Ludwig, ‘Liberalism in the Classical Tradition’, translated by Ralph Raico, 3 ed. Irvington on Hudson,

NY, 1985, S1-5, 713, from the copy published in the proceedings of the Convention on Liberal Values, January 1996,
Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, New Delhi, p.107.
81 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982 [1962]. p. 192.
82 Carnoy, Martin, The State and Political Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p.22
83 Second Treatise, chap.5, sec.25
84 Locke’s paper on poor law, cited in Jeremy Waldron, ‘Nozick and Locke: Filling the Space of Rights’,

[http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S026505250504104X], p.96.
85 John Locke (1690) Two Treatises of Government, 1690. Para 42, Chapter V.
[http://socserv2.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/government.pdf]

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 Wouldn’t the social contract become a worthless piece of paper to us if we are protected from
assault by ruffians but left ‘free’ to starve when we may have unavoidable reasons for poverty,
despite our best efforts. If the social contract lets its citizens starve, their totally amoral animal
powers to defend their existence could also be unleashed, leading to a significant increase in
crime (I’ll revert to this argument a later when considering the stability of social contracts).
2) Our empathy for the poor
That a fellow citizen should die of starvation or face extreme privation surely hurts our
sentiments, knowing fully well that it has never been possible for charity to shelter everyone.
And while we may choose to support the poor through charity, we must surely resist any thought
of such charity being compulsory through the tax system. And surely no title exists to our
‘plenty’. That is a dangerously socialistic argument! The poor have no right to our charity despite
some such claims 86. No society can assume that all taxpayers will voluntarily pay taxes that are
to be deployed towards others’ welfare.
3) Prospects of self-reliance
One such relatively better argument has been made by Dennis Mithaug. According to him,
equal opportunity does not mean that ‘everyone deserves an equal starting point’. It means that
there must be a ‘reasonably favourable match between their capacity and their social
opportunities’ 87 [italics in the original]. Mithaug then shows that the difference principle
‘decreases prospects for self-determination because it increases dependence on social and
economic benefits that are provided independently of individual needs’ [italics in the original]. 88
This argument emphasises self-reliance as the key virtue and correctly rejects charity as a
principle for social organisation. He is then able to relate the provision of equality of opportunity
through education strongly to our prospects for self-determination. And thus public education is
defended. This interpretation, however, seems to veer quite a bit towards positive liberty. We
need an even better argument, an argument that would demonstrate how our personal self-
interest is served through social insurance.
4) Positive externalities
There is a real self-interested, rational reason for us to contribute voluntarily towards the
basic education of all children. That is the prospect of gaining personally from our contribution.
Many potential geniuses are found among poor children, like unpolished strewn about in the
mud. By educating them, we do ourselves a great favour. We therefore not only find ourselves an
uninterrupted supply of good soldiers and policemen to fight our battles for us and die for us, but
also public servants, shopkeepers, and teachers who do some of the more routine and boring jobs
in society. And if we are fortunate, some of these children will grow up into Einsteins or Edisons,
their brilliance providing us and our children with new opportunities. The more educated the
people around us are, the better our own prospects become – and those of our children. This self-
interested argument is just the kind of argument to persuade those who are not going to be
swayed by anything but the narrow self-interest.
5) Inability to eliminate all sources of disutility
We can’t always eliminate things that increase our costs (or give us disutility). The parent of
a disabled child is not free – even though he or she is the progenitor of the child and not the
‘society’ – to kill that disabled child on the ground that the costs imposed by that child exceed
the benefits the parents will obtain. If a society blocks such choices (including suicide as a
‘solution’ to poverty) then it must help us care for that child. That is clearly one more reason for
the social minimum. Either we should be totally free to kill ourselves and our children, or if we
are not, then the society must sustain us in our distress. We can’t ask a poor to not kill off his
children and yet deny him basic support when that is the only other option left for his own
survival.

86 Chistopher John Nock, ‘Equal Freedom and Unequal Property: A Critique of Nozick's Libertarian Case’ in Canadian
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25 (4), Dec. 1992, p. 681.
87 Mithaug, Dennis E., Equal Opportunity Theory, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1996, p.201.
88 Mithaug, Dennis E., Equal Opportunity Theory, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1996, p.28.

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6) National unity and stability
Ensuring reasonable equality of opportunity is important for yet another reason. The
allegiance of citizens towards their country will weaken considerably if equal opportunity is not
ensured. The only reason the poor will continue to bear allegiance and come forward as soldiers
to protect us is that their well-off brethren are willing to insure everyone for minimum needs
when poverty is caused by factors beyond a poor person’s control.
And despite disagreeing with Rawls on a number of things, he was right point out that ‘one
must take into account the problem of stability. A just system must generate its own support.
This means that it must be arranged so as to bring about in it members … an effective desire to
act in accordance with its rules’ 89. This is a strategic principle, and a society that fails to abide
by its requirements will face endless social unrest.
Revolution and rebellion are never far away. Even George Washington was forced to allow
illegal squatters to settle down permanently on his estate because he realised (as his lawyer
advised him!) that if he tried to physically eject them, they ‘would probably burn his barns and
fences’. In an incident in the USA in around 1800, illegal settlers killed off the sheriff under
similar circumstances. 90 The spark of animal-power based rebellion resides barely below the
surface. We treat the poor with contempt only at great personal risk! Equality of opportunity is
the balm to the aggrieved, the glue that holds a free society together even as it undergo the
enormous stresses and pressures of innovation and market competition.
7) Insurance
We can now understand the most sensible self-interested and strategic argument of all.
Consider Hayek’s experiment:
The conclusions to which our considerations lead is thus that we should regard as the most
desirable order of society one which we would choose if we knew that our initial position in it
would be decided purely by chance… [A] better way of putting this would be to say that the best
society would be that in which we would prefer to place our children if we knew that their
position in it would be determined by lot. 91
This appears, at first sight, to be similar to Rawls’s experiment on a veil of ignorance
experiment. But note that it is quite different, for it asks us (a) to choose a form of society as
conscious, alive people in this real world today, and (b) to choose this society not for ourselves
alone but for our children before they are born. We aren’t asked to go behind a veil of ignorance.
We are also directly responsible for dealing with foreseeable contingencies that can potentially
make us, or our children, destitute. This leads naturally to an agreement for the social
minimum, as part of social insurance. Some of these reasons are outlined below.
• Genes regress to the mean. Even the smartest parents can bear mentally retarded children.
We simply don’t know what our child will be like before it is born.
• Great uncertainty is the norm in the market place. Our children will not always be rewarded
for their efforts, for luck plays a crucial role, as well. Rich people’s children too can end up on
the footpath. Poor people’s children can also succeed hugely.
• About half the children in pre-modern societies died before reaching the age of five. Our
children have a fair chance of survival – particularly once we become poor for reasons not
within our control.
• We may have occasion to need emergency health care under situations where our financial
status cannot be verified, such as in severe road accidents. The nurse admitting us into the
ICU in an unconscious state wouldn’t know our financial status but we definitely want the
very best care irrespective of our financial circumstance.
Such reasons (and there are many others) show that it in our narrowly defined self-interest
to pay an insurance premium in the form of taxes for a wide range of uninsurable contingencies,

89 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (1971), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,

1999, p.230.
90 de Soto, Herndando, The Mystery of Capital, Bantam Press, London, 2000, p. 104-5.
91 Hayek, F.A., Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Vol. 2, University of Chicago Press, 1976, p.132. Google books.

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when our ability to insure will be in question. It is a rational strategy to jointly create a poverty,
disability, and emergency fund through tax premiums to insure against a range of uninsurable
contingencies. This fund can ensure our children’s survival and pay for their education should
circumstance prevent our ability to look after them. It can cover our hospitalisation needs during
severe emergencies.
It is worth reminding ourselves that in a general sense, even the most elementary social
contract – that only looks after defence (Proposition 4), is a form of social insurance. We pay the
defence force for our personal protection, not as charity towards others. We pay collectively for
defence through taxes, and yet we personally benefit from defence perhaps only once in 200
years. That is the precise meaning of social insurance.
The quantum and duration of the social minimum
Now that we are persuaded about the relevance of the social insurance scheme, the practical
issues about its magnitude of coverage must be addressed. I have discussed the implementation
plan for a detailed package in BFN, including an Equal Opportunity Act to punish
discrimination on grounds in relation to public office (not private sector discrimination over
which a government can have no grounds to object). But what is the appropriate quantum of
services for the social minimum? Should it be sumptuous, such as university education, top class
health care, and significant cash payout? Or should it be frugal?
Apart from the practical difficulty of paying for such an outlandish insurance package, the
social minimum must be designed to prevent any distortion in work incentives. The frugal top-
up can only be provided once the poor have proved that they have worked to the extent they can.
Excluding such a check would mean rewarding people for laziness. The social minimum cannot
be large at all. It must deliberately be kept extremely frugal.
In addition, the premium paid by taxpayers should be totally ring-fenced from political and
bureaucratic discretion. The free society must retain just one point of consideration of an
individual’s (or family’s) needs. Someone who has fallen below the social minimum must be
topped-up, but after that, the market must once again be allowed to take over. No special
schemes of any sort are admissible under this model. The plethora of anti-poverty programmes
for ‘special groups’ is totally inappropriate. Special concessions of any sort, e.g. for students, the
elderly, or for special occupations should be brought to a halt. If someone is already receiving a
social minimum and can’t pay their electricity bill, they must learn to live within their means.
No additional concessions can apply. That is the point of frugality.
Should the provision for a social minimum in the social contract be retained forever? Hayek
thought that ‘developed capitalist market systems have no need for government maintenance of
a social minimum’. 92 The social minimum would therefore wither away after the society is
sufficiently developed. But although the need for providing social insurance would decline
significantly in an advanced nation, eliminating the social minimum is not only ambitious, it is
unwarranted. Many circumstances outside our control play a critical role in our capacity for self-
reliance. Deep, even chronic, poverty is often involuntary. The free society must therefore retain
the principles of the social insurance scheme, albeit with diminishing coverage over time.
Stability of the social contract
Most social contracts in human history have been extremely unstable. What appears to be
settled on the surface could be a seething mass of contradictions below. Therefore, extensive
change in governments, revolutions, and secession are the norm. Stability is the exception. The
question arises – whether the type of social contract outlined above will be stable. While nothing
in the world is permanent, nor therefore stable, I believe that the features outlined in the kind of
social contract discussed above are more likely to lead to stability than other contract types,
particularly if equal opportunity is treated reasonably and not enhanced into the welfare state.

92DiQuattro, paraphrasing Hayek, Arthur DiQuattro, ‘Rawls versus Hayek’, in Political Theory, Vol. 14, No. 2, (May,
1986), p. 309, referring to Friedrich August Hayek’s 1978 New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the
History of Ideas.

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The devil is in the detail, however, and the design of the system of governance and its incentives
are crucial determinants of stability.
By carefully designing the social contract and minimising adverse economic and health
risks, only the upside risks (gains) remain. Consequently, such societies will experience
significant social and economic mobility, as people can take entrepreneurial risks without too
much downside. Everyone can therefore hope to prosper through merit, hard work, and some
luck.
Poor citizens obviously support this social contract because it gives their children the
opportunity to receive education and therefore work towards success. The middle ‘classes’
support it because they know that they may well have occasion to fall back on the social
minimum. Unanticipated circumstances can easily throw most middle-class citizens off their
cosy perch.
Even the rich support it, for the free society lets them reap the rewards of their effort
without imposing an upper limit on wealth and without the chronic fear of being robbed. They
benefit also from the greater availability of geniuses who are constantly churned up from the
lower economic ranks of the society through good educational opportunity. This supply of
geniuses is particularly important to the rich who need constantly innovate in order to remain
competitive. And finally, while they may not need social insurance, they gain comfort from the
knowledge that should things go truly pear shaped, their progeny will not be thrown out on the
streets.
Moreover, everyone is committed to this society because it is a moral society, where everyone
can make their choices without paternalistic imposition or ‘guidance’ by the state. Its citizens
therefore learn to cooperate voluntarily – for the most part – hoping to build their reputation
through such interactions, as trustworthy, civic-minded people.
The system of freedom which includes reasonable equal opportunity therefore provides each
citizen with the greatest potential (not equal) long-term expected payoffs. Equal opportunity
ensures that the payoff won’t fall below a frugal social minimum. The payoffs for different social
contracts are schematically depicted Figure HH.

100 Strong democratic

state that delivers:
- protection and
justice
Potential long-term expected

- equal opportunity
- public goods
where necessary
individual payoffs

0 Anarchy Capitalism Communism

Alternative political systems

-20

Figure HH: Expected individual payoffs under different social contracts

Indeed, capitalism maximises people’s total expected utility even over multiple generations.
Our progeny will be much richer under capitalism than under any other system. The market
economy lets us maximise our utility subject to our budget constraint. Equal opportunity (EO)
lets us harvest the benefits from a free society (e.g. positive externalities, network effects), even
as we are assured of a social minimum. With total expected utility bounded below, there is
plenty of scope for the unbounded upside. This motivates everyone to compete vigorously
without the fear that we will starve if we make a really bad decision. EO also helps reduce many

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psychological negative externalities arising from the presence of beggars in the streets and
children scavenging in rubbish bins.
The total multi-generational expected utility of each individual in such a free society can now
be represented as:
EU = EUmax + EUpositive externalities – EUnegative externalities
subject to the budget constraint,
where EU ∈ (Umin, ∞), Umin > 0, being equal to the minimum requirements for subsistence.
Lifetime incomes in pre-civilised societies – being forms of anarchy – were clearly the lowest
in human history. Longevity was also very low. Later, with feudalism, per capita lifecycle income
slightly increased, but a reasonable quality of life was only available to nobles and kings. It is
true that lifetime incomes in many communist societies in the 20th century have often been
higher than in pre-civilisation anarchies, but loss of life has been enormous due to internal
massacres, so that its net effect has almost been negative. Totalitarian societies may temporarily
raise incomes, but because of violence and injustice, negative set in, and reduce total utility. But
of this we can be sure – that the highest human achievements have arisen mostly in free
societies. We can’t maximise our utility if what we produce is seized by feudal landlords or by
the state. So Umax is necessarily very low in non-capitalist societies.
The rational person will therefore always pick the free society with social minimum. But we
are not fully rational. Humans continue to create huge negative externalities for each other from
their foibles and fanaticisms – religious, cultural, or other. Societies have therefore tended
towards freedom only very slowly.
It is worth reminding ourselves that there is no one-size-fits-all ‘liberal’ society. They can be
many variations. Constitutions of nations greatly differ in detail. Further, constitutions only
form the first element of the social contract which is supplemented by an array of additional
features, such as election manifestos of political parties, legislation, regulations, and norms. No
contract is permanent, either. People’s preferences also change: they may become more liberal
over time, or even regress into fanaticism. Therefore, the liberal manifestos of parties will
necessarily change over time. At times, the entire social contract may have to be re-drafted from
scratch. There is no firm, fixed, and ideal liberal society.

A note on utilitarianism and neo-classical economics

I pointed out in the first chapter that the entire discipline of economics is based essentially
on four simple assumptions about human nature. These mathematically expressed assumptions
generate the utility function which is amenable to mathematical deduction. Using this
formulation, economists can model our behaviour through utility maximisation subject to the
relevant budget constraint. This general method leads to many useful conclusions.
What is the relationship between maximising our freedoms (subject to accountability) and
maximising utility (subject to a budget constraint)? At the micro-economic level I suggest that
these two are closely related so long as negative externalities are internalised. We use our
freedom to maximise what (we think) is good for us, and to minimise what we think is evil or vile
(using Hobbes’s three-fold terminology). Only free people can choose among a range of options to
maximise utility.
Where our actions create negative externalities and harm others, the utility maximising
model must be modified to ensure we internalise the damage we cause, for the theory of freedom
(and justice) demands accountability. In that sense the concept of freedom is a higher
requirement than utility maximisation. This does not impose a particularly difficult problem,
since the utility maximising model is capable of accommodating accountabilities through, for
instance, Pigovian taxes, markets for pollution, or penalties. Since the standard economic model
can accommodate the requirements of justice, the use of economic theory is strongly
recommended, except in the few matters discussed below.
Statist views emerge from utilitarianism, as well. Claude-Adrien Helvétius (1715-1771), the
actual founder of utilitarianism (not Bentham) believed that the policy maker should educate

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people in things that will increase their happiness and reduce pain. The society would also make
laws to incentivise people to do the ‘right’ thing for their happiness. This is a strongly statist and
paternalistic approach, and implies that people are stupid while the policy maker is the ‘smart’
one. We hear echoes of this through modern behavioural economics. Thus, the default option for
a financial saving scheme should be a conservative one, and so on. This conception can infringe
on liberty and its claims must be questioned.
More problematic is the case where utilitarian approaches end up denying freedom,
becoming ‘inconsistent even with Pareto optimality – perhaps the mildest utility-based condition
and the most widely used welfare criterion in economics.’ 93 In general, we will need to keep an
open mind and carefully consider the trade-offs between the strict utilitarian principle and
dictates of freedom, with freedom given over-riding weightage.
A society’s utility cannot be aggregated
The utilitarian aims to maximise the total utility of a society. (According to Bentham, ‘it is
the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong’ 94.) By
assuming that everyone has the same underlying utility function, a ‘social welfare function’
which merges everyone’s identity 95 can be readily created. The utility maximising model is also
so flexible it can accommodate the Rawlsian collectivist maximin (i.e. difference) principle by
making appropriate assumptions. In the end, the model is merely a form of language to express
our philosophy. The mathematics must be rigorously controlled by philosophy.
This idea – of lumping all individuals together – can destroy individual freedom. Attempts to
maximise social utility invariably lead to arguments for redistribution of wealth. But it is
theoretically impossible to aggregate the preferences of all individuals, or to compare utilities.
This approach is therefore fundamentally flawed. A government must only help us maximise our
freedom subject to accountability. Everything else, including our happiness, is something for us
to figure out independently.
The technique of social cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is based on utilitarian concepts as well.
When economists compare costs and benefits of regulation across an entire society, they are
often indifferent about whom these costs are imposed, so long as the net benefits exceed costs. In
some cases this may mean that those who cause harm pay, being required by justice. In others
cases, regulations act as a channel of re-distribution, and thus illegitimate (redistribution being
a polite word for theft).
Some people have done cost-benefit analyses of freedom itself. As John Rawls pointed out: ‘It
[cost-benefit analysis] can lead one to argue against slavery on the grounds that the advantages
to the slaveholders do not counterbalance the disadvantages to the slave and to society at large’.
Such a conception is abhorrent. Freedom must never be subject to CBA. It is a higher, non-
negotiable value. Utilitarian CBA must therefore be subordinated to the overarching demands of
life and liberty. Having said this, CBA remains a useful tool for policy analysis given the absence
of other tools, particularly as it forces the disclosure of policy maker’s assumptions.

Further explorations of theory

Discussing a few other related issues will now help better understand these propositions.
Consider Proposition 4. It might not always be obvious to everyone that benefits to them of
having a fortress with its impersonal and impartial system of law and order outweigh the
benefits of not having one. Buchanan and Tullock’s analysis, in Calculus of Consent (1962) has
made extremely valuable contributions in this regard. They studied the economic theory of
constitutions (social contracts), being ‘an efficiency explanation for the voluntary acceptance of

93 Sen, Amartya, and Bernard Williams, ‘Introduction’, in Sen and Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, p.7).
94 Bentham, Jeremy, A Fragment on Government, 1776. London: T. Payne.
[http://socserv2.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/bentham/government.html]
95 This approach was first explored by Bergson (1938) and Samuelson (1947). Details in Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael

D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green, Microeconomic Theory, New York: Oxford, 1995, p.825-838.

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coercion, why self-interested individuals might submit to binding decision rules even though
some group decisions may not be in their best interest.’ 96
Of course, there are many informational constraints facing people when they think about the
social contract, the costs and benefits of which are uncertain when they are asked to sign up on
the dotted line. Moreover, the government, with its monopoly over the use of force, has a natural
tendency to increase costs while reducing benefits. Indeed, Hans-Hermann Hoppe argues in The
Myth of National Defense (ed. Hoppe, Von Mises Institute) that the government monopoly over
defence is ineffective and expensive. He argues, as an illustration, that even though US defence
budgets are quite large, they have proved to be largely ineffective in protecting US interests. The
US defence and policy machine constantly asks for more money but delivers less. Hoppe believes
that the World Trade towers attacks could have been prevented merely by allowing pilots carry a
pistol costing $50. The $400 billion defence budget couldn’t prevent 9/11. He therefore argues for
anarchy wherein defence is privately insured. At least some people question even this most
fundamental liberal precept of the fortress or nation on the ground that its benefits are less than
its costs. Most people, though, continue to prefer the state to privatised defence. I don’t buy
Hoppe’s argument. No defence system can be perfect and no country must under-resource its
defence because of a particular failure. Inefficiencies in defence must be identified and rectified,
but anarchy is not guaranteed to do better, and will usually do far worse.
Rationally speaking, though, the creation of the state might not be optimal for some. A
social contract can potentially force Pareto non-optimal outcomes on some. Some people can
become better off with a social contract at the expense of others (this, of course, assumes a zero-
sum game, which, I believe is not valid in this context). Not everyone would therefore want the
state. If, under such circumstances, those who benefit agree to compensate those lose (e.g.
hereditary monarchs) then presumably a contract could work. The Kaldor-Hicks rule outlines
such compensation. Since general laws should apply in the state, on-going compensation is not
valid. A one-off lump-sum could, however, be paid out by the winners to the losers at the moment
of contract signing (in that sense, privy purses were perhaps a valid compensation for erstwhile
rulers upon India’s independence, but there was definitely no ground for a regular payment).
I would suggest that the compensation rule, while potentially a part of the transition
package for revolutionary change, is largely irrelevant, on the lines of the Lockean proviso. The
social contract is not to be seen as a utilitarian mechanism (although economic benefits will
surely accrue – see Figure HH) but a contract for freedom subject to accountability. Agreeing
with it is a strategic calculation for our overall freedom, not a precise economic calculus. History
is a sunk cost and totally irrelevant, except in the rarest of circumstances. The state does not
owe anyone anything. The Nash equilibrium must determine the motivation to the social
contract, not short-term economic calculus.
In the Nash equilibrium representing the contract, reaction functions represent
accountability. A strategic person agrees to the social contract because it maximises all his
expected benefits including justice, while reducing negative events. The king foregoes monarchy
both because of fear and because of the assurance of his life and property in the subsequent
democratic regime. The rich man similarly agrees to the social minimum since not doing so
would constantly endanger his life and property.
While a relatively simplistic Nash equilibrium can be modelled, more realistic contracts
require time (and even some additional expertise) that I don’t have. It would have to be, at a
minimum, a dynamic, repeated game of uncertain information, with reaction functions
(accountabilities) and appropriate boundary conditions. An individual’s expected utility from the
social contract would, among other things, be a function of the reactions of others to his actions,
infinitely nested; but limited in extent by our bounded rationality and ignorance of the shape
and nature of the reaction functions. An individual’s utility could be represented as:
EU = f(individual endowment, culture and institutions, individual effort, reaction
functions or accountabilities) + white noise

96 Stevens, Joe B., The Economics of Collective Choice, Bounder, Colarado: Westview Press, 1993, p.134.

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 In this contract, each of us is effectively playing a ‘chess game’ with everyone else. The
underlying ‘game’ is dynamic because our strategies are influenced by our anticipations (and
reactions) to constantly changing reaction functions – changing both through our internal efforts
and because of our changing responses (learning by doing).
Many simple social contracts have been modelled. For instance, in 1984, Robert Axelrod
provided a mathematical proof that a cooperative social contract, based on tit-for-tat
accountability – is stable. 97 We need to extend this to all non-zero sum games, all prisoner
dilemma games, and so on; all played at the same time. In my judgement the optimal strategy
for each player, compatible with the more realistic social contract – if it is ever modelled – will
still be found to be of the tit-for-tat type.
The existence of uncertainty imposes crucial limitations on the social contract. Not only we
don’t know our future payoffs, we don’t know other’s strategies and reaction functions. The true
costs and benefits of our actions are therefore unknown. We could, for instance, be trounced in
the marketplace not because our products are not good but because our competitor is better or
lucky. Even Ford’s progeny can go bankrupt, as better suppliers enter the market. Since all we
can hope for is that instances of justice will exceed instances of injustice, and that we will be
looked after if we ‘go under’, we will choose the risk-averse approach of democratically controlled
justice with a social minimum. If luck is on our side, well and good. If not, at least we won’t
starve. That, in a nutshell, is the rational response to uncertainty.
We also well know that the state can easily become Frankenstein’s monster, increasing in
size even as it decreases our benefits. Our hope is that democratic approval of government
expenses and actions give us some control. Alternatives (like monarchy) leave us with no true
opportunity to fix bad governance. If our representatives don’t pass the Finance Bill in
parliament, government activity will necessarily halt. And if the government is still not
responsive to our demands, then we shall disembowel Frankenstein’s monster and restore
anarchy. Of course, being strategic we won’t ordinarily do such things, anticipating police or
armed force mutiny or other forms of chaos. Ensuring freedom and justice is never easy.
There is the problem, however, that even in democracies, the use of power remains
monopolistic. The ‘nuclear button’, for instance, vests with just one man or woman even in a
democracy. How are we to control this powerful person? That the powers of the state must be
diluted and checks and balances (cf. Montesquieu) imposed. People charged with achieving
different objectives tend to see the world slightly differently, that would enable the exercise of
power by an institution to be checked by another with a slightly different mandate. Diluting
power through delegation of decision making across multiple institutions is another possible
way. Further, the system of justice can start with a top-down approach, namely, with the state
administering justice. Over time, however, private arbitration can be allowed to play a greater
role. Indeed, private arbitration will work best when the option of a harsher (and more
expensive) official justice system is available.
Because of these considerations, the social contract must be flexible enough to be constantly
improved. Indeed, each generation must start from scratch and write a fresh one every thirty
years. The solution to the principal-agent problem that lies at the heart of the discipline of
governance can only be incrementally perfected. In this review and remaking of the constitution,
we must borrow from previous human experience. In the Arthashastra, for instance, ‘the state
was held responsible for any failure to protect the public. If a thief was not apprehended and the
stolen property not recovered, the victim was reimbursed from the king’s own resources’ 98. That
is surely the sternest benchmark of accountability, and its surest guarantee.
Regardless of these considerations, there can be no substitute for active participation by
citizens in the governance of their own country. Eternal vigilance, as they say, is the price of
liberty.

97 Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic books, 1984, Appendix B.

98 Rangarajan, L.N., The Arthashastra (translation), Delhi: Penguin India, 1992, p.74.

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 The costs and benefits of our contract are now clearer. In brief, an equal opportunity society
makes everyone better off without making anyone worse off. Our Upositive externalities increases while
Unegative externalities decreases. It has been empirically confirmed that public provision of school
education and some health services generates very large positive externalities for everyone.
Thus, the Meiji reformation in Japan positioned Japan for a huge economic take-off though
public provision of high quality school education. Such a society can’t fall prey to Naxalites or
other terrorists, either, since its well-educated citizens are better off making an honest living,
instead of waging a costly war. Free societies garner huge benefits from the networks and
associations of these educated people. (This refers to the well known concept of ‘social capital’.)
It should be reasonable to model the guarantee of a social minimum – comprising poverty
elimination (through a negative income tax type scheme), school education, emergency care, etc.
– as an actuarially fair insurance scheme across multiple generations. The design of this scheme
must be sensitive to incentives which means that the package insured must be frugal –
barebones – even as the school education provided is world class, else it will adversely impact
work incentives, generating moral hazard. It must also be simple to administer, and totally non-
discretionary.
Provision for peaceful secession
One of the keys elements of the social contract must be the ability of citizens to secede
peacefully and create a nation that better protects their freedom. As von Mises noted:
‘whenever the inhabitants of a particular territory, whether it be a single village, a whole
district, or a series of adjacent districts, make it known, by a freely conducted plebiscite, that
they no longer wish to remain united to the state to which they belong at the time, but wish
either to form an independent state or to attach themselves to some other state, their wishes are
to be respected and complied with. This is the only feasible and effective way of preventing
revolutions and civil and international wars.’ (http://mises.org/liberal/ch3sec2.asp)

The happy slave?

Can a free person choose unfreedom? What, therefore, if as part of my claims of self-
determination, I choose to become someone’s slave? Is that an acceptable outcome under our
theoretical framework? This example is not entirely hypothetical, even though it is primariliy
intended to draw the boundaries of freedom. Prisoners who are released after a long period of
internment and are into their old age, sometimes refuse to leave the prison since they neither
know anyone outside, nor have anyone they care for. Worse, they might even commit crimes
upon their release, simply to get back into the prison to re-unite with their ‘family’ of prison
wardens and inmates. In extreme circumstances, they may even commit suicide upon release. 99
Such a decision – to become a slave – can be tested within the framework of the theory we
have just outlined.
• Proposition 1: Would this choice diminish the slave’s life? It may – if violence against the
slave is admissible. Therefore the compact between a slave and his master must necessarily
rule out physical violence and potential for harm to the slave’s life. But when this
modification is applied, the contract can potentially become a variant of the ordinary wage
contract.
• Proposition 2 tells us that the free man must remain free, unless freedom is constrained as
part of accountability. Since the contract for slavery forbids bargains between the slave and
society, it violates the fundamental requirements of freedom, and is therefore illegitimate
from the philosophical perspective.
• Proposition 3 asks whether the ‘agreement’ for slavery has specified its matching
accountabilities, such as the attribution of (and appropriate compensation for) products made
by the slave. If it does not, then it violates justice, and hence freedom. If, on the other hand,
the slave is able to retain the product of his labour (or receive compensation in the
marketplace) then it merely a wage contract. The Kantian categorical imperative also comes

99 For instance, the character Brooks Hatlen in the 1994 movie Shawshank Redemption.

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 into effect at this point. It requires the happy slave to desire everyone’s slavery – including,
at the minimum, the slave owner’s. This leads to a circular argument. The ‘happy’ slave’s
choice must therefore be denied.
• Proposition 5 then asks whether the accountabilities (if any) that have been specified in the
‘contract’ for slavery are consistent with the social contract. Clearly the free society
necessarily prohibits slavery. Being a ‘happy slave is therefore a still-born decision.
We cannot, therefore claim, a power to relinquish our freedoms. We can’t voluntarily choose
to become a slave.
With these propositions we can now divide the functions of the state into three (see BFN for
details). Defence, policing, and justice are first order or core functions. Once these have been
discharged well, a government can consider spending some effort on infrastructure and
reasonable equality of opportunity. Unless first order functions are discharged well, the
government should not consider other functions. Finally, there are a few third order functions
that a government can potentially perform with taxpayer consent, such as proactively preserving
national monuments or the environment, although noting that parts of this function will be
addressed under the system of justice and ancient monuments are best preserved by selling
them to the highest bidder and regulating their maintenance and use.
This, by the way, is a good place for the reader to go back to the definition of freedom I
outlined in the preface and chapter 2 (page xx of this book). The implications of that definition
should be obvious by now.

The institutions (i.e. the pillars) of freedom

From basic assumptions about human nature and the five propositions in this chapter, we
can now consider the institutions that are necessary for the free society. Capitalism, or as Adam
Smith preferred to call it, the system of natural liberty, is the set of these institutions.
Capitalism is both the philosophical system that defends our life and liberty, and the practical
system of freedom based democratic governance which provides justice, eliminates poverty and
creates prosperity.
It is important not to mistake current Western societies as good examples of capitalism.
First, there is no single ‘Western’ model – or indeed, any ‘standard’ model of freedom. Second,
most Western welfare countries are welfare states with the concept of equality of opportunity
having gone haywire, mixing with the deeply socialist undercurrent of equality, coupled with a
sense of misplaced guilt and altruism towards the poor. The poor are not just brought up above
poverty, but pampered to an extent that they don’t see any need to work. Taxpayer funds are
wasted through a constant churn – extracting taxes from the middle classes only to return these
back to them after deducting the totally unproductive administrative expense.
In addition, paternalism and interference with citizen freedoms is the hallmark of most
Western societies today. Coherent thought has been lost in the blind search to please all factions
and interests. Mercantilist businessmen and trade unions (both fishing for profitable protection)
dominate the scene. The followers of Rawls and Keynes (or even of Marx himself) abound,
hijacking public funds for their pet misguided projects, refusing to implement market-based
solutions. Economic analysis (which is now malleable enough to justify virtually any human
preference) is commonly used to argue in favour of increasing government incursions into
freedom. Despite that, it remains true that the institutions of freedom first came together (albeit
in hazy outline) about 250 years ago in the West, and that the West does remain, for the most
part, relatively more free than countries like India. (This may well change in the future.)
Before examining the institutions of freedom, it would be worthwhile to precisely define
what we mean by the term: institution. Along with Douglas North, I believe that institutions are
‘analogous to the rules of the game in a competitive team sport.’ 100 At the heart of the concept of
an institution is a set of rules (implicit or explicit) that aim to influence our behaviour.

100 North, Douglass C., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1990, p.4.

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Institutions can be formal (and well-documented) or informal. Their main function is to ‘reduce
uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life’. 101 In particular, they help clarify the rules
of accountability either through a formal process or through commonly accepted norms. The
structures and processes of family, markets and governments, along with underlying norms and
laws, are the institutions of societies. Anything that says or implies that: ‘Thou shalt do things
this way’ is likely to be an institution.
Most institutions are informal since most rules and norms (including traditions) are not
explicitly laid out. Where they are, they generally formalise these implicit understandings. Even
social norms like tolerance and the ‘rules’ of critical thinking can be considered to be
institutions. As can be readily seen, this is a broad definition that encompasses the culture,
tradition, norms, implicit contracts, and anything virtually that influences our behaviour. As
Hayek notes, most of these have not evolved consciously: but some have – and these, the
conscious interventions interest us the most, for they reflect the highest form of self-awareness.
Trust, shared understandings, and shared expectations grease the wheels of institutions.
Without these, institutions cannot function, causing constant friction and misundersandings.
Indeed, the strength of institutions is defined by the level and strength of these shared
expectations about the ‘rules of the game’. Because of these we are aware, in advance, about how
others are likely to respond. We therefore don’t have to be strategic (and calculating) at every
moment of our life, since certain things can be taken for granted, having evolved a stable Nash
equilibrium. Thus, I will not go naked to address a press conference since the tradition of
wearing a formal suit or dress for such occasions has evolved sufficiently. (Such a tradition
wouldn’t exist if, in my tribe we don’t wear clothes.) Note that the standard social contract Nash
conditions underpin institutions. Trust is always premised on the enforcement of accountability,
should the need arise. Institutional rules include investigative processes where appropriate.
Umpires in tennis are authorised to conduct investigations and award points or mete out
penalties. Our reputation is a major part of the institution of markets, being the account-keeper
of our previous actions and perceived reliability.
Institutions, being Nash equilibria, are local, being path dependent; thus vary across
geographies. Consider punctuality. In Germany, business meetings start exactly on time. It is
considered rude to be late even by a minute. In India, on the other hand, meetings start several
minutes late without any fuss being made. Such differences, of course, add up in the end:
Indians are therefore less productive, on average, than Germans.
The way key institutions are designed, or evolve, such as property rights, contracts,
insurance, civil and criminal justice, can make or break societies. Much research in recent
decades has focused on understanding the institutions of the free society. 102 In the rest of this
book, I focus on what I consider the most important of them. I’ll also try to provide a brief outline
of their evolution or history where possible.
The institutions that I discuss can be grouped for convenience into two primary groups:
political and market institutions. These are the ones that economists mostly focus on. But in
addition, I want to discuss a more intangible set of institutions that establish norms about how
we think and how we react to the world. Figure xx below depicts the main institutions that I will
discuss.

101 North, Douglass C., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1990, p.3.

102 North, Douglass C. and Robert Paul Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History, New York:

Cambridge University Press, 1973 and Greif, Avner. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from
Medieval Trade, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

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 Political institutions Market institutions

‰ Tolerance ‰ Property rights

Outer freedom
‰ Limited delegation ‰ Free markets, free
to governments. trade, free banking
‰ Democracy
‰ Rule of law
‰ Equal treatment Inner freedom
and equal opportunity
‰ Free press and
media
Rules (institutions) of thinking

‰ Independent thinking
‰ Critical thinking
‰ Aspiration to a moral life
Institutions of capitalism (or system of natural liberty)
Is there any order of priority among these institutions? How view is that economic
institutions (e.g. the markets) became free first, leading to the development of modern political
institutions. Thus, Hayek thought that ‘a liberal democratic system and respect for civil liberties
can only develop in the context of a capitalist economic order’ 103.The alternative view is that
political modern institutions developed first. That is a strong argument, as well, for only after
democracy found firm roots in England in 1688 that economic freedoms got unleashed, enabling
the Industrial Revolution from around 1750. Both views, regarding the priority of political or
economic freedom, have a long history.
In my view, the strong inter-linkages between political and market institutions of freedom
suggest that one can’t truly succeed without the other. Innovation in one field must necessarily
spill-over into the other. Indeed, these appear to me to both less important than advances in the
(a) freedom to think and (b) knowing how to think. Theory-building and deliberate reasoning
must be fostered; only then can people explore their political and economic institutions
rigorously. Theorists like Francis Bacon and, later John Locke (who essentially was a scientific
thinker) were crucial to the development both political and economic freedom.
In examining the effectiveness of an institution, the basic question to be addressed is
whether it maximises equal freedom subject to accountability. If it does not, then it needs to be
abandoned, or amended. Economic analysis can throw useful light on the design of good
institutions. Since I discussed market institutions in some detail in BFN I discuss them only
briefly in this book (chapter 14), focusing on money and banking, and taxation.
It is not my intention, though, to enter into tribal debates about who discovered freedom
first. However, unlike similar books by Western authors, I do incorporate oriental contributions
to liberty in addition to Western contributions. The history of freedom must reflect the combined
history of its development. I do so to ensure that India does not to turn its back to freedom on
the irrelevant ground that it is primarily a ‘foreign’ idea. I will show in this book that freedom
belongs to India equally as it does to humanity. In any event, like we all make use of electricity

103 Heywood, Andrew, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, p.27.

140
regardless of it being first discovered in the USA, freedom is of universal value, and we don’t
really care who discovered its logic or when.
But enough of these preliminaries. Let me now pass on to the fascinating story of freedom.

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Part 2 The ‘personal’ pillars of freedom

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Chapter 5 Independent thinking

‘Human history begins with man’s act of disobedience which is at the very same time the
beginning of his freedom and development of his reason.’ – Erich Fromm 1

Knowing how to think is arguably the most important attribute of man. In this chapter and
the following one I will explore the institutions of thinking. You are entitled to question whether
there is at all a thing called the ‘institution’ of thinking. That there is such a thing is evident if
we consider two basic fields of academia. Psychology studies cognition. Philosophy examines
epistemology, or the study of the nature of knowledge. The way we think about thinking is an
institution, with its own rules and assumptions.
A chimpanzee in the wild surely possesses has some form of ‘knowledge’ about the members
of its group, and gains, as it grows, knowledge about what is good to eat and what is not. But it
doesn’t understand how it thinks; it is not a self-conscious, questioning animal. Hence its
approach to everything is unconscious and instinctive, not informed by a plan of action or careful
reflection. Even our ancestors remained in a similar state of ignorant bliss for a long time. Only
after thousands of years of development, premised on developing language skills and the rules of
thinking, could modern man evolve sufficiently enough to create Google, or go to the moon.
Why did our ancestors, gifted with a powerful brain, much like ours, fail to innovate in
similar proportion? And indeed, more pertinently, why do people in nations like India, who have
the same brain capacity as others, fail to deliver basic governance and infrastructure? The
answer can be found in the way people thinking. Humans have made progress because of man-
made knowledge; not from our instinct. It takes time to build man-made knowledge, one brick of
thought at a time.
Language, including grammar and the invention and connotation of words, is the primary
institution or mechanism of human thought. Each language is constrained, however, in its
capacity to depict our world. Emotions evoked in one language (say, Hindi) are different to those
evoked in other languages, say, English. Language thus determines precision of thought, and
limits future advance. A good example is discovery of the Indian number system. Were we only
able to count using the Roman number system, most of the advances in today’s world could not
have been made. Advances in language matter a lot.
From this building block of language (including arithmetical skill), various disciplines have
been created. Among these, mathematics must rank at the top for its precision. The physical
sciences come next, being capable of unlocking the deepest secrets of nature (which perhaps tells
us that nature is a purely rational process).
How did mankind arrive at these disciplines? To understand that, we need to understand
how we reproduce our learnings from one generation to the next, and how the. Traditions so
established, set the baseline from which we operate.
The five main methods of learning are outlined below
1. Conditioning: Ivan P. Pavlov discovered conditioning during his experiments with a dog in
1922. 2 Conditioning, or rewarding desirable behaviours, and punishing undesirable ones, is one
obvious way knowledge is reproduced across generations.
2. Mimicking: Simply watching golf on TV can improve our golf swing. This ability to mimic
others is perhaps the most important way of learning and forms the foundation of our
socialisation. As a result, we develop a network of axons and hence memories in our brain that

1 Fromm, Erich (1950). Psychoanalysis and Religion. New York: Vail-Ballou Press, p.84.
2 Wolman, Benjamin, Contemporary Theories and Systems in Psychology, Delhi: Freeman Book Company, 1979, p.47.

143
embed elemental preferences and motor capacities. Such traditional ‘knowledge’ becomes sub-
conscious habit, second nature: imprinting us with the seal of the culture we were born into.
Thus, what we will prefer to eat, wear, and to believe in can almost entirely be predicted
from knowledge of the culture into which we were born. A Hindu’s child will almost certainly
become a Hindu; a Jew’s child a Jew; a hunter-gather’s child a hunter-gatherer. Twins separated
at birth and brought up in different cultures are socialised differently and think about life
differently (despite possessing a similar temperament and intellect). The Hindu child will be
taught history selectively, particularly at home, and will probably learn to dislike, if not hate,
Muslims. The Muslim child will likewise learn to dislike Hindus. And both will dislike the
Christians. As we teach our children so they become. The seeds of hatred are usually sown very
early in our life through incidental references in books and in the conversations of adults in the
family. If we send our children to a fanatic madrassa in Afghanistan we will probably get a
fanatic member of the Taliban as a result. But send them to a good school that teaches science,
and we can get an Einstein.
These processes of learning largely transmit existing knowledge. As Hayek shows,
evolutionary processes of this sort often preserved things of value, while weeding out harmful
ways. In general, though, these are not creative processes, so one tribal child becomes an
intellectual replica of another, with natural curiosity switched off by the society when they were
young. Most tribal societies, as a result, barely advanced beyond lighting fire.
3. Trial and error: Change in knowledge is created by other processes. The simplest of these is
trial and error or learning by doing. That is how we learn things like riding the bicycle in which
we try, then fail, then try again until we finally succeed. E.L. Thorndike ‘discovered’ this process
of learning during his experiments with a cat in 1898. Successful impulses are stamped into our
brain and unsuccessful ones cleared out. 3 This method is useful both for reproducing what is
already known and for discovering new things. Trial and error was surely vital in the
development of our cultural heritage and language. Creating a new term to represent a new
thought is also perhaps an outcome of trial and error.
4. Sub-conscious processes: Our most radical ideas arise, though, from the sub-conscious,
lateral processes which seem to be at work at the back of our mind. Innovative thinking is also
prompted by competition among similarly interested people who can therefore benefit through
networking: this explains the existence of professional associations where the work of someone
might spark a lateral thought in someone else’s mind.
But what I am interested in is something basic which is not commonly considered a part of
the learning and creative process: the need to think (a) independently and therefore without
preconceived notions; and (b) systematically, i.e. critically; a willingness to examine all
assumptions. To me these drive all creative energy. This chapter explores the first of these, i.e.
independent thinking. The next chapter will discuss critical thinking.

1. The value of oppositional thinking

While there can be merit in following tradition – which largely evolves through trial and
error – it is often useful to break away from it. In particular, one of the main disadvantages of
socialisation, which is then used to embed the tradition, is that while something may have been
found to be relevant in the certain circumstances, that tradition may no longer be relevant as
the circumstances change. Despite that, the pressures of socialisation would compel people to
follow a by now dysfunctional tradition. Traditional understandings are often false (see the
diagram below). Simply challenging them can add considerable value.

3 Wolman, Benjamin, Contemporary Theories and Systems in Psychology, Delhi: Freeman Book Company, 1979, p.35.

144
 100%

Level of false ‘knowledge’

At least 1/3rd, IF NOT MORE of what we
‘know’ today, is likely to be wrong

D
BC
D
0% 0A
OA
0

200
500

Time

There are two main ways to get to the truth: to find it, or to eliminate falsehood. Since there
is always only one truth, there must be an infinity of falsehoods. This tells us that the
probability that we know all the truths is infinitesimally small. While finding the truth is clearly
the best strategy, eliminating falsehoods is also very important, to get us closer to the zone of
truth.
Eliminating wrong understandings is therefore the very foundation of our search for the
truth, even though it can make us unpopular. Wrong understandings can be eliminated by
asking simple questions such as: ‘Why?’ Inquisitive and respectful opposition to traditional views
is crucial to the institution of thinking. As Heraclitus said: ‘That which opposes produces a
benefit’. 4 We must question the status quo in our mind, if only (upon reflection) to confirm it. We
can make our questioning stronger by asking: ‘Why not this (or that)’? Proposing alternatives
gets everyone’s brain working, and often leads to new insights. Indeed, the more challenging
and unrelated the proposed alternatives, the greater the likelihood of finding the truth, and
hence, the likelihood of innovation. Of course, opposing merely for the sake of opposition is never
a good idea. Without at least some reasonable logic (or a ‘method to the madness’) to underpin it,
opposition can lead us astray, to delusion.
It is fortunately a great time for innovation. Thousands of ideas press upon us from all sides,
each potentially contradicting others. The internet is surely the world’s great experiment in
freedom. We can readily find opposing views on almost everything. And the free press is, of
course, a crucial part of this mix. The question we want to ask in the rest of this chapter is: How
did this modern practice of challenging established ideas, emerge? It appears to me that such
oppositional thoughts became influential first in ancient India, followed a little later (through
transmission of such ideas from India), by ancient Greece.

1.1 Oppositional thinking in India – Charvaka, Buddha

About 2,600 years ago, Charvaka is said to have founded what is called the Charvaka (or
lokayata) school. Its entire literature of this school has since been lost, perhaps destroyed by
those who found these ideas too hard to digest. All we have left are a few unflattering references
to his alleged views in ancient Hindu and Buddhist literature. These references may have
exaggerated the ‘case’ against him, but importantly for our purpose, they indicate that robust
philosophical in ancient Indian. Without any parallel, India’s philosophical prowess (if that’s the
right word for it) during this period was at least on par with, if not greater than the thought in
ancient Greece. In Hiriyanna’s opinion, ‘[t]he chief importance of the [Charvaka] system for us
lies in the evidence it affords of the many-sidedness of philosophic activity in India in ancient

4 Translation used in Roger von Oech (2001). Expect the Unexpected (Or You Won’t Find It). Free Press. p.12

145
times and of the prevalence of a great deal of liberty of thought as well as of freedom of
expression’ 5[emphasis mine].
But there is more to Charvaka than liberty of thought. Ancient Hindu and Buddhist texts
seem to suggest that Charvaka disbelieved in the analytical mind, i.e. reason, believing instead
that we perceive reality only with our senses. It would appear to me, though, that such
representation of Chavaka’s views is not just deficient, but probably inaccurate, for even to come
to such a view, one would need some form of reason. Charvaka also apparently rejected
supernatural or transcendental phenomenon, arguing that no evidence of such things reaches us
through our senses. He denied the soul or atman, and hence life after death. These conclusions
were in stark contrast to the dominant discourse of the day in which not only sense perception
(pratyksha) but even inference (anumana) and verbal testimony (sabda) were considered valid
methods to discover knowledge. 6 Apart from Charvaka, many others questioned the status quo.
Ajit Kesakambala, Makkhali Gosala, Pakudha Kacchayana and Purana Kassapa were among
the thinkers so mentioned in the Buddhist text Digha Niyaka. 7 The agnostics (Ajnanavada)
formed another clearly rebellious branch of thought. India was therefore a bubbling cauldron of
philosophical thought, the distinct leader in free thinking. In its various schools of philosophy
were found the kinds of revolutionary thoughts that the world would next hear about only in 19th
century.
I believe that Western writers have grossly under-reported on the direct influence of Indian
philosophy on modern Western thought. For instance, W.T. Stace 8 wrote that Indian philosophy
didn’t arise from ‘pure thought’ and was ‘poetic rather than scientific’. Mel Thompson notes that
Heraclitus’s views were ‘radical … in the 6th century BCE, and … interestingly parallel to the
metaphysics being developed by the Buddha in Northern India at about the same time.’ 9 But
Thompson did not pause to ask why the astonishing advances in India, which clearly precede
Greek thought, presumably had no direct bearing on Greek thought despite extensive trade and
communication. Basnagoda Rahula, in a recent American doctoral dissertation has extensively
referenced ancient literature to establish that it was Indian scepticism that travelled to Greece
through Persia, and led to the concept of asking questioning which, then, led to the emergence of
Socrates. 10 Socrates is thus a progeny of Indian thought, and India must today learn to value the
thought of one of its best students.
While most of these innovative Indian philosophers were unable to attract a mass following,
they did set the scene for the world’s most revolutionary – indeed, atheistic – ‘religions’: Jainism
(by Mahavira, 599-527 BC) and Buddhism (by Gautama Buddha, 563-483 BC). These are the
world’s predominant non-theistic ‘religions’ even today. 11 Buddhism expanded rapidly to become
a major intellectual (and spiritual) force in the world. These religions are revolutionary in many
ways. For instance, both the Buddhists and Jains dispute many of the conclusions and
recommendations of the Vedas. The Buddha asked people not to accept something merely
because he (or anyone else) said so. He insisted that people think for themselves and internalise
the truth. The guru – even the Vedas – must be fully questioned. The truth must be experienced
and understood directly by each of us. A paean to individualism, a gong for human self-respect.
Before forming this extremely modern view, the Buddha had been a student of many gurus, all
of whom, he found, had not arrived at what they believed was the truth themselves, but were
parroting what they had been told. And thus he gave perhaps the greatest sermon ever. To the
people of Kalama he spoke:

5 Hiriyanna, M., Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Bombay: George Allen and Unwin (India) Ltd., 1932 [1976], p.188.
6 Hiriyanna, M., Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Bombay: George Allen and Unwin (India) Ltd., 1932 [1976], p.177,
189.
7 Mishra, Pankaj, An End to Suffering. London: Picador, 2004 [2005 paperback], p.107.
8 In his book, A Critical History of Greek Philosophy by MacMillan,1965, p.15.
9 Thompson, Mel, Teach Yourself Philosophy, 2003, London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., p.24.
10 Rahula, Basnagoda, The Untold Story about Greek Rational Thought: Buddhist and Other Indian Rationalist

Influences on Sophist Rhetoric, PhD dissertation, December 2000, Texas Technical University.
11 See Jayatilleke, K.N., The Message of the Buddha, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1975, p.104-116 who shows

that the Buddhist approach to God is not as simple as classifying it as an atheistic or theistic religion. I will not
attempt to many complexities of Buddhist philosophy here.

146
 Do not believe something just because it has been passed along and retold for many generations.
Do not believe something merely because it has become a traditional practice. Do not believe
something simply because it is well-known everywhere. Do not believe something just because it
is cited in a text. Do not believe something solely on the grounds of logical reasoning. Do not
believe something merely because it accords with your philosophy. Do not believe something
because it appeals to ‘common sense’. Do not believe something just because you like the idea.
Do not believe something because the speaker seems trustworthy. Do not believe something
thinking, ‘This is what our teacher says’. 12
Each time I read this I am startled at the modernity of his message. There is, in the Buddha, an
extremely strong flavour of independent thinking and many elements of critical thinking.
Buddhism asserts that ‘one may attain salvation and a high degree of enlightenment by one’s
own efforts, without necessarily depending on the teachings of the Buddha himself.’ 13 One can,
however, argue that Buddha did not take his message to its logical conclusion, for he did end up
teaching specific things such as the ‘eight fold path’. In other ways, as well, his teachings are
often prescriptive. It can therefore be argued that the greatest teacher is he one who teaches us
how to think – and then stops. In that sense Socrates was a greater teacher. As for me, I do tend
to ‘teach’ the precise applications of the principles of freedom in relation to public policy, in
addition to recommending the general principles of thinking. I do, however, always suggest that
my views be considered only as one among many. What I say (or write) must be critically
analysed and over-ruled where I am found to be wrong (on the basis of evidence), or where
explanations exist.
India, much to its subsequent misfortune, rejected ‘the Buddhist substitution of reason in
place of Vedic authority’ 14, just as the Greeks rejected Socrates and went downhill. Indeed, the
Buddhism that survives today does not display any independence and vigour, having become
mired in mindless mysticism. The good thing is that by contesting these ideas (intellectually, not
physically) Hinduism did learn to tolerate dissent, something rarely found in other religions.
Hinduism not only became inclusive, it actively accepted alternate views.
The eclectic nature of Hinduism is worth commenting on. If a Hindu child questions the
existence of God or the soul, he is told (with some rolling of the eyes) that his atheistic view is
merely one of the many versions of Hinduism. He is also told that most people ‘outgrow’ such
views. Hinduism is the only theistic religion (monotheistic, with thousands of gods who
represent different aspects of God) which never ostracised or killed its members for ‘heresy’. It is
the broadest church of belief in the world, and therefore assimilates most other religions easily.
Thus, some branches of Hinduism have co-opted Buddha and Christ as avatars of Vishnu.
Hindus will readily offer prayers at the shrines of other religions. Gandhi’s favourite bhajan was
‘Ishwar Allah Tere Naam’, which translates thus: ‘You are Ishwar (the Hindu name for God) and
you are Allah (the Muslim name for God)’. Most other religions aren’t capable of comprehending
this broad, humane perspective. In a sense, Buddhism did not die in India; some of it got
assimilated in Hinduism, but unfortunately Hinduism did not learn from his message.
Basnagoda says:
the modern Hindu belief that Buddhism is an integral part of Hinduism and the Buddha is a
reincarnation of the Hindu god Visnu. This is the picture portrayed within Hindu society. Hindu
scholars never speak or write about the Buddha’s rejection of Brahma and creation and the
Buddha’s opposition to the Hindu caste system and the oppression of women. Subsequently,
Hindus hardly think that the Buddha presented a rationalist system of thought to counter the
social practices invented by early Hinduism. 15
Unfortunately, much of its philosophical vigour died out, after the consolidation of the caste
system 2 000 years ago. Vedic thought, with its many innovations, also petered off. It would
appear that India forgot its early history of thought. In the modern version of Hinduism,
independent thinking is not encouraged (Box RR).

12 Kālāma Sutta, Anguttara Nikaya, Vol 1, 188-193 – [http://oaks.nvg.org/kalama.html]

13 Jayatilleke, K.N., The Message of the Buddha, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1975, p.15.
14 Sarma, D.S., Hinduism through the Ages, 1961 , Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, p.14.
15 Rahula, Basnagoda, The Untold Story about Greek Rational Thought: Buddhist and Other Indian Rationalist

Influences on Sophist Rhetoric. PhD dissertation, Texas Tech University, p.24 [softcopy downloaded]

147
 Box RR
Does Hinduism encourage independent, critical thinking?
Gandhi was a great believer in freedom of thought. He wrote: ‘I am not interested in
freeing India merely from the English yoke. I am bent upon freeing India from any yoke
whatsoever … Hence for me the movement of swaraj is a movement of self purification’ 16
[emphasis mine]. He believed that ‘Hinduism leaves the individual absolutely free to do
what he or she likes for the sake of self-realisation for which and which alone he or she is
born’. 17 Many other Hindus likewise believe that the Hindu approach to life provides great
independence of thought.
I believe, however, that such a view is valid only in the narrow sense of achieving ‘self-
realisation’ and does not apply to the broader conception of free, independent, critical
thinking. Copycat worship of traditional beliefs is valued more than independent thought.
In particular, there is absolutely no advocacy of political freedom in Hindu scriptures.
Gandhi perhaps combined the Hindu focus on self-realisation with elements of Western
liberal political thought (particularly from Henry David Thoreau). To justify my view, let
me present few perspectives from Hindu scriptures.
a) We do not create knowledge: it must be ‘given’ to us by God.
Hindu scriptures lay claim to a divine source for knowledge. Knowledge is thus seen ‘as
an exclusively divine activity’ 18, passed via divine intermediaries to the final authors of the
scriptures. All aspects of the Hindu’s life are prescribed in the sastras, leaving little scope
for the creation of new knowledge. Despite this structural rigidity, there also appears to be
scope for critical inquiry. For instance, the Mundaka Upanishad contains a major
onslaught against sacrificial ceremonials (that were prescribed during the early Vedic
period). 19 Hinduism appears to have the advantage of not formalising its findings into a
single book, which gave it the flexibility to critique earlier customs.
Even Hindu conceptions about God evolved over time. The early Vedas thought that
the gods (or devas) were ‘a luminous something presented as external to us’. 20 That is a
theistic perspective. It is worth nothing that at the (seeming) multiplicity of gods (or
aspects of God) in Hinduism was underpinned by a monotheistic view.
This perspective was dramatically revised by the Upanishads. Called the vedantic view
(being at the end of the Vedic period), this was developed coterminous with somewhat
similar subtle pantheistic Buddhist ideas (I am unable to confirm which came first).
According to this, God is everywhere, being the basic energy and consciousness
underpinning creation, the ‘“thread” that runs through all things and holds them
together.’ 21 The Brahman is seen as the ‘hidden Self in everyone’. 22 This ideas is
pantheistic, not just a transcendental (something beyond us); an immanent principle
(found in us). Vivekananda was a major modern proponent of this perspective. This
evolution (not accepted by all Hindus) appears to indicate the formation of at least some
new ‘knowledge’.
Current advocates of the Advaita perspective (e.g. Swami Suddhananda) seem to
favour at least some critical thinking. Thus he suggests that no teacher of Advaita

16 In The Essential Gandhi. Edited by Louis Fisher. Vintage Books. New York. 1962. p. 191
17 In The Essential Gandhi. Edited by Louis Fisher. Vintage Books. New York. 1962. p.212.
18 Pollock, Sheldon, ‘The Theory of Practice and the Practice of Theory in Indian Intellectual History’, in Journal of the

American Oriental Society, Vol. 105, No. 3, , (Jul. - Sep., 1985), p.515. Also verified with Ganeri, Jonardon, Philosophy
in Classical India: The Proper Work of Reason, London: Routledge p.7.
19 Hiriyanna, M., Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Bombay: George Allen and Unwin (India) Ltd., 1932 [1976], p.48.
20 Hiriyanna, M., Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Bombay: George Allen and Unwin (India) Ltd., 1932 [1976], p.82.
21 Hiriyanna, M., Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Bombay: George Allen and Unwin (India) Ltd., 1932 [1976], p.82.
22 Kathopanishad (3:12) Eknath Easwaran Translation,

[http://myweb.cableone.net/subru/Vedanta.html#anchor71261]

148
 arrogates the teaching or the knowledge to himself, and suggests that ‘Ultimately, your
own experience is the best teacher’ 23 (emphasis mine).
b) Reasoning can lead us seriously astray
Like with all religions, reason is not particularly popular in Hinduism – or at least was
not in the past. In the Ramayana, Rama advises Bharata to steer clear of those ‘brahmans
who are materialists’ (referring to the lokayatas), on the ground that ‘although pre-eminent
sastras on righteous conduct are ready to hand, those ignorant fellows derive their ideas
from reasoning alone and so propound utter nonsense.’ 24 The Mahabharata (Anusasana
Parva, Section CLXII) similarly decries reason: ‘That knowledge, O king, which is derived
from reason (or inferences), can scarcely be said to be knowledge. Such knowledge should
be rejected. It should be noted that it is not defined or comprehended by the word. It
should, therefore, be rejected!’ 25 These approaches have always stood in direct opposition to
the requirements of reason and critical thinking.
c) Disproportionate veneration of the teacher
The pre-eminent stature of the teacher in Hinduism is highlighted in the
Kathopanishad (2:9) in which Yama tells Nachiketa:
This awakening you have known comes not
Through logic and scholarship, but from
Close association with a realized teacher. 26
Apart from the Swami Suddhananda quote above, I have been unable to find evidence
in Hinduism (unlike in Buddhism) suggesting that the teacher must be actively questioned
by his pupils. This emphasis on the importance of the teacher seems to have led to a deep-
seated subservience towards elders, so much so that children are often discouraged, and
hence reluctant to ask questions even in the modern classroom. This trend is now
changing.
Satyameva jayate
It is sometimes said that the Upanishads do prompt us to search for the truth, and the
phrase, satyameva jayate is cited in evidence. This term is actually India’s national motto
and finds a place in the national emblem. The origin of this term is in a mantra in the
Mundaka Upanisad (3.1.6) of the Atharva Veda, a part of which reads thus: satyam eva
jayate nanrtam. This phrase has been variously translated as: ‘Truth alone conquers, not
falsehood’, ‘The true prevails, not the untrue’, ‘Truth alone conquers, not untruth’, 27 or (the
more widely used) ‘Truth Alone Triumphs’. But M.A. Mehendale has questioned these
interpretations, after extensive analysis of the Upanishads. As he has noted:
In the above interpretation satyam and anrtam are taken to be the subjects, but this
does not seem to be correct. Both satyam and anrtam have to be regarded as the objects,
and a rsi is to be understood as the subject. Taken this way, the sentence would mean “A
sage obtains only the Real (i.e., the Brahman), not the unreal. ...This interpretation will
be found to be in harmony with the spirit of the Upanisads in general and that of the
Mundaka in particular. 28
It is likely that the common connotation of this term is imprecise. I am quite happy,
though, for this error to continue, and for Hindus to believe that their religion emphasises

23
Suddhananda, Swami, Self Knowledge: A Path to the Pathless, 3rd edition. Chennai: Suddhananda Foundation for Self
Knowledge, 2006, p.32.
24 Pollock, Sheldon, ‘The Theory of Practice and the Practice of Theory in Indian Intellectual History’, in Journal of the
American Oriental Society, Vol. 105, No. 3, , (Jul. - Sep., 1985), p.510.
25Translated by Sri Kisari Mohan Ganguli, [http://www.hinduism.co.za/direct_perception.htm]
26 Eknath Easwaran Translation, [http://myweb.cableone.net/subru/Vedanta.html#anchor71261]
27 All citations from Mehendale, M. A., ‘Satyam Eva Jayate Nāntram’, Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol.

81, No. 4, (Sep. - Dec., 1961), p. 405.

28 Mehendale, M. A., ‘Satyam Eva Jayate Nānrtam’, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 1961, 81 (4): 405-408.
29 Pollock, Sheldon, ‘The Theory of Practice and the Practice of Theory in Indian Intellectual History’, in Journal of the

American Oriental Society, Vol. 105, No. 3, , (Jul. - Sep., 1985), p.510.

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 the importance of the truth.
One must note that some later developments in Hinduism explicitly opened the door to
critical thinking. Thus, the Carakasamhita, a scientific text written in the third century
BC assert that ‘[o]f all types of evidence, the most dependable is that [which is] directly
observed.’ It goes on to proclaim that ‘[t]he wise understand that their best teacher is the
very world around them.’ 29 More fascinatingly, Hindu mathematicians discovered, in
around 500 AD, the decimal number system that we use today, a system that has totally
transformed all fields of science.
On balance, though, one is somewhat hard pressed to give credit for the major
advances in the institutions of human thinking to the Vedic or the Vedantic tradition.
When viewed as a whole, Hinduism is broadly similar to other religions, most of which
have acted as a bulwark against reason, not its progenitors.

1.2 Oppositional (dialectical) thinking – Socrates

Basnagoda Rahula has provided substantial evidence of the direct influence of ancient
Indian philosophy on Protagoras, the founder of sophistry. ‘[A] careful examination of the
practices in Indian debating during the sixth century B.C.E. and comparison of those practices
with Protagoras’ attitude towards argumentation justify the possibility of this hypothesis.’ 30 Out
of sophistry finally emerged Socrates (469-399 BC), the most important advocate of independent
thought. Van Loon summarises the Socratic worldview, thus:
[A]s no one can possibly reach the right conclusions without a thorough examination of the pros
and cons of every problem, people must be given a chance to discuss all questions with complete
freedom and without interference on the part of the authorities. 31
He did not achieve freedom from interference by authorities, though. Authorities (even in
democratic societies) dislike being questioned, and Greece was nowhere like India in its levels of
tolerance. Had he lived in India Socrates might have even been become an honoured saint like
Buddha, but the Greeks couldn’t cope with his independent mind. Democratic Athens therefore
charged him with corrupting the youth and for not believing in the Greek gods. It sentenced him
to death on these frivolous grounds. (This single event turned off people from democracy for
hundreds of years, as they started associating it with mob rule.)
We remember Socrates today largely for the manner in which he approached the truth. He
was the world’s greatest ‘questioner’, asking us to question virtually everything, more so our
assumptions. He asked us to validate our beliefs through the dialectical approach, focused on
eliminating fallacies. ‘His method would be to start with whatever seemed the most satisfactory
“hypothesis,” or postulate, about a given subject and then consider the consequences that follow
from it. So far as these consequences proved to be true and consistent, the “hypothesis” might be
regarded as provisionally confirmed.’ 32
The dialectical method aims to discover the ‘higher’ truths through contestable debate. By
eliminating errors a better formulation of the issue (or hypothesis) is achieved. This method
remains at the heart of modern methods of thinking. Socrates’s advocacy of independent thought
changed world history when it was rediscovered 1200 years later.

1.3 Systematic doubt – Peter Abelard

These initial advances in India and Greece 2 500 years ago were soon forgotten, lost in the
sands of time. Authorities across the world shut down debate. For instance, Christianity, which
took control of the Roman empire from the time of Constantine I (306–337) crushed the Greek
ideas of independent thought. The West then fell into a deep, fitful slumber, full of intolerance
and dogmatism; blind zealous faith blocked out the sunlight of truth. Greek philosophy

30 Rahula, Basnagoda, The Untold Story about Greek Rational Thought: Buddhist and Other Indian Rationalist

Influences on Sophist Rhetoric, PhD dissertation, December 2000, Texas Technical University, p.227
31 Hendrik W, van Loon (1926). Liberation of Mankind. London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd. [1954 reprint], p.38.
32 Encyclopaedia Britannica: [http://www.eb.com:180/cgi-bin/g?DocF=macro/5005/86/0.html]

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(derogatively called ‘paganism’ – that included Socratic thought) was banished, many Greek
books were burnt. Schools of Greek philosophy were closed. 33 On the Eastern side of the world as
well, critical thinking ground to a halt. Hinduism slipped into a long stupor following
Manusmriti – which ossified the caste system which had by then become hereditary and put an
end to India’s vitality.
Fortunately for us, hundreds of years later, independent thinking arose again, in a different
place. Early Islam helped a lot by encouraging greater education and acquisition of scientific
knowledge. For a while Islam even created an outstanding synthesis of Western and Oriental
traditions (Box JJ). This spurt in thinking was, however, short-lived. Islam’s initial openness
was overpowered by the tribal culture that Mohammed had battled against. Islamic societies
become sterile and totally subservient to their backward-looking priests. The human brain was
basically switched off for hundreds of years (although in a few places like England, new thinking
was beginning to emerge).
It took the Reformation (a major battle between the main branches of Christianity) to re-
start mankind’s thinking. The seeds of systematic doubt sown by Socrates were revived by Peter
Abelard (1079-1142), a Parisian teacher. Note that Greek thought was by now ascendant across
Europe, so it is not obvious whether Abelard was an original thinker or was rehashing ancient
Greek thought. We do know for sure, though, that he wrote a fascinating book, Sic en Non (Yes
and No), in the preface of which he proposed a method for finding the truth: ‘By doubting we
come to questioning, and by questioning we perceive the truth.’ 34 But Abelard spoke too soon. A
church council immediately censured him. Nevertheless, his work influenced many of his
students, and humanity was on its way to independent thought once again.
Box JJ
Islam’s role in protecting and preserving Greek thought
I thought that since I make many references in this book to the excellent role of Islam in
preserving and reviving aspects of ancient Greek thought, it would be useful to summarise
the key arguments in one place.
Many Roman emperors were strongly influenced by Christianity, particularly from
around 313 AD. That’s when Constantine issued his Edict of Milan which permitted all
religions to be practiced freely, and stopped the earlier (some argue, sporadic) persecutions of
Christians. But it appears that the Christians didn’t like the idea of religious freedom one
bit. They were interested in a monopoly over religious belief. So, by around 390 AD, they
persuaded emperor Theodosius I, a Christian, to not only prohibit the worship of ‘pagan’ gods
but to destroy or otherwise shut down ‘pagan’ temples. While a few Christians had been
persecuted in early Rome (largely because the Romans felt they did not mingle with the rest
of society), the Christianity in power took persecution to a totally new level. Demolishing
other religions’ places of worship has ever since been a favourite pastime of religions that
arose in the Middle East. Theodosius I did not stop at that. He even shut down the Olympic
games. It is a marvel that modern Christians participate in the modern Olympic games – a
reckless pagan activity.
The few remaining Greek philosophers were then expelled. Fortunately, they were
embraced by Persia which at that stage, a haven of tolerance amidst the then grievously
intolerant southern Europe. Persia had derived its conceptions about life and justice from the
great Emperor Cyrus (approximately 500 BC). Later, the Roman Emperor Justinian
(482/483–565) (whose framework of laws became the basis of modern legal systems) closed
down the philosophical schools of Athens in 529. In 640 AD the great library at Alexandria
was burnt down, when ‘many original Greek texts which had survived up to that time were
finally lost’. 35 The loss of many original Greek texts and its proponents destroyed progress in

33 Evaggelos G. Vallianatos: The Passion of the Greeks: Christianity and the Rape of the Hellenes. Harwich Port, Mass.:

Clock and Rose, 2006. This book has been reviewed at: http://mq.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/19/1/97.pdf
34 Cited in A History of World Societies by John P. McKay, Bennett D Hill and John Buckler (1988), Volume 1. London:

Houghton Mifflin Co., p.413.

35 Haworth, Alan, Understanding the Political Philosophers, Lond: Routledge, 2004, p.7.

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 southern Europe and the middle East. The ideas of liberty ground to a halt. Fortunately, this
knowledge was largely preserved in some form or shape, and ultimately recovered. The main
routes of its preservation are outlined below:
a) The route with the greater influence was through Persia into Islamic nations. Many Greek
pagans fled to (pre-Islamic) Persia which practiced monotheistic Zoroastrianism and had a
history of tolerance towards religions. Thus, the Sassanid king Noshirwan the Just (531-579)
‘welcomed the pagan neo-Platonic philosophers expelled from the Byzantine Empire by
Justinian.’ 36
Islam conquered Persia in 644 AD, a few decades after it arose. The fate of the Greek
pagans now lay in the hands of Muslim rulers. Islam had by then come up with a two-
pronged approach towards other faiths. After Mohammed’s death in 632 the Caliph Omar
had decided that ‘while in Arabia itself there must be one religion, in the rest of the world
submission, as shown by the material token of tribute, was to be sufficient.’ 37 Therefore the
Arabic army which conquered Persia permitted the Zoroastrians and pagans to purchase
‘tolerance’ by paying a tax called the jaziya. The people ‘of the book’ (i.e. those with allegiance
to the Old Testament) were called dhimmis and were particularly offered protection. The
pagans, being persecuted by Christians elsewhere but allowed to live in peace as long as they
paid the jaziya, chose Islamic Persia. (A digression: While a few Zoroastrians did flee to India
during that time, a good number stayed back. Many Zoroastrians still live in Iran,
demonstrating the underlying tolerance of Islam, although that tolerance is sharply receding
in the recent years.) The pagans translated Greek literature first into Eastern Aramaic
languages and then into modern Arabic, a language that arose at about the same time as the
Koran was transferred to writing.
They were allowed, and even encouraged in this enterprise of translation by many
Islamic rulers of Persia (and later of Cordoba). Thus, in around 832 AD, the Abbasid ruler
Caliph al-Ma’mun 38 established the ‘House of Wisdom’ in Baghdad and charged it with the
task of translating ancient Greek texts into Arabic. 39 Islamic scholars actively studied and
developed Greek science. Al-Khwarizmi invented algebra in 847 AD (a discipline that gets its
name after his book Hisab al-Jabr). Brilliant Arab mathematicians assimilated the number
system (its ‘zero’) that had been invented in India in about 500 AD. Later, this was going to
be transmitted to the West, enabling Kepler and Newton. Medicine advanced greatly through
the work of the Persian Abu Bakr Razi (865-925) who took it well beyond the investigations
of Hippocrates.
Many Islamic scholars then ‘migrated to … Islamic Spain, which became a bridge for the
transfer of ancient Greek thought from the former Hellenic world to medieval Europe.’ 40
Thus, in around 1002 AD, Abu Amir, the Caliph of Cordoba built a library containing 400
000 volumes. Avicenna (also known as ibn Sina) (980-1037) wrote a major medical
encyclopaedia. As a result, Islamic scholars led the mediaeval word of science and knowledge.

36 Brickman, William W., ‘The Meeting of East and West in Educational History’, in Comparative Education Review,
Vol. 5, No. 2, Oct., 1961, p. 85.
37 Kellett, E.E., A Short History of Religions, Australia: Penguin, 1962, p.357.
38 ‘Ptolemy’s work was ‘transmitted to the Arabo-Islamic scholars at an early date; under khalif al-Ma'mun it was

translated into Arabic by a committee of scholars.’ – cited in Ralph W. Brauer, ‘Boundaries and Frontiers in Medieval
Muslim Geography’, in Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series, Vol. 85, No. 6, (1995),p.3n.
39 Note that Christianity was a Middle Eastern religion, and many early Christians preferred to live in tolerant Persia

and than in the increasingly intolerant Rome.

40 Chronicle of the World, London: Longman Group and Chronical Communications, 1991, p.310.
41 H. A. R., Gibb, Studies on the Civilization of Islam. Boston: Beacon Press, 1962. p.204. cited in Euben, Roxanne L.

‘Comparative Political Theory: An Islamic Fundamentalist Critique of Rationalism,’ The Journal of Politics, Vol. 59,
No. 1, (Feb., 1997), p.52n.
42 J.M.Roberts (1985).The Triumph of the West. London: Phoenix Press, 2001, p.93.
43 McKay, John P., Bennett D Hill and John Buckler, A History of World Societies, Volume 1. London: Houghton

Mifflin Co., 1988, p.413.

44 Setton, Kenneth M., ‘The Byzantine Background to the Italian Renaissance’, Proceedings of the American

Philosophical Society, Vol. 100, No. 1, (Feb. 24, 1956),.p.3.

152
 But Islam was soon to retreat into its tribal shell. Religious fanaticism emerged. The
Persian philosopher, Muhammad al-Ghazali (1058-1111) sharply criticised Greek philosophy
for suggesting that reason can find the truth. ‘Muslim Aristotelianism [therefore] “stopped
short” at logic and physics’ 41, and did not extensively investigate Greek metaphysics. Greek
studies fell out of favour in mainstream Islam and it clamped down on reason. Islamic
scholars have made virtually no major contributions to mankind ever since – a terrible waste
of highly intelligent people’s capacities.
Despite this regression, Islamic Spanish Cordoba continued to be, relatively to others, an
exemplar of tolerance. ‘From the mid-tenth to the mid-thirteenth centuries, Muslim,
Christian, and Jewish scholars were used to working together in Spain, to their great mutual
benefit.’ 42 Averroes (or Ibn-Rushd) (1126-1198) of Cordoba wrote extensive commentaries on
the Arabic translations of Aristotle’s work. His work was translated, in turn, into Hebrew
and Latin. The latter translation reached St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) and helped to
kick-start modern political thought.
Aquinas was influenced by another source, as well: Moses Maimonides (1135-1204), a
Jew philosopher and Averroes’s contemporary. Maimonides, also born in Islamic Cordoba,
fled to other, more tolerant Islamic kingdoms in Spain after his persecution by a fanatical
Islamic sect in Cordoba. At this point he got the opportunity to read Arabic translations of
Aristotle and decided to attempt a reconciliation of the Jewish scripture with Greek thought.
This work reached St. Thomas Aquinas and led to the possibility of reconciling Christianity
with paganism. And thus the ‘[a]ncient Greek and Arabic texts … entered Europe in the
early twelfth century, primarily through Toledo in Muslim Spain.’ 43 Islam had became a
major gateway for the discovery of ancient Greek thought.
St. Aquinas rehabilitated Greek thought and was instrumental in reversing the stigma
attached to pagan thinking. Christians could once again read Greek literature without being
burnt, dismembered, or excommunicated. Most importantly, Aquinas revived the ancient
Greek arguments against tyranny and created a new Christian theology which led ultimately
to tolerance (after a few hundred years, first, of great bloodshed).
This revival of Greek thought set the scene for the Renaissance – a great revival of Greek
art, literature and medicine. In addition, the Renaissance thinkers were able to make use of
the Indian number system and Chinese technologies like gunpowder. A new spirit of inquiry
and reason arose. Over the years, the backlash among citizens in the West against erstwhile
Christian intolerance grew stronger and led to modern conceptions of individual sovereignty
– a quintessentially Eastern idea. The 1439 invention of modern printing, a breakthrough
almost on par with the internet in its revolutionary impact, helped transmit the ideas of the
Renaissance.
b) The other route leading to the re-discovery of pagan thought passed was through the
recovery of original Greek texts from inside the Byzantine empire. Greek texts that survived
Christian Rome had been ferreted away by the pagans (pretending to be Christians, or
possibly genuinely converted) to the Byzantine (east Roman) empire. These texts were
hidden away (and perhaps never opened) for centuries. We know that because the Greek
Orthodox Church did not, in any way, promote Greek thought. And so Islam came to the
rescue of the ancient Greeks again – this time in the form of a disruptive force. Islamic forces
ransacked the Byzantine in the 1450s to found the Ottoman empire. That prompted the
exodus of Greek texts into Italy. As a scholar has noted, ‘there [had been] was no survival of
“Hellenism” from antiquity to the Middle Ages in Italy. Greek culture was reintroduced into
southern Italy by the Byzantines.’ 44
In any event, regardless of the speed and process of adoption of these ideas in Europe,
one thing is clear: it was Greek philosophy – and not Christian, that ultimately helped
advance liberty. Let us never confuse this basic fact.

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1.4 Opposing authority – Reformation
Socrates (following on from the sophists) taught us to question our assumptions. But there is
another way to the truth, too: to question received human knowledge or the claims of authority
or experts. That was the key Buddhist method. However, it was not Buddha’s method thinking
(which seems to have decayed over the centuries and taken on mystical overtones) but the
Reformation that has built the modern institutions of thought. It was not its direct influence
that led to this outcome, though. Only after conflicts that took many thousands of lives did a
reconciliation of ideas occur. The lessons we draw from it are an unintended consequence.
The questioning authority is of course, potentially very dangerous. In the late 11th century
Peter Waldo from Lyons was among the first to question the authority of the Bishop of Rome
(Pope) to interpret Christ’s message. He believed that people should be able to read Christ’s
message and form their own opinions. And despite opposition from the Church, he went ahead
and translated the New Testament from Latin into local languages. Other people with similar
insubordinate ideas soon sprung up, creating much disturbance within the Church. A group
called the Cathari stopped building churches entirely and decided to worship only inside their
homes. 45 This effectively meant the end of priests’ livelihood.
So God’s machine fought back. Peter Walden was fortunate to remain physically unharmed
but his followers (and many others who thought like him) were not so lucky. Under the direct
oversight of the Pope, Christian forces set about massacring those who thought they could follow
the message of Christ unaided by the Church. Voltaire describes one such massacre, thus (I am
quoting at length, to ensure we clearly understand the brutality involved]:
[T]there were men who wanted no law but the gospels, and who preached ideas almost the same
as those held today by the Protestants. They were called Vaudois because they were numerous
in the valleys of Piedmont; Albigensians, from the town of Albi; Goodmen, from the consistent
goodness of their lives; and finally Manicheans, the name then given to heretics in general. It
was astonishing that, towards the end of the twelfth century, the Languedoc seemed full of
them.
In the year 1198 Pope Innocent III delegated two simple monks to judge the heretics. ‘We
command’, he says ‘to the Princes, to the Counts, and to all Lords of your lands, to aid them
against the heretics, by the authority that they have been given to punish the evil-doers, so that
when Brother Rainier has excommunicated them, the Lords should seize their property, banish
them from their lands, and punish severely those who dare to resist…
On one side of him were to be seen the Duke of Burgundy, the Count of Nevers, Simon Count of
Montfort [the father of Simon de Montfort whom we will come across later for his important
work on democracy], the Bishops of Sens, of Auytun, of Nevers, of Clermont, of Lisieux, and of
Bayeux, all at the head of their troops, and the miserable Count of Toulouse like a hostage in
their midst: on the other side a mob animated by fanaticism of their faith. The city of Béziers
tried to hold out against the crusaders; all the inhabitants who sought refuge in a church had
their throats cut and the city was reduced to ashes. 46
And so (this is from a separate account)
‘[i]n July 1209, an army of crusaders marched down from northern France into Languedoc and
besieged the city of Béziers. When the city fathers refused to hand over 222 Cathari heretics, the
crusaders broke in and massacred every man, woman and child – priests included – of Béziers’
20,000 inhabitants. Before the massacre one of the crusaders is said to have asked his leader,
Abbe Arnaud Amalric, head of the Cistercian monastic order, how to distinguish between the
heretics and the faithful. “Kill them all,” was the abbot’s alleged reply. “God will recognize his
own!” From then on, the crusade became a war without mercy, in which almost any southern
Frenchman was assumed to be a heretic. Historians estimate the total number of casualties at
1,000,000.’ 47

45 Time magazine, Apr. 28, 1961. [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,897752-2,00.html]

46 Voltaire, ‘De la Croisade Contre les Languedociens’, 1756, translation at: [ http://www.languedoc-
france.info/articles/t_voltairecathars.htm]
47 Time magazine, 28 April, 1961. [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,897752-2,00.html]

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As for Peter Walden, most of his followers were killed during the 12th, 13th, and 14th centuries.
It was only after Martin Luther’s Protestant movement arose and grew strong that the few
remaining Waldensians finally converted to Protestantism.
The medieval Church vigorously opposed independent thinking. Despite ever-present
danger, Martin Luther (1483-1546) spoke out the truth as he saw it. In 1517 he challenged the
Pope’s authority to sell indulgences which were supposedly a ticket to Heaven: forgiveness of
sins sold on God’s behalf. For some unknown reason, God, the Creator could, in those days, be
bribed with a few petty gold coins.
The cynic may well ask: But isn’t it the job of religion to sell us ‘tickets’ to Heaven? People
pay their hard-earned money even today, in oodles, to construct temples and to feed priests, so
they can be assured a ticket to Heaven. Beliefs have commercial value, and religions don’t
hesitate to extract their ‘share’. Aren’t priests mercenaries anyway, totally indifferent to the
source of wealth (booty!) we share with them? It would even appear that priests have a
malleable conscience that favours the corrupt and criminal over the honest. They gladly take
money from thieves. In Tirupati temple, for instance, corrupt politicians and businessmen get an
immediate darshan with God, and can buy special prayers – while the honest but poor man
waits in a serpentine queue. But let’s leave the cynic alone. We can only hope that there is some
underlying morality in religions.
Luther’s action dangerously undermined the Pope’s authority. He was essentially suggesting
that the Pope was a blasphemous fraud (‘The assurance of salvation by letters of pardon is vain,
even though the … pope himself, were to stake his soul upon it’; ‘the papal pardons are not able
to remove the very least of venial sins, so far as its guilt is concerned’ ; ‘To say that the cross,
emblazoned with the papal arms, which is set up [by the preachers of indulgences], is of equal
worth with the Cross of Christ, is blasphemy’ 48).
He asked people to pay attention to what Christ had said, that salvation is the reward for
good deeds (‘Christians are to be exhorted that they be diligent in following Christ … [a]nd thus
be confident of entering into heaven’). He asserted that the Pope was wealthy enough to build
the Basilica of St. Peter’s with his own money (‘Why does not the pope, whose wealth is to-day
greater than the riches of the richest, build just this one church of St. Peter with his own money,
rather than with the money of poor believers?’). In 1521, at the Diet of Worms, Luther spoke
thus: ‘I do no accept the authority of Popes and councils ... I am bound by the Scriptures.’ What
gumption! The sacrilege of it all!
Such defiance would have got Luther killed instantly but he was fortunate that the times
had changed. Many princes supported his bold challenge against the Pope, for they were tired of
the Pope’s political domination. The tsunami that arose with from this event caused a major
breakdown in the Church and led to a ‘cleansing’ process – through wars and massacres – for
nearly two hundred years before Europe achieved a level of tolerance typical of ancient India.
What is relevant for us here is not the merit or otherwise of Luther’s argument, but that he
– an ordinary priest – successfully questioned the dictates of authority. The Buddha had said
long ago that we must question our gurus (and that the guru must, therefore, respond clearly to
our questions). But the Buddhist approach (or Indian tolerance) was alien to the medieval
Christian mind. Luther’s challenge of the Pope’s authority motivated what is known as the
Reformation (1517-1650s).
Let me repeat that I am not claiming to deify Martin Luther. His personal character left
much to be desired. All I’m making note is the history of how opposition to authority developed.
Let me also outline one of his intolerant works, to balance our views about Luther. In 1543 he
wrote a book, On the Jews and Their Lies which, some historians suggest, played a prominent
role in whipping up hatred towards Jews in Germany and across Europe more widely. In that
book Luther called for synagogues to be set on fire, and for German states to be rid of Jews.
Adolf Hitler, whether from his Christian upbringing or otherwise (the precise reason being

48 Luther, Martin, 95 Theses, http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/274, October 31, 1517

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irrelevant for our purpose), put his teachings into practice four hundred years later. William
Shirer wrote about Luther’s lasting influence in Germany thus:
[I]t may be said, in passing, that this towering but erratic genius, this savage anti-Semite and hater of
Rome, who combined in his tempestuous character so many of the best and worst qualities of the
German – the coarseness, the boisterousness, the fanaticism, the intolerance, the violence, but also
the honesty, the simplicity, the self-scrutiny … left a mark on the life of Germans, for both good and
bad, more indelible, more fateful, than was wrought by any other single individual before or since. 49
Regardless of Luther’s many questionable ideas, the Reformation sparked a burst in the
quest for individual liberty. Europeans finally began to think for themselves. The ready
availability of printed copies of the New Testament in local languages cemented this dramatic
advance in human freedom. The inordinately high status of priests was also diluted.
A crucial consequence of Luther’s actions was shift in public opinion in favour of separating
the jurisdictions of the church and the state. This process began with the increased powers of
princes and kings who selected amongst various religious sects and imposed their personal
preference on their subjects. In doing so they increasingly broke away from the Pope, and
claimed the divine right to rule and impose their decisions. In exercising their independence,
nations began to think of themselves as sovereign entities, with political power that was
independent of the church. In many places, thoughts also emerged about the ‘supremacy of the
individual conscience’. 50
That such concepts about individual liberty emerged at first in parts north-western Europe,
particularly Germany and England, has led some commentators to argue that the Protestant
movement directly led to the modern understandings about liberty. 51 But even Catholic societies
changed as a consequence of the Reformation.
The Scholastics (a stream of Catholicism) were pivotal in this growth of ideas about
separation of powers, and liberty. The growing strength of Protestant kings led to the Counter-
Reformation in the Catholic church between roughly 1560-1650. The Jesuits (members of the
Society of Jesus, a sub-group of Catholics) began the Counter-Reformation by opposing the
divine right of kings. A Spanish Jesuit, Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), declared that man is by
nature free and wrote that political organisation comes into being by members of the society
consciously – and voluntarily – limiting some of their individual liberties. 52 (Similar thoughts
had been expressed in India thousands of years ago). Recall that the Renaissance had been a
Catholic phenomenon in a sense, with its new-found support for Greek thought. Without the
advance of printing and science in the southern European nations, the philosophical, scientific,
and industrial revolutions in Northwest Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries would not have
occurred.
The great struggle between Protestants, Catholics and the princes ‘led ultimately to the
growth of individual liberty and democracy. The reformers preached the equality of man
…[demanding] the freedom of … man to follow his own conscience’. 53 The idea that people –
sovereign individuals – were the actual source of princes’ authority grew strong between 1564-
1618. 54 In the second half of the seventeenth century, first Hobbes and later, Locke came on the
scene. Their views largely reflected increasingly widely held views about tolerance. Later, J.S.
Mill praised those who oppose us, thus: ‘If there are any persons who contest a received opinion
…let us thank them for it, open our minds to listen to them, and rejoice that there is some one to

49 Shirer, William L., The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, New York, Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1990 [original
edition 1959], p.91.
50 Shirer, William L., The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, New York, Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1990 [original

edition 1959], p.91.

51 Danford, John W., Roots of Freedom, Washington: ISI Books, 2000, p.36.
52 Ibid. p.193.
53 D.R Bhandari (1963). History of European Political Thought. Bangalore: The Bangalore Printing & Publishing Co.

Ltd. p.179-80.
54 D.R. Bhandari (1963). History of European Political Philosophy. The Bangalore Printing & Publishing Co. Ltd.

p.180.

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do for us what we otherwise ought’ 55. It is a result of these great upheavals that our minds have
been freed of any unnecessary fears of authority. We no longer parrot mindlessly what others
teach us. Instead, we form our own understandings of the world. Regardless of the number of
‘learned’ people who may believe a particular view, we are now free to discard views that don’t
make sense to us.
I want to make special note here of Rene Descartes (1596-1650, who, in his Discourse on
Method, suggested (on the lines of Buddha) that each of us must discover the truth ourselves.
His ‘first rule was to accept nothing as true which I did not clearly recognise to be so.’ He
suggested, ‘cogito ergo sum’, or ‘I think, therefore I am’: both as a way to recognise one’s ‘self’ and
in order to emphasise the crucial value of human reason. This perspective is an exaggeration, for
we do exist even without conscious thought: such as when we are asleep or under anaesthesia;
but this assertion did help to reduce blind faith. Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), Descartes’s
contemporary, then boldly affirmed: ‘I do not feel obliged to believe that the same God who has
endowed us with senses, reason, and intellect has intended to forgo their use.’ 56 Through such
bold self-belief has mankind inched towards freedom.

2. Not taking oneself too seriously

Questioning assumptions does not come easily to us. Our socialisation creates a mental trap
for us getting out of which is very hard. Thus, if we ask a Hindu to become a Muslim (including
changing his beliefs) even for a day (or vice versa), stout resistance would be forthcoming. Our
beliefs – socialised or otherwise acquired –define us, and examining them objectively from an
independent perspective is very challenging. But we also know that the truth can’t be seen
through tinted glasses. We must be able to change our glasses, and see through different glasses,
and one day grow up enough to remove them permanently. We simply can’t afford mindless
belief. We must know.
Humour plays a very important role in helping us change our socialised perspective. Mark
Twain recognised this when he wrote: ‘A discriminating irreverence is the creator and protector
of human liberty.’ 57 Laughing at ourselves also helps to bring us down to earth, and prevents
hubris.
Jonathan Swift (1667-1745) made a significant contribution to the advance of liberty through
his book, Gulliver’s Travels, in which he put words like the following into the mouth of (the
fictional) King of Brobdingnag:
He said, ‘he knew no reason why those, who entertain opinions prejudicial to the public, should
be obliged to change, or should not be obliged to conceal them. And as it was tyranny in any
government to require the first, so it was weakness not to enforce the second: for a man may be
allowed to keep poisons in his closet, but not to vend them about for cordials.’ 58
People were able to relate this kind of language to their own life, and therefore think about
their own reality afresh. Voltaire (1694-1778)’s Candide is another outstanding masterpiece in
this genre. Later, cartoons came to the rescue. Political cartoons and, more recently, the
television (e.g., Yes, Minister) have blown apart the façade of all-knowing wisdom that authority
figures adopt in the public. The political cartoon is the shorthand of freedom. (An aside: Martin
Luther was one of the first cartoonist which he used successfully as early as in the sixteenth
century! 59). Today, of course, we get our daily cartoon fix from newspapers.

55 Mill, J.S. [1861], ‘On Liberty’, On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, World Classics

Paperback 1991, p.51.

56 Letter to Madame Christina of Lorraine, Grand Duchess of Tuscany, 1615 (cited in The Yale Book of Quotations,

Yale University Press, 2006, p.297).

57 Cited by Lacayo, Richard, ‘The Seriously Funny Man’, in Time magazine, 14 July 2008, p.37.
58 Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels. Part II - A Voyage to Brobdingnag - Chapter VI
[http://classiclit.about.com/library/bl-etexts/jswift/bl-jswift-gull-2-6.htm]
59 [http://xroads.virginia.edu/~MA96/PUCK/part1.html]

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Chapter 6 Critical thinking

‘There is no slavery but ignorance. Liberty is the child of intelligence.’ – Robert G. Ingersoll 1

Today we are able to control nature – at least to some extent. A journey to the Antarctica
would have killed people a hundred years ago, but is now merely a routine job for some of us. We
can’t even begin to describe what science has done for us in terms of bringing some control and
order into our world. This book itself could not have been written without a huge number of
scientific discoveries (not just the discovery of printing, e.g. I have dictated most of it into the
computer).
Note that the scientific method did not emerge from religious teachings or beliefs, not even
Vedic belief (which had strong elements of the scientific approach in parts), or the Buddha’s. 2 Its
roots are found, instead, in the Renaissance. That, in turn, was rooted in pagan Greek attempts
at science and philosophy. As we go back in time, we find that the roots of science are ultimately
found in the rise of critical thinking. Thinking independently is not enough. Without thinking
critically, in addition to thinking independently, and thus without evaluating the evidence and
arguments carefully we will not be able to reach the truth. Nature is complex is and highly fine
tuned. It does not yield its secrets to careless thinking.
Thinking critically means knowing when and how to frame questions, how to determine
alternative and test the evidence, and finally, how to evaluate the results. This exercise is not
trivial, and can call for a very high level of education. But thinking critically can begin very
simply: by asking questions. It requires keeping an open mind until a carefully evaluated
answer is arrived at. The information necessary for answering complex questions may never be
found during our lifetime in some cases; in others cases never ever. In the face of such
difficulties, critical thinking means being persistent and very patient. All reasonable questions
must be pursued until a reasonable answer is found. Giving up on critical inquiry is never an
option. Thus, merely because we can’t harvest fusion energy today should never deter us from
continuing to think further on this subject. After all, fusion is a routine feature on the sun.
Controlled fusion will certainly be found – if only we diligently persist in our inquiries. Thinking
and sentient beings that we are, we must aim for masterly over the known universe; nothing
less is expected of us.

1. The liberating torch of logic and science

Philosophical analysis shows us six ways of acquiring knowledge: sense experience, reason,
authority, intuition, revelation, and faith. 3 (Traditional Hindu literature outlined three – see
chapter 5). Of these six, only sense experience and reason can be objectively validated. Since I
am interested in universal (objective) Truth, now ‘personal’ (subjective) Truth in this book, such
independent validation must be the touchstone of truth. Anything else could be merely our
imagination, hallucination, superstition, or dream.

1 Ingersoll, Robert G., The Liberty of Man, Woman and Child, 1877, [http://www.sacred-
texts.com/aor/ing/vol01/i0108.htm]
2 In this context, G. S. P. Misra’s paper entitled, ‘Logical and Scientific Method in Early Buddhist Texts’ in Journal of

the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, No. 1/2 (Apr.,1968), pp. 54-64, is perhaps one of the more
sympathetic accounts of Buddhist dialectical approaches. It fails to demonstrate, however, that Buddhism knew or
was open to inductive reasoning.
3 Hospers, John, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1977 [1967: Prentice Hall]

reprint, pp.122-142.

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 xxxThe disciplines of mathematics, logic, and science assist in our quest for these objective
truths. These disciplines document our discovery of knowledge which then becomes the basis for
further advances. Thus we become like dwarfs who stand on the shoulders of giants, looking
further into the horizon than those before us. Thus, it was by making use of mathematical
knowledge of the previous centuries that the astronomer Johannes Kepler (1571–1630) could
formulate the laws of planetary motion to match his observations. These laws then enabled
those who followed him to go much further. Progress is thus a relay race. The amazingly
complex structure of human knowledge has been built one truth at a time over the centuries.
Insights from science have helped us question and discard countless myths and fallacies. But
this has not been easy. Political and religious leaders have not like this one bit. Christianity, for
instance, persecuted many medieval scientists because it didn’t like their findings. It is only
now, after repeated confirmation of scientific truths that religions are beginning to reluctantly
tolerate things like evolution. We are fortunate that politicians and priests don’t forbid parents
from taking their children to science museums.
Figure HH outlines the main ways of arriving at the truth: deductive, dialectical, and
scientific (inductive). [Note: add somewhere: the truth a finite, untruths are infinite]

Ways to the truth

Dialectical Deductive Scientific

Identify and Elaborate an Empirically test
eliminate falsehood existing truth hypotheses to confirm
a theory of causation
This method E.g.
questions existing mathematics
“truth” (thesis) builds complex Insight
through opposing models from Inductive Intuits new
“truth” (anti-thesis). simple Induces the
truths and
The analysis can assumptions truth from
tests with the
lead to the higher observation and
inductive
truth (synthesis). experiment
method

Figure HHH. Three main ways to find a truth

1.1 Dialectical method

We looked at Socrates’s dialectical approach in chapter 5 [CHECK]. This approach continues
to be very important. Consider the 1776 US Declaration of Independence which said: ‘We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness.’ In 1776 America’s founders literally meant that men (more specifically, prosperous
white men) ‘are created equal’. They tacitly excluded poor white men, all black men, and all
women.
Not much had changed eighty years later. For instance, Abraham Lincoln believed that
equality amongst the black and white ‘races’ was not practicable:
I will say then that I am not, nor ever have been in favor of bringing about in anyway the social
and political equality of the white and black races - that I am not nor ever have been in favor of
making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with
white people; and I will say in addition to this that there is a physical difference between the
white and black races which I believe will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of
social and political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together
there must be the position of superior and inferior, and I as much as any other man am in favor
of having the superior position assigned to the white race. I say upon this occasion I do not

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 perceive that because the white man is to have the superior position the negro should be denied
everything. 4
Yet he successfully liberated America’s slaves (more on this in chapter XX). Those who
followed him demanded far more equality. Fifty years after his death, the US Supreme Court
justice, Harry A. Blackmun went off to the other extreme, writing thus: ‘In order to get beyond
racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some
persons equally, we must treat them differently’ 5 (this is an argument for affirmative action). In
this case, the ‘truth’ about the Declaration of Independence had effectively gone the other way
(anti-thesis) and moved in many ways beyond its essential meaning. This example shows,
however, that questioning a truth often leads to a ‘higher truth’. A statement can thus find an
entirely new meaning (truth) over time.

1.2 Deductive method

Deductive reasoning is quite old, being understood by most ancient civilisations. Indeed, any
civilisation that had learnt to add and subtract, for example, had at least a rudimentary
understanding of deductive reasoning.
In the deductive method new truths are derived from existing truths. This method requires
the original premises to be true, else we will only get further away from the truth. Consider the
following statement: ‘since gravity pulls all apples to the earth, therefore this apple will fall to
the earth.’ The truth of the premise (gravity pulls all apples to earth) guarantees the truth of the
conclusion (that this apple will fall down, as well). While this was a simple deduction, extremely
complex deductions can be made from rather simple premises. For example, the entire
disciplines of mathematics and micro-economics are built almost entirely on deductions from
basic axioms or assumptions. Similarly, basic laws of physics (some of which may have been
discovered through observation) help us deduce a spacecraft’s path to the moon and back.
As mentioned above, if the initial assertion is false we will always end up with falsehood,
possibly even greater falsehood than we started out with. The principle, ‘garbage in, garbage
out’, holds very strongly. Unfortunately, when we blunder this way, we tend to rationalise,
arguing that evidence was wrong or making excuses to argue our pet theories. That’s why, for
hundreds of years, the world kept on believing that the earth was flat.
Superstitions are a typical example of erroneous deduction. Thus, if we assume that the
lines found on our palms represent oracular predictions, instead of folds that our hands form
naturally, then we will spend hours, even yeras, ‘studying’ our palm instead of improving our
knowledge about the world and becoming better prepared for life. Yet if the palmist’s
‘predictions’ are proven wrong, he will rationalise, claiming that lines on the palm mean
different things based on the position of planets or stars, and that we needed to have taken
account of the stars as well! It is the rare person who will conclude palmistry is nonsense. It
requires significant knowledge of the science of statistics to understand evidentiary
requirements for the proof of such things; and thereafter it takes diligent inquiry to find out
whether such proof has been adduced. Hence baseless beliefs like palmistry are rife. Indeed,
more than half of what people think they ‘know’ is false.

1.3 Scientific method

‘[A]ll people, right from the cradle, engage in a kind of scientific thinking. We are all intuitive
physicists, biologists, engineers, psychologists, and mathematicians.’ – Steven Pinker 6

Before looking at the scientific method, it is important to examine inductive reasoning.

Inductive reasoning is a form of deduction where the initial ‘truth’ is ‘deduced’ from empirical

4 Cited in Mendelberg, Tali, The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, p.38. Digitised at Google Books.
5 Cited in Sleeper, Jim, Liberal Racism: How Fixating on Race Subverts the American Dream, Maryland: Rowman &

Littlefield, 2002, p.9. Digitised at Google Books.

6 Pinker, Steven, How the Mind Works, London: Penguin Books, 1999, p.301.

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observation. Empirical observation is generalised into a broader ‘truth’, from which specific
truths can once again be deduced. Thus, for instance, from an observation that ‘this apple fell to
the earth’, a generalisation is first made that ‘all apples fall to the earth.’ Only then can we
predict what will happen to the next apple that we see on the tree.
This approach has many limitations as well. We do not know the ‘real’ truth but make the
assumption that a particular observation (or set of observations) is sufficiently representative of
the truth. That leap of faith can sometimes go wrong. If I have only seen one tiger in my life –
and that tiger was white – then I may conclude that all tigers are white: a wrong conclusion.
Inductive logic works best when it is applied to a large number of observations. But even then
we must always be cautious. What is true today may not necessarily remain true tomorrow.
David Hume wrote that just because the sun rises each morning we can’t conclude that it
will do so tomorrow. This was a strikingly accurate insight, for five billion years from today our
sun will actually blow up into smithereens and stop rising in the ‘morning’ (there won’t be an
earth on which to rise from). And we know well today that even the so-called ‘laws’ of nature can
change under different, albeit rare conditions. Thus, if we were to travel at speeds close to that
of light, time would slow down considerably. Similarly, light, once considered to travel at a
constant speed, can be artificially slowed down – and quite dramatically. 7 Research also seems to
indicate that light travelled faster during the first few instants Big Bang than its current
maximum speed. This does not imply that what we knew earlier was false, but that it was
partially true. Empirically, we cannot hope to find the entire truth about almost anything, and
must therefore be content with incrementally expanding our knowledge, or to always recognise
its tentative nature. On the whole, though, the results of inductive reasoning are grounded in
observable reality, and therefore superior to purely speculative deduction.
Inductive reasoning often tells us something about causality in real life. Such models of
causality are called theories. The theory of evolution is one such outstanding example.
Observations over the years on millions of fossils have failed to disprove the theory. That makes
it likely that speculative cosmologies, proposed in various religions, are unlikely to represent the
truth and must be discarded. We need to constantly discard untrue ‘truths’, regardless of the
‘authority’ of the source of such truths.
I’d like to investigate evolution a bit more. The concept – of evolution – had already emerged
as a candidate theory by around 1794, well before 1859 when Darwin published his theory 8.
Darwin had presumably heard of this possibility, even though he was a devout Christian in his
early years and therefore brought up on the diet of Christian cosmology. He, of course, needed to
assess this concept carefully under the cold light of reason and evidence before passing a view on
it. After collecting thousands of samples between 1831 and 1836, he spent many years in
reviewing this data before concluding, finally, that the theory of evolution, which was able to
explain all the facts he had assembled, was more representative of the likely truth. The scientific
method is like detective work, involving the piecing together of a plausible story based on the
facts assembled. Theories based on induction lend themselves relatively easily to further
deductive advances. Since 1859, all deductions made on the basis of the theory of evolution have
been tested and found to hold good.
The inductive method is clearly not new. Knowledge of the medicinal properties of plants
was based at least in part on induction, and even possibly on at least some experimentation
(scientific method). Ancient Greek and Indian texts confirm the wide range of knowledge of
medicine in those times. Of course, not all this knowledge was true knowledge – often being
speculative and not properly tested. The induction from observation was not systematically
undertaken. And documented, for others to repeat and check.

7 E.g. see [http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/1999/10/991005114024.htm],

[http://www.hno.harvard.edu/gazette/1999/02.18/light.html], and
[http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2005-08/epfd-ltt081905.php]
8 Geologist James Hutton wrote a chapter on natural selection in 1794

(see: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/wales/south_east/3191506.stm]). Darwin had already formulated his theory

in 1834, but published it much later, in 1859. In the meanwhile, in 1844, Robert Chambers anonymously published
Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation which supported evolution.

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 That is where the scientific method comes in, with Francis Bacon (1561-1626). Systematic
induction is called the scientific method. It comprises an appropriate mix of induction and
deduction, with a lot of systematic documentation and careful analysis. Scientists make use of
all methods of thinking, including deductive and dialectical, to refine their conceptions. The
scientific method is the culmination of human thinking. Although it is predominantly inductive
because it seeks evidence at each step, and always leaves the door open for further revision
following new evidence.
Of course, such ideas have definitely occurred to people in the past and Bacon was not the
first to discover the scientific method, only the first to articulate it clearly. Thus Aristotle is said
to have stated:
The actual facts are not yet sufficiently made out. Should further research ever discover them,
we must yield to their guidance rather than to that of theory; for theories must be abandoned,
unless their teachings tally with the indisputable results of observation. 9
Francis Bacon suggested a precursor of the modern systematic approach that we call the
scientific method, in his book, Novum Organum (‘New Instrument’ – of thinking). He asked us to
base our quest for the truth on careful observation. Once the data come in, we should look for
patterns and sort into coherent categories. These patterns or categories could help us to propose
a causal pathway. In his words, it could help us ‘light the candle’ (to the truth). Our explanation
would be known as a theory, not the truth. In doing so we would affirm our commitment to the
truth by keeping the option of changing our theory should better explanations emerge. The
theory would lead us to a testable prediction (testable hypothesis). By calling it a hypothesis, not
arguing that it is the truth, we once again emphasise our openness to be persuaded by evidence.
The great benefit of this method is the suspension of belief during (and after) the investigation.
We then set up an experiment to test our hypothesis. Ideally, only one explanatory variable
must be allowed to change at a time through a tightly controlled experiment. Our experiment
must be ‘duly ordered and digested, not bungling nor erratic’. It would help us to either confirm
or reject our hypothesis. At that stage either the initial theory would be confirmed or a new one
needed. Bacon believed that this approach would yield ever-increasing clarity: a higher truth
each time as the false hypotheses are refuted and the true ones retained. Of course, no theory
may ever be found to fit the facts. Nevertheless, we would have benefited from knowing which
theories aren’t true (or fully true).
Before the scientific method was invented, individual discovery and invention had been
largely a matter of serendipity. Since then it has almost been institutionalised. By spending
money on research and development, new discoveries emerge with some regularity. When the
US government decided to send man to the moon poured money into this idea, and before long,
man had reached the moon. Scientists now go to work in the morning, almost clueless about
what they are going to do or discover. At work, through a mechanical process, they end up
discovering or inventing new things. On returning home they can switch off their rational mind
and revert – as most of them do – to mythical and irrational belief systems. People can be
scientific in one part of their daily life but totally unscientific in another. Science allows us to
remain human even as we do extraordinary things.
But how do we actually induce a new theory? Clearly, some underlying creative processes
are involved, the nature of which is not obvious. Bertrand Russell thought that:
Bacon’s inductive method is faulty through insufficient emphasis on hypothesis. He hoped that
near orderly arrangement of data would make the right hypothesis obvious, but this is seldom
the case. As a rule, the framing of hypotheses is the most difficult part of scientific work… The
part played by deduction in science is greater than Bacon supposed. 10
Scientific insight can arise only when we mentally order the available data in a manner not
earlier visualised. This is a non-trivial task. A lot of lateral thinking, review of data, and much
imagination and subconscious processing is involved. The edge that we will (perhaps) continue to

9 Cited in Barrow, John D. and Frank J. Tipler, The Anthropological Principle, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996
[1986], p.39. Unfortunately this citation refers back to another secondary source, and not to the original source.
10 Russell, Bertrand, A History of Western Philosophy, Simon and Schuster, 1972, pp. 544-5.

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retain over robots – which will sooner than later become at least as ‘clever’ as us (e.g. computers
have already beaten the world chess champion) – will come from the bizarrely creative thinking
processes that we are capable of, primarily using our subconscious mind. Our mind works like a
kaleidoscope somewhere deep inside, bringing together, scattering, then re-joining our
experiences and observations in an infinity of ways. Through processes that we simply don’t
understand, we are able to create not only fiction and art but also scientific insights. The same
ability (or capacity) also perhaps underpins human spirituality.
Indeed, Karl Popper (1902-1994) emphasised the important role that deductive reasoning
plays in scientific enquiry. And Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) suggested that hypotheses usually
arise from existing theories and not the other way around. In his words, the ‘route from theory to
measurement can almost never be travelled backward’ 11. There is a Hegelian dialectical
progression of ideas [Hegel had postulated that opposing ideas (thesis, antithesis) lead to a blend
(synthesis) which then becomes a new thesis. Each time, in doing so, we reach a higher truth.
(This conception is plausible to an extent, but horrendously fraught, even dangerous, when
lessons are drawn from history in the manner Hegel drew them.) A testable hypothesis is thus
the ‘pointy’ end of the debate between various theories.
We mix a wide range of thinking methods to approach the truth. So long as we are willing to
abide by two key features of the scientific method: independent verifiability and replicability;
and systematic evaluation of all ideas without any pre-judgement, we will do well enough. The
scientific method will therefore continue to expand mankind’s knowledge in perpetuity.
While scientific thinking is a boon, it is important to treat scientists with scientific caution.
Most scientists do not follow the scientific method in the routine of their lives. And most
scientists simply do not think scientifically beyond their limited field of specialisation. Too often
science is put in question by so-called ‘scientists’ who recklessly pass judgement on areas on
which they have no expertise. On the other hand, we cannot assume that ‘common’ people are in
any way less capable of thinking clear headedly through complex issues. The thinking method
matters, not the title of the person. Never be ‘taken in’ by something just because a certain
‘scientist’ is making a certain claim. Let’s always think for ourselves.
After Francis Bacon articulated the scientific method it then became very easy for scientists
to discover the various properties of matter. Inquiries into matter are easy because multiple
observations can be made and repeated endlessly. Direct experiment with matter is quite
straight forward. But discovering the properties of human societies is much harder. The
interaction of a billion humans is therefore virtually unpredictable except at the broadest level of
generality.
Inquiries into human behaviour have largely been deductive, based on insights from one’s
own personal tendencies and experience. Deductions from world history also inform this study.
To Thomas Hobbes and John Locke must go the credit for some of the early scientific analyses of
human nature. These analyses led Hobbes to recommend a strong sovereign and Locke to
recommend democracy. Recently, experimental psychology and experimental economics have
started expanding the frontier of our knowledge (e.g. heuristics – by Kahneman and Tversky).
More commonly, empirical studies are based on statistical deduction from large data sets. An
example is to compare societies with differing levels of freedom or forms of government and try
to determine if their economic indicators differ. But econometric models often go awry, for rarely
are there any direct pathways or causalities in human behaviour. Therefore, the average
‘scientist’ who interprets complex social phenomenon often comes up with seriously deficient
answers.

2. The package of critical thinking

Critical thinking, which is both a stance (being independent: and not a rush to judgement)
and a framework for thought (appropriate method) has led to enormous advances over the past
centuries. However, critical thinking is an acquired skill: it does not come naturally to us. The

11 Kuhn, Thomas, The Essential Tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977, p. 197.

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concepts of critical thinking are constantly being refined, therefore. I agree with Edward de Bono
that there are significant limitations to the traditional approaches to critical thinking:
limitations that can sometimes be overcome by stepping out of the world of hard logic and
exploring non-linearities and other irregular patterns in society. 12 Then there are new
techniques like lateral thinking, recursive thinking, cybernetic thinking, etc. which can add
value. The main point is to keep our mind open to new ways of thinking.
I will illustrate a few examples of critical thinking below. We note that the most dramatic
impacts of critical thinking have been on religion. ‘Religion has been compelled by science to give
up one after another of its dogmas, of those assumed cognitions which it could not substantiate’ 13
(Herbert Spencer).
Impact of critical thinking on religion
All religions have a theory of the universe, a cosmology. Unfortunately, no cosmology
precisely matches the findings of science. It is true, for instance, that Hindu cosmology refers to
extensive time scales which (broadly speaking) match the durations determined by modern
science, but it is not precise enough, nor can it be without evidence. Thus, the Hindu puranas
suggest that we are currently in the Kali-yuga (yuga means an epoch). The previous one,
Dvapara-yuga, is said to have ended 5 000 years ago. Before that was apparently the Treta-yuga
which in turn ended in 860 000 BC. That was preceded by another epoch, Satya-yuga, which
ended in 2 156 000 BC after lasting for 1.728 million years, and where righteousness is said to
have prevailed. The Satya-yuga thus existed four million years ago. However, scientific evidence
is clear – that there was no simple human from on Earth at that time: only monkeys and other
primates. This cosmology therefore fails.
Similarly, the Old Testament states that the stars, the sun, and the moon were created by
God on the fourth day, 14 after water and dry earth had been created on the second and third
days, respectively. This implies that the stars (and thus our sun) are younger than the earth,
which is false. Concepts of heaven and hell (commonly found in religions) are also quite
implausible, since below the earth are molten compounds and above it, empty space. Not very
long ago mankind did not know any of this, so idle speculation was rife. If the claims of
scriptures are to be taken at face value then it would now appear that God himself – who
allegedly came down to Earth personally (on may occasions it would appear) or sent His
messenger – was ignorant, at least in the past. At the least, this indicates that the scriptures are
likely to be made-up imaginations of ordinary men: mere works of fiction.
That the earth is no longer the centre of the universe has impacted religious views
significantly. Added to that, Darwin’s theory of evolution gave a big jolt to religion. By
suggesting that we are an animal species, evolved from lower (but by no means to be looked
down upon 15) life forms, Darwin put on notice all those who though that we are particularly
unique, in some way unrelated to, or even beyond the animal kingdom.
Indeed, Darwin’s own views about the world changed dramatically during his own lifetime.
He had begun as a deeply religious person, a student of religious studies in Christ’s College
Cambridge. At that stage he believed in the literal truth of the Bible. Recalling this period, he
wrote: ‘I read with great care Pearson on the Creeds and a few other books on divinity; and as I
did not then in the least doubt the strict and literal truth of every word in the Bible, I soon
persuaded myself that our Creed must be fully accepted’. But his discoveries during the voyages
of HMS Beagle, and his subsequent research, threw him into great inner turmoil, for Christian
cosmology was no longer tenable (in his mind). To remain true to the truth, but above all to
remain true to his reason, he renounced Christianity and became an agnostic. In a book

12 This is the general theme of de Bono’s1990 book, I am Right You are Wrong, London: Viking (Penguin Group).
13 in First Principles, 1862.
14 And God made two great lights; the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the night: he made the

stars also.
15 See ‘Minds of their own’ in National Geographic magazine, March 2008.

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(published posthumously) he wrote: ‘The mystery of the beginning of all things is insoluble to us;
and I for one must be content to remain an Agnostic.’ 16
The ‘theory’ of intelligent design (supported by religion) continues to resist evolution. But
Spencer rightly said 150 years ago, that ‘[t]hose who cavalierly reject the Theory of Evolution, as
not adequately supported by facts, seem quite to forget that their own theory is supported by no
facts at all.’ 17 Indeed, religions are on the back-foot now, as a result of the many setbacks arising
from science. They are hard pressed to prove their wild claims (about miracles and such things).
Clearly, the truth doesn’t lower its standards for anyone – including the scriptures. Just because
something is written in a book doesn’t make it true. Therefore, with the rapid advance in
science, the control that religions once exercised on the minds of men has declined precipitously.
While traditional values must not be thrown overboard, science is sure to put more people off
religion. There is actually no contradiction between science and religion so long as we do not
expect these to be judged on the same standard of evidence. Nothing but our lack of belief
prevents God from existing in the manner our religions say He does. Nothing prevents us from
believing in heaven, hell or in an afterlife. There is no evidence that religions are intrinsically
‘wrong’ (there is no way to prove them right or wrong through the use of logic). These two are
simply two different domains, not to be mingled with each other.
Critical thinking and racism
Scientific discoveries have also impacted on our political relations. When authors of the 1776
American Declaration of Independence claimed that ‘all men are created equal’ they actually
meant only that propertied white men, not women nor blacks are created equal. But following
Darwin’s theory and subsequent research, evidence about the genetic homogeneity of the human
species has been progressively confirmed. This is one of the key reasons (apart from the general
theory of ethics) that the implications of the American Declaration have now expanded
exponentially. While many people fought against racism on moral grounds prior to the advent of
Darwin, the results arising from his studies were to make the claims for equality that much
more urgent – over the years. Initially, people used Darwin’s argument the other way around.
For nearly a hundred years to come, concepts like Social Darwinism increased racism. It is now
impossible to go back to the old world of racism. Millions of people have thus been released from
political oppression as a result.
Impacts of communication technology
Technology is perhaps the best advertisement of the benefits of critical thinking. Numerous
technological advances in our quality of life over the last few centuries have come about almost
entirely from advances in critical thinking. Among these, communication technology has been
perhaps the most significant. A long time ago books were individually transcribed, by hand. This
dramatically constrained their availability. Diffusion of knowledge was therefore slow, with the
availability of books being limited to a few libraries and scholars. Modern printing, invented in
around 1450 at the beginning of the Renaissance, revolutionised the progress of freedom. The
number of philosophical and scientific books in print soon exceeded religious books (the Bible
was the earliest to be mass printed). Greek philosophical literature was re-published, leading to
a revival of pagan critical thought. While print runs for most non-religious books were quite
small, 500 copies or less, that was enough to boost human inquiry and knowledge.
This period marked a significant boost to story-telling as a tool of philosophy. Writers on
liberty started using stories (e.g. Candide) to make their message more easily understood.
Stories were relatively safe at a time when it was easy to get killed (or at least jailed) for
expressing independent thought. Today, ideas are spreading faster than ever before. Millions of
books are published every year. The media and the internet add huge amounts of information to
this mix. Unfortunately, even disinformation is increasing. Hateful writings now find an easy
residence on the internet. The battle for ideas is now in the open. And it has been joined by both

16This and the previous quotation are from Charles Darwin’s Autobiography that he wrote as private memoirs. It was

published after his death in 1882.

17 Herbert Spencer, in an anonymously published article, ‘The Development Hypothesis’ in the March 20, 1852 issue of

The Leader

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sides: the good and the evil. Dictators, terrorists, and good people: all are using the internet to
spread their message.
It is important that lovers of liberty debate vigorously on all channels to show people the
path of freedom, tolerance and truth. Freedom will need to wage a continuous battle against
false ideas, ignorance, and prejudice. It will need to be an ongoing task for each of us. Change is
always going go be hard. Given our strong conditioning, our ability to accept new ideas takes a
lot of time. Entire generations may need to pass away before new thinking is more widely
accepted. 18 We will not only need to keep an open mind but to motivate our children to ask
questions and to seek evidence for their own views: lest things go backward. Evil and wrong
ideas complete in the same space as good ideas. The victory of the good is not guaranteed.
Impacts of the Industrial Revolution on freedom
Industrial technology helped to significantly hasten the spread of freedom. One of the
pathways was the changing structure of the society. The Industrial Revolution – a byproduct
almost entirely of new science and technology – generated a large middle class which did not
depend on land. Unrestrained by the cumbersome relationship with land, this highly mobile and
increasingly economically powerful class soon became politically influential. Without this
bourgeois, freedom would perhaps not have received the great boost it did (particularly in
Europe and USA) over the past 300 years. Democracy also was driven by the needs of this
middle class because of the greater availability of technology. So, which of these came first –
technology, or advances in political thought? It would appear to me that both were based on the
same underlying advance – in critical thinking. It was the institution of thinking, particularly
the scientific method, which spurred both industrial growth and political change. Not all
political thinking was good, for in response to industrial growth, socialism grew in strength, as
well. But all’s well that ends well. Socialism has been battled and practically destroyed over the
past twenty years. Reason and liberty have triumphed.
* * *
I have always encouraged my children to become critical thinkers. Let our children decide –
as free-thinking adults – their own religion and approach to life. We ought not to burden them
with our beliefs. They will also have far more information than we did, to decide matters
concerning their own lives. If India can adopt the institution of critical thinking we would be
well on our way to becoming a truly great country.

18 As Max Planck said (in a quote popularised by Thomas Kuhn) ‘a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing
its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation
grows up that is familiar with it.’

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Chapter 7 Aspiration for a moral life

‘Your character is your destiny.’ 1 Heraclitus (500BC)

‘Capitalism is based on self-interest and self-esteem; it holds integrity and trustworthiness as

cardinal virtues and makes them pay off in the marketplace, thus demanding that men survive
by means of virtue, not vices. It is this superlatively moral system that the welfare statists
propose to improve upon by means of preventative law, snooping bureaucrats, and the chronic
goad of fear.’ Alan Greenspan 2

By now, it should be clear that freedom is not a hedonist or ‘libertarian’ concept. Instead, it
is tightly inter-woven with individual accountability, and is a moral concept. It requires the
society to commit to the highest human values, without trying to force us down that path. By
leaving us free to choose and to order our priorities and values the way we see fit, the philosophy
of freedom affirms our dignity. In general, most people behave ethically in a free society. We
voluntarily uphold our accountabilities for we are focused on the higher objectives and on fair-
play. We don’t care for temporary advantage obtained from cheating, for instance.
In addition to being ethical, the free society is also a land of opportunity. There is freedom to
compete and become the best we can be. Merit matters. Our caste or parents’ economic status
does not determine our place in life. The free society tells its young: ‘Tell me what you know and
what you have done. I don’t want to know what your father was, or did. You are the man (or
woman) I am interested in! Only your thoughts and actions will determine your fate.’ These are
all part of the ethical framework of the free society. This chapter explores the institutions that
underpin these ethical aspirations and outcomes.

1. The quest for a moral life

As noted above, most of us, most of the time, to do the right thing. Why we do so is
considered below. In brief, we are ethical not merely because we want to be ethical but because
we the society nudges us towards an ethical mindset through strong enforcement of
accountability.

1.1 The natural (strategic) incentives for a moral life

When we ask the grocer for bread, and he hands one to us, we do not walk off without
paying. Why so? Are we afraid of being assaulted by the grocer if we don’t pay? Possibly. But one
would like to believe that the risk of being assaulted is not the main reason. And indeed, we pay
for the bread even if the grocer is only a small child tending the shop in her father’s absence in a
small roadside town where we have stopped our car on the way to a distant destination. Even in
such situations (where we could cheat without fear of being found out) we do not – as a rule –
lower our basic moral standards. Similarly, when we make a mistake, we are quick to apologise
and make amends. The apology is a form of accountability: verbal compensation. And while it is
possible to make a quick buck through fly-by-night operations and then escape to some remote
island to ‘enjoy’ one’s unearned wealth, the vast majority of us will never even dream of doing
such a thing. Even business organisations prefer to remain accountable and to supplying
genuine functioning products. Thus, our corporations, shops and traders largely function
honestly with monotonous regularity without the need to call out a policeman each time we deal
with them. Alan Greenspan’s quotation (on the top of this chapter) highlights this fact. As Ian
Harper also noted: ‘The market economy ... rewards traditional virtues. Material success in a

1Translation used in Roger von Oech (2001). Expect the Unexpected (Or You Won’t Find It). Free Press. p.13.
2Greenspan, Alan, ‘The Assault on Integrity’ in Rand, Ayn, Capitalism - the Unknown Ideal. Signet (Penguin Group),
1967, p.121.

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capitalist setting requires diligence, industriousness, trust, prudence, courage, co-operation and
self-reliance. Without these, no capitalist enterprise can succeed. 3
Where does all this moral behaviour come from? At its root morality is founded on
enlightened (or strategic) self-interest. Now, we can think of pure self-interest as an extension of
our competitive nature, while altruism is part of our cooperative nature. By combining these two
traits, enlightened self-interest is formed.
Let’s consider self-interest first. The self-interested person notes that he is not born for
others – nor are others born for him. That such pure self-interest leads to good things for a
society was the great discovery of classical liberal philosophers. In doing the best we can for
ourselves, we end up doing the best we can for others. Bill Gates will do his best for us when he
wants to make profit from what he sells us. That is because he will only made a profit if we are
willing to buy them. In doing so, he will give employment to thousands of people and improve
the productivity of millions of customers. Indeed, his profit is a tiny fraction of his contributions
to society. His profits (wealth) also ultimately return back to society, either as an investment,
charitable activity, taxes, or bequests – so long as Bill Gates does not bury his wealth
underground after he dies (like the pharaohs did). One hundred per cent of what he creates in
his life will ultimately irrigate the society.
Had Bill Gates tried to give away his software free of cost, he wouldn’t have made his profits,
and thus he would have failed to attract outstanding software engineers to improve the products
he wanted to make. That would have been the worst outcome for everybody. Had society
compelled him to give away his products free, it would have been even worse. He would lose all
incentives to work. Indeed, corporate social responsibility (CSR) which tries to make businesses
do charitable things, which are well outside their primary field of business, is thus a waste of
precious resources which would have been best deployed in the business doing what it did really
well (cf. the theory of comparative advantage) – and not half-heartedly in areas they have no
particular expertise in. CSR also raises the more basic question about the purpose of the
business, and whether all its shareholders approve their money being used for charitable
purposes. We must, of course, closely monitor that self-interest doesn’t turn into haughtiness or
arrogance. But the sensible person avoids arrogance like the plague since it damages our
interests. A robust sense of humility and a sense of perspective about one’s limitations is
therefore an extremely useful asset.
The second aspect of enlightened self-interest, namely, altruism, is an outcome of our natural
empathy for others. When others are injured we fear their pain in some form. Altruism is thus a
well-documented trait that we all seem to possess in some measure. Most people are willing
to contribute in some way for the welfare of those whom they do not know, or are not directly
responsible for. The key is to contribute without expecting anything in return. This
contribution is over and above the insurance premium (tax) they are willing to pay for
ensuring a social minimum. The extreme case of altruism is when people try to save someone
they have never known before from drowning – without regard to for themselves. However,
altruism is a part of enlightened self-interest because when we give to others without (anything
seemingly) in it for ourselves, we are being (indirectly and strategically) selfish. We may do
altruistic things to advance our own salvation, or to feel good, or to diminish our anger at the
existence of avoidable poverty. If India’s poverty (arising from misgovernance) is reduced even
marginally as a result of my efforts, I will gain from being able to bask in the prestige of
belonging to a well-off nation. Even though it may appear to a casual observer that I have paid
an excessively high price for this dubious privilege, it is I who know its value to me, not the
observer. Indeed, so called altruism vitally represents our self-interest (Box QQ). It is worth
noting, though, that much altruism is strategic, and hence consistent even with narrow self-
interest.
Box QQ
Distinguishing between altruism, enlightened self-interest, and sacrifice

3Ian Harper (2003). ‘Christian Morality and Market Capitalism: Friends or Foes?’ 5th Annual CIS Acton Lecture on
Religion & Freedom. Centre for Independent Studies, Sydney.

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 According to the dictionary, a sacrifice is defined as the ‘[d]estruction, surrender, or
foregoing of anything valued for the sake of anything else, esp. a higher consideration’ 4 (where
the higher represents so-called moral values) [emphasis mine]. I suggest this is a confusing
definition. Let’s say I give up something of value (say my time, or my money) that is worth X to
me, and receive Y in return, where Y can range in value (to me) from 0 (worthless) to ∞
(infinitely valuable), with varying probabilities. Now consider the following
a) Ayn Rand thought that ‘“Sacrifice” is the surrender of a greater value for the sake of a lesser
one or of a nonvalue.’ This may refer to a situation where ‘something [is] given up or lost’ 5.
Thus we may say that ‘the soldiers of the Allied forces sacrificed their life for our future’. We
say so because of our belief that the soldiers presumably get nothing (death – i.e. nothing) in
return for something of infinite value (life). However, this view is not quite right. First, the
soldiers were fighting for a society they genuinely cared for, and were acting as responsible
citizens. Hence the value they got (while alive) of the belief that they were fighting for the
country that they loved – was sufficient compensation for the small likelihood that they may
lose their life in battle. Second, these soldiers voluntarily chose this profession, and got a
salary – and after their death a pension to take care of their family. Many other values attend
to this, e.g. good health from exercise. It would be hard to argue that a voluntary decision to
become a soldier is a sacrifice. What we choose to do either for ourselves or for our beloved ones
(or beloved country) cannot qualify as sacrifice for that would totally devalue the emotion
behind these choices. As Ayn Rand said:
Any action that a man undertakes for the benefit of those he loves is not a sacrifice… Concern for the
welfare of those one loves is a rational part of one’s selfish interests. If a man who is passionately in love
with his wife spends a fortune to cure her of a dangerous illness, it would be absurd to claim that he does
it as a “sacrifice” for her sake, not his own, and that it makes no difference to him, personally and
selfishly, whether she lives or dies.
What if I forego an expensive dinner that I had planned, and donate the savings arising to
charity? Am I simply being altruistic or am I also ‘sacrificing’? That I am being altruistic
cannot be doubted. But I am not making a ‘sacrifice’ because I get a good feeling in return,
From the moment we really care for something or someone, the concept of sacrifice cannot
exist.
If one’s friend is in trouble, one should act to help him by whatever nonsacrificial means are
appropriate. For instance, if one’s friend is starving, it is not a sacrifice, but an act of integrity to give him
money for food rather than buy some insignificant gadget for oneself, because his welfare is important in
the scale of one’s personal values. If the gadget means more than the friend’s suffering, one had no
business pretending to be his friend. 6
We only sacrifice when we do things we don’t really care for. But if we are to do such
things, we’ll violate our self-interest. As Ayn Rand noted:
‘The virtue involved in helping those one loves is not “selflessness” or “sacrifice,” but integrity. Integrity
is loyalty to one’s convictions and values; it is the policy of acting in accordance with one’s values, of
expressing, upholding and translating them into practical reality. If a man professes to love a woman, yet
his actions are indifferent, inimical or damaging to her, it is his lack of integrity that makes him immoral.
The same principle applies to relationships among friends.’
If a ‘sacrifice’ is an obligation we have voluntarily chosen, or an action compatible with
one’s values, then how can sacrifice or even altruism exist? Clearly, the term ‘sacrifice’ is
questionable. I believe that the term ‘enlightened self-interest’ is more accurate, as it clarifies
that everything we do voluntarily must necessarily be in our own interest in some way: else we
wouldn’t choose to do it. Thus, when parents tell to their children: ‘We made so many sacrifices
for you’, and demand obedience or care, we should ask them: ‘Who forced you to do it?’ Parents
must either want to have their children (in which case what they do for them can’t be a
sacrifice), or not have them at all in the first place. They can’t have the cake and eat it too!
b) When we receive something of equal or greater value than what we give that is not a

4 Chambers 20th Century Dictionary, 1983 edition.

5 [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sacrifice]
6 Rand, Ayn, 1964, ‘The Ethics of Emergencies’, The Virtue of Selfishness, New York: New American Library, pp.45-46.

– cited in Hospers, John, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1977 [1967: Prentice
Hall] reprint, p. 602.

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 sacrifice. Thus, in a normal market transaction, when we ‘give up’ Rs. 100 for a movie ticket,
we get at least Rs. 100 worth of value in return (the concept of consumer surplus shows that
we get more than Rs. 100 in value). Getting Y ≥ X by ‘giving up’ X, involves no sacrifice. It is a
bargain. A trade-off of the following sort similarly cannot be called a sacrifice: ‘We must
sacrifice watching TV today so we can get good results in the exams tomorrow’. Delayed
gratification is not sacrifice, but a rational method of smoothing lifecycle consumption: a form
of pure self-interest.

Reputation
There are many direct benefits of honesty. Not only do we personally benefit, but the
beneficent effects of our reputation brush off onto our progeny (e.g. the progeny of murderers are
almost always scarred for life). It is in our enlightened self-interest to have a good reputation, for
without it we can lose badly in the free market. Consumers will deny custom to cheating (or ill-
mannered) shopkeepers. As David Klein said, ‘A habit of deceit is a mark of bad character, and
bad character has a way of revealing itself no matter how cunning the individual. Deceit is both
bad karma and bad business. I’m inclined to agree with Montesquieu, Adam Smith, and
Friedrich Hayek that commerce elevates manners and probity.’ 7
We cannot afford to be known as a liar or thief. We are similarly mindful of our family’s
reputation. Our reputation is a precious asset which we often go to great lengths to protect. In a
‘repeated game’, our bad actions will come back to haunt us in the future. Bad reputation
spreads in many ways – through gossip, the grapevine; even the internet. Even those not
particularly ethical will generally behave well under repeated game scenario. Even though
greater mobility across cities make reputational effects weaker than in villages (because of fewer
chances of repeated interactions), most city dwellers do not need external pressure to keep us on
the ‘straight and narrow.’ Likewise, most private organisations and traders will never need
minding. On the contrary, many companies in the West spend millions of dollars to prevent (or
repair) the slightest harm to their reputation, recalling goods which are even slightly unsafe.
In addition to enlightened self-interest that is based (at least in part) on strategic
imperatives, we do possess internal compass, our conscience (being the moral sense discussed in
Chapter 1). This helps us distinguish the good from the bad. And although our moral sense is not
very strong, it does reduce at least some moral confusion.
As a result of these two: namely, enlightened self-interest and the moral impulse, most of
us will remain voluntarily accountable for their actions throughout life. Freedom and justice
can be sustained without external intervention for the most part, and the problem boils down
to the control of evil people.

1.2 The role of good governance in ensuring moral behaviour

It would be a very foolish society indeed that depended entirely on self-interest and the
moral sense to achieve accountability. The bleak truths about human nature cannot be brushed
aside. Humans can behave baldly, and in dastardly ways. The market, as Ian Harper pointed
out, ‘can and will violate human dignity, unless this is well-defined and enshrined in law or
custom’ 8. We will be foolish to take others on face value alone.
The free society therefore keeps a big stick – a highly credible threat of punishment for
wrong-doing. This keeps potential delinquents at bay. Knowing that a policeman will almost
certainly catch us if we steal forms at least part of the explanation for voluntary accountability.
Thus, while self-regulation is the correct place to start the discussion on appropriate behaviour,
free societies must make clear laws to require individual accountability.
If, after these conditions for voluntary accountability are met, it becomes sub-optimal to
cheat, why do fraudsters and charlatans exist even then? Some psychopaths or mentally
unsound people will always be found in human society. But most criminals are of sound mind.

7Klein, Daniel B., ‘Trust for Hire: Voluntary Remedies for Quality and Safety’, Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary
Elicitation of Good Conduct, University of Michigan Press, 1997, pp.97–133.
8 Ibid – Ian Harper.

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What they seem to lack is a rational understanding of their own self-interest, being unable to
recognize the consequences. In addition, there may well be a few genuinely smart and
opportunistic criminals who indulge in crime after making sure they can’t get caught (or so they
think). The quality of regulation and enforcement of laws in society is therefore very important
to deter such ‘smart’ criminals. Such (smart) types increase when a government becomes weak
or corrupt. Under such circumstances, the government’s own employees become criminals, and
those who live in such a society are essentially doomed.
Of course, it is not only the corrupt elements in governments that drive up crime.
Bureaucrats and politicians with good intentions (but little sense) can prove even more
dangerous! They endanger society by their shallow and misguided analysis of incentives and
human nature, through which they can easily distort the economic structure of a society,
increasing society-wide criminality. Nehru comes to mind. Despite his excellent intentions, his
badly flawed policies generated vast incentives for corruption and crime. While robbing Peter to
pay Paul may appear to be a simple method to help the poor, it is definitely wrong to do, and will
harm the poor themselves in the end.
As an example of how bad policies lead to crime, consider India’s public distribution system
(PDS). This system creates two sets of prices in the market for (almost exactly) the same
product, say, sugar. As a result, huge incentives for fraud are set into play, motivating gangs of
criminals (supported by collusive bureaucrats and the police) to divert PDS goods into the ‘main’
market. False ration cards are another outcome. (As Subdivisional Magistrate in Hojai, Assam
in 1985, I found strong linkages between politicians, business and bureaucrats – all making
money through PDS arbitrage and theft. I was able to get one of my senior officers arrested but
of course that did not solve the problem which was created in the first place by bad policy).
In general, policy emanating from a bureaucrat’s or politician’s ‘altruism’ is likely to prove
dangerous. Rejecting good intentions as a viable basis for policy making, Ayn Rand showed that
a system built on an understanding of self-interest will not only lead to the best economic
outcomes, but to the highest standards of morality. As Alan Greenspan wrote in Ayn Rand’s
book, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal:
The hallmark of collectivists is their deep-rooted distrust of freedom and of the free-market
processes; but it is their advocacy of so-called ‘consumer protection’ that exposes the nature of
their basic premises with particular clarity. By preferring force and fear to incentive and reward
as a means of human motivation, they confess their view of man as a mindless brute functioning
on the range of the moment, whose actual self-interest lies in ‘flying-by-night’ and making ‘quick
kills.’ They confess their ignorance of the role of intelligence in the production process, of the
wide intellectual context and long-range vision required to maintain a modern industry. They
confess their inability to grasp the crucial importance of the moral values which are the motive
power of capitalism….It is this superlatively moral system that the welfare statists propose to
improve upon by means of preventive law, snooping bureaucrats, and the chronic goad of fear. 9
Regulating people in a preventive sense is fraught. Any attempt to impose one’s morality n
others can lead to extremely dangerous consequences. For instance, prohibiting free import of
gold (to prevent consumption of ‘luxury goods’ – a matter not within a government’s scope to
comment on) created serious violent crime in India through increased smuggling. Drug wars in
Mexico and South America are directly consequence of attempts to impose one’s morality on
society. The harm caused by drugs needs to be minimised, and prohibition is no solution. In
order to prevent a few deaths through rash driving after drug use (for which systematic road
checks can be organised), thousands of drugs smugglers and policemen are killed each year.
Crime is created not reduced, by mixing morality with the role of government.
Good governance is therefore about effective and efficient regulation: about optimal
regulation, neither too much too little, to achieve the stated goals. Unfortunately, across the
world: even in the West, many bureaucrats consider citizens (who pay the taxes that help hire

9 In an essay on ‘The Assault on Integrity’ in her Capitalism - the Unknown Ideal. Signet (Penguin Group). 1967.
p.121.

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them in the first place!) ‘stupid’. 10 This leads to significant over-regulation through paternalistic
government. A government must never be seen as our parent but as our servant. With reference
to bad regulation we must agree with Alan Greenspan:
Government regulations do not eliminate potentially dishonest individuals, but merely make
their activities harder to detect or easier to hush up. Furthermore, the possibility of individual
dishonesty applies to government employees fully as much as to any other group of men. There
is nothing to guarantee the superior judgment, knowledge, and integrity of an inspector or a
bureaucrat – and the deadly consequences of entrusting him with arbitrary power are obvious. 11
[if only Greenspan had applied this to himself as the regulator of money in USA! – see Chapter
XX for a further discussion]
One of the main measures of the level of freedom obtaining in a society is the general
level of ethics in society. Predominantly capitalist countries naturally show up amongst the
more honest societies in Transparency International’s annual surveys. On the other hand,
socialist India and pseudo-communist China are corrupt at levels that boggle the mind. Good
behaviour is best found where good law and order exists, not by exhorting them to be good.

1.3 Religions have no monopoly over morality

This is perhaps the right place in this book to pause and make note of the purported
purveyors of morality: the many religions. Apart from reiterating the principle of accountability
(Golden Rule) – on which one has nothing to say, being a basic liberal principle, religions have
often dabbled in social issues, creating great dissonance and conflict on Earth. Religions have
actively promoted (and in many cases continue to promote) caste, slavery, polygamy, and other
things now considered evil. It is important, therefore, that free society laws consider the advice
of religions but make decisions based on the strength of the underlying arguments, not the
strength of the dogma.
It is worth considering various immoral religious acts, here. One reason religions often act
immorally is because they are unable to review their scriptures through representative
religious parliaments (unlike in a free society where its laws are periodically reviewed).
Scriptures written (or spoken) thousands of years ago are quite likely to be out of step with
modern social expectations. Religious believers are therefore forced selectively choose what
they think is right from the teachings of their religion. They then rationalise the ‘bad
elements’ of their scriptures by suggesting that words used in the past had a different
metaphysical meaning. The following failures of religions strongly challenge the oft-held
view that religions have a monopoly over morality.
a) Slavery
Slavery was commonly practiced when most of today’s major religions first arose. The old
religions provided active support for, or at least condoned, slavery. Thus in Judaism it is
said:
[Y]ou may purchase male and female slaves from among the nations around you. You may also
purchase the children of temporary residents who live among you, including those who have
been born in your land. You may treat them as your property, passing them on to your children
as a permanent inheritance.’ (Leviticus 25, 44-46, Old Testament 12).
The Christian scripture, Ephesians 6 (New Testament 13) asks slaves to perform their role
sincerely: ‘5 Slaves, obey your earthly masters with deep respect and fear. Serve them sincerely
as you would serve Christ.’ There is no suggestion that slavery opposes the will of God (it
obviously didn’t, then).
In Islam, the Koran does not oppose slavery. Instead, it totally denies rights to married
slave women. Her humanity and marriage rights are mercilessly destroyed: ‘4:24. You are ...

10 These are the precise words used by a young urban policy specialist I met in a training workshop in Melbourne in
2008 – and repeated by another young economist in 2009.
11 Greenspan, Alan, ‘The Assault on Integrity’ in Rand, Ayn, Capitalism - the Unknown Ideal. Signet (Penguin Group),

1967, p.121.
12 New Living Translation. [http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?book_id=3&chapter=25&version=51]
13 New Living Translation. [http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?book_id=56&chapter=6&version=51]

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forbidden to take in marriage ... married women, except those whom you own as slaves.’ 14
Verse 23:5 then asks believers to ‘restrain carnal desires (except with their wives and slave
girls, for these are lawful to them)’. 15 The status of men slaves isn’t much better in Islam.
Many of them were deployed as soldiers (one of them, Qutb-ud-din Aybak, broke free and
founded the slave dynasty in India in 1206 AD – a dynasty that built the Qutub Minar).
Some people argue speciously that it was religion that called for the fairer treatment of
slaves. But as Bertrand Russell noted, ‘churches … opposed the abolition of slavery as long as
they dared.’ 16 It is quite possible that if religious fanatics gain control of society again,
slavery will be brought back. Almost all religions are clearly an ongoing threat to humanity
and need to be closely monitored.
b) Polygamy
Polygamy often makes an already subordinate situation for women in most religions, much
worse. It is therefore incompatible with (equal) freedom unless informed consent of the (adult)
participants is involved. Most religions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism and Islam,
with the exception of Christianity – have permitted, even encouraged, polygamy, at least for the
rich (Judaism outlawed polygamy only in the tenth century 17).
c) Interference in basic freedoms, such as consumption of food
Religions often try to restrict simple freedoms, such as what one can eat. While some foods
could harm us (such as excessive consumption of alcohol), and others can lead to disease (such as
inadequately cooking pork), religions do not, as a general rule, prohibit consumption of a food on
health grounds. Instead, they demand blind obedience to whimsical restrictions. Because thee is
no logic behind their restrictions religions differ on what they prohibit. Thus, some allow the
consumption of alcohol while others prohibit it (Note that while Islam admonishes against the
consumption of wine (Koran, 5:90) its formal prohibition is mentioned in a hadith, an
interpretation). Similarly, Jainism advocates vegetarianism but others allow meat even as they
distinguish between meats. Other religions, like Hinduism, change their view about foods over
time. Thus, while Vedic Hindus ate beef 18 later Hindu texts prohibit its consumption (perhaps
influenced by Jainism). In any event, religions present an ongoing danger to basic human
freedoms. That is one more reason to disallow the mixing of religion and politics.
d) Social stratification
The varna system (later called the caste system by the Portuguese) arose in early Hinduism
in a non-racist form. It originally represented different levels of human skill and mental
advancement. Raghunandan Sharma 19 shows that the idea of varna (‘level’) was introduced in
Vedic society as an individual, merit-based honorific. Despite innumerable verses which confirm
that varna is not meant to be hereditary (e.g. Gita 4:13 – which is, unfortunately, often
mistranslated in English translations), discriminatory behaviour did take place in later Vedic
society. For instance, the Mahabharata (of which the Gita is a part) tells us that sage
Dronacharya rejected a request from a low caste tribal named Ekalavya to learn archery from
him Eklavya then built a clay statue of Drona and practiced industriously, ultimately becoming
a better archer than Arjuna, Dronacharya’s best student. When Arjuna discovered this, he asked
Drona to do something about it. Drona therefore asked Eklavya for dakshina for having ‘taught’
him through his clay statue. In dakshina he demanded Eklavya’s right thumb, thus ending his
career. While this could have been part of Drona’s political strategy to protect his monopoly as a
teacher, it can also be construed as an attack against low caste people who seek to advance on
their merit.

14 Dawood, N.J. (translator), The Koran, London: Penguin Books, 2003, p.63.
15 Dawood, N.J. (translator), The Koran, London: Penguin Books, 2003, p.241.
16 in his Has Religion Made Useful Contributions to Civilization? (1930, p.25),
17 Pinker, Steven, How the Mind Works, London: Penguin Books, 1999, p.476.
18 D.N. Jha, Myth of the Holy Cow.
19 Sharma, Raghunanda (2002). Samajik Samarasta Evam Varna Vyavastha, Speech delivered to political workers

and leaders of Scheduled Caste Morcha at Jabalpur in 2002.

[http://www.sanjeev.sabhlokcity.com/book2/raghunandan.pdf]

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 In the meanwhile, the varna and jati (caste and sub-caste) system has become deeply
entrenched in the Hindu mind. Things went downhill with Manusmriti, 20 written around 200
AD. A king obeying Manu’s laws would have to cut off the tongue of ‘untouchables’ who tried to
learn the scriptures. Clearly, Hinduism long lost any claim it may have had, to being a religion
of equal freedom.
e) Child abuse
This is also an appropriate place to note the extensive abuse of children that has occurred
within the confines of the Catholic Church. And instead of asking the police to investigate this
abuse, the Church has spent a huge amount of energy sheltering these abusers. The moral
standing of the Church has now surely hit the rock bottom. Child abuse, of course, includes child
marriage, which was chronic feature of Hinduism for thousands of years (and perhaps of a few
others societies as well). Even today, this has not completely gone away. Hindu priests have
been marrying children off for thousands of years, and Hindu scriptures don’t seem to prohibit
such things.

2. Self-realisation
Our freedom to choose responsibly, to discover the truth for ourselves, and self-awareness,
form the key elements of the concept of self-realisation. Choosing (behaving) responsibly
includes choosing – with care – each element of our lives, such as what we wear, eat, or believe
in. Even choosing tradition must be deemed a conscious decision. But taking such deliberate
responsibility is not something natural to societies where the concepts of freedom have not been
understood.
Some people seem to lack the intellectual and psychological apparatus that is necessary to
deal with responsibility (and freedom). They would rather follow traditions established
thousands of years ago by opinionated ‘saints’ or thinkers with little or no grounding in logic or
science. Myths therefore rule the world. Fraudsters, who speak about miracles and unnatural
events, therefore continue to thrive. The free society, however, encourages us to discover the
truth for ourselves. We must live our lives in freedom and choose our beliefs, detoxifying
ourselves from prejudice. Self-reliance (not self-sufficiency!) – advocated by Ralph Waldo
Emerson – comes to mind as a model.
The second key element of self-realisation is self-awareness. Thus, ancient Indian
philosophers spent considerable effort in finding out who they were. Some found a spirit within
themselves – and indeed, in everything around them. But whether we are a spirit, or whether
we are all One (at some level), each of us on this earth is unique, never to be repeated again.
Finding out about ourselves is therefore a task of considerable urgency – and more important
than knowing more about the moon. This journey towards self-discovery is surely at least as
challenging as any other. Self-reflection ideally involves looking at ourselves and our behaviour
from the vantage point of an external observer. This can also tell us something about the way
others think.
Upon looking inside, we are likely to find that we are a complex mix of selfishness and
altruism. What is our true nature is not obvious. We may also find in us, for instance, a strong
desire to merge with the crowd – which is a collective desire completely at odds with
individualism (but consistent with self-interest!). This desire for conformity underpins all
culture: a uniformity of outlook that arises from this urge not to stand out. And so we imitate the
religion, language – even clothes – of our society or culture. And on top of this unedifying fact

20 Manusmriti [http://www.hindubooks.org/scriptures/manusmriti/manusmriti.html]. Chapter 8, 267. A Kshatriya,

having defamed a Brahmana, shall be fined one hundred (panas); a Vaisya one hundred and fifty or two hundred; a
Sudra shall suffer corporal punishment.
268. A Brahmana shall be fined fifty (panas) for defaming a Kshatriya; in (the case of) a Vaisya the fine shall be
twenty-five (panas); in (the case of) a Sudra twelve.
269. For offences of twice-born men against those of equal caste (varna, the fine shall be) also twelve (panas); for
speeches which ought not to be uttered, that (and every fine shall be) double.
270. A once-born man (a Sudra), who insults a twice-born man with gross invective, shall have his tongue cut out; for
he is of low origin

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about ourselves we will surely find deep ignorance, that we know almost nothing about
anything. Humility has good reasons to emerge, once a modicum of self-awareness is achieved.
The combination of these two: (a) taking responsibility for our choices; and (b) being better
aware of ourselves, can lead to dramatic changes in our personal lives. Self-realisation is not,
however, code for such (potentially spiritual) epiphany but for steadily nudging ourselves
towards humanity, empathy and humility. A self-realised person will likely display kindness,
compassion, and deep understanding: without becoming weak when hard decisions need to be
taken.
By choosing our own beliefs responsibly, we nudge the entire mankind towards the truth. By
conducting our own analysis and then forming opinions, we are released from the obligation to
follow authority figures of the past. In the past, the lack of scientific method meant that people
came to wrong conclusions most of the time. At least 90 per cent of what they thought was
wrong! But today, if we use the tools of thinking carefully, could turn out to be right half the
time! We must be allowed to make our own mistakes. No hand-holding, no paternalism, and no
force, please. Through our actions, experiments and failures, we will find out who we are. As
Victor Frankl put it:
It did not really matter what we expected from life, but rather what life expected from us. We needed to stop
asking about the meaning of life, and instead to think of ourselves as those who were being questioned by life
– daily and hourly. Our answer must consist, not in talk and meditation, but in right action and in right
conduct. Life ultimately means taking the responsibility to find the right answer to its problems and to fulfill
the tasks which it constantly sets for each individual. 21

3. Happiness
While freedom has no ultimate goal, we must surely wonder occasionally if freedom can help
us achieve happiness (a utilitarian or instrumentalist conception about freedom: that it must
‘achieve’ something more than simply make us free). To be (and just be free) is not the same as to
be happy. That distinction must always be kept in mind. We need to be free because we must be
free. All other arguments are incidental.
Indeed, it is possible that being free to search for the truth could leave us unsatisfied,
unhappy that we don’t know much about anything. But what about quiet enjoyment of a
moment, or even some fun: laughter, dance, and music? The theory of freedom leaves us free to
choose either of these: we are the master of our own happiness. Happiness is about who you are,
not what you have. Adam Smith wrote about happiness so well (in his 1759 Theory of Moral
Sentiments) that we can do no better than to quote him at great length:
Happiness consists in tranquillity and enjoyment. Without tranquillity there can be no
enjoyment; and where there is perfect tranquillity there is scarce any thing which is not capable
of amusing.
The poor man’s son, whom heaven in its anger has visited with ambition, when he begins to look
around him, admires the condition of the rich. He finds the cottage of his father too small for his
accommodation, and fancies he should be lodged more at his ease in a palace. He is displeased
with being obliged to walk a-foot, or to endure the fatigue of riding on horseback. He sees his
superiors carried about in machines, and imagines that in one of these he could travel with less
inconveniency. He feels himself naturally indolent, and willing to serve himself with his own
hands as little as possible; and judges, that a numerous retinue of servants would save him from
a great deal of trouble. He thinks if he had attained all these, he would sit still contentedly, and
be quiet, enjoying himself in the thought of the happiness and tranquillity of his situation. He is
enchanted with the distant idea of this felicity. It appears in his fancy like the life of some
superior rank of beings, and, in order to arrive at it, he devotes himself for ever to the pursuit of
wealth and greatness. To obtain the conveniencies which these afford, he submits in the first
year, nay in the first month of his application, to more fatigue of body and more uneasiness of
mind than he could have suffered through the whole of his life from the want of them. He studies
to distinguish himself in some laborious profession. With the most unrelenting industry he
labours night and day to acquire talents superior to all his competitors. He endeavours next to
bring those talents into public view, and with equal assiduity solicits every opportunity of

21 Victor Frankl in his 1946, Man’s Search for Meaning [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man's_Search_for_Meaning]

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 employment. For this purpose he makes his court to all mankind; he serves those whom he
hates, and is obsequious to those whom he despises. Through the whole of his life he pursues the
idea of a certain artificial and elegant repose which he may never arrive at, for which he
sacrifices a real tranquillity that is at all times in his power, and which, if in the extremity of old
age he should at last attain to it, he will find to be in no respect preferable to that humble
security and contentment which he had abandoned for it. It is then, in the last dregs of life, his
body wasted with toil and diseases, his mind galled and ruffled by the memory of a thousand
injuries and disappointments which he imagines he has met with from the injustice of his
enemies, or from the perfidy and ingratitude of his friends, that he begins at last to find that
wealth and greatness are mere trinkets of frivolous utility, no more adapted for procuring ease
of body or tranquillity of mind than the tweezer-cases of the lover of toys
On a similar note, one must perhaps agree with Cassandra Wilkinson who wrote: ‘Freedom
alone is not what makes us happy, it’s what we do with it. Freedom is not the end of our quest
but the beginning, the precondition of the pursuit of happiness.’22 Working out our central
purpose in life (and perennially reinventing this purpose) and doing things we genuinely enjoy
doing is the key. Caring for others is the widely known ‘secret’ of happiness – and savouring each
moment of life, no matter how stressful (or painful). Little children with leukaemia still manage
to smile and laugh through their last days on earth. Virtually nothing we face in our lives
should, in comparison, have the power to make us unhappy. Even pain and frustrations can
become a pleasure – of sorts: a reminder that we are still alive, and a challenge to be overcome.

22 Wilkinson, Cassandra, ‘Freedom and the global pursuit of happiness,’ in The Weekend Australian, August 16-17,

2008.

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Part 3 The political and market pillars of freedom

177
Chapter 8 The pillar of tolerance

‘We have just enough religion to make us hate, but not enough to make us love one another.’
Jonathan Swift. 1

‘Lovers of wisdom must open their minds to very many things.’ Heraclitus 2

In Chapter 4 had I the asked the basic question: ‘What are we all really looking for?’ If you
recall, I had offered a view at that we are, at the least, looking for security, for simple things like
the freedom to be, and for justice – with the hope (not requirement!) that these may enable us to
pursue happiness the way we wish to achieve it. Assuming therefore that we have found (or
created) a society that ensures security and justice, and defends our freedoms, we then reach the
point when we can start considering how we will interact with others.
Now, these others are quite a problem. Most of them believe in quite different things to us,
and we face serious questions about how we shall engage with them. Of this we are sure, that we
want to interact with others only the way we want to, or otherwise we want to be left alone. We
want to deal with others only on our own terms, and only if we choose to.
If we want to be left alone, we must leave others alone, as well. The free man therefore does
not ‘regard himself as entitled to impose … [his views] on others.’ 3 This concept is the basis of
the institution of tolerance. It leaves us free to act on our religions or philosophical beliefs – so
long as we don’t coerce or harm others in any way. Freedom is essentially about living and
letting live. A free society is a social ‘order in which, even on issues which to one are
fundamental, others are allowed to pursue different ends’ (Hayek). 4 Non-imposition and
forbearance is the essence of freedom. Note that this idea doesn’t require us to respect others. We
are allowed to disagree vehemently with others, and even disrespect their viewpoint. All it
suggests is that even if you do not particularly esteem me or my ideas, you are not free to
physically impose your will upon me. You may, if you so wish, freely criticise me based only on
the facts and merits of the case. Of course, there are no rights to libel or damage others’
reputation without basis. Tolerance is, in the end, vitally intertwined with self-restraint both
physically and in their expression, requiring that we stick to the facts and to the demands of
accountability.
A great amount of friction is created in free societies because everyone is free to believe in
different things. The free society is clearly not the easiest society to live in. Politeness and
mutual tolerance must therefore lubricate it, if it is not to blow apart. We cannot persecute
others for their opinions (unless they are actively engaged in destroying the fabric of society).
Voltaire said: ‘What is tolerance? …it is the consequence of humanity. We are all formed of
frailty and error; let us pardon reciprocally each other’s folly – that is the first law of nature. It is
clear that the individual who persecutes a man, his brother, because he is not of the same
opinion, is a monster.’ 5
Unfortunately, nature has not built us for tolerance. We tend to dislike views different to
ours. We get a gut-wrenching feeling when we come across (what is in our opinion) undesirable

1 Jonathan Swift (1667–1745), repr. in Jonathan Swift: A Critical Edition of the Major Works, eds. Angus Ross and
David Woolley (1984). ‘Various Thoughts Moral and Diverting,’ Miscellanies in Prose and Verse (1711). Cited at
[http://bartelby.org/66/13/56813.html]
2Translation used in Roger von Oech (2001). Expect the Unexpected (Or You Won’t Find It). Free Press. p.12
3 Friedrich A. Hayek, 1960. ‘Why I am not a Conservative’, in The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago: Chicago University

Press. Copy available at [http://www.fahayek.org/]

4 Friedrich A. Hayek, 1960. ‘Why I am not a Conservative’, in The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago: Chicago University

Press. Copy available at [http://www.fahayek.org/]

5 From his The Philosophical Dictionary.

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speech or action. We may even get the physical urge to intervene. This tendency for intolerance
can’t be eradicated, only reduced through good institutions.
Societies are generally far more tolerant today than they were in the past, but this is the
result of an arduous and bloody historical process. Of course, some people in the past were
relatively more tolerant than others. Early examples include the Indians and King Cyrus of
Persia (mid-500 BC).
[T]he figure of Cyrus has survived throughout history as more than a great man who founded an
empire. He became the epitome of the great qualities expected of a ruler in antiquity, and he
assumed heroic features as a conqueror who was tolerant and magnanimous as well as brave
and daring. His personality as seen by the Greeks influenced them and Alexander the Great,
and, as the tradition was transmitted by the Romans, may be considered to influence our
thinking even now. 6
Emperor Julian of Rome, emperor Kublai Khan of Mongolia and China 7, the Caliphs of
Cordoba are other notable early examples of (relative) tolerance. Machiavelli was the first major
modern thinker to promote tolerance. He wrote that ‘[d]uring the period of the good Emperors he
will see that golden age when everyone could hold and defend whatever opinion he pleased.’ 8
Akbar of India who followed him a few decades later in India, was another notably tolerant
rulers. But for the most part, human history is a history of intolerance.
It is worthwhile noting here that William Galston distinguishes two types of liberalism: the
Reformation liberalism and Enlightenment liberalism. Toleration is at the heart of the
Reformation liberalism (which is what I advocate). The alternative brand of liberalism, largely
espoused in France and Germany, brings in the concept of positive liberty and permits the state
to interfere in the personal choices of people, for instance the dress they wear (e.g. a burka). For
instance, the arguments for a uniform civil code in India are based on statist conceptions of
liberalism. I argue that we must continuously revert to the definition of liberty, and this would
rule out any state interference unless harm was conclusively established.

1. The limits of tolerance

Clearly tolerance has limits. We can’t ‘tolerate’ human sacrifice ‘required’ by Tantric ritual.
Or sati. Or those who incite others to communal violence or crime. Similarly we can’t tolerate
extreme elements in Islam that bay for Salman Rushdie’s head in response to alleged disrespect
shown for their religion? The boundary of tolerance is limited to non-criminal and non-violent
acts; else we will end up with moral relativism and be asked to ‘tolerate’ criminal and violent
‘cultures’. The concepts of accountability and justice must necessarily inform our positions on
such matters. 9
Ordinary life brings a range of issues that test the boundaries of tolerance regularly. Like
the principles of justice, its boundaries must be determined with reference to the foundational
principles of life and liberty. A few examples below outline how we could approach the idea of
tolerance under different circumstances.
• Thus, in Chapter 4 we ruled out sati. In general, human sacrifice can be ruled out, as well as
any incitement to violence. These clearly violate life.
• Unless conclusive scientific evidence is adduced about the significantly harmful effects of
modest levels of social drinking, no free society can ban alcohol. (Strangely, in India, some
people seem to have a phobia against alcohol even as they take a relatively benign approach
towards smoking, which is far more harmful.)
• A TV program where offensive language is used or somewhat offensive scenes are depicted
cannot be banned unless it is conclusively demonstrated that the program has directly

6 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2001 CD-ROM edition.

7 Brickman, William W., ‘The Meeting of East and West in Educational History’, in Comparative Education Review,
Vol. 5, No. 2, Oct., 1961, p. 83.
8 David Webster and Louis Green (1969). Documents in Renaissance and Reformation History. Cassell Australia Ltd.

P.126, being an extract from Niccolo Machiavelli’s The Prince [1516].

9 e.g. Two Concepts of Liberalism by William A. Galston Source: Ethics, Vol. 105, No. 3, (Apr., 1995), pp. 516-534

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 caused injury, or is not representative of human reality. However, the time of the day or
night when it is aired, can legitimately be regulated.
• As long as the material in prurient books is voluntarily produced only for adults, and does
not injure someone directly, their sale cannot be banned. However, their sale can (and
should) be restricted to bookshops that allow entry only to adults.
• We may dislike things like tattoos, but we can’t forbid adults from choosing to have them
unless it is demonstrated that tattoos harm others. Since tattoos don’t kill, they can’t be
treated as a category of self harm, either.
• Nudity in public, while in bad taste and objectionable, does not kill or injure anyone or
directly reduce our liberty. Social norms should therefore be sufficient to deal with such
‘offences’. There is little cause to criminalise these things, remembering that our skin is the
‘dress’ given to us by nature. Covering our skin is a man-made invention. Thus, tribals who
dress sparsely commit no crime.
• Personal law: Can the free society ‘tolerate’ people having more than one spouse? While
marriage can be quite a challenge, it is not a lethal crime. However, it is possible that the
liberty of spouses in a polygamous (or polyandrous) marriage could well be adversely
affected. To arrive at a view on this question we would need to ask: Did these spouses willing
marry one person? If, as adults, they chose this option after due deliberation, we would be
hard pressed to object. To confirm that this is the case, we could well ask: Have all
accountabilities been met? For instance, has the future of each child born of this polygamous
(or polyandrous) marriage been adequately catered for? If such matters have been looked
after, then our grounds to intervene become weaker.
Historically speaking, when the number of men in a society declined after a major war, it
became customary for unmarried women and widows – who may otherwise become destitute
– to marry (or be ‘given’ in marriage) to the surviving men. For thousands of years, children
have been born into polygamous arrangements in most societies. In the mythological book,
Ramayana, Rama, a Hindu god king, was the child of a polygamous marriage. Therefore,
detailed analysis would be needed before condemning polygamy outright. It will need to be
resolved through debate and not through a strong-arm approach. That is the only position
compatible with liberty and tolerance.
• Compulsory education of children: Should a free society ‘tolerate’ those parents who do not
send their children to school? And can a society force such parents to do so? In response, we
note at first that most parents are naturally keen to educate their children, so the ‘problem’
only applies to a small minority. We could tell these people that while lack of education may
not kill their child (remembering that the human species was illiterate for most of its
existence), the child’s freedom can be adversely impacted, by limiting the choices it gets in
the future. But this is a difficult argument to pursue, for two reasons. One, a children’s
freedom is subsumed under is parents’ freedoms (after all, they are responsible for bringing
up their children, and we are not proposing that the taxpayer will take full responsibility for
these children). Second, the children can choose to educate themselves when they grow up,
anyway.
I believe, however, that this is a man-made ‘problem’. For sixty years the majority of
India’s children were not given the opportunity for education by socialists. Parents didn’t
send their children to school not because they didn’t want to send them to school but because
the educational system simply did not work. We should first make it possible for children to
get educated. After we’ve assured that we’ll find, for the most part, that parents will send
their children to school.
Once capitalism, that ensures good schools for all and reasonable equal opportunity,
starts working in a society, there will be almost no recalcitrant parents to even worry about.
But what if some parents don’t join the educational bandwagon even at that stage? We may
then (through civil society: not by using taxpayer funds) explain the merits of education to
such parents. If that doesn’t work we could do nothing about it. No rights accrue to society to
punish those who genuinely believe that educating their children is harmful. The child, as

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 noted above, will still retain the option of getting educated after it becomes an independent
adult. It is crucial that we do not impose our (paternalistic) views on others. Such an
approach will instil the value of tolerance and freedom in everyone, and become an
important educational experience in itself.
The free society can therefore display sublime genius on the one hand and smut on the other
– consistent with the full range of ‘normal’ human behaviour. We are well advised in a free
society to develop a thick skin so we can tolerate many things that we personally dislike but
which don’t harm us.

2. Tolerance, and intolerance within religions

If intolerance is typical of human society, how did we finally learn to tolerate each other?
Max Weber suggested (in his book The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism) that
Protestant attitudes played a significant role in the evolution of the such ideas of freedom. 10
Similarly, J.M.Roberts wrote: ‘At the deepest level, it is in its Christian nature that the
explanation of the success of medieval society in shaping the future must lie.’ 11 Robert A. Sirico
has an even more extravagant view, suggesting that ‘it is Christianity that lies at the root of the
body of ideas we know today as classical liberalism’, and ‘[i]t was monotheism in the Judeo-
Christian tradition that gave us liberty’ – even as he questions whether the Father of classical
liberalism, John Locke, was a genuine Christian. 12
The truth, of course, is that most religions have never been tolerant, being, instead, a
chronic source of intolerance. Very rarely has their (allegedly) key message – of love for
humanity – come through in their actions. Instead, all religions would rather have their views
about God and society imposed on others. Life is a zero-sum game for them: the loss of one ‘soul’
is someone else’s gain. Hence the ferocious competition for harvesting souls. I now propose to
explore the actual (as opposed to ideal) role played by religions in relation to tolerance.
While Jesus Christ, for example, might not have advocated intolerance (we have no tape
recording of what he actually said), organised religions (e.g. Christianity) quickly became
intolerant. Such things seem to occur all the time, wherein the founder is deified and the
followers are subsequently converted into a political organisation (called religion). As
Vivekananda noted, ‘[t]he disciples of all the prophets have always inextricably mixed up the
ideas of the Master with the person, and at last killed the ideas for the person.’ 13 Bertrand
Russell summed this up even better:
Churches may owe their origin to teachers with strong individual convictions, but these teachers
have seldom had much influence upon the churches that they founded… The most important
thing about Christianity, from a social and historical point of view, is not Christ but the church...
Christ taught that you should give your goods to the poor, that you should not fight, that you
should not go to church, and that you should not punish adultery. Neither Catholics nor
Protestants have shown any strong desire to follow His teaching in any of these respects. Some
of the Franciscans, it is true, attempted to teach the doctrine of apostolic poverty, but the Pope
condemned them, and their doctrine was declared heretical.... There is nothing accidental about
this difference between a church and its founder. As soon as absolute truth is supposed to be
contained in the sayings of a certain man, there is a body of experts to interpret his sayings, and
these experts infallibly acquire power, since they hold the key to truth. Like any other privileged
caste, they use their power for their own advantage. 14
While founders of religions are often worthy of regard, their religions are a different matter
altogether, being thought of as political parties or businesses. The objective of religious leaders is
(almost invariably) to hijack the teachings of religious founders for their personal gain and fame.
These leaders (to be carefully distinguished from the founders) thus become a dangerous lot,
often doing things completely at odds with the founder of the religion.

10 English translation in 1930 by Talcott Parsons.

11 J.M.Roberts (1985).The Triumph of the West. London: Phoenix Press, 2001, p.71.
12 Robert A. Sirico, Must Religion Be a Threat to Liberty? Sydney: Centre for Independent Studies, 2008, p.12.
13 Selected works, p.68, vol. 5
14 In, Has Religion Made Useful Contributions to Civilization? (1930). p.25

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 The good news, however, is that religions can also be a source of tolerance, since their
founders actually have a message of peace and goodwill. If they manage to find good leaders,
religions can do good as well, and become compatible with tolerance.

2.1 Tolerance, and intolerance in Christianity

Prior to the origin of Christianity, many ancient societies were not fussed about their
members having differing views to theirs about God. Ancient Greece, India and China tolerated
a wide range of religious opinions. The Romans developed – in order to keep their diverse
populations happy – a general separation of state and religion. They also displayed great
tolerance for a variety of religions (although that did depend on the ruler). Themistius (317-387
AD), a prominent Constantinopolitan senator and adviser to Roman emperors, apparently said:
There is a domain for which no ruler can hope to exercise any authority. That is the domain of
the virtues and especially that of the religious beliefs of individuals. Compulsion with in that
field calls hypocrisy and conversions that are based on fraud. Hence it is much better for ruler to
tolerate all beliefs, since it is only by toleration that civic strife can be averted. Moreover,
tolerance is a divine law. God himself has most clearly demonstrated his desire for a number of
different religions. And God alone can judge the methods by which humanity aspires to come to
an understanding of the Divine Mystery. God delights in the variety of homage which is
rendered Him. He likes to questions to use certain rules [CHECK], the Greeks others, the
Egyptians again others. 15
Romans thus possessed considerable liberty of religious conscience and practice. According
to Van Loon, Roman citizens ‘could believe or disbelieve anything they pleased… And if
perchance they thought that their gods had been insulted, they must not rush to the magistrate
for relief. ‘For’, as Emperor Tiberius remarked, ‘if the gods think that they have just claims for
grievance, they can surely take care of themselves’’. 16
Christianity soon split into many sects and great infighting commenced. As Erhman says,
‘What could be more diverse than this variegated phenomenon, Christianity in the modern
world? In fact, there may be an answer: Christianity in the ancient world. As historians have
come to realize, during the first three Christian centuries, the practices and beliefs found among
people who called themselves Christian were so varied that the differences between Roman
Catholics, Primitive Baptists, and Seventh-Day Adventists pale by comparison.’ 17 Thus,
In the second and third centuries there were, of course, Christians who believed in one God. But
there were others who insisted that there were two. Some said there were thirty. Others claimed
there were 365.
In the second and third centuries there were Christians who believed that God had created the
world. But others believed that this world had been created by a subordinate, ignorant divinity.
(Why else would the world be filled with such misery and hardship?) Yet other Christians
thought it was worse than that, that this world was a cosmic mistake created by a malevolent
divinity as a place of imprisonment, to trap humans and subject them to pain and suffering.
In the second and third centuries there were Christians who believed that the Jewish Scripture
(the Christian ‘Old Testament’) was inspired by the one true God. Others believed it was
inspired by the God of the Jews, who was not the one true God. Others believed it was inspired
by an evil deity. Others believed it was not inspired.
In the second and third centuries there were Christians who believed that Jesus was both divine
and human, God and man. There were other Christians who argued that he was completely
divine and not human at all. (For them, divinity and humanity were incommensurate entities:
God can no more be a man than a man can be a rock.) There were others who insisted that Jesus
was a full flesh-and-blood human, adopted by God to be his son but not himself divine. There
were yet other Christians who claimed that Jesus Christ was two things: a full flesh-and-blood
human, Jesus, and a fully divine being, Christ, who had temporarily inhabited Jesus’ body

15 Van Loon p.69 - note: this is probably a paraphrase – can’t find evidence anywhere.
16 van Loon, p. 47-48.
17 Erhman, Bart D,. Lost Christianities: The Battles for Scripture and the Faiths We Never Knew, Oxford University

Press, 2003 [http://jmm.aaa.net.au/articles/13480.htm]

182
 during his ministry and left prior to his death, inspiring his teachings and miracles but avoiding
the suffering in its aftermath.
In the second and third centuries there were Christians who believed that Jesus’ death brought
about the salvation of the world. There were other Christians who thought that Jesus’ death had
nothing to do with the salvation of the world. There were yet other Christians who said that
Jesus never died.
How could some of these views even be considered Christian? Or to put that question differently,
how could people who considered themselves Christian hold such views? Why did they not
consult their Scriptures to see that there were not 365 gods, or that the true God had created the
world, or that Jesus had died? Why didn’t they just read the New Testament?
It is because there was no New Testament. To be sure, the books that were eventually collected
into the New Testament had been written by the second century. But they had not yet been
gathered into a widely recognized and authoritative canon of Scripture. And there were other
books written as well, with equally impressive pedigrees – other Gospels, Acts, Epistles, and
Apocalypses claiming to be written by the earthly apostles of Jesus. 18
While the early branches of Christianity fought with each other, early Roman emperors
persecuted them as well, particularly between 250 and 311 AD. Roman emperors, who were
otherwise tolerant, somehow found Christianity to be obnoxious. Some suggest this was because
Romans feared the exclusiveness of Christians (‘early Christians, like the Jews, kept to
themselves’ - all quotations in this paragraph are from a single source 19). Also, ‘time and again’
the pagans ‘accused Christians of atheism’ because ‘Christians either denied the existence of
pagan gods or called them evil spirits.’ And while ‘pagans did not demand that Christians believe
in pagan gods’, ... ‘[y]et Roman religion was inseparable from the state. An attack on one was an
attack on other other.’ Emperor Decius, Valerian, and Diocletian reputedly persecuted those
Christians who refused to participate in pagan rites. On the whole, however, ‘[a]lthough a few
emperors, including Diocletian, vigorously persecuted Christians, most pagans left them alone’.
Mzny academic debates therefore rage even today about the nature and extent of these
persecutions.
Regardless of the nature and extent of these prosecutions, there is no dispute that once
Christians gained access to political power upon the conversion of Emperor Constantine (272–
337) to Christianity, they started persecuting and brutalising the pagans. They sought to, and
indeed soon managed to, completely destroy pagan religions. Far from being an organisation
that promotes love and goodwill, Christianity degenerated into a mafia, only caring for political
power. ‘Emperor Constantine, who lifted Christianity into power, murdered his wife Fausta and
his eldest son Crispus’. 20 But such criminality did not deter Christians from elevating him into a
saint! Christianity thus cast Christ aside, and started worshipping a murderer, instead! (So
much also for the acclaimed relationship between religion and morality.)
Emperor Julian (332-363) was the last great pagan emperor. A liberal pagan, he tolerated
Christainity but would not countenance persecution of anyone by Christians. For his tolerant
and humane approach, Christians call him Julian the Apostate! The Christian claim that
Christianity has promoted tolerance is surely made in jest. Instead, Christianity couldn’t wait to
see the end of all other religions – an approach that continues today. How can such an approach
be compatible with tolerance? Indeed, Roman emperors like Valentinian, Valens, and
Theodosius literally forced Christianity down the throat of pagans. They also banned sacrifices
to the old Roman gods and deprived pagan priests of their livelihood. Punishments for wilful
disobedience included exile and even death.

18 Ibid.
19 A History of World Societies by John P. McKay, Bennett D Hill and John Buckler (1988), Volume 1. London:
Houghton Mifflin Co., p.214.
20 Ingersoll, Robert G., Voltaire: A Lecture, New York: CP Farrell, 1895.
[http://www.archive.org/details/voltairelecture00ingeiala]

183
 According to Eric Jones and Ian Harper, ‘Christians believe that life’s meaning and purpose
… is to be found in the biblical injunction to love God and love one’s neighbour as oneself’ 21. It is
obvious, however, that for nearly two thousand years the so-called followers of Christ flagrantly
violated these injunctions. Indeed, on comparing Christianity and Islam, both predominantly
intolerant religions, Vivekananda found Islam to be the more tolerant of the two:
[S]ince the day when the sword of Constantine made a place for it in his kingdom, what support
has Christianity ever lent to the spread of civilisation...? What reward did the Christian religion
offer to that European Pandit who sought to prove for the first time that the Earth is a revolving
planet? What scientist has ever been hailed with approval and enthusiasm by the Christian
Church? ... In the New Testament there is no covert or overt praise of any arts and sciences. But
there is scarcely any science or branch of art that is not sanctioned and held up for
encouragement, directly or indirectly, in the Koran, or in the many passages of the Hadis, the
traditional sayings of Mohammed. The greatest thinkers of Europe – Voltaire, Darwin, Buchner,
Flammarion, Victor Hugo, and a host of others like them – are in the present times denounced
by Christianity and are victims of the vituperative tongues of its orthodox community. On the
other hand, Islam regards such people to be believers in the existence of God, but only wanting
in faith in the Prophet. ...[W]herever Islam has gone, there it has preserved the aboriginal
inhabitants – there those races still exist, their language and their nationality abide even to the
present day.
Where can Christianity shows such an achievement? Where are, today, the Arabs of Spain, and
the aboriginal races of America? What treatment are the Christians according to the European
Jews? ... Whatever heights of progress Europe has attained, every one of them has been gained
by its revolt against Christianity... . If Christianity had its old paramount sway in Europe today,
it would have lighted the fire of the Inquisition against such modern scientists as Pasteur and
Koch, and burnt Darwin and others of his school and the stake. 22 [Emphasis mine]
J.M. Roberts noted that in medieval Europe, ‘Popular and official persecution of Muslims,
Jews, and Moriscos (converted Moors) began well before the Reconquest was complete.’ 23 For the
most part, in contrast, Islam allowed Christians to live in peace if they paid a tax (jaziya). As
Roberts notes, ‘even after the Islamic severity awoken by the crusades, Christians in the east
were still practising their own religion and living in communities under their own religious
leaders; at the same moment ruthless intolerance was successfully being imposed in Spain’.
In the style of a mafia, the most brutal of all was the intolerance Christian displayed
towards its own ‘dissenters’. In the previous chapter, I mentioned the Christian massacres in
Béziers. But we must not forget the huge massacre that started on Saint Bartholomew’s Day (24
August 1572). Commencing that day, French Catholics butchered French Protestants
(Huguenots) on a truly great scale. This gory massacre started in Paris with the murder of
Admiral Coligny, a Huguenot leader. Other leaders were subsequently killed. Thereafter, all
Huguenots found anywhere by Catholic mobs were brutally attacked. The massacre continued
into October across the provinces of France. About 70,000 people were killed. ‘Everywhere the
cry was heard, “Kill every man of them! Kill the Huguenots!” The streets were reeking with the
blood of men, women, and children. Not an individual suspected of a leaning towards the
Reformed religion was suffered to escape’. 24
Protestants gained temporary respite through the Edict of Nantes issued by King Henry IV
in 1598. Henry converted to Catholicism to win their hearts, and was able to bring them around
to a position of some tolerance. But his view was not acceptable to fanatic Catholics: a Jesuit by
the name of Ravaillac put an end to him.
Things deteriorated sharply for French Protestants 88 years hence with the revocation, in
1685, of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV. In panic, a huge exodus (le Refuge) of French
Protestants took place to distant places like Canada and the American Colonies. The echo of this
migration was felt a hundred years later through in the First and Second Amendments to the

21 Eric L. Jones and Ian R. Harper in ‘To have and have not’, being an edited extract from Christian Theology and
Market Economics, ed. by Ian R. Harper, and Samuel Gregg, as published in The Australian, April 26-27, 2008.
22 Selected works, p. 532, volume 5.
23 J.M.Roberts (1985).The Triumph of the West. London: Phoenix Press, 2001, p.97.
24 In ‘The Massacre of St. Bartholomew’ by C. H. Spurgeon in Sword and Trowel, April 1866.

184
American Constitution which guaranteed American citizens the right to hold arms. This was
because the American Protestants felt that if they had been allowed by the state in France to
bear arms, the Catholic massacres of Protestants could have been minimised.
[It is worth mentioning in passing that this so-called ‘right’ to bear arms has no basis in the
theory of freedom. After citizens agree to hand over responsibility for their defence to the state,
then their right to bear arms should become limited to small arms to be used for urgent self-
defence. But today, because of this quirk of history – prompted by Christian intolerance –
Americans can buy powerful attack weapons almost as easily they can buy candy. As a result, an
endless series of accidental killings and an excess of homicides and mass killings by the mentally
deranged is rife in ‘free’ America. This is really bad policy without a genuine logical basis in the
theory of freedom.]
Tolerance seems to have emerged as a concept only after Christians started killing
thousands of their own people over the course of time. Only after Christianity had convulsed for
centuries with its self-inflicted wounds – of Inquisitions, massacres, and internecine warfare –
did Christ’s message re-emerge. We can be sure that if Jesus Christ had been born during this
dark period, he would have declined Christianity as his religion. It was the combined work of
many philosophers of freedom (and not the positive work of the Church) that finally exorcised
evil from Christianity. Bertrand Russell summarised this process, thus:
Before the rise of Christianity this persecuting attitude was unknown to the ancient world
except among the Jews. If you read, for example, Herodotus, you find a bland and tolerant
account of the habits of the foreign nations he visited. Sometimes, it is true, a peculiarly
barbarous custom may shock him, but in general he is hospitable to foreign gods and foreign
customs. He is not anxious to prove that people who call Zeus by some other name will suffer
eternal punishment and ought to be put to death in order that their punishment may begin as
soon as possible. This attitude has been reserved for Christians. It is true that the modern
Christian is less robust, but that is not thanks to Christianity; it is thanks to the generations of
freethinkers, who from the Renaissance to the present day have made Christians ashamed of
many of their traditional beliefs. It is amusing to hear the modern Christian telling you how
mild and rationalistic Christianity really is and ignoring the fact that all its mildness and
rationalism is due to the teaching of men who in their own day were persecuted by all orthodox
Christians. 25 [emphasis mine]
It is, however, true that the seeds of tolerance were planted by Christians themselves.
Protestants opposed Catholic intolerance, although that didn’t make them tolerant towards
others, such as Jews. They argued for a right to rebel against tyrants (a pagan Greek principle
revived by St. Aquinas). In particular, ‘[t]he massacre of St. Bartholomew convinced the bulk of
Calvinists of the lawfulness of rebellion against tyrants.’ 26 Numerous philosophers joined the
battle. Comedy, satire and indirect argument were their preferred instruments. Foremost among
these was John Locke, one of the earliest philosophers of tolerance. He argued that Christ’s
teachings favoured tolerance and that therefore, the state must follow a policy of tolerance. As
he said, ‘The toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion is so agreeable to
the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and to the genuine reason of mankind, that it seems monstrous for
men to be so blind as not to perceive the necessity and advantage of it in so clear a light.’ 27 The
West was thus nudged back to pagan philosophical thought and Christ’s views were found
compatible with it.
Voltaire (1694-1778) followed Locke. His commentary on massacres such as those in Béziers
were to prove very influential. [An aside: Robert Ingersoll’s brilliant lecture of 1895 on Voltaire
is worth a read 28]. It is evident that without philosophers like Locke, David Hume and Voltaire
to save Christianity from itself, vast populations in Europe would have almost certainly been

25 Bertrand Russell’s essay of 1930. ‘Has Religion Made Useful Contributions to Civilisation?’ See:
[http://www.positiveatheism.org/hist/russell2.htm]
26 Lord Acton, ‘The History of Freedom in Christianity’, an Address Delivered to the Members of the Bridgnorth

Institute
May 28, 1877 [http://www.acton.org/research/acton/history-of-freedom-in-christianity.php].
27 Locke, John, A Letter Concerning Toleration, 1689, [http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/l/locke/john/l81t/]
28 [http://www.archive.org/details/voltairelecture00ingeiala]

185
decimated through internecine warfare, or have continued with superstition, witchcraft, torture,
and persecution even today.
We must not rest easy even today, though. Religion, including Christianity remains an ever-
present threat to world peace. While the growth of socialist ideas was at least partially
responsible for Nazi fascism (according to Hayek in his Road to Serfdom), at least an equal role
was certainly played by the long-standing Christian hatred of the Jews. Hitler promoted the
message of Christian leaders (recall Martin Luther had promoted such hatred of the Jews) to
perpetrate the most shameful massacres ever seen. According to Yehuda Bauer, ‘[w]ithout
Christian, or traditional anti-Judaism, modern, nationalistic and racial antisemitism would
have been impossible.’ 29
An aside: Debates continue to rage in the literature regarding Hitler’s personal religious
beliefs (or lack thereof). He was certainly not an atheist, and was at least outwardly an active
Christian. Researchers agree that he believed in these fundamentals: ‘God, Christ, the
immortality of the soul, and divine providence.’ 30 He invoked the ‘Almighty God’ frequently in
his speeches and writings. In Mein Kampf he wrote: ‘I believe to-day that my conduct is in
accordance with the will of the Almighty Creator. In standing guard against the Jew I am
defending the handiwork of the Lord.’ 31 Even if it is argued that he was not a devout Christian,
many of his actions can only be explained by a fanatical belief in his God (whoever that was). He
certainly thought that he was doing God’s work by exterminating Jews (and which religion’s
leaders advocated that?). It will be unconscionable to even remotely relate Hitler’s terrors to the
message of Christ, but Christianity is clearly implicated. Clearly we humans don’t allow the gods
to sort out their disputes themselves and rush in ourselves, instead, to help the ‘Lord’ by killing
off those humans we believe shouldn’t belong to Him.
Despite their history, most countries with a preponderance of Christians have by now
become bastions of tolerance and freedom. Reforms do arise in reaction to excesses, it would
appear. In an unfortunate sense, Hitler’s murderous regime did lead to some ‘good’ in the end,
through a great reduction in Christian anti-Semitism.

2.2 Tolerance, and intolerance in Islam

Strange at it may seem today Islam was at one time far more compatible with freedom and
tolerance than Christianity. Unlike Catholics who sought to destroy other religions as well as
other branches of Christianity, Islam had this policy of non-interference with religions in non-
Arabic lands provided followers of those religions paid the jaziya. Indeed, Christian groups
fighting each other often welcomed Islamic rule, for then they could buy peace. Muslims were (at
least then) particularly protective of the Christians and Jews, being ‘people of the book’, thus
‘deserving protection’ 32. (Hindus, being deemed to be idol-worshippers from a superficial
understanding of their practices, did not fare as well. Thus while churches were simply taken
over and converted into mosques, Hindu temples were actually knocked down, and in some cases
rebuilt as mosques.)
In general, though, where Islam ruled, all other religious denominations survived (and
continue to do so) despite sporadic massacres by fanatic Islamic rulers. On the other hand, not
only were the Greek pagan religions wiped out by Christians, no trace of Islam was left in
Spanish Cordoba after it Christians re-conquered it. Thus, ‘Never was the annihilation of a
people more complete than that of the Morisco-Spaniards’ (Washington Irving 33). On the other
hand, despite repetitive brutal Christian acts against Muslims, Emperor Mehmet II (1432-1481)

29 Bauer, Yehuda, ‘Genocide: Was It the Nazis' Original Plan?, in Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, Vol. 450, (Jul., 1980), p. 36.
30 Carrier, Richard C., ‘”Hitler's Table Talk”: Troubling Finds’, German Studies Review, Vol. 26, No. 3, Oct., 2003, p.

573.
31 James Murphy translation of Mein Kampf by Adolf Hitler, at [http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks02/0200601.txt]
32 Akhavi, Shahrough, ‘Islam and the West in World History’, in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3, (Jun., 2003),
pp. 548.
33 Irving, Washington, The Alhambra, Chapter 7: The Hall of Ambassadors, eBooks, University of Adelaide, 2004.

[http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/i/irving/washington/i72a/part7.html]

186
of the Islamic Ottoman empire ‘made no effort to expel Christians in the manner that Spain had
expelled Muslims. Instead, he created space for the Church.’ 34 Islamic ‘generosity’ towards other
religions was truly exceptional for those primitive times. Even in 1914 (after 600 years of Islamic
rule), ‘22 per cent of Constantinople was Orthodox Christian, 25 per cent Armenian and four per
cent Jewish.’ (CITE)
No doubt, as a result of the economic pressure of the jaziya the poor were predominantly
forced to convert to Islam. But it is also true that in converting millions of people across Asia to
Islam, far less violence was used than by the early and medieval Church. In addition, as we have
already seen, Islam helped to preserve Greek knowledge. But why did Islam regress into
primitive tribalism after such a (relatively) good start? A few explanations are possible.
It appears that the Islamic scholar Muhammad al-Ghazali (1058-1111) who propounded a
very narrow view of Mohammed’s message, was the main cause of Islam’s descent. Mainstream
Islam thereafter looked upon Greek literature as incompatible with Islam, indeed heretical;
Islam soon cut off its links with Greed thought. While Ibn Rushd (whom we have met earlier)
challenged al-Ghazali’s views, he was only temporarily successful. Thus:
Ibn Rushd attacked al-Ghazali’s book, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, an attempt to
synthesise mainstream (Ash’arite) theological views and Sufism. Entitling his own work The
Incoherence of the Incoherence, ibn Rushd wrote that al-Ghazali misunderstood philosophical
discourse and misused its concepts in an unsuccessful effort to demolish their arguments. Ibn
Rushd broadened his criticisms by saying that theologians and mystics lacked knowledge of
scientific methodology and discursive logic and so must stop trying to control philosophical
research. 35
Benazir Bhutto thought that the decline of Islam started after the 1258 end of the Abbasid
Empire (Baghdad). According to her, ‘The fall of the Abbassid Empire to the Mongols brought in
a period of tyranny from which the Muslim world has yet to escape. This political tyranny was
accompanied by religious tyranny. The gates of ijtihad (interpretation of the Quoran -CHECK)
were closed, and emphasis was put on memorising the Quoran and studying what
interpretations already existed.’ 36
Indeed, the story of Islam after 1258 is a story of Mongol supremacy and the revival of tribal
attitudes in Islam. Many Mongol clans converted to Islam in the 13th and 14th centuries and
exercised great influence on the future of Islam. This was a different culture, though, without
significant intellectual inquiry. The warrior Mughals, who combined the Persian, Arabic, and
Mongol cultures, soon took over vast areas in Asia and accumulated untold resources and
wealth. This wealth soon led to decadence and stagnation. While there were still a few Islamic
intellectuals, Islam reverted to the primitive tribal cultures that Mohammed had wanted to
reform; Islamic ‘thought’ soon feel into the hands of fanatic Mullahs. Even the great reformer,
Emperor Akbar, who proposed an eclectic religion based on mutual respect, was branded a
heretic (after his death). Aurangzeb thereafter destroyed whatever little good name Islam had
built in India.
Today, Islamic leadership relies heavily on terrorist activity as a means of self-expression.
This is surely the period when Islam is at its lowest stage of intellectual development. Clearly
Islam must clamp down on the vicious terrorism sprouting from inside its bowels, or it could well
face the prospect of alienating the entire world, and being wiped out through intellectual decay.
There is no place in the world today for mindless killings of the kind that Islam seems to
condone. As Benazir Bhutto had pointed out, Islam must now sheathe its sword and learn to
respect other viewpoints. I’m not entirely despondent, though, about Islam. Given Christianity’s
history of reform, there is no need to despair about Islam and its future role in the world. If
Christianity could reform itself after 1500 years to become a supporter of freedom and tolerance,
there is no reason why Islam can’t reform.

34 M.J.Akbar. The Shade of Swords. Roli collection. 2003, p. 110.

35 Akhavi, Shahrough, ‘Islam and the West in World History’, in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3, (Jun., 2003), p.
550.
36 Bhutto, Benazir, Reconciliation, London: Simon & Schuster, 2008, pp. 45-6.

187
 The humanisation of Islam has, in some ways, already begun. The fanaticism of madmen
like Osama bin Laden is putting off most followers in Islam. They are slowly gravitating towards
the message of freedom and tolerance. Enlightened Muslims are increasingly insisting that the
Koran forbids the killing of innocents and condemning terrorism committed in the name of
Islam. But there remains considerable scope for the Muslim community to do more to improve
its image. It needs to teach its children the path of peace. It also needs to excommunicate Islamic
terrorists and hand them to the police. As Gandhi noted, in 1926, ‘The sword is too much in
evidence among Mussalmans. It must be sheathed if Islam is to be what it means – peace.’ 37

2.3 Tolerance, and intolerance in Hinduism

Some people consider Hinduism to be particularly tolerant. Thus, in 1958 Max Weber wrote:
‘It is an undoubted fact that in India, religions and philosophical thinkers were able to enjoy
perfect, nearly absolute freedom for a long period. The freedom of thought in ancient India was
so considerable as to find no parallel in the west before the most recent age.’ 38
I have no doubt that in comparison to the brutality of some other religions, the Indian
religions of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism, among others, did not resort to violence or
economic coercion to convert others to their beliefs. While some internecine battles in Hinduism
degenerated into violence, these were the exceptions rather than the rule (I disagree with the
view expressed in a 1925 encyclopaedia that ‘though Hinduism is eminently eclectic and
tolerant, disputes between rival sectarians, ending in bloodshed are not uncommon’. 39 Most such
disputes were clearly intellectual with no physical harm caused). It is widely accepted that a
range of alternative worldviews happily co-existed in ancient India. Also, refugees from other
religions almost always found shelter in India. Thus, the Zoroastrians who migrated to India
from Persia on the arrival of Muslims thrived in their new land. Early Christians, who trace
their teachings directly to Christ’s apostle, St. Thomas, who is believed to have taught in south
India, were not persecuted in India, either. Instead, it was the Portuguese, who upon their
arrival in India 1400 years later, declared these early Christians to be heretics and destroyed
many of their vital documents. It can thus be reasonably argued that Hindu traditions have been
generally tolerant towards other beliefs, with the typical Hindu of the view that ‘Truth is one,
though sages call it by different names’.
But while Hinduism has been tolerant in its dealings with other beliefs, it has displayed
significant intolerance towards some of its own people – the so-called ‘untouchables’. While the caste
system was not hereditary in Vedic times, things changed for the worse after that. While the
untouchables were not massacred (at least not en-masse), they were treated with the kind of
contempt perhaps reserved for slaves. Even today, Hinduism has not abolished the caste system.
In addition, over the past 100 years of so, many Hindus have become increasingly intolerant
towards other faiths, particularly Islam and Christianity. Instead of the Hinduism becoming a role
model for tolerance to the rest of the world, is rarely displays such characteristics, as seen from the
discussion to be outlined below.
Mixing religion with politics, and chronic communal violence in India
Most Muslim rulers in India did not endear themselves to Hindus. Some of them destroyed.
Others forcibly converted Hindus to Islam, albeit only in a few cases. Hindu political leaders in
the earlier part of the 20th century became aggressive after it became clear that Islam’s power would
reduce in independent, democratic India. Perhaps they thought that their time to exact revenge had
come. The new political scene was actually the first major test of Hindu tolerance after many
centuries. It was crucial for (allegedly) tolerant Hindus to embrace their brethren who had been

37 Cited in Louis Fischer The Essential Gandhi. Edited by Louis Fisher. Vintage Books. New York. 1962. p. 211;
originally in Young India, December 30, 1926.
38 Weber, Max, The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism, New York: The Free Press, 1958. [CHECK

FROM ORIGINAL BOOK]

39 W. Crooke, in his entry on Hinduism in the Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics ed. James Hastings, 1925, T&T

Clark. Vol. 6 p. 709.

188
forced to convert to Islam (primarily through the economic pressure of the jaziya), and to assure
them of an equal status after India became democratic.
Simultaneously, the British rulers decided to build, in their own self-interest, a
counterweight against the National Congress. This they did by promoting the Muslim League
(that was founded in 1906). The Muslim League did not need much promotion, of course, for
many Muslims had formed the view, based on their interpretation of the acts of various
Congress leaders, that it was primarily a Hindu body. For instance, many Congress started
demanding a ban on cow slaughter, a clear imposition of their religious beliefs on the affairs of
the state. Bal Gandadhar Tilak, likely in innocence, made things worse by glorifying Shivaji’s
actions purely from a Hindu perspective. In one of Tilak’s works, Shivaji speaks thus:
I protect the cow as my mother
She is the foundation of life, the giver of strength
…Yet these people, they take mother cow away
they lead her to the butcher, they have her slaughtered. 40
‘[A] vague Hindu aura pervaded much of the nationalist agitation because of the use of
Hindu symbols, idioms, and myths.’ 41 This clamour from Hindu leaders that India be structured
around their personal religious belief system led Muslims to expect the worst about their status
in independent India. Not that Congress leaders were fanatic Hindus, but that is the impression
they seem to have created on their Muslims colleagues.
Indeed, the Congress did make special overtures to Muslims to ease their concerns through
the 1916 Lucknow Pact. However, this Pact went overboard and promised a disproportionate
share of seats to Muslims in future assemblies (Jinnah was a member both of the Congress and
Muslim League at that time 42). Some Hindu Congressmen wanted to abandon the Pact,
believing it to be an appeasement of the minorities. Such discontent led to the creation of the
Hindu Mahasabha (date of formation not clear: between 1909 and in 1917) by Madan Mohan
Malaviya, followed in 1925 by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), founded by K.B.
Hedgewar. The initial pleasantries between Congress and the Muslim League didn’t last long.
They were to separate totally, under unpleasant circumstances, in 1937 (as we shall soon see).
A cycle of mutual fear among different religious communities therefore escalated in this
period. Gandhi made a call for Ram Rajya; but in the increasingly charged atmosphere, his
approach of bringing spirituality into politics merely exacerbated the situation.
In the most spiritual area on earth, it was inevitable that the freedom struggle should take on
the guise of a religious crusade, and Gandhi had made it one… Inevitably, unintentionally,
Gandhi’s Congress Party movement began to take on a Hindu tone and colour that aroused
Moslem suspicions. 43
The rapid growth of Hindu political organisations strengthened this fear. A vicious cycle had set
in, from which India has not yet recovered. By the 1920s, ‘Abu’l Kalam Azad and the Jamiyyat
were already advocating the division of India’ 44 with self-governing institutions for Muslims.
Furious communal rioting soon broke out across India. Religion and politics got inextricably
intertwined, and remain so till today.
This disruption among the two communities continued. In December, 1930 Sir Muhammad
Iqbal, presiding over a Muslim League session, proposed the amalgamation of India’s four
Muslim majority states into one. We should note, however, that this suggestion, divisive as it
was, was not in the same league as asking for two separate nations. This is very important. It
was, instead, Rahmat Ali, then a law student in Cambridge University who, in January 1933,

40 Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s ‘Shivaji’s Utterances’, cited in Jasper, Daniel, ‘Commemorating the "Golden Age" Of Shivaji

In Maharashtra, India and the Development of Maharashtrian Public Politics’, Journal of Political and Military
Sociology, Winter 2003 .
41 Chandra, Bipin, India’s Struggle for Independence, New Delhi: Penguin, 1989, p.410.
42 Hardy, P., The Muslims of British India, 1972, p. 187.
43 Lapierre, Dominique, and Larry Collins, Freedom at Midnight, 1997 (2003 reprint), New Delhi, Vikas Publishing

House, p.32.
44 Hardy, P., The Muslims of British India, 1972, p. 195.

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was the first to put forth the two-nation idea. He gave the new proposed nation-state the name
Pakistan. But – and this is important to note, as well – almost no Muslim bought into this idea.
At least till 1937, the vast majority of Indian Muslims remained convinced they should remain
part of one nation.
[W]hen Muslim politicians came to fight the first elections to be held under the 1935 Act, the
fought them with the same assumptions as did the other parties to those elections, namely that
India would remain constitutionally united, albeit under a federation, and that Muslims would
continue to live as fellow-citizens of non-Muslims all over the sub-continent. Indeed, in many
spheres of policy Muslim politicians went into the elections determined to prove how much
Muslims shared with their fellow-countrymen.
Enter Muhammad Ali Jinnah finally – and in a big way. Jinnah had initially opposed the
formation of the Muslim League (in 1906 45) and also opposed separate electorates for Hindus
and Muslims. But by 1916 he had become the Muslim voice in the Lucknow Pact with its
separate electorates. Objecting to Gandhi’s civil disobedience strategies (and feeling humiliated
by him at times), he finally left the Congress, in 1920. 46 Soon becoming a politically irrelevant
person (even Muslims ignored him, preferring to work with the Congress) he ended up as a
recluse in England 47 by 1931. But then things changed as three key persons: Aga Khan (the
founding President of Muslim League), Rahmat Ali and Muhammad Iqbal persuaded him to
return to India in 1935. By now he was fully based in favour of a two nation theory, although he
did try to cooperate with the Congress and seek adjustments with various Muslim parties.
His Muslim League fared badly in the 1937 elections, however, securing only 109 of the 482
seats that were reserved for Muslims. Thereafter, the ‘Congress proceeded to read the Muslim
politicians of the United Provinces, the province where historically Muslims had considered
themselves the natural aristocracy, a lesson in the power of elected majorities’ 48 This is what
happened: Jinnah sought a face-saving agreement with Congress to allow the League to
participate in a coalition government. Unfortunately, Nehru’s Congress would have none of his
compromises. Nehru asked the Muslim League to disband itself before he could accommodate
Jinnah’s request. Jinnah was furious. Muslims across India took this affront to be a sign of the
arrogance that Hindus would display in democratic India. Hindu majoritarianism was a reality
that was simply unacceptable to the Muslims. Jinnah exploded. ‘We are not going to be camp
followers or a subject race of a Hindu Raj’, 49 he said.
Deepak Pandey argues that the ‘Muslim[s]… felt betrayed and humiliated, and in opposition
took every opportunity to make public the wrongs, real or fictitious, suffered by the Muslims
under Congress rule. No doubt, Nehru, seeing the circumstances and problems faced by the
country, acted correctly; yet the consequences of the rejection to enter into a coalition with the
League were worse.’ 50 Greater strategic foresight was called for, but it did not emerge, creating a
crisis that split India. But initially, despite the deep souring of Hindu-Muslim relations, Jinnah
did not publicly call for two nations to be formed.
It was the Hindus who latched on to this theory. During the 1937 annual session of the
Hindu Mahsabha in Calcutta, V.D. Savarkar (an atheist, noting that atheists can well be
Hindus) stated: ‘Let us bravely face unpleasant facts as they are. India cannot be assumed today
to be a unitarian and homogeneous nation, but on the contrary there are two nations in the
main; the Hindus and the Moslems, in India. 51 This was the first public expression of the two-
nation theory on a major political platform. Golwalkar of RSS expressed strong support through
his 1939 book We in which he said:

45 Chandra, Bipin, India’s Struggle for Independence, New Delhi: Penguin, 1989, p.432.
46 Noorani, A.G., Assessing Jinnah, Frontline, Aug 13 - 26, 2005.
47 Hardy, P., The Muslims of British India, 1972, p. 223.
48 Hardy, P., The Muslims of British India, 1972, p. 225.
49 Indian Annual Register, 1937, Vol. I, Calcutta Session, 27, 28 December 1937, reported in Pandey, Deepak,

‘Congress-Muslim League Relations 1937-39: “The Parting of the Ways”’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1978),
p. 634n.
50 Pandey, Deepak, ‘Congress-Muslim League Relations 1937-39: “The Parting of the Ways”’, Modern Asian Studies,

Vol. 12, No. 4 (1978), p. 635.

51 Nichols, Verdict on India, 1944, p.185.

190
 The foreign races in Hindusthan must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn
to respect and hold in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no ideas but those of
glorification of the Hindu race and culture ... or may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to
the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment-
not even citizen’s right. 52 [Note that We has now been officially proscribed by the RSS 53.]
Jinnah was wedged into a tight corner. It is not surprising therefore (with lack of support
from the Congress, and virulent opposition from fanatic Hindus) that Jinnah’s Muslim League
made its infamous 23 March 1940 ‘Pakistan’ resolution in Lahore, demanding two nations.
Supporters of Jinnah could well argue that he made the right choice, for after independence
Hindu religion has got deeply mixed with politics in India (e.g. the 1992 demotion of the Babri
Masjid and subsequent mass killings of Muslims across India). Of course Pakistan and
Bangladesh have not protected the Hindus in their nations, either (which is to be expected given
that Islam has lost its tolerant nature a long time ago). In any event, a mere student’s proposal
of 1933 did not became a political fiat accompli until both Hindu and Muslim fanatics got behind
it. No side was without blame.
What happened next had very significant effects, including on the future of my immediate
family. Half a million people lost their lives during its India’s partition. Tens of thousands more
were to lose their lives subsequently in the wars between India and Pakistan, in frequent bursts
of communal violence across India, in the suppression of Hindus in Pakistan, and in Kashmir. In
recent decades, people affiliated to rabid Hindu groups (the Sangha Parivar including RSS, VHP
and the Bajrang Dal) have indulged in a range of criminal activity against Muslims. Fanatic
‘Hindu’ politicians (including members of Congress (I)) have not been averse to provoking riots
against Muslims. The Indian police, largely made of up Hindus, has also, at times, often
committed significant atrocities against Muslims during controlling riots. Official reports
released after investigating communal riots speak for themselves. 54 To therefore claim that
Hinduism is a tolerant religion, overlooking its increasing aggressiveness, will misrepresent the
truth.
Since India’s independence, its Muslims have largely been law-abiding (although immersed
in intellectual obscurantism). But the increasing levels of Hindu intolerance, combined with the
chronic intolerance already found in Islam and other religions, has converted India into a
seething cauldron of tension where from which violence erupts ferociously at unpredictable
intervals. I’d like to pause for a moment here to remember the hundreds of thousands who have
been killed and maimed in mindless religious violence, which remains a painful feature of
modern India. Hindus simply can’t walk away from all responsibility for the amount of
bloodshed India has witnessed in the past hundred years. Sadly, India is not an exceptional
country in this regard. Violence and intolerance are the norm in human societies, not the
exception. Only recently have liberal societies emerged. India is struggling very hard to become
one.
Proselytisation
A different, but perhaps equally important, test of tolerance is a religion’s approach towards
proselytisation. A free society must permit its citizens to preach and convert others to their views.
Thus, Hindus are usually permitted by Christianity-dominated Western societies to not only build
their temples but to proselytise and convert Western people, if they so wish. Indeed, the Hare Rama
Hare Krishna movement and other Indians ‘gurus’ have regularly converted Western citizens.
However, Hindus are generally not so tolerant (or if they were in the past, are no longer so) (Box
ZZZ).

52 Golwalkar, M.S. We, or Our Nationhood Defined, Nagpur: Bharat Publications, p. 35, cited in Islam, Shamsul, ‘RSS

and the Raj’, in Puniyani, Ram, Religion, Power and Violence: Expression of Politics in Contemporary Times, SAGE,
2005, Google Books. Note that there is a slightly different version of this quotation in Chandra, Bipin, India’s Struggle
for Independence, New Delhi: Penguin, 1989, p.437.7
53 Mukul, Akshaya, ‘RSS officially disowns Golwalkar's book’, Times of India, 9 Mar 2006
[http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/RSS_officially_disowns_Golwalkars_book/articleshow/msid-1443606,curpg-
2.cms]
54 Some illustrative case studies at: [http://www.liberalpartyofindia.sabhlokcity.com/communal/riots.html]

191
 Box ZZZ
Proselytisation and conversion
Many Indians take pride that large numbers of people across the world have converted
to Buddhism – a religion stared by an Indian in India. In an article in the Times in 1896,
Vivekananda was quoted thus: ‘India was once a great missionary power. Hundreds of
years before England was converted to Christianity, Buddha sent out missionaries to
convert the world of Asia to his doctrine.’ 55 Elsewhere, he said: ‘Buddhists never killed, but
converted three quarters of the world at one time by pure gentleness.’ 56
Indians also take pride in the spread of Hinduism to places like Thailand, Cambodia,
and Indonesia. Even within India, local tribal groups were steadily converted to Hinduism
over thousands of years. In this process, Hinduism has actually assimilated and evolved,
often becoming eclectic. For instance, in Thailand a new Ayodhya (Ayutthaya) came up
near Bangkok. ‘The god-kings of Ayutthaya and their people incorporated many beliefs and
practices of Hinduism, Mahayanan Buddhism, ancient Thai spiritism, Mon occultism, and
Chinese mysticism and ancestor worship into their religion.’ 57 Despite these differences,
Hindus of India do take pride in their having infuenced the world far away from India’s
shores.
While Hindus seem to enjoy influencing or converting others, they don’t like being
influenced by others. Thus Gandhi strongly objected to proselytism, telling a missionary
nurse in an interview (on May 11, 1935) that: ‘If I had power and could legislate, I should
certainly stop all proselytising.’ 58 [This phobia about getting converted us is not merely
found among Hindus, of course. Even Christians prefer to convert than to be converted.
The ‘pope has spoken out repeatedly against the efforts of evangelical Protestants to
convert Catholics.’ 59 What’s good for the goose is clearly not good for the gander!]
Vivekananda apparently took a similar view. For instance, in an article in Des Moines
News (28 November 1893) he is reported to have said: ‘I have often been asked in this
country [USA] if I am going to try to convert the people here. I take this for an insult. I do
not believe in this idea of conversion. Today we have a sinful man; tomorrow according to
your idea he is converted and by and by attains unto holiness. Whence comes this
change?’ 60 Consistent with his views, he declined to convert anyone. He wrote in a letter in
May 1894: ‘I was never a missionary, nor ever would be one’. 61
But his overall views seem to have been compatible with liberty – for he also said that he
did not oppose anyone trying to convert Hindus. He therefore tolerated proselytisation. In
an article in The Detroit Free Press in 1894, he is quoted as having said: ‘I belong to the Hindu
religion... We never indulged in missionary work. The fundamental principles of our religion
forbid that. Nor do we say anything against any missionaries whom you send from this
country [USA] anywhere.’62 A question was put to him by The Hindu, Madras, in February
1897: ‘Question: Does the spirit of Hinduism permit the proselytism of strangers into it?’ He
replied, unambiguously: ‘Proselytism is tolerated by Hinduism.’63 (He did harbour concerns
about specific Christian missionaries, concerns which he raised in some of his letters.).
Overall, this is a perfectly reasonable position: we may not like something but we choose to
live with it as long as it does not harm us physically.
We must side with Vivekananda against Gandhi on this matter. Freedom of expression
must necessarily include freedom of speech, and that includes freedom to preach. Religious

55 The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1989 [1990], vol 5, p.191.
56 The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1989 [1990], vol. 7, p. 43.
57 The History of Ayutthaya: Social & Political Developments. [http://www.jack-wallace.com/g8social_t3_03.htm]
58 The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 61, pages 46-47.
59 Kevin Sullivan, in a Washington Post Foreign Service report on Sunday, July 28, 2002
[http://www.preventgenocide.org/prevent/news-monitor/2002july.htm]
60 The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1989 [1990], vol. 3 p.483.
61 The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1989 [1990], vol. 7 p.467.
62 The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1989 [1990], vol. 7, p.287.
63 The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1989 [1990], vol. 5, p.208-09.

192
 freedom means letting everyone choose their own religion. Conversion is merely a ‘contract’
that confirms that someone has now ‘purchased’ a new supplier of spiritual services. Just
as we must remain free to switch allegiance from one coffee shop to another, we must
remain free to switch our religions – or to not have one at all. Most theistic religions claim
that there is one God, so different religions presumably supply the same God (coffee) in
different receptacles. It is incomprehensible why anyone should become so excited if
someone changes his or her supplier of God. As long the sales pitch has been made in good
faith and the offer has been accepted voluntarily, we can surely have nothing to say about
a religious conversion.
Not only should everyone be free to convert others, but free to convert to as many religions
as we want. To claim that the poor cannot make reasoned choices in such matters is
untenable. We should presumably stop the poor from voting, as well! Gratuitous accusations
about other’s inability to think sensibly for themselves are not supported by fact. And so, what
Justinus Febronius (1701-1790) said is worth remembering:
God is all powerful. God is able to lay down certain laws of science which hold good for all
people at all times and under all conditions. If follows that it would have been easy for
Him, had he desired to do so, to guide the minds of men in such a fashion that they all of
them would have had the same opinions upon the subject of religion. We know that He did
not do anything of the sort. Therefore, we act against the express will of God if we try to
coerce others by force to believe that which we ourselves hold to be true. 64
Preventing unethical practices
While a right (or privilege) to preach and convert others must always be staunchly
defended in the free society, it must be tempered by morality. Conversions must be
motivated and conducted in good faith. Fraud is unconscionable and unacceptable, even in
a matter that is as tenuous as spiritual matters are. Ultimately, religious organisations are
a business for spiritual services and have no liberty to commit fraud. All missionary work
must diligently exclude the use of magic tricks, opportunistic exploitation or direct bribery.
Indeed, if religion and morality are so dramatically divorced (as they are in many cases of
religious conversion in India), then the very basis of religion collapses. Misleading or
deceptive conduct including the spread of hatred towards particular religions or their
god/s, must be prohibited, and punished.
Moral religions would presumably have no objection to such regulation of conversions
for ethical conduct. For no one can guarantee that all priests or missionaries are without
blame. Similarly, Hindus can’t guarantee that some crazy Hindu won’t murder Gandhi,
nor can Muslims guarantee that murders like Osama bin Laden won’t arise from their
midst.
In this contentious area, co-regulation may be a better solution than state-imposed
rules. This could be in the form of a Code of Conduct agreed by all religious bodies, which
the state agrees to enforce. This may include a requirement for all conversions to be vetted
by an independently certified process. Conversions could be registered by an All Faith
Integrity Assurance Body. This requirement would, of course, only apply to conversions,
i.e. not to ‘original’ beliefs. Both mass conversions and conversions of people below the age
of 18 would also need to be disallowed.
In closing this section, one would suggest that if Hinduism does with to make claims
about its tolerance, it will definitely need to given other religions the freedom to preach
and convert Hindus – albeit under a regime of ethical constraints.
Hinduism as a potential reason for corruption in India
I’d now like to digress into a controversial topic that militates against my main thesis about
corruption in India. I have argued in BFN that India is corrupt because its model of governance
fosters corruption. Some people have suggested, however, that Hinduism itself fosters corruption.

64 Van Loon, p. 295. Van Loon hasn’t provided citations, so it is possible that Febronius is not being quoted verbatim

here.

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Thus both N. Vittal and S.S. Gill suggest that Hindus take corruption rather lightly. For example,
N. Vittal notes:
Any number of examples are given in the puranas where a sinner having led a life of sin can get
redemption by taking the name of Lord Narayana in his last moments as in the case of Ajamila. In
social terms this has come to be accepted. People who lived a life of sin like the prodigal sons return
to the straight and narrow path at some stage usually late in life. The sholka Vridha nari pativrata
vridha veshya tapaswani probably represents the cynical acceptance of how people change in life
from vice to virtue.
At another level, the very basis of Hinduism which believes in rebirth shows that every soul is given
innumerable opportunities to improve itself on its onward path. There may be set backs for sins
committed but then virtue is also earned. This endless cycle of birth and death leads to the ultimate
goal of Moksha. The emphasis of our saints on getting out of the birth and death cycle also is an
attempt to persuade people to come to the right path as early as possible. Punarapi jananam
punarapi maranam punarapi jananai jathare sayanam iha samsare bahu dustare kripaya pare pahi
murare said Adi Shankara in Bhaja Govindam reflecting the toils of repeated births and death. 65
S.S. Gill notes that ‘the numerous deviant actions of …[Hindu] gods are an integral part of
Hindu folklore. And it is reasonable to infer that their influence on public morality could not be very
wholesome. Such incidents, and there are any number of them, were bound to lower the importance
of means used in achieving one’s ends. And coupled with a relatively relaxed concept of sin, their
overall impact on social ethics was to enlarge the areas of permissiveness.’66
Hinduism allows sins to be washed off merely by taking a dip in the Ganges or by bribing god/s
in the temple. Such easy forgiveness of evil sits uneasily with the theory of karma, but is widely
accepted. Chapter 1 noted that Srimad Bhagavatam talks about saama, the process of pacifying;
daana, the process of giving money in charity; bheda, the principle of divide and rule; and
danda, the principle of punishment. 67 Later, Vivekananda commented on these principles
favourably. These principles were also emphasised in Kautilya’s Arthashastra in a slightly
different form: as sama, dama, bheda, danda. I suspect that dama is somewhat similar to daana –
or to incentivise others to do something for oneself in return (daana is one-sided gift, without
expectation of an return, so it is not quite the same thing as dama). This overall model can be
translated into: persuade, provide economic incentive, divide and rule, and punish. The problem is
that providing economic incentives can, without ethical self-restraint, lead to bribery!
Vivekananda asked: ‘Is not doing work, though mixed with good and evil, better than doing
nothing and passing an idle and inactive life, and being like stones?’68 In other words, even evil
action is presumably preferable to no action! a view that all sensible people would strongly oppose.
He did caution thus: ‘Show your heroism; apply, according to circumstances, the fourfold political
maxims of conciliation, bribery, sowing dissensions, and open war, to win over your adversary and
enjoy the world – then you will be Dharmika (righteous)…. Of course, do not do any wrong, do no
injure or tyrannise over anyone, but try to do good to others as much as you can.’69 (Note: This
citation suggests that one of India’s major Hindu gurus preached bribery. I suspect that this is a
mistranslation, given its inconsistency with Vivekananda’s overall message.).
Overall, such things may suggest that India is particularly prone to corruption. And such
arguments, if used without the condition that Vivekananda suggested: of doing good, could well
become a recipe for immorality. Enlightened Hindus do claim that Hinduism is a highly ethical
religion. And I know many of my relatives have been exemplars of ethical behaviour. Maybe the
solution is for corrupt Hindus (and communal fanatics and killers) to be excommunicated from
Hinduism and handed over to the police. Then of course there would be no confusion about whether
Hinduism is a cause, in itself, of India’s chronic corruption.

65 Paper presented by N. Vittal at Institute of Secretariat Training and Management, New Delhi, on 8 January2002,
[http://cvc.nic.in/vscvc/cvcspeeches/sp9jan02.pdf]
66 Gill, S.S., The Pathology of Corruption, New Delhi: HarperCollins, 1998, p.8-9.
67 [http://srimadbhagavatam.com/7/5/19/en]
68 Complete woks, p. 451, vol 5
69 The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1989 [1990], vol 5, p. 448.

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3. Conclusion
Religious reformers have arisen throughout history to take religion back to its basics. For
example, Swami Vivekananda wrote about freedom, thus:
I disagree with the idea that freedom is obedience to the laws of nature. ... According to the history
of human progress, it is disobedience to nature that has constituted that progress. ... I never saw a
cow steal. An oyster never told a lie. Yet they are not greater than man. This life is a tremendous
assertion of freedom; and this obedience to law, carried far enough, would make us simply matter
[inert] – either in society, or in politics, or in religion. Too many laws are a sure sign of death.
Wherever in any society there are too many laws, it is a sure sign that that society will soon die. If
you study the characteristics of India, you will find that no nation possesses so many laws as the
Hindus, and national death is the result. But the Hindus had one peculiar idea – they never made
any doctrines or dogmas in religion; and the latter has had the greatest growth. 70
It is not obvious whether this represents the views of Hindu scriptures. Nevertheless,
these interpretations open the door to a more free, modern society in India. Belated
realisations about freedom have recently been articulated by the Church, as well. For
instance, the Declaration of Religious Freedom by Pope Paul VI in 1965 says, among other
things:
… the human person has a right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all men are
to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or of social groups and of any human
power, in such wise that no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own
beliefs, whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within
due limits. … This right of the human person to religious freedom is to be recognized in
the constitutional law whereby society is governed and thus it is to become a civil right.
In general it is high time for religions to stop their aggression towards other worldviews and
revert to the ethical behaviour their founders taught. They are entitled to advertise and write
about themselves and preach their views but they have no right to behave unethically, or
violently, or to break the rule of law.
As for myself, the position I have arrived at after surveying religion is to distance from all
religious institutions. I find them secretive, undemocratic, and opaque. I prefer to remain an
empathetic agnostic – I empathise with both theistic and atheistic beliefs; I understand why
people may need a clear position about God, but I can’t rationally find evidence of the soul,
spirit, ghosts, or ‘creator’. Hence I can’t conclude whether God exists or not. One thing is sure as
well: I can’t prove that God doesn’t exist, either. I find it necessary, however, to continue to hope
for a benevolent God, and have sporadically (and shamelessly!) prayed when it suits my needs –
without worrying about ‘whose’ God I could be praying to (if God does exist!). Mr. God (or Ms.
God, or simply God, whichever is the case) had better have good ears and an open mind. I know
that such an act is likely to prove immensely futile. But it is like the child who talks to a doll:
quite harmless.
Most of us have a deep need for faith in something beyond and bigger than us, and I
sometimes experience that need, when Tagore’s words come to me: ‘Born in this great world, full
of the mystery of the infinite, we cannot accept our existence as a momentary outburst of chance,
drifting on the current of matter towards an eternal nowhere.’ 71 But despite my sporadic
prayers, of one thing I remain very clear, that neither I or any other human being ‘represents’
God in any way – nor can. The laws of nature cannot be overcome simply by our wishful
thinking. If anyone has evidence otherwise, please contact the James Randi Educational
Foundation with your claims. I do find the morality preached by religious founders to be
(generally) sound and worth imbibing. I am happy, therefore, to extract the best out of religions
while keeping aside their evil qualities, which are many. Religion has possibly passed its ‘use by’
date. Maybe. But man’s spiritual quest will not pass away, of that one is sure.

70 The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1989 [1990], vol 5 p. 287.
71 Tagore, Rabindranath, ‘My School, lecture delivered in America, Personality, London: MacMillan, 1933.

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Chapter 9 The pillar of limited powers

‘Real Swaraj will come not by the acquisition of authority by a few but by the acquisition of the
capacity by all to resist authority when abused. In other words, Swaraj is to be attained by
educating the masses to a sense of their capacity to regulate and control authority.’ – Gandhi 1

Propositions 4 and 5 in Chapter 4 spoke outlined the concepts of the fortress and social
contract though which we give the government a monopoly over the use of force and hand over
the defence of our body and property to it. We also empower it to act as the arbiter or judge of
our actions, should our these be questioned.
Historically, the move towards the modern social contract went through a number of stages.
As a first step we had to find a strong sovereign to defend us from never-ending warfare. This
was the Leviathan. This happened through a move from tribalism (including early forms of
monarchy) to feudalism. But the moment found a strong sovereign we faced the threat of
tyranny. Thus, feudalism also converted (in places) collectivism such as socialism and fascism,
with many regressive interludes between 1850 (publication of the Communist Manifesto) and
1989 (end of the Cold War).
It has always been very hard to hold governments to account. In the meanwhile, from the
fifteenth century, the seeds of individualism and capitalism started sprouting, leading
ultimately in some places like England to modern liberal democracy. A number of steps
occurred: reduced linkages between religion and the state, and disbanding the ‘divine right’ of
kings; reducing inherited privilege and political power; and creating parliaments with some
representation. Initially the parliaments only represented powerful men (indigent white men,
women, and blacks, could not find representation). But in due course the universal franchise was
extended. All this was not going to be enough, for even representative democratically elected
governments can fail to protect life and liberty. And so, constitutional safeguards arose: ‘If the
majority could be trusted with its power, ... safeguards would be unnecessary. Since it cannot be
so trusted, its freedom must be curtailed for the very sake of freedom’ 2 (Hans J. Morgenthau). To
prevent democracies from degenerating into majority-rule mobocracies, rival interests were
created to check and balance each other. A watchful and vigilant citizenry is an invariable
component of democratic self-governance. As a result, where good democratic institutions exist it
is now difficult for people to accumulate excessive power over others.
Obviously not all the stylised stages outlined above actually occurred in each society. In this
chapter I will explore how the Leviathan was tamed. The next chapter will examine the
development of democracy.

1. Conceptions about the proper role of government

To be able to hold a government to account, we first need to clarify its role. Initially
governments acted as our ‘rulers’, assuming limitless power. The modern concept of government
is far more limited. How did change in role come about?

1.1 The social contract and strong state

Propositions 4 and 5 in Chapter 4 outlined how security must comes first, followed by a more
detailed social contract. Protecting against attacks from neighbouring countries and from within
requires a level of coordination of effort more than ordinary self-regulatory business groups can
muster (although anarchists and libertarians like Nozick may well differ from me on this

1 Young India, 29-1-1925, p. 41

2 Hans J. Morgenthau (1957). ‘The Dilemmas of Freedom’, in The American Political Science Review, 51(3), p.721.

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assertion, claiming, in my view erroneously, that private defence associations can arise through
market mechanisms). We must begin with a strong state – the Leviathan – to protect us.
In addition, Proposition 5 showed that a social contract is at least implicit in the use of the
state to deliver justice. India was one of the earliest to recognise the value of a strong king. As
noted, earlier, Bhishma said, in the Mahabharata: ‘A kingdom in which anarchy prevails
becomes weak and is soon afflicted by robbers’, and highlighting the need for a social compact,
he added:
It hath been heard by us that men, in days of old, in consequence of anarchy, met with
destruction, devouring one another like stronger fishes devouring the weaker ones in the water.
It hath been heard by us that a few amongst them then, assembling together, made certain
compacts, saying, ‘He who becomes harsh in speech, or violent in temper, he who seduces or
abducts other people’s wives or robs the wealth that belongs to others, should be cast off by us.’
For inspiring confidence among all classes of the people, they made such a compact and lived for
some time.
Having clarified the need for the state, he emphasised that a ‘person who is desirous of
prosperity should worship the king as he should worship Indra himself.’ Thus, the kings were
were exhorted to treat citizens on par with divine beings. 3 In the 4th century BC, Kautilya
arrived at conclusions that were similar in many ways to those that Machiavelli and Hobbes
later arrived at. In the third century BC the Digha Nikaya or the Long Discourses – a part of the
Pali canon of Theravada Buddhism, stated:
Now those beings … gathered themselves together, and bewailed these things, saying: From our
evil deeds, sirs becoming manifest, inasmuch as stealing, censure, lying, punishment have
become known, what if we were to select a certain being, who should be wrathful when
indignation is right, who should censure that which rightly be censured and should banish him
who deserves to be banished? But we will give him in return a proportion of the rice. … Chosen
by the whole people … is what is meant by Maha Sammata (the Great Elect) … 4
According to A.L. Basham, this view is ‘one of the world’s earliest versions of the widespread
contractual theory of the state, which in Europe is specially connected with the names of Locke
and Rousseau’. 5 Even in the West, people were thinking on such lines before Machiavelli and
Hobbes came to the scene. Thus, the Marsilius of Padua (c.1275-c.1342) wrote (cited by Lord
Acton):
Laws derive their authority from the nation, and are invalid without its assent. As the whole is
greater than any part, it is wrong that any part should legislate for the whole; and as men are
equal, it is wrong that one should be bound by laws made by another. But in obeying laws to
which all men have agreed, all men, in reality, govern themselves. The monarch, who is
instituted by the legislature to execute its will, ought to be armed with a force sufficient to
coerce individuals, but not sufficient to control the majority of the people. He is responsible to
the nation, and subject to the law; and the nation that appoints him, and assigns him his duties,
has to see that he obeys the Constitution, and has to dismiss him if he breaks it. The rights of
citizens are independent of the faith they profess; and no man may be punished for his religion. 6
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) thus didn’t ‘discover’ the social contract, which seems to have
been repeatedly articulated in some form or shape throughout history. However, Hobbes was
perhaps the first to bring it all together coherently. In his Leviathan (1651) he argued that for a
strong state is needed to overcome a society’s tendencies towards anarchy. Without a strong
state our lives would be ‘solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short’. 7

3 These three quotations are from The Mahabharata, Book 12: Santi Parva, sec. LXVII, translation by Kisari Mohan
Ganguli, published between 1883 and 1896, Online version:
[http://www.bharatadesam.org/Mahabharata/m12/m12a066.htm]
4 Digha Niyaka, III, 93. Translation in Sacred Books of the Buddhists, IV, p.88ff, cited in Thapara, Romila, The Past

and Prejudice, Patel Memorial Lectures, New Delhi: Publications Division, 1973, p.41
5 Basham, A.L., The Wonder that was India, Fontana, 1971, p.88-9.
6 Cited in John Emerich Edward Dalberg, Lord Acton, The History of Freedom and Other Essays, ed. John Neville

Figgis and Reginald Vere Laurence (London: Macmillan, 1907). [http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/75]. Chapter 2.
7 Chapter 13 of Leviathan.

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 [An aside: Was life actually short without the strong state? While Hobbes lived to a ripe old
age – of 91, the average English child would have expected in his time to live only between 20
and 30 years upon birth. High infant mortality and disease reduced longevity. Anarchy perhaps
could never kill as many people as disease can. Only after significant scientific advances did life
expectancy creep up to 36 in England, by around 1800. But was life in the weak state (anarchy)
particularly brutish (in addition to being short)? That seems to be the case. The existence of
extensive internecine warfare between tribes in northeastern India seems to confirm that weak
states could lead to a brutish life.]
Hobbes thus suggested that we should therefore (at least implicitly) jointly agree to transfer
our sovereign powers to the strong state (either to a king or representative assembly). He wrote:
The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of
Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by
their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live
contentedly; is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of
men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to
say, to appoint one Man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person; and every one to owne, and
acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their Person, shall Act, or
cause to be Acted, in those things which concerne the Common Peace and Safetie; and therein to
submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his Judgment. This is more
than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person, made by
Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every
man, I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of
men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like
manner. This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in
latine CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more
reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortall God, our peace and
defence. 8
Hobbes insisted, though, that once we have handed over our powers of self-defence, we
cannot then subject the state (now sovereign) to the same laws that the state makes for us. Since
the sovereign now becomes the law, he must be deemed to be above the law. This effectively
meant following Justinian’s system according to which ‘What pleases the prince has the force of
law’ 9. Hobbes also argued (and this concept was surely revolutionary) that the authority of the
state must override that of the Church, which must obey the temporal rulers to ensure the
defence of its physical security. While Hobbes did not canvass a king (the sovereign could well be
an assembly), he did support royalists (supporters of King Charles I) during the English Civil
War. He made another strong argument as well – that citizens must live with abuse of power by
the sovereign as the price for peace. He effectively suggested that there no justification could
arise for overthrowing a king.
There is an (non-anarchist) alternative to Hobbes’s view which suggests that instead of a
strong ruler, coalitions of tribes could jointly protect our freedoms. However, such coalitions
have rarely been durable (Switzerland being an exception). Such coalitions are likely to be
overpowered from within by an ambitious leader with a large enough support base.
Anarchic alternatives are of course rife. For instance, Gandhi suggested upon India’s
becoming independent that power be reverted to villages for managing themselves. But a
vacuum of power is not sustainable, and will soon attract plundering armies. Thus, armed tribes
immediately raided Kashmir in 1947 when the king could not control his territory (and indeed,
fled Srinagar, making Kashmir a state-less anarchy: up for grabs by anyone). Similarly, armed
groups emerged across Iraq in 2004 after the rout of Saddam Hussain’s armed forces by the US
army, forcing the US to provide some form of government to avoid anarchy. It is clear that a
strong sovereign is a minimum requirement for civilisation to exist.

8 Hobbes’s Leviathan, 1651, with an Essay by the Late W.G. Pogson Smith, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909.
[http://oll.libertyfund.org/EBooks/Hobbes_0161.pdf]
9 Cited in A History of World Societies by John P. McKay, Bennett D Hill and John Buckler (1988), Volume 1. London:

Houghton Mifflin Co., p.512.

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1.2 The basic functions of the state
If the basic roles of defence, policing and justice are not performed well, then the other roles
of the state won’t really matter, because the nation will rapidly disintegrate. St. Augustine of
Hippo (354-430) also suggested that: ‘The state is a necessary evil, responsible only for providing
the peace and order Christians need in order to pursue their pilgrimage to the City of God. The
particular form of government – whether monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy – is basically
irrelevant. Any civil government that fails to provide justice is no more than a band of
gangsters.’ 10

1.3 Limiting other roles

George Washington is reported (apocryphally) to have said: ‘Government is not reason, it is
not eloquence, it is force; like fire, a troublesome servant and a fearful master. Never for a
moment should it be left to irresponsible action’. This is an extremely pertinent sentiment that
we should never forget sight of.
It must be clear by now that a government is not a road-building or manufacturing
organisation. However, it is possible that economies of scale could motivate a government to
undertake functions other than the basic functions outlined above. The people may feel that
creating new organisations to provide things like public works or social insurance would be
wasteful. Also, collecting revenues for such functions is made easier by the monopoly of the
government to tax people. If the economic benefits to society of a government taking up
additional functions outweigh the costs and risks (of mismanagement) then a society may well
choose to empower its government to do other things as well.
But these additional functions are a matter of economic calculation (including the
mechanisms and costs of enforcement and adverse impacts on our liberties) and convenience, not
fundamental to the existence of the state. Such functions should be thought of as second or third
order functions, to be taken up by a government only to the extent that these functions do not
encroach on our freedoms (I have suggested a few arguments that can be used to determine the
precise roles of a government in Box 10 in Online Notes 11).
These additional roles must meet the criteria of economic efficiency. However, there is also
the crucial element of enforceability and accountability that needs to be taken into account. For
once governments assume power, there is little we can do to prevent them from using this power
to squander taxes in futile endeavours. Politicians and their bureaucrats constantly tend to
demand a bigger role for themselves, continuously seeking to expand their empire. J.S. Mill
(1806-1873), an East India Company public servant and later a parliamentarian, suggested that:
‘the great majority of things are worse done by the intervention of government, than the
individuals most interested in the matter would do them, or cause them to be done, if left to
themselves.’ 12 And having demanded an addition role themselves, they hide the unpalatable
truth about their poor performance by resorting to official secrecy laws or obfuscating matters.
Citizens are therefore hard pressed to find out about what is happening behind the closed doors
of government. We citizens, the principals, are forced to depend on our agents (politicians) for
delivery of promised services, but these agents are more likely than not to behave recklessly
with our taxes. Hayek studied these and other problems with representative government and
proposed a model of democracy that is well worth further investigation. 13
In the light of this, what precisely should the role of a government be, apart from its basic
(or core) functions? John Stuart Mill explained thus:
A government cannot have too much of the kind of activity which does not impede, but aids
and stimulates, individual exertion and development. The mischief begins when, instead of

10 Cited in A History of World Societies by John P. McKay, Bennett D Hill and John Buckler (1988), Volume 1. London:
Houghton Mifflin Co., p.235.
11 [http://sanjeev.sabhlokcity.com/book1/BFN-Notes.doc]
12 J.S Mill, section 5 of chapter Book V, Chapter XI, ‘Of the Grounds and Limits of the Laisser-faire or Non-

Interference Principle’, Principles of Political Economy.

13 Hayek, Friedrich A. ‘Economic Freedom and Representative Government’, IEA, 1973.

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 calling forth the activity and powers of individuals and bodies, it substitutes its own activity for
theirs; when, instead of informing, advising, and upon occasion denouncing, it makes them work
in fetters or bids them stand aside and does their work instead of them. The worth of a State,
in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it; and a State which postpones the
interests of their mental expansion and elevation, to a little more of administrative skill or that
semblance of it which practice gives, in the details of business; a State, which dwarfs its men, in
order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes, will
find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished; and that the perfection of
machinery to which it has sacrificed everything, will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the
vital power which, in order that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to
banish’ [in his essay, On Liberty, bold italics mine] . 14
Bureaucrats often display a strong penchant for throwing our money at their favourite
whim. The free society should never allow bureaucrats and politicians to undertake activities
that should remain within the domain of the individual. The free society must therefore limited
the powers of government to prevent do-gooders (and criminals) from destroying our liberties.
This need to limit the powers of government was not obvious to early liberals. Hobbes thought
that we can’t hold governments to account.
Even today, far from demanding accountability of our governments, most people seem to
want even greater government intervention in their lives. If someone pollutes, we call upon the
government to fix it. If prices become ‘high’, we ask the government to do something about it. If
our children are still illiterate after attending government schools, we ask the government to
build more schools. If we find too many people in the streets, we ask the government to sterilise
them (not us, of course – only others!). If birth rates fall, we ask governments to subsidise the
birth of children (this is now happening in most Western societies). It doesn’t seem to matter to
us that governments can’t seem to do anything cheaply, or well. All we seem to want is that it do
something about our so-called problems! And governments jump in at the opportunity to take on
additional work: bureaucrats love expanding their empire. Rarely will we come across any
problem that the ‘Government God’ (GG) admits to being unable to resolve. GG is always ready
to ‘fix’ things for us – often even before we ask! And we buy into its bogus assurances like a
hapless fish biting into bait. Legislation upon legislation, rules upon rules, bottlenecks upon
bottlenecks, are therefore churned out from government offices, choking of the lifeblood of
societies, tying our liberties into knots.
It is the hardwiring of our tribal roots that makes us trust (even adore) our ‘rulers’. We fail
to realise that governments are made up of ordinary men and women like any of us – with the
same foibles and risks the control of which motivated us to sign up to the social contract in the
first place. David Hume’s pithy advice is often ignored:
Political writers have established it as maxim, that in contriving any system of government …
every man ought to be supposed a knave and to have no other end, in all his actions, than
private interest. 15
Government officials actually don’t just impose their will on the society. They are political
beasts, spending their days politicking, backbiting, and boot-licking. It is surely some strange
trick played upon us by Nature that we look for solutions to our problems through increased
government intervention! We should become responsible adults, being clear that we are the
principals, while the government is our agent. We must impose the same requirements of
accountability upon governments that shareholders impose on the managers of their companies.
In doing so, I am not suggesting that we lose faith in governments, but that we do not let down
our guard or think of governments as a Fairy Godmother with a magic wand. In brief, we need
an optimal level of regulation – neither too much nor too less. And a lot of caution before letting
a government undertake additional functions.

14 He had a 35 year public service experience in the East India Company (from the age of seventeen till he retired

when the Company’s administrative functions in India were taken over by the British government following the
Mutiny of 1857.
15 Hume, David, ‘On the Independency of Parliament’, in Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, London: A. Millar,

1758, p.30. (cited in Policy, Centre for Independent Studies, Autumn 2008, Vol.24:1, p.51.)

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 We need always examine whether a government is an appropriate agency to solve our
‘problems’. Where it is not, we must require the government to revert such functions and
liberties to us. We also need to work hard to improve the institutions of government on the basis
of the findings of public choice theory and other studies of human incentives. Laws need to be
reviewed regularly for effectiveness, as well. Checks and balances in the system need to be
continually strengthened. A government must be designed internally to reward merit at all
levels (this means that hereditary selection of leaders is unacceptable). Subsidiarity is also
necessary: state governments must delegate the management of local affairs to local
governments because state governments do not possess the relevant local information.
Limiting additional roles to a government is an important step in reducing tyranny. I
propose to spend some time in looking at the historical struggles to check excesses by
governments.

2. Reforming bad rulers

Religious and political thinkers have long thought about ways to reform bad rulers. Some of
the strategies they came up with are outlined below.

2.1 Flattery and petitions

Most rulers yearn for praise. They would rather be thought of well in history. We can always
try flattery, to begin with. We could give them a bauble like the Nobel peace prize and hope that
they will reform. But, of course, this kind of a thing doesn’t work. Yasser Arafat did not become a
man of peace merely be getting a Nobel prize. People like Robert Mugabe don’t change simply
because someone gives them a bauble.
We could, of course, try submitting mass petitions to such people. But that too, won’t likely
help. While these methods could raise awareness about tyranny, they are not likely to change
the tyrant’s behaviour.

2.2 Preaching to the ruler

Religions have long tried to put the fear of God into kings, asking them to behave well or
face retribution in their afterlife. Political preachers (philosophers) have similarly told rulers
that they must keep try to people happy, else the people may rebel. After all, the king too
must sleep.
As Vivekananda noted, ‘[t]he voice of Asia has been the voice of religion. The voice of
Europe is the voice of politics.’ 16 Modern Europe has often used political strategies. There
have been, of course, many exceptions. Kautilya preceded Machiavelli by nearly 1800 years
and appealed to the kings’ self-interest. Even religious books like the Mahabharat and
Bhagwad Gita are tightly packed with political insights. As a result of these precachings,
India achieved reasonably accountable governments for thousands of years, leading to an
economic status comparable with (or better than) most world civilisations till at least the
1750s. 17 Europe did also have a strong religious voice, with people like St. Augustine of
Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, and Martin Luther. Islam developed a range of religious and
political strategies as well.
Of course, kings could easily see through such advice. For instance, Kautilya asked the king
‘to go to the length of having his secret agents disguised as gods, and allowing himself to be seen
in their company, in order that his simpler subjects may believe that he mixes with the gods on

16 In a lecture delivered at Los Angeles, in 1900 (cited in Selections from Swami Vivekananda, Advaita Ashram,
Mayavati, Almora 2nd edition 1946, p. 308.
17 ‘The retinue of a grandee in China or Indostan [sic] accordingly is, by all accounts, much more numerous and

splendid than that of the richest subjects in Europe… in manufacturing art and industry, China and Indostan, though
inferior, seem not to be much inferior to any part of Europe’ (Adam Smith in Chapter XI: Of the Rent of Land, Wealth
of Nations.)

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equal terms.’ 18 If the king was trained to exploit citizens through trickery then preaching
goodness to kings wouldn’t work.

2.2.1 Religious preaching

Religions dangled the carrot of luxury in the afterlife, contingent on kings behaving well
in this life. Thus, the righteous were to be rewarded with earthly pleasures in heaven, in
Islam. If this promised carrot did not work, fear was deployed: to intimidate kings,
elaborately choreographed religious ceremonies were organised, including cheap magic
tricks. (Some – like Muhammad – ‘disclaimed power to perform miracles’ 19, although the
‘fact’ that God was transmitting messages through him must surely count as a major, and
quite unbelievable, miracle). Artists depicted Hell as a place of endless pain (without
explaining what happens if you get injured in the fire and die? What happens next?)
Anyone with a modicum of intelligence would disbelieve this claptrap. For such people,
religions introduced the idea of cycles of rebirth. For example, in Hinduism, ‘the type of birth
you take in this world, and the conditions of your existence here are all determined by what
you did in your earlier existences. You may even be born as an animal, says the Upanishad,
if the karma is very bad’ (Vivekananda 20). The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad specifies a range
of insects one can be reborn as. Its chapter on the ‘Process of Rebirth’ says that ‘those who
conquer the worlds through sacrifices, charity and austerity’ will do well upon rebirth, but
those who do not meet these requirements will ‘become insects and moths, and these
frequently biting things (gnats and mosquitoes).’ Clearly, given the huge population – of
more than 200 million insects for each human on this planet 21 – there were a lot of bad
people in the past [well exceeding the number of humans ever born!]. Unfortunately, we don’t
know how many bad people are currently in Hell, and so we can’t confirm the truth of this
statement. Religious hypotheses are a logical nightmare.
After the king was softened up thorough choreography, temptation, and fear,
metaphysics was then deployed – particularly for those who were not easily ‘taken in’ by
cheap magic tricks. One of these metaphysical concepts was the idea of nishkama karma –
doing one’s duty without attachment to the fruits of labour. No doubt this is an excellent
piece of advice. Within this framework, the king’s duty was to promote the common weal. Sri
Krishna counselled king Yudhishthira in the Mahabharata, thus:
King of men! with sleepless watching ever guard thy kingdom flair,
Like a father tend thy subjects with a father’s love and care,
Be unto them like the rain-drop nourishing the thirsty ground,
Be unto them tree of shelter shading them from heat around,
Like the blue sky ever bending be unto them ever kind,
Free from pride and free from passion rule them with a virtuous mind! 22
It goes without saying that for the king to follow such guidance, he had to be
indoctrinated to believe in religious texts, or to be exceptionally strategic.
This strategy – of using religion to control kings – has numerous shortcomings. Religious
perspectives can become extremely fanatical. In addition, different religions have different ideas
about what proper behaviour means. Thus, Aurangzeb’s views about righteous behaviour
actually led to great grief for India. While the religious strategist could succeed (at times) in
raising a highly ethical person like Akbar, a single Aurangzeb could easily undo this good work.
Note that Akbar was by no means perfect. Not only was he fond of waging war, he wasted
significant ‘taxpayer’ resources in building Fatehpur Sikri – a massive city which never got to be
used. Even the ‘best’ king can cause serious harm to society. Kings who become overly devout

18 As interpreted by A.L.Basham in his book, The Wonder that was India, Fontana, 1971, p.84.
19 Dawood, N.J. (translator), The Koran, Penguin Books, 2003, p.2.
20 Swami Krishnananda in Chhandogya Upanishad, Rishikesh: The Divine Life Society Sivananda Ashram, 1984.
21 The Smithsonian institution estimates that there are more than 200 million insects for each human on the planet.

(Information sheet No. 18 of the Museum: [http://www.si.edu/Encyclopedia_SI/nmnh/buginfo/bugnos.htm]

22 Dutt, Romesh C., The Ramayana and Mahabharata, 1899. [http://sacred-texts.com/hin/dutt/maha03.htm]

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can create other risks, as well. For instance, Prince Siddhartha walked out of his father’s
kingdom. Overly spiritual kings can allow anarchy to take over, and weaken state boundaries.
Then are those know-all paternalistic kings who prevent us from thinking for ourselves. As
Vivekananda pointed out:
Even the strongest youth remains but a child if he is always looked after as a child by his
parents. Being always governed by kings of godlike nature, to whom is left the whole duty of
protecting and providing for the people, they can never get any occasion for understanding
the principles of self-government. Such a nation, being entirely dependent on the king for
everything and never caring to exert itself for the common good or for self-defence, becomes
gradually destitute of inherent energy and strength. 23
The religious strategy ‘works’ very slowly, and intermittently. India had to wait for Emperor
Ashoka to first kill thousands of innocent people before he came to a stage of self-realisation
after which he repented and propagated Buddhism. Turf wars are also extremely common
among religions. For instance, Christianity (till recently) and Islam (for most of its history)
have been extremely intolerant of each other. Things can become really if kings take sides.
No mercy is then shown for the independent soul, or enemy!
Religious strategies tend also to distort the society and encourage immoral activities like
slavery and caste discrimination. As well, sometimes priests could find political power so
attractive that they aspire to become kings themselves! The Bishop of Rome is a case in
point. He became the most prominent pontiff in Christianity upon Emperor Constantine’s
formal recognition of Christianity in 313 AD. He took for himself the title of Pope (Latin for
papa, or father) and soon arrogated the role of a temporal king upon himself, becoming the
overlord of the extensive Papal States (which shrunk in 1870 into the Vatican City). Not all
these powerful people were good men. Some of them, for instance, connived in the brutal
killing of ‘heretics’ 24 and mass massacre of Protestants. For a religion whose founder said:
‘He that is without sin among you, let him cast the first stone’ (New Testament, John 8:1-11), the
Popes (presumably sinless!) were the first to cast the stone. Their tyranny over the people was at
least on par with ordinary kings.
Worse, a smart king may see through the tricks and choreography of religion and declare
himself God! Egyptian pharaohs did that, but fortunately the ‘Egyptians knew that their divine
ruler was only a human being, if a supreme one; they judged him according to his deeds,
criticizing pharaohs, plotting against them, and deposing or murdering ineffectual ones.’ 25 This
tendency of kings to see themselves as god was widespread. For instance, the Mahabharata tells
us: ‘No one should disregard a king by taking him for a man for he is really a high divinity in
human form’. 26 And the Laws of Manu affirmed that:
[t]he Lord created a king for the protection of this whole (creation), taking [for that purpose]
eternal particles of Indra, of the Wind, of Yama, of the Sun, of Fire, of Varuna, of the Moon, and
of the Lord of Wealth (Kubera). Because a king has been formed of particles of these lords of the
gods, he therefore surpasses all created beings in lustre … Even an infant king must not be
despised [from an idea] that he is a [mere] mortal; for he is a great deity in human form. 27
English King James I (1566-1625) directly claimed such transcendental privilege. In a
speech he made to Parliament on 21 March 1609, he said:
Kings are justly called Gods, for that they exercise a manner or resemblance of divine power
upon earth. For if you will consider the attributes to God, you shall see how they agree in the

23 Translated from a Bengali contribution to The Udbodhana, March 1899, cited in The Complete Works of Swami
Vivekananda, Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1989 [1990], vol 4. p.441.
24 Pope Innocent III (1198-1216) was perhaps the first to introduce the ‘Inquisition’, a tribunal for punishment of

‘heresy.’ In 1233, Pope Gregory IX began one of the more cruel Inquisitions, that involved trial without process and
witnesses, and the frequent use of torture to extract ‘confessions.’ In a later, Spanish Inquisition, thousands of
‘heretics’ were burned at the stakes.
25 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2001 CD-ROM edition.
26 Mahabharata, Shantiparvan, Section 67, cited in Cited in Niharranjan Ray, Brajadulal Chattopadhyaya, et.al. A

Sourcebook of Indian Civilization. Orient Longman, 2000, p.322.

27 Manusamhita, VII, 3-5, 8, Buhler, The Laws of Manu, SBE, Vol. 25, pp.216-7, Cited in Niharranjan Ray, Brajadulal

Chattopadhyaya, et.al. A Sourcebook of Indian Civilization. Orient Longman, 2000, p.322.

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 person of a king. God has power to create, or destroy, make, or unmake at his pleasure, to give
life, or send death, to judge all, and to be judged nor accountable to none: to raise low things, and
to make high things low at his pleasure, and to God are both soul and body due. And the like
power have Kings; they make and unmake their subjects: they have power of raising, and casting
down: of life, and of death: judges over all their subjects, and in all causes, and yet accountable to
none but God only. 28
It is clear that if priests can’t succeed in fooling the kings, then the kings will not only fool
them – and force them to proclaim their ‘divinity’ – but kill them at whim, as well! (the
Archbishop of Canterbury was thus killed in 1170). The use of the religious card is fraught
with risk. Even Vivekananda admitted that religious strategies usually do not work:
[W]hen the government of a country is guided by codes of law enjoined by Shâstras which are
the outcome of knowledge inspired by the divine genius of great sages, such a government
must lead to the unbroken welfare of the rich and the poor, the wise and the ignorant, the king
and the subjects alike. But we have seen already how far [i.e. how unsuccessful] the operation
of those laws was, or may be, possible in practical life. 29
Vivekananda therefore advocated the use of political strategies. He had a high opinion of
the revolutions that led to the creation of USA. He also knew that India had a long way to go,
for its ancient experiments with self-government had ‘never passed beyond the embryo
state’ 30. When a religious reformers starts advocating political solutions, we had better start
listening!

2.2.2 Strategic political counsel

If a king was really clever, he’d instinctively appreciate why being good to his people was
also good for him. The same advice can also be offered through political counsellors. Lau Tzu
(or Laotse, the famous author of Tao Te Ching) who lived in around 600BC was one such
counsellor. Indeed, the earliest known formulation of the laissez faire principle is attributed to
him. 31 He asked kings to let things be, for then things would get done ‘on their own’. He
suggested that kings should focus on providing security, after which order and prosperity would
arise spontaneously as people do things by themselves. That is surely an astonishingly modern
insight, reminding one of Adam Smith’s invisible hand. Lao Tzu also asked kings to be non-
violent, just, and humble. But Lao Tzu failed to ask (or at least did not explain clearly) why any
king would listen to him. And they did not. No king in China followed Lao Tzu. Anyway, the
following three illustrative sutras from Lao Tzu (translations from three separate sources)
demonstrate his exceptional wisdom: 32
17. As for the best leaders (rulers), the people do not notice their existence... When the best
leader’s (rulers) work is done the people say: ‘We did it ourselves!’
37. Tao invariably takes no action, and yet there is nothing left undone. If kings and barons can
keep it, all things will transform spontaneously.
57. Win the world by doing nothing. How do I know it is so? Through this: The more prohibitions
there are, the poorer the people become... The greater the number of statutes, the greater the
number of thieves and brigands. Therefore the sage says: I do nothing and the people are
reformed of themselves. I love quietude and the people are righteous of themselves. I deal in no
business and the people grow rich by themselves.
Kautilya (300 BC) and Machiavelli (1469-1527) provided strategic advice to their kings
as well. Thus, Arthasastra, Kautilya suggested that: ‘in the happiness of his subjects lies his
happiness’. 33 He wrote that ‘[t]he king should find his religion in promptness of action; the

28 Cited on the official website of the British Monarchy at [http://www.royal.gov.uk/files/pdf/jamesi.pdf]

29 Translated from a Bengali contribution to the Udbodhana, March 1899. (cited in The Complete Works of Swami
Vivekananda, Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1989 [1990], vol 4. p. 441-42.
30 Ibid.
31 Roderick T. Long in ‘Austro-Libertarian Themes In Early Confucianism’ in the Journal of Libertarian Studies

Volume 17, no. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 35–62 available on the web.
32 17 is by MacHovec, Frank J. New York: The Peter Pauper Press, 1962. 37 is by Professor Wing-tsit Chan. 57 is by

Lin Yutang of the Importance of Living fame.

33 Cited, in Sarma, S.R. The Soul of Indian History, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bnavan, 1969, p. 86.

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discharge of his duties is a religious sacrifice, and readiness to attend to all alike is his
consecration: in the happiness of his subjects lies his happiness, in their welfare his welfare;
not his own pleasure, but their’s, shall he consider. Ever active shall he be in the discharge of
his duties; for in activity lies the root of well-being.’ If a king does good and meets his
people’s needs, they won’t need to replace the king. But Kautilya failed to explain why an
egotistic, arrogant, and intellectually feeble king would seek the happiness of his people. To even
begin to understand political strategy requires an intellectual calibre well beyond the capacity of
most kings.
Consider the case of king Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev of Nepal. He could have enjoyed
a lifelong sinecure in one of the world’s most scenic countries merely by keeping his thoughts to
himself and graciously condescending to let his people exercise a modest form of democracy.
That would have been a great strategy for him. The failures of governance could never have been
attributed to him. He could then spend his time as a choreographed entertainer, receiving great
applause and hero-worship for the slightest movements of his hands such as cutting a ribbon or
two. But his megalomania let him down. The resulting revolution saw him lose his crown and
palace.
No doubt, many of these arguments are relevant even today. Machiavelli’s and Kautilya’s
insights into political strategy continue to inform modern political philosophy. Governments
need to be shrewd and insightful (and ruthless in dealing with enemies and miscreants). A major
problem with political advice is, of course, that it is essentially amoral, designed to manipulate
people to advance a king’s interests. That people may benefit from it does not make it more
attractive. If we continue with such strategies we will ultimately flounder, for our freedom
will remain at the mercy of kings.

3. The advance of popular sovereignty

‘The history of liberty is a history of resistance. The history of liberty is a history of the
limitation of governmental power, not the increase of it.’ – Woodrow Wilson 34
‘Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom must, like men, undergo the fatigue of
supporting it’ – Thomas Paine, in The American Crisis, 23 December 1776.
‘The whole history of the progress of human liberty shows that all concessions yet made to her
august claims have been born of earnest struggle.’ - Frederick Douglass, in a speech at
Canandaigua, New York, 4 August, 1857.

A free society must have total equality in political status between the ‘ruler’ and the ‘ruled’.
This idea, of citizens being the equal of kings, is new – an outcome of many revolutions. But
before kings could be tamed, a complete theory of rebellion was required. When was it
appropriate to rebel?
The rebellion against the so-called ‘sovereignty’ of kings started as a philosophical assertion
about everyone’s right to equal freedom. But assertions don’t mean much. They have to be
backed up by force. While subsequent battles often led to confusion and bloodshed (e.g. during
the French Revolution), they cumulatively did add up to create a new momentum for freedom.
Kings had argued that they were representatives of God. But counter-arguments have long
been made. When a government doesn’t deliver security and justice it has no rights to govern.
The Mahabharata, written thousands of years ago, ‘explicitly sanctions revolt against a king
who is oppressive or fails in his function of protection, saying that such a ruler is no king at all,
and should be killed like a mad dog.’ 35 It also argues that ‘that any king is better than none’. 36
Presumably even momentary anarchy is undesirable.
In ancient Greece, Aristotle had argued for the rights of citizens to depose tyrants. He wrote
that ‘monarchy unaccountable is the first sword of tyranny, and least of all to be endured by

34 Address to New York Press Club, September 9, 1912. Though Woodrow Wilson actually increased the intervention of
government in US, the principle he was articulating is sound.
35 Basham, A.L., The Wonder that was India, Fontana, 1971, p.88-9.
36 Basham, A.L., The Wonder that was India, Fontana, 1971, p.89.

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free-born men’. 37 As we have seen, Islamic Cordoba brought these Greek ideas to St. Thomas
Aquinas, who then wrote:
A King who is unfaithful to his duty forfeits his claim to obedience. It is not rebellion to depose
him, for he is himself a rebel whom the nation has a right to put down. But it is better to abridge
his power, that he may be unable to abuse it. For this purpose, the whole nation ought to have a
share in governing itself; the constitution ought to combine a limited and elective monarchy,
with an aristocracy of merit, and such an admixture of democracy as shall admit all classes to
office, by popular election. No government has a right to levy taxes beyond the limit determined
by the people. All political authority is derived from popular suffrage, and all laws must be made
by the people or their representatives. There is no security for us as long as we depend on the
will of another man. 38
St. Aquinas said even more powerfully that ‘there is no security for us as long as we depend
on the will of another man.’ In a few centuries this idea gained wide currency, with the
scholastics being pivotal to its advance across Europe. Lord Acton describes an event of around
1309 in which the Scottish Parliament informed the Pope that:
the laws and customs of the country, which we will defend till death, and the choice of the
people, have made him [Robert Bruce] our king. If he should ever betray his principles, and
consent that we should be subjects of the English king, then we shall treat him as an enemy, as
the subverter of our rights and his own, and shall elect another in his place. We care not for
glory or for wealth, but for that liberty which no true man will give up but with his life. [Note:
This seems to me to be a very powerful event in history but for some reason it has received
limited attention apart from Lord Acton’s book.]
By the 16th century, such concepts (about popular sovereignty) were being widely discussed.
John Pynet, the Bishop of Winchester, in arguing against the doctrine of the divine right of
kings, proposed the strategy of passive obedience (note: not civil disobedience) against tyrant
kings. 39 Similarly, the Jesuits insisted that no divine rights accrued to kings. Further, they
argued that the Church was higher in status than the state, being divinely ordained. The state,
they said, must give due regard to popular sovereignty because kings’ powers were received by
them through a delegation from the people. 40 So while God empowered the Church, the people
empowered the king. [It is worth noting that political debates against divine rights of kings
never took place in India. As a result, many Indians see divinity even among their elected
representatives!]
Sir Edward Coke (1552–1634), England’s Attorney General (and later Chief Justice), argued
that the Magna Carta had imposed the rule of law on all, including on the king. ‘Magna Carta is
such a fellow,’ he wrote, ‘that he will have no sovereign’. In France, arguments were made about
electing kings by a council of elders (this idea wasn’t implemented well, or on a sufficiently large
scale, anywhere). French Protestants lost faith in kings particularly after the massacres of
1572 41. The Frenchman Francis Hotman set the arguments out in his 1573 book called Franco-
Gallia (‘a truly revolutionary book’ 42, it ‘breathed the very spirit of Protestantism – a protest
against absolutism in state as well as in religion, a vindication of the rights of the intellect of the
individual against the claim of blind submission to prelate and secular ruler’ 43). Hotman argued
that people wanted kings to guard their self-interest: ‘When they [the Franks, or the citizens] set
up kings, they set not up tyrants and murderers, but guardians, overseers, protectors of their
own liberties.’ 44 Hotman published another book (anonymously, in 1574) entitled, Dialogi ab

37 In the fourth of his Politics, chap. X, cited in John Milton’s The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates.
38 Cited in John Emerich Edward Dalberg, Lord Acton, The History of Freedom and Other Essays, ed. John Neville
Figgis and Reginald Vere Laurence (London: Macmillan, 1907). [http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/75]. Chapter 2.
39 Ibid. p.198. (WHICH BOOK! CAN’T FIND IT)
40 Ibid. p.189. (WHICH BOOK! CAN’T FIND IT)
41 Baird, Henry Martyn, ‘Hotman and the ‘Franco-Gallia’’, in The American Historical Review, Vol. 1, No. 4, (Jul.,

1896), p. 617.
42 Baird, Henry Martyn, ‘Hotman and the ‘Franco-Gallia’’, in The American Historical Review, Vol. 1, No. 4, (Jul.,

1896), p. 618.
43 Baird, Henry Martyn, ‘Hotman and the ‘Franco-Gallia’’, in The American Historical Review, Vol. 1, No. 4, (Jul.,

1896), p. 627.
44 Cited in Baird, Henry Martyn, ‘Hotman and the ‘Franco-Gallia’’, in The American Historical Review, Vol. 1, No. 4,

(Jul., 1896), p. 620.

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Eusebio Philadelpho cosmopolita in Gallorum et caetera-rum nationum gratiam composite. He
argued that ‘princes who by evil craft and the violation of the laws of the realm crush the
freedom of the states should no longer be esteemed kings, but tyrants and wicked enemies of the
Commonwealth.’ 45
Such sentiments became more common as time went by. Some suggested that since uniform
laws governed heavenly bodies and human affairs, the Law must be above the king. The Law
therefore gives the king his power. For instance, John Milton proposed in 1649 in The Tenure of
Kings and Magistrates:
To say kings are accountable to none but God, is the overturning of all law and government.’
Further, ‘The power of kings and magistrates is nothing else but what is only derivative,
transferred, and committed to them in trust from the people to the common good of them all, in
whom the power yet remains fundamentally and cannot be taken from them without a violation
of their natural birth right. 46
Defending the 1649 execution of Charles I, John Milton wrote: ‘Proving that it is lawful, and
hath been held so through all ages, for any, who have the power, to call to account a tyrant, or
wicked king; and, after due conviction, to depose, and put him to death.’ 47 He added:
None can love freedom heartily but good men; the rest love not freedom but license, which never
hath more scope or more indulgence than under tyrants.’ Further, ‘Since the king or magistrate
holds his authority of the people, both originally and naturally for their good in the first place,
and not his own, then may a people, as oft as they shall judge for the best, either choose him or
reject him, retain him or depose him, though no tyrant, merely by the liberty and right of
freeborn men to be governed as seems to them best.
Only after killing one of them (in 1649) and exiling the other (in 1688) could popular
sovereignty be wrested out of the control of British kings. (Since the Glorious Revolution of 1688
is best remembered for the origin of British constitutional monarchy, I discuss it in later, in
Chapter 10).
Sentiments against tyranny underpinned the 1776 American Declaration of Independence.
The implicit right to revolt is found in the 1787 American constitution: ‘A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.’ This must be read together with the American Declaration of
Independence which says: ‘whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these
ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government’.
Thus the founders of America asserted that if a government becomes tyrannical, its citizens are
justified in using force to abolish it. Even America is not protected from such a revolt.
Thomas Paine (1737-1809) vocally argued in his 1791 Rights of Man – written in support of
the 1789 French revolution – that oppressive regimes can, and indeed must, be overthrown. He
did not agree with Edmund Burke’s (1729-1797) scepticism about the French revolutionaries.
Burke had said: ‘I should therefore suspend my congratulations on the new liberty of France,
until I was informed how it had been combined with government, with public force, with the
discipline and obedience of armies, with the collection of an effective and well-distributed
revenue, with morality and religion, with solidity and property, with peace and order, with civil
and social manners.’ Burke also predicted that the French Revolution would lead to, in this
order: a republic, anarchy, war, and military dictatorship. Paine said in response that people
must be prepared to pay the price of freedom. His advocacy of violent upheavals against tyranny
inspired many later revolutionary movements. Of course Paine was right. Revolution can (and
even must) occur under certain circumstances. Despite momentary setbacks, we are better off if
by moving forward a little.
It is useful to note that Burke’s concerns regarding the use of uncontrolled violence are
pertinent, as well. Establishing a workable alternative government after a violent revolution is a
matter of desperate urgency. Well-designed institutions of governance must replace the tyranny,

45 Cited in Baird, Henry Martyn, ‘Hotman and the ‘Franco-Gallia’’, in The American Historical Review, Vol. 1, No. 4,

(Jul., 1896), p. 627.

46 John Milton’s The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates is available online: [http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/271/43725]
47 In his book, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates

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else the new social contract will not only be fragile, but the anarchy that sets in could lead to
even greater tyranny than the one it was intended to replace. Violence – even against tyrants –
must therefore be deployed only in the rarest of cases, and very tightly managed (although that
is far easier said than done).
Paine’s contributions are important from another perspective as well. He was a great
believer in political equality and a vociferous champion of democracy. He would have delighted
in India’s great experiment with democracy. Burke, on the other hand, was not a fan of
democracy. He stood for aristocratic rule and opposed democracy for the masses. This reluctance
to embrace democracy among early classical liberals is rooted in negative perceptions about
early Greek democracy. Of course, there is no guarantee that democracy will increase liberty
(India’s democracy did not increase economic liberties and harmed millions of people). One
would side with Paine, on balance, though, for democracy does help reduce tyranny. Indira
Gandhi’s 1975 Emergency denied thousands of innocent citizens their liberty (many people were
also forcibly sterlised). But she finally did hold elections again, in 1977, perhaps out of her fear
of being written off by history as a common dictator, or because she feared that the illegitimacy
of her government could endanger her long-term survival. Democracy in India has therefore
helped advance at least some basic human liberties, and saved it from the disastrous
dictatorships of Pakistan.
That democratic governments act as a bulwark against tyranny has since been
demonstrated empirically by Rudolph Rummel. But Hayek was not sanguine about democracy,
for good reason. In his 1944 The Road to Serfdom, he wrote: ‘There is no justification for the
belief that, so long as power is conferred by democratic procedure, it cannot be arbitrary... it is
not the source but the limitation of power which prevents it from being arbitrary.’ He cautioned
us from assuming that democracies are a natural solution to tyranny. Ultimately we citizens
have to be vigilant and ensure that government’s power is limited.
The idea of a republic (no hereditary head of state) is a very important idea – perhaps first
implemented in Rome. Montesquieu (1689-1755) perhaps contributed the most to the theory of
the modern republic. In its praise he wrote: ‘In republican governments, men are all equal; equal
they are also in despotic governments: in the former, because they are everything; in the latter,
because they are nothing.’ His concepts were highly influential in the USA (through Jefferson). 48
US thus became the first modern republic. Its design included other Montesquieuian ideas as
well, e.g. checks and balances (more on these later).

4. Options against tyranny

Today, we assert our sovereignty, but the dangers to our freedoms are not past. Indeed, are
we prepared for action when (not if) tyrants will arise in our society? There is no simple answer,
no guaranteed method to oust rogue governments. One thing is clear, that we will have to take
recourse to the theory and practice of revolution. Patrick Henry said, ‘[G]ive me liberty or give
me death!’ That spirit must underpin all citizenship, else our freedoms will be soon snatched
away.

4.1 Civil disobedience

After testing flattery and lodging petitions with tyrants (which we know don’t work), civil
disobedience must be considered next. Not all liberals agree. Dr Ambedkar, who can be
considered broadly to have been a liberal, felt that civil disobedience, non-cooperation and
satyagraha are inconsistent with constitutional democracy. He said on November 25, 1949 in
India’s Constituent Assembly that:
If we wish to maintain democracy not merely in form, but also in fact, what must we do? The
first thing in my judgement we must do is to hold fast to constitutional methods of achieving our
social and economic objectives. It means we must abandon the bloody methods of revolution. It
means that we must abandon the method of civil disobedience, non-cooperation and satyagraha.

48David W. Carrithers, ‘Montesquieu, Jefferson, and the Fundamentals of Republican Theory,’ The French-American

Review 4 (Fall 1982).

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 When there was no way left for constitutional methods for achieving economic and social
objectives, there was a great deal of justification for unconstitutional methods. But where
constitutional methods are open, there can be no justification for these unconstitutional
methods. These methods are nothing but the Grammar of Anarchy and the sooner they are
abandoned, the better for us 49 [emphasis mine].
However, we know that a constitutional democracy cannot guarantee freedom. It is a
necessary but definitely not sufficient condition. In any event, elections are only held
infrequently, and the system to recall representatives is usually non-existent. Under such
circumstances, democracies often exceed their legitimate powers. It can also become impossible
to enter electoral politics because the laws reward corruption. If democratic opportunities to
voice dissent don’t exist, and liberty and life are at risk, then vigilant citizens could need to step
outside constitutional frameworks. Civil disobedience must be the first serious option in such
cases. It is in many ways an act of civic responsibility. The disobedient citizen demonstrates
through non-violent disobedience that he still wishes to live on in that society, subject to the
changes he seeks. It is not a direct assault against the government – but a strong hint.
There can be a variety of types of civil disobedience – starting with simple non-violent
protest which may include chanting slogans or protesting a particular issue, but which does not
involve breaking any law except, perhaps, a law that requires protest. A stronger form of
disobedience actually breaks the law. The Dandi march is an example. The objector breaks a
relatively minor law and is prepared to face the consequences. The objector does not resist
arrest, trial, or punishment: he insists on breaking the law. While the state is notionally
honoured (by accepting the punishment) the protest against tyranny is duly registered, in public.
The excesses of tyranny are brought to light, and popular support for resistance demonstrated.
Civil disobedience is a valuable tool to be exercised even in democracies when necessary. For
instance, in BFN, I regretted that today ‘[w]e never find any political leader protesting against
our freedoms being trampled upon. No Dandi marches; no fasts to death to protest the absence of
the rule of law or against corruption.’ Yes, there are a few websites now in India against
corruption, but unfortunately, no national movement. 50 It is perhaps time for citizens of India to
offer satyagraha and march (with a black band, for example) against corruption. The battle for
liberty has never been easy. It can’t be won merely by sitting on one’s haunches, and letting the
corrupt rule.
An even more extreme form of civil disobedience is fast to death, of the type that Gandhi
often undertook. Being potentially a kind of self-harm, this needs a finely nuanced approach.
This form of protest not suited to everyone, nor suitable for every cause. In Chapter 4 we
explored the ethics of fasts unto death, and found that under certain circumstances, this could be
an ethical option. The person undertaking this remedy must have earned ‘a right to risk his own
life in order to preserve it’ (Rousseau). Gandhi’s fasts helped to reduce the level of communal
violence, and saved thousands of lives. However, we can’t permit the use of fasts as blackmail.
These must always be undertaken out of love, including of the government. They must arise
from the generosity of one’s heart; or else this method is likely to do more harm than good.
Violent revolution is a far preferable alternative, if the protestor is motivated by hatred. The
moral character needed for a fast to death is generally well beyond most of us.
A government is entitled to use force to prevent an outbreak of crime or unruly mob
behaviour, or when specifically authorised by a court of law after due process including fair trail,
or when authorised by a magistrate exercising his preventive detention powers: powers duly
created through a democratic mandate. 51 If the government uses force primarily for legitimate
purposes, then violent resistance is unethical. Civil disobedience may still be used.

49 Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly of India - Volume XI. Friday, the 25th November, 1949
[http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol11p11.htm].
50 E.g. See the Fifth Pillar [http://india.5thpillar.org/], and the Anti Corruption Movement Chennai,
[http://anticorruptionchennai.com]
51 Even then the use of force could well be illegitimate, for even democratic governments cannot truncate our freedoms

without an extremely strong basis. The testing of such causes should be included as part of judicial review required
under the social contract.

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 Thus, if a few government functionaries do use force illegitimately, but the government then
takes action to hold them to account, then such violence does not constitute grounds for violent
revolution against the government. India is a case in point. There has never been a premeditated
assault or pogrom against any group of Indian citizens by the Indian government, nor state-
sanctioned violence. Therefore there is no basis for violent revolution in India. The myriads of
mini-revolts across India are patently unjustified. In particular, the existence of systemic
corruption and bad policy is not grounds for violent revolution.

4.2 Violent revolution

But there is only a certain kind of tyranny that is amenable to methods of civil disobedience.
Where a government repeatedly uses force illegitimately or executes a pre-mediated onslaught
against a group of citizens then violent resistance becomes an ethically valid option. The grounds
to justify violent revolution can’t always be precisely laid out: thus, the American revolution or
French revolution had grounds which may not appear on the surface to be perfectly compatible
with violent revolution.
In some such cases (e.g. in Hitler’s Germany) civil disobedience simply can’t work because of
the nature of the tyranny: violent resistance then becomes a moral necessity. Indeed, in some
extreme cases the point when violent revolution is a realistic option may also pass quickly. It is
doubtful whether the Jews on their own could have launched a violent revolution against the
Nazis. Exit was their only option, although that too was blocked by the rest of the world, for few
wanted them. Such are the tragic outcomes of tyranny and human nature.

4.3 Exit
The last option available to each of us is exit – to walk out, to migrate. Our responsibility to
our society is always a shared (joint) responsibility, not our sole responsibility. If others don’t
come together to oppose tyranny, then we may have no choice but to leave, to migrate to a more
free society. Nations exists to meet our requirements of life and liberty, and if they fail to provide
these basics, then the social contract must be broken. If our countrymen refuse to fight
unfreedom, then there is nothing we can do, anyway.
Many Indians have left India after failed attempts to reform the corrupt socialist governance
of India. That is the way it should be – so long as they did try genuinely to change things before
leaving.

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Chapter 10 The pillar of democracy

‘No man has a natural right to commit aggression on the equal rights of another, and this is all
from which the laws ought to restrain him.’ – Thomas Jefferson.

There is a seriously mistaken notion in some circles that capitalism refers exclusively to the
economic models of ‘free’ markets. Thus The Columbia Encyclopedia (the authors of which surely
ought to have known better) says: ‘Capitalism does not presuppose a specific form of social or
political organization: the democratic socialism of the Scandinavian states, the consensus
politics of Japan, and the state-sponsored rapid industrial growth of South Korea while under
military dictatorship all coexist with capitalism.’ 1 But this is a gross misrepresentation of Adam
Smiths’s ‘system of natural liberty’ which Marx tried to condemn by calling it ‘capitalism’.
Capitalism and good governance are of one piece. And good governance necessarily includes
democracy. When economic freedom is delinked from political freedom the society may get a
temporary bounce in per capita income (as in the case of Singapore) basically by letting its
citizens copy developed nations technology, but genuine innovation can’t flourish without the
comprehensive freedom which includes political freedom. And political freedom, as is self-
evident, is not feasible without equal freedom. That necessarily leads us to democracy. John
Locke clearly showed in 1690 that property can be protected only if the laws are made by
people’s own representatives. In the minds of the classical liberals, economic freedom is deeply
and indistinguishably linked with political freedom.
[T]he people finding their properties not secure under the government as then it was (whereas
government has no other end but the preservation of property), could never be safe, nor at rest,
nor think themselves in civil society, till the legislative was so placed in collective bodies of men,
call them senate, parliament, or what you please, by which means every single person became
subject equally with other the meanest men, to those laws, which he himself, as part of the
legislative, had established. 2
Adam Smith’s advocacy of Turgot’s system of laissez faire in markets was within the
framework of democracy. Smith was fully aware of Locke’s work which argued for democracy. He
was also writing at the time when British democratic institutions had become reasonably well
established. Therefore he primarily focused on economic freedom, not requiring to re-litigate the
obvious case for democracy. Where appropriate, he did advocate democracy, though. For
instance, he wrote: ‘The assembly which deliberates and decides concerning the affairs of every
part of the empire, in order to be properly informed, ought certainly to have representatives from
every part of it.’ 3 In advocating a union of England with America (his book was too late to change
history) he suggested that America should send ‘fifty or sixty new representatives to Parliament’
and that there was ‘not the least probability that the British constitution would be hurt by the
union of Great Britain with her colonies.’ Completely abhorrent for him would have been the
very thought of authoritarian systems like Singapore, which claim to provide economic freedom:
as if it can be delinked from political liberty. Given that democracy was very young then, Smith
did make a questionable suggestion, though, that ‘the number of American representatives’
should be ‘in proportion to the produce of American taxation’. Adopting such a model wouldn’t be
considered representative of individual liberties today since each person should definitely have
one vote. The number of representatives in a society should relate to the number of adults, not to
the gross product.

1 The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition.2001-07. Columbia University Press. Entry on ‘capitalism’.

[http://www.bartleby.com/65/ca/capitali.html]
2 From Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, 1690. Para 94, Chapter VII, Of Political or Civil Society.

[http://socserv2.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/government.pdf]
3 Smith, Adam, The Wealth of Nations, Volume 1I. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976, p.139.

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 There can thus be no doubt, not the slightest ambiguity, that the founders of the philosophy
of natural liberty were strong advocates of democracy. To suggest otherwise, i.e. that they
merely advocated economic ‘capitalism’, would seriously misrepresent them. I therefore do not
accept any attempt to narrow the concept of capitalism. It must necessarily include democracy,
else it is not capitalism and natural liberty that we are talking about but something else.
But given the experience of the Greeks, why is democracy good, or even necessary? Because
there can be no basis for any other form of decision-making across the society among people who
are equally free. Monarchical and dictatorial forms of government are unacceptable, ab initio.
There is a positive consequence as well. Democracies lead to peace and fewer wars. ‘According to
Rummel, of 353 pairings of nations fighting in major international wars between 1816 and 1991,
[only] one occurred between democracies.’ 4 According to Rudolph Rummel, ‘[d]emocracy solves,
by controlling power better than any other form of government, the problems of genocide and
mass murder, internal violence, bilateral violence, as well as war’ 5 (italics mine). Bruce Russett
(1993) 6 and Spencer Weart (1998) 7 also came to similar conclusions. There is yet another benefit.
Famines can’t easily develop under a democracy because representatives can be removed
through elections, and so they are careful that nobody dies of starvation on their watch.
I’d now like to look back in history up to the time of John Locke to explore how democracy
ultimately came into being – as an integral part of the system of liberty.

1. Precursors of modern democracy

The idea of equal freedom for everyone perhaps started through early experiments both in
Greece and in India. We know that Indian experiments in this regard were relatively less
influential.

1.1 Greek city states (and the Roman republic)

In 507 BC, Cleisthenes, a noble in Athens, helped introduce a range of democratic reforms.
Self-governing Greek city states and republics were based largely on democratic principles. This
was a form of direct democracy, albeit limited only to a few. The poor, women and slaves had no
voting rights (such exclusion was not particularly remarkable since even modern democracies
did not give everyone the right to vote to until recently.) Athenians selected their officials by lot
from amongst eligible citizens, in a process somewhat similar to the way modern juries are
selected. It was assumed that everyone is equally capable of holding every office. Those who
were elected were then rotated in their roles across portfolios. An assembly of all citizens took
the responsibility of ensuring that elected officials were held to account:
[T]he principal legislative body [in Athens] was the Assembly of all citizens, the boards of
lawmakers and juries were chosen by lot from the citizens; the Council which prepared the
Agenda for the Assembly was chosen annually by lot from the citizenry; the decisions of the
Assembly were subject to review only by the people’s courts. 8
Such concepts soon spread to the Roman Republic which, initially, started as just another
small Italian city state. The city of Rome made a very influential model of democracy. It was
governed by two elected consuls, each with the power to veto the other. Elected magistrates
reported to the consuls and managed day-to-day affairs. The consuls and magistrates (both being
paid roles) formed the executive branch of government. The consuls were empowered to
nominate citizens to the Senate (which was effectively a Council of Elders). The consuls and
Senate together recommended laws which the popular assembly then voted upon. Upon approval
by the assembly the laws were enacted. Many centuries later, John Adams and James Madison

4 Cited in Moore, John Norton, ‘Solving the War Puzzle’, in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, No. 2,
(Apr., 2003), p. 282.
5 Peterson, Jr., H. C., ‘Twelve Problems With Ted Galen Carpenter's Review of Power Kills’,
[http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/PK.REV.HCP.HTM]
6 Russett, Bruce. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World, 1993.
7 Never At War: Why Democracies Will Never Attack One Another (Yale, 1998).
8 Cited in Grofman, Bernard, ‘Lessons of Athenian Democracy: Editor's Introduction’, PS: Political Science and

Politics, Vol. 26, No. 3, (Sep., 1993), p.472.

212
were greatly influenced by this model in designing the institutions of American democracy.
Indeed, the bicameral (upper house, lower house) concept is found in some form in all later
democracies
Given various ups and downs in governance, neither Greek nor Roman democracies survived
very long. In 44 AD, after Julius Caesar was assassinated, Rome became a monarchy. In the
meanwhile the Greek states which had once occupied parts of modern Italy, shrank upon being
subjugated by Rome, and their democratic traditions were lost, as well.
But well before that happened, ‘Antiquity [had already] rejected Democracy. As a form of
government it lacked permanence even in Athens, and in the realm of speculation the most
famous thinkers both of Greece and Rome – Plato and Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca – were
against it.’ 9 Socrates had significant concerns with democracy. His concerns were vindicated
when a jury of 500 Athenians condemned him to death for allegedly ‘refusing to recognise the
gods acknowledged by the state … and corrupting the young.’ 10 Plato (428/427-348/347 BC), his
student, disliked democracy as well. In his view, citizens (the demos) are driven by blind opinion
while a good government should be based on the Truth, which requires expertise. In his
Republic, therefore, he proposed a model of oligarchy. Fortunately, not everyone was so inclined
and democracy did continue to have its supporters. At least some Athenians thought that the
solutions to the problems of democracy are to be found by increasing democracy and educating
the people. 11 Plato is clearly not part of the classical liberal tradition.

1.2 Indian republics and panchayats

Independently of, but coterminous with early Greek and Roman democratic initiatives,
ancient India also developed its own forms of democratic government, albeit not as extensively.
According to Romila Thapar, while ‘monarchical states in the Ganges plain were well
established by fourth century BC, ... [n]evertheless chiefdoms and oligarchies, the gana-sanghas,
had for some time held their own in competition with evolving monarchies.’ 12
While not exactly republics, these gana-sanghas were a cooperative of oligarchs – of nobles
who came together in decision-making councils. According to S.R. Sarma, ‘Megasthenes refers
to the republican Sabaracae who opposed Alexander with a force of 6000 cavalry, 6000
infantry, and 500 chariots. Nyasa was an oligarchy governed by a Council of 300, – like the
Sakyas, Mallas and Lacchavis of Buddha’s days. Malavas, Yaudheyas and Arjunayas were
other tribes with democratic constitutions’. 13 The great expert on Indian history, A.L.
Basham, thinks that calling some of the states, a republic is actually quite appropriate. 14 And
the Marquess of Zetland famously exclaimed: ‘[I]n the Assemblies of the Buddhists in India,
2000 years and more ago, are to be found the rudiments of our Parliamentary practice of the
present day’. 15 On this claim I have some reservations, for I have found little or no evidence
yet of ancient Indian democratic institutions influencing the West, despite extensive ancient
trade links that then existed).
I tend to agree with Vivekananda who wrote thus about these early republics:
The voice of the ruled in the government of their land – which is the watchword of the modern
Western world, and of which the last expression has been echoed with a thundering voice in
the Declaration of the American Government, in the words, ‘That government of the people of
this country must be by people and for the good of the people’ – cannot however be said to have
been totally unrecognised in ancient India. The Greek travellers and others saw many
independent small States scattered all over this country, and references are also found to this

9 Wollheim, Richard, ‘Democracy’, in Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 19, No. 2, (Apr., 1958), p. 225.
10 Xenophon, The Memorabilia, Translated by H. G. Dakyns, 1897, [http://www.fullbooks.com/The-Memorabilia1.htm]
11 Euben, Peter J., ‘Democracy Ancient and Modern’ PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 26, No. 3, (Sep., 1993), p.

479.
12 In her article, ‘Epic and History: Tradition, Dissent and Politics in India’ in Past and Present November 1989 (p.3-

26)
13 In his The Soul of Indian History. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan.1969. p. 87.
14 In his book The Wonder that was India. Fontana. 1971, p.97
15 In his foreword to The Legacy of India, edited by G T Garrat, 2005, New Delhi: Black and White.

213
 effect in many places of the Buddhistic literature. And there cannot be the least doubt about it
that the germ of self-government was at least present in the shape of the village Panchayat
which is still to be found in existence in many places of India. 16
We gather that these assemblies used power relatively judiciously, given their
cooperative and consultative approach. Thus, S.R.Sarma tells us: ‘Arrian alludes to the
prosperity of some of these early republican states, and observes that they “exercised
authority with moderation”.’ 17 What does seem to have been missing from the mix, possibly
because such documents (if any) have likely been lost for ever, is the existence of a theory of
the republic.
As with Greece, Indian republics soon faded out as well. The usual set of kings and
monarchies: strong, weak, benevolent, or tyrannical; indigenous or foreign; ruled India for
the next two thousand years. Vivekananda therefore cautions us from reading too much into
the early Indian initiatives – ‘the germ remained for ever the germ; the seed though put in the
ground never grew into a tree. This idea of self-government never passed beyond the embryo
stage of the village Panchayat system and never spread into society at large.’ 18
Some recent discoveries shows that a few localised village panchayats emerged later,
sporadically, in some parts of India. These were apparently not only democratic and
participative, but delivered justice at a local (village) level. In around 920 AD, in the reign of
Parantaka Chola, the village Uthiramerur seems to have had ‘a veritable written
Constitution of the village assembly’ as well as a ‘written Constitution prescribing the mode
of elections. It was inscribed on the walls of the village assembly.’ 19 This inscription, of the
constitution,
gives astonishing details about the constitution of wards, the qualification of candidates
standing for elections, the disqualification norms, the mode of election, the constitution of
committees with elected members, the functions of [those] committees, the power to remove the
wrong-doer, etc. … The villagers even had the right to recall the elected representatives if they
failed in their duty! … [T]he entire village, including the infants, had to be present at the village
assembly … when the elections were held…. Only the sick and those who had gone on a
pilgrimage were exempt… [T]he village was divided into 30 wards, one representative elected for
each. Specific qualifications were prescribed for those who wanted to contest. The essential
criteria were age limit, possession of immovable property and minimum educational
qualification. Those who wanted to be elected should be above 35 years of age and below 70...
Only those who owned land, that attracted tax, could contest. …A person serving in any of the
committees could not contest again for the next three terms, each term lasting a year. Elected
members, who suffered disqualification, were those who accepted bribes, misappropriated
others’ property, committed incest or acted against public interest.’ 20
More discoveries of this sort would surely be found in the future, and a careful assessment of
such assemblies made. What one can say with some certainty, though, is that such advances in
democracy arose like bubbles of water in a spring and were soon lost, not being influential either
across India or abroad.
Democracy was revived in India only after the British came in. This time democracy was to
be more enduring, but it was not offered on a platter. What was considered good for England was
not considered suitable for India. For instance, J.S. Mill thought that not all peoples can
responsibly exercise freedom: ‘Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things
anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal
discussion. … we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society’. To keep such

16 In a Bengali contribution to the Udbodhana, March 1899, in The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda,

Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1989 [1990], vol 4. p. 442.

17 S.R. Sarma – IN FULL
18 In a Bengali contribution to the Udbodhana, March 1899, in The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda,

Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1989 [1990], vol 4. p. 442.

19 Details in a book by Dr. R. Nagaswamy, Uthiramerur, the Historic Village in Tamil Nadu, Chennai: Tamil Arts

Academy.
20 Reported by the Hindu newspaper on 11 July 2008:

[http://www.hindu.com/fr/2008/07/11/stories/2008071151250300.htm]

214
statements in context, we must not forget that battles for increased democracy were still being
waged in England and Europe, such as for suffrage for poorer men initially, and later, for
women. India was therefore not too far behind England in democratic practice by the 1930s.
It was almost certainly the Mutiny of 1857 – which put the fear of revolt into the minds of
the British – that motivated them to seek representation of ‘natives’ in the governance of India.
In addition, Indians started submitting petitions from about 1860 onwards, seeking
participation in the government. 21 These initial efforts led to The Indian Councils Act, 1861 and
later, to The Indian Councils Acts (of 1892 and 1909) and the Government of India Acts (of 1919
and 1935). Each of these progressively advanced democracy in India. The India Act 1935 was so
useful that India’s constituent assembly accepted it as the basis for the 1950 Constitution of
independent India. As a result of strong British influence, we follow the Westminster democratic
model. The key difference is that England remains a primitive constitutional monarchy while
India is a modern constitutional republic.
Many of the laws we follow are British, as well: not indigenous to India. The English system
of law – a mixture of Roman and common law – And was introduced into India (laws like the
Indian Penal Code of 1860). India’s ancient system of law – a mixture of Islamic, Hindu, and
creative law (from strategists like Kautilya) – was not formally codified. Justice was often
whimsically administered by kings; hence India is unlikely to go back into its history to re-create
its ancient laws.

2. The evolution of modern democracy

The precise historical path taken by modern democracy is hard to discern. However, it is
almost certain that the first signs of modern democracy arose in medieval England. Thus, the
concept of ‘parliament’ (a word derived from ‘parley’ or a peaceful meeting of the king and
people’s representatives) first arose in England. The kings of England convened early
parliaments 200 years before the Magna Carta (of 1215 AD) was signed – noting that these early
meetings do not comprise elected representatives, and had no power to make laws. But not only
in England did such representative bodies emerge (by around 1000 AD). Most kingdoms in
Europe – the French, Spanish, and Dutch – had started such forms of consultation with the
people. And of course, soon thereafter, ideas about Greek self-governance were re-discovered by
12th century Scholastics like St. Aquinas. A great ferment of experimentation in democratic
theory and concepts, as well as practice, arose between 1000 and 1200 AD.

2.1 The growing power of the early British parliaments (1265-1688)

The Magna Carta of 1215 was the result of a standoff 22 between King John I and his barons.
The barons were upset at the constantly increasing demands on their resources by the king and
so they physically took control of London (the common people of London supported the barons by
opening the gates of London to them).
This famous document, extracted under duress out of a reluctant King John I, committed
him to a more systematic and judicious application of laws. But this document did not get
implemented easily. Before he died in the following year, King John managed to get the Magna
Carta rejected by the Pope and the barons excommunicated. Thereafter, during the minority of
the next king (Henry III) the barons who ruled on his behalf re-proclaimed the Magna Carta
once again. Upon becoming king, Henry III quickly distanced himself from this document. His
barons did not take kindly to this, and led by Simon de Montfort, they defeated Henry III in
battle in 1264, taking him prisoner. Henry was reinstated as a figurehead.
Simon de Montfort was perhaps the first modern democrat, setting significant precedents for
the future. The parliament he summoned in 1265 was more representative than any of its
predecessors. Many more classes of people were invited to this body (the common citizen –
remember this was the peak of feudalism! – was obviously not yet represented). de Monfort laid

21Kapur, A.C., Constitutional History of India, 1765-1984, New Delhi: S.Chand & Co., 1985, p.79.
22The web site of the British Library states, ‘It was a practical solution to a political crisis which served the highest
ranks of feudal society.’

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down the principle that ‘what concerns all should be treated of, and approved of by all’. No
thought more significant for democracy was perhaps articulated until the drafting of the
American Declaration of Independence. Henry III’s son (then only a Prince – Edward I) fought
back against democracy got de Montfort killed in 1265.
These initial reversals did not diminish the role of the Magna Carta in transforming human
society. The clamour (from barons and lords) to participate in decision-making and for the king
to enforce the rule of law grew steadily louder. Each time a king wanted to raise money to wage
war, the aristocrats ratcheted up their demand for greater democracy and freedom. Each victory
for freedom steadily made further victories just a little bit easier. When Edward I ran out of
money in 1295, he was left with no choice but to summon a ‘model parliament’. This parliament
not only included the usual suspects – i.e. members of the clergy and aristocracy – but also two
knights from each county, two burgesses from each borough and (for the first time ever) two
general citizens from each city. Concepts of broader representation matured over time. The
parliament split into the House of Lords and the House of Commons just fifty years later.
The Magna Carta, revived in fits and starts, lived on. Many clauses (such as 39, 39, 45) re-
affirmed the right to a fair trial, and became firmly embedded in practice. Similarly, causes 1, 9,
and 29 are in force even today. Many other clauses influenced later statues, and were formally
adopted as law. 23
These parliaments were not, however, institutionalised yet, and were convened only
whimsically by kings. Consider, for instance, the reign of James I who ruled England from 1603
to 1625 after Queen Elizabeth I. (We have met him earlier in relation to his views on the divine
rights of kings.) James I dissolved his first parliament in 1611 but summoned a new one in 1614.
He then dissolved that one as well. His third parliament, summoned in 1621, is famous for
impeaching Sir Francis Bacon (the scientific method man). Dissolving his third parliament,
James I summoned it again in 1623 when he desperately needed money.
His poor relationship with his parliaments was worsened by his son, Charles I, who began
his reign in 1625. The parliament got sick of the whimsical actions of kings and decided to oust
Charles I. A ferocious civil war began in 1642 (one in ten Englishman would die as a result;
freedom has never came cheaply). The forces of the parliament were led by Oliver Cromwell.
Finally Charles I was defeated and arrested in 1647. A court was established by the House of
Commons in 1649 to try him. Charles declined to make a plea, arguing a divine right to rule:
hence that he was above the law. The court made short shrift of his claim and beheaded him – in
public. (Modern judicial systems would, of course, insist on preserving the dignity of the prisoner
during capital punishment.) The bell had tolled for the British monarchy. The end of whimsical
rule was nigh.
After Charles I, Oliver Cromwell led a people’s council which ruled England till 1653. But
democracy is never easy. Frustrated with the infighting and bickering in the council, Cromwell
ultimately disbanded it, albeit reluctantly. He was surely a reluctant dictator, from all accounts.
However, his third son, Richard Cromwell, was not so reluctant. After Cromwell’s death in 1658
Richard made an abortive attempt to become king. Chaos was descending upon England and as
usually happens in such a case, the more powerful individual took over England – Charles II,
the son of Charles I. To avoid disintegration and anarchy, the parliament restored monarchy in
1660. Why did the parliament not create a republican president? On a practical level, the wealth
of Charles II was a crucial determinant. However, the theory of democracy and republic had not
yet been advanced to the level needed to support a republic. That was the time of Hobbes who
had argued for a strong king. Locke had not yet come onto the scene (being born in 1632), nor
Montesquieu (who was born 1689).
The civil war taught both sides valuable lessons. The kings now had one last chance to show
some respect for the parliament. The society had validated Hobbes’s insight about a strong
government – democratic ruling councils would have to show some discipline in the future: they

23 [http://www.answers.com/topic/magna-carta]

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could not bickering for ever and still achieve legitimacy in society. Respect for democracy was
valid, but democracy had to be disciplined.

2.2 The Glorious Revolution of 1688

The British monarchy did need to take a few more hard knocks before it finally learnt its
lesson. Charles II, who was keenly aware of the power of the parliament, kept it happy during
his regime till 1685. Peace reigned.
But his brother James II – who followed him as king – wasn’t gifted with much common
sense. Long before he became king, in 1669, James II had converted to Catholicism (which was,
by then, not a politically savvy thing to do). He had thereafter begun to actively promote
Catholicism, claiming liberty of conscience. England, which had become Protestant by then, did
not welcome this, from its king. James prorogued the parliament almost as soon as he ascended
the throne, and dissolved it two years later, in 1687. There was effectively no parliament during
his tenure. That was to prove to be a great mistake.
Erstwhile members of his dissolved parliament joined forces with Protestant forces and
organised an armed revolt in 1688. The revolt was led by James’s (Protestant) Dutch son-in-law,
William III, who had married his daughter Mary II. Many of James’s officers, being Protestants,
abandoned his army. His other daughter (Anne) declined to support him, either. James II had no
one to defend him. He was therefore allowed to flee to France, marking a bloodless coup known
as the Glorious Revolution. After this the parliament took away the powers of the English
monarchy to make laws and administer justice, and converted it into a cultural artefact. The
king became a figurehead. This change was helped by the intelligence of William III, who
understood that the time to keep trifling with the power of the people was over. He agreed to
take on a decorative role.
William III convened his parliament (the first genuine parliament) which then declared him
and Mary II to be the joint rulers of England. After their coronation the parliament passed the
Bill of Rights (or the Declaration of Rights) which, upon receiving royal consent, became An Act
Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of the Crown. The
Declaration, read with the Magna Carta, underpins the British social contract. England has not
so far, consolidated these documents into a Constitution (it is presumably mulling over the need
for such a document). Among various other things, the Declaration:
• established ‘That the pretended power of suspending the laws or the execution of laws by
regal authority without consent of Parliament is illegal’, and ‘That the pretended power of
dispensing with laws or the execution of laws by regal authority, as it hath been assumed
and exercised of late, is illegal’. It ended all claims of kings to any divine right, and placed
them firmly below the parliament’s thumb;
• required the king to seek the parliament’ consent to raise any tax, including for meeting the
ongoing expenses of the military;
• guaranteed free and fair elections to the parliament (even though representation was very
limited);
• guaranteed ‘parliamentary privilege’ or the unrestricted freedom of speech for members of
parliament during a parliamentary proceeding; and
• established the order of succession of the kings in England.
The Triennial Act, enacted in 1694, prevented the king from disbanding the parliament and
placed a requirement that general elections be held every three years. The Britain’s parliament
has ever since assembled without any arbitrary dissolution or break. The Whigs, the party of the
classical liberals, became the prominent political group, initially. In summary, ‘[a]fter the
revolution, Parliament sharply curbed the royal prerogative powers, denied the kind the power
to dismiss parliaments or to replace judges at pleasure, took firm control of the government’s
purse strings, asserted its supervision of the military, and strengthened property rights.’ 24 (One

24 Starr, Paul, Freedom’s Power, New York: Basic Books, 2007, p.32-33.,

217
of the reasons England grew dramatically since then was the ability of the Parliament to borrow
money, unlike kings who, because of the innate instability of their position, could not in similar
proportion. Indeed, as we note later, in 1694, the Bank of England was created as a central bank
and the government borrowed heavily, a pattern that has continued till today!)
Almost precisely a hundred years after the liberation of England, the French Revolution was
to take place (in 1789). I do not consider it, however, to be a pivotal event in the history of
freedom. Three reasons: one, it was strongly influenced by Rousseau’s arguments of fraternity
and equality which had strong collectivist underpinnings. These ideas go well beyond the
concept of negative liberty. Second, Voltaire’s ideas of freedom, which were instrumental in
motivating the revolution as well, were not informed by a clear understanding of requirements of
good governance, but were relatively superficial. Finally, the leaders of the French Revolution
were of an extremely questionable sort. Maximilien Robespierre came from a utopian Jacobian
tradition which had strong roots in socialist ideas. Given its illiberal precedents, and poor
understanding of the principles of governance, the French Revolution quickly moved towards
positive liberty, a desire to liberate ‘man from suffering’ (Hannah Arendt 25). The actions of its
leaders were reprehensible. Robespierre acted like a cheap dictator, abolishing religion with the
aim, supposedly, of introducing an ‘age of reason’. More problematically, he created the Terror
which killed about 70 or 80 people each day in a frenzy of whimsy and injustice. Moderate
members of the National Convention were among those who were killed. He thus introduced the:
tyranny of a few ... who had such a passionate love for democratic virtue that they felt compelled
to kill all those who disagreed with them. France was turned into a slaughter house. Everybody
suspected everybody else.... Out of sheer fear, a few members of the old Convention, who knew
they were the next candidates for the scaffold, finally turned against Robespierre, who had
already decapitated most of his former colleagues. Robespierre [a coward at heart in my view]
tried to kill himself but failed. He ... was dragged to the guillotine. 26
After Robespierre was killed, the Terror abruptly ceased, as Paris danced with joy. As a
‘revolution’ based on false premises and inappropriate actions, the French Revolution did
nothing to bring about a free society with well-ordered justice. I tend to agree with Edmund
Burke’s critique of the French Revolution. It must be noted, however, that its related events –
such as Thomas Paine’s advocacy of revolution – did indeed lead to the advance human freedom.
In other words, the unintended consequences of the French Revolution were reasonably
significant.

2.3 The American Declaration of Independence, 1776

The American Revolution, in comparison the French Revolution that succeeded it, was a
genuine advance. It had some of the best possible leaders whose contributions to liberty are
immense. Through this revolution, the ‘Americans followed the example of Britain in creating a
form of constitutional government, but they gave a new meaning to constitutionalism and a new
structure to government’ 27. ‘With the American founding, constitutional liberalism became both
a state-limiting and a state building strategy, at once a method for creating power and building
in checks against its misuse.’ 28
This revolution occurred place between 1763 to 1789, with the American War of
Independence sandwiched between, from 1775 to 1783. Its most valuable product, perhaps, was
the small but powerful 1776 Declaration of Independence. It is worth noting that in many ways,
the British Declaration of Rights was the direct precursor of this document and (later) of the
first ten amendments to the US Constitution of 1791 which, collectively, are called the
(American) Bill of Rights. The Declaration, drafted primarily by Thomas Jefferson with the help
of John Adams and Benjamin Franklin, among others, talks about liberty in the most

25 Cited in Harzenski, Sharon, ‘Terrorism, A History: Stage One’ Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, Vol. 12:2,
p.148. [http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/transnational/vol12_2/harzenski.pdf]
26 Van Loon, Hendrik Willem, ‘The Story of Mankind’,
27 Starr, Paul, Freedom’s Power, New York: Basic Books, 2007, p.41.
28 Starr, Paul, Freedom’s Power, New York: Basic Books, 2007, p.52.

218
scintillating manner conceivable. It gives voice to John Locke’s ideas on our natural right to life
and liberty in a manner that expresses to our deepest aspirations. It says, in simple language:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness. – That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.
These are surely some of the most elegant words ever strung together. These are the words we
have always wanted to say, as an entire species, but couldn’t find the voice and clarity earlier.
Here’s another gem:
That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the
People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such
principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect
their Safety and Happiness.’ This affirms our power as sovereign individuals to overthrow
despotic regimes. It does, however, caution us from rushing to judgement: ‘Prudence, indeed, will
dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes.
While the reasons cited for declaring independence from England in the Declaration are not
relevant here, they do seem to suggest that despite its policies being made by Parliament after
1689, England had continued to remain wedded to mercantilism. It is almost as if the former
misuse of power by the kings had now shifted to the aristocracy that constituted the parliament.
It is true that this parliament had also started demanding higher ethical standards in
governance than ever before, such as from the East India Company. It had started impeachment
proceedings against Robert Clive in 1767 (he was acquitted). Many of its other decisions were,
however, highly questionable – such as its refusal to allow representation to the British colonists
in America, leading to far-reaching consequences, and charges against King George III in the
Declaration, such as:
• He has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of
our people.
• He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his
invasions on the rights of the people. He has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions,
to cause others to be elected.
• He is at this time transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenaries to compleat the works of
death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty & perfidy
scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized
nation.
I’m not sure how many of these allegations attributed to the King were actually attributable
to him, and how many to his Prime Minister Lord North (1770–82). Edmund Burke was a
parliamentarian then, as well, and demanded conciliation with America 29 but was not heard
(Adam Smith’s book of 1776 came too late to matter, either). Whoever was ultimately
responsible for prompting these charges, it does suggest that parliaments can easily become
tyrannies themselves, as well. England must surely rue the excesses of its parliament (or king).
Imagine what a force England would have been today had America part of its federation. Aside:
another important contributions to democratic theory arose during the Revolution, through the
well known slogan, ‘No taxation without representation.’

2.4 The right to vote

Early liberals argued that the right to vote should be limited to those who are capable of
exercising that right responsibly. ‘Locke in the Second Treatise on Government makes clear that
suffrage depends on property: only parts of the public that pay taxes have a right to vote, in
proportion to the assistance which they afford the public.’ 30

29 Burke, Edmund, ‘Speech on Moving His Resolutions for Conciliation with the Colonies,’ March 22, 1775. The Works

of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, Vol. II. (of 12), Project Gutenberg.
[http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15198/15198-h/15198-h.htm#CONCILIATION_WITH_THE_COLONIES]
30 Gordon, David, ‘The Attempt at Vindicating Lincoln’, Mises.org, 26 November 2008. [http://mises.org/story/3224]

219
 Bentham was one of the most forceful votaries of the universal franchise (only for men, of
course, consistent with the social ethos of his time), arguing ‘that universal suffrage is the only
way of promoting “the greatest happiness for the greatest number”‘ 31. James Mill (1773-1836),
J.S. Mill’s father, was also a staunch votary of democracy. His son continued that tradition but
added that those who live off charity (parish relief) should be disqualified from voting: ‘the
receipt of parish relief should be a peremptory disqualification for the franchise. He who cannot
by his labour suffice for his own support has no claim to the privilege of helping himself to the
money of others.’ 32
But J.S. Mill’s argument is not tenable, even assuming that government was the source of
charity. For we come together and form a nation to protect our life and (equal) freedoms. Under
this social contract we agree that those people whose resources drop below the social minimum
will be provided with frugal relief until they or their children can stand on their feet. Such
payments are not charity but returns on a social insurance premium (and hence entitlements)
available as a general rule to everyone who may be so eligible; paid through taxes in advance.
The recipient may have paid taxes in the past, or his parents may have done so.
If equal freedom has to make any sense at all, every adult without significant mental
disabilities should be able to vote. Indeed, if poor people were not allowed to vote, they would
lose the ability to influence the legislation that might end up destroying their liberties. Anyway,
modern societies do not agree with such restrictions, and all adults (over 18) are generally
provided with the right to vote.

3. Citizen-leadership in democracy
In Chapter 9 I discussed some steps to prevent government tyranny. We also saw that
despite democracies generally being beneficial for peace, they are no guarantees that they will
not convert into tyrannies. That India was a democracy did not prevent Indira Gandhi from
declaring emergency on frivolous grounds. Hitler’s Germany was also notionally a democracy –
albeit with major design flaws (in hindsight). Thus, Hitler’s partly only secured 12 seats in 1928
in the Reichstag, a tally that increased to 230 out of 608 in 1932 through strong arm tactics on
the streets. His party’s seats reduced to 196 subsequently. In any event, his party was not close
to a majority at any time, but through devious machinations involving former Chancellor Franz
von Papen, Hitler came to power. 33 Once installed, he was unstoppable. Hitler clearly could not
have come to power in a Westminster-type democracy with well-designed institutions. It is
therefore necessary while designing democratic institutions to identify and close all loopholes
that can be used by demagogues to ‘democratically’ destroy democracy. In BFN I explored the
loopholes that allow corrupt elements in India to rise to the top. Those were matters of detail,
and very important. However, some broader principles and methods to hold democracies to
account are outlined below.

3.1 Citizen assertion, and vigilance

Having agreed to a democratic form of government, the citizens of a society need to supervise
the democracy, even as it is not practical to exercise direct oversight over the functioning of
governments at all times. The citizen must be prepared to assert his sovereignty at all times as
the employer of the government; its principle. For instance, calling political leaders by their first
names is absolutely necessary. If they insist on being giving titles, then we can address them as
‘Dear First Servant’, but definitely not appellations like ‘Your Highness’ or ‘Your Honour’ which
give them an inflated sense of their importance.
It will be foolish of us to ever treat the government as a benevolent agency. Being vigilant,
even suspicious about potential misuse of power is crucial. ‘Trust but verify’ must be our motto.

31 Heywood, Andrew, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, p.45.
32, Chapter VIII (OF THE EXTENSION OF THE SUFFRAGE), in .
Mill, J.S. [1861], ‘Considerations on Representative Government’, On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, World Classics Paperback 1991, p.322.
33 see [http://www.huppi.com/kangaroo/L-hitlerdemo.htm]

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We must always demand accounts. Fortunately, modern governments generally publish detailed
reports that tell us about how our money is being spent. Secrecy in government is another thing
to be avoided. The media must be allowed to shine light on the government’s various actions.
Mechanisms for demanding accountability include Local Boards, implementing which, however,
requires sophistication among citizens that is not readily found even in the best societies. 34

3.2 Leading the society: forming the government

Power is heady brew. But only those who understand human nature, namely the classical
liberals, truly understand this concept. Most others are keenly interested in blindly trusting the
government. Thus, if those who understand the temptations of power do not aim to form the
government, then our governments will invariably turn against us. The liberal is obliged to
deliver the social contract he talks about. They must offer to represent their fellow citizens in
elected bodies. They should contest elections even if not always elected. And, of course, once the
liberal forms government, the best protection against or a coup is to deliver good governance to
the people. When governments are directly controlled by such freedom-loving citizens, rogue
governments cannot easily arise.
After the demise of the Swatantra Party in 1973, India could not produce a liberal political
party. Therefore citizen freedoms have been significantly truncated over the past six decades. In
addition, intense corruption characterises the Indian democratic system today. The Indian
democracy is only notionally accountable to the citizens today (changing governments every few
years is not enough). It is high time that educated liberals get involved in the governance of the
country. Only after India adopts the system of natural liberty, namely, capitalism, will security
and justice be delivered.

34 See Appendix xxx of Online Notes – details.

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Chapter 11 The pillar of the rule of Law

‘When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person … there can be no
liberty’ [and] … ‘there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the
legislative and executive.’ – Montesquieu 1

Equal liberty implies, and is contingent on, the legally mandated equal treatment of all. This
is assured by a system where the law or rules, i.e. the ‘government of laws and not of men.’ 2
Governments are required to take decisions on the basis of general principles and not
arbitrarily. In particular, laws must apply equally to everyone. The history of this simple but
very important liberal institution can be traced back to alternative systems and codes of law.

1. A law must be known in advance

Codifying a society’s laws is generally a first step towards the creation of the rule of law.
There was a culture of making general laws in the ancient Mesopotamian civilisation. In Old
Babylon in the 18th century BC, Hammurabi had begun codifying the law. With these codes, the
law was no longer dictated by the whim of the king or judge. People now knew in advance how
they would be treated under specific circumstances. In ancient India, while religious codes were
drafted and the political philosophy of law developed, formal codes or general laws were
generally not used. Instead, the king’s opinion was treated as law (the story of Ram rajya is a
case in point where the word of Ram was taken as the final word).
It was with the Roman system of law, however, that codified laws of a certain quality
emerged, influencing later legal development across the world. The laws made by Roman
emperors were codified in order to bring about some level of consistency and uniformity in the
application of justice across its vast domains. The great systematisation of Roman law took place
with the Byzantine emperor Justinian I’s (482/483-565) Corpus juris civilis (originally intended
for the Eastern Roman empire). Justinian’s laws became influential across Western Europe
through the work of academics like Irenius (d.1125) who taught the code in the Italian
University at Bologna, a major centre of legal learning in medieval Europe. 3
This Greco-Roman tradition was later extended by Napoleon through his codes of law that
were created between 1804 and 1811. It is important to note, however, that neither Roman law
nor Napoleon’s code applied to the Emperor or his senior officials. Therefore, these codified laws
were not true general laws, and do not represent the liberal conception of the rule of the law.
(Note that the Roman law tradition is commonly referred to as ‘civil’ law after the title, Corpus
juris civilis. This is not used in the sense of being the opposite of criminal law.)
A slightly different and almost equally ancient tradition of law was developed separately, in
England – a tradition that did, ultimately, yield the rule of law. English kings had used
somewhat elementary kinds of law codes in the past – codes considerably simpler than those of
the Romans. For instance, the code of King Ethelbert of Kent (600 AD) comprised ninety
sentences on the following lines: ‘If one man strikes another with the fist on the nose – three
shillings.’ 4 This was not a general code, since it discriminated amongst various classes of people.
Thus, fines varied with social rank: ‘If a man slay another in the king’s tun [dwelling], let him
make bot [compensation] with fifty shillings.’ On the other hand, ‘If a man slay another in an

1 Montesquieu, L’Esprit des Lois (Spirit of the Laws), 1748. Translated by Thomas Nugent, 1752.
[http://books.mirror.org/gb.montesquieu.html]
2 From the 1780 Constitution of the state of Massachusetts.
3 Cited in A History of World Societies by John P. McKay, Bennett D Hill and John Buckler (1988), Volume 1. London:

Houghton Mifflin Co., p.411.

4 Lefroy, A. H. F., ‘The Anglo-Saxon Period of English Law’, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 26, No. 4, (Feb., 1917), p. 293.

222
eorl’s [Earl’s] tun, let him make bot with twelve shillings.’ 5 Later Anglo-Saxon laws continued
this differential treatment of different ranks of people. The fine for killing a small-time king was
£1 500 but for killing a prince, only £750. 6
Another tradition developed after the Norman conquest of 1066, ‘Common Law’ (also known
as Anglo-American law) began to develop more rapidly now. Common law is entirely different
from codified law. It can be thought of as ‘common-sense’ or practical law that evolved not
through the king’s fiat or formal codification but through the discovery of key principles of justice
by judges who adjudicated on real-life problems. The concept of trial by a jury of twelve lay
jurors emerged as part of this development process, during the thirteenth century. In many
ways, the common law is created by the judgements of law people (jurors). It is a ‘body of
customary law, based upon judicial decisions and embodied in reports of decided cases, which
has been administered by the common-law courts of England since the Middle Ages.’ 7 Common
law ‘developed features that differed strikingly from the system of Roman law operative in
continental Europe. [It] … relied on precedents: a decision in an important case served as an
authority for deciding similar cases. By contrast, the continental judges, trained in Roman law,
used the fixed legal maxims of the Justinian code to decide their cases.’ 8 The collective history of
precedents steadily evolved into a system of non-arbitrary rules in England that mimic, in a
broad sense, the conception of a code of law that gives certainty to citizens.
Bruno Lenoni seems to think that the difference between Roman and common law is not
significant. According to him, ‘The Romans and the English shared the idea that the law is
something to be discovered more than to be enacted.’ 9 That, to me, does appear to be an
exaggeration. And yet, it is true that over the past two hundred years, after Napoleon’s system,
these two have steadily become closer to each other in their operation. Many aspects of common
law now codified through statutes, and civil law takes advantage of the case history developed
through common law. Most importantly, though, the exemption for senior officials from the
application of laws no longer exists across the West.

2. The same rules for all

Our good friend, the Magna Carta of 1215, has been absolutely crucial in the history of
freedom. One of its most significant contributions has been to insist that laws must not only be
known in advance (i.e. non discretionary), but must apply equally of all, including (at least for
the most part) the king. We know that even though the kings of England continued to be
powerful till 1688, the Magna Carta had been seriously clipping their wings all the way since
1215. Of course, the Magna Carta allowed certain ceremonial functions to the king, e.g. letting
him pompously ‘grant’ citizens their liberty: ‘We have ... granted to all the Freemen of our
Kingdom, all the underwritten Liberties’. This is nonsense, of course, for none can grant liberty
to us; only take it away – or return it back to us on demand.
The Magna Carta ‘granted’ a number of liberties to the commonest of citizens, including the
most basic of these: liberty of our body: ‘No freeman shall be seized, or imprisoned, or
dispossessed, or outlawed, or in any way destroyed; nor will we condemn him, nor will we
commit him to prison, excepting by the legal judgement of his peers, or by the laws of the land’
(emphasis mine). The Magna Carta also required king’s functionaries to behave judiciously, even
judicially (with due process). Thus, ‘no Bailiff ... shall put any man to his law, upon his own
simple affirmation, without credible witnesses produced for the purpose.’ The king was required
to let his decisions be scrutinised by a group of twenty five Barons who thus formed an appellate
body of sorts. In other words, the king’s ability to make capricious decisions was significantly
curtailed.

5 The Anglo-Saxon Dooms, 560-975 available in full on the internet.

6 The Book of Knowledge, Sydney: Golden Press, 1983, p.138.
7 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2001 CD-ROM edition.
8 Cited in A History of World Societies by John P. McKay, Bennett D Hill and John Buckler (1988), Volume 1. London:

Houghton Mifflin Co., p.400.

9 Leoni, Bruno, Freedom and the Law, Nash Publishing, Los Angeles, 1972, p. 10. (cited in de Soto, p.162.)

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 The king was also forced to commit to the delivery of justice through stationary (i.e. not
randomly located, or itinerant) courts. ‘Ordinary lawsuits shall not follow the royal court around,
but shall be held in a fixed place.’ This was implemented well enough, and went on to become
the modern institution of independent courts, whose decisions went on to inform the common
law. The Magna Carta also established standards for weights and measures. Standards are
public goods that a market may not necessarily supply efficiently. The government can enhance
trade through establishment of standards, which reduces information gaps.
In general, the Magna Carta laid a strong foundation for the development of the rule of law,
particularly equal justice for all. After initial hiccups that we have earlier noted, each king
routinely re-proclaimed it, particularly during moments of financial need. This key outcome of
the Magna Carta got embedded into the psyche of the English people and later influenced the
nations they colonised, as well.

3. The right to be produced before a court

This is, once again, a British contribution to liberty and justice. In medieval England, if
someone was detained by a magistrate or by a lower court, it was often difficult to make an
appeal to the king or his royal court. Over time, however, it became customary for detainees to
be able to lodge their petition with the royal court through an agent, or, in rare cases, personally.
The royal court could then issue a writ of habeas corpus (Latin for: ‘you (shall) have the body’) if
it believed that the reasons for detention were not sufficient (the writ could, of course, not help
those imprisoned after due process, such as through a criminal trial). The writ released the
detainee. This appellate power against detention (not against its cause) marked a major advance
in the development of the rule of law. Writs of this type had appeared as early as the 11th
century, but their formal use was first recorded in 1305. By the time King John I acknowledged
it as a basic right in the 1215 Magna Carta (clauses 36, 38, 39, and 40) the writ was already part
and parcel of community expectations. It was more formally institutionalised through the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.
Today, no society can claim to be free without the basic guaranty to its citizens to this writ –
except in the most exceptional circumstances (e.g. the US Constitution says: ‘The Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it’ (Article 1, Section 9)). Indeed, in many countries, a detainee can
now usually lodge a request with a designated judge even in the middle of the night. In India,
this writ has been successfully used by many. For instance, Kanu Sanyal – a Naxlite leader
detained till 1971 in the Visakhapatnam jail upon the arbitrary direction of the District
Magistrate of Darjeeling. Unfortunately the Supreme Court of India meekly declined to use its
power during the Emergency, a cowardly action which let Indira Gandhi imprison her political
opponents without recourse to any form of justice.

4. Separation of law-making and adjudication

It may appear obvious to us today that the best way for laws to be made is for those who
make them to not be the ones to administer them. This ensures that laws are made in general
terms. A lawmaker’s job is to imagine how he or she would fare under the law, given it would be
universally applicable – including to the lawmaker. The concept of non-arbitrary law and equal
justice is not obvious, and took a long time to develop. So also, the distinction between the
lawmaker and adjudicator evolved relatively recently, chiefly motivated by the contributions of
Montesquieu (1689-1755). He made a very strong case for checks and balances in the democratic
system including for the separation of powers of the legislature, judiciary, and executive.
Unchecked power is certain to be used arbitrarily, for we are all human.
These views had far-reaching impacts through his influence on Jefferson and hence on the
American constitution. USA became the first nation to comply with the rule of law, with the
USA constitution insisting on the ‘due process of law’. It is a moot question whether the USA
actually delivers the rule of law.

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Chapter 12 The pillar of property rights

‘Since man has to sustain his life by his own effort, the man who has no right to the product of
his effort has no means to sustain his life. The man who produces while others dispose of his
product, is a slave.’ Ayn Rand, ‘Man’s Rights’, in The Virtue of Selfishness.

The scholar Howard Williams summarised the importance of the institution of property
rights in a 1984 book, thus: ‘the concept of property has been a central concern of political
philosophy from classical times onward. … Property relations go to the root of any social
system’. 1 If the fruit of our labour is to be at the mercy of any passing stranger or gangster, our
society will surely end up in murderous conflict. Not only must our body to be protected, but our
property must be protected as well.
There are two main types of property: one belongs collectively to entire nations and the other
belongs to specific individuals. While individual property rights are logically innate (Propositions
2, 3), group territorial rights must exist (Proposition 4, Chapter 4) before they can be enforced.
We look at these two now, with national property rights first.

1. Claims of nations to territory (The Fortress)

Wherefrom do nations get their right to own vast territories of land and water? Collective (or
tribal) territorial ‘rights’ have necessarily to be based on physical occupation, and continue to
exist (or change) according to the collective’s ability to defend its occupation. (This is closely
linked to the social contract). Nations are the most obvious and visible reminders of our tribal
origins.

1.1 The emergence of nations

Unlike individual property rights which must necessarily emerge along with our actions and
accompanying attributions and accountabilities, and be contractually enforced by the society,
The concept of liberty and justice has virtually nothing to do with so-called territorial ‘rights’.
Sheer power is all that matters in this case – the vigour and energy radiated by an entire
collective. There is absolutely nothing that dictates where a national boundary shall be drawn
except what the group of people that choose to belong to a nation, occupy. The boundaries of a
nation can be based on ethnicity, religion, or some principle. Historically speaking, tribes tended
to grow into city states and with the advent of cannons (which allowed ease of conquests), city
states expanded into large territories, being the seed of modern nation state. Of course many
exceptions exist, such as the Maurya empire which had no access to cannons.
Even when while boundaries are drawn sitting in an ivory tower (as with the boundaries of
India and Pakistan upon partition that were drawn up in Delhi or with many Middle Eastern or
African countries), there must be coercive force to enforce these boundaries. Without such force,
boundaries can change quite rapidly (e.g. Kashmir’s boundary). Indeed, and there is no logic to
‘revert’ ownership of territory. This is all about brute power. If a nation can’t hold on to its
territories, it can lose them easily and can make no further claims on is old boundaries. All
previous claims are forfeited as soon as collective territory changes hands. This is an irrevocable
change. The law of the jungle rules.
Debates on terra nullius vs. conquest in Australia, for instance, are totally irrelevant.
Australia took possession of – and continues to possess – the territory it now occupies. This
situation can only be changed by force. The law of any society has absolutely no role in this
debate. While Australia well may, in its strategic self-interest, share chunks of this land with
Aboriginal communities, the reality is that unless the Aboriginal people gather the power to

1 Williams, Howard, Kant’s Political Philosophy. New York: Macmillan, 1983.

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control what they call their own land, their claims on property taken away from them by English
settlers are absolutely worthless.
Because their claims to territory are based purely on physical prowess, nation-states are
extremely fluid in terms of the human timeline, leave alone geological timelines. Human history
is a moving feast of national boundaries. New banners keep emerging and forcing their way in.
Territory has also (at least till the last century) been purchased. Alternatively, gentlemen’s’
agreements can create nations (such as Australia which arose through a voluntary decision by
its constituent states).
To the believer in moral principles, this process of coercive control over territorial appears to
be primitive, even illegitimate. But we must not be disappointed with our animal roots. We are a
ferocious and tribal animal species. If our history is a guide, our future will be filled with many
ferocious territorial battles. It is crucial that we do not forget human tribal roots and are always
prepared to defend – with brute force – our territory from rogue tribal groups and nations, such
as religious tribal groups like the Al-Qaeda.

1.2 The curse of jingoism

As Albert Einstein said, ‘Nationalism is an infantile disease. It is the measles of mankind. …
Our schoolbooks glorify war and hide its terrors. They inculcate hatred in the veins of children.’ 2
Nationalism is the religion with the world’s largest following. Like any religion, it has some
utility but many shortcomings. Our emotional bond with our nation can reach absurd heights.
As Morgenthau noted:
the great mass of the individual members of a nation ... identify themselves with the power and the
foreign policies of the nation, experience this power and these policies as their own, and do so with an
emotional intensity often surpassing the emotional attachment to their individual aspirations for
power. 3
Even where a nation is created artificially, with no historical antecedents of its form or
shape, as with Pakistan (or many African nations), its citizens soon become convinced through
incessant socialisation and indoctrination that their nation is a some kind of ‘deity’ to be
elevated above them; even worshipped. Ritual military parades, celebrations, and solemn
occasions to mark the anniversaries of various national events and heroes soon arise. And soon
people are prepared to kill others more readily for their nation than even for their religion. This
great human weakness: of eulogising the fortress which we need purely in order to defend
ourselves, has very ancient roots. Indeed, early Greek philosophers almost always recommended
that national boundaries be expanded to acquire slaves and to achieve glory.
Acquiring other’s territory must surely rank among the more stupid things that we do. In
the end, reality does dawn after thousands or millions of people have lost their lives in vain.
Former foes become allies; people intermarry; old nations disappear. It is such a colossal waste
of human life to aspire to expand one’s nation’s boundaries. Taking control of bits and pieces of
land at great cost – only to give them back in the end: how does it help anyone? Of course, this
sentiment is mere wishful thinking. In a strategic (and second-best) world there is no possibility
of nations stopping their constant expansion of boundaries.
It is time for the leaders of the world to work for political and economic unions: something on
the pattern of the European Union (EU), for instance. That will perhaps bring durable peace and
prosperity. If all goes well, the nation state may ultimately become a less brutal entity (I am
reminded of the Canadian referendum of 1995 on Quebec’s secession). It is possible that,
ultimately, as more nations deliver genuine freedom to their citizens, the nation-state may
become a cultural boundary, with primary differences only in language and national songs.
Unfortunately, nations differ today most significantly in their level of freedom, thus
motivating people to constantly migrate from less free to more free nations. Secession and
migration – to seek greater freedom – can only be an intermediate step to the ultimate goal of

2Cited by Carl Sagan in Broca’s Brain, New York: Ballantine Books, 1979, p.37.
3Morgenthau, Hans J., and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New
Delhi: Kalyani Publishers, 1985, p.118.

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greater freedom everywhere. Once freedom is uniformly available, then secession will become
outdated, irrelevant. Today, numerous movements are seeking to secede from India and are in a
rush to use force without exploring various democratic options. However, by not displaying even
basic regard for life and liberty, they nullify their claim to be seeking the best interests of ‘their’
people. Random killings of people (e.g. through bombs) by ULFA 4, for instance, are totally
indefensible. Terrorist secessionist movements must stop their massacre of innocents and start
talking about whether they seek genuine freedom, and if so how. Providing greater levels of
freedom to ‘their’ people can be achieved through greater federalism and local empowerment in
which states and local governments implement policies of freedom. If Indian secessionists (or
others) kill people (and often indiscriminately), why would anyone trust them to look after the
lives and freedoms of ‘their’ so-called people? All they seem to have on offer is anarchy. It is clear
that violent secessionism is a menace and must be curbed. (Of course, I realised the inmate
contradiction between this view and the reality that nation states, whatever their value, have to
mostly come into existence on the basis of force.)
And then we must face the vexed issue of negative externalities. With some forms of
pollution an across-Earth phenomenon, we need to get some coordination across national states.
No nation should be able to transgress or damage others’ property, or pollute without
consequence. 5 A global social contract, broadly in the form of the national social contract, may
ultimately have to be negotiated by all nations, with stringent enforcement mechanisms for
accountability across national boundaries. Of course this is virtually impossible to achieve.
While the League of Nations and the United Nations have made some initial attempts, these
bodies do not come even close to the level of coordination needed if mankind is not to destroy the
earth through its polluting activities, or even resolve vexed problems like excessive harvesting of
fish. No doubt, greater scientific cooperation is taking place among advanced countries, as with
Antarctica scientific expeditions and space exploration. But vast areas of cooperation remain
unresolved.
Today, Mugabe’s regime can literally get away with mass murder. It can also drive hundreds
of thousands of people out of Zimbabwe into neighbouring countries, without anyone being able
to push back on Mugabe’s inhumanity. There is no one, within or outside Zimbabwe, to hold him
to account. If human freedoms are to be defended, national sovereignty will have to be
recognised widely for what it is – an artificial artefact of our convenience. The nation is merely a
fortress behind which we group together to fight for our freedoms, should that need arise. It is
not the reason for our existence. We need a system by which would-be Stalins, Maos, Idi Amins,
Mugabes and Hitlers are nipped in the bud and can’t rise to positions of power.
Also, vast amounts of property in the seabed, in the sea and in space remains un-allocated.
When specific people or countries are not accountable for vast parts of the globe, the curse of the
commons afflicts those parts, leaving to things like over-fishing and unchecked pollution.
Ideally, all territory must be allocated to someone, and within each territory, all property
allocated.
Tribes and petty kingdoms clearly outlived their utility hundreds of years ago. Today, even
the nation state has lost at least some of its relevance. How the problems of cooperation across
national boundaries are to be resolved is the next great frontier for the theory of freedom. This
problem will not be resolved without ensuring that the protection of freedoms becomes the first
priority of all nations.

2. Property rights
Only after the nation or fortress has been fully established can we meaningfully discuss the
underlying social contract which would need to give primacy to the defence of our (personal)
property rights. As we have seen, individual property ‘rights’ are innate but are enforceable only
to the extent the society recognizes them as rights. Alchian’s provides an excellent definition of
property, thus: ‘The rights of an individual to the use of resources (i.e., property rights) in any

4 United Liberation Front of Assam.

5 For instance, the issue about compensation for the pollution caused by greenhouse gases.

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society are to be construed as supported by the force of etiquette, social custom, ostracism, and
formal legally enacted laws supported by the states’ power of violence or punishment.’ 6 Property
rights are ‘a method of assigning to particular individuals the “authority” to select, for specific
goods, any use from a nonprohibited class of uses.’ 7
Animal behaviour can throw at least some light on the origin of property rights. Animals and
birds may happen to need a ‘house’ at times – nests, burrows or caves (particularly when
breeding or hiding from the elements). They may also exercise some control over an area of land
or water in which to find prey. This is less urgent in three-dimensional space, such as inside
deep water or in the air (crocodiles command direct control even over shallow rivers). Carnivores
are well-known to mark and defend land. Even coral fish defend their little space among the
corals. It would appear that property in a place to live and rear our young has a very strong
biological basis. We are well advised to stay away from the cave in which a bear is rearing its
young. But there is a counterpart for the land a carnivore controls to hunt (produce) food –
namely, our farmlands (or land for factories).
Notice the constant battles over control of space in the animal world. This translates into our
need to defend our property from encroachment. Also, ‘personal property’ is not distributed
evenly in the animal world, but in proportion to physical might. Alpha males thus ‘own’
disproportionately more ‘things’. Socialist ideas of equality clearly have no basis at all in nature.
No ‘natural’ rights over property can arguably arise in isolation of our animal origins. And
indeed, our animal ‘powers’ ultimately underpin our ‘rights’.
The behaviour of primitive human tribes provides us with other valuable clues, as well. All
tribes lay claim to at least some geographical territory, and will wage war (or have done so in its
defence in the past). In addition, individual tribe members possess private at least some
property – things like a personal place to sleep at the end of the day, be it in a hut or cave. They
possess ‘chattel’ 8 and other personal belongings too. In the tribes of Arunachal Pradesh, the most
important chattel – mithun (a type of cow) – is owned by individual tribal families and used in
marriage as dowry. The very existence of dowry points to the existence of individual property
rights, howsoever rudimentary (only if one owns something can one give it away). In some tribes
the house, clearly a crucial part of personal property, is passed on to the youngest daughter (as
in rural Thailand). Thus, even tribes allow some private property. It is true, though, that tribes
may not quite understand the concept of ‘possessing’ land. Thus Paul Pilzner suggests that
Native Americans did not quite grasp the concept of land ownership. When they were paid by
European settlers for land from which they had removed edible plants and game, the Natives
thought that they had got a good deal, little realising that they had given away the rights to all
future produce from that land. 9 It would seem to me that such ignorance is not typical of most
tribes, and even in this case there may have been a communication gap; a sheer
misunderstanding.
Property must therefore have emerged very early in human history, during the conduct of
various day-to-day activities. In building and repairing a house, in making clothes and wearing
them, in getting married, in having and rearing children, and in dying, parts of ‘us’ were created,
transmitted, or remained behind. The following things clearly form a basic part of personal
property: our bodies (subject to the limitations outlined in Chapter 4); immovable and movable
assets (some being potentially of interest to others even after our death); and things only we
value – such as crayon drawings made by our children. Hernando de Soto shows in The Mystery
of Capital, that detailed records of land ownership are soon created even by illegal settlers.
Humans observe who owns what, and instinctively recognise the concept of property. Some form
of record keeping of property, even informally, must therefore have been a natural part of even
the most primitive human tribes.

6 Alchian, Armen A., Economic Forces at Work, Indianapolis, Liberty Press, 1977, p.129.
7 Alchian, Armen A., Economic Forces at Work, Indianapolis, Liberty Press, 1977, p.130.
8 The word apparently derives from the movable ‘cattle.’
9 Pilzner, Paul Zane, God Wants You to be Rich, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1995, p.26.

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 Civilisation probably needed state support and recognition of property, in order to arise.
Civilised societies had clearly evolved extensive conceptions of property records and rights. For
example, Genesis 23:1-20 (Old Testament) describes how Abraham purchased land from Ephron
for 400 shekels of silver (implying existence of private money). The discussion of usury in the
Bible (and in the Mahabharata) similarly points similarly to the existence of property rights
(what the scriptures objected to was usury and not money per se).
There are numerous references in the Dharmasastras and Kautilya’s Arthasastra about
property. These include discussions on the proofs of the possession and ownership of property,
purchase and sale, inheritance; and donation. 10 Romila Thapar notes that ‘Private ownership of
land emerged [in India] in areas where the village economy had been established’ 11. She added
that ‘In the post-Gupta period references to the sale of land to individuals, increase. Inscriptions
dating to the period after the sixth century A.D. frequently refer to purchase of land and the
transfer of property.’ 12 Records of property ownership were also passed on through genealogical
records – something on which one is often amazed (a visit to the pandas in Haridwar is an
experience in itself).
An important step in recognising property rights was the creation of a register of land
records by the state. This took a lot of time coming. Modern legal rights of property ownership
seem to begin with the Magna Carta which set out procedures that the king had to follow before
he could ‘seize … land’. Prior to it English kings could grab any land at will, but after the Magna
Carta, the king agreed that he or his functionaries could no longer do such things: ‘No Constable
nor other Bailiff of ours shall [i.e. the king’s] take the corn or other goods of any one, without
instantly paying money for them.’ This restraint also applied to ‘the horses or carts of any free-
man’ and ‘another man’s wood.’ A section in the Magna Carta discussed matters related to
inheritance, clarifying that rights over movable property or chattel transmit to the deceased
person’s relatives and friends, thus: ‘If any free-man shall die intestate, his chattels shall be
distributed by the hands of his nearest relations and friends... saving to every one the debts
which the defunct owed.’ The Magna Carta thus marked a significant advance in the
development of the law on property rights.
Today, claims on property are securitised and traded on sophisticated financial markets (of
course, some of these securities were ill designed and therefore bombed during the so-called
global financial crisis). To reach this stage, significant further development had to occur. As
Hernando de Soto points out, ‘Before the fifteenth century in Europe, for example, even though
some isolated registries did exist in some parts of what is today Germany, most official rules on
how property transactions ought to work were unwritten and known only through oral
traditions.’ Indeed, one restriction that continued in many parts of the West till a few hundred
years ago was the practice called entail, which prevented transfers (including through sale) of
land outside one’s family. To Thomas Jefferson must go the credit (in the West) for abolishing
this restriction on the sale of land. 13
Some attributes of property rights
Individual property (both movable and immovable) must necessarily be associated only with
a living person. While national territory continues after we die, our individual property must
either pass on to some other living person (or organisation), or revert to the tribal or national
group as a whole. Governments usually auction such properties and deploy the proceeds towards
general revenue.
Also, it is worth noting that land is merely one form of property, but its characteristics are of
a somewhat different kind to other kinds of property. Unlike money (the more of which is always
better, since it can be easily stored and moved, and requires little ‘maintenance’) more land is
not necessarily better. The potential uses of land can change its value. For instance, we do not

10 Sternbach, Ludwik, ‘Review of Theory of Property in Ancient India by A. M. Samozvancev’, in Journal of the

American Oriental Society, Vol. 101, No. 4, (Oct. - Dec., 1981), p. 487.
11 Thapara, Romila, The Past and Prejudice, Patel Memorial Lectures, New Delhi: Publications Division, 1973, p.39.
12 Thapara, Romila, The Past and Prejudice, Patel Memorial Lectures, New Delhi: Publications Division, 1973, p.42.
13 de Soto, Herndando, The Mystery of Capital, Bantam Press, London, 2000, p. 171.

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care to own vast amounts of desert lands in the Sahara, the cost of maintaining ownership over
which (by building a boundary wall) is enormous but its benefits zero. Therefore, only that much
of land is demanded the benefits of holding which outweigh holding costs. And anyone who has
removed pesky weeds from a garden knows that managing land is also a chore, and potentially
very expensive. Land often gives us great disutility beyond a point. In modern societies, people
generally do not invest vast chunks of agricultural land, preferring instead to live in city
apartments that are stacked on top of each other. Any fixation with land as a preeminent
representation of property is therefore uncalled for.
We care for our personal property far more than we care for common, shared property (the
commons). The returns from various types of property (e.g. land) therefore depend on the nature
of ownership of the property. Perhaps the fastest way to increase yields in agriculture, timber
and fisheries, is to demarcate the commons and sell parcels to individuals for their private use.
Wherever such private property rights come into being, wealth (and hence civilisation) is
inevitably enhanced. Indeed, Wolfgang Kasper notes that: ‘Without a respected property rights
system the exclusion costs can be so high that agricultural production does not take place.’ 14
India was fortunate to have (relatively) well-defined private property rights in the past and so it
grew wealthy (compared to tribal areas like ancient England).
Wealth is ‘crystallised’ through trade. Trade (or exchange) depends on the existence of well-
defined property rights. Without property rights it also becomes difficult to count a nation’s
wealth (national accounts). As well, the incentives for wealth creation drop off significantly.
Property rights are not absolute, however, being constrained by accountability. Just because I
own a knife does not give me the right to slice off someone’s nose.
The various characteristics of property can logically be sub-divided, and reassembled into
different packages or bundles. For example, by renting a house, I acquire a temporary property
right to live in it, while its title remains with the owner.

2.1 Theories about citizens’ rights in property

For a long time, the existence of property was taken for granted, much like gravity was
taken for granted before its ‘discovery’ by Newton. But a few philosophers finally began to ask:
What gives us the power or the right to take something from Nature? Thus, how does a natural
object (or its transformation by man) become property? What are the rights of those who arrive
at to the scene later, having missed the opportunity to take possession of (say) virgin land? I
outline below four of the many theories about the origin of rights in property.
1) Property as a loan from the king
This theory suggest that the entire national territory (land and natural resources)
exclusively belongs to the sovereign. Thus, land in a monarchy is deemed to be Crown land.
Individual rights are thereafter temporally settled (assigned) by the sovereign. King James I
(1566–1625) believed in this theory and insisted all property in England belonged to him. He
wrote: ‘[Kings arose] before any estates or ranks of men, before any parliaments were holden, or
laws made, and by them was the land distributed, which at first was wholly theirs.’ For full
measure, he added: ‘And so it follows of necessity that kings were the authors and makers of the
laws, and not the laws of the kings.’ 15 In this view, property rights are not innate and have no
relationship with the purpose of reason for the existence of the state. There are few takers of this
view today.
2) Property is assigned by the collective
Similar to the above theory, this view argues that the collective (tribe) owns all land and
assigns it to individuals to use (not necessarily as a ‘property right’). Socialists advocate this
view, with arguments ranging from the Marxian (which requires for the destruction of all
property rights) to the Fabian and Rawlsian (which significantly truncates property rights).
Harold Laski, a Fabian socialist, thought that:

14 Kasper, Wolfgang, Property Rights and Competition, Sydney, The Centre for Independent Studies, 1998, p.65.
15 In his book, The Trew [True] Law of Free Monarchies.

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 the existing rights of property represent, after all, but a moment in historic time. They are not
today what they were yesterday and tomorrow they will again be different. It cannot be affirmed
that, whatever the changes in social institutions, the rights of property are to remain
permanently inviolate. Property is a social fact, like any other, and it is the character of social
facts to alter. 16
Laski was particularly influential with Nehru who argued, in turn, that property is an
arbitrary concept. Rawls has an equally arbitrary view about property. According to him: ‘justice
as fairness includes no natural right of private property in the means of production’. Were Rawls
a dictator, our property rights except perhaps for the ownership of the clothes on our back would
have been disbanded. Rawls thought that our talents belong to the society and a central planner
should decide how this talent can be best used to advance economic equality through a range of
arbitrary ‘formulae’ (that even Rawls could not articulate the details of). I would argue that this
view about property rights can lead to extremely dangerous outcomes, worse in some ways than
arbitrary dispensation by a king. Socialism is generally worse than feudalism.
3) Labour theory of property rights
John Locke viewed property rights as an innate right. To make such a conception palatable
to Christian theologians who had a demonstrated penchant for burning at the stake anyone who
raised questions (remember Bruno?), Locke did not speak about his views directly but made a
long detour. (Note that in outlining Locke’s theory, below, I have also combined it with some
consideration of Nozick’s theory as well, it being partly an offshoot of Locke’s.
Locke began by noting the seemingly obvious truth that we own ourselves (we also hear
direct echoes of this in Nozick). ‘Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any
Right to but himself.’ Hence, he argued, ‘The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we
may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his
own, and thereby makes it his Property.’ In summary, he showed that property rights are
created by adding our labour to what we take from nature.
But how does anyone get the power to take things from Nature in the first place? Locke
believed that it is the divine gift of life that gives us the right to the fruits of Nature. ‘Men, being
once born, have a right to their Preservation, and consequently to Meat and Drink, and such
other things, as Nature affords for their Subsistence.’ But if all this is given to us divinely in
common, what gives us the particular right to appropriate something for our exclusive use?
Locke explains this conundrum thus: ‘God, as King David says, Psal. CXV. xvi. has given the
Earth to the Children of Men, given it to Mankind in common. But this being supposed, it seems
to some a very great difficulty, how any one should ever come to have a Property in any thing’ 17?
He suggested (a thread later picked up and elaborated by Nozick) that we are entitled to convert
previously undiscovered or unused natural resources into personal (individual) property,
provided we leave sufficient amounts for others. This is what Nozick calls the ‘Lockean proviso’.
Of course, it is a great leap of faith to not only pose a question on behalf of God but to respond on
His behalf as well. It is inexplicable why Nozick pursued this hypothetical ‘explanation’ any
further.
This argument poses many problems, some of which are outlined below:
• The first objection is that Locke seems to be invoking a seemingly religious argument
without first showing why religious arguments are valid in any sense. Why do we need to
claim that the Earth has been ‘given’ to us by God? That explanation creates far more
problems than it tries to explain away. We are far better off by harking to the animal
kingdom, our tribal groups, and the facts of evolution, for possible hints to the answer.
• The amount of labour is only very feebly related to the creation of property rights. For
example, the labour (value of time) mixed in a large gold nugget that is picked up during a

16 In his A Grammar of Politics, 1960, cited a footnote on p.77 in Working in a Democratic Constitution: A History of
the Indian Experience, by Granville Austin (1999). OUP, Delhi (2003 paperback edition).
17 Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government, Book 2, Chapter 5 (Of Property).
[http://socserv2.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/government.pdf]

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 walk through a jungle is a tiny fraction of its value. Indeed, the finder of such a nugget and
another – who steals it from him – will likely mix their labour with it in similar quantities.
Doing so, however, doesn’t give the thief any property rights over the nugget. Similarly, the
owner of a gold mine who received the mine as an inheritance would likely never even have
touched any of the gold, but the entire gold would still belong to him. Property is thus
strongly related to accountability, and has nothing to do with the labour we expend in its
creation or discovery.
• An argument that we own our own person can become a notch too strong for comfort, for it
leaves each of us free to take our own lives at will – thus contradicting Proposition 1 and
diminishing the thing of ultimate value – our life. We have also seen that Locke argued that
we do not have the right to commit suicide (the individual, he said, does not have the
‘Liberty to destroy himself’). This (fortunately) contradicts his basic argument (Nozick, who
took this argument further, was at least consistent, and ‘permitted’ suicide – denying
himself the luxury of self-contradictory argument, but also denying in that process that
preservation and enhancement of human life is the ultimate aim of all philosophy).
• Locke seems to have ignored the concept of national territory entirely – thus delinking it
from the history of human society. The reality remains that we need to defend and control –
as a group – a geographical territory before we can even think of acquiring anything from
Nature. All parts of nature come pre-owned by tribal groups, or nation (at least in the world
we live in today). One just can’t walk up to any random piece of land we see and start
digging it up.
• The Lockean proviso is irrelevant because natural resources are irrelevant. Locke clearly
over-emphasised land (i.e. the fruits of nature). Today wealth (being the present value of all
future cash flows from our labour and assets) is created almost entirely from human
ingenuity – with little or no relationship to land. Primitive tribals even today possess a lot of
land but their economy is primitive. Neither Bill Gates nor Edison cared for cultivating or
digging up large chunks of land but did well enough, nevertheless. Land is often valued now
for its scenic and amenity value than for its use value, or productivity. A mere truckload of
sand can be converted, with human ingenuity, into far greater wealth than what was
generated by hundreds of square kilometres of land during in Locke’s times. The Lockean
proviso today would imply that people should leave ‘enough and as good’ of one’s brain – or
just sand – for others. That is nonsense. Comparing Singapore with Russia divests us of the
delusion that land matters. It is time to overcome mankind’s fetish with land.
Locke’s explanation is therefore almost entirely flawed. His theory was to later become the
labour theory of value that Adam Smith erroneously propounded (and even more erroneously,
Karl Marx). These theories are speculative judgements, not worthy of further analysis, so let us
leave it here and move on.
4) Property is an outcome of justice
The last main view on property rights (a view to which I subscribe) considers property rights
as an inevitable consequence of our actions. David Hume (1711-1776) was perhaps the first to
state this clearly: ‘‘Tis very preposterous … to imagine, that we can have any idea of property,
without fully comprehending the nature of justice, and shewing its origin in the artifice and
contrivance of men. The origin of justice explains that of property. The same artifice gives rise to
both.’ 18 Thus, if I were to find a gold nugget on my morning walk, it is I who would have found it
and none else. Prior to being found it was merely lying on the ground unrecognized by any
currently living human (unless someone dropped it accidentally while carrying a bigger pile of
nuggets – in which case the nugget I found may need to be returned to its rightful owner). The
mere act our recognising a nugget as a thing of value is sufficient for us to own it. There is not,
and can never be a requirement for us to leave a part of the gold nugget for others who come
later (Lockean proviso). All those who are alive today are fully justified in apportioning the
entire world between themselves based on the principles of justice. We have no obligation to

18 In his A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III: Of Morals, Part I: Of virtue and vice in General, Sect. II: Of the origin

of justice and property. [http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/342/55219]

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those who have not yet found the gold we find or the ideas we have. In general, I agree with
John Sanders that ‘the famous Lockean proviso …is both conceptually incoherent and self-
defeating’ 19.
We now look at the concept of justice in more detail. Consider trade, during which property
is exchanged. Some types of exchange transfer a physical residue, i.e. goods. Others (such as a
psychotherapy session) leave only the trace of a memory behind. In the end, all ownership is
built ultimately through a record of memories of attributions. These are recorded more diligently
and rigorously for important properties like land, but only casually noted or fleetingly
remembered for ordinary things like a pencil or rubber we may own. At times we need a strong
set of witnesses to attest for our property rights; at others, our personal memory trace is
sufficient. In the end all we need is to carefully note the relevant attributions and
accountabilities. Simple things matter. For example if I am Bill Gates, I ask only to be paid for
my services, not (accidentally?) someone else who didn’t produce them. A perfect match of
attributions and accountabilities is crucial. Intellectual property thus becomes our property
merely by our having first thought of it. (Note, merely thinking about something doesn’t give us
any property rights: A thief thinks while stealing a gold nugget, but his thinking is about how to
divest us of ownership. Such a thought is unjust and doesn’t generate property rights.)
Justice relates purely to individuals. Property is therefore necessarily individual, as well.
There is no collective attribution: hence no collective ownership (group territory is a different
concept, not based on any principle of justice, anyway). If I am Jack the Ripper, I should go to
the gallows, not my entire village. Even where property is unbundled into discrete rights, its
title remains precise and can ultimately be attributed to specific individuals. Accordingly,
everything we are born with (including our name, body, and what our parents have provided for,
or bequeathed, us), as well as everything that we acquire through our actions and thoughts,
becomes part of us. Property therefore mirrors our actions and thoughts. It is us;
indistinguishable; an extension of us.
For thousands of years, people have instinctively acknowledged each other’s property. An
implicit Nash equilibrium has prevailed. People have reciprocally accepted others’ right to keep
what others have justly earned. Even tribal societies understood this quite well. Note in this
context that the new fangled socialist concept of equal holding of property had absolutely
nothing to do with such innate understanding about property. Tribal chiefs always own
disproportionately larger amounts of property; and others possess differing amounts, contingent
on their individual status or effort. A tribe can’t afford a free rider (someone who gets equal
share to land without effort) equally as a modern free society can’t. For socialists (or utopians) to
tell us that property rights are in any way unnatural is a flagrant distortion of the reality of
human history. People have always tried to become ‘richer’ in whatever manner their society has
allowed them.
While property rights are a by-product of freedom (justice), it is crucial for these rights to be
enforced. In this manner alone, are property rights a contrivance of men (Hume, cited above-
CHECK). The existence of property is ultimately premised on of state guarantee. It is important
to note that state-contingent enforcement of property rights doesn’t mean that they exist because
of such enforcement. A sapling will invariably arise from a seed. It can be trampled upon each
time it emerges: and so also property rights be destroyed through non-enforcement, but they
exist nevertheless.
The overwhelming majority of people, however, want their property rights enforced. As
Alchian noted: ‘private property rights are rights not merely because the state formally makes
them so but because individuals want such rights to be enforced, at least for a vast,
overwhelming majority of people.’ 20 Violations of our property cause us great distress. Many
murders in agricultural societies are directly caused by land disputes among close relatives.
Love of property (particularly land) often transcends love of family. It is thus one of the basic

19 Sanders, John T., ‘Projects and Property’, in David Schmidtz (ed.) (2002). Robert Nozick. Cambridge University
Press, p.39.
20 In his Selected Works. Liberty Press. 1977. p.129

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functions of the state to defend our property rights. It is worth emphasising that property rights
– the outposts of freedom – actually precede the state, and indeed, motivate the need for the
state. The state does not create property. Property creates the state. As Rousseau wrote 21:
Look into the motives which have induced men, once united by their common needs in a general
society, to unite themselves still more intimately by means of civil societies: you will find no
other motive than that of assuring the property, life and liberty of each member by the
protection of all …
It is certain that the right of property is the most sacred of all the rights of citizenship, and even
more important in some respects than liberty itself; either because it more nearly affects the
preservation of life, or because, property being more easily usurped and more difficult to defend
than life, the law ought to pay a greater attention to what is most easily taken away; or finally,
because property is the true foundation of civil society, and the real guarantee of the
undertakings of citizens: for if property were not answerable for personal actions, nothing would
be easier than to evade duties and laugh at the laws.
This view of the state as our creation, aimed at defending our property rights sits in
opposition to socialist views that consider property to be an arbitrary artefact, or rather an
outcome of exploitation. But unless our rights to property are enforced, we shall ultimately
demand the overthrow of the state. For if property rights are not vigorously defended, economic
activity will freeze. We will become unsure how others will treat our money and property. This is
easy to visualise: If people had the choice of not returning the money they borrow, arguing that
we have no right to get back the money we lent, the society will descend into anarchy. The
moment lending and borrowing (and trade) stop, all entrepreneurship and innovation will come
to an end. If farmers can’t be sure that their farm and its produce will be protected by the state,
they will stop planting seeds. If industrialists can’t be sure that they can retain the proceeds of
the cars they manufacture, they will stop making them. In place of cooperation, trust, innovation
and productivity, theft, corruption, pillage and murder will become the norm. Indeed, that (theft,
etc) is a good description of what has happened in societies like India which disdain property
rights because of a preference for socialism.
Which of these theories better explains property rights? The first of these essentially
recapitulates the logic of the fortress. King James I of England was in that sense right to claim
that the ‘king’ (state) does let property rights exist. Without the fortress, individual property
rights can be snuffed out. But James I was wrong because kings only defend what is already
there: they do not create property rights. With developments like the Magna Carta, property
rights became underpinned by justice. Finally, after formal property records were created by the
state, economic development received a great fillip in the West.

21 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, translated with an

Introduction by G.D. H. Cole (London and Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1923). [http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/638]

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Chapter 13 The pillar of equal treatment

Let us all hope that the dark clouds of racial prejudice will soon pass away and the deep fog
of misunderstanding will be lifted from our fear drenched communities, and in some not too
distant tomorrow the radiant stars of love and brotherhood will shine over our great nation
with all their scintillating beauty. – Martin Luther King, Jr. 1

Equal freedom means being treated equal politically. Things like the absence of slavery,
absence of hereditary superiors, and most importantly, absence of discrimination in public office
on grounds of ‘race’ (including caste) or religion are part of equal freedom. The playing field must
be equalised and only merit must count, not predetermined characteristics that are irrelevant to
a public office or role. In this chapter I will mainly look at equal treatment, but also discuss, in
passing, the social minimum and social insurance which we have come across earlier in Chapter
4.

1. Equal individual sovereignty

Equal sovereigns we must demand equal treatment and dignity. This has implications which
are best considered by looking at three issues: population ‘problem’, foreign aid, and slavery. The
underlying principle of individual sovereignty explains the liberal’s approach to these issues.

1.1 I’m not your ‘population problem’!

It is totally inappropriate for anyone to suggest that others to be a population ‘problem’.
This slight is intended invariably for poorer sections of society: no one implies that the rich or
beautiful are a ‘problem’. Thus, it is sometimes implied that there are an ‘excessive’ number of
people in India. The lowest point in this diatribe against people was Paul Ehrlich’s 1968 The
Population Bomb. Evidently, it doesn’t occur to such maniacs that they are referring to fellow
human beings. It is unacceptable for to suggest that the sheer presence of others poses a
problem. My recommendation is that such people are welcome to commit suicide in order to solve
the population ‘problem’ by one person. Why is India’s population a ‘problem’ and not American
(or European)? Let rich Americans be sterilised first, and then we can further discuss.
Such views are primarily racist, and ignore the huge growth of European populations in the
18th and 19th centuries. India is now barely beginning to recover its original ‘share’ in world
population after the grossly disproportionate expansion of the Europeans during which they
colonised many parts of the world (Table yy). I’m not suggesting that there is any meaningful
concept of ‘historical proportions’ of various populations or nations. But it is important to see
through the self-interested hype of the rich who cry crocodile tears about the large populations of
the poor.
It is informative to find out how the Europeans actually got so many ‘people’ to populate the
world? This is where freedom comes in. The advances in freedom led to increased commerce,
industry and science. As far as science is concerned, the most significant change was the decline
in infant mortality arising from improvements to sanitation and public health. As a result,
European birth rates significantly exceeded death rates for many decades before fertility finally
started declining to about two children per family. The huge ‘surplus’ population migrated all
over the world. As a result of this European ‘population bomb’ the world share of undivided
India’s population sunk from 21.5% from 1750 to 17.3% by 1900. This share has barely recovered
and will revert to around 22% of world population by 2025, tapering off to stabilise around 20%
of world population in the long term. In that sense, India and other developing nations are
seeing a delayed growth in their populations consistent with the advance of freedom and science.
This is a good thing. There is no population bomb. The Earth can sustain large and wealthy

1 Martin Luther King, Jr. in ‘Letter from a Birmingham Jail,’ 16 April 1963.

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populations of humans – of that there is no doubt. There is no shortage of any resource; indeed
natural resources don’t matter as much as the human resource.

Table yy: Population of undivided India as a ratio of world population

World India* Indian proportion of world population
1750 791 170 21.49
1800 978 186 19.02
1850 1262 222 17.59
1900 1650 285 17.27
1950 2517 439 17.44
1990 5295 1078 20.36
2025 8473 1882 22.21
Note: Figures are in millions. *Includes Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India.
Sources: Various, based on my research of 1998 (the 2025 projections were of from
reports published in the late 1990s, and may now be over-estimates).

No relationship between population size and economic growth

Most concerns about ‘excessive’ population arise from deep ignorance about the way humans
reproduce. Even Indians have bought into Western hysteria about India’s large population! Our
National Population Policy (2000) states: ‘Stabilising population is an essential requirement for
promoting sustainable development with more equitable distribution.’ 2 Both historical grounds
(discussed above) and moral grounds make this an obnoxious policy objective. But it must also be
challenged on scientific grounds. It erroneously links income and quality of life with population
size.
Two mechanisms are assumed for such a hypothetical relationship. First, a Malthusian
route argues that land and natural resources experience a diminishing capacity to sustain
population. In relation to this first mechanism, the essential point to note is that the abilities of
the human mind far exceed the constraints that limitations of natural ‘resources’ impose.
Natural resources only constrain us so long as we haven’t thought of new ways to change the
situation. Resource ‘scarcity’ vanishes in most cases once markets are able to operate freely
through price signals. The price signal is vital to innovation. Resource prices must be allowed to
rise when they become scarce. Alternative resources will then become economically viable,
particularly with increasing economies of scale as market demand increases. Further, venture
capital is usually invested into research in areas where resource constraints are being felt.
Recycling and invention of more efficient ways to use resources are then more likely to emerge.
Where there are large research costs, it may be useful (in extreme rare cases) for a government
to subsidise – but not entirely fund – appropriate (private) research. 3 Box 99 discusses how this
could apply in the case of energy. India’s problem is not its population size or ‘limited’ resources
but that its socialist (controlled) policies make it commercially unviable for businesses to invest
in research in may appropriate resource areas.
Box 99
Energy
Modern life as we know it will grind to a halt if we can’t generate sufficient electricity.
We know that literally infinite amounts of energy are embodied within matter that is
all around us (e = mc2). ‘The complete conversion of one gram of mass into energy
…releases … the equivalent of the explosion of roughly a thousand tons of TNT.’ 4 One
gram of hydrogen could therefore light an average house for 1000 years. But we don’t
know how to extract this energy entirely. Two processes: fission and fusion, are able to

2 [http://populationcommission.nic.in/npp_intro.htm]
3 One has to be very cautious about such things, e.g. see Terence Kealey, Sex, Science and Profits, London: William
Heinemann, 2008.
4 Carl Sagan in Broca’s Brain, New York: Ballantine Books, 1979, p.27.

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 extract reasonable chunks of this energy. In the short period since 1942 when the
world’s first nuclear reactor went critical, the safety of nuclear reactors has risen ten-
fold. 5 Nuclear energy is today the safest mode of energy generation (with safety
measured by the number of lives lost per megawatt generated, from the time of
discovery of the ore to decommissioning of the nuclear plants). However, big atoms
like uranium are very rare and so we will soon need to shift fusion energy. But easy
solutions to the fusion question do not exist. Private funding for research in this area
is unlikely to be forthcoming. Government funding is therefore generally acceptable
for such research.
But there are many other forms of energy as well, which private businesses can
develop themselves if clear market signals are received. These alternatives include
kinetic energy that swirls about in great abundance in the atmospheres (wind) and
the sea, but is quickly lost, or the sun’s heat. The reason we don’t extract alternative
energy today is because there are too many cheap alternatives like coal, oil and gas.
Once these become scarcer their prices will rises and alternatives will become viable.
Many potential energy alternatives already exist in research laboratories, and others
have been continuously improved at a commercial level.
Either way, it is certain that in a few hundred years, the relative share of energy
costs in our monthly budgets will shrink to insignificance despite mankind consuming
far more energy than it consumes today. There is clearly no theoretical limitation to
energy; only practical limitations, which time will overcome. Julian Simon’s book, The
Ultimate Resource 6 provides a fuller description of how the resource market works,
including the energy markets.

The second argument that is made in order to ‘prove’ that population is a problem is that
social investment is dissipated when spread over a large population. If society tries to educate a
large number of people, they will apparently end up being educated badly since a given sum of
money will be spread thinly across them. This is a flawed argument. The more the number of
people in a society, the greater is the number of taxpayers as well, except when the demographic
transition begins in a society – at which stage there may be, for a very short period, a relatively
larger proportion of children to taxpayers. If marginal tax rates remain constant,
proportionately more funds are automatically generated and yield the same per capita funding
for the education of children as was the case with a lower population. Education is an
investment with one of the highest possible returns and some funds can initially be borrowed, at
the time of the demographic transition. Young citizens will easily repay this amount.
Population size can only be a potential problem if marginal tax rates are required to be
increased, or if per capita economic growth reduces as population increases. But economic
growth is related to the level of freedom in a society, and its distance from the technical or
‘production possibility’ frontier; not to its population size. Instead, there are a large number of
benefits of high population, particularly for greater innovation. Social capital increases as the
number and size of associations networks multiply. Economic growth will tend to increase with a
larger (but well-educated) population.
Therefore population size is a non-issue, except in relation to environmental impacts. These
impacts are also minimal in the free society since it possesses wealth and technological resources
to better deal with the environment. We are back to square one: what is needed is simply one
thing: equal freedom. That will do. No attempt need be made by governments to prevent people
from being born. All family planning should be a private matter for each citizen.

5 James A. Lake, former president of the American Nuclear Society in 2000-2001, at

[http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0706/ijee/lake.htm].
6 Book 2 is freely available at [http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate_Resource/] though I find the genuine

pleasure of reading only comes through the paper edition.

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1.2 No foreign aid, please! We are not beggars
No one can be (or should aim to become) self-sufficient in a civilized free society. Division of
labour, along with open commerce, allows societies to specialise and produce only things in
producing which they have a comparative advantage. In such an open system we must depend
on others for most of the things we consume.
But the liberal insists on self-reliance. Ever willing to learn from others and improve
himself, he refuses any charity from anyone unless he falls into desperate straits. He prefers to
stand on his own feet at all times, even if that might mean earning only enough for one complete
meal a day. This insistence on self-respect and self-reliance is missing from the
recommendations of utopian philosophers on the one hand, and self-interested bureaucrats of
international organisations on the other, who advocate increasing the level of foreign aid to
allegedly fix the problem of world poverty. For instance, the philosopher Peter Singer asked, in
2007, for $808 billion to be spent by developed countries in foreign aid.
The liberal almost entirely opposes foreign aid, for he knows that the alleged reason – to
alleviate poverty – can easily be addressed if recipient nations bootstrap themselves with
policies of freedom. Capitalism invariably transforms the poor into highly productive humans,
reaching out into new vistas of innovation. By now means are poor countries poor because they
get less foreign aid, but because they literally refuse to use the Adam Smith’s suggestions,
preferring instead to use the quack, Karl Marx. The fact is that most allegedly ‘poor’ countries
(like India) have always had enough resources to totally eliminate poverty if they wanted to –
through a negative income tax regime (e.g. see my article in the August 2009 issue of Freedom
First 7). But politicians of these countries are desperately corrupt, ignorant, and totalitarian.
Foreign aid can never help such countries.
There is an even more fundamental issue that comes up, in this regard. Except in life-
threatening situations, no rights accrue to anyone to help us without our prior consent. Self-
respecting people demand to be left alone to determine their destiny, even if that might lead to
(as in the case of India) self-inflicted poverty and disease. Foreign aid humiliates the receiving
nation while exalting the donor. That is wrong. It is one thing to trade with poor nations as
equals, but quite another to humiliate them through foreign aid. This can be seen as a racist, as
well, with sentiments like the ‘white man’s burden’ often underpinning this ‘generosity’. That
such generosity is suspect is clear from the restrictions the West imposes on trade, denying the
opportunity to poor nations to sell things and take themselves out of poverty. The only respectful
way to engage with others is through trade. Foreign aid is an abomination with no redeeming
features.
On the practical level, foreign aid is the worst kind of poison, leading to unethical and
harmful outcomes. Throwing money into socialist dens of corruption can never be justified, and
will never help the poor. Indeed, large amounts of foreign aid spent on countries like India find
their way into Swiss bank accounts of corrupt politicians and bureaucrats. Even where such is
directly supervised by the West (as with Afghanistan and Iraq recently) corrupt practices
invariably emerge because no one is ultimately accountable. Peter Bauer examined both the
theory of foreign aid and evidence about its impacts to demonstrate conclusively that aid often
ends up making poverty worse. Even worse outcomes often result, for foreign aid is fungible.
Local politicians who would have been otherwise compelled to buy at least some food and relief
for the poor of their country, are enabled, with foreign aid, to buy guns with the money they
would have otherwise spent on food. Aid inevitably strengthens corrupt politicians and violent
dictators.
Charity can, at its best, give someone a fish for a day, but can’t teach that person to fish. It
has therefore to be ‘administered’ each day, whereas teaching how to fish is a durable cure.
Unless a desperate emergency arises, charity must be strictly abjured. Donors interested in
helping the citizens of developing countries should become partners, teaching them the policies

7 Also available on my blog at http://tinyurl.com/y6bfrnc.

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of freedom. This is the only ethical way. This would also provide the West with long-term
security, instead of spending trillions of dollars on defence.
Before the West even dares to teach freedom to poor nations, however, it must throw its
markets open. After that it must employ respectful ways of teaching. For instance, classics of
liberty, such as books by Adam Smith and John Locke, can be made available cheaply. It would
be inappropriate for Western nations to directly teach the citizens of poorer nations for that
could well be interpreted as racist arrogance, as well. It would be best that liberty is promoted
by citizens of the poorer nations. The West can support such indigenous efforts. Giving
scholarships to bright students from poor nations to study in good Western universities is
another good method, although it should be conditional on such students returning to their
countries for at least five years after their education. A method that I particularly recommend is
to bring senior bureaucrats from developing countries for long term training-cum-secondment
programs in the local, state and federal governments of Western nations. There is much
information about good governance that can never be learnt form books alone. Finally, policy
partnerships should be created in which both countries involved work together as a team agreed
policy areas, such as regulatory reform opportunities.
In summary, it is totally inappropriate for international bodies (or misguide philosophers,
for that matter) to set aspirational foreign aid ‘targets’. There are many ways to achieve better
and more durable ways to eliminate global poverty and misery.
There may well exist a need to pay poor nations for negative externalities created by the
richer nations (such as greenhouse gas emissions – if proven to be a pollutant 8). Such a
compensation is best organised by directly channeling funds into private businesses in the
poorer countries (such as into businesses that grow new trees). A market mechanism with
international standards of quality control can then be established to procure carbon
(sequestration) certificates.

1.3 Sovereignty over our body: No more slavery!

Unfettered movement and being able to do we please is a most basic freedom. But often this
was not available to everyone until recently (some don’t have it even today). Indeed, slavery was
actively supported, or at least accepted, by all major societies and religions. The so-called
‘greatness’ of many ancient societies, such as Rome and Egypt, was achieved by imposing
crushing burdens on slaves. Even philosophers like Aristotle justified slavery, declaring (in
around 350 BC) that:
some men are by nature free, and others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both
expedient and right.’ 9 and, ‘Where then there is such a difference as that between ... men and
animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and who can do nothing
better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they
should be under the rule of a master.
In early societies, the civilians captured in war were used as slaves (Homer refers to slaves
acquired in war in his 500 BC book, Odyssey). Nearly a third of the residents of the Roman
empire were slaves from the tribes of northern Italy, France and Britain. France (Gaul) was
worst affected, providing Julius Caesar with a million slaves.
Trading in slaves became an industry from around 900 AD, with Islamic traders being its
pioneers. They sourced slaves from Western Africa. Local tribal kings were given a few trinkets
in return for the salves who were then sold in the middle East and Europe. Note that African
kings participated actively in this trade (anyone who commends the tribal ‘state of nature’ had
better not forget this).
The discovery of the New World fuelled a huge demand for cheap labour, and the Europeans
were motivated to join the trade in a big way. Thus, Vice Admiral Sir Francis Drake, a famous
explorer, made a fortune in the mid-1500s trading in slaves. The European trade then grew into
a crescendo between 1700 and 1810, during which about three million Africans slaves were

8 See my blog post: http://sabhlok.blogspot.com/2010/04/co2-some-facts.html

9 In his Politics, 350 BC

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traded by British merchants alone. Altogether around 10 to 28 million slaves, mostly Africans,
were shipped to North and South America in the 400 years from 1450. Being packed like
sardines on small ships, many of them died during the long sea voyage across the Atlantic.
Between 1826 and 1920, the British introduced the system of indentured labour – another form
of slavery. Thousands of Indians were taken to places like the Mauritius and West Indies as
indentured labour. Most of them could not find the money to return to India after their
indenture ended, and remained behind as remnants of this inhuman practice.
Protests against slavery were scarce. The earliest perhaps came from Epictetus (55-135 AD),
a Greek philosopher (who was born as a slave) who spoke out thus: ‘What you shun enduring
yourself, attempt not to impose on others. You shun slavery – beware of enslaving others! …
Vice has nothing in common with virtue, nor Freedom with slavery.’ 10 But his was a lone voice
for thousands of years. Except for a few slave revolts (mostly unsuccessful, such as the battle led
by Spartacus in 73 BC) slaves were too weak to fight for themselves. Even most of the founders
of classical liberalism being racist, justified slavery. They believed that black slaves were part of
a lower species. Thus David Hume exclaimed that Negroes were ‘naturally inferior to the
Whites’ 11.
By the end of the 18th century, however, a clamour was beginning to arise against slavery.
Two different viewpoints were driving this change, one religious, the other liberal. It appears
that French liberal philosophers were among the first to ask hard questions about the validity of
slavery. ‘Unlike earlier years, when only a few solitary, barely audible voices protested in France
against black slavery, the middle of the eighteenth century saw a gradual awakening of the
French collective consciousness under the prodding of the philosophes.’ 12 Chevalier de Jaucourt,
Diderot and Voltaire were some of the early philosophers who opposed slavery.
Religious views were also changing. The Quakers of England, a sect of Christianity that was
neither Protestant nor Catholic, formed a view that slavery violated what Christ had stood for
(this may not be strictly true if the scriptures are considered, but the Quakers did not follow the
scriptures). They petitioned the British Parliament in 1783 against the slave trade. Then, in
1786, the Quaker Thomas Clarkson wrote An essay on the slavery and commerce of the human
species. Soon, in May 1787, a Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade was formed.
William Wilberforce, a British Parliamentarian, also played a particularly important role in
getting the slave trade abolished in England. In 1792, the House of Commons agreed by 230
votes to 85 to abolish the slave trade but the House of Lords, comprising slave-trading
aristocrats, did not support the Bill. But progress was made with the 1807 Abolition of the Slave
Trade Act which empowered the government to impose fines on those caught trading in slaves.
Its ghastly and unintended consequence was that slaves being carried on slave ships that were
about to be raided by the British Navy were thrown overboard. Finally, slaves in the British
Empire got their freedom through the Slavery Abolition Act of 1833, even as indentured labour
would soon replace it. To smoothen this transition, the British government partially
compensated slave owners.
Slavery took longer to be abolished in France, although the French philosophers had been
among the first to oppose slavery. The Society of the Friends of Blacks addressed the
(revolutionary) French National Assembly in 1790, asking it to abolish slavery. In 1794 the
Assembly declared an end to slavery in the French colonies, but Napoleon quickly brought
slavery back in 1796, to be finally abolished only in 1848.
Things were much harder in the New World where entire economies depended on the work
of slaves. Benjamin Franklin (1705-1790) was among the first in the world to write against
slavery, but to no avail. Nearly four million slaves had been imported to USA by 1860, mostly to
the southern states; although a few northern states had abolished slavery by then. To change

10 Epictetus, The Golden Sayings of Epictetus, translated by Hastings Crossley, XLI.

[http://www.gutenberg.org/files/871/871-h/871-h.htm]
11 Hume, David, The Philosophical Works of David Hume. Available online – Google Books.
12 Hunting, Claudine, ‘The Philosophes and Black Slavery: 1748-1765’, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 39, No. 3,

(Jul. - Sep., 1978), p. 407.

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the situation needed a violent revolution through the American Civil War. Northern states,
which had been industrialising rapidly and did not need slaves for sustenance, had formed the
view that slavery was abominable. One John Brown collected a few supporters in 1859 and tried
to seize the federal armoury in Harpers Ferry, a small town in West Virginia. His aim was to
distribute arms to Southern slaves who would then have a chance to fight for their own liberty.
He failed in his attempt, but his attempt galvanised the North, and sent shivers down the spine
of the Southerners.
In the meanwhile, Abraham Lincoln was nominated for presidency in 1860 by the newly
formed Republican party. Lincoln became President with 40 per cent of the popular vote (it being
split among four candidates). Like most people of his time, Lincoln may have opposed slavery
but was not a believer in complete equality between the white and slave ‘races’. Thus, in 1858,
during a debate with Stephen Douglas, he had said that (the alleged) differences between the
races ‘will probably forever forbid their living together upon a footing of perfect equality.’ He also
said: ‘I have no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and black
races.’ 13 During his entire campaign nowhere did he suggest that he would abolish slavery. In
his view he was responsible for representing all Americans as the American President and would
‘preserve, protect, and defend the constitution of the United States’ 14. He didn’t even raise the
issue of abolition in the first couple of years of his presidency.
But by then the die had long been cast. Of the 15 states that supported slavery, seven (South
Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas) seceded from the USA –
unhappy with his election and suspecting the worst. The civil war broke out on April 12, 1861.
Abraham Lincoln did ultimately issue the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 using his War
Powers. This gave slaves in USA, including those in the Confederate territories (i.e. the seceding
states) their freedom. His ‘Union’ armies physically emancipated most American slaves as they
advanced. It was in 1865 Lincoln that said, made his strongest statement against slavery:
‘Whenever (I) hear any one, arguing for slavery I feel a strong impulse to see it tried on him
personally.’ 15 (Lincoln was assassinated in April, 1865 during the second year of his second
term.) After the Civil War ended in late 1865 (the Confederates were defeated) the USA made a
Thirteenth Amendment to its Constitution which formally abolished slavery.
Brazil remained the last major bastion of slavery in the West. It too finally succumbed to the
winds of change and abolished slavery in 1888. We are sorely humbled to discover that even so-
called ‘free societies’ like USA began to ensure the most basic of freedoms – of movement and
occupation – only in the late nineteenth century. Regrettably, slavery continues in parts of the
world even today. 16 Thus, in India, bonded labour is still found in remote villages. Justice PN
Bhagwati of the Supreme Court described this system as follows, in 1982: ‘This system, under
which one person can be bonded to provide labour for another for years and years until an
alleged debt is supposed to be wiped out, which never seems to happen during the lifetime of the
bonded labourer’. India abolished bonded labour in 1976 through its Bonded Labour System
(Abolition) Act. Slavery also continues in parts of Africa. The day when slavery will be
eliminated from the face of the Earth will be a great day for all of us.
Personal servants
This is also an appropriate place to think of personal servants. Even though people
voluntarily choose to become personal servants, it is surely a deeply humiliating and
dehumanising experience. In particular, not all full-time servants are treated with dignity and
respect (I wish, in retrospect, that I had treated some of my servants with far more respect, as
well). Pyarelal described Gandhi’s views on this matter (reporting on a silent day in Gandhi’s life
in Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase):

13 Cited in Timur Kuran (1995). Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification.
Cambridege, Mass. Harvard University Press, p. 314.
14 Lincoln, in a letter to Albert G. Hodges on April 4, 1864.
15 Abraham Lincoln, in a speech to the 140th Indiana Regiment, 17 March, 1865.
16 E.g., see reports on this subject by Anti-Slavery International and the Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Human Rights.

241`
 [On one of Gandhi’s silent Mondays, a group of fifteen ‘Socialist’ students visited him. Gandhi
jotted down replies to their questions on slips of paper, his practice on days of silence.]
Now tell me how many of you have servants in your homes? [They said a servant in each home.]
And you call yourself Socialists while you make others slave for you? It is a queer kind of
Socialism which, I must say, I cannot understand.... The first step in the practice of Socialism is
to learn to use your hands and feet. It is the only sure way to eradicate violence and exploitation
from society. 17
Lack of job opportunities in socialist India compel people to become servants. Most socialist
leaders have personal servants – sometimes tens of them. So much for socialism! One cannot
expect the prevalence of servants in India to disappear until the curse of socialism disappears.
With increasing freedom, the poor will find more useful things to do. As well, the middle classes
will no longer be able to afford personal servants. In the meanwhile, it is important to ensure
that no one deprives servants of their freedom and dignity. Laws are needed to regulate the
employment of personal servants. People with full-time servants must be required to provide for
the educational and career development of their servants’ children. No servant should be made
to work for 24 hours a day, throughout the year. If such 24-7 work conditions are imposed it
should be made mandatory that servants are paid for such excessive burdens. There is no
freedom to humiliate and mistreat our fellow citizens.

2. The end of racism

Racism is based entirely on deep ignorance of the facts: in particular, of biology and
statistics. Thus, even the better thinkers in the past often fell prey to racism because knowledge
(science) had not advanced sufficiently by then. And they didn’t understand statistics, either.
Racism violates equal freedom for it treats people unequally, regardless of their merit. From the
economic perspective, it harms the society by not adequately making use of the talents of those
who are discriminated against.
More importantly, even if people were to differ in their genetic heritage, that would not
justify racism or create grounds to deprive others of their equal liberty. As Hayek eloquently
said,
To rest the case for equal treatment of national or racial minorities on the assumption that they
do not differ from other men is implicitly to admit that factual inequality would justify unequal
treatment, and the proof that some differences do, in fact, exist would not be long in
forthcoming. It is of the essence of the demand for equality before the law that people should be
treated alike in spite of the fact that they are different. 18
Unfortunately, as Charles Hirschman has noted, ‘[e]ven in modern societies, which have
exposed the myth of racism, race remains a widely used term for socially defined groups in
popular discourse – and, in some countries, also in scholarly research, and public policy.’ 19 It is
incumbent upon our generation to banish the scientific and moral ignorance that leads to
racism.
To understanding this concept of ‘race’ better, it is useful to study its history. The main thing
we observe is that racism is a relatively recent phenomenon. Hirschman notes that ‘race and
racism are not ancient or tribal beliefs but have developed apace with modernity over the last
400 years and reached their apogee in the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth
century.’ 20 Indeed, Robert Draper says that ‘‘The ancient world was devoid of racism.’ 21 The main
reason for this is that in the ancient world not only were dark-skinned people like Indians far
more advanced than the Nordics or Caucasians (who were primitive in comparison), but even
darker-skinned civilisations like the Nubian were quite advanced (The Nubian civilisation either

17 Cited in Louis Fischer The Essential Gandhi. Edited by Louis Fisher. Vintage Books. New York. 1962. p. 305.
18 In his 1960 The Constitution of Liberty
19 Hirschman, Charles, ‘The Origins and Demise of the Concept of Race’, in Population and Development Review, Vol.

30, No. 3, (Sep., 2004), p.385.

20 Ibid. pp.385-86.
21 Draper, Robert, ‘Black Pharaohs’, National Geographic, February 2008, p.41.

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preceded or was coterminous with the great Egyptian civilisation. The modern world does not
know much about it, however, because archaeologists are only now discovering its glories 22).
It was of obvious to all that different people had different skin colour. But this was
attributed to climatic variation, not to differences in ability. Instead, the Greeks (more brown-
skinned than ‘white’) were prejudiced against their northern white neighbours who were
considered to be barbarians, fit only to be deployed as slaves. For instance, Herodutus, the
famous Greek historian, wrote: ‘Barbarians can neither think nor act rationally [and] … are
incapable of living according to written laws’. 23 The Greeks and Romans identified (and
compared) themselves with the flourishing cultures of the Middle East and Egypt, not with
primitive North Europeans (Julius Caeser thought they painted their bodies blue with woad 24).
It was nevertheless acceptable, for manumitted (i.e. released) slaves to mix with the rest of the
community. Fortunately, the enslavement of the white ‘barbarians’ did not lead to racism. As
James Dee points out, after a comprehensive review of Greek and Latin literature, ‘the most
remarkable aspect of all … is the absence of the kind of obsessive and corrosive concern with
‘whiteness’ and ‘blackness’ that so disfigures our modern world.’ 25 The Jews were, of course,
middle-eastern and hence tanned by the sun, not ‘white’. Jesus Christ and his early followers
were equally tanned. No adverse attribution of weaker ability attached to skin colour. Indeed,
three North Africans were elevated to the rank of the Bishop of Rome (Pope) in early
Christianity, namely: Victor (183-203), Gelasius (492-496), and Mechiades or Militiades (311-
314). With the most powerful religious leaders of the time being dark, racism was not even
remotely considered.
The earliest signs of racism in the world appeared in India where the caste (varna) system –
originally based on individual merit – quickly degenerated into a hereditary system based
largely (although not entirely) on skin colour. Darker skinned Indian aborigines were absorbed
into Hinduism but given a lower caste. After inter-marriage between castes was prohibited by
Manusmriti, India became a racial society without even thinking about it. Thus, skin colour and
caste continue to be strongly correlated.
But the modern idea that the ‘white race’ is in any way superior to others did not arise until
very recently. ‘The first examples of “white race/people” in the Oxford English Dictionary are no
earlier than the 1600s, when Europeans were deeply involved in African slave-trading; the same
seems to be true of the corresponding terms in the major European languages.’ 26 The origin of
this concept seems to coincide with the commencement of European slave trade in the mid-1500s
and the increasing technological prowess of Europe.
This period was simultaneously marked by the relative decline of ‘black’ kingdoms. Thus, by
the end of the first millennium, the main black African and Egyptian civilisations had
disappeared or otherwise lost prominence. Primitive tribes from Africa that substituted these
civilisations were disinterested in the welfare of their own people. Their loathsome moral
character – of handing over their people in return for a few baubles – led slave traders to assume
that all blacks similarly loathsome. Based on such false understanding, a complete re-write of
human history was then undertaken. Painters converted Christ into a blonde northern
European by the 15th century.
It didn’t help that when the British reached India in 1600 they found sati and child marriage
in a country that also had opulent Mughal grandeur and decadence.
But India’s experience with European racism was somewhat mixed. True racism, of the sort
experienced by the ‘Negroes’ in America, was never seen in India. By the time England gained

22 See ‘Black Pharaohs’, National Geographic, February 2008.

23 Cited in William C. Bradford, ‘Barbarians at The Gates: A Post-September 11th Proposal to Rationalize the Laws of
War’ (September 6, 2003). bepress Legal Series. Working Paper 54, p.109. [http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/54]
24 Dee, James H., ‘Black Odysseus, White Caesar: When Did ‘White People’ Become ‘White’?’The Classical Journal,

Vol. 99, No. 2, (Dec., 2003 - Jan., 2004), p. 164.

25 Dee, James H., ‘Black Odysseus, White Caesar: When Did ‘White People’ Become ‘White’?’The Classical Journal,

Vol. 99, No. 2, (Dec., 2003 - Jan., 2004), p. 162.

26 Dee, James H., ‘Black Odysseus, White Caesar: When Did ‘White People’ Become ‘White’?’The Classical Journal,

Vol. 99, No. 2, (Dec., 2003 - Jan., 2004), p. 164.

243`
comprehensive political power in India in 1858, slavery had long been abolished in England, and
it was considered bad manners to overtly display racism, anyway. No Indian who went to UK to
study (e.g. Nehru, Gandhi, or Jinnah) faced racism that was even close to what Gandhi
experienced in South Africa from Dutch (Boer) and British settlers. British rule in India was
definitely not founded on a foundation of racial superiority, some later bad behaviour
notwithstanding.
International racism had started just when the British were trying to gain a foothold in
India. The British East India company was established in 1600 and Captain William Hawkins
was sent to beseech the Mughals for a secure location from which to trade He secured the right
in 1608 to found a trading post in Surat. The economic and social status of the British globally
was rather humble, then. Indeed, for the next 157 years their social status remained well below
that of Indian nobles and rulers. Plus they were considered inferior and unclean by Indians, as
part of the caste system is not merely colour-conscious but also xenophobic. They, the Firangis
(as the Franks – and Europeans more generally – were known in India), were beef-eaters and
outside the pale of Indian society. Generally looked down upon by Indians of all types (no Indian
felt that they had any philosophical knowledge to offer them – a big mistake!), they were not, of
course, treated like the untouchables. The colour-conscious Indian society never demoted them
to that level. (It is possible that the underlying racism of the caste system percolated across the
world and led to the strengthening of incipient racial ideas, as well.)
The growth of British power in the next 150 years was dramatic. By the 1740s their military
expertise was being sought by rival Indian kingdoms. Some racism surely arose during this
period, raising the status of the ‘whites’ to that of the Kshatriya, perhaps. It was not a surprise
when on the other side of the world, racial ideas were maturing. By 1782, no less an advocate of
liberty than Thomas Jefferson wondered whether blacks were a different species of man:
[T]hough for a century and a half we have had under our eyes the races of black and of red men,
they have never yet been viewed by us as subjects of natural history. [I] advance it therefore as a
suspicion only, that the blacks, whether originally a distinct race, or made distinct by time and
circumstances, are inferior to the whites in the endowments both of body and mind. It is not
against experience to suppose, that different species of the same genus, or varieties of the same
species, may possess different qualifications. Will not a lover of natural history then, one who
views the gradations in all the races of animals with the eye of philosophy, excuse an effort to
keep those in the department of man as distinct as nature has formed them? This unfortunate
difference of colour, and perhaps of faculty, is a powerful obstacle to the emancipation of these
people. Many of their advocates, while they wish to vindicate the liberty of human nature, are
anxious also to preserve its dignity and beauty. Some of these, embarrassed by the question
`What further is to be done with them?’ join themselves in opposition with those who are
actuated by sordid avarice only. Among the Romans emancipation required but one effort. The
slave, when made free, might mix with, without staining the blood of his master. But with us a
second is necessary, unknown to history. When freed, he is to be removed beyond the reach of
mixture. 27
It goes to Jefferson’s credit, though, that despite his (as it turned out, false) apprehensions
about the blacks, he was clear about one thing: that even if his apprehensions were true, that
could not justify bad behaviour. In response to a letter to Henri Grégoire on February 25, 1809,
he wrote:
Be assured that no person living wishes more sincerely than I do, to see a complete refutation of
the doubts I myself have entertained and expressed on the grade of understanding allotted to
them by nature, and to find that they are on a par with ourselves … but whatever be their
degree of talent it is no measure of their rights. Because Sir Isaac Newton was superior to others
in understanding, he was not therefore lord of the property or person of others. 28
I have no doubt that had Jefferson been alive today he would have vehemently opposed the
slightest form of racism. Since mankind possessed almost no knowledge about itself in those
times, such views can therefore be understood contextually, even if not condoned.

27 Jefferson, Thomas. Notes on the State of Virginia. Published originally in 1781-1782. Internet edition at the
University of Virginia: [http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/JefVirg.html]
28 See the scan of the letter Jefferson wrote, at [http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/images/vc80.jpg]

244
 It didn’t help the growth of racism later (whether or not there is any iota of truth in her
book) that Katherine Mayo’s 1927 Mother India sold extremely well in the West, creating the
image of the immoral Indian, whose morality was allegedly as different to that of the British
‘like the colour of the skin’ 29. Of course, the British had to reconcile this information with the
numerous skills and talents that Indians displayed, and a grand philosophical history that
mesmerised so many European scholars. It simply was not possible racially discriminate against
outstandingly smart people who excelled in every field of human endeavour. Hence the mixed
journey of racism in India.
To what extent is racism practiced in the West today? Consider this, that ‘interracial’
marriages were banned in many parts of USA till as late as 1967. Australia had a White
Australia Policy until 1973. But today no Western nation practices overt racism (i.e. officially).
Nevertheless, a good amount of latent racism continues.
The Economist of 15 November 2008 reported that ‘American firms are one-and-a-half times
as likely to interview a person they think is white than one they think is black even if both have
identical qualifications.’ 30 That they harm their own self-interest through this process seems to
escape them (A business that discriminates on irrelevant characteristics like skin colour will
logically lose to the one that does not, at least in the long run.)
Data on the prevalence of racism can also be reduced from proxies. Thus, an exit poll by
Associated Press on 22 April 2008 indicated that ‘16 per cent of white Democratic voters
considered race an important factor and 43 per cent of these said they would either vote
Republican or not vote at all if Obama were to be the Democratic nominee.’ 31 In other words,
potentially 7% of Democratic party voters are likely to actually implement their racist views. If
we assume that a similar proportion applies to Republican voters and thus to the USA, more
generally, then around 7% of the Americal population (white or black) actively discriminates on
the basis of skin colour. Interestingly, the British National Party secured ‘about 6 percent of the
British vote in European elections’ in June 2009, 32 thus confirming the above proportion. Of
these 5-8%, there are a few who seem particularly challenged ability and knowledge-wise who
pursue their failed arguments of ‘white’ supremacy on the internet. 33 Fortunately, civilisation is
often cyclical. ‘Black’ civilisations will inevitably recover their (relative) glory once they adopt
the path of freedom. Economic prowess will expose the myth of racism more blatantly, even to
the ignorant.
Overall, a vast majority of people in the West are no longer racist. Indeed, a good number of
‘whites’ and ‘blacks’ are now inter-marrying. Barack Obama is himself the product of one such
marriage. Also, as labour moves across the world more freely, racist beliefs will further reduce.
Also, as dark-skinned people take charge of senior positions across the world, the concept of race
will tend to become a historical curiosity. Barak Obama’s election as the President of USA is a
major step forward in mankind’s journey towards equal freedom. Also, Indians or persons of
Indian origin now head (or have headed in the recent past) major companies like McKinsey,
Citibank, and ArcelorMittal, apart from a plethora of IT companies. The world of the future
therefore has competitiveness and merit written all over it. The best will win, irrespective of
their skin colour. For that future to be universally realised, however, all countries will need to
adopt the policies of freedom.
Unfortunately, caste-based racism is going to be the most difficult to eradicate from the face
of the earth. Caste consciousness has now spread beyond Hindus into Indian Christians and
Muslims. Also, not many Indians will agree to marry (or allow their son/daughter to marry) a
pitch black African from Somalia. Perhaps 99 per cent of Indians are therefore racist, and very
deeply so! Recently, Indians imported 1000 totally ordinary and quite untalented British

29 Mayo, Katherine, Mother India, London: Johathan Cape, 1932, p.225.

30 The paper in question is: Levine, Ross, Levkov, Alexey and Rubinstein, Yona, ‘Racial Discrimination and
Competition’, NBER Working Paper No. W14273, August 2008. [http://ssrn.com/abstract=1248934]
31 Article by Anatole Kaletsky entitled, ‘US may not be ready for a black president’ in The Australian, 25 April 2008.

On the web at [http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23593328-26397,00.html]

32 [http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20091020/ap_on_re_eu/eu_britain_far_right]
33 E.g. [http://www.white-history.com/], [http://www.geocities.com/white_truth/]

245`
‘actresses’ for acting in Hindi movies: but none from dark Africa. 34 The signals are clear: Indians
place a disproportionate value on ‘white’ skin colour, almost beyond all other attributes. That
also explains why Sonia Gandhi is readily acceptable to most Indians. It would have been very
different had she been a black Somalian. Also, at least till some years ago, not all temples
allowed entry to members of the lower castes. Outward manifestations of racism have perhaps
started reducing now, but it will take a long time for ‘lower castes’ in India to build self-
confidence. I believe there is an urgent need for reform within Hinduism. Three options for
reform are:
a) Mutual exchange of caste: Brahmins could convert into Harijans and Harijans into
Brahmins, at least for two generations.
b) All can become Brahmins on the same day.
c) All can become Harijans: And of course, if the Brahmins don’t like this idea we need to ask
why not? Do they think they are superior merely because of their birth? If so, why should the
oppressed not revolt against them, and indeed, against Hinduism as a whole?
India simply can’t get out of hereditary politics (e.g. the Nehru-Indira-Rajiv-Sonia-Rahul
dynasty) if it holds on to the concept of hereditary social class. We must have a single category of
citizen – the Free Indian. ‘High castes’ Hindus can start by bringing ‘Harijans’ to their homes for
dinner and encouraging ‘inter-caste’ marriages.

3. Equal freedom for women

The West is successful today at least in part because its women are allowed to work in
almost all occupations. The same laws also apply to women and men. And at least in some
households, both men and women share in the task of child-rearing. India will never achieve its
potential if half its population remains ill-educated or is otherwise prevented from using its
abilities.
But such equal freedom for women has been a relatively recent phenomenon. In the past,
only a few upper class girls got educated in the West. As Barbara Whitehead notes, ‘up to 90 per
cent of early modern women [in the West] were illiterate. Women were officially denied entrance
to universities until the nineteenth century.’ 35 But in ‘1792 Mary Wollstonecraft … denounced
the subjection of women in her “Vindication of the Rights of Women”‘. 36 And ‘In 1843 Mrs. Henry
Reid published “A Treaty for Women” and many suffrage pamphlets followed.’ 37
It was not till the second half of the 19th century, though, that serious thought was given to
expanding women’s education. Franes Buss and Dorothea Beale in England, and Sacré-Cœur –
an order of nuns in France – established secondary schools for girls around the 1850s. The
alumni of these schools later added to the increasing demand for girls’ higher education. J.S.
Mill strongly supported this demand in his 1869 essay, The Subjection of Women, in which he
argued that ‘if freedom is a good for men, it is for women’. 38 He asked:
was there ever any domination which did not appear natural to those who possessed it? … The
subjection of women to men being a universal custom, any departure from it quite naturally
appears unnatural… Nothing so much astonishes the people of distant parts of the world, when
they first learn anything about England, as to be told that it is under a queen; the thing seems
to them so unnatural as to be almost incredible. To Englishmen this does not seem in the least
degree unnatural, because they are used to it; but they do feel it unnatural that women should
be soldiers or Members of Parliament.

34 ‘Aspiring Brits find Bollywood beauty skin deep’, in The Age, 28 June 2009. [http://tinyurl.com/l334up]
35 Whitehead, Barbara J. (ed.), Women's Education in Early Modern Europe: A History, 1500-1800, New York:
Garland Publishing, 1999. Limited preview on Google books.
36 Stone, Olive M., ‘The Status of Women in Great Britain’, The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 20, No. 4

(Autumn, 1972), pp. 592-621.

37 Stone, Olive M., ‘The Status of Women in Great Britain’, The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 20, No. 4

(Autumn, 1972), pp. 592-621.

38 Mill, J.S., The Subjection of Women, in 1869.

246
 It was obvious, he said, that at least a few women writers did not think that the existing
state of affairs was either natural or acceptable. Women wanted the right to vote. Thus, ‘In 1867
seventy-three members of Parliament voted in favor of an amendment to the Reform Bill, moved
by John Stuart Mill, which would have given unmarried women householders the vote on the
same condition as men.’ 39 This Bill failed to carry, but the demand for equality for women was
now a part of the mainstream reform agenda. The doors of higher education did finally open to
women, and women’s colleges came up in Oxford, Cambridge and London Universities by 1871. 40
And later – much later – in 1918, English women did finally get the right to vote.
There was other, more direct, oppression of women, as well. Under the law, they were
treated as the personal property of men. ‘[I]t was the law that conveyed all a woman’s personal
property to her husband by the wedding ceremony, and deprived her of all authority over her
children and of any contractual capacity during his life.’ 41 Changes took place in this area only
very slowly. The Infants and Child Custody Act, 1839 gave women a few custodial rights. These
rights were extended in 1873 and 1886 and, later, through the Guardianship of Infants Act,
1925. The 1857 Matrimonial Causes Act made it possible for women to sue for divorce but
husbands retained most of the property acquired by women during the course of the marriage.
The 1882 Married Women’s Property Act did finally give women ownership to their own property.
Despite these reforms, it is true that women’s struggle for equal freedom has still some way
to go. In most places (including in the West) women remain at least somewhat restricted in the
choice of their profession. And in places like India, the socialist model has created vast numbers
of illiterate or ill-educated women whose capabilities are only fractionally used. Policies of
freedom will ultimately unleash the vast capacities of half of India’s population.

4. Ending stereotypes
Stereotypes, i.e. prejudices about entire groups – are convenient shortcuts we take in
forming a preliminary opinion about others. We may also experience a halo effect unduly favours
those who have particular group or personal characteristics, regardless of their individual merit.
But the free society must consider everyone on their merit. While inappropriate discrimination
based on ‘race’, caste, and gender has been touched upon above, these are not the only forms
practiced in society. For instance, the following discriminations are prohibited by the Victorian
Equal Opportunity Act: age; physical features such as height; marital status; pregnancy; lawful
sexual activity; impairment; parental status or status as a carer; political belief or activity;
industrial activity; religious belief or activity; and breastfeeding. There can be others as well
which diminish equal opportunity and equal freedom.
Stereotyping is invariably the fruit of ignorance or limitations of time. For example, I
mentioned to an Australian colleague that while growing up in India I used to read many
American comics and English novels. The colleague inquired whether these were translations,
imagining perhaps that Indians could not read English! Many people in the West find it hard to
believe that many Indians speak, read, and write English quite in India itself, and do not have to
learn it after reaching the West. This might be a case of harmless ignorance but I know that this
person has since been promoted and will be recruiting people. Such ignorance can impinge badly
on recruitment decisions, depriving people of Indian origin of job opportunities by denying them
even the interview call. Helen Szoke, CEO of the Victorian Equal Opportunity Commission has
noted that despite labour and skill shortages, recent arrivals from non-English-speaking
countries do not easily get jobs compatible with their skills. 42 This hurts everyone: Australia,
which misses out on talent; but also the immigrants who are unable to perform to the level they
are qualified for. Stereotypes that affect public office (including government jobs) are

39 Stone, Olive M., ‘The Status of Women in Great Britain’, The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 20, No. 4
(Autumn, 1972), pp. 592-621.
40 Lazarus and Coppel, The Making of the Modern World, Melbourne: Macmillan, 1967, p.196.
41 Stone, Olive M., ‘The Status of Women in Great Britain’, The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 20, No. 4

(Autumn, 1972), pp. 592-621.

42 Szoke, Helen, ‘Australia, land of the fair go (as long as you're not foreign)’, The Age, July 18, 2008.

[http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/australia-land-of-the-fair-go-as-long-as-youre-not-foreign-20080717-3gwd.html]

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particularly insidious and inimical to equal freedom. Such decisions should always be based on
merit. Those who discriminate on the basis of irrelevant characteristics for tax-payer funded jobs
should be seriously punished.

5. A social minimum and economic dignity for all

In Chapter 4 I outlined the concept of equal opportunity in some detail (and also in BFN).
Suffice it therfore to affirm that the institution of reasonable equal opportunity should include,
besides equal treatment, a social minimum for all. This minimum would include, among other
things, poverty elimination and children’s education.
In a free society there will always be some people who fall through the cracks of the
competitive marketplace, such as those without the mental or physical wherewithal (either
temporarily or permanently) to compete successfully. The free society should enable such people
to work with dignity (to the extent they can find work) and to the extent they cannot make a
sustainable living despite their best efforts they must be supported at a frugal level by those who
can. This minimum must be provided as part of a social insurance scheme and effectively
becomes an ‘entitlement’. (It is definitely not a form of charity.) In addition, we always remain
free to contribute to charitable organisations of our choice if we want to help people beyond the
social minimum.

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Chapter 14 The (many) other pillars of freedom

‘A properly functioning free market system does not spring spontaneously from society’s soil as
crabgrass springs from suburban lawns. Rather, it is a complex creation of laws and mores ...
Capitalism is a government program.’ - George Will 1

In this chapter I touch upon a few other important institutions of freedom, noting that there
many other institutions can’t be covered in a book this size for lack of space.

1. Freedom of expression
Freedom of expression is a well known pillar of freedom, but examples from across the world,
such as China or Singapore show us how rare it is. It was fortunate for India that British models
of freedom of expression and freedom of the press were adopted in the 19th century.
Like all other freedoms, freedom of expression must necessarily be interwoven with
accountability. Pinning down and demarcating the boundaries of freedom of expression remains
an ongoing challenge, however. Since writing something against someone only amounts to an
opinion, not a physical attack. The accountability arising from writings must necessarily be
lower than accountability that arises from physical violence. People are also free to ignore
writings they don’t agree with. Two examples below give us a sense of the issues involved.
Burning a national flag
Must a free society tolerate the burning or desecration of its national flag as a political act of
civil disobedience? An appropriate response to this question can begin by asking: If this act were
to be banned, how would it help to maximise our equal freedoms subject to accountability?
People may burn a flag for two possible reasons: Being mentally incompetent, they may burn the
flag for no reason at all. Such an action doesn’t matter. On the other hand, if someone genuinely
feels aggrieved about his freedoms having been trampled upon, and burns the flag as a protest,
then the facts of the case would need to be considered. For someone to signal that something is
seriously wrong is a favour to the society. Why would we want to criminalise it? Instead, this
form of protest should give us cause to examine our society. Flag burning is a clear sign that
something is seriously wrong.
However, not wishing to take any chances, India has enacted The Prevention of Insults to
National Honour Act, 1971 that provides for imprisonment of up to three years, or fine, or both,
for anyone who – in public view – mutilates, defaces, defiles, disfigures, destroys, tramples on, or
otherwise brings the National Flag into ‘contempt’. In addition, The Emblems and Names
(Prevention of Improper Use) Act forbids the use of the flag in any trade mark or design.
Unlike India, though, which seems to have a very feeble sense of identity, and lacks
confidence in the concept of freedom, the US has ruled that even though desecrating its flag is a
deplorable act, its citizens remain free even to burn its flag. Indeed, US citizens make
underwear that bear their flag’s image, as well. Since the patience of some people with flag
burning was running thin, however, an amendment to the US Constitution to prohibit flag
burning was proposed in 2006. But the US Senate rejected this amendment – albeit narrowly.
Senator Daniel K. Inouye, who lost an arm in World War II, fighting for USA, said that flag
burning ‘is obscene, painful and unpatriotic’, … ‘[b]ut I believe Americans gave their lives in the
many wars to make certain that all Americans have a right to express themselves – even those
who harbor hateful thoughts.’ 2 Such a resounding commitment to freedom surely defines what
the USA stands for: the world’s greatest bastion of liberty. Surely we must doff our hat to these

1George Will speaking in This Week with Sam Donaldson, ABC News, Jan. 13, 2002.
2 Reported in the Washington Post, June 28, 2006, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/27/AR2006062701056.html]

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courageous people. Three cheers to USA! Liberty expects no less. It is clearly inappropriate for a
free society to invest any symbol with a hallowed status that free people’s freedoms can be
curtailed for its sake. A flag is, at the end, merely a piece of cloth: human life and liberty is
priceless. Let us find the courage to respect human life and liberty.
Artistic license to abuse liberty?
The end of social organisation is to preserve our life and liberty – not the advancement of
art. The freedom of an artist must be bounded by accountability, like anyone else. Being creative
is not license to abuse freedom.
Unfortunately, some artists seem to have chosen to insult various religions or religious
figures. Islam, Christianity and Hinduism have been among the religions most frequently
subject to abuse. It is clear that while an analytical critique based on objective data is
reasonable, vilification and abuse is not. Artists must take care to understand the possible
impacts of their work on others and exercise appropriate self-restraint. Basic respect of others is
a basic principle of civilised society.
If self-restraint is not exercised, then those affected are entitled to seek compensation. As a
rule, where physical injury is not involved, accountability is best resolved through an
appropriate civil remedy. If A demonstrably offends B’s emotions (even though he does not
personally know B), then A is potentially accountable and may be called upon to compensate B –
either through an apology or through some form of financial compensation. Of course, B will
need to provide evidence that he has lost, say, certain hours of sleep; and must be compensated
only for the value of suffering caused by such lost sleep. Civil action could also take on the form
of class-action suits if many people claim to be affected.
In addition to exploring appropriate civil remedies, people in the free society must develop
forbearance; even forgiveness. We need a ‘thick skin’ to help us avoid exaggerated emotional
response to others’ opinions. We need as our motto: ‘Sticks and stones may break my bones but
words will never hurt me’. So long as we are not physically assaulted, we must learn to tolerate
others’ opinions. And if we don’t like a particular artist’s work, we do not need to go out looking
for it. We can ignore it. No cause can ever arise to physically attack any artist or writer just
because our sentiments are adversely affected.
India suffers from significant constraints on freedom of expression. Violent threats are rife
against artists, actors and writers. The government actively suppresses some forms of art and
writing. For example, Salman Rushdie’s book, Satanic Verses was banned because of protests by
Muslims. Fanatic Hindus prevented Water, a movie, from being made in India. The screening of
Da Vinci Code was prohibited in a few states because of protests by Christians. Freedom of
expression is now becoming a distant memory in India. Not just in India, governments across
the world have been banning books, movies, and even internet blogs, arguing that failure to do
so would endanger public order. That is, however, a shockingly bad excuse. It is the
government’s job to ensure both freedom of expression and law and order. Just because someone
has the ability to bully others through a big protest and threaten public order doesn’t mean he
can be allowed to destroy freedom.
There may exist a few instances where a society may reasonably argue for a generic ban on
freedom of expression, such as a ban against nudity in public places on the ground that it
violates basic social norms. However, in a free society situations of this sort would likely be
resolved amicably with certain areas demarcated for nudists.

2. Free markets, free banking and public finance in the free society
2.1 Free markets
One of the most important institutions that liberal thinkers advocate is the ‘free market’, b
which they mean a free market regulated for fraud prevention and accountability. In 1776 Adam
Smith demonstrated the happy coincidence between freedom, morality, and the generation of
wealth, a fact since confirmed repeatedly across the world. Like John Locke, Adam Smith was
not entirely original (and surely, no one can be). The French Physiocrats had already outlined a
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theory of laissez-faire. His teacher Hutchinson had elaborated on many key concepts of liberty.
All Smith did was to bring these together with insight, to propose the startling conclusion that
the more effort we make on increasing our personal gain the greater the social good.
While Machiavelli found that selfishness is inevitable, Adam Smith showed that selfishness
is a virtue. Doing well for ourselves is a good thing so long as we do so ethically. Life is not a
game of winners and losers. The size of the ‘pie’ for which we compete is not fixed. In a free
society everyone can be a winner, and the pie can continuously expand through our combined
(albeit competitive) efforts. Even if our relative share of the pie declines (because one of us, say,
Bill Gates acquires an inordinate amount of wealth) we all stand to gain, through the
productivity gains achieved by everyone through trade. Francis Edgeworth (1845-1926)
illuminated this key point through a diagram now called the Edgeworth box. Every student of
economics is familiar with it. Steven Pinker provides an elegant summary of the mechanics of
trade:
‘If I have two pounds of meat and no fruit, and you have two pounds of fruit and no meant, the
second pound of meat is worth less to me than the first (since there is only so much meat I can
eat at a sitting), and you feel the same way about your second pound of fruit. We’re both better
off if we exchange pound for pound.’ 3
Smith’s insight is so counterintuitive that even today, billions of people refuse to ‘believe’ his
conclusions. They prefer to harm themselves by looking for centralised or collectivist solutions in
which a government planer then apparently improves things that markets can’t. The problem is
that our intuition easily goes wrong on complex matters. We may think that if only Bill Gates
could be forced to work for the society’s welfare, we would all become better off. Thus, we may
think that if only the government nationalised Microsoft and put lowly paid bureaucrats in
charge, wonderful software will be cheaply generated for our use. We would also be able to forbid
others from producing software and thus avoid ‘duplication of effort’. Even if we didn’t take this
draconian route, we could force Bill Gates to increase the number of software DVDs he produces,
or at least fix the sale price of the software. This should (presumably) eliminate the obnoxious
inequality – in which a mere minute of his time is economically worth our entire lifetime. But in
pandering to such ill-informed intuitions, we would effectively destroy our society’s economy
(and significantly harm the world)! Indeed, if such a thought process were to be applied to every
productive activity, then the society’s incentives would become totally misaligned and the entire
society would come to a grinding halt. There is actually nothing more dangerous than the good
intentions of the ill-informed. Adam Smith could easily have predicted the sad fate that awaited
countries like USSR, China under Mao, and India for most of its independent history, based on
their policies. This wisdom that lets governments create wealth by doing almost nothing, is
extremely important for every society, but virtually impossible for most policymakers to grasp.
Since I have discussed at length in BFN the reasons why free markets underpin the free
society, and why the price system must be allowed to regulate a society’s resource allocation
decisions, I will not go into detail here. In this context it is worth noting that freedom includes
not only the freedom to compete but the ‘freedom to organise to eliminate competition’ 4. We must
always be wary of amateur ‘economists’ who insist on perfectly competitive markets. Causing
economic harm through a competition is not an ‘injury’, but a necessary process of wealth
generation. The leeway about what is fair contest in a competitive marketplace is far greater
than what the theory of perfect competition may imply.

2.2 Free trade

Associated closely with the idea of free markets inside the boundaries of a successful nation
is the concept of global free-trade. Trade among ancient civilisations was largely free. Few tariffs
or quotas (if any) applied. The reason why the world failed to ‘take off’ despite this freedom was

3Pinker, Steven, How the Mind Works, London: Penguin Books, 1999, p.502.
4Frank H. Knight (1935) in ‘Economic Theory and Nationalism’, in The Ethics of Competition and Other Essays. Cited
by Daniel B. Klein, ‘Discovery Factors of Economic Freedom’, in Uncertainty and Economic Evolution: Essays in
Honor of Armen A. Alchian. New York: Routledge, 1997, pp.165-180.

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because of the sovereign (and security) risks involved in such trade. Governments were mostly
unstable, law and order hardly available anywhere, justice was not enforced, and piracy was
rife. Trade can’t flourish under these conditions, despite in open borders.
But after the 16th century, European kings reduced their endless wars and powerful nation
states started to slowly come into shape. As the Leviathan grew stronger, law and order became
relatively more assured and trade began to surge, facilitated also by technological advances in
shipping. Indeed, the Portuguese, the Spanish, the Dutch, the French and finally, the British,
the soon became imperialists.
Initial arguments in favour of trade were led by mercantilist beliefs. According to these
concepts, trade is a zero-sum game in which one country gains at the expense of the others.
Consequently, countries promoted exports and discouraged imports (note that self-sufficiency
and infant industry arguments are examples of the mercantilism). Only Adam Smith understood
that this was a self-harming ideology. Through a theory of ‘absolute advantage’ he showed that
free trade benefits society. He wrote:
[N]ations have been taught that their interest consisted in beggaring all their neighbours. Each
nation has been made to look with an invidious eye upon the prosperity of all the nations with
which it trades, and to consider their gain as its own loss. Commerce, which ought naturally to
be, among nations, as among individuals, a bond of union and friendship, has become the most
fertile source of discord and animosity. 5 … It is in consequence of these maxims that the
commerce between France and England has in both countries been subjected to so many
discouragements and restraints. If those two countries, however, were to consider their real
interest, without either mercantile jealousy or national animosity, the commerce of France
might be more advantageous to Great Britain than that of any other country, and for the same
reason that of Great Britain to France. 6
David Ricardo (1772-1823) later proposed a refined principle of trade: the theory of
‘comparative advantage’. According to this, each nation should do what it does best (as measured
by what produces the greatest economic value), not what it does cheaply, although in some cases
this would lead to the same result. It is actually quite easy to understand this. For isn’t it better
for everyone that Einstein spend his time on physics (in which he is really good at) than on
milking cows – even if he can milk cows more cheaply and efficiently than others? In general, the
area in which we provide the greatest value to society is signalled by our skill which is paid the
most (indeed, Einstein was paid $16,000 by the Princeton University in 1933, an exceptionally
high salary at that time, noting that he had only formally completed a diploma, but had also got
the rich Nobel prize in 1921. 7)
For people to be deployed in their most productive vocation, the labour markets must be free.
Price signals must not be artificially disrupted. Attempting to be self-sufficient is often a bane
(self-reliance is a different matter altogether). We should, generally speaking, maximise our
income first, and hire others to do the various other things. Einstein should do physics and buy
milk with his money. This concept is also implicit in Adam Smith’s ideas about division of labour
whereby everyone specialises in a tiny area in which they, however, must excel (Smith also
wrote: ‘Jack of all trades will never be rich, says the proverb’ 8).
As a result of the work of liberal thinkers like Locke, Smith, and Ricardo, pressures
started to build up by the end of the 18th century in Europe to free up international trade. The
repeal of corn laws also set the scene (I will shortly discuss these laws, below). Accordingly, the
19th century saw much economic growth in USA and Europe, largely driven by free trade
between the Western nations (not as much with the colonies). Trade across the West increased s
much that India’s share of world trade declined from nearly 25 per cent in 1750 to 2.4 per cent in
1950s (and further to 0.4 per cent 1980, finally rising to about 1.6% recently). The wealth of
Europe and USA was largely built by trading with each other, not by exploiting colonies (thus
contradicting Dadabhai Naoroji’s 1901 thesis, Poverty and un-British Rule in India). The

5 Smith, Adam, The Wealth of Nations, Volume 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976, p.519.
6 Ibid., p.521.
7 Mentioned by Carl Sagan in Broca’s Brain, New York: Ballantine Books, 1979, p.32.
8 Smith, Adam, The Wealth of Nations, Volume 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976, p.38.

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empirical evidence about the benefits from trade is unequivocally positive. Wealth increases
dramatically with trade, as was also seen, for instance, with Japan, the East Asian tigers, and
now China.
The repeal of Corn Laws
At this stage, a sort discussion on the repeal of the 1815 British Corn Laws in 1847 will
provide a useful context to the historical development of the institutional of free trade (note first
in England that ‘corn’ means grain, primarily wheat; not maize alone). British Corn Laws have a
long history. Free trade (export and import) of grain had been allowed in the distant past, with
some periods of trade restriction. In 1773, for instance, corn was allowed to be freely traded and
restrictive duties largely abolished. As a result ‘both agriculture and industry flourished.’ 9 But
Adam Smith found reasons to be critical even then. According to him, ‘the praises which have
been bestowed upon … that system of regulations which is connected with [the exportation of
corn] are altogether unmerited.’ 10 Analysing the laws in detail, he argued that even greater
freedom should be allowed.
But soon the laws were changed for the worse, and freedom to trade was almost entirely lost.
The landed aristocracy had started exercising increasing control over the democratic politics of
England through its control over the so-called ‘pocket boroughs’ – tiny parliamentary
constituencies comprising, in some instances, as few as seven voters, with most of their former
residents having migrated to cities. By paying off these few voters, the lords effectively
controlled the House of Commons!
Wanting to strengthen their monopoly rents, these aristocrats changed the Corn Laws to
prohibit imports of foreign wheat until English wheat rose to three times its 1815 price. Wheat
farming obviously cannot become a pure monopoly, with at least some competition from other
producers, but these laws did dampen the supply of foodgrain considerably. As a result, even
though most workers only ate potato and cheap grain (i.e. other than wheat), wheat prices
became unbearably high. At the time when farm labour and industrial workers earned an
average of 7½ and 13½ shillings a week (respectively), an ordinary loaf of bread cost between 1½
to 2 shillings, taking bread out of the reach of working families. 11 This, in turn, put upward
pressures on industrial wages, hurting the industrial class – which were England’s new middle-
class.
Some reforms were finally delivered in 1832 to the British ‘democracy’. Angry urban
residents (mostly represented by the Whigs) faced these high food prices and threatened civil
war. In response, the parliament enacted the Reform Act of 1832 which got rid of 56 pocket
boroughs that had given undue power to the lords. The act also extended voting rights to the
wealthy industrial class (the vote was not given to poorer men yet – which galled the workers
and led to major agitations).
Basing their arguments on David Ricardo’s theories, workers and industrialists combined at
this stage to launch a political agitation in 1838 through the Anti-Corn Law League led by
Manchester businessman Richard Cobden, and the Chartist movement representing workers.
The Chartists wanted universal suffrage for all men aged 21 and over, electoral districts of equal
size, voting by secret ballot, an end to the property qualification for entry into Parliament, and
pay for Members of Parliament. The Anti-Corn Law League and the Chartists broadly agreed on
this list of demands, but the Chartists did not want free trade, arguing that it would reduce the
wages of labour. On this topic, they sided with Karl Marx’s ideas (Marx’s collaborator Friedrich
Engels used to write in their newspaper 12). In an 1853 article, Marx wrote that the industrialists
had effectively betrayed the workers: ‘In 1842, when the Manchester School, under the banner of

9 Thomas, J. A., ‘The Repeal of the Corn Laws, 1846’, Economica, No. 25, (Apr., 1929), p. 55.
10 Smith, Adam, The Wealth of Nations, Volume 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976, p.29.
11 Davis, M.O., The Story of England, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936, p.293.
12 [http://www.marxistsfr.org/archive/marx/works/subject/newspapers/moral-world.htm]

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free trade, enticed the industrial proletariat into insurrectionary movements, and, in the time of
peril, treacherously abandoned them’ 13.
By 1845 these various movements had convinced Robert Peel, the Prime Minister, that the
Corn Laws must go. But his own party (the Tories) refused to comply. In the autumn of 1845,
disease almost caused the entire potato crop to fail in Ireland. That shifted the political scene
dramatically:
The traditional remedy for famine was to suspend the Corn Laws and open the ports. But Peel
told his Cabinet that if he did this he could not promise to reimpose them, and a majority in the
Cabinet felt that they could not support him in this policy on those terms. He therefore retired,
but the Whigs could not, or would not, form a government. Peel, therefore, returned to office at
the Queen’s request, repealed the Corn Laws himself [gradually over three years] and was
hounded from office again... 14
Peel’s repeal of the Corn laws is quite remarkable, for he did so with the support of the
opposition (Whigs, being the liberals), not his own party 15. The repeal was phased out over a few
years.
It would have been nice if I could have reported that after these laws were repealed, imports
increased and prices of wheat fell. But wheat prices stayed largely where they were. This
happened because the repeated failure of the potato crop led to increased wheat consumption,
reducing the potential for prices to fall. 16 The repeal of the Corn Laws was therefore too late and
too slow to make a significant dent in food prices during peak famine conditions.
Indeed, despite the failure of their potato crop, the Irish landed gentry continued to export
wheat to mainland England where substitution in demand was occurring for wheat, from potato.
As a result, between half to one million Irish peasants perished. 17 Two million Irish peasants –
particularly those evicted by their landholders for non-payment of rent – migrated, mostly to the
USA. Ireland was severely depleted of people. All that can be said with some confidence is that
while the repeal of Corn Laws was overpowered by the famine and did not reduce wheat prices,
it surely prevented even worse consequences.
Free trade is, in the end, the greatest saviour of the poor. Adam Smith was perhaps the first
to show how free trade prevents famine. Today some people claim that we have globalisation.
But do we, really? There are still too many barriers to trade, and poor nations continue to
exacerbate their poverty by either closing their economies to foreign investment and trade, or by
trying to protect their ‘infant industries’. Mercantalism is well and alive.
A further digression for a moment: What about the claim that democracy also prevents
famine? Which is more powerful: democracy or free trade, in preventing famine? What we can
say for sure is that the primitive English and Irish democracy of the 1850s was insufficient to
prevent famine. Democracy without genuine representation is clearly as harmful as any
tyranny. Plato was clearly wrong: ‘elites’ of any sort (in this case the ‘lords’) can never be trusted
with the welfare of a society. What we need is genuine democracy – where the common man is
fully represented. That is the only way democracy can prevent famine. But even within a
democracy, what ultimately prevents famine is free trade. Even dictatorships with free trade
will work pretty well in this regard.
Marx was a mercantilist and opposed free trade (essentially arguing that Adam Smith was
wrong). He wrote that ‘free traders cannot understand how one nation can grow rich at the
expense of another.’ 18 And in a speech in 1848 he said: ‘[W]e are told that free trade would create
an international division of labor, and thereby give to each country the production which is most

13 In an article in New York Daily Tribune, No. 3925, November 15, 1853,
[http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1853/11/15.htm]
14 Kitson Clark, G., ‘The Repeal of the Corn Laws and the Politics of the Fortie’, The Economic History Review, New

Series, Vol. 4, No. 1, (1951), p.3.

15 Cameron, Rondo, A Concise Economic History of the World, New York: Oxford University Press, p.277.
16 Fay, C. R., ‘Corn Prices and the Corn Laws, 1815-1846’, The Economic Journal, Vol. 31, No. 121, (Mar., 1921), p. 26.
17 Kinealy, Christine, A Death-Dealing Famine: The Great Hunger in Ireland, Pluto Press, 1997. Google books.
18 From Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, cited in Morgenbesser, Sidney, ‘Imperialism: Some Preliminary

Distinctions’, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1, (Autumn, 1973), p.26.

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in harmony with its natural advantage. You believe, perhaps, gentlemen, that the production of
coffee and sugar is the natural destiny of the West Indies.’ 19 He simply couldn’t grasp the basics
of economics. (It is interesting to note that while Marx opposed free trade, he thought that it was
good tactically, for it would presumably hasten the collapse of capitalism … this turned out to be
an amazing misjudgement!).
In fact, Marx’s mistakenly attributed the deleterious affects of feudalism and mercantilism
to the system of natural liberty. He failed to observe the steadily rising incomes of ordinary
workers. His misperceptions and misunderstandings led to a philosophy that was to destroy
millions of lives over the next 150 years. In 1848 he asked the proletariat to aspire to
dictatorship as a first phase of communism. Among the ten planks of communism that he
suggested in the Communist Manifesto were these:
1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.
3. Abolition of all rights of inheritance.
7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the state... 20
This was a manifesto to abolish the fundamentals of liberty and free markets. It was a vote
against freedom. As Milton Friedman wrote, ‘Underlying most arguments against the free
market is a lack of belief in freedom itself.’ 21 Unfortunately, mercantilist and socialist hatred of
freedom is not dead, yet. For instance, many Western nations subsidise their farmers and
impose significant barriers on imports of food from developing countries. Mercantilist
approaches are preferred by organised labour as well.

2.3 Free labour markets

A free society’s labour markets must necessarily be free. Its workers must be free to leave a
job if they get a better offer. Similarly, employers must be free to let bad workers go, and hire
better ones instead. Any intervention in labour markets is unacceptable in the free society
except where it may be is necessary to ensure individual justice, basic (non-exploitative) working
conditions, and worker safety. This rules out, for instance, the possibility of setting a legal
minimum wage which, even the simplest economic analysis clearly shows, always harms the
prospects of unskilled workers at the bottom of the pyramid. These are those who earn the least,
anyway, given their low skills, and are the first to lose their jobs when employers aren’t able to
pay them a wage rate that is generally commanded by skilled workers. In a competitive market,
the wages of the unskilled will always be driven down to the subsistence level (just above the
poverty line).
It has always been hard for governments to let markets determine wages. In the
Arthasastra, Kautilya Proposes a centrally controlled wage system for everyone in the society
including merchants: ‘The superintendent of commerce shall fix a profit of five percent over and
above the fixed price of local commodities, and ten per cent on foreign produce. Merchants who
enhance the price or realize profit even to the extent of half a pana more than the above in the
sale or purchase of commodities shall be punished with a fine.’ Kautilya then explained ‘how
‘‘just” wages for a number of occupations, ranging from musicians to scavengers’ would be
determined, with government superintendents regulating these including ‘the earnings …
expenditure, and future earnings of every prostitute.’ 22 State control comes naturally to us; it is
freedom that we find so difficult to let others have.
Unions
Unions believe that they are an interest group (association) for protecting worker welfare
and interests. No doubt unions have played a vital role in all free societies in advancing worker
welfare. There is a simple strategic (game theoretic) issue involved: without combining, workers

19 Marx, Karl, ‘On the Question of Free Trade’, a Speech to the Democratic Association of Brussels at its public
meeting of January 9, 1848. [http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/01/09ft.htm]
20 The Communist Manifesto [http://www.anu.edu.au/polsci/marx/classics/manifesto.html].
21 Capitalism & Freedom, 1962.
22 Scheuttinger, Robert L. and Eamonn F. Butler, ‘Wage and Price Controls in the Ancient World’, Mises Daily,

2/27/2009, [http://mises.org/story/3346#part5]

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are unlikely to see their working conditions improve. Indeed, unions have been actively
supported by liberal thinkers (like J.S. Mill) in legislation that stops the race to the bottom (this
can also be seen as an example of what Frank Knight calls a positional arms race in which it is
not in anyone’s interest to stop a harmful activity unless everyone else gives it up.)
The question, when analysed theoretically, leads to the conclusion that unions must be
permitted to exist so long as joining a union is never made a mandatory requirement by the
state. Workers must remain free to join a union or to use other means of representation,
including individual contracts. The basic logic is that workers must be free to deal with their
employer any way they please so long as they are accountable. This can happen either directly or
through an agent (e.g. book writers or actors often use agents). We are entitled to protect our
best interests during any negotiation. That is why we use lawyers when we go to a court. Hiring
a union can provide a voice to a worker who may otherwise be too busy, ill-informed, or ill-
equipped to deal with the complexities of detailed contracts and work conditions.
Businesses can also profitably engage with unions to assess employee opinions and involve
them in business decisions to the extent that members of the union have useful or relevant
information. Good unions are therefore an integral part of capitalism, and a legitimate
organisation in free societies. It is a myth that capitalism opposes the collective wage
bargaining, or bargaining for worker conditions, that unions undertake.
And yet, the liberal remains concerned about their activities when unions try to influence
government economic policy. Organised labour almost invariably also supports mercantilist and
statist approaches. There is hardly any union in the world that won’t collude with heads of
industry to block free trade. That is where the liberal draws a line and asks policy makers to
stay away from short-term interests that unions represent.
The basic point to note about unions is that they arose from historical roots which were
nourished by liberal ideas. Starting from guilds and friendly societies, they were supported by
writers like Adam Smith who wrote about worker combinations thus: ‘The masters, being fewer
in number, can combine much more easily; and the law, besides, authorises, or at least does not
prohibit their combinations, while it prohibits those of the workmen.’ 23 Smith noted that in
disputes with labour, the ‘masters … never cease to call aloud for the assistance of the civil
magistrate, and the rigorous execution of those laws which have been enacted with so much
severity against the combinations of servants, labourers, and journeymen.’ 24
His reason was that employers seem to combine equally or more, but make a hue and cry
when workers do so: ‘We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters, though
frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely
combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the subject.’ 25 Workers ‘are desperate, and act with the
folly and extravagance of desperate men, who must either starve, or frighten their masters into
an immediate compliance with their demands.’ 26 Despite that, ‘The workmen … very seldom
derive any advantage from the violence of those tumultuous combinations, which . . . generally
end in nothing, but the punishment or ruin of the ring-leaders.’ 27 That is because employers,
without batting an eyelid, often use their ‘dirty tricks’ department to isolate and destroy the
credibility of union-leaders. Unions therefore bring a balance of forces into the labour market.
It was Parliamentarians who represented employer interests that opposed unions, not from
liberal thinkers. Thus, William Wilberforce, a Protestant MP who helped abolish slave trade,
opposed unions. He said in 1799 that a general measure ‘to prevent unlawful combinations of
workmen’ would be desirable. 28 Fortunately, democracy has the advantage of giving popular
opinion a stronger voice, and ultimately, the Combination Act of 1825 gave workers the formal
right to form trade unions and bargain collectively.

23 Smith, Adam, The Wealth of Nations, Volume 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976, p.74.
24 Ibid, p.75-76.
25 Ibid, p.75.
26 Ibid, p.75.
27 Ibid, p.76.
28 Pelling, Henry, A History of British Trade Unionism, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1963, p.25.

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 It is very important to remember that Karl Marx, or socialism more generally, had nothing
to do with the coming into being of unions, or indeed, with supporting them. Unions preceded
Karl Marx by nearly a century. It was liberal England that formalised their role. French
socialists denied unions any role. And while Marx tactically tried to fit trade unions into his
socialist revolution, unions didn’t care for his ideas. Thus, a 1866 socialist document that Marx
helped draft, says:
Unconsciously to themselves, the Trades’ Unions were forming centers of organization of the
working class, as the medieval municipalities and communes did for the middle class. If the
Trades’ Unions are required for the guerrilla fights between capital and labor, they are still
more important as organized agencies for superseding the very system of wages labor and
capital rule. 29
There remains an uneasy relationship between unions and socialists even today. Some
socialists think that unions serve a useful purpose in society but others refuse to countenance
them. In general, today, free countries permit unions subject to their being accountable; unfree
countries don’t (e.g. communist China has abolished them).
Health and safety of workers
There is a somewhat related issue that is perhaps best discussed here. Marx created a myth
that free societies are inimical to the health and safety of workers. But free societies had created
laws to protect worker safety well before Marx came on the scene. It was due to democracy that
this change occurred – in response to increasing complaints about the lack of worker safety. The
increasingly more representative British parliament introduced protections for the safety of
workers. By 1833, many British Parliamentarians had ‘determined to use the power of the state
to correct what they considered intolerable conditions in the factories.’ 30 Robert Torrens, a
parliamentarian (and economist of repute), argued that limiting daily work by children and
young persons to ten hours was compatible with economic science. While the act of permitting
child labour may sound atrocious, the important thing is that liberals conceptions about
accountability that ultimately to the abolition of child labour, not socialist. The liberals took the
side of workers against feudal and industrial elites.
The Factories Act of 1833 greatly improved the working conditions of workers. John Ramsay
McCulloch, Nassau Senior, and J.S. Mill continued the arguments for reform. Mill argued for
better working conditions to be legislated. He noted that workers face a serious dilemma.
Employees who want to work for less than ten hours a day will soon find themselves without a
job. The only solution must therefore be political. 31 The theorists of freedom offered practical
solutions, and most reforms had been introduced before Marx came on the scene. Many others
that came into effect later would have happened without Marx’s ‘help’.
We are still exploring the implications, and expanding the limits, of freedom. While good
organisations may not need to be regulated for health and safety of their employees, it is
necessary for the law to mandate such health and safety through a performance- or outcome-
based approach (not prescriptive). The wage contract is surely not a license to harm workers.
The liabilities and obligations of workers are limited only to the services they commit to perform
as part of their wage contract. No one signs up to give up their life or limb for an employer. The
employer has no authority to misbehave or bully the workers, either. Respectful treatment must
surely be a mandatory minimum requirement. A regulatory model to ensure worker safety
without needlessly impinging on employers’ freedoms was developed in 1971 by Lord Robens. 32
Such an approach aims for co-regulation, by encouraging industry to establish its own self-
regulatory standards.
Free labour movement across nations

29 Gilbert, Alan, ‘Social Theory and Revolutionary Activity in Marx’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 73,
No. 2, (Jun., 1979), p. 534.
30 Sorenson, Lloyd R., ‘Some Classical Economists, Laissez Faire, and the Factory Acts’, The Journal of Economic

History, Vol. 12, No. 3, (Summer, 1952), p.253.

31 Ibid, p.262.
32 Report of the Inquiry into Safety and Health at Work chaired by Lord Robens.1972.

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 The genuinely free society permits free labour movements across its borders, subject only to
skill and security requirements or concerns. Through such free flow, cross-fertilisation of ideas
increases, leading to increases in innovation and human welfare. Once this happens, the
availability of options for skilled people to exit un-free countries will impose pressures on such
countries to increase freedoms. Some of this is already happening. The alternative way of
ensuring similar outcomes is for industries to be allowed to move freely, generally to nations
with cheap skilled labour. Both these are advances in liberty.

2.4 Free banking

Banking and a well-managed money market are yet another vital free society institution.
Money, which is the medium of exchange for transactions, must be well regulated so it doesn’t
distort incentives. I’ll touch upon the concept of banking first, and then outline key issues
relating to money as the medium of exchange.
The banking system arises from the following simple requirement – the difference in inter-
temporal preferences for consumption of two people, and the lack of intermediation between
them. Someone (say, person ‘A’) has some spare money today that he doesn’t need to use
immediately but will need it sometime in the future. Someone else (say, person ‘B’) needs the
same amount to invest in a potentially profitable enterprise, and can repay it tomorrow. If a safe
mechanism to transfer money from ‘A’ to ‘B’ could be created then ‘A’ could lend, say, Rs. 1000 to
‘B’ who would agree to repay more than Rs. 1000 in the future. If this trade (of money) goes
ahead, both the lender ‘A’ and borrower ‘B’ will become better off. ‘B’ gets money he can use to
invest and generate a profit, and ‘A’ gets more money in the future than he otherwise would
have. The increased value has come from increased production, of course. Real wealth is created
by trading money, like with any other trade.
But the problem is that ‘A’ doesn’t know ‘B’ and even if ‘A’ knew ‘B’, there was no guarantee
for ‘A’ that he would get his money back from ‘B’ in the future. Hence the trade doesn’t go ahead.
There is a gap in trust, and accountability. That is where the bank steps in as an intermediary.
Banks take collateral (e.g. title to ‘B’s factory) and confirms the viability of B’s business plan. It
is then the bank’s job to get the money back from ‘B’. ‘A’ can then lend not to ‘B’ but to the bank
which then lends to ‘B’. ‘A’ is confident that he will get his money back.
What should be the appropriate rate of interest charged by the bank to ‘B’? If as a society
people want to consume more today, then ‘A’ will demand a high interest rate to part with his
savings. A low interest rate will reduce ‘A’’s incentive to save and ‘B’ won’t be able to borrow
money at that price. Only by bidding up the interest rate will ‘B’ find the money he needs. In the
free market, competition among banks would also ensure that the market price of money
(interest rate) is just sufficient to cover the costs of the bank, including the risk of default of ‘B’.
Overall, in this situation the price of money would reflect the highest economic value it can
generate compared with its alternative uses, and the society’s time preference for consumption.
Thus it is crucial that the interest rate be determined by a freely competitive market.
Who should produce the actual money? Modern societies do not permit the private issue of
money, it is important to remember that money was largely issued privately in the past. A range
of objects served as money: gold, silver, bronze, even iron, silk and other commodities. But paper
money interests us the most. China started to issue paper money sometimes between 600 and
800 AD. The Chinese government soon got involved and issued paper money but by 1455 its use
had stopped. In the meanwhile, indigenous bankers in India used the hundi system (the
equivalent of bills of exchange) from the 12th century onwards. 33
In the Levant in Europe, private notes, being commitments to pay a specified amount of gold
to their bearer, had started being used in trade. By 1661, paper money was re-invented, this
time by Stockholm Banco in Sweden, which issued the first banknotes but soon went bankrupt
because of its inability to honour them. But the concept stayed and the practice spread across
Europe. The ‘gold standard’ supported paper notes which were readily convertible into gold.

33 Desai, S.S.M. Economic History of India, Bombay: Himalaya Publishing House, 1980, p.319.

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 The issue and management of money raises many complex issues, particularly related to
monitoring against fraud. However, if left free to issue money and fix interest rates subject to
prudential regulation including regulation to prevent fraud, banks are likely to evolve a range of
methods to create and manage money. If the issuers of money were purely independent of
government, they would not ‘have the right to call on the Government or any other institution’ 34
to save them if things went bad. They would live or die on their own merit, and it would
primarily be the responsibility of depositors or independent private agencies hired by them to
verify the credibility of banks.
The reality is that banks have not been, for the most part, allowed to operate freely. 35 This is
not because of the unreliability of private banking systems but because of the government’s
great desire to control money (and to lend a lot of it to itself!). Central banking is the mechanism
for a government to control money. By 1694, just a few years after the Glorious Revolution, the
British government found itself in financial distress. A solution it found to its problems was to
create the (private) Bank of England with the monopoly power to print paper money. For this
favour, the government received an advance of £1.2 million.
A few enlightened governments did buck this trend. Thus, Sweden allowed free banking for
a while. Its free banking episode between 1830 and 1902 eliminated economic booms and busts
and dramatically reduced bank failures. 36 But Sweden abandoned free banking later, given it
imposes great discipline on governments which they find very hard to follow.
Indeed, central banks exist exclusively for one purpose: to interfere with the free market
both in the production and supply of money, and in the determination of interest rates. Thus, the
US Federal Reserve Bank, established in 1913, soon become a Frankenstein’s monster, choking
the banking system and leading to many bank failures. Being a lender of last resort meant that
banks became careless about their lending. It can be reliably argued that the Great Depression
was almost entirely caused by bad decisions of the Federal Reserve. Milton Friedman thought
that the Federal Reserve created the Great Depression by contracting money supply excessively.
Von Mises attributed another aspect of the Fed’s behaviour: its keeping interest rates artificially
low, and indeed expanding the money supply excessively in the beginning. I support Mises’s
view on the ground that central banks will never have enough knowledge to determine the
precise level of money supply needed in a society. Instead, the free market should determine
both money supply and interest rates, with the government acting as a prudential regulator,
forcing banks to insure against bad practices.
Today, neither free markets in money exist, nor free banking. As a result, consumers and
entrepreneurs are in perpetual quandary about their optimal plans. They are simply unable to
discover the truth under the quagmire of centrally planned money. Worst affected are those
whose money is constantly devalued by inflation caused by increases in money supply.
Americans save so little and borrow so much not because they are stupid but because the Fed
effectively prohibits the society’s time preference of consumption from being discovered by the
markets.
By (usually) forcing interest rates well below what the market rate would have been, the Fed
forces Americans to consume more and save less. For no sensible person would save if his
savings earn little or no interest; even negative interest after inflation and taxes are factored in.
It is far better for the consumer to borrow at low interest rates and consume in excess. Clearly,
American citizens are rational; it is politicians and central bankers whose heads need to be
checked up!
* * *
For a wealth-destroying event of the magnitude of the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008 to
have taken place despite celebrated economists running Western economies tells us that

34 Smith, Vera C., The Rationale of Central Banking and the Free Banking Alternative, [1936], Indianapolis: Liberty
Fund,1990, p.170.
35 See also Cameron, Rondo, A Concise Economic History of the World, New York: Oxford University Press, p.309-323.
36 Lakomaa, Erik, ‘Free Banking in Sweden 1830–1903: Experience and Debate’, The Quarterly Journal of Austrian

Economics, 10 (2 ), Summer 2007, pp. 25-44.

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‘standard’ economics has failed at a most fundamental level, just like the theories which said the
earth was flat. Instead, the ideas of thinkers like Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek of the
Austrian school of economics, who were deeply neglected in the past, but who repeatedly warned
about the dangers of state-induced distortions in money markets, have been vindicated.
Unfortunately, the economics taught today continues to ignore these great economists’ insights.
Current economics is more inclined to side with Marx who dreamt of state-controlled credit in
the hands of a national bank. It is time the world asks these ‘standard’ economists the blunt
question: Why does the free society need Marxian central banking?
The banking system today provides incentives to bank executives to take highly risky
decisions knowing that the government or central bank will bail them out. If someone makes a
bad decision, why should the tax payer pay the costs of that bad decision? The problem with
having a central bank is that, like any centralised body, it magnifies the risks of bad decisions.
We need to abandon central banking and let private banks come up with their own models,
under the careful prudential supervision of governments. There are many alternative and better
models to be explored, and markets will do that if they are allowed to do so. The government’s
role is to ensure prudential regulation; not to become the insurer of the last resort. A banking
business, like any other business, must learn to insure itself. And citizens must insure
themselves as well. Thus, if a business takes risks, or citizens take needless risks, they must lose
money, not tax-payers. People in a free society are free to be as stupid as they want to be. That is
their birth right. But equally, it is the birthright of hardworking taxpayers to not bail out the
stupid. The market should therefore be allowed to determine the interest rate to be charged for
each category of risk, and people asked to take responsibility for their decisions.
The key problem is that like any other socialist planner, central banks are prone to imagine
that the solutions to the world’s problems lie inside their presumably super-intelligent but in
reality deeply flawed and ill-informed brains (we are all similarly endowed: that is a basic truth
about our ignorance and frailty). Fatal conceit afflicts them as they ‘fine tune’ the economy by
randomly tinkering with money supply and its price. Alan Greenspan (whom Ayn Rand very
erroneously considered to be her disciple) wrote in the 1960s that the US Federal Reserve had
‘nearly destroyed the economies of the world’ in the 1920s, and that ‘a free banking system
stands as the protector of an economy’s stability and balanced growth’. This was excellent
thinking. But between 1987 and 2006, as Chairman of the Fed, Greenspan changed colours
completely. Not only did he not liberate the money markets, he kept interest rates artificially
low, more particularly between January 2001 and June 2004. Had he recalled the Austrian trade
cycle theory (which Ayn Rand endorsed) he would have realized the great dangers of the central
planner’s administering the price of money. The artificially low interest rates he set persuaded
entrepreneurs worldwide to build things like houses and car factories in great excess, leading to
the same over-investment (or mal-investment if we consider Mises’s theory, that led to the
roaring 20’s and thence to the Great Depression. Greenspan thus did exactly what he had earlier
decried. Freedom was betrayed by this man, once considered by many to be its votary.
Irrespective of the actions of Greenspan (for we are talking about the institutions of freedom,
not about individuals), it is now time to stop controlling the supply of money in otherwise free
societies. Central banking, the illegitimate child of mercantilist monarchs and communist
utopians, must be abolished. Free societies must get free banking based on a mandatory (and
well-regulated) gold standard. Clearly, despite being founded under the banner of liberty,
America has never been completely free – and its heavy control over the money market further
reduces its chances of becoming free.
India’s Reserve Bank should get out of the business of creating money and fixing the price of
money as quickly as possible. It should morph into an independent regulator of a totally
privatised money and banking system. Many of its functions should be unbundled, and specialist
regulators created to deal with those functions such as deposit lending and coins and notes issue.
The lender of last resort would then be performed purely by private insurance companies, with
the job of a specialist regulator to ensure solvency of these insurance companies. Reforms on
these lines will at last allow citizens to discover the market’s true interest rate, allowing risks to

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be priced appropriately, thus enabling uninterrupted prosperity. Of course, good fiscal policy
would have to accompany such reforms.

2.5 Paying for the social contract: public finance

The liberal social contract authorises governments to provide us with public goods like defence,
police, justice, and infrastructure. 37 Taxes are then the fees paid for these goods. The liberal thus
considers the proper funding of government activity as an integral part of the free society. This
perspective is dramatically different from the ‘New Classical’ or anarchic approaches which
consider government activity to be a waste.

The liberal notes that it is citizens who, implicitly or explicitly, authorise the social contract (and
not companies or other legal entities). Therefore citizens, individually, must pay taxes: not
companies or other such entities. Second, it must be mandatory on all citizens to pay taxes
except when someone is simply too poor to pay.

How much should these citizens pay? Should there be one flat fee per citizen (poll tax) or should
different citizens pay a different amount? There are basically two different price models in the
marketplace. (1) In a perfectly competitive market everyone pays the same unit price (such as
for a kilo of onions) irrespective of his or her willingness or ability to pay. (2) Monopolistic
control, however, allows circuses to fix different prices for different seats for the same
performance. Price discrimination (PD) of this sort is based on consumers’ differential
willingness to pay (note that willingness to pay is the same as the ability to pay under most
circumstances). PD is commonly used in markets, and includes student discounts and different
fees charged from Indians and foreigners to enter the Taj Mahal.

Price discriminating taxation by the monopoly state

Economic analysis (made from the demand side) of public goods provision leads us to “Lindahl
prices” as the proper solution. According to this each person must pay a different price equal to
the worth of the public good to him. 38 From the supply side the opposite problem becomes: what
should the monopoly state (Leviathan) charge for its services to ensure that everyone gets what
they really want?

The theory of monopoly tells us that where PD is feasible, the monopoly will increase its output
to accommodate all preferences and thus produce “the same level of output as would a
competitive industry” 39. It does so by skimming off all consumer surplus. 40 Both these analyses
lead us to reject outright the poll tax solution: thus, a “tax structure that levies the same tax on
all citizens cannot in general be Pareto efficient”. 41 But which of the two: flat tax or progressive
tax is a better way to deliver the optimal level of public goods?

Consumer surplus generally increases disproportionately with income for (as illustrated by
auctions) the rich are willing to pay disproportionately more than the poor for a given product,
since each incremental unit of money has a relatively lower value for them. A flat marginal tax
will therefore lead to sub-optimal provision of public goods by not capturing the entire consumer
surplus of the rich. A level of progression is therefore more appropriate. In general, tax levels
should be set at the point where the rich and poor get equal disutility from taxes.

A few other arguments reinforce this conclusion. First, the liberal requirement of a social
minimum (basically a universal insurance scheme funded through the tax system) adds an

37 Details in chapter 4 of my draft manuscript, The Discovery of Freedom, http://discovery.sabhlokcity.com/.

38 Joe Stevens, The Economics of Collective Choice, Westview, 1993, p. 106.
39 Hal Varian, Microeconomic Analysis, W. W. Norton and Company, 3rd edition, 1992, p. 243.
40 The amount over and above the market price for a product that that different consumers would be willing to pay if

its supply were significantly reduced.

41 Robert Frank, Microeconomics and Behaviour, Irwin McGraw Hill, 3rd edition, 1997, pp.622-23.

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apparent measure of progression to the liberal tax system. More commonly, progressive taxation
is needed to offset the many indirect taxes usually imposed, such as consumption and excise
taxes which are highly regressive, hitting the poorest the hardest in relative terms. Even F.A.
Hayek, the great advocate of flat taxation, accepted that a modicum of progression would be
needed for these two reasons.

But there is one more very important reason that is often neglected. PD is optimal only when the
same good is provided by a government. If an extra product is delivered to the rich, then a
further increment must be charged. It is self-evident that the rich do receive a greater share of
government services than the poor do. For instance, they use the court system
disproportionately more. They also receive a higher quality of services. Thus, if a rich person’s
daughter is kidnapped, the head of Police gets involved, but a similar complaint from a poor
slum-dweller may not even get registered. Governments treat the rich as being of value, and the
poor of no value. That is totally contrary to the social contract, and even the slightest such
discrimination means the rich must be charged progressively.

The practical implementation of PD: hurdle pricing

A monopoly can only price discriminate if it has complete information about consumer
preferences and is able to keep transaction costs (of calculating different prices for each
consumer) low. Without these preconditions, it will prefer to impose hurdle pricing by placing
hurdles between ‘seats’ and pricing them differently. “[T]he more finely the monopolist can
partition her market under the hurdle model, the smaller the efficiency loss will be.” 42
Governments generally follow a hurdle model with tax brackets based on citizens’ ability to pay.

The rich never pay a flat tax

The reality all over the world is that only the salaried upper middle classes end up paying the
highest marginal tax rates. The rich pay much less than an overall flat tax rate would require,
by influencing politicians to create tax shelters, exceptions, exemptions, and loopholes. Thus,
Warren Buffet noted in June 2007 that in 2006 he paid only 17.7% of his $46 million income as
tax, while his employees paid 32.9%. And the rich never pay the worst tax of them all: inflation;
because they own real estate and shares which are inflation-proof.

Modest progressive taxation recommended

Since the rich don’t even pay a flat tax, introducing a genuine overall flat tax will always be an
improvement. But other factors prevent the practical implementation of progressive taxation, as
well. First, a government can never determine the precise level of progression that captures
everyone’s consumer surplus perfectly. Second, progressive taxation can lead to injustice when
those with variable income flows (e.g. sports celebrities) are taxed at the highest marginal rate
during the few years when they receive high incomes, while others who receive the same total
income that is distributed more evenly are possibly (not necessarily) taxed less (in theory, this
should not happen as the annualised lifetime worth of individuals must be used as the base of
taxation; but this requirement can’t be implemented precisely). The third problem is that if a
country sets its highest marginal rate too high, its rich will promptly abandon it or smuggle out
their capital.

Practical difficulties with progression and the reality that the rich never pay even a flat tax
mean that only a modest level of progression can be recommended. Hayek’s prescription on
taxation 43 can now be extrapolated to yield a broad rule of thumb, namely: that where income
taxes are the primary source of taxation (as should be the case), then the highest marginal tax
rates should be just above the proportion of taxes to GDP, with two tax brackets equal to, and
below, this proportion. In India, this could mean the highest marginal tax of (say) around 21 per

42 Ibid, p.418.
43 In his book, Constitution of Liberty, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960, p.323.

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cent with two brackets at 18 and 15 per cent each. Of course, such low rates will demolish our
tax collections because of our narrow income tax base.

To recap, I have so far outlined the following principles, that (a) citizens (and not companies)
should pay taxes; (b) paying taxes must be mandatory unless someone is simply unable to pay;
(c) taxes should be based on the annual average of the lifetime worth of an individual; and (d)
taxes must price-discriminate with a modest level of progression: the marginal rates
approximating the overall share of taxes in GDP.

According to the fourth principle, the middle class should pay an income tax at a marginal rate
approximately equal to the proportion of overall taxes to GDP; the rich should pay at a rate
slightly above this; and those below the poverty line should not pay taxes, receiving a negative
income tax as part of the social insurance scheme, instead.

The right level of taxation

A fifth principle suggests itself: the total amount of tax collected should be neither too much nor
too little, being just enough to ensure effective delivery of necessary government services. The
liberal believes that when governments are restricted to their proper role they provide us with a
crucially needed service. In this regard it may be noted that a society comprising a larger share
of honest people (like Japan) will need less policing and hence lower taxation. Corrupt societies
will need higher levels of taxation.
In any event, the liberal is not smitten by the mindless fascination of some alleged ‘liberals’ for
low taxation. It is crucial to have the right size of government with right services and functions.
That is the only correct determinant of the right level of taxation. Today, India’s socialist
government imposes an extremely low overall tax burden but then it squanders these precious
revenues on totally unnecessary activities.

The consequent under-supply of basic public goods like defence, police and justice – including the
defence of property rights – has led to significant crime and poverty in India.

The ever-present specter of regressive taxation

Theoretical models of public taxation are extremely difficult to translate into practice. We noted
last month how regressive taxation is the norm across the world. The rich pay proportionately
less as they get richer. At the same time, the poor (who, we have noted, should not have to pay
taxes) fork out heavy consumption and indirect taxes. The most progressive taxes of all are
reserved for the salaried upper middle class, which carries the world on its shoulders.

The rich benefit most from any number of exemptions, including a regressive capital gains tax
regime. Assume that A and B have the same level of assets today and that they invest equally
in, say, land. Now assume that A receives a windfall gain with his land tripling in value while
B’s stagnates. Most tax systems will treat A’s windfall gains very lightly, even though A is now
considerably richer than B. It is improper for windfall gains to be taxed proportionately less than
income from ordinary hard work.

The reality is that even as the rich continue to influence politicians to give them more and more
exemptions, they end up suffering from the effects of the consequent regressive taxation regime.
While they can own the best Mercedes, they must then hire heavily armed security guards and
drive through sludgy, potholed roads. The quality of life is very low in societies that depend on
regressive taxation.

Some other principles of taxation

Other principles of taxation include:
• No taxation without representation (i.e. democratically determined taxes).
• Inflation is the most regressive form of taxation. The liberal therefore opposes deficit
financing except in the rarest circumstances (like war).
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 • Taxes must be levied by that tier of government which administers the relevant service
(principle of subsidiarity).
• Since it is citizens who must be taxed, taxation of goods must be avoided, being limited to
Pigovian taxes to facilitate the internalizing of negative externalities. Where possible,
market-based instruments should be used to control negative externalities.
• The variable cost of a government service to an individual or industry, such as the cost of
processing a license, should be recovered from that individual or industry (cost recovery
principle).
• The government should not own land except for roads, common infrastructure,
Parliament, courts, basic defence establishments, and police stations. This will allow land
to be put to its most productive use. The government should therefore sell land and use
these revenues to keep taxes low.
• Transfers of assets from one generation to another should be treated seamlessly, thus
ruling out inheritance taxes.

Clearly, the liberal is not utopian. He realizes that practical matters related to the ease of
collection of taxes will influence the real tax system, even though unavoidable distortions will
result. Thing like a mix of indirect and direct taxes; or the use of visible and not
discounted future income and wealth; will therefore be unavoidable.
I have explored the implications for India both in BFN, and in my December 2009 article in
Freedom First, so I’ll refer the interested reader to these two sources.

* * *
It is worth reminding ourselves that free market institutions constitute only a small part of
capitalism. To confuse capitalism with the free market is to ignore its comprehensive
philosophical basis. The free market cannot exist, for instance, without the institutions of
governance and democracy, which we have outlined earlier. The entire set of institutions of
freedom are of one piece. The whole package – of theory and its institutions – is best known as
capitalism.

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Part 4 What lies ahead

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Chapter 15 Modern societies emerge into freedom

‘If the perpetual oscillation of nations between an anarchy and despotism is to be replaced by
the steady march of self restraining freedom, it will be because men will gradually bring
themselves to deal with political, as they now deal with scientific questions.’ - Thomas Henry
Huxley 1

It is now time step back into the broader canvas of the journey of liberty and to consider the
journey ahead. A major result of this long journey towards greater freedom has been the
formalisation of the concept of sovereign nations (with sovereign individuals underpinning their
existence) and the consequent decline of imperialism. During this period a range of utopias have
competed for our attention. Over this period, after millions of lives have been squandered in
their baseless experimentations, the world has largely rejected ideas, or ideologies that don’t
work, and could never have worked. The rejection of socialism is total and comprehensive. There
remains the ongoing challenge of guiding new generations so they don’t take the world back by
revisiting discarded utopias – or creating new utopias such as libertarian anarchy.
And finally in this chapter, in closing this book, I’d like to examine what each of us can do in
our private lives to nudge the world towards gerater liberty. I have already suggested many
actions for India in BFN, but many other ideas have surely emerged through this book. Those
are things in which everyone in India should get involved (and others elsewhere should get
involved in similar things for their own society). Many other actions exist that no amount of
writing by a single individual will ever cover adequately, particualry at the policy design and
governance level. And so this will necessarily have to be a journey where everyone puts their
shoulder to the wheel and we all work on this together: after all, this is our planet, this is our
life, these are our children.

1. ‘Sovereignty’ of nations: The end of imperialism

The formalisation of the fortress (nations) has been a major advance over the past few
centuries. The concept that nations are sovereign must, of course, be taken with a pinch of salt,
since it is not national but individual sovereignty that must always be paramount. A nation is
formed by sovereign individuals who choose to hand over part of their sovereignty to a monopoly
provider of defence, police, and justice through the social contract. The powers a nation receives
are referred powers, so its sovereignty is ‘referred sovereignty’, at best, not true sovereignty.
Also, nations can only represent a momentary strategic alignment of forces designed to support
our freedoms, but our sovereignty is permanent.
But there is no doubt that nations must be independent. That means imperialism is totally
unacceptable. Freedom cannot be supported by foreign powers, no matter how benign their
intention. Being responsible for the laws and governance of our society – even if that temporarily
means dictatorship, monarchy, or corrupt democracy – is a necessary first step towards freedom.
As Indians we are deeply grateful to the leaders of our independence movement for having
created India as a united nation with the potential for its citizens to achieve genuine freedom.
Our neighbouring nations have not been as lucky as us. Of course, many other nations achieved
independence during the second half of the 20th century as well. Numerous revolutions led to
numerous handing-over ceremonies as a result of which most parts of humanity now live in
sovereign nations.
Not all these nations are free, however. The major challenge is for these nations to adopting
capitalism and freedom. The other challenge is to avoid jingoism, for nationhood can degenerate
into a dangerous tribal concept unless its conceptualisation is based on the social contract.
Expansion of territory becomes an easy goal for nations, or elevating it into a god. It is fine to

1 (1880), in ‘Science and Culture’.

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call our nation, Mother India. But at no time should ‘Mother India’ become more important than
India’s citizens.

2. Shunning utopias like the plague!

For some unknown reason, utopias seem to be very influential in newly formed nations. But
these are idle daydreams about societies, with no relationship to reality. These dreams have
been the bane of mankind throughout history. Whether it is Plato’s Republic, Thomas Moore’s
Utopia, Gandhi’s Ram Rajya, or Marx’s communism, utopias downplay the pitfalls of human
nature and glorify the cooperative spirit, totally misrepresenting reality. While most utopias
quickly collapse, some of them take untold lives or cause great harm before being discarded.
Murray N. Rothbard wrote about the socialist utopia thus:
[A]bsurd fantasies are at the root of the Marxian utopia of communism. Freed from the supposed confines
of specialization and the division of labor (the heart of any production above the most primitive level and
hence of any civilized society), each person in the communist utopia would fully develop all of his powers in
every direction. As Engels wrote in his Anti-Dühring, communism would give “each individual the
opportunity to develop and exercise all his faculties, physical and mental, in all directions.” And Lenin
looked forward in 1920 to the “abolition of the division of labor among people … the education, schooling,
and training of people with an all-around development and an all-around training, people able to do
everything. Communism is marching and must march toward this goal, and will reach it.” 2
In each case utopias fail not because of limits of imagination but failed assumptions about
human nature and incentives. Utopias are so badly divorced form reality that one must agree
with Edmund Burke that utopians consider ‘their speculative designs as of infinite value, and
the actual arrangements of the state as of no estimation’ 3. The very idea that someone’s ideas
about society could be ‘perfect’ is denied by the liberal, who knows well enough about the severe
limitations of human knowledge. Hence the liberal in all humility suggests democracy in which
many people rather than a ‘chosen’ few, decide, for extremist ideas can be ironed out in this
process. The liberal cares to understand how humans actually behave, not how they should
behave. Therefore, he believes in things like checks and balances; constant vigilance; and good
leadership.
It would be timely, perhaps, to look back at capitalism and compare it with its most likely
opponent: the utopia of socialism. Capitalism – the system of equal freedom with reasonable
equality of opportunity and democracy – is not utopia but the opposite of utopia. From its basic
assumptions onwards, it is designed to bring some sanity into human ignorance, hatreds,
corruption, evil, deception, and emotional extremes. Its major goal is to avoid empowering any
single person to micro-manage our lives. We must be free to do anything we want subject to or
being accountable.
Capitalism creates wealth not by exhorting people to work for their country, but by letting
them work for themselves in the most energetic and self-interested manner. By thereafter
building checks and balances it allows accountability and justice to underpin freedom, thus
reducing the expression of many human imperfections. Democracy and freedom take the sting
out of human failure, thus preventing the exodus of failed people into violent ideologies.
Capitalism never reaches any ‘final’ shape, however; for it seeks to iteratively rediscover and
reshape its foundations, and to therefore continuously improve its institutions.
Unfortunately, capitalism – the concept of freedom – gets a bad rap each time stupid things
happen in the world. It will be a grave error, for instance, to attribute the sub-prime mortgage
fiasco of 2007-08, or business cycles more generally, to capitalism. These arose from flaws of
human nature and flaws in the design of institutions. The underlying cause of such debacles is
almost invariably attributable to political foolishness and paternalism, or the laziness or
stupidity of regulators.
In the case of the sub-prime crisis, the failures of the Fed (outlined in the previous chapter)
were greatly exacerbated by American welfare socialism. Thus, state-owned Fannie Mae was
created in 1938 to funnel federal funds into home loans, thus artificially boosting the housing

2 Rothbard, Murray, Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature, Mises Institute, 1974. [http://mises.org/story/3071]
3 Burke, Edmund, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p.90 [CHECK]

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demand. It was (notionally) privatised in 1968 but remained guaranteed by the US government.
Freddie Mac was created in 1970 to (allegedly) provide Fannie Mae with some competition. The
growth of American welfare socialism worsened the situation with Jimmy Carter’s 1977
Community Reinvestment Act which required banks to give loans to people who had either no
income or a low income, thus over-riding good lending practice. Fannie May and Freddie Mac
(FMFM) were thereafter ‘leaned upon’ by successive US governments to buy sub-prime
mortgages. Then started what can perhaps only be described as government-supported fraud.
FMFM began to guarantee sub-prime loans issued by Bear Stearns, and also directly sold these
mortgages to foreigners.
Punishing those who make false claims about a product is a primary function of the
government, but the US Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight that was charged with
supervising FMFM, failed to block the fraud being perpetrated by FMFM. Activities of an
equally dubious nature were separately unfolding in the market in relation to financially
engineered products. For instance, Credit Suisse Group Sellers misled markets about the
excessive risks of the securities it was selling by claiming these had been given AAA ratings by
Standard & Poor’s. Self-regulation thus failed dramatically. To add to the many man-made
problems, urban planning laws in many parts of the USA prevented urban boundaries from
expanding even though thousands of new housing loans were being issued by banks. This
shortage of land added pressure on house prices.
Capitalism leaves people free to take appropriate risks. Some decisions – even of markets –
fail. The only thing that the state must not do in such cases is to bail out failed entrepreneurs.
Unfortunately, in 2008 the USA government did not rest content with its over-management and
‘concern’ for the poor over the past sixty years. It therefore threw huge amounts of taxpayer
money at failing companies, casting aside any semblance of accountability. Using taxpayer funds
to bail out failed companies is pure theft from other hardworking people who have saved their
money for their future.
The point is that in capitalism, politicians do stupid things (and continue to do stupid
things). What capitalism needs is a system that prevents them from continuous interference
where they shouldn’t. However, this problem can’t be resolved by exhorting politicians to be
good. Systemic reforms are needed; and most important of all, increased awareness of the
dangers of interference in markets, and the dangers of under-regulation where prudential
regulation is needed.
Business cycles tend to scare the wits out of many people. People ask if such turbulence is
worth the effort. But these events are often unavoidable – not because the theory of freedom is
defective but because freedom with accountability is not always enforced. Capitalism is
imperfect, and is meant for imperfect people. It will perhaps never achieve find a perfect
regulatory solution to all human problems, but at least it won’t kill people outright from utopian
ambitions. The liberal recognises that as a general rule, governments will be incompetent
(equally as doctors and other professionals are incompetent). The liberal also recognises that
those politicians who try to ‘do good’ are the ones to be shunned, because there is much more to
governing a free society than just good intentions.
Capitalism in the ideal sense (I don’t quite know what the ideal will look like, for it is a long
journey to get to that stage, and will involve everyone on earth in some form or other) does not
exist anywhere in the world, but reasonable approximations are found in USA and Australia,
among many other countries for some time now. We see clear evidence that even small increases
in freedom boost the incomes of the poor quite strongly. Capitalism grabs the poor by the scruff
of their necks and sucks them into a powerful vortex of freedom, that leads to wealth, health,
and morality. It enables people to stand on their own feet, it builds capability, it does not spoon-
feed. ‘Good’ capitalism also reviews its regulations regularly and refines them to minimise the
inevitable failures of human nature that will be remain even in the most free society. Things like
the sub-prime crisis will come and go, but relatively free societies like the USA will prosper even
as countries like India remain strangled by their corrupt socialist leadership. It is surely time for

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India to admit its gigantic mistakes of the past sixty years and to move strongly towards
freedom. It is surely time for India to wake up.

3. Where are we going?

Where to from here? The main thing is to be very, very (!) patient. Social change is very slow.
Our foibles ensure that we do not accept change easily, even when we know it is for the better.
We tend to hold on to our views stubbornly irrespective of the evidence presented. It is extremely
rare to come across someone who admits that a view he held earlier, even published, was wrong
(there are a few such people, but too few of them for the good of mankind 4). In most cases people
stick to the views they formed when they were children despite endless evidence to the contrary.
Thus, many American Christians deny evolution no matter how much scientific evidence is
presented to them. Some Muslims believe that killing non-believers on a mammoth scale assures
a passage to Paradise. Some Hindus totally deny the possibility of a caste-less society. So also,
many people refuse to even think about the benefits of freedom. Shutting their eyes to evidence
is very convenient. But even if they think that freedom is in-principle a good thing, they have
formed stubborn views about what it means and will generally refuse to consider alternative
views. It is true that people do ultimately change, but that happens over many generations.
Much social change is not unidirectional, though: it goes through cycles; it waxes and wanes.
Bad ideas which we considered to have been proven wrong, re-emerge as children rebel and try
to prove their parents wrong. Only incrementally therefore, and with a vigorous fight by each
generation will people ultimately abandon utopia, bigotry, and begin to accept the value of
liberty for all.
Of course, things don’t change on their own. History is made by the actions of each of us,
today. Our small contributions incrementally add up. It is books, articles, blog posts,
conversations, and other efforts of hundreds of thousands of people that will lead to the triumph
of freedom. It won’t happen by merely being a spectator. Responsible citizenship is essential. It
is my hope that the time I have spent writing this book and on things like the Freedom Team of
India (freedomteam.in) will have made a tiny but useful contribution in this long journey. I must
admit that I being a mere mortal, I often become deeply despondent at the low uptake of good
policies and good ideas in so many parts of the world. We can do so much better: hundreds, even
thousands of time better – if only we let each other live and do their best. Why bother ourselves
so much about superficialities like what God others believe in, what clothes they wear, what
foods they eat, and so on? Why make this life which is already quite difficult, even more difficult
by finding a new source of conflict in everything?
We are required, however, to only do whatever is reasonably possible without at any time
sacrificing our self-interest. There is no call to sacrifice for others, leave alone for a ‘nation’. It
must be a joint enterprise of common effort that everyone puts in, else we are over-doing our
‘share’ of citizenship. And we must never lose sight of our insignificance and importance – both
tragically and comically mixed in the same person. Therefore, after the fuss about freedom has
been made and done, and poems written about it and sung with great gusto, ‘we must,’ as
Candide so eloquently said, ‘go and work in the garden’. 5

‘The inherent vice of capitalism is the unequal sharing of blessings; the inherent virtue of
socialism is the equal sharing of miseries.’ Winston Churchill

‘Believing in capitalism does not mean believing in growth, the economy, or efficiency.
Desirable as these may be, these are only the results. Belief in capitalism is, fundamentally,
belief in mankind.’ - Johan Norberg

4 E.g. in his article entitled ‘Economic Consensus Calls for Bit of Give and Take’, in The Weekend Australian, April 24-

25, 2010, p. 14, John Caroll, a professor in La Trobe University, admitted that a view he strongly advocated in the
early 1990s against free markets was wrong [see: http://bit.ly/cwMrIV].
5 Voltaire. Candide.

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1 Appendix 1
The following table depicts a few dimensions of human nature. This table is not intended in
any way to be definitive, nor are the dimensions or traits below listed in any particular order.
Dimension or trait Brief description
‘Bad’ traits Traits the excess of which is generally harmful.
Territorial We are territorial, and possessive about where we live. Most humans will
defend themselves and their homes with guile, strategy, and even brutality (at
least in the ‘wild’ or tribal state). On a larger scale, groups of humans will go
out to fight wars to defend national territory.
Aggressive While assertiveness is considered to be a ‘good’ trait, humans can become
and brutal aggressive as well, and extremely violent and brutal. On some occasions,
humans kill each other in revenge, anger, or other ill will. At other times,
humans display unimaginable brutality. The human species is therefore at
times the most brutal species created in the universe.
Competitive We hate to lose. We want the best for ourselves in whatever field we choose to
contest in, whether it is academic excellence, on the sports field, in business, in
love, even in parenting. We want our kids to be better than other kids. We go to
great lengths to succeed. Our minds are driven by dreams of knowledge,
influence, or change.
We constantly ‘preen’ and show off. Both the male and females of the species
comb their hair and smile beatifically in group photographs.
‘Neutral’ traits Traits which can lead to either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ results
Boundedly We have serious defects in our rational brain. Kahneman and Tversky outlined
rational the systemic flaws in our thinking. These flaws can be overcome with practice,
but we can never be completely free from error.
Emotional We experience an enormous range of emotions. The words for our emotions
come much later to us; the emotions come first, even as children. We are
familiar with anger, irritation, annoyance, frustration, exhilaration, love, fear,
hatred, abhorrence, envy, and so on. These emotions are driven by a
combination of the way we think and our hormones. Despite that, we are
generally fairly calm and docile, involved in routine family affairs and hobbies
such as watching TV.
Social We are gregarious and live in groups such as tribes, villages, or cities and are
not usually found alone for significant durations. We need others, sometimes
desperately. No man is an island unto himself. We need a group to ‘belong to’,
else we display psychological distress such as anomie and anxiety. Solitary
confinement or social exclusion is one of the severest forms of punishment.
We are designed to be part of families and social groups. Even though we may
need some isolation from time to time, without others, we are not complete. We
sometimes need others so much, as when we are ‘in love’ that we may perform
the most astonishing acts of valour.
We take delight in company and can chatter with others for hours. Our younger
ones chatter on their mobile phones endlessly. We display excitement when we
are part of large crowds such as in soccer or cricket.
However, we don’t wish everybody well equally. There are a few outstanding
people who genuinely wish everybody well, but for the vast majority, while we
may not hate others, we have our pet grievances against one group or another.
Economic Most of us do not hunt or grow our own food, but buy it from others in return for
services or pieces of paper called money.
In our self-interest, however, we rarely see beyond our direct impacts on others.
The Brazilian farmer who burns hectares of native forests to clear land for
cattle rearing and thus reduce the ability of the earth to absorb carbon dioxide,
is as short-sighted as the American citizen who drives huge cars for thousands
of needless kilometres, guzzling petrol and emitting tonnes of carbon dioxide.

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Dimension or trait Brief description
Dealing with All of us di.e. The moment of death leads to strange outpourings and also to
death complexities like inheritance and fragmentation of lands, which leave a legacy
both of positive and negative emotions for the rest of our lives.
‘Good’ traits Traits the excess of which may be beneficial.
Cooperative We co-operate with others. We realise we can’t do everything on our own. We
therefore instinctively cooperate with others, a quality we first learn within our
family. In our adult life, most of our cooperation is tinged with self-interest. We
work co-operatively in business organisations only to the extent our efforts are
rewarded. Our self-interest often matches with the complementary self-interest
of others. The employer wants our work as much as we want the job.
Moral We have a hardwired moral sense. We desire not merely to be rich and
powerful, but to experience the company of good and wise people. We admire
those who have gained mastery over themselves.
We are for the most par honourable, dutiful, ethical, and dignified. We aspire to
be self-disciplined, calm, and wise. We aspire to gain a mastery over our
emotions. We are also in various ways, altruistic. We tend to think of the
welfare of the entire planet, including all life on it, even though such thinking
could sometimes go against our immediate self-interest.
The vast majority of us want nothing more than to grow up normally, do normal
things, have normal families, achieve normal ambitions, and look back before
we die on a life where we grew, through our own efforts, and mastered life to
the extent we could.
Musical and Man is a spiritual animal, above all. There is no known human society, no
spiritual matter how primitive, which does not display a sophisticated sense of the spirit
(whether it has a religion is a different matter).
Humans demonstrate a search for a higher being who knows everything about
us, someone whom we think could have created of everything; someone we could
merge with or live through in an extended manner after our death.
Whether we believe in God or not, whether we follow a religion or not, we all
know the spiritual experience even if we do not believe in a God. We recognise it
in the silence in a church or in the majesty of a religious ceremony. Most of us
experience a sense of wonder upon gazing at the night sky far from the lights of
the city. We understand the mystic experience of the Sufis or of Meera. Some of
us have experienced the reality of meditation and deep relaxation. It is this part
of our nature that has been tapped by all religions, and it is the other, more
animal, parts of our nature that lead some religious believers into violence. Our
deepest emotion, our spirituality, however become the bane of mankind, if it
allowed to protrude on our political organisation.
We are also musical, and sing and dance, sometimes with great beauty and
elegance.
We have (or need) all these traits (and many others not listed above) to come together as a
human being.

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Acknowledgements
My acknowledgements for this book are almost entirely the same as for BFN, so I have not
repeated them again here but placed a copy on the internet 1. I’d like to, however, make special
mention of Suresh Anand, Captain Pullat, and Gavan O’Farrell, once again, for having taken the
time to provide me with valuable feedback on early drafts of this book (Suresh Anand, again,
provided the most comment). Of the others, thanks go to Supratim Basu for an engaging debate
with me on equal opportunity which impelled me to streamline my arguments and make them
even more air-tight, and to Shanu Athiparambath for pointing out an inaccurate attribution to
Ayn Rand when it should have been Alan Greenspan.

Sanjeev Sabhlok 2
Melbourne, Australia
XXX 2011 (TBA) [most likely mid or late-2011]
sabhlok AT yahoo DOT com.

[Note to myself: Build and finish the reading list at:

http://sanjeev.sabhlokcity.com/book2/bk2reading.html]

NOTES TO MYSELF
&8&8

We have seen An argument is often made that only charitable organizations should work towards eliminating
poverty. It is argued that the business of a government is merely to ensure our liberty and secure our life from
crime and external attack. By letting free markets do their work (under a well-regulated system to ensure
accountability), poverty is certain to drop to really low levels. So why not let charitable institutions to deal with
residual poverty?

We create a state through a social contract to defend our life and liberty. If so the contract is a worthless scrap
of paper if we it protects us from assault but leaves us to starve to death. The contract must therefore include a
guarantee of protection against deep poverty. Indeed, that is crucial, because the social contract is almost
certain to collapse if any citizen starves. If our life is at stake (as with malnourishment) our animal powers to
defend our existence are unleashed and an (off-equilibrium, for the most part) threat of revolt comes into effect.
We are no longer bound by laws since the laws have failed to protect us. We are back to the state of nature.
This makes it mandatory for the free society to ensure a social minimum to all.

http://www.slideshare.net/sgewali2000/what‐is‐india‐current‐b‐1615487

book list
http://www.lyfindia.org/liberal-bookshelf.php

LATER

EDITING MANDATES
WEED OUT: “the fact that”
REMOVE ALL UNNECESSARY WORDS

1 TBA.
2 Ph.D. Economics (University of Southern California) and a former member of the Indian Administrative Service
(September 1982-January 2001). More information on me is available at [http://sanjeev.sabhlokcity.com/]. It should be
kept in mind that the material on that website has evolved over the years; much of it is outdated and was written for
a range of different audiences. I may not necessarily subscribe now to what I have written on my website in the past.

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