ARTICLE III BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 1
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
Ichong vs Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]
Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. vs Torres [G.R. No. 98050, March 17, 1994]
Ynot
vs Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987]
Alonte vs Savellano [G.R. No. 131652, March 9, 1998]
Aniag vs COMELEC [G.R. No. 104961, October 7, 1994]
Spouses Romualdez vs COMELEC [G.R. 167011, April 30, 2008]
Philippine Communications Satellite Corp. vs Alcuaz [G.R. No. 84818, December 18, 1989]
AngTibay vs Court of Idustrial Relations [G.R. No. 46496, February 27, 1940]
Ateneo de Manila vs Capulong [G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993]
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs Anti-Terrorism Council [G.R. No. 178552,
October 5, 2010]
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
People vs Vera [G.R. No. 45685, November 16, 1937]
Ichong vs Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]
Villegas vs HiuChiong Tsai Pao Ho [G.R. No. L-29646, November 10, 1978]
People vs Cayat [G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939]
Dumlao vs COMELEC [G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980]
Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs Drilon [G.R. No. L-81958, June 30, 1988]
Himagan vs People [G.R. No. 113811, October 7, 1994]
Quinto vs COMELEC [G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010]
Biraogo vs The Philippine Truth Commission [G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010]
Almonte vs Vazquez [G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995]
Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. vs Treasurer of Ormoc City [G.R. No. L-23794, February 17, 1968]
SECTION 2 SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
People vs Marti [G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991]
Stonehill vs Diokno [G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967]
Mantaring vs Judge Roman, A.M. No. RTJ-93-964, February 28, 1996]
Soliven vs Makasiar [G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988]
Silva vs Presiding Judge of RTC, Negros Oriental [G.R. No. 81756, October 21, 1991]
Morano vs Vivo [G.R. No. L-22196, June 30, 1967]
Harvey vs Santiago [G.R. No. 82544, June 28, 1988]
Salazar vs Achacoso, G.R. No. L-22196, June 30, 1967]
Alvarez vs CFI [G.R. No. 45358, January 29, 1937]
Mata vs Bayona [G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984]
People vs Del Rosario [G.R. No. 109633, July 20, 1994]
People vs Gerente, G.R. No. 95847-48, March 10, 1993]
Umil vs Ramos [G.R. No. 81567, July 9, 1990]
People vs Sucro [G.R. No. 93239, March 18, 1991]
People vs Rodrigueza [G.R. No. 95902, February 4, 1992]
Go vs Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992]
Posados vs Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 89139, August 2, 1990]
People vs Mengote [G.R. No. 87059, June 22, 1992]
Malacat vs Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997]
People vs Malmstedt [G.R. No. 91107, June 19, 1991]
Luz vs People [G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012]
Espano vs Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 120431, April 1, 1998]
United Laboratories vs Isip [G.R. No. 163958, June 28, 2005]
Papa vs Mago [G.R. No. L-27360, February 28, 1968]
People vs Musa [G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993]
People vs Peralta [G.R. No. 145176, March 30, 2004]
Valmonte vs De Villa [G.R. No. 83988, September 29, 1989]
Rules 113 and 126 of the Revised Rules of Court
SECTION 3 PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE
Ramirez vs Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995]
Zulueta vs Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996]
Navarro vs Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999]
Ople vs Torres [G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998]
Disini vs Secretary of Justice [G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014]
SECTION 4
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Diocese of Bacolod vs COMELEC [G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015]
United States vs Bustos [G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918]
People vs Alarcon [G.R. No. 46551, December 12, 1939]
Ayer Productions PTY Ltd vs Capulong [G.R. No. L-82380, April 29, 1988]
Borjal vs Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999]
Reyes vs Bagatsing [G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983]
Pita vs Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 80806, October 5, 1989]
Social Weather Stations, Inc. vs COMELEC [G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001]
ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
Primicias vs Fugoso [G.R. No. L-1800, January 27, 1948]
Malabanan vs Ramento [G.R. No. 62270, May 21, 1984]
De La Cruz vs Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 126183, March 25, 1999]
PBM Employees Association vs Philippine Blooming Mills [G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973]
Bayan vs Ermita [G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006]
Batas PambansaBlg. 880
SECTION 5 FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Aglipay vs Ruiz [G.R. No. 45459, March 13, 1937]
Garces vs Estenzo [G.R. No. L-53487, May 25, 1981]
American Bible Society vs City of Manila [G.R. No. L-9637, April 30, 1957]
Iglesia Ni Cristo vs Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996]
Ebralinag vs Division Superintendent of Cebu [G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993]
Estrada vs Escritor [A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006]
Imbong vs Ochoa [G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014]

SECTION 6 LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

Marcos vs Manglapus [G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989]
Manotoc vs Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986]
Silverio vs Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 94284, April 8, 1991]
SECTION 7 RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Legaspi vs Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987]
Valmonte vs Belmonte, Jr. [G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989]
Province of Cotabato vs The Government of the RP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain [G.R. No.
183591, October 14, 2008]
Echagaray vs Secretary of Justice [G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998]
Chavez vs Presidential Commission on Good Government [G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998]
In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court officials and
employees as witnesses under the subpoenas of February 10, 2012 and the various letters for
the Impeachment Prosecution Panel dated January 19 and 25, 2012, [February 14, 2012]

SECTION 8 RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATIONS

Rutter vs Esteban [G.R. No. L-3708, May 18, 1953]
Ortigas& Co. Ltd. Partnership vs Feati Bank & Trust Co. [G.R. No. L-24670, December 14,
1979]
Lozano vs Martinez [G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986]
Ganzon vs Inserto [G.R. No. L-56450, July 25, 1983]
SECTION 10 NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
Rutter vs Esteban [G.R. No. L-3708, May 18, 1953]
Ortigas& Co. Ltd. Partnership vs Feati Bank & Trust Co. [G.R. No. L-24670, December 14,
1979]
Lozano vs Martinez [G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986]
Ganzon vs Inserto [G.R. No. L-56450, July 25, 1983]

SECTION 11 FREE ACCESS TO THE COURTS

In Re: Query of Mr. Roger Prioreschi [A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC, August 19, 2009]

SECTION 12 CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

Ho Wai Pang vs People of the Philippines [G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011]
Gamboa vs Cruz [G.R. No. L-56291, June 27, 1988]
People vs Macam [G.R. Nos. 91011-12, November 24, 1994]
People vs Judge Ayson [G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989]
People vs Pinlac [G.R. Nos. 74123-24, September 26, 1988]
People vs Bolanos [G.R. No. 101808, July 3, 1992]
People vs Andan [G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997]
Navallo vs Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 97214, July 18, 1994]
People vs Dy [G.R. No. 74517, February 23, 1988]
People vs Alicando [G.R. No. 117487, December 12, 1995]
Republic Act No. 7438

SECTION 13 RIGHT TO BAIL

Basco vs Rapatalo [Adm. Matter No. RTJ-96-1335, March 5, 1997]
People vs Judge Donato [G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991]
People vs Fortes [G.R. No. 90643, June 25, 1993]
Comendador vs De Villa [G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991]
Baylon vs Judge Sison [Adm. Matter No. 92-7-360-0, April 6, 1995]
Manotoc vs Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986]
Government of the US vs Judge Puruganan [G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002, December
17, 2002]
Government of Hong Kong vs Hon. Olalia [G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007]
Rule 114, Revised Rules of Court
SECTION 14

CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS

Tatad vs Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. L-72335-39, March 21, 1988]
Galman vs Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 72670, September 12, 1986]
Alonte vs Savellano [G.R. No. 131652, March 9, 1998]
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
People vs Dramayo [G.R. No. L-21325, October 29, 1971]
Dumlao vs COMELEC [G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980]
Marquez vs COMELEC [G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995]
Corpus vs People [G.R. No. 74259, February 14, 1991]
Feeder International Line vs CA [G.R. No. 94262, May 31, 1991]

RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND COUNSEL

People vs Holgado [G.R. No. L-2809, March 22, 1950]

People vs Agbayani [G.R. No. 122770, January 16, 1998]
Amion vs Judge Chiongson [A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, January 22, 1999]

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION

People vs Quitlong [G.R. No. 121562, July 10, 1998]
Pecho vs People [G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996]
Soriano vs Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. L-65952, July 31, 1984]
Borja vs Mendoza [G.R. No. L-45667, June 20, 1977]

RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL

People vs Tee [G.R. Nos. 140546-47, January 20, 2003]
Flores vs People [G.R. No. L-25769, December 10, 1974]
Conde vs Rivera [G.R. No. 21741, January 25, 1924]
Republic Act No. 8493
Mateo, Jr. vs Villaluz [G.R. No. L-34756-59, March 31, 1973]
Garcia vs Domingo [G.R. No. L-30104, July 25, 1973]
People vs Teehankee, Jr. [G.R. No. 11206-08, October 6, 1995]
In Re: Request for Live Radio and TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandigabayan of the Plunder
Cases against Former President Joseph Estrada [A.M. No. 00-1-4-03-SC, September 13, 2001]
Re: Petition For Radio and Television Coverage Of the Multiple Murder Cases Against
MaguindanaoGovernnorZaldyAmpatuan, et al. [A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, June 14, 2011; October
23, 2012]
People vs Mapalao [G.R. No. 92415, May 14, 1991]
People vs Valeriano [G.R. Nos. 103604-05, September 23, 1993]

RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
United States vs Javier [G.R. No. L-12990, January 21, 1918]
Talino vs Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. L-75511-14, March 16, 1987]

COMPULSORY PROCESSES
Roco vs Contreras [G.R. No. 158275, June 28, 2005]

SECTION 15 SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Lansang vs Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971]
Jackson vs Macalino [G.R. No. 139255, November 24, 2003]
In Re: The Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus for Dr. Aurora Parong, et al. vs Ponce Enrile
[G.R. No L-61388, April 20, 1983]
Rules on Habeas Data
Rules on Writ of Amparo

SECTION 16 - RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

Padua vs Ericta [G.R. No. L-38570, May 24, 1988]
Flores vs People [G.R. No. L-25769, December 10, 1974]

SECTION 17 RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

United States vs Tan Teng [G.R. No. 7081, September 7, 1912]
Villaflor vs Summers [G.R. No. 16444, September 8, 1920]
Beltran vs Samson [G.R. No. 32025, September 23, 1929]
Chavez vs Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-29169, August 19, 1968]
People vs Gallarde [G.R. No. 133025, February 27, 2000]
Pascual vs Board of Medical Examiners [G.R. No. L-25018, May 26, 1969]
Mapa, Jr. vs Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994]

SECTION 18 RIGHT AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

Philippine Refining Company Workers Union vs Philippine Refining Co. [G.R. No. L-1668,
March 29, 1948]

In the matter of petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus of SegifredoAclaracion [G.R. No. L-39115,
May 26, 1975
Republic Act No. 10364

SECTION 19 PROHIBITED PUNISHMENT

People vs Estoista [G.R. No. L-5793, August 27, 1953]
People vs Esparas [G.R. No. 120034, August 20, 1996]
Echagaray vs Secretary of Justice [G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998]

SECTION 20 NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT

Serafin vs Lindayag [A.M. No. 297-MJ, September 30, 1975]
Lozano vs Martinez [G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986]

SECTION 21 DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Philippine Savings Bank vs Bermoy [G.R. No. 151912, September 26, 2005]
People vs Obsania [G.R. No. L-24447, June 19, 1968]
Paulin vs Gimenez [G.R. No. 103323, January 21, 1993]
Icasiano vs Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 95642, May 28, 1992]
Lejano vs People of the Philippines [G.R. No. 176389, January 18, 2011]
People vs Balisacan [G.R. No. L-26376, August 31, 1966]
People vs City Court of Silay [G.R. No. L-43790, December 9, 1976]
Esmea vs Pogoy [G.R. No. L-54110, February 20, 1981]
People vs Pineda [G.R. No. L-44205, February 16, 1993]
People vs Tampal [G.R. No. 102485, May 22, 1950]
People vs Adil [G.R. No. L-41863, April 22, 1977]
People vs Relova [G.R. No. L-45129, March 6, 1987]

SECTION 22 EX POST FACTO LAW AND BILL OF ATTAINDER

United States vs Conde [G.R. No. L-18208, February 14, 1922]
Concepcion vs Garcia [G.R. No. L-32380, November 29, 1929]
Nasi-Villar vs People of the Philippines [G.R. No. L-176169, November 14, 2008]
Salvador vs Mapa, Jr. [G.R. No. 135080, November 28, 2007]

ARTICLE IV CITIZENSHIP
Tecson vs COMELEC [G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004]
Republic vs Lim [G.R. No. 153883, January 13, 2004]
Co vs House of Representatives [G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30, 1991]
In Re: Application for Admission to the Bar of Vicente Ching [B.M. No. 914, October 1, 1999]
Cabiling Ma vs Fernandez [G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010]
Yu vs Defensor-Santiago [G.R. No. 83882, January 24, 1989]
Maquiling vs COMELEC [G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013]
Frivaldo vs COMELEC [G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989]
Republic vs De La Rosa [G.R. No. 104654, June 6, 1994]
Labo vs COMELEC [G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989]
Aznar vs COMELEC [G.R. No. 83820, May 25, 1990]
Mercado vs Manzano [G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999]
Bengzon III vs HRET [G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001]
Mo Ya Lim Yao vs Commissioner of Immigration [G.R. No. L-21289, October 4, 1971]
Altajeros vs COMELEC [G.R. No. 163256, November 10, 2004]
Commonwealth Act No. 625
Commonwealth Act No. 63
Commonwealth Act No. 473
Republic Act No. 530
Republic Act No. 9225
Republic Act No. 8171

DUE PROCESS
Alonte vs. Sevillano.Jr.
G.R. No. 131652 & 131728,287 SCRA 245, March 9, 1998

FACTS: Petitioners were charged for rape before the RTC of Binan, Laguna. A petition
for a change of venue to RTC of Manila was filed by the offended party. During the pendency of
such petition, the offended party executed an affidavit of desistance. The court granted the
change of venue. Public respondent Judge Savellano issued warrant of arrest for both
petitioners. Alonte surrendered and Concepcion posted bail.
They pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had
attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that
they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and
Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion Perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte
waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions
were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners-accused were denied of due process.

RULING: YES.There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver
requires that it not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Mere silence of
the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. The case is remanded to the lower court
for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require:
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply
imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles
find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that
procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a law which hears before it condemns,
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.

SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ AND ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ, PETITIONERS,

VS.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND DENNIS GARAY, RESPONDENTS. G. R. NO.
167011, APRIL 30, 2008

FACTS:
Dennis Garay filed a case alleging that petitioners made false and untruthful
representations in violation of Section 10[11] of Republic Act Nos. 8189, by indicating therein
that they are residents of 935 San Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they
were and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
Quezon City.
The petitioners contended, inter alia that Section 45(j) of the Voters Registration Act was void
for being vague as it did not refer to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which would
constitute an election offense ; hence, it ran contrary to Section 14(1) and section 14 (2) ,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution ( due process clause)
Nevertheless, the Commission on Election (COMELEC) Charged the petitioners with
violations of Section 10 (g) and (j) , in relation to Section 45 (J) of the Voters Registration Act.
1. Section 10(g) and Section 10(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, provides that a qualified voter
shall be registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality
wherein he resides to be able to vote in any election. To register as a voter, he shall personally
accomplish an application form for registration as prescribed by the Commission in three (3)
copies before the Election Officer on any date during office hours after having acquired the
qualifications of a voter. The application shall, inter alia, contain the following data: Periods of
residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration and a statement that the
application is not a registered voter of any precinct.
2. Section 45(j) of the same Act provides, inter alia, that the following shall be considered
election offenses under this Act: Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of its jurisdiction when it premised its resolution on a misapprehension of facts and
failed to consider certain relevant facts that would justify a different conclusion.

HELD:NO. The Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The void-for-vagueness
doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. However, this Court has imposed certain
limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized.
This Court has declared that facial invalidation or an on-its-face invalidation of criminal
statutes is not appropriate.
Indeed, an on-its-face invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal
of parties whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would
constitute a departure from the usual requirement of actual case and controversy and permit
decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness.The rule
established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be
subjected to a facial challenge.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is
evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.It is
succinct that courts will not substitute the finding of probable cause by the COMELEC in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

Aniag Jr. v Comelec 237 SCRA 424 (1994)

Driver underwent illegal search and seizure on check pt. petitioner charged in violation of
Omnibus Election Code (gun ban) invokes deprivation of Constitutional right on due process
of law.

Facts: Upon the issuance of declaration of gun ban by the Comelec in connection to the
national & local election, the Sgt-at-Arms of the House of Representatives requested petitioner
to return the 2 firearms issued by the House to him. In compliance, petitioner ordered his
driver Arellano to pick up the firearms in his house to return them to Congress. On his way
back to the Batasan Complex, Arellano was flagged down in a check point and police search
the car. Upon finding the guns, he was apprehended and detained and his case was referred
for inquest to the City prosecutor office. Petitioner was not made a party to the charge but was
invited to shed light on the incident. Petitioner explained the purpose how Arellano came to
have the firearms boarded on the car and wrote the prosecutor to exonerate Arellano from the
charges. The prosecutor recommended dismissing the case. The Comelec however issued a
resolution filing information in violation of the gun ban against petitioner. Petitioner moves for
reconsideration to the Comelec which was denied hence this petition contending that the
search on his car was illegal and that he was not impleaded as respondent in the preliminary
investigation and his constitutional rights for due process was violated.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was denied of due process of law.

Held: The court held that as a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant
duly issued by an appropriate authority.
However, this is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless
search had been upheld in cases of:
(1) moving vehicles
(2) the seizure of evidence in plain view and
(3) search conducted at police or military checkpoints which are not illegal for as long as the
vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of
the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search, and
(4) Stop-and-search without warrant conducted by police officers on the basis of prior
confidential information which were reasonably corroborated by other attendant matters is also
recognized by the court to be legal.
An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the
search had reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist
was a law offender or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the
commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. Because there was no sufficient evidence
that would impel the policemen to suspect Arellano to justify the search they have conducted,
such action constitutes an unreasonable intrusion of the petitioners privacy and security of
his property in violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. Consequently, the firearms
obtained in violation of petitioner's right against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any
purpose in any proceeding. The manner by which COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs
counter to the due process clause of the Constitution. The facts show that petitioner was not
among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he
subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary investigation for such offense. Thus the court
declared the warrantless search and seizure of the firearms as illegal hence inadmissible to
court as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner.

** Philcomsat v Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218 (1989)

Facts: Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications.

Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose
Alcuaz commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered
to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC
the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing.

Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as
exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative. But
respondents contention that notice and hearing are not required since the assailed order is
merely incidental to the entire proceedings and temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c)
of the Public Service Act, providing for the proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and
hearing, dictates that a Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper notice and hearing,
and, if not subject to the exceptions, limitations or saving provisions.

It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order
without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it
is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon
the commission's own motion as in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents is hereby SET
ASIDE.
G.R. No. L46496 February 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, andNATIONAL
WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,vs.THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and
NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC

Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The
NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a
scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this
averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs
and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.

The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was
raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.

Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.

Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a
special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the
Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated
judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government.
Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is
invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of
the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic.
It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes
between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive.
It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any
question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and
employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations
between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.

As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is
not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of
the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just
and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence
in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of
the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the
decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties
adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the
same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with
instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise
proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.

** Ateneo de Manila University v Capulong 222 SCRA 644 (1993)

Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious
physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis.
Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure
occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner
Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the
circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent
students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt.
Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In
the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-
Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the
testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for
violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were
then required to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a
Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students. The Board found
respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline
which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity
among the
members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty
to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on
all respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are
currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from
dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean
del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent
students Abas andMendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and
argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition
which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was
ordered.

Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.

Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of
theAteneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit their written
statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through
their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately
spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.

Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition
under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the
trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine
that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a
question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have
been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner University.

Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic

institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide the case
.

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs Anti-Terrorism Council [G.R. No.

178552, October 5, 2010]

FACTS:Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the constitutionality of
RA 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act. Impleaded as respondents in the
various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Councilcomposed of, at the time of the filing of the
petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul
Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense
Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government
Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions,
except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should prosper

HELD: No. Petitions Dismissed

REMEDIAL LAW- certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or
quasi-judicial functionsSection 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Petition for
certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how
respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

POLITICAL LAW- Requisites of power of judicial review

In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites,
viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue
of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential,
renders the discussion of the last two superfluous. Locus standi or legal standing requires a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it
has personally suffered some actual or threatened injuryas a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected "communist fronts"
by the government, especially the military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the
"transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 178890 allege that they have been subjected to "close security
surveillance by state security forces," their members followed by "suspicious persons" and
"vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with military build." They
likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies of the State. Even conceding such
gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that
petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported"surveillance" and the
implementation of RA 9372.

REMEDIAL LAW- Requisites of Judicial Notice

Petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of
respondent's alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples Army
(NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without
following the procedure under the law.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter
must be oneof common and general knowledge; (2) it must bewell and authoritatively
settledand not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact
must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination
by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice. Petitioners
apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription
under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its effectivity,belies any claim of
imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging.

The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who merely
harp as well on their supposed "link" to the CPP and NPA. They fail to particularize how the
implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their
organization and members.

The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice
Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU
classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations. Such statement notwithstanding,
there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA
organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. From July 2007
up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely
without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.

REMEDIAL LAW- A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or
taxing power of Congress,whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in
the proceeding.

RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for
its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and
personal interest in the implementation of the law. It bears to stress that generalized interests,
albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of
a direct and personal interest is key.

POLITICAL LAW- judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe
for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount
to an advisory opinion.

Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being tagged as

"communist fronts" in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these
allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its function.
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over
which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by
"double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the
anticipated reaction to it of a public official aremerely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for
lack of ripeness.

POLITICAL LAW- A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein
certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the
crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are
nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile,
decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that
individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that
behavior, even though some of it is protected.

Distinguished from anas-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real
litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption
or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities.

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his concurring opinion that the vagueness
and overbreadth doctrines,as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A
litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either
vagueness or overbreadth grounds. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague
as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA
9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them.

In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners
contend that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism must necessarily
be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause.

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime
actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements
of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an "unlawful demand."
Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the
communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into
a protected speech.

Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses

on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails
some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt criminal
acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a
deceitful transaction.

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat
of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of
"terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power
neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on hypothetical
scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in
Congress.

Petitions Dismissed

Equal Protection of Law

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION,
petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and
MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16 1937 En Banc [Non Delegation of Legislative Powers]

FACTS:Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a
motion for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated
to the Supreme Court of United States for review, which was also denied. The SC denied the
petition subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial and thereafter remanded
the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the
application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the
same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an
opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act
No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution,
is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing
equal protection of the laws. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition,
elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of
legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).

ISSUE:Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.

RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful
delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason,
unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act shall
apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the
salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals.
Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the
direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of
the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial
board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context,
is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the
different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates
not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the
various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in
the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument
to show that if not one of the provinces and this is the actual situation now appropriate
the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be
illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a
probation officer without the probation system.

People v Vera 65 PHIL 56 (1937)

In criminal cases, the elements were laid down in Vera v. People:

a. Accused is informed why he is proceeded against, and what charge he must answer.
b. Judgment of conviction is based on evidence that is not tainted by falsity, and after the
defendant was heard.

If the prosecution produces the conviction based on untrue evidence, then it is

guilty of depriving the accused of due process. Thus false testimony can be questioned by
the accused regardless of the time that lapsed.

c. Judgment according to law

d. Tribunal with jurisdiction

** Villegas v Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270 (1978)

Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on
February 22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any
person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be
engaged in any kind of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing
an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes.

Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance.

Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.

Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable
aliens generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation.
While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit
from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or
disapproval of application is regulatory in character, the second part which requires the
payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure.

Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic
human right of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. While it is
true that the Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an
alien is admitted he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee
includes the means of livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City
Mayor in the issuance or denial of an alien employment permit fee.

** Dumlao v Comelec 95 SCRA 392 (1980)

Facts: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as

discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the
Constitution.

Section 4 provided that any retired municipal or provincial city official that already received
retirement benefits and is 65 years of age shall not be qualified to run for the same local
elective office from which he has retired.

Issue: Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the equal protection
and due process rights.

Held: No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification based on
reasonable and real differentiations. In the present case, employees 65 years of age have
been classifieddifferently from younger employees. The former are subject to compulsory
retirement while the latter are not.

Retirement is not a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials because there can be
retirees who are even younger and a 65year old retiree could be as good as a 65 year old official
who is not a retiree. But there is reason to disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is trying
to run for office because there is the need for new blood to assume relevance. When an official
has retired he has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government
work.

WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared
valid.

** Philippine Asso. of Service Exporters v Drilon 163 SCRA 386 (1988)

Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the
Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It claims
that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in
violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further,
PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged
guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent
have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the
Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure
the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order
No. 1.

Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino
female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to
which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to
female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes.
It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect
identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that:

1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions

2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.

Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban
has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among
other things, to the requirements of public safety as may be provided by law. Deployment ban
of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as
the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department
Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE
with rule making powers.

G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent

Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and
Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:

SEC. 4.Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding a public appointive
office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other
officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.

Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file
their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive
positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant
petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of
Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No.
9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These
must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they
are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause

Held: Yes.In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their
posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants,
specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact
alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and
those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may
pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of
valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the
classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public
Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other
motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll
ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equala two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and
more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second
requirementif it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present
but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last
requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment
of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane
to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental
position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the
electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of
the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be
motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is
also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still
in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would
be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be
constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite
that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds
an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain.
For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could
wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet
post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national
housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With
the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them
differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the
Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position
during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his
campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his
appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files
his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to
show his fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones.
The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the
law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of
R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to
question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the COMELEC resolution, and Section
4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, Any
person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy. RA 9369 provides that
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who
files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at
the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That,
unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office
or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in
government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her
certificate of candidacy.

Issue: Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369
and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause
and therefore unconstitutional

Held: No
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws
to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals
as determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and
yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the
first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious
conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis--vis elected officials is not
germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an appointive office or an
elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the
operation of the deemed resigned provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the
sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office
by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a
definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed
resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words,
complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials
until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation
insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the
purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and
discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial
scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling,
interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents and the intervenors
Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Courts December 1, 2009
Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not
UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso
in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
==============
Note: Not applicable sa barangay office: Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or
national official or employee, or those in the civil or military service, including those in
government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be considered automatically resigned upon
the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office.
Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the
present state of law, there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found in
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA
9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For this reason, the overbreadth challenge
raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the pertinent proviso in Section 13
of RA 9369 must also fail.

** Himagan v People 237 SCRA 538 (1994)

F: Petitioner, a policeman assigned w/ the medical co. of the PNP HQ at Camp Catitigan,
Davao City was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder
of Bernabe Machitar. After the informations for murder and attempted murder were filed w/
the RTC, the trial court issued an order suspending petitioner until termination of the case on
the basis of Sec. 47 of RA 6975, w/c provides:
Sec. 47.Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or
information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies
where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall
immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be
subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of
the accused.
Petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension relying on Sec. 42 of PD 807, that
hissuspension should be limited to 90 days and also, on our ruling in Deloso v. SB, and Layno
v. SB.The motion and the subsequent MFR were denied. Hence, this petition
forcertiorar i andma ndamus.

HELD: We find the petition to be devoid of merit.

(1) The language of the first sentence is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. xxx The second
sentence xx providing the trial must be terminated w/in 90 days from arraignment does not
qualify or limit the first sentence. The 2 can stand independently of each other. The first refers
to the period of suspension. The 2nd deals w/ the time frame w/in w/c the trial should be
finished.
Suppose the trial is not terminated w/in the 90day period, should the suspension of accused
be lifted? Certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word "shall" bef. the phrase "be
terminated w/in 90 days," there is nothing in the law that suggests that the preventive
suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated w/in that period. But this
is w/o prejudice to the administrative sanctions, and, in appropriate cases where the facts so
warrant, to criminal or civil liability of the judge. Should the trial be unreasonably delayed w/o
the fault of the accused, he may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should this be refused, he
can compel its dismissal bycer tiorari, prohibition orma nda mus, or secure his liberty by
(2) Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows
that it refers to the lifting of the preventive suspension in pending admin. investigation, not in
crim. cases, as here. xxx Sec. 91 of RA 6975 w/c states that the CS law and its implementing
rules shall apply to members of the PNP insofar as the provisions, rules and regulations are not
inconsistent w/ RA 6975.
(3) The petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. xxx Sec. 13 of RA 3019 upon
w/c the preventive suspension of the accused in Layno and Deloso was based was silent w/
respect to the duration of the preventive suspension, such that the suspension of the accused
therein for a prolonged and unreasonable length of time raised a due process question. Not so
in the instant case. Petitioner is charged w/ murder under the RPC and it is undisputed that
he falls squarely under Sec. 47 RA 6975 w/c categorically states that hissuspension shall last
until the case is terminated.
(4) The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense relative to
the bill that became RA 6975 reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a
member of the PNP charged w/ grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six
yrs. of imprisonment and w/c suspension continues until the case against him is terminated.
** Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. v Treasurer of Ormoc City 22 SCRA 603 (1968)

Facts: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4,
Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per
export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." Payments for said tax
were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7, 087.50
and on April 20, 1964 for P5, 000, or a total of P12, 087.50.

On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well
as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III,
Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution).

Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to
enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited
constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the case on memoranda, the Court
of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of
the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the
Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its
charter.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
clause under Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution.

(2) Whether or not it was violative of the rule of uniformity of taxation under the Bill of Rights,
Sec. 22[1], Art. VI, Constitution.

Held: The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, We ruled that the equal
protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a
reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where
(1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to
future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification
applies only to those who belong to the same class.

A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them,
for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.,
it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be
reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance
should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central,
of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar
company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only
to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not
arbitrarily collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of collection,
the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then
presumed constitutional until declared otherwise.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared
unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50
plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. No costs. So ordered.

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZG.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010LOUIS BAROK C.

BIRAOGOvs.THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010G.R. No. 193036REP. EDCEL
C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, andREP.
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.vs.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET ANDMANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD

FACTS:Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

(PTC) dated July 30,2010.PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Oce of the President
with the primary task to investigatereports of graft and corruption commi ed by third-level
public ocers and employees, theirco-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its ndingand recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of aninvestigative body. But it is not
a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, se le, orrender awards in
disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assessevidence of graft
and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it hasno power
to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-nding body,
itcannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the ling of an
information inour courts of law.Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and
to enjoin the PTC from performing itsfunctions. They argued that:(a) E.O. No. 1 violates
separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a publicoce and
appropriate funds for its operation.(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 cannotlegitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of
the President to structurally reorganize theOce of the President to achieve economy,
simplicity and eciency does not include the power tocreate an entirely new public oce which
was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the
Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth Commissionwith quasi-judicial powers
duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Oce of the Ombudsmancreated under the 1987
Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation
andprosecution ocials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their
peculiarspecies even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who
may be indictable.Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and
argued that:1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents
executive power andpower of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct
investigations to ensure that lawsare faithfully executed and that, in any event, the
Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987,PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970
and se led jurisprudence, authorize the President to createor form such bodies.2] E.O. No. 1
does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is noappropriation
but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.3] The Truth Commission
does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and theDOJ, because it is
a fact-nding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate,supplant or
erode the la ers jurisdiction.4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection
clause because it was validly created forlaudable purposes.

ISSUES
:1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to le the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;2.
WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress tocreate and to appropriate funds for public oces, agencies and commissions;3.
WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;4. WON E. O. No. 1
violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an
actual case orcontroversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have thestanding to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise
stated, he must have a personaland substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result ofits enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4)the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power
of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of
Congress are impaired, so is the power of each memberthereof, since his oce confers a right
to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.Legislators have a legal standing
to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by theConstitution in their oce
remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of anyocial action which, to
their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.With regard to Biraogo, he has not
shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personaland direct injury
attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.Locus standi is a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standingis governed by the real-parties-
in interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted ordefended in the name
of the real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be beneted or
injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.Diculty of
determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plainti who asserts a publicright in
assailing an allegedly illegal ocial action, does so as a representative of the general public.
Hehas to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sucient
interest in thevindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or
taxpayer.The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in thecase such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as
a result. The Court, however, nds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers
matters of transcendental importance to justify theexercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There
are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve thea ention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedentsThe Executive is given much leeway in ensuring
that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of thePresident are not limited to those
specic powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powersof the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoccommi ees. This
ows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have beenfaithfully
executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiryinto
ma ers which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided
inthe performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the
land.2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds
alreadyappropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of
Congress toappropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the
operation of thecommission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Oce
of the President will bethe very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would
be allocated to the PTC shall besubject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is
no impropriety in the funding.3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode
their respective powers. If at all, theinvestigative function of the commission will complement
those of the two oces. The function ofdetermining probable cause for the ling of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to bewith the DOJ and the Ombudsman.
PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it canadvise and guide the
President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution andenforcement of the laws
of the land.4. Court nds diculty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
1 in view of itsapparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1,
Article III (Bill of Rights) ofthe 1987 Constitution.Equal protection requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as torights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarlysituated individuals in a
similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure everyperson within a
states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the states
duly constitutedauthorities.There must be equality among equals as determined according to
a valid classication. Equal protectionclause permits classication. Such classication,
however, to be valid must pass the test ofreasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classication rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It Isgermane to the purpose of the law; (3) It
is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It appliesequally to all members of the same
class.The classication will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.Executive Order No. 1
should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clearmandate of truth
commission is to investigate and nd out the truth concerning the reported cases ofgraft and
corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out
the previousadministration is plain, patent and manifest.Arroyo administration is but just a
member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not aclass of its own. Not
to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness whichthe
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating dierentiation clearly
reverberates tolabel the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Supercial dierences donot make for a valid classication.The PTC must not exclude the other
past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority toinvestigate all past
administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws
mustconform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public
authorityadministered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down
for beingunconstitutional.WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1
is hereby declaredUNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution.

Commissioner Jose T. Almonte, petitioner v Honorable Conrado Vasquez, respondent

Facts:Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and

Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr.
1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was
issued in connection with the investigation of funds representing savings from unfilled
positions in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the anomalous
activities that circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the subpoena duces
tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the Government.
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is
Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was
issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging
that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed.
The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen,
was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices,
including the Office of the Ombudsman.

Issue:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum
to provide documents relating tWhether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by
virtue of subpoena duces tecum to provide documents relating to personal service and salary
vouchers of EIIB employers.o personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.

Ruling:
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the
gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information. "illegal activities affecting the
national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion,
dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to
determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion
of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse
can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is directed that the inspection of subpoenaed
documents be made personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and with all the safeguards
outlined in this decision.

Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,

G.R. No. 169838
April 25, 2006

Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the
Philippines and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally
they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing
Batas Pambansa No. 880.

Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of
which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one
can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present
danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression
clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message which the
expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass
actions in support of the government. The words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or
influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the
phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government
because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict
scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on February
14, 2006. During the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy
resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues,
particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to
the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.

Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880,
specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine
Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to
peaceably assemble.

Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional
protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without
which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.

However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights,
nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of
such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the power
to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety,
and general welfare of the people.

B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates
the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to
all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause
does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion,
protesting, and influencing in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so
its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all
rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to
public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a
recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for
the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the
establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and
municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to
the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to
peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plaza in every city or municipality that
has not yet complied with section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive response
(CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL
and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY
OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other
respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED

Search and seizures

People vs. Andre Marti [GR 81561, 18 January 1991] Third Division, Bidin (J): 3 concur

Facts: On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the
booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita,
Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no
relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. Marti informed Anita Reyes that he was sending
the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti filled up the contract necessary for the
transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipmentand the name
and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich,
Switzerland." Anita Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured the
former that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend
in Zurich. In view of Marti's representation, the 4 packages were then placed inside a brown
corrugated box, with styro-foam placed at the bottom and on top of the packages, and sealed
with masking tape. Before delivery of Marti's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of
Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. Job
pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves, and took
several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the
shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from
the cellophane wrapper. At the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
the box containing Marti's packages was opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like
(bricks) dried marijuana leaves. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box
and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects.
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail, inasmuch as the latter's stated
address was the Manila Central Post Office. Thereafter, an Information was filed against Marti
for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the Special
Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the decision, convicting
Marti of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2
(e)(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act. Marti appealed.

Issue: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused's

constitutional rights, be invoked against the State.

Held: In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the

Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The contraband herein, having come into
possession of the Government without the latter transgressing the accused's rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be
admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. The mere presence of the NBI
agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and
seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain
sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been
committed in aid thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles are identified without a
trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the
constitution. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore
applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint
against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search is made upon
the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a
private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the
intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.

Stonehill v diokno

Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners

personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the
persons of petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for
personal properties books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank
Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the
respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other
records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to
question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as
evidence against them.
On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same
on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.

Held:
Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being
general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the
things to be seized. The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims,
caprice or passion of peace officers.
Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a
poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the circumstances.
Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from
the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different
from that of the corporation.

LEOVIGILDO U. MANTARING,complainant,vs.JUDGE MANUEL A. ROMAN, JR.,RTC,

Branch 42, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro;and JUDGE IRENEO B. MOLATO,MTC,
Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro,
[A.M. No. RTJ-93-964. February 28, 1996]
SECOND DIVISION; Mendoza, J.:

Facts:
On the application by a police officer, respondent judge issued a search warrantwhich resulted
in the seizure from a certain Joel Gamo of a home-made gun, a handgrenade, five live
ammunitions for Cal. 38 and three live ammunitions for 12 gaugeshotgun; a complaint for
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition was filedagainst Gamo in which the herein
complainant Leovigildo, Sr. and his son, Leovigildo,Jr., were included and that finding that the
house in which the firearms and ammunitionhad been found was owned by complainant and
his son, respondent judge concludedthat there was probable cause to believe that complainant
and his son were guilty ofillegal possession of firearms and ammunition and accordingly
ordered theirarrest. Respondent judge claims that he inhibited himself from the case after he
wasordered by the Executive Judge, RTC, Branch 41, Pinamalayan, Oriental
Mindoro.Complainant contends that as the search warrant was issued only against Gamo
andMantaring, Jr. it was wrong for respondent judge to find probable cause against him onthe
theory that, as owners of the house in which the firearms and ammunitions werefound, they
had constructive possession of the same.

Issue:
Whether or not there was valid basis for issuance of the warrant of arrest

Ruling: No.
The issuance of a search warrant and of a warrant of arrest requires theshowing of
probabilities as to different facts. In the case of search warrants, thedetermination is based on
the finding that (1) the articles to be seized are connected toa criminal activity and (2) they are
found in the place to be searched. It is not necessarythat a particular person be implicated. On
the other hand, in arrest cases, thedetermination of probable cause is based on a finding that a
crime has been committedand that the person to be arrested has committed it. It is now settled
that in issuingwarrants of arrest in preliminary investigations, the investigating judge must: (a)
haveexamined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by
searchingquestions and answers; (b) be satisfied that probable cause exists; and (c) that there
isa need to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate theends of
justice.In this case the respondent judge ordered the issuance of warrant of arrest solelyon his
finding of probable cause, totally omitting to consider the third requirement that
there must be a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice.
SOLIVEN V MAKASIAR

Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged
with libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against
him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this
would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a
president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow
herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to
be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to
appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the
president.

HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is
to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
from requiring all of the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and
may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents
behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is the
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from
proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege
and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to
waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.

G.R. No. 81756 October 21, 1991

NICOMEDES SILVA @ " Comedes", MARLON SILVA, @ "Tama" and ANTONIETA SILVA,
petitioners,vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS ORIENTAL,
BRANCH XXXIII,
DUMAGUETE CITY, respondent

Facts:
M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, as chief of the PC NARCOM Detachment in Dumaguete City,
Negros Oriental filed an application for the search warrant with the RTC against petitioners.
The application was accompanied by deposition of witness executed by Arthur Alcoran and
Pat. Leon Quindo.

Judge Hickarter Ontal, Presiding judge issued search warrant no. 1 directing the
aforesaid police officers to search the room of Marlon Silva in the residence of Nicomedes Silva
for violation of the dangerous drugs law.. under the search warrant its state that :seize and
take possession of the following property marijuana, dried leaves, cigarettes, joint and bring
said property to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
In the course of the search, the serving officer also seized money belonging to
Antoinette Silva in the amount of 1231.40. Antoinette filed a motion the return of the said
amount. Acting on said motion Judge Ontal issued an order stating that the court holds in
abeyance the disposition of the said amount pending the filing of appropriate charges in
connection with the search warrant.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Section 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides
for the requisite for the issuance of a search warrant.

Section 3 a search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the Judge after examination under oath

G.R. No. L22196 June 30, 1967

ESTEBAN MORANO, CHAN SAU WAH and FU YAN FUN, petitionersappellants, vs.
HON. MARTINIANO VIVO in his capacity as Acting Commissioner of Immigration,

Facts: Petitioners are Chinese nationals (Chan Sau Wah from Fukein, with a minor child from
prior marriage, Fu Yan Fun) who were granted a temporary visitors visa as mom-immigrant for
2 months upon posting P4k cash bond to visit a cousin in the Philippines. She soon married to
Esteban Morano, a Filipino Citizen, on January 24, 1962 and gave birth to a child, Esteban
Morano, Jr. After several extensions to prolong stay in Philippines, their visas expired on Sept.
10, 1962 and were ordered by Commissioner of Immigration (COI) on Aug. 31, 1962 thru a
letter, to leave the country on or before Sept. 10, 1962 with warning of issuance of warrant of
arrest for failure to leave and confiscation of bond.
Petitioners then filed with the CFI of Manila for Mandamus to compel COI to cancel their ACR,
to stop issuing arrest warrant, and preliminary injunction from confiscating their bond. They
argue that Chan Sau Wah became a Filipino Citizen upon marriage to Esteban Morano by
virtue of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Revised Naturalization Act). Likewise, it
argues that Section 37 of the Naturalization Law is unconstitutional for allowing the COI to
issue warrant of arrest and effecting deportation without judicial intervention enshrined in the
Constitution. CFI decided partly against petitioners, thus, COI and petitioners both appealed to
SC.

Issues:
Whether or not the marriage of Chan Sau Wah to Esteban Morano makes her a Filipino citizen.

Whether or not Section 37 of the Naturalization Law empowering the COI to issue a warrant of
arrest, and deport upon a warrant on deportation cases is unconstitutional for are covered by
the Constitutional mandate on searches and seizures without judicial intervention required
under the Constitution on searches and seizures.

Ruling:
Citizenship. Marriage to a Filipino citizen does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen. She
must show that she possess all the qualifications, and none of the disqualifications required by
the Naturalization Law requiring as follows:
Valid marriage; and
Alien woman herself might be lawfully naturalized
In the additional stipulation of facts of July 3, 1963, petitioners admit that Chan Sau Wah is
not possessed of all the qualifications required by the Naturalization Law. Thus, she did not
become a Filipino citizen.
Searches and seizures. Power to deport aliens is an attribute of sovereignty planted on the
accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
dominions. Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, does not require judicial intervention in
the execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional
limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary
or incidental to prosecution or proceeding for a given offense or administrative action, not as a
measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal
order of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid
legislation.
Petition for mandamus and prohibition with respect to petitioners Chan Sau Wah is hereby
denied; and judgment declaring her a citizen of the Philippines, directing COI to cancel her
Alien Certificate of Registration and other immigration papers, and declaring the preliminary
injunction with respect to her permanent, are all hereby set aside; and in all other respects, the
decision appealed is hereby affirmed.

HARVEY VS SANTIAGO
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY, JOHN
SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT vs. HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM
DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION
G.R. No. 82544 June 28, 1988

Facts:
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after
three months close surveillance by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID)
agents in Pagsanjan Laguna. Two days after apprehension 17 opted for self deportation, one
released for lack of evidenced, one was charged by another offense, working without a valid
working visa. Thus, three was left to face the deportation proceedings.
Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the
suspected child prostitute shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the
sexual act. There were also posters and other literatures advertising the child prostitution.
Warrant of arrest was issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sec. 37,
45 and 46 of the Immigration act and sec. 69 of the revised administrative Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the Philippines immigration act clothed the commissioner with any
authority to arrest and detained petitioner pending determination of the existence of a probable
cause

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that there can be no question that the right against
unreasonable search and seizure is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused
of a crime or not.
One of the constitutional requirement of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is
that it must be based upon probable cause.
The arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close
surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The
existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives,
photographs and posters without warrant. Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful
arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence.
 But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its
inception, the records show that formal deportation charges have been filed against them, as
undesirable aliens.

That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal.
Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman
being naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe
that petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as "psychosexual perversion involving
children"

G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

HORTENCIASALAZAR, petitioner, vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ,

facts: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner
with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram
directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. On the same day,
after knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent
Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It
stated that there will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to
be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department ofLabor and Employment to recruit and
deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under
Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was then
tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong
policemen, went to petitioners residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar,
who let them in. The team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter
requesting for the return of the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and
hearing. The said Order violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill
of Rights, and the properties were confiscated against her will and were done with
unreasonable force and intimidation.

Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of
Labor) can validly issue warrants ofsearch and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor
Code

Held: Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Mayors
and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure
Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, We reiterate that
the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants.
Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article
38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect The power of
the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the
power to order arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the
Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order
was in the nature of a general warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void,
because it must identify specifically the things to be seized.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all
materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

G.R. No. L-45358 January 29, 1937

NARCISOALVAREZ, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS and
THE ANTI-USURY BOARD

FACTS: On June 3, 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the
Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the
Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information,
the petitioner kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits
and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender charging
usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the and of the affidavit, the chief
of the secret service stated that his answers to the questions were correct to the best of his
knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge
of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit
in question the Judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the
petition, ordering the search of the petitioner's house at any time of the day or night, the
seizure of the books and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to
him to be disposed of in accordance with the law. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-
Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at seven o'clock on the night of June
4, 1936, and seized and took possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for
the years 1933 to 1936, one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks, nine order books, four
notebooks, four checks stubs, two memorandums, three bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs,
forty-eight stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories, two bundles of bills of lading, one
bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, two packages of
correspondence, one receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of invoices
and other papers many documents and loan contracts with security and promissory notes, 504
chits, promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation. The search for and a seizure of said articles were made with the the opposition of
the petitioner who stated his protest below the inventories on the ground that agents seized
even the originals of the documents.

ISSUE: WON the Search Warrant issued by the respondent court valid.

HELD: The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of
using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were
found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a
violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify
against himself (Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil,, 886; Brady vs. U. S., 266 U. S., 620;
Temperani vs. U. S., 299 Fed., 365; U. S. vs. Madden, 297 Fed., 679; Boyd vs. U. S.,116 U. S.,
116; Caroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S., 132). Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the
documents in question were seized for the purpose of using them as evidence against the
petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation against him, we hold that the
search warrant issued is illegal and that the documents should be returned to him.

SORIANO MATA vs. HON. JOSEPHINE BAYONA

G.R. No. 50720 March 26, 1984

Facts:
Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by selling illegal tickets
known as Masiao Tickets without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai and amusement
Corporation or from the government authorities concerned.
Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from
the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers
connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its
whereabouts and to which inquiry respondent judge replied it is with the curt. The judge then
handed the records to the Fiscal who attached then to the records

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that under the constitution no search warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge personally or such other responsible officer
as may be authorized b law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and witnesses that he may produce
and to attach then to the records. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the judge
may be able to properly determined the existence and nonexistence of the probable cause, to
hole liable for perjury the person giving It if it will be found later that his declaration are false.
Deposition any written statement certified under oath. written testimony of a
witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trail or haring upon oral
examination

The search warrant is illegal, the return of the thing seized cannot be ordered. Illegality
of search warrant does not call for the return of the thing seize, the possession of which is
prohibited.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORMANDO DEL ROSARIO Y LOPEZG.R. No.
109633 July 20, 1994
Facts:
Del Rosario was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammutions and illegal
sale of regulated drugs
Upon application of SPO3 Raymundo Untiveros of PNP Cavite, before RTC judge Arturo
de Guia issued a search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of an : undetermined
quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its
paraphernalia in the premises of appellants house. However, the search warrant was not
implemented immediately due to lack of police personnel to form the raiding team.
In the course of the search they found a black canister containing shabu, an aluminum
foil, a plastic .22 caliber, three set of ammunitions and three wallets containing the marked
money.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the accused cannot be convicted of the illegal possession
of firearms and ammunitions. The search warrant implemented by the raiding party authorized
only the search and seizure of the described quantity of shabu and paraphernalia.
A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake
a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a
crime. The constitution itself and the Rules of Court specifically mandate that the search
warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no
authority for the police officers to seize the firearms which was not mentioned, much less
described with particularity, in the search warrant.

Neither may it maintain that the gun was seized in the course of an arrest, for as
earlier observed, accused arrest was far from regular and legal. Aid firearm, having been
illegally seized, the same is not admissible in evidence.
202 People vs. Gerente [GR 95847-48, 10 March 1993] First Division, Grino-Aquino (J): 3
concur Facts: At about 7:00 a.m. of 30 April 1990, Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo
Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, allegedly started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in
Gerente's house which is about 6 meters away from the house of Edna Edwina Reyes who was
in her house on that day. She overheard the three men talking about their intention to kill
Clarito Blace. She testified that she heard Fredo Echigoren saying, "Gabriel, papatayin natin si
Clarito Blace." Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito
Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of the same day. Reyes allegedly witnessed the killing. Fredo
Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel
Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren
dropped a hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place
behind the house of Gerente. At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of
the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a
mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He
was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was
massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman
Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to
Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with
blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by Reyes that
she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed
Clarito. The policemen proceeded to the house of Gerente, who was then sleeping. They told
him to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 97 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Patrolman Urrutia frisked Gerente and found a
coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried
leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist
found them to be marijuana. Only Gerente was apprehended by the police. The other suspects,
Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are still at large. On 2 May 1990, two separate informations were
filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against him for Violation of Section 8,
Art. II, of RA 6425, and for Murder. When arraigned on 16 May 1990, Gerente pleaded not
guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the two cases was held. On 24 September 1990, the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, found Gerente guilty of Violation
of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
a term of 12 years and 1 day, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum; and also found him
guilty of Murder for which crime he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. .
Gerente appealed. Issue: Whether the police officers have the personal knowledge of the killing
of Blace to allow them to arrest, and the subsequent searchly Gerentes person, without the
necessary warrant. Held: The search of Gerente's person and the seizure of the marijuana
leaves in his possession were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.
Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that "A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;" The policemen arrested
Gerente only some 3 hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace
dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the
instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used
to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the
policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those
circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and
of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest
Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant,
he would have fled the law as his two companions did. The search conducted on Gerente's
person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that "A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant." The frisk and search
of Gerente's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting
officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and
might attack them unless he is first disarmed.

In RE: Umil, Umil vs. Ramos [GR 81567, 9 July 1990]; also Roque vs. de Villa [GR 84581-
82], Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 90 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) In RE: Anonuevo.
Anonuevo vs. Ramos [GR 84583-84], In RE: Ocaya. Ocaya vs. Aguirre [GR 83162], In RE:
Espiritu. Espiritu vs. Lim [GR 85727], and In RE: Nazareno. Nazareno vs. Station
Commander of Muntinlupa Police Station [GR 86332] En Banc, Per Curiam: 11 concur

Facts: [GR 81567] On 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the
Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the
NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes
Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded
person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a
member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day
before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of
this verification, Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for
security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Dural was positively identified
by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car,
and fired at the 2 CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and
CIC Renato Manligot. As a consequence of this positive identification, Dural was referred to the
Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the
crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority." (Criminal Case C-
30112; no bail recommended). On 15 February 1988, the information was amended to include,
as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still
unidentified. Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with the
Supreme Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court
issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and Fidel V. Ramos, Maj. Gen. Renato de
Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montano, and Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre filed a Return of the Writ
on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February 1988. On 26 February
1988, however, Umil and Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and they
were accordingly released.
Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested without any warrant of arrest for the crime of
rebellion.

Held: Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the 2
CAPCOM soldiers nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his
arrest came a day after the said shooting incident.Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is
unjustified. However, Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA),
an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of
Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense
when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. The
arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing
them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not
follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a
judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and
the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no
legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against
government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious
movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that
involves the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities.

People vs. Sucro [GR 93239, 18 March 1991] Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 91 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

Facts:
On 21 March 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by
P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the
activities of Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling
marijuana. As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio positioned himself
under the house of a certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of
Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw Sucro enter the
chapel, taking something which turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a
cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the same to a
buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while Sucro went back to the chapel and again came out with
marijuana which he gave to a group of persons. It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio
radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the activity going on P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio
to continue monitoring developments.At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up
Seraspi to report that a third buyer later identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with
Sucro. At that point, the team of P/Lt Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police
officers were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept
Macabante and Sucro. P/ Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante at the crossing
of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing the police,
Macabante threw something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana.
When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from Sucro in front of
the chapel. The police team was able to overtake and arrest Sucro at the corner of C. Quimpo
and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart
inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante. The teabags of marijuana were sent to
the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens
were all found positive of marijuana. Sucro was charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of
the Dangerous Drugs Act. Upon arraignment, Sucro, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not
guilty" to the offense charged. Trial ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered, finding
Sucro guilty of the sale of prohibited drug and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, and pay a fine of P20,000, and costs. Sucro appealed.
Issue: Whether the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently, whether
the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.

Held: Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where
arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states that "A peace officer or private
person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b)
When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;" An offense is committed in the
presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest
without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. The failure of the
police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge acquired from the
surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant.
What is paramount is that probable cause existed. Still, that searches and seizures must be
supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. Among the exceptions granted by law is a
search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant. Herein, police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the
crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused. Under the
circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for the arresting
officers, to arrest Sucro who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the contraband. Thus,
as there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with the requirements
of a warrantless arrest; ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in
evidence.

People vs. Rodrigueza [GR 95902, 4 February 1992] Second Division, Regalado (J): 4
concur

Facts: [Prosecution] At around 5:00 p.m. of 1 July 1987, CIC Ciriaco Taduran was in their
headquarters at the Office of the Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City,
together with S/Sgt. Elpidio Molinawe, CIC Leonardo B. Galutan and their commanding officer,
Major Crisostomo M. Zeidem, when a confidential informer arrived and told them that there
was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay. Major Zeidem formed
a team to conduct a buybust operation, which team was given P200.00 in different
denominations to buy marijuana. These bills were treated with ultraviolet powder at the
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 102 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Philippine Constabulary Crime
Laboratory (PCCL). Sgt. Molinawe gave the money to Taduran who acted as the poseur buyer.
He was told to look for a certain Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs. Taduran went to
Tagas alone and, while along the road, he met Samuel Segovia. He asked Segovia where he
could find Don and where he could buy marijuana. Segovia left for a while and when he
returned, he was accompanied by a man who was later on introduced to him as Don
Rodrigueza. After agreeing on the price of P200.00 for 100 grams of marijuana, Don halted a
passing tricycle driven by Antonio Lonceras. He boarded it and left Taduran and Segovia. When
he came back, Don gave Taduran "a certain object wrapped in a plastic" which was later
identified as marijuana, and received payment therefor. Thereafter, Taduran returned to the
headquarters and made a report regarding his said purchase of marijuana. Based on that
information, Major Zeidem ordered a team to conduct an operation to apprehend the suspects.
In the evening of the same date, CIC Galutan and S/Sgt. Molinawe proceeded to Regidor Street,
Daraga, Albay and arrested Rodrigueza, Antonio Lonceras and Samuel Segovia. The constables
were not, however, armed with a warrant of arrest when they apprehended the three accused.
The arrests were brought to the headquarters for investigation. Thereafter, agents of the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) conducted a raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza, Don's
father. Taduran did not go with them. During the raid, they were able to confiscate dried
marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe, among others. The search, however, was not authorized
by any search warrant. The next day, Jovencio Rodrigueza was released from detention but
Don Rodrigueza was detained. [Defense] Don Rodrigueza, on the other hand, claimed that on
said date he was in the house of his aunt in San Roque, Legaspi City. He stayed there
overnight and did not leave the place until the next day when his brother arrived and told him
that their father was taken by some military men the preceding night. Rodrigueza went to
Camp Bagong Ibalon and arrived there at around 8:00 a.m. of 2 July 1987. When he arrived,
he was asked if he knew anything about the marijuana incident, to which question he
answered in the negative. Like Segovia, he was made to hold a P10.00 bill and was brought to
the crime laboratory for examination. From that time on, he was not allowed to go home and
was detained inside the camp. He was also tortured in order to make him admit his complicity
in the alleged sale of marijuana. On 10 July 1987, Don Rodrigueza, Samuel Segovia and
Antonio Lonceras, for possession of 100 grams of marijuana leaves and for selling, in a buy-
bust operation, said 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves for a consideration of P200.00.
During the arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge against them. The
Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 10, found Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic
Act 6425, as amended) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay
a fine of P20,000.00 and costs. The court, however, acquitted Segovia and Lonceres.
Rodrigueza appealed.

Issue: Whether the time of Don Rodriguezas arrest is material in determining his culpability in
the crime charged.

Held: As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be

authorized by a search warrant duly issued by the proper government authority. True, in some
instances, the Court has allowed government authorities to conduct searches and seizures
even without a search warrant. Thus, when the owner of the premises waives his right against
such incursion; when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it is made on vessels
and aircraft for violation of customs laws; when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of
preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; when it involves prohibited articles in
plain view; or in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire,
sanitary and building regulations, a search may be validly made even without a search
warrant. Herein, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio
Rodrigueza was not authorized by any search warrant. It does not appear, either, that the
situation falls under any of the aforementioned cases. Hence, Rodrigueza's right against
unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM agents could not have
justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under
surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they
should, because they easily could, have first secured Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 103 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) a search warrant during that time. Further, the inconsistencies
made by prosecution witnesses give more credibility to the testimony of Don Rodrigueza. While
it is true that Rodrigueza's defense amounts to an alibi, and as such is the weakest defense in
a criminal prosecution, there are, nonetheless, some evidentiary aspects pointing to the truth
in his testimony. Firstly, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest corroborates his testimony that he was
not among those who were arrested on the night of 1 July 1987. His co-accused Segovia also
testified that Rodrigueza was not with them when they were apprehended by the NARCOM
agents. Hence, Rodrigueza is acquitted of the crime charged, due to the failure of the
prosecution to establish its cause.

Go vs. Court of Appeals [GR 101837, 11 February 1992] En Banc, Feliciano (J): 5 concur

Facts:
On 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila,
heading towards P. Guevarra St. Rolito Go y Tambunting entered Wilson St., where it is a one-
way street and started traveling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson
and J. Abad Santos Sts., Go's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Go alighted from
his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Go then boarded his car and left the
scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down Go's car plate number.
The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty
shell and one round of live ammunition for a 9mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land
Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go. The following
day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had come
from; they were informed that Go had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting.
The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by Go from the cashier of
the bake shop. The security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of Go and he
positively identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan. Having established that the
assailant was probably Go, the police launched a manhunt for Go. On 8 July 1991, Go
presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being
hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained
him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively
identified Go as the gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for
frustrated homicide against Go with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed Go, in the Presence
of his lawyers. that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he
must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Go refused
to execute any such waiver. On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor,
and before an information could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his
gunshot wound(s). Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an
information for frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder before the Regional Trial
Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified
that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and
sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. In the afternoon of 11
July 1991, Go's counsel filed with the prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release
and proper preliminary investigation, alleging that the warrantless arrest of Go was unlawful
and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed. On
12 July 1991, Go filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle in order to expedite action on
the Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Benjamin V.
Pelayo (Branch 168, RTC of Pasig City), who, on the same date, approved the cash bond posted
by Go and ordered his release. Go was in fact released that same day. On 16 July 1991, the
Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended. On
the said date, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary
investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution
shall have concluded its preliminary investigation. On 17 July 1991, however, the Judge motu
proprio issued an Order, (1) recalling the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail: petitioner
was given 48 hours from receipt of the Order to surrender himself: (2) recalling and cancelling
the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the Prosecutor to conduct preliminary
investigation: (3) treating Go's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary
investigation dated 11 July 1991 as a petition bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991. On 19
July 1991, Go filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme
Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order. Go also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the
case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition: this motion was, however, denied
by Judge Pelayo. On 23 July 1991, Go surrendered to the police. By a Resolution dated 24 July
1991, the Supreme Court remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to
the Court of Appeals. On 16 August 1991, Judge Pelayo issued an order in open court setting
Go's arraignment on 23 August 1991. On 19 August 1991, Go filed with the Court of Appeals a
motion to restrain his arraignment. On 23 August 1991, Judge Pelayo issued a Commitment
Order directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit Go into his custody at the Rizal
Provincial Jail. On the same date, Go was arraigned. In view, however, of his refusal to enter a
plea, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty. The trial court then set the criminal
case for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on
7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22 November 1991. On 27 August 1991. Go filed a petition for habeas
corpus in the Court of Appeals. On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of
habeas corpus. The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the one hand, and
the petition for habeas corpus, upon the other, were subsequently consolidated in the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying Go's motion
to restrain his arraignment on the ground that motion had become moot and academic. On 19
September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced. On 23 September 1991, the Court of
Appeals rendered a consolidated decision dismissing the 2 petitions on the grounds that Go's
warrantless arrest was valid and Go's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity
attending his arrest, among others. On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3)
more witnesses at the trial. Go's Counsel also filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" with the trial
court, with Go's conformity. On 4 October 1991, Go filed the present petition for Review on
Certiorari. On 14 October 1991, the Court issued a Resolution directing Judge Pelayo to held
in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below until further orders from the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether Go was arrested legally without warrant for the killing of Maguan, and is thus
not entitled to be released pending the conduct of a preliminary investigation.

Held: Go's warrantless "arrest" or detention does not fall within the terms of Section 5 of Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that "A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
created has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When
an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)
hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7." Go's
"arrest" took place 6 days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously were
not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time Go had allegedly shot Maguan.
Neither could the "arrest" effected 6 days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected
"when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5 (b).
Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that
Go was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had
been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting -- one stated that
Go was the gunman another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number
which turned out to be registered in Go's wife's name. That information did not, however,
constitute "personal knowledge." It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful
warrantless arrest of Go within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that
Section 7 of Rule 112 is also not applicable. Indeed, Go was not arrested at all. When he
walked into the San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed
himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering"
himself, in all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon
Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 105 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the
Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to
determine whether there was probable cause for charging Go in court for the killing of Eldon
Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous supposition
that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required Go to waive the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This
was substantive error, for Go was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should
have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since Go had not been arrested;
with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his
appearing at the preliminary investigation.

G.R. No. 89139 August 2, 1990ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA, petitioner, vs.THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:
Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the
Intelligence Task Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance
along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While in the vicinity of Rizal Memorial Colleges they
spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They
approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner
attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was unsuccessful. They then checked the "buri"
bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial
No. 770196, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear
gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 calibergun. They brought the petitioner to
the police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked
to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his
possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the
prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty.
He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City.

Issue: Whether or Not the warantless search is valid.

Held: In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner, argues
that under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense
without a searchwarrant. It is further alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner
was lawful under the circumstances.

in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable considering that it was
effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers
to inspect the same.

It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the
petitioner only after they shall have obtained a searchwarrant for the purpose. Such an
exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.

Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under theexceptions heretofore
discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures has not been violated.

People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio Mengote y. TejasG.R. No. 8759, June 22, 1992
Facts:
a telephone call was by Western Police district that here were three suspicious-looking
persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo Manila. A surveillanve
team of plainclothesmen was dispatch to the place. They saw two men looking from side to
side one of whom is holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified
themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape
because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of
them, who turned out to be the accused was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson
revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion had a fan knife. The weapons were
taken from them.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure is violated
Ruling:
The Supreme court held that par(a) section 5 Rule 113 of rules of court requires that a
person be arrested 1 After he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least
attempting to commit an offense 2 In the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar at bar. At the time of
the arrest in question, the accused was merely looking from side to side and holding his
abdomen. There was apparently no offense that has just been committed or was being actually
committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
Par. B. is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have not been
satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the time of arrest an offense had in fact just
been committed and that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and
about a crime that had yet to be committed. ACQUITTED

Malacat vs. Court of Appeals [GR 123595, 12 December 1997] En Banc, Davide Jr. (J): 11
concur

Facts: On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats reported
seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the
Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three
other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the
Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men,
with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of
Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with
"their eyes moving very fast." Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points
and observed both groups for about 30 minutes. The police officers then approached one group
of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with
and apprehended Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized, inasmuch as allegedly the
previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2 others
attempt to detonate a grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation grenade
tucked inside the latter's "front waist line." Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran,
apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan
were then brought to Police Station 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the
grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade
he allegedly recovered from Malacat. On 30 August 1990, Malacat was charged with violating
Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866. At arraignment on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted
by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty. Malacat denied the charges and explained
that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several other police officers mauled him,
hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found
on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented. In its decision dated 10
February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court ruled that the
warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was akin to a "stop and frisk," where a "warrant and
seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose object is
either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information"; and that the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful
arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives
under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years,
4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than 30 years of
Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal
indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the record of the case was
forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme
Court.

Issue: Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of stop and
frisk.

Held: The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in
order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests,
searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to
certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113
of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under
Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b)
has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are
limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a
"stop and frisk." The concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest
must not be confused. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite
quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search
incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental
search. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding
the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or
an overt physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just been committed,
was being committed or was going to be committed. Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat
could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. On the other hand, while probable cause
is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a
hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the
general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition
that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit
the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not
armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer. Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid: First,
there is grave doubts as to Yu's claim that Malacat was a member of the group which
attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police
report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group.
Second, there was nothing in Malacat's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably
elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" an observation
which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it
was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his companions were merely
standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble. Third, there was at all
no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed with a deadly weapon.
None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the
front waistline" of Malacat, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and Malacat,
any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 75 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. What is
unequivocal then are blatant violations of Malacat's rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2
and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.

People v. Malmstedt [GR 91107, 19 June 1991] En Banc, Padilla (J): 8 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the 3rd time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985. In the
evening of 7 May 1989, Malmstedt left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning
of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for 2 days. On 11 May
1989, Capt. Alen Vasco of NARCOM, stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a
temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of
checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in
the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had in his possession prohibited drugs. At about 1:30 pm, the bus where Malmstedt was riding
was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were
members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. During the inspection,
CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on Malmstedt's waist. Suspecting the bulge on Malmstedt's waist
to be a gun, the officer asked for Malmstedt's passport and other identification papers. When
Malmstedt failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was
bulging on his waist, which was a pouch bag. When Malmstedt opened the same bag, as
ordered, the officer noticed 4 suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, which
turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana, when opened. Malmstedt stopped to
get 2 travelling bags from the luggage carrier, each containing a teddy bear, when he was
invited outside the bus for questioning. It was observed that there were also bulges inside the
teddy bears which did not feel like foam stuffing. Malmstedt was then brought to the
headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa for further investigation. At the investigation
room, the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 48 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) officers opened the
teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken
from the hashish found among the personal effects of Malmstedt and the same were brought to
the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis, which established the objects examined as
hashish. Malmstedt claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his
pouch bag and that the 2 travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to
him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian
couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available
in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked Malmstedt to take charge of the bags,
and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station. An information was filed against
Malmstedt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. During the arraignment, Malmstedt
entered a plea of "not guilty." After trial and on 12 October 1989, the trial court found
Malmstedt guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425 and
sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000. Malmstedt sought reversal of
the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether the personal effects of Malmstedt may be searched without an issued warrant.

Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is
made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest
without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following
circumstances. Section 5 provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just
been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and
he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7." Herein, Malmstedt was
caught in flagrante delicto, when he was transporting prohibited drugs. Thus, the search made
upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law,
which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.

G. R. No. 197788 : February 29, 2012

RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.SERENO
FACTS:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza testified that he saw the accused driving a motorcycle without a
helmet and this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance
which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving said motor vehicle. He
invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the
accused is almost in front of the sub-station to where he is assigned as a traffic enforcer. While
he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal
ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his
jacket. He was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his
jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it. The accused obliged and slowly put out the
contents of the pocket of his jacket which included two (2) plastic sachets of suspected shabu.
The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. It found the prosecution
evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then
subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later
found to contain shabu. Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure of the alleged subject shabu was incident to a
lawful arrest.

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest

There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic
violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer
for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest.
Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor
a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of
one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. Under R.A. 4136, or the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation
is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter.

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not
be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest
him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the
period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting
time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they
went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that
place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was
no intention to take petitioner into custody.

Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed arrested upon
being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the
requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with. At the time a person is arrested, it shall
be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must
show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used
against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were
complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession
of dangerous drugs.

Espano vs. Court of Appeals [GR 120431, 1 April 1998] Third Division, Romero (J): 3
concur

Facts: On 14 July 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., Pat. Romeo Pagilagan and other police officers,
namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquilino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police
District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm
reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw Rodolfo Espano selling "something" to another
person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached Espano, identified themselves as
policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana .
When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The
policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana.
Espano was brought to the police headquarters where he was charged with possession of
prohibited drugs. On 24 July 1991, Espano posted bail and the trial court issued his order of
release on 29 July 1991. On 14 August 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, convicting
Espano of the crime charged. Espano appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court, however, on 15 January 1995 affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto.
Espano filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the search of Espanos home after his arrest does not violate against his right
against unreasonable search and seizure.

Held: Espano's arrest falls squarely under Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was
caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis
of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw Espano handing over something to an alleged
buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana.
His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were
admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime. As for the 10 cellophane bags of
marijuana found at Espano's residence, however, the same inadmissible in evidence. The
articles seized from Espano during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made
incidental to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded
ten cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were not armed
with a search warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of Espano.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purposes shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized." An exception to the said rule is a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Herein, the ten cellophane
bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets
do not fall under the said exceptions.

Unilab, Inc. vs. Ernesto Isip and/or Shalimar Philippines - GR No. 163858 Case Digest
Facts:UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing
fake UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some photographs
where the clandestine manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help
of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC
of Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a search warrant directing the police
to seize finished or unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins. No
fake Revicon was however found; instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened
contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by
UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to the custody of the Bureau
of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The respondents
then filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the
seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin
and Inoflox were seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion
of the respondents.

Issue:
Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup
and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view doctrine.

Held:
It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view doctrine.
However, seized things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The
State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the doctrine to apply are present,
namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial
intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the
officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately
apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure.

It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on
plain view. It is not enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents.
However, the NBI failed to present any of officers who were present when the warrant was
enforced to prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that such boxes
and their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only
the enforcing officers had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents
thereof were incriminating and that they were immediately apparent. There is even no showing
that the NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum
then, the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to the seized
items.

Papa vs. Mago [GR L-27360, 28 February 1968] En Banc, Zaldivar (J): 9 concur

Facts:
Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department,
acting upon a reliable information received on 3 November 1966 to the effect that a certain
shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the
following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon
orders of Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of
Customs, conducted surveillance at gate 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate 1 at
about 4:30 p.m. of 4 November 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the
trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks,
consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of
Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the
policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry No. 147-5501",
issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit. Claiming to have
been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago
and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila a petition "for
mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction (Civil Case 67496), praying for the
issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the police and customs authorities, or their
agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the
return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary
damages in their favor. On 10 November 1966, Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex
parte restraining Ricardo Papa (as Chief of Police of Manila) and Juan Ponce Enrile (as
Commissioner of Customs) in Civil Case 67496. However, when the restraining order was
received by Papa.et. al., some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of
Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal
and a representative of Remedios Mago. Under date of 15 November 1966, Mago filed an
amended petition, including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of
Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. At the hearing on 9 December
1966, the lower court, with the conformity of the parties, ordered that an inventory of the goods
be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives of the claimant of the goods,
the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti- Smuggling Center of the Manila Police Department. On
23 December 1966, Mago filed an ex parte motion to release the goods, alleging that since the
inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation, the same
should be released as per agreement of the parties upon her posting of the appropriate bond
that may be determined by the court. On 7 March 1967, the Judge issued an order releasing
the goods to Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00. On 13 March 1967,
Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court releasing
the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had been directed
by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the
seizure proceedings. Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration,
and alleging that they had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
Papa, et. al. filed the action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before the
Supreme Court.

Held: The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in
writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the
customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make
seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be
subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. He could
lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when
he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into
the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. It cannot be
doubted, therefore, that Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and
seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand
assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal
duty to render said assistance. This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin
Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine
bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to
make the interception of the cargo. Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority
to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and
Customs Code does not require said warrant herein. The Code authorizes persons having
police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or
search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also
to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope
or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person
suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But
in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered
and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace." Except in the case
of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law
may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
Herein, Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to make any search before
they seized the two trucks and their cargo. But even if there was a search, there is still
authority to the effect that no search warrant would be needed under the circumstances
obtaining herein. The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is
construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other
structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship,
motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a
warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought. Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila
Police Department of the goods in question was in accordance with law and by that seizure the
Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the
enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of
Manila.

People v. Musa [GR 96177, 27 January 1993] Third Division, Romero (J): 4 concur
 Facts: On 13 December 1989, the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) in Zamboanga City
conducted surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City.
Information received from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling
marijuana in said place. The Narcom agent (Sgt. Ani) was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped
dried marijuana for P10.00, which was turned over to the Narcom office. The next day, a buy-
bust was planned with Sgt. Ani being the poseur-buyer. NARCOM teams proceeded to the
target site in 2 civilian vehicles. Ani gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa returned to
his house and gave Ani 2 newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. The signal to
apprehend Musa was given. The NARCOM team rushed to the location of Ani, and a NARCOM
officer (Sgt. Belarga) frisked Musa but did not find the marked money. The money was given to
Musas wife who was able to slip away. Later, Belarga found a plastic bag containing dried
marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Musa was placed under arrest and was brought
to the NARCOM office. One newspaper-wrapper marijuana and the plastic bag containing more
marijuana was sent to the PC Crime Laboratory, the test of which gave positive results for the
presence of marijuana. On the other hand, Mari Musa alleged that the NARCOM agents,
dressed in civilian clothes, got inside his house without any search warrant, neither his
permission to enter the house. The NARCOM agents searched the house and allegedly found a
red plastic bag whose contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. He also did not know if the
plastic bag belonged to his brother, Faisal, who was living with him, or his father, who was
living in another house about ten arms-length away. Mari Musa was handcuffed and was taken
to the NARCOM office where he was joined by his wife. Musa claimed that he was subjected to
torture when he refused to sign the document containing details of the investigation. The next
day, he was taken to the fiscals office to which he was allegedly made to answer to a single
question: that if he owned the marijuana. He allegedly was not able to tell the fiscal that he had
been maltreated by the NARCOM agents because he was afraid he might be maltreated in the
fiscal's office. Mari Musa was brought to the City Jail. Still, an information against Musa was
filed on 15 December 1989. Upon his arraignment on 11 January 1990, Musa pleaded not
guilty. After trial and on 31 August 1990, the RTC Zamboanga City (Branch XII) found him
guilty of selling marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of RA 6425. Musa appealed to the
Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the contents of the red plastic bag found in the kitchen may be admitted as
evidence as evidence acquired incidental to a lawful arrest.

Held: Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make
a search upon the person of the person arrested. An officer making an arrest may take from
the person arrested and money or property found upon his person which was used in the
commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with
the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial
of the cause. Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law
enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the person of the pusher
immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. The warrantless search
and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the
one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in
the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. When the discovery of the evidence did
not constitute a search, but where the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full
view, the warrantless seizure of the object was legal on the basis of the "plain view" doctrine
and upheld the admissibility of said evidence. The "plain view" doctrine, however, may not be
used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. What the 'plain view' cases
have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an
intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other
legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused
and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is
legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one
object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. The "plain view" doctrine
neither justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not
apparent from the "plain view" of the object. Thus, the exclusion of the plastic bag containing
marijuana does not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the other pieces of
evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation
of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. By virtue of the testimonies of Sgt.
Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by Musa to Sgt. Ani, among
other pieces of evidence, the guilt of Musa of the crime charged has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.

G.R. No. 145176 March 30, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,vs.
SANTIAGO PERALTA y POLIDARIO (at large),
Facts:Appellant was convicted of the crime of Qualified Theft for stealing& carrying punctured
currency notes due for shredding belonging tothe Central Bank. During arraignment,
appellants, assisted by theirrespective counsels, pleaded not guilty.Accdg to the prosecution,
while he was waiting for the bus on hisway to BSP, he was arrested & brought to the Police
Station forInvestigation. For 3 days, while in the custody of the police, he gave3 separate
statements admitting his guilt & participation in thecrime charged. The defense has an exact
opposite detail of thearrest.During the hearing, Atty. Sanchez manifested that he did not
assistappellant & that he only signed the 3 statements as a witness.

Issue: W/N such affidavits can be admitted as evidence against theappellants?

Held: NO!It is clear that the 3 extrajudicial confessions was not made w/ theassistance of Atty.
Sanchez. The signature of the latter was affixedonly as a witness. A waiver in writing, like that
which the trial courtrelied upon in the present case, is not enough. w/o the assistance
ofcounsel, the waiver has no evidentiary relevance.Without the extrajudicial confession & the
perforated currencynotes, the remaining evidence would be utterly inadequate tooverturn the
constitutional presumption of innocence. Therefore,the appellants are ordered acquitted &
released immediately.

Socorro Ramirez vs. CA and Garcia [G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995]15AUGPonente:
KAPUNAN, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia,
vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive
to petitioners dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy..
Private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for
violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other
related violations of private communication, and other purposes. Petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said motion. The private respondent filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred the case to the Court
of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the
trial courts order as null and void, after subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration by
the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a
private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
HELD:NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO:Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
[P]etitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
communication to a point of absurdity.

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals [GR 107383, 20 February 1996] Second Division, Mendoza
(J): 3 concur
Facts: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. On 26 March 1982, Zulueta entered the
clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and
Martin's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took
157 documents consisting of correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against her husband. Dr.
Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against
Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. After trial, the trial court rendered
judgment for Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of Martin's Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and
Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the
properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral
damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the
Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to
be inviolable apply even to the spouse of the aggrieved party.

Held: The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The
only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." The
intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity.
A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures
absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other
as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage,
save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do
with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 153 (1999)

FACTS:
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City wnet to the
police station to report alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment shows in the
City. At the station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused
policeman Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs.
The victim was hit with the handle of the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a
fist blow, resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment. The exchange of words was
recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation
that it was the victim who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man ,
testified. Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had made of
the heated discussion at the police station between the accused police officer Navarro and the
deceased, Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which
prohibits wire tapping.

2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of

the offended party and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated in
favor of the accused.

HELD:
1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which prohibits
wire tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made.

The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private

communications (Ramirez v Cpourt of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Snce the exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

2. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the acts of the accused, constituted
sufficient provocation. Provocation is said to be any unjust or improper conduct of the offended
party capable of exciting, annoying or irritating someone. The provocation must be sufficient
and must immediately precede the act; and in order to be sufficient, it must be adequate to
excite a person to commit the wrong, which must be accordingly proportionate in gravity. The
mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong must also be
considered. The exclamations made by Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who
provoked him showed that he had no intent to kill the latter.

Ople v Torres G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998.

Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption
of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional
grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for
the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further
erosion.

A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997
and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against
respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government
agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the
implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining its implementation.
Issue: Petitionercontends:
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK
FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE
CONSTITUTION."

Held: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void
for being unconstitutional. SO ORDERED.

Ratio: It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various
contending state policies the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest
against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr.
Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought.

Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it
confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No.
308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to
the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this
identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight
that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his
privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no
duty cannot stand.

In view of standing
Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is
possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No.
308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public
funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.

The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No.
308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet
to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have
started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January
19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for
the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.

In view of the need for Legislative Act

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific
aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and
should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
 Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders
as determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform
standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end,
he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders."

Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence,
beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of
identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino
citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of
Congress is understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the
Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their
delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed.

In view of right to privacy

Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to
show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens
and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social
security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not
totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic
services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance
of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of
A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present
danger.

The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference
Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned
agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." A.O.
No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state
whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes.
In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System
will contribute to the "generation of population data for development planning." This is an
admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but for the generation of other
data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of
A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for
a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN .

His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded whether it be in
the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his
transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities,
reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the
better the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic
linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but
the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to
misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist.

Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the
information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the
access code of the control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder,
without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse,
manipulate the data stored within the system. It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls
short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our people will only
be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. 60 The lack of proper safeguards in this
regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by
enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to
access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may
pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN,
biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual
lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the
data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.

In Morfe v. Mutuc, we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public
officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and
expenses, did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote
morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological
advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the
law be narrowly focused and a compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the
right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent
unconstitutional invasions.

G.R.No.203335:February11,2014
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the validity of several provision of the Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.

Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course
asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish
wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the following provisions are valid and constitutional.

a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;

b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;

c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;

d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;

e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;

f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;

g.Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;

h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;

i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;

j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;

k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;

l. Section 8 on Penalties;

m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;

n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;

o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;

p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;

q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;

r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;

s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;

t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and

u. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and Functions.

Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the
RPC on the crime of libel.

HELD:
a. Section 4(a)(1) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(a)(1) provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime
punishable under this Act:

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:

(1) Illegal Access. The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.

Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard
required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the people and should thus be
struck down.

The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict
scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is
essentially a condemnable act accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a
universally condemned conduct.

Besides, a clients engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between them

as to the extent of the search, the methods to be used, and the systems to be tested. Since the
ethical hacker does his job with prior permission from the client, such permission would
insulate him from the coverage of Section 4(a)(1).

Hence, valid and constitutional.

b. Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(a)(3) provides:

(3) Data Interference. The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration
of computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the
introduction or transmission of viruses.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to
discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression,
creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to

state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly,
thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these
freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism,the act of willfully
destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data,
electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed
freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other peoples computer systems and private
documents.

Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that
under no set of circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid.Petitioner has failed to discharge this
burden.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(a)(6) provides:

(6) Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit,
mislead, destroy the reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain
name is:

(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the
appropriate government agency at the time of the domain name registration;

(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in case
of a personal name; and

(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clausein
that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same
fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other
literary device.

The law is reasonable in penalizing the offender for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to
profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful
opportunity of registering the same.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(b)(3) provides:

b) Computer-related Offenses:

x x x x

(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer,
possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether
natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty
imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to
privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.

In Morfe v. Mutuc,it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its identification with
liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection.

Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the "Zones of
Privacy."

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form
of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal
process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction
that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized men,"
but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates
that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has
the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks." In the Matter of the
Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon, 535 Phil. 687, 714-
715 (2006).

Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against
unreasonable searchesand seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the
right to privacy of communication and correspondence.In assessing the challenge that the
State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether
a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation
has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.

Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity
theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of law.

Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or
deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire
anothers personal data.

Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that
journalists would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the
news to secure information about him that could be published.
The Court held, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or social investigation, has
nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is
required by this Section.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 4(c)(1) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(c)(1) provides:

(c) Content-related Offenses:

(1) Cybersex. The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly,
of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer
system, for favor or consideration.

Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression clause.They express fear
that private communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting
adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as
crimes when done "for favor" in cyberspace. In common usage, the term "favor" includes
"gracious kindness," "a special privilege or right granted or conceded," or "a token of love (as a
ribbon) usually worn conspicuously."This meaning given to the term "favor" embraces socially
tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement agencies into the bedrooms of
married couples or consenting individuals.

The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for
favor and consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by
webcam.

Likewise, engaging in sexual acts privately through internet connection, perceived by some as a
right, has to be balanced with the mandate of the State to eradicate white slavery and the
exploitation of women.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 4(c)(2) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(c)(2) provides:

(2) Child Pornography. The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act
No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer system:
Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for
in Republic Act No. 9775.

The above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009(ACPA) to cover
identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government from invoking the
ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit child pornography using a computer system.
Actually, ACPAs definition of child pornography already embraces the use of "electronic,
mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means."

Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in
cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative
prerogative and there is rational basis for such higher penalty.The potential for uncontrolled
proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is
incalculable.
Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 4(c)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(c)(3) provides:

(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. The transmission of commercial electronic

communication with the use of computer system which seeks to advertise, sell, or offer for sale
products and services are prohibited unless:

(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or

(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative
announcements from the sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or

(iii) The following conditions are present:

(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the
recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same
source;

(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the
electronic message; and

(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading
information in any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.

The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known
as "spam." The term "spam" surfaced in early internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy
games. One who repeats the same sentence or comment was said to be making a "spam."

The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited commercial
communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network capacities of
internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes
with the owners peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams amounts to trespass
to ones privacy since the person sending out spams enters the recipients domain without prior
permission. The OSG contends that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.

These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such ads.
What matters is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these mail ads.
That is true with spams. Their recipients always have the option to delete or not to read them.

To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his
emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Unsolicited advertisements are
legitimate forms of expression.

Hence, void for being unconstitutional.

Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Penal Code

Section 4(c)(4) of the Cyber Crime Law

Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as
Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.
The RPC provisions on libel read:

Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in
the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by
public officers in the exercise of their functions.

Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. A libel committed by means of writing,
printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition,
cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in
its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in
addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.

The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand, merely incorporates to form part
of it the provisions of the RPC on libel. Thus Section 4(c)(4) reads:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable
under this Act:

(c) Content-related Offenses:

(4) Libel. The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which
may be devised in the future.

Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal codeand, in effect, the libel provisions of
the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of "presumed malice" even when the latest
jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of "actual malice" as a basis for
conviction.Petitioners argue that inferring "presumed malice" from the accuseds defamatory
statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression.

Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to
protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since
Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section
4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing
libel.

But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of
the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when
the penal code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is
distinct from that of print.
The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style. In a
sense, they are a world apart in terms of quickness of the readers reaction to defamatory
statements posted in cyberspace, facilitated by one-click reply options offered by the
networking site as well as by the speed with which such reactions are disseminated down the
line to other internet users.

Hence, Section 4(c)(4) penalizing online libel is valid and constitutional with respect to the
original author of the post; but void and unconstitutional with respect to others who simply
receive the post and react to it; and

Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 5 provides:

Sec. 5. Other Offenses. The following acts shall also constitute an offense:

(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully abets or aids
in the commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.

(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully attempts to commit any
of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person
who willfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses
enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect
on protected expression.

The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current body of jurisprudence and laws on
aiding and abetting sufficiently protects the freedom of expression of "netizens," the multitude
that avail themselves of the services of the internet. He points out that existing laws and
jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding or abetting" a crime as to protect the
innocent. The Solicitor General argues that plain, ordinary, and common usage is at times
sufficient to guide law enforcement agencies in enforcing the law.

Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a persons image with just one click of the mouse.
Scurrilous statements can spread and travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover,
cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives,
and friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which
seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a persons
reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep,
invading the area of protected freedoms. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await
internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be
threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for
law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. (Adonis) G.R. No. 203378The terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep
that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts,
comments, and other messages.

Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the
cyberspace is a nullity.

As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of communication. It

is inevitable that any government threat of punishment regarding certain uses of the medium
creates a chilling effect on the constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of the great
masses that use it. In this case, the particularly complex web of interaction on social media
websites would give law enforcers such latitude that they could arbitrarily or selectively enforce
the law.

Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension
on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression,
especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front
in a fuzzy way.In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of
responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel,
Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child
Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.

But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5 should be
permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception,
Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on
Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related
Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related
Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the exercise
of the freedom of expression.

Section 6 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 6 provides:

Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special
laws, if committed by, through and with the use of information and communications
technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty
to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, and special laws, as the case may be.

Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying
circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial distinction
between crimes committed through the use of information and communications technology and
similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender
often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. The
distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 7 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 7 provides:

Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to
any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special
laws.

Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print,
said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the
subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised
Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the
same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that
online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article
353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of publication.
Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against
double jeopardy.

The Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section 7
that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic
Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of:

1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act
10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription
against double jeopardy; as well as

2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section
4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009
also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is void and
unconstitutional.

Section 8 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 8 provides:

Sec. 8. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Sections
4(a) and 4(b) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at
least Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) up to a maximum amount commensurate
to the damage incurred or both.

Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be punished with
imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand pesos
(PhP500,000.00) or both.

If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the penalty of
reclusion temporal or a fine of at least Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) up to
maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both, shall be imposed.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1) of this Act
shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred
thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) but not exceeding One million pesos (PhP1,000,000.00) or
both.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(2) of this Act
shall be punished with the penalties as enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 or the "Anti-
Child Pornography Act of 2009:" Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1)
degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775, if committed through a
computer system.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(3) shall be
punished with imprisonment of arresto mayor or a fine of at least Fifty thousand pesos
(PhP50,000.00) but not exceeding Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP250,000.00) or both.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5 shall be
punished with imprisonment one (1) degree lower than that of the prescribed penalty for the
offense or a fine of at least One hundred thousand pesos (PhP100,000.00) but not exceeding
Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.

The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative.
Here the legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious
cybercrimes. Judges and magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority
to modify or revise their range as determined by the legislative department.

The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 12 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 12 provides:

Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. Law enforcement authorities, with due cause,
shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time
associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system.

Traffic data refer only to the communications origin, destination, route, time, date, size,
duration, or type of underlying service, but not content, nor identities.

All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.

Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the
collection or recording of the above-stated information.

The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written
application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses
he may produce and the showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of
the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to
be committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that will be
obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the
prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for
obtaining such evidence.

Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record traffic
data in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for official abuse.
They claim that data showing where digital messages come from, what kind they are, and
where they are destined need not be incriminating to their senders or recipients before they are
to be protected. Petitioners invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to be protected
from government snooping into the messages or information that they send to one another.

Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there is a
need to put order to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public good. To do this, it is
within the realm of reason that the government should be able to monitor traffic data to
enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.

Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed, and
the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.In determining whether or not a
matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a
subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of
privacy over a certain matter. The second is an objective test, where his or her expectation of
privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. 429 U.S. 589
(1977)

Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in relation to its application to
a particular person or group, petitioners challenge to Section 12 applies to all information and
communications technology (ICT) users, meaning the large segment of the population who use
all sorts of electronic devices to communicate with one another. Consequently, the expectation
of privacy is to be measured from the general publics point of view. Without reasonable
expectation of privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact.

In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)the United States Supreme Court classified privacy into
two categories: decisional privacy and informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the
right to independence in making certain important decisions, while informational privacy refers
to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter rightthe right to
informational privacythat those who oppose government collection or recording of traffic data in
real-time seek to protect.

Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the
messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient.

Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with specified
communications." But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the
law enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The power is virtually
limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing
whatever specified communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals
to privacy.

The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these technologies be written
with specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the Constitution
guarantees.

Hence, void for being unconstitutional

Section 13 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 13 provides:

Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. The integrity of traffic data and subscriber information
relating to communication services provided by a service provider shall be preserved for a
minimum period of six (6) months from the date of the transaction. Content data shall be
similarly preserved for six (6) months from the date of receipt of the order from law enforcement
authorities requiring its preservation.

Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6) months:
Provided, That once computer data preserved, transmitted or stored by a service provider is
used as evidence in a case, the mere furnishing to such service provider of the transmittal
document to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed a notification to preserve the
computer data until the termination of the case.

The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the order and its
compliance.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 203391 (Palatino v. Ochoa)claim that Section 13 constitutes an undue
deprivation of the right to property. They liken the data preservation order that law
enforcement authorities are to issue as a form of garnishment of personal property in civil
forfeiture proceedings. Such order prevents internet users from accessing and disposing of
traffic data that essentially belong to them.

No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to their
authors or recipients and are to be considered private communications. But it is not clear that
a service provider has an obligation to indefinitely keep a copy of the same as they pass its
system for the benefit of users. By virtue of Section 13, however, the law now requires service
providers to keep traffic data and subscriber information relating to communication services for
at least six months from the date of the transaction and those relating to content data for at
least six months from receipt of the order for their preservation.

At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data that service providers
preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users by reason
of the issuance of such orders. The process of preserving data will not unduly hamper the
normal transmission or use of the same.

Hence, valid and constitutional

Section 14 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 14 provides:

Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data.
warrant, shall issue an order requiring
subscribers information, traffic data or
seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of
docketed and assigned for investigation
purpose
Law enforcement authorities, upon securing a court
any person or service provider to disclose or submit
relevant data in his/its possession or control within
the order in relation to a valid complaint officially
and the disclosure is necessary and relevant for the
of investigation.

The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a subpoena.

Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a
function usually lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable them to carry out their
executive functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful
search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications and correspondence.
Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 15 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 15 provides:

Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. Where a search and seizure
warrant is properly issued, the law enforcement authorities shall likewise have the following
powers and duties.

Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in this Act,
and:

(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;

(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;

(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;

(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage medium; and

(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or
computer and communications network.
Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has knowledge
about the functioning of the computer system and the measures to protect and preserve the
computer data therein to provide, as is reasonable, the necessary information, to enable the
undertaking of the search, seizure and examination.

Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the examination
of the computer data storage medium and to make a return thereon but in no case for a period
longer than thirty (30) days from date of approval by the court.

Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will supplant established search and
seizure procedures.

The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of the person from whom they
were taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but
merely supplements them.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 17 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 17 provides:

Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. Upon expiration of the periods as provided in Sections
13 and 15, service providers and law enforcement authorities, as the case may be, shall
immediately and completely destroy the computer data subject of a preservation and
examination.

Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data subject of previous preservation or
examination violates the users right against deprivation of property without due process of law.
But, as already stated, it is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the service
provider to have that copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he
wanted them preserved, he should have saved them in his computer when he generated the
data or received it. He could also request the service provider for a copy before it is deleted.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 19 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to computer data:

Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. When a computer data is prima facie
found to be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or
block access to such computer data.

Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Solicitor General concedes that this provision
may be unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, the Court
must satisfy itself that Section 19 indeed violates the freedom and right mentioned.

Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards
jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech.
Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests: the
dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear and present danger
rule. Section 19, however, merely requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in
violation of any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration, this can
actually be made to apply in relation to any penal provision. It does not take into consideration
any of the three tests mentioned above.

The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of the
constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Section 20 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 20 provides:

Sec. 20. Noncompliance. Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically
the orders from law enforcement authorities shall be punished as a violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of prision correctional in its maximum period or a fine of
One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every noncompliance with
an order issued by law enforcement authorities.

Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is that the
mere failure to comply constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard to situations
where non-compliance would be reasonable or valid.

But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
1829,PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL
OFFENDERS. Section 20 necessarily incorporates elements of the offense which are defined
therein.

Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done "knowingly or
willfully." There must still be a judicial determination of guilt, during which, as the Solicitor
General assumes, defense and justifications for non-compliance may be raised. Thus, Section
20 is valid insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by
the Court.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Sections 24 and 26(a) of the Cybercrime Law

Sections 24 and 26(a) provide:

Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center. There is hereby created, within
thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be known as the
Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC), under the administrative
supervision of the Office of the President, for policy coordination among concerned agencies
and for the formulation and enforcement of the national cybersecurity plan.

Sec. 26.Powers and Functions. The CICC shall have the following powers and functions:

(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of real time
commission of cybercrime offenses through a computer emergency response team (CERT); x x
x.

Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave the
Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national
cybersecurity plan without any sufficient standards or parameters for it to follow.

In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has
adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test,
the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.1avvphi1The
second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Gerochi v.
Department of Energy, 554 Phil. 563 (2007).

Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and
implement a national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the
law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of
cybersecurity.

Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions,
training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect cyber
environment and organization and users assets.This definition serves as the parameters within
which CICC should work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.

Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to
"prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection, investigation, and
prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by providing arrangements for
fast and reliable international cooperation." This policy is clearly adopted in the interest of law
and order, which has been considered as sufficient standard.

Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a) are likewise valid and constitutional.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.

NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY,
Petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD
CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately
six feet (6) by ten feet (10) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within
public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message IBASURA RH Law referring to the
Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is
the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading Conscience Vote
and lists candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a check mark, or (Pro-RH) Team
Patay with an X mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the
passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising Team Patay, while those who
voted against it form Team Buhay.
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by
any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for
the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not
candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political
question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Courts power of review.
Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners fundamental right to freedom of expression.
Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral
regulation.
Whether or not there was violation of petitioners right to property.
Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or
modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the
expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming
arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the
tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue
involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are
no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.
Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of
the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech.
Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall
squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the
controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the prerequisite that something had
by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government
before a court may come into the picture.
Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium,
had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELECs letter threatening
the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this
right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC
suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position
that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these
provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do
they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the
enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this
case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
 The Court held that every citizens expression with political consequences enjoys a
high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondents argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda,
being petitioners way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting
those who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted in return for consideration by
any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue, fostering informed and civic minded deliberation. On the
other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does no more than propose a
commercial transaction. The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is,
however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions based on
the subject matter of the utterance or speech. In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes
controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin
content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court
has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. Only when the challenged
act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of
the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason
for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their
private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone elses constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the
tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is
likewise protected by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private
property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void,
because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of
the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and
stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property.
Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person
shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding
upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law
does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech
solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any
doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality
allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are
government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the governments
favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise
of, a persons or institutions religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the government may take religion into account . . . to
exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose
religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state
involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
Adjudication
Affiliate program commission

Notes

Abridged
It has a secular legislative purpose;
It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

U.S. v Bustos G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918

J. Malcolm

Facts:
In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a petition to the Executive Secretary regarding charges
against Roman Punsalan, the justice of the peace of Macabebe. They wanted to oust him from
his office.
Specific allegations against him included bribery charges, involuntary servitude, and theft.
The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the charges were proved. But, the judge still
found him guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim of prosecution and one Jaime, an
auxiliary justice, instigated the charges against him for personal reasons. He was acquitted.
The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor General but it wasnt acted upon.
Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents by Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or
suffer imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the objection made by Punsalan. The trial
court denied the motion. All except 2 of the defendants appealed. Making assignments of error.
1. The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.
2. Error in not holding that the libelous statement was not privileged
3. Error in not acquitting defendants
4. Evidence failed to show gult of defendants beyond reasonable doubt.
5. Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous statements were true.
6. Error in sustaining the prosecutions objection to the introduction in evidence by the
accused of the affidavits upon which the petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was
based.
7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection in advertently interposed by
their counsel to the admission in evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the
accusation in this case arose.

Issue:Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan,
justice of the peace in Pampanga.

Held: Yes. Defendants acquitted.

Ratio:
Freedom of speech was non existent in the country before 1900. There were small efforts at
reform made by the La Solidaridad. The Malolos Constitution, on the other hand, guaranteed
freedom of speech.
During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself laid down the tenet Magna Charta of
Philippine Liberty when he wrote, that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech
or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government
for a redress of grievances." This was in the Philippine Bill.
In the Amrican cases it was held, there were references to public opinion should be the
constant source of liberty and democracy. It also said the guaranties of a free speech and a
free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a
matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a
fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge
the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted
terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort.
It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation
of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on
the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice
of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and
the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to
meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or
group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the
government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of
course, assume responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy has demanded protection for public opinion. The doctrine of privilege has been
the result of this. Privilged communications may in some instances afford an immunity to the
slanderer. Public policy is the unfettered administration of justice.
Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified privilege is prima facie which may be
lost by proof of malice. This is apparent in complaints made in good faith against a public
officials conduct having a duty in the matter. Even if the statements were found to be false, the
protection of privilege may cover the individual given that it was in good faith. There must be a
sense of duty and not a self-seeking motive.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a
person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter
which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that
presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring
home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and
the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person,
might well be considered libelous per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable
conditions convict one of a libel of a government official. As a general rule words imputing to a
judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching
him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not have present a
simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges predicated
on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not
been proved by the prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the
justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded
their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed
is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of a
person thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. These
respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only
seemed to them of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of
first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the
petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper.

CASE DIGEST ON AYER V. CAPULONG [160 S 865 (1988) En Banc] - Senator Enrile cannot
object to his inclusion in the movie on the EDSA Revolution by invoking his right to privacy.
"The right of privacy or "he right to be let alone" is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion
into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public
figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him
constitutes matters of a public character. Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked
to resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. The right of priivacy of a
"public figure" is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen."
As distinguished from Lagunzad v. Gonzales, which involved a film biography necessarily
including at least his immediate family, the subject matter of the move in this case is one of
public concern and does not relate to the individual or public life of Senator Enrile.

Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee
refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for
damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative
action that may be taken.

Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor

through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machinations, or any other unjust, oppressive or
high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers
damages.

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon
motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall
so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

Borjal v Court of Appeals 301 SCRA 1 January 14, 1999

Facts: A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before the court against Borjal and
Soliven for writing and publishing articles that are allegedly derogatory and offensive against
Francisco Wenceslao, attacking among others the solicitation letters he send to support a
conference to be launch concerning resolving matters on transportation crisis that is tainted
with anomalous activities. Wenceslao however was never named in any of the articles nor was
the conference he was organizing. The lower court ordered petitioners to indemnify the private
respondent for damages which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A petition for review was
filed before the SC contending that private respondent was not sufficiently identified to be the
subject of the published articles.

Issue: Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel.
Held: In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it
is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized
himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person
could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. These requisites have not been
complied with in the case at bar. The element of identifiability was not met since it was
Wenceslaso who revealed he was the organizer of said conference and had he not done so the
public would not have known.
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press and that
privileged communications must be protective of public opinion. Fair commentaries on matters
of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.
The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation
publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not
necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred
from the facts.

The questioned article dealt with matters of public interest as the declared objective of the
conference, the composition of its members and participants, and the manner by which it was
intended to be funded no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued with public
interest. Respondent is also deemed to be a public figure and even otherwise is involved in a
public issue. The court held that freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed and
protected with the reminder among media members to practice highest ethical standards in the
exercise thereof.

A privileged communication may be either:

1. Absolutely privileged communication those which are not actionable even if the author
has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which
exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
Committee thereof.

2. Qualifiedly privileged communications those containing defamatory imputations are not

actionable unless found to have been made without good intention justifiable motive. To this
genre belong "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or
remarks."

REYES VS BAGATSING

FACTS: Petitioners request for a permit to hold a peaceful march and rally was denied by
respondent mayor due to police intelligence reports affirming plans of criminal intent to disrupt
the assembly. Respondent recommended that the permit may be issued if said rally is to be
held at any other enclosed area where safety is ensured.
ISSUE: Whether or not denial of a permit to rally violates freedom of speech.

HELD: Yes. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, is the danger of a
character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil public safety, public morals, or any other
legitimate public interest. Peaceful assemblies are guaranteed in freedom of speech.

PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO.80806; 5 OCT 1989]

Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of
the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group,
Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of
Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers
along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be
obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the
University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and
several officers and members of various student organizations.

Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published
and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.

Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of
Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents
from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof
claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se
obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary
restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy
Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminaryinjunction. The
Court granted the temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the
TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.

Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society
from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws
punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier said
than done to say, that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but
rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection.
Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged
as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences
and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall."
Another is whether it shocks the ordinary andcommon sense of men as an indecency.
Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of
the case and that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the
community reached by it." The government authorities in the instant case have not shown the
required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they
were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography,
and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of asearch warrant. The
court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a
judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that;

1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene
and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant
State interference and action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to
be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judges sound discretion;

Social Weather Stations v COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-stock, non-profit social research
institution conducting surveys in various fields. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan
Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation.

Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
enforcing Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides that: Surveys affecting
national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys
affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a
prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to
justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the
results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before
the election day without causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither
empirical nor historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and
inevitable danger to tile voting process posed by election surveys. No similar restriction is
imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from
writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. They
contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of election
surveys, which are relatively objective.

Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as
necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous
and erroneous surveys just before the election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the
publication of election survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a rational
connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of the electoral
process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is
narrowly tailored to meet the "evils" sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom
of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days
before the national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it does
not prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom
of speech, expression and the press.

Held:
Yes. It constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of expression, speech and the
press. To summarize, the Supreme Court held that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental
interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of
expression.

It has been held that mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public
convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be
insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of
democratic institutions.

PEACEFUL ASSSEMBLY

Primicias vs. Fugoso [L-18000. Jan 27, 1948]

Doctrine:
Clear and Present Danger Test, Freedom of Assembly and Expression

FACTS:
This case is an action of mandamus instituted by petitioner Cipriano Primicias,
manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties, against respondent Manila City Mayor, Valeriano
Fugoso, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at the Plaza
Miranda on Nov 16, 1947. The petitioner requested for a permit to hold a peaceful public
meeting.
However, the respondent refused to issue such permit because he found that there is a
reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that
passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar
speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their
government t, and in the duly peace and a disruption of public order.
Respondent based his refusal to the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an
offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place,
meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other
persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation
engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Mayor has the right to refuse to issue permit hence violating freedom
of assembly.

HELD:
The answer is negative. Supreme Court states that the freedom of speech, and to
peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental
personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitution. However, these
rights are not absolute. They can be regulated under the states police power that they should
not be injurious to the equal enjoymentof others having equal rights, nor to the rights of the
community or society.The Court holds that there can be 2 interpretations of Sec. 1119:
1) the Mayor of the City of Manila isvested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to
grant permit for the holding of a lawfulassembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the
streets and other public places of the City of Manila;and
2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets
orpublic places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure
convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper
policing to minimize therisk of disorder.
The court favored the second construction since the first construction is tantamount to
authorizing theMayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system
of government no such unlimitedpower may someofficialbe validly granted to any officer of the
government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency. It is to be noted that the permit to
be issued is for the use of public places and not for theassembly itself.The Court holds that the
assembly is lawful and thus cannot be struck down. Fear of serious injurycannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free menfrom the
bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable
groundto believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground
believe thatthe evil to be prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in
some violence or destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be
the probability of seriousinjury to the state.

MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO [129 SCRA 359; G.R. NO.62270; 21 MAY 1984]

Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They
sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to
12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held
a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Sciencebasketball court (VMAS), the
place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second
floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their
opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of
Agriculture. The same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their
rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the period
allowed. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for
holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were
under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The
validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
against private respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports.
Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal assembly which was
characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and
oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty
imposed, there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of
free speech.

Held: Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if
during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But with the
activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present
danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking ofdisciplinary
action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder
or invasion of the rights of others."

The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational
institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving
public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless
there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right
to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards
displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however,
by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired
being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in
school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the
power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be
conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage
of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the
penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.

Luzviminda dela Cruz v CA, et. al. 305 SCRA 303 (March 25, 1999)

Facts:
Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were
simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in October 1990 by
the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) in connection with
the administrative complaints filed before its office by their respective principals for
participating in a mass action/strike and subsequently defying the return-to-work order by
DECS constituting grave misconduct., gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil Service
Law, Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty,
gross insubordination conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence
without official leave (AWOL), in violation of Presidential Decree 807, otherwise known as the
Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. Petitioners contend they are merely participating in a
peaceful assembly to petition the government for redress of their grievances in the exercise of
their constitutional right and insist their assembly does not constitutes as a strike as there is
no actual disruption of classes.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners exercise of their right to freedom to assembly and
petition were valid.

Held: The court held that previous jurisprudence laid down a rule that public teachers in the
exercise of their right to ventilate their grievances by petitioning the government for redress
should be done within reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare. The conduct
of mass protests during school days while abandoning classes is highly prejudicial to the best
interest of public service. The court stresses that teachers are penalized not because they
exercised their right to peaceably assemble but because of the manner by which such right was
exercised, i.e., going on unauthorized and unilateral absences thus disrupting classes in
various schools in Metro Manila which produced adverse effects upon the students for whose
education the teachers were responsible.

DELA CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS
Petitioners are public school teachers who were simultaneously charged, preventively
Suspended, and eventually dismissed by Sec. Carino in Oct. 1990. It was alleged that
the teachers participated in the mass action/ illegal strike on Sept. 1990. The teachers also
violated the return-to-work order issued by the DECS. Respondents failed to explain to the
DECS despite the 5 day period given. Hence they were found guilty as charged, and
subsequently dismissed from office by Sec. Carino of the DECS. The Civil Service Commission,
upon appeal, found the teachers guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, and
imposed upon them the reduced penalty of six months suspension. However in view of the
length of time that the teachers had been out of service due to the dismissal issued by Sec.
Carino, the CSC likewise ordered their immediate reinstatement without back wages.

ISSUE
1. Whether the teachers conducts are prejudicial to the best interest of service.
2. Whether or not the teachers are entitled to back wages for the period of 3 years pending
their appeal deducting the 6 months suspension eventually meted out to them.

HELD
YES, the mass actions amounted to a prohibited strike of civil service servants. Although the
right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is
guaranteed by the Constitution, this liberty must be exercised within reasonablelimits. The
public school teachers committed acts prejudicial to the interest of the service by staging the
mass protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes and failing to return despite
the return to work order.

2. NO, they are not entitled to backwages. The teachers were neither exonerated nor
unjustifiably suspended, the 2 circumstances necessary for the grant of backwages in
administrative disciplinary cases.

Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,

G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006

Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the
Philippines and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally
they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing
Batas Pambansa No. 880.

Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human
rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a
permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear
and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of
expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message which
the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass
actions in support of the government. The words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or
influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the
phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government
because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict
scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on February
14, 2006. During the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy
resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues,
particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to
the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.

Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880,
specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine
Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to
peaceably assemble.

Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional
protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without
which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.

However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It
may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal
rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the
exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is
the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order
or safety, and general welfare of the people.

B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply
regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it
refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful
cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion,
protesting, and influencing in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so
its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all
rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger
to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a
recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for
the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the
establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and
municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to
the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to
peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plaza in every city or municipality that
has not yet complied with section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive response
(CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL
and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY
OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other
respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED
FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Aglipay vs Ruiz

Facts of the Case:

The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in Manila newspapers that he would
order the issuance of postage stamps for the commemoration of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress celebration in the City of Manila. The said event was organized by the
Roman Catholic Church. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the petitioner, is the Supreme Head of
the Philippine Independent Church, requested Vicente Sotto who is a member of the Philippine
Bar to raise the matter to the President. The said stamps in consideration were actually issued
already and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the
stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress

Held:

No, the respondent did not violate the Constitution by issuing and selling the commemorative
postage stamps. Ruiz acted under the provision of Act No. 4052, which contemplates no
religious purpose in view, giving the Director of Posts the discretion to determine when the
issuance of new postage stamps would be advantageous to the Government. Of course, the
phrase advantageous to the Government does not authorize the violation of the Constitution.
In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not intended by Ruiz to favor a
particular church or denomination. The stamps did not benefit the Roman Catholic Church,
nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of
issuing of the stamps was to actually take advantage of an international event considered to be
a great opportunity to give publicity to the Philippines and as a result attract more tourists to
the country. In evaluating the design made for the stamp, it showed the map of the Philippines
instead of showing a Catholic chalice. The focus was on the location of the City of Manila, and
it also bore the inscription that reads Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-
7, 1937. In considering these, it is evident that there is no violation of the Constitution
therefore the act of the issuing of the stamps is constitutional.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to
costs.

GARCES VS. ESTENZO [104 SCRA 510; G.R. L-53487; 25 MAY 1981]

Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:

a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This
provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a
waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and
cash donations.

b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of
the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year
and until the election of his successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic
Church during the celebration of the saints feast day.
These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The
image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However,
after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea refused to return the image to the barangay
council, as it was the churchs property since church funds were used in its acquisition.

Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case
against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain
Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of
the said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church,
contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.

Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.

Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The
image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the
purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio
residents. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patronsaint(such as the
acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a laymans custody so that it
could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with
prayers and novena. It was the councils funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is
their property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to
give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used.
Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has
some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church
and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.

American Bible Society vs. City of Manila

GR No. L-9637 | April 30, 1957

Facts:
American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary
corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency
established in Manila in November, 1898
City of Manila is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in
conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila
American Bible Society has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions
throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialect
City Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible Society that it was violating several
Ordinances for operating without the necessary permit and license, thereby requiring the
corporation to secure the permit and license fees covering the period from 4Q 1945-2Q 1953
To avoid closing of its business, American Bible Society paid the City of Manila its permit
and license fees under protest
American Bible filed a complaint, questioning the constitutionality and legality of the
Ordinances 2529 and 3000, and prayed for a refund of the payment made to the City of
Manila. They contended:
They had been in the Philippines since 1899 and were not required to pay any license fee or
sales tax

b. it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles

City of Manila prayed that the complaint be dismissed, reiterating the constitutionality of
the Ordinances in question
Trial Court dismissed the complaint
 American Bible Society appealed to the Court of Appeals

Issue: WON American Bible Society liable to pay sales tax for the distribution and sale of bibles

Ruling: NO
Under Sec. 1 of Ordinance 3000, one of the ordinance in question, person or entity
engaged in any of the business, trades or occupation enumerated under Sec. 3 must obtain a
Mayors permit and license from the City Treasurer. American Bible Societys business is not
among those enumerated
However, item 79 of Sec. 3 of the Ordinance provides that all other businesses, trade or
occupation not mentioned, except those upon which the City is not empowered to license or to
tax P5.00
Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the power of the City to
license or tax said business, trade or occupation.
2 provisions of law that may have bearing on this case:
a. Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila is empowered to tax and fix the license fees on retail dealers engaged in the sale of
books
b. Sec. 18(o) of RA 409: to tax and fix the license fee on dealers in general merchandise,
including importers and indentors, except those dealers who may be expressly subject to the
payment of some other municipal tax. Further, Dealers in general merchandise shall be
classified as (a) wholesale dealers and (b) retail dealers. For purposes of the tax on retail
dealers, general merchandise shall be classified into four main classes: namely (1) luxury
articles, (2) semi-luxury articles, (3) essential commodities, and (4) miscellaneous articles. A
separate license shall be prescribed for each class but where commodities of different classes
are sold in the same establishment, it shall not be compulsory for the owner to secure more
than one license if he pays the higher or highest rate of tax prescribed by ordinance. Wholesale
dealers shall pay the license tax as such, as may be provided by ordinance
The only difference between the 2 provisions is the limitation as to the amount of tax or
license fee that a retail dealer has to pay per annum
As held in Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, The power to impose a license tax on the exercise
of these freedoms provided for in the Bill of Rights, is indeed as potent as the power of
censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down. It is not a nominal fee imposed as a
regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is in no way
apportioned. It is flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities
whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and religion and
inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly recognized as the inherent
vice and evil of this flat license tax.
Further, the case also mentioned that the power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the
power to control or suppress its enjoyment. Those who can tax the exercise of this religious
practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its
maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary
evangelism can close all its doors to all those who do not have a full purse
Under Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 or the National Internal Revenue
Code,Corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . .
. or educational purposes, . . .: Provided, however, That the income of whatever kind and
character from any of its properties, real or personal, or from any activity conducted for profit,
regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be liable to the tax imposed under this
Code shall not be taxed
The price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a
little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that American Bible
Society was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit
Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be applied for in doing so it would impair American
Bible Societys free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its
rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, We hereby reverse the
decision appealed from, sentencing defendant return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45
unduly collected from itEstrada vs Escritor (August 4, 2003)

Estrada vs. Escritor

AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.
Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch
253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been
living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son.
Escritors husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the
judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is
not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor,
Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed
in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity
with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a
Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness which was approved by the congregation. Such
declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize
their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been
a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for
executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapios in
Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central
Office.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross
and immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.

HELD:
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept
in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause.
This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests.

The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining
among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. There is nothing in the OCAs
(Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this
interest is so compelling that it should override respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed,
it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling
interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the
government which is the Office of the Solicitor General.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given
an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is
within the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her
conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional
encroachment of her right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a
passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom but must also apply the compelling
state interest test.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The
Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to
examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to
present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief
and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive
to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from the
Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.

SECTION 6- LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668; 1989

FACTS:
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue travel documents to former Pres. Marcos
and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses
to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6.
They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President
impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President
(Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

HELD:
"It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to
travelfrom the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right
to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country,
a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to
travel.
Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory
of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and
distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the
right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to
leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the
national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others.
However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be
therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the
same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well
considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle
of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
 The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare.
President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the
Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos
regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return
to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED

SILVERIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS [195 SCRA 760 ; G.R. 94284; 8 APR 1991]

Facts:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the revised securities act.
Respondent filed to cancel the passport of the petitioner and to issue a hold departure order.
The RTC ordered the DFA to cancel petitioners passport, based on the finding that the
petitioner has not been arraigned and there was evidence to show that the accused has left the
country with out the knowledge and the permission of the court.

Issue: Whether or Not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court.

Held:
The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and warrant of arrest has been
issued by reason that he failed to appear at his arraignments. There is a valid restriction on the
right to travel, it is imposed that the accused must make himself available whenever the court
requires his presence.
A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the
country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition,
p. 138).
So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity
of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court
where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd
par. ]).

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while
the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive
officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose
limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or
public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the
1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263).
Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on
international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing
Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party
(See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA
121).
Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his
departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel
so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal
proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions
should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding
himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.
SILVERIO VS CA RICARDO C. SILVERIO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G.
GAVIOLA, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch IX, and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 94284 April 8, 1991

Facts:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in
Criminal Case of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his
provisional liberty.
More than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the Philippines
filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order
against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the
necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled
hearings.
Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order directing the Department of
Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioners passport or to deny his application therefor, and the
Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was
based primarily on the Trial Courts finding that since the filing of the Information, the
accused has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates
scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio,
Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this
Court. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make
himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction of his right to travel. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the
Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return. So it is also that An accused
released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart
from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending.

Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the
power of the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it
restricts the allowable impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national
security, public safety or public health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement
in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

Manotoc vs. CA | May 30, 1986

FACTS:
Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
Management Inc. and the Manotoc Securities Inc. (stock brokerage house). He was in US for a
certain time, went home to file a petition with SEC for appointment of a management
committee for both businesses. Such was granted. However, pending disposition of a case
filed with SEC, the latter requested the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear him for
departure. Consequently, a memorandum to this effect was issued.
There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc which
was suspected to be fake. 6 of its clients filed separate criminal complaints against the
petitioner and Leveriza, President and VP respectively. He was charged with estafa and was
allowed by the Court to post bail.
Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to leave the country stating
his desire to go to US relative to his business transactions and opportunities. Such was
opposed by the prosecution and was also denied by the judges. He filed petition for certiorari
with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and the SEC communication request denying his
leave to travel abroad.
According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither
the courts that granted him bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could
prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

ISSUE: WON petitioners constitutional right to travel was violated.

HELD:
NO. The court has power to prohibit person admitted to bail from leaving the country
because this is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The
condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the
court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his constitutional right to
travel. In case he will be allowed to leave the country without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of courts.
Furthermore, petitioner failed to satisfy trial court and CA of the urgency of his travel,
duration thereof, as well as consent of his surety to the proposed travel. He was not able to
show the necessity of his travel abroad. He never indicated that no other person in his behalf
could undertake such business transaction.
Article 3 Sec6: The liberty of abode and of changing the same shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. According to SC, the order of trial court in releasing
petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the provision on right to
travel.

SECTION 7- RIGHT TO PUBLIC INFORMATION

LEGASPI V CA

Facts
Citizen Valentin Legaspi requested from the Civil Service Commission information on
the civil service eligibilities of sanitarian employees in the Health Department of Cebu City. The
Commission rejected the request, asserting that Legaspi was not entitled to the information.
Legaspi instituted an action for mandamus from the Court to require that the information be
provided (pg. 1).

Decision
The Court began by noting that both the 1973 (Art. IV, Sec. 6) and 1987 (Art. III, Sec. 7)
constitutions recognize the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
Further, they specify that information shall be provided, subject only to limitations
provided by law (pg. 1).
While the Solicitor General interposed a procedural objection challenging the
requesters standing in this petition for mandamus, the Court ruled that, in this case, the
people are regarded as the real party in interest and the requester, as a citizen interested in
the execution of the laws, did not need to show any legal or special interest in the result (pg. 2).
Further, government agencies have no discretion to refuse disclosure of, or access to,
information of public concern because the Constitution guarantees access to information of
public concern, a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a
democracy (pg. 3-4). That is, the government agency denying information access has the
burden to show that the information is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that
the information has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee (pg. 5).
Here, the information was of a public concern because it is the legitimate concern of
citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only
by eligible persons, and the Civil Service Commission failed to cite any law limiting the
requesters right to know (pg. 5). Thus, the Court ordered the Civil Service Commission to
provide the information (pg. 6).
VALMONTE V BELMONTE

Facts:
Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be
"furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who
were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos"
and also to "be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan.
Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to serious
legal implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to
the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion
"that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it,
whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality;
and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by
the courts."
On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government
Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte
another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free
to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in
pursuance of public interest."
On 26 June 1986, Ricardo Valmonte, Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando
Bartolome, Leo Obligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba, Percy Lapid,
Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary
injunction invoke their right to information and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish
Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b)
to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective
loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.

Issue: Whether Valmonte, et. al. may access GSIS records pertaining to behest loans secured
by Imelda Marcos in favor of certain members of the opposition in the Batasang Pambansa.

Held:
The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art.3, Sec. 7 states that "The
right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic
thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues
thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The
cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the
State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the
authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of
government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the
power had been delegated.
The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in
Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be
mere empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under
limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and
expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and
therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press.
Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full
public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of
the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well in checking abuse in government. Yet,
like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute.
As stated in Legaspi, The people's right to information is limited to "matters of public
concern", and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."
Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public
interest", and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of
"public interest" or "public concern", and is not exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee.
Herein, the information sought by Valmontethe truth of reports that certain Members
of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from
the GSIS immediately before the 7 February 1986 election through the intercession of the
former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos.
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held
by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and
concern. However, a second requisite must be met before the right to information may be
enforced through mandamus proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not be among
those excluded by law. On this matter, Belmonte has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS
the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the petition. His position is
apparently based merely on considerations of policy.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is,
and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the
domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the
repository of all State power. Although it may be true that when the information requested from
the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to
information and to privacy may arise. Such competing interests of these rights need not be
resolved in the present case.
The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public
and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical
entities like the GSIS.
Thus, neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, Belmonte, invoke the right to
privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature, and hence may be invoked only
by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated. It may be observed, however, the
concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to
privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to
have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their
newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in
government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their
actions being subject to closer public scrutiny.
In fine, Valmonte, et. al. are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans
granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating
to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may
be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be
prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the
Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to
compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD
and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation
thereon.
They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO
enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;

2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of

public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160
(Local Government Code of 1991);

3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines would be binding itself:

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF
1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL
DOMAINS)

RULINGS:

1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the
local government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents
from their mandate under EO No. 3.
Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of
guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution
by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or
of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in
David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
[B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action,
the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other
overt act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a
coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x
settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.That the law or act in
question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the
matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA
7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody
demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its
complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject
only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public
interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and
negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as
to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national
and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building.
In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular
dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace
partners and concerned sectors of society.
3.a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state,
or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to
vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely
approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having
an associative relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers
that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional
government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the
Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part
of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in
the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its
relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the
ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down
in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of
Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept
of association runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE
being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific
provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the
Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term autonomous region in the constitutional provision
just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the
existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact
and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework, implying an amendment of
the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to
the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only
to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to
allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or
revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the
proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need
not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed
standards.
Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose constitutional
amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments
will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could
do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom
constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF
1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL
DOMAINS)

This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros and all
Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros. It
defines Bangsamoro people as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its
adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or
colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes
not only Moros as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous
peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically
defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the Bangsamoro homeland, the ownership of which
is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation.
Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the
public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut
procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other
things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive
Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national
offices to conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and
human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people
residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people,
which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great
number of inhabitants from their total environment.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion
when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3,
Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD
was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to
a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a
gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship
envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes
that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

Echegaray v Secretary G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998

Facts:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape
of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the
death penalty for the said crime.
He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied
both motions.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death
penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT
DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.
The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against
him under the grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being
violative of due process, a violation of the Philippines' obligations under
International covenants, anundue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful
exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an
unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.
In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.

The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the
constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty
is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal injection, as
authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional,
lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to
apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; R.A. No.
8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177
confers the power to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary
of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.
The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or
Appear as Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus
Curiae. They alleged similarly with Echegarays arguments.
The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course to
the petition.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not
pass constitutional muster for:
(a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations,
(c) being an undue delegation of legislative power, and
(d) being discriminatory.

Issue:
1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment?
2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?
3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?
4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?

Held:
No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.
Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment considering that:
(1) R.A. No. 8177 (AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD
OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7659)fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for
each drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the
accused;

(2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time
of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the
greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and

(3) the possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in administering the drugs renders
lethal injection inherently cruel.

Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment.

Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in
the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than
the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved
in the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court
believes not. For reasons discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters
which are properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative officials.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will
fix the time and date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the
death convict. As petitioner already knows, the "court" which designates the date of execution
is the trial court which convicted the accused. The procedure is that the "judgment is entered
fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the
court below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is there any
uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of notification.
As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in
conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death
sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months
from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory, without
prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times."
Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months from the time the
judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executor wherein he can seek executive
clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible
complications in the intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained and
untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned,
renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that
lethal injection required the expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that
the drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the
United States wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and
agonizing death for the convict, without any other evidence whatsoever.
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which
requires that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the
performance of such task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the
implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying
out the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel
which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to
the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does
not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished." The cruelty against which the
Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the
necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."

2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:

In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the
commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only
be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court."
The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious
crimes".
Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was
adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor
ratified said document.

3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its
limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it.
It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out.
R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "the death sentence shall be executed under the
authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to
mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as
during the proceedings prior to the execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient
to cause the instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature also mandated that "all
personnel involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the
performance of such task." The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served by
requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a criminal
offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by the Courts. In this sense,
R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the administrative
officials concerned is, canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious
flaws that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in Section
19 of the implementing rules which provides a manual for the execution procedure. It was
supposed to be confidential.
The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a
vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the
manual on the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not
providing for a mode of review and approval. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department
of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the
imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making
authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental responsibility
renders the said paragraph invalid.
4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for being
discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent
Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may
be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659(AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON
CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL
LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.)
"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by
lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the
date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of
age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well
as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner
insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without
an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of
R.A. No. 7659, stating that the death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is
pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age.
While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act
No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or
within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year
period following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a
ground for suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in
petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans statutory basis, while the
omission is an impermissible contravention of the applicable law.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but
instead remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ VS. PCGG ET AL., GR NO. 130716, DECEMBER 09, 1998
LOCUS STANDI

Facts: Petitioner, instituted a case against public respondent to make public any negotiations
and/or agreements pertaining to the latter's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth.
The respondents argued that the action was premature since he has not shown that he
had asked the respondents to disclose the negotiations and agreements before filing the case.

Issue: Does the petitioner have the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition?

Held: The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to
government records, documents and papers- a right guaranteed under section 7, article III of
the Philippine Constitution. The petitioner a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen, and
because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain
petitioner's standing i.e

(1) ENFORCEMENT OF A LEGAL RIGHT

(2) ESPOUSED BY A FILIPINO CITIZEN
we rule, that the petition at bar be allowed.

SECTION 8- RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATION

RUTTER V ESTEBAN

Facts: On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land situated in the
Manila for P9,600 of which P4,800 were paid outright, and the balance was made payable as
follows: P2,400 on or before August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with
interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum.
To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage has been constituted
in favor of the plaintiff. Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed upon, as well as
the interest that had accrued and so Rutter instituted an action to recover the balance due, the
interest due and the attorney's fees. The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the
properties mortgaged in accordance with law. Esteban claims that this is a prewar obligation
contracted and that he is a war sufferer, having filed his claim with the Philippine War Damage
Commission for the losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last war; and that under
section 2 of RA 342(moratorium law), payment of his obligation cannot been forced until after
the lapse of eight years. The complaint was dismissed. A motion for recon was made which
assails the constitutionality of RA 342.

Issue: Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on non-impairment clause grounds.

Held: Yes. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state
through the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of police
power. The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and
dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts. The question is not
whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but
whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable
and appropriate to that end.

However based on the Presidents general SONA and consistent with what the Court
believes to be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, declared that
the continued operation and enforcement of RA 342 at the present time is unreasonable and
oppressive, and should not be prolonged should be declared null and void and without effect.
This holds true as regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, with greater force and reason
considering that said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as regards the
suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations.

Ortigas & Co. vs Feati Bank & Trust Co.

Facts:
On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision
at Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred
their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed with
stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes
only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati
then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May
5, 1963, Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking
purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop
construction but Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed according
to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the
West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and
decided in favour of Feati.

Issue: Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial
and commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of
Titles.

Held:
Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the
Local Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power
of the municipality should be liberally construed in its favour, to give more power to the
local government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in
the community.
This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of
contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the
legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed
in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and order and the general welfare
of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive residential area considering the
amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the surrounding industrial and
commercial establishments.

LOZANO v. MARTINEZ G.R No. L-63419. December 18, 1986 (CASE DIGEST)
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATEPOLICE POWER
FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch XX, Manila,
and HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. L-63419. December 18, 1986

FACTS:
This is a consolidated case, the petition arose from cases involving prosecution of
offenses under the BP 22 also known as Bouncing Check Law. The defendant in these case
moved seasonably to quash the information on the ground that the acts charged did not
constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the
respondent trial court, except in one case, which is the subject of G.R No. 75789, wherein the
trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely
affected have come to the court for remedy. Those who question the constitutionality of the said
statute insist the following ground:

1) It offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt;

2) it impairs freedom of contract;
3) it contravenes the equal protection clause;
4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and
5) its enactment is flawed in the sense that during its passage the interim Batasan violated the
constitutional provision prohibiting to a bill on Third Reading.

ISSUE:Whether or not BP 22 or the Bouncing Check Law is unconstitutional.

RULING: No, the enactment of the assailed statute is a valid exercise of Police power and
is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. It may be
constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of debt
ex contractu, but certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to prescribe
certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not only acts
which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence,
not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed
and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its
police power.
The enactment of the said statute is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of
public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be
abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.

GANZON VS CA
G.R. No. 93252 August 5 1991
FACTS: Ganzon, after having been issued three successive 60-day of suspension
order by Secretary of Local Government, filed a petition for prohibition with the CA to bar
Secretary Santos from implementing the said orders. Ganzon was faced with 10 administrative
complaints on various charges on abuse of authority and grave misconduct.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the President) has
the authority to suspend and remove local officials.

RULING:
The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the
President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials
administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition. The Chief Executive is not banned
from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but
because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.
In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was
not because that the President cannot exercise it on account of his limited power, but because
the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the power,
the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from
exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of interior is exercising
that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote
possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term
in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent.

FREE ACCESS TO COURTS

In RE: Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi Re Exemption from Legal and Filing Fees
of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., En Banc, A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC, August 19, 2009,
the Philippine Supreme Court did not exempt the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. from legal
and filing fees despite its recognized mission of working for indigent and underprivileged
Filipinos. It held that the free access clause of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, as
implemented by Rule 3 and Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines (re:
indigent litigants), applies only to natural persons who suffer from economic poverty.

To encourage and promote the growth of charity work in the Philippines, I think it is
high time for the Court to amend Rule 3 and Rule 141 of the Rules of Court to accommodate
the needs of accredited and reputable non-profit and non-stock juridical persons whose
mission are to serve and save the poorest of the poor in Philippine society.

A few years back, the Court risked the ire of the Filipino people, especially the poor
litigants, and the Philippine Bar for partnering with Congress for the passage of a special law
(R.A. No. 9227) commanding the imposition of radical increases in court docket and filing fees
and other legal costs just to double the special allowances of judges and justices (which
excluded ordinary court personnel, at that). The issue irked the top leaders of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on constitutional grounds. They filed a well-publicized petition
before the Court seeking its nullification. They held protest rallies in front of Congress. But the
petition died of a natural death on technical grounds when a majority of the IBP leaders, for
unknown and mysterious reasons (and without explaining the matter to its national
membership), withdrew their signatures in the petition.

And now, the Court has the gall to refuse the simple request of a reputable corporate
charitable institution for exemption from huge court docket and filing fees and other legal costs
involving a litigation which affects the said institution. The reason? The charitable institution is
not a poor natural person. Somehow, I cannot hold my insulting smile founded on
disbelief, anger, and shock. Here is a digest of the said case.

In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi,
administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., questioned OCA Circular No. 42-2005
and Rule 141 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines that reserve the privilege of exemption
from docket and filing fees to indigent persons. He questioned why the rules excluded
foundations or associations that work with and for the most Indigent persons, as in the case of
the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. which had been reaching out since 1985 to the poorest
among the poor, the newly born and abandoned babies, children who never saw the smile of
their mother, old people who cannot afford a few pesos to pay for common prescriptions,
broken families who returned to a normal life, whom the Philippine Government and the
Filipino society could not reach to or had rejected or abandoned.

To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Supreme Court held that it could not grant
to foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same exemption from payment of
legal fees granted to indigent litigants even if the foundations are working for indigent and
underprivileged people. The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access
clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that free access
to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty.

In implementation of the right of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme Court
promulgated rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of
Court, which respectively state thus:

Sec. 21. Indigent party. A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as
an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is
one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities
for himself and his family.

Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of
transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of
the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on
any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise
provides.

Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is
rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as
an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other
lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within
the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue for the payment thereof, without prejudice to
such other sanctions as the court may impose.

Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. Indigent litigants (a) whose gross
income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum
wage of an employee and (b) who do not own real property with a fair market value as stated in
the current tax declaration of more than three hundred thousand (P300, 000.00) pesos shall be
exempt from payment of legal fees.

The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent
litigant unless the court otherwise provides.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and
his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, and they do not own any real
property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person
attesting to the truth of the litigants affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be
attached to the litigants affidavit.

Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss
the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever
criminal liability may have been incurred.
The Court held that the clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions
of the Rules of Court indicated that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an
indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the
State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical
person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as
incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and
regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, it cannot be accorded the exemption
from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants.

The Court stated that the free access clause of the Constitution applies only to a natural
person who suffers from poverty. It added that extending the exemption to a juridical person on
the ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may be prone to abuse (even
with the imposition of rigid documentation requirements), particularly by corporations and
entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the fees and that the scrutiny of
compliance with the documentation requirements may prove too time-consuming and wasteful
for the courts.

SECTION12-CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

HO WAI PANG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 176229. October 19, 2011.
FACTS:
When Gilda Cinco search the bag of Ho Wai Pang in the Baggage Declaration at the
arrival area, she found boxes of chocolate which when she saw inside had white substance.
They were then brought to the PNP after the procedures in the airport.
The RTC found Pang guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The CA while
affirming the RTC decision took note that their right to counsel during custodial investigation
was violated.

ISSUE: Whether the violation of the petitioner's right to counsel made the evidence
taken from the petitioner inadmissible.

RULING:
The SC held in the negative. The SC reiterated that infractions to the accused during the
custodial investigation render only extrajudicial confession or admissions of the suspect
inadmissible as evidence.

Also, the guilt of Pang was based on the testimony of Cinco when she caught Pang in flagrante
delicto transporting shabu.

Gamboa vs. Cruz [GR L-56291, 27 June 1988] En Banc, Padilla (J): 9 concur, 1 concurs
pro hac vice

Facts:
On 19 July 1979, at about 7:00 a.m., Christopher Gamboa y Gonzales was arrested for
vagrancy, without a warrant of arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter, Gamboa was
brought to Precinct 2, Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy and then detained therein
together with several others. The following day, 20 July 1979, during the lineup of 5 detainees,
including Gamboa, Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to Gamboa and said, "that one is a companion."
After the identification, the other detainees were brought back to their cell but Gamboa was
ordered to stay on. While Bernal was being interrogated by the police investigator, Gamboa was
told to sit down in front of her. On 23 July 1979, an information for robbery was filed against
Gamboa. On 22 August 1979, Gamboa was arraigned. Thereafter, hearings were held. On 2
April 1980, the prosecution formally offered its evidence and then rested its case. On 14 July
1980, petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his defense, manifested in open court that
he was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence. On 13 August 1980, Gamboa filed
said Motion predicated on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice to, and in
the absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. On
23 October 1980, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIX, in Criminal Case 47622
issued the order denying the Motion to Acquit. Gamboa filed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition, with prayer for a temporary restraining order.

Issue: Whether Gamboa was entitled to a counsel, as part of his right in custodial
investigation, at the time he was placed in a police lineup.

Held:
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or
admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being
interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or
coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the
commission of an offense. Any person under investigation must, among other things, be
assisted by counsel. Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (similar guarantees in
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution) are clear. They leave no room for equivocation.
Accordingly, in several cases, the Supreme Court has consistently held that no custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person
arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the
detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver
shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel. However, the police
line-up (at least, in this case) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, Gamboa was not yet
entitled, at such stage, to counsel.

PEOPLE VS. MACAM [238 SCRA 306; G.R. NOS. 91011-12; 24 NOV 1994]

Facts: Prosecutions version:

On Aug 18,1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan Jr., Danilo Roque
and Ernesto Roque went to the house of Benito Macam (uncle of Eduardo Macam) located at 43
Ferma Road QC. Upon the arrival of the accused, Benito invited the former to have lunch.
Benito asked his maidSalvacion Enrera to call the companions of Eduardo who were waiting in
a tricycle outside the house. A. Cedro, E. Cawilan and D. Roque entered the house while E.
Roque remained in the tricycle. After all the accused had taken their lunch, Eduardo Macam
grabbed the clutch bag of Benito Macam and pulled out his uncles gun then declared a hold-
up. They tied up the wife (Leticia Macam), children, maid (Salvacion) and Nilo Alcantara and
brought them to the room upstairs. After a while Leticia was brought to the bathroom and after
she screamed she was stabbed and killed by A. Cedro. Benito, Nilo and Salvacion was also
stabbed but survived. The total value of the items taken was P536, 700.00.

Defenses version:
Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver drove the 4 accused to Benitos
house for a fee of P50.00. Instead of paying him, he was given acalling card by Eduardo Macam
so that he can be paid the following day. Upon arriving, he went with the accused inside the
house to have lunch. Thereafter he washed the dishes and swept the floor. When Eugenio
Cawilan pulled a gun and announced the hold-up, he was asked to gather some things and
which he abided out of fear. While putting the said thins inside the car of Benito (victim) he
heard the accused saying kailangan patayin ang mga taong yan dahil kilala ako ng mga yan.
Upon hearing such phrase he escaped and went home using his tricycle. He also testified that
his brother Ernesto Roque has just arrived from the province and in no way can be involved in
the case at bar. On the following day, together with his brother, they went to the factory of the
Zesto Juice (owned by the father of Eduardo Macam) for him to get his payment (50.00) . He
and his brother was suddenly apprehended by the security guards and brought to the police
headquarters in Q.C. They were also forced to admit certain things.

After which, he together with all the accused, in handcuffs and borecontusions on their faces
caused by blows inflicted in their faces during investigation, was brought to the QC General
Hospital before each surviving victims and made to line-up for identification. Eugenio Cawilan
was also charged with Anti-fencing Law but was acquitted in the said case.

Issue:
Whether or Not their right to counsel has been violated.
WON the arrest was valid.
WON the evidence from the line-up is admissible.

Held: It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even
before trial. A police line-up is considered a critical stage of the proceedings. Any
identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. HOWEVER,
the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellants identification at the line-up. The
witnesses identified the accused again in open court. Also, accused did not object to the in-
court identification as being tainted by illegal line-up.

The arrest of the appellants was without a warrant. HOWEVER, they are estopped from
questioning the legality of such arrest because they have not moved to quash the said
information and therefore voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court
by entering a plea of not guilty and participating in trial.

The court believed the version of the prosecution. Ernesto Roque, while remaining outside the
house served as a looked out.

Wherefore, decision of lower court is Affirmed. Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque is guilty of the
crime of robbery with homicide as co-conspirators of the other accused to suffer reclusion
perpetua.

Things taken: 2 toygun, airgun riffle, CO2 refiller, TV, betamax tapes, betamax rewinder,
Samsonite attache case, typewriter, chessboard, TOYOTA Crown Car Plate No. CAS-997,
assorted jewelry. .22 gun and money.

People vs. Ayson [GR 85215, 7 July 1989] First Division, Narvasa (J): 4 concur

Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its
Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities in
the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted
into the matter of 9 February 1986. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's
Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the
Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained.
On the day before the investigation, 8 February 1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a
handwritten note stating the he was willing to settle irregularities allegedly charged against him
in the amount of P76,000 (approximately) subject to conditions as may be imposed by PAL on
or before 1700/9 February 1986. At the investigation of 9 February 1986, conducted by the
PAL Branch Manager in Baguio City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent Antonio
Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo,
Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of the Audit Team."
Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were taken down in writing.
Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the
tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him,
that although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been prevented from doing
so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a
"compromise to pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next
investigation;" that he desired the next investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO,"
and that he should be represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that
he was willing to sign his statement (as he in fact afterwards did). How the investigation
turned out is not dealt with the parties at all; but it would seem that no compromise agreement
was reached much less consummated.
About 2 months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him with
the crime of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City during the period from 12 March 1986 to
29 January 1987. On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty,"
and trial thereafter ensued. At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a
written offer of evidence dated 21 June 1988, which included the statement of Ramos taken on
9 February 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, as well as his handwritten admission given
on 8 February 1986. Ramos' attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiffs Evidence." By
Order dated 9 August 1988, Judge Ruben Ayson (Branch 6, RTC Baguio City) admitted all the
exhibits "as part of the testimony of the witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for
whatever they are worth," except Ramos' statement of 9 February and his handwritten
admission dated 8 February. The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. It was
denied, by Order dated 14 September 1988. The private prosecutors, in the name of the People
of the Philippines, filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the orders of 9
August 1988 and 14 September 1988.

Issue: Whether the constitutional rights of a person under custodial investigation comes
into play during the administrative inquiry.

Held: Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should
be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered
irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights
of a person under custodial interrogation did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance
to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to
him on the first day of the administrative investigation, 9 February 1986 and agreed that the
proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of
the criminal action subsequently filed against him, just as it is obvious that the note that he
sent to his superiors on 8 February 1986, the day before the investigation, offering to
compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on
his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not
been accorded to Ramos.
As to the danger of violation of the right of any person against self-incrimination when
the investigation is conducted by the complaining companies or employers, it suffices to draw
attention to the specific and peremptory requirement of the law that disciplinary sanctions may
not be imposed on any employee by his employer until and unless the employee has been
accorded due process, by which is meant that the latter must be informed of the offenses
ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and opportunity to explain his side.
The requirement entails the making of statements, oral or written, by the employee
under such administrative investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit the
assistance of counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of course, refuse to
submit any statement at the investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in
his defense to the accusation against him, it would be absurd to reject his statements, whether
at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought against him,
because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and presenting them, his "Miranda
rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be informed thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant
only in custodial investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident that the employee's statements,
whether called "position paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him precisely so that they may
be admitted and duly considered by the investigating officer or committee, in negation or
mitigation of his liability

People vs. Bolanos [GR 101808, 3 July 1992] Second Division, Paras (J): 4 concur

Facts:
The death of the victim, Oscar Pagdalian, was communicated to the Police Station
where Patrolmen Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao of the Integrated National Police
(INP), Balagtas, Bulacan, are assigned. Patrolmen Alcantara and Dayao proceeded to the scene
of the crime of Marble Supply, Balagtas, Bulacan and upon arrival they saw the deceased
Pagdalian lying on an improvised bed full of blood with stab wounds. They then inquired about
the circumstances of the incident and were informed that the deceased was with 2
companions, on the previous night, one of whom was Ramon Bolanos who had a drinking
spree with the deceased and another companion (Claudio Magtibay) till the wee hours of the
following morning. When Alcantara and Dayao apprehended Bolanos, they found the firearm of
the deceased on the chair where Bolanos was allegedly seated. They boarded Ramon Bolanos
and Claudio Magtibay on the police vehicle and brought them to the police station. In the
vehicle where the suspect was riding, "Ramon Bolanos accordingly admitted that he killed the
deceased Oscar Pagdalian because he was abusive," after he was asked by the police if he killed
the victim. Bolanos was charged for murder before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 14, under Criminal Case 1831-M-90.
The trial court, even if the alleged oral admission of Bolanos was given without the
assistance of counsel when it was made while on board the police vehicle on their way to the
police station, found Bolanos guilty of the crime charged and imposed on him the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua (life imprisonment) and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00.
The Office of the Solicitor General threafter filed a Manifestation (in lieu of Appellee's
Brief), claiming that the lower court erred in admitting in evidence the extra-judicial confession
of Bolanos while on board the police patrol jeep.

Issue: Whether the extra-judicial confession of Bolanos while on board the police patrol
jeep may be used to prove Bolanos guilt.

Held: Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep
on the way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, Bolanos
should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution which explicitly provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the service of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this section as well as
compensation and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their families.
Considering the clear requirements of the Constitution with respect to the manner by
which confession can be admissible in evidence, and the glaring fact that the alleged confession
obtained while on board the police vehicle was the only reason for the conviction, besides
Bolanos's conviction was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, the Court has no recourse but
to reverse the subject judgment under review

People vs. Andan [GR 116437, 3 March 1997] En Banc, Per Curiam: 15 concur

Facts:
On 19 February 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag, Bulacan,
Marianne Guevarra, 20 years of age and a second-year student at the Fatima School of
Nursing, left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She was to
prepare for her final examinations on 21 February 1994. Marianne wore a striped blouse and
faded denim pants and brought with her two bags containing her school uniforms, some
personal effects and more than P2,000.00 in cash. Marianne was walking along the subdivision
when Pablito Andan y Hernandez invited her inside his house. He used the pretext that the
blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to take her blood
pressure as the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside
the house. Andan then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped
her. His lust sated, Andan dragged the unconscious girlto an old toilet at the back of the house
and left her there until dark.
Night came and Andan pulled Marianne, who was still unconscious, to their backyard.
The yard had a pigpen bordered on one side by a 6-foot high concrete fence. On the other side
was a vacant lot. Andan stood on a bench beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped the
girl's body over the fence to transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head
with a piece of concrete block. He heard her moan and hit her again on the face. After silence
reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of the fence, dragged it towards a shallow portion
of the lot and abandoned it. At 11:00 a.m. of the following day, the body of Marianne was
discovered. She was naked from the chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward
her neck. Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary napkin. Marianne's gruesome death
drew public attention and prompted Mayor Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form a crack team of
police officers to look for the criminal. Searching the place where Marianne's body was found,
the policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained with what appeared to be
blood. They also found a pair of denim pants and a pair of shoes which were identified as
Marianne's. Andan's nearby house was also searched by the police who found bloodstains on
the wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed the occupants of the house and
learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of Andan's wife, that Andan also lived there but
that he, his wife and son left without a word.
Calma surrendered to the police several articles consisting of pornographic pictures, a
pair of wet short pants with some reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a wet T-
shirt. The clothes were found in the laundry hamper inside the house and allegedly belonged to
Andan. The police tried to locate Andan and learned that his parents live in Barangay Tangos,
Baliuag, Bulacan.
On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced Andan in his
parents' house. They took him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the police
headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, Andan denied any knowledge of Marianne's
death. However, when the police confronted him with the concrete block, the victim's clothes
and the bloodstains found in the pigpen, Andan relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert
Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed Marianne and that he was merely a lookout. He also said that
he knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of Marianne. Immediately, the police took
Andan to his house. Larin and Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were likewise brought
there by the police. Andan went to an old toilet at the back of the house, leaned over a flower
pot and retrieved from a canal under the pot, two bags which were later identified as belonging
to Marianne. Thereafter, photographs were taken of Andan and the two other suspects holding
the bags. By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police
headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to
the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, Andan approached him and whispered a
request that they talk privately. The mayor led Andan to the office of the Chief of Police and
there, Andan broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the
one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media
representatives witness the confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist Andan but
since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped.
In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and Andan's own
wife and son, Andan confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered
to show them the place where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon
whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. He also said
that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read
almost everyday. After his confession, Andan hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to
help him. His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide.
Andan was detained at the police headquarters.
The next two days, February 26 and 27, more newspaper, radio and television reporters
came. Andan was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor and reenacted
the crime. Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was charged with rape with homicide. On
arraignment, however, Andan entered a plea of "not guilty."
In a decision dated 4 August 1994, the trial court convicted Andan and sentenced him
to death pursuant to Republic Act 7659. The trial court also ordered Andan to pay the victim's
heirs P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and P100,000.00
as moral damages. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether Andans confession to the police, the mayor, and the newsmen may be admitted
as evidence against Andan.

Held: Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right:
(1) to remain silent;
(2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and
(3) to be informed of such rights.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Any
confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in evidence
against him. The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is
thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation
procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully
apparent.
The incommunicado character of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures
a later judicial determination of what really transpired. When the police arrested Andan, they
were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of Marianne. Indeed, Andan was
already a prime suspect even before the police found him at his parents' house. Andan was
already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the
police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional rights when he was investigated and
interrogated. His confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags
recovered from Andan's house. The victim's bags were the fruits of Andan's uncounselled
confession to the police. They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible. On the other
hand, however, Andan's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation
by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question Andan at all. No police authority ordered
Andan to talk to the mayor. It was Andan himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily
sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that Andan was going to
confess his guilt to him. When Andan talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a
law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional
rights. Andan's confessions to the media were properly admitted. The confessions were made in
response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer.
Statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are
deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. The records show that Alex Marcelino, a
television reporter for "Eye to Eye" on Channel 7, interviewed Andan on 27 February 1994. The
interview was recorded on video and showed that Andan made his confession willingly, openly
and publicly in the presence of his wife, child and other relatives. Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for
"Tell the People" on Channel 9 also interviewed appellant on 25 February 1994. Andan's
confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police
authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed Andan. They
were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were there to check Andan's
confession to the mayor. They did not force Andan to grant them an interview and reenact the
commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him. They
interviewed him on separate days not once did Andan protest his innocence. Instead, he
repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of
the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were
witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview
of Andan by the news reporters.
Thus, Andan's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and
(3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation
between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the
individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its
agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any
governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that government
has the duty to protect. Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down
these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by
any department of government and its agencies

People vs. Dy [GR 115236-37, 29 January 2002] First Division, Ynares-Santiago (J): 4
concur

Facts:
Gina Marie Mobley, together with her companion Helen Kathleen Tennican, both
American nationals, were exchange students at the Chengdu University of Science and
Technology in Chengdu, Sichuan, China. Gina was taking up Biology. Helen was also a Biology
major and took Chinese Studies as an additional course. Both were enrolled at the Pacific
Lutheran University at Tacoma, Washington, where Gina was a university scholar. Having
heard of the renowned Filipino hospitality from their Filipino-American friends, Gina and Helen
decided to spend their semestral break in the Philippines. They arrived in the country on 10
January 1994. In the afternoon of 12 January 1994, they were driven from their hotel to the
Philippine Rabbit Bus terminal in Dau, Pampanga, where they were supposed to take a ride to
Baguio City. While waiting for their bus, they went to a Shakeys Pizza Parlor near the terminal.
Gina and Helen took the table near the comfort room, while Bryan Dy y La Madrid and Giovan
Bernardino y Garcia, who are brothers-in-law, and their driver Rizal, were seated at the next
table. With them was their driver, Rizal. Bryan and Giovan offered the girls a ride to Baguio
City, which eventually, was accepted by Helen and Gina, thinking that they could save some
money besides the thought that the boys looked nice and trustworthy. They left Shakeys at
7:30 p.m. and boarded a white 1991 four-door Mitsubishi sedan. Rizal took the wheel, while
Bryan sat at the front passenger seat. Helen, Gina and Giovan stayed on the back seat, in that
order. Before proceeding to Baguio, they stopped at a residential area where Bryan delivered
some papers and picked up some jackets. The group arrived in Baguio City at 10:45 p.m.,
proceeding first to the house of Bryans uncle, but shortly afterwards, looked for another place
to stay. They went to the Terraces Hotel, the Baden Powell, and the Benguet Pines Tourist Inn
to check the rates and the rooms. They checked in at the Benguet Pines Tourist Inn at 11:00
p.m. They got two rooms on opposite sides of the corridor on the second floor. After a while,
Bryan and Giovan asked the girls out for some drinks and dancing at the Songs Jazz Bar along
Session Road. While at the Songs Jazz Bar, Helen drank a margarita, tequila and blowjob with
plenty of water. Gina drank Singaporean sling, blowjob and half a glass of Giovans mai tai.
Bryan drank just one shot of tequila while Giovan drank half a glass of mai tai.
After the group left Songs Jazz Bar, Giovan drove to a convenience store on the pretext
that he was thirsty and wanted to buy cola drinks. Giovan and Bryan alighted and returned
after some 10 minutes with Giovan carrying 3 plastic cups of Sprite or Seven-Up and Bryan,
two cups and a plastic bag containing Chinese food with small lemons to be squeezed on it.
Bryan gave Helen and Gina a cup each. Helen and Gina drank from the cups. Meanwhile, as
they were drinking their cola drinks, Giovan drove the group to Club John Hay where he told
the guards at the gate that they were just going to check on the Clubs billeting rates. They
parked in front of the billeting office. Gina was then about to finish her cola drink when she felt
something gritty in it which stuck into her teeth; they were like small particles. She spat them
back into the cup and dumped out the remaining contents of the cup outside the car and
thereafter gave the cup to Giovan who threw it into a trash can. Gina commented out loud
about the gritty substance in her drink and related that in China they often found strange
things in their food. There was no word from the boys. Helen finished her drink and then
handed the empty cup to Giovan who likewise threw it into a trash can. After leaving Club
John Hay, the group returned to their hotel. Gina and Helen appeared to have been
drugged, as they were disoriented by the events thereafter. Helen felt that someone was
violating her personal space before she became unconscious. Gina remembered that Giovan
forcefully kissed her and inserted two fingers in her vagina before someone else entered her
room; finding Bryan attempting to have carnal knowledge with her, she did oral sex on Bryan
to prevent him from penetrating her before she passed out. Gina woke up at 3:00 p.m. feeling
groggy and confused. She opened her purse to get money to pay for the room, but found that
her US$290.00, P2,000.00, 300 yuan and US$200.00 travellers check were all missing. Only
her US $100.00 travellers check was left. She tried to wake Helen up but the latter only rolled
over. Gina ran downstairs and met Hilda, a hotel desk girl, who asked her if she was alright.
Gina cried and told her that she had been robbed. Hilda said she will call the police. Gina
returned to their room to wake up Helen but the latter still did not wake up.
After sometime, Gina again went downstairs and was introduced to 5 or 6 members of
the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS). She told them that she was robbed and sexually
molested and narrated to them what had happened.
Bryan and Giovan were charged with Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness in Criminal
Cases 12600-R, and 12601-R. The two cases were tried jointly. Bryan and Giovan refused to be
arraigned and enter a plea; hence, a plea of not guilty was entered on their behalf.
During the trial, and based on the set of facts provided by the private prosecutor, the
entries in Ginas journal and the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary
examination conducted by the trial court in the afternoon of January 26 and 27, 1994, Dr.
Hernandez opined that Gina and Helen were drugged, possibly with lorazepam or ativan, which
is a benzodiazepine.
On 16 March 1994, the trial court rendered a decision declaring Bryan and Giovan
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness as charged.
In Criminal Case 12600 (rape), the court sentenced Bryan to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of 8 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum (appreciating the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and the
generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender); and Giovan to an indeterminate
penalty of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 20 years and 1 DAY of
reclusion perpetua, as maximum (appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender).
Both were ordered to pay Gina Marie Mobley in the amounts of: P50,000.00 for her
being raped, P12,195.00 (the equivalent of US$450.00 dollars at the exchange rate of P27.10 to
US$1.00) as actual damages, and P500,000.00 as moral damages, plus costs. In Criminal
Case 12601-R (acts of lasciviousness), the Court sentenced Bryan to suffer a straight penalty of
2 months of arresto mayor; and Giovan to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 2 months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as maximum.
Both were ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally Gina Marie Mobley in the amount of
P100,000.00 for and as moral damages, plus costs; and furthermore, pay, jointly and severally,
the offended party attorneys fees in the amount of P100,000.00 in the two cases. Bryan and
Giovan filed separate appeals.
Issue: Whether the alleged lack of arraignment nullifies the proceedings against Bryan
Dy and Giovan Bernardino.

Held:
Concededly, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation may not
be waived. Indeed, the defense may waive their right to enter a plea and let the court enter a
plea of not guilty in their behalf.
However, it becomes altogether a different matter if the accused themselves refuse to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. The defense can not hold
hostage the court by their refusal to the reading of the complaint or information. The reason
proffered by Bryan and Giovan for their refusal to be arraigned, i.e., that to do so would
supposedly constitute a waiver of their right to appeal the resolutions of the prosecutor to the
Secretary of Justice, appears to be specious.
Evidently, Bryan and Giovan only wanted the trial court to suspend the arraignment to
enable them to exhaust their remedy of appeal to the Secretary of Justice. However, Bryan and
Giovan had no valid ground to move that their arraignment be held in abeyance, considering
that at that time they had not filed a petition for review of the prosecutors resolution before the
Department of Justice.
It is also important to stress that to nullify the proceedings had before the court a quo
would set a dangerous precedent. For, all that an accused would do is to refuse to be arraigned
and then proceed to trial, and if found guilty would just invoke the absence of arraignment to
set aside the proceedings had in the trial court. Such practice would run counter to the
purpose and spirit of our rules of procedure which is: to help achieve an orderly and speedy
disposition of cases. Nonetheless, Bryan and Giovan were substantially informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against them when their counsel received a copy of the
Prosecutors resolution maintaining the charge for rape and acts of lasciviousness. The failure
to read the complaint or information in a language or dialect known to them was essentially a
procedural infirmity that was eventually non-prejudicial to Bryan and Giovan. Not only did
they receive a copy of the information, they likewise participated in the trial, cross-examined
the complainant and her witnesses and presented their own witnesses to debunk and deny the
charges against them. The conduct of the defense, particularly their participation in the
trial, clearly indicates that they were fully aware of the nature and cause of the accusations
against them. Interestingly, after the arraignment, the defense never brought up the supposed
invalidity or defect thereof. Rather, Bryan and Giovan and their counsel vigorously and fully
participated in the trial of the case. Bryan and Giovan are clearly estopped to question the
alleged invalidity of or infirmity in their arraignment. By actively participating in the trial of the
case, they have effectively waived whatever procedural error there was in their arraignment. In
short, whatever was the defect in their arraignment was substantially cured by their own
omission and subsequent actions.

People vs. Alicando [GR 117487, 12 December 1995] En Banc, Puno (J): 9 concur

Facts:
In the afternoon of 12 June 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of the four year old victim
Khazie Mae, wasdrinking liquor with Ramil Rodriguez and Remus Gaddi in his (Penecilla's)
house at Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. Arnel Alicando y Briones joined them but
every now and then would take leave and return. Alicando was living in his uncle's house some
5 arm's length from Penecilla's house. At about 4:30 p.m., Penecilla's group stopped drinking
and left. At about 5:30 p.m. of that day, Luisa Rebada saw the victim at the window of
Alicando's house. She offered to buy her "yemas" but Alicando closed the window. Soon she
heard the victim crying. She approached Alicando's house and peeped through an opening
between its floor and door. The sight shocked her Alicando was naked, on top of the victim,
his left hand choking her neck. She retreated to her house in fright. She gathered her children
together and informed her compadre, Ricardo Lagrana, then in her house, about what she saw.
Lagrana was also overcome with fear and hastily left.
 Romeo Penecilla returned to his house at 8:00 p.m.. He did not find Khazie Mae. He
and his wife searched for her until 1:00 a.m. Their effort was fruitless. Rebada was aware that
the Penecillas were looking for their daughter but did not tell them what she knew. Instead,
Rebada called out Alicando from her window and asked him the time Khazie Mae left his
house. Alicando replied he was drunk and did not know.
As the sun started to rise, another neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago went down from his
house to answer the call of nature. He discovered the lifeless body of Khazie Mae under his
house. Her parents were informed and so was the police. At 9:00 a.m., Rebada suffered a
change of heart. She informed Romeo Penecilla and his wife Julie Ann, that Alicando
committed the crime. Forthwith, Alicando was arrested and interrogated by P03 Danilo Tan. He
verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounseled
verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from
Alicando's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained
pillow and a stained T-shirt. Alicando was charged with the crime of rape with homicide.
On 29 June 1994, Alicando was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio
Antiquiera of the PAO, Department of Justice. Alicando pleaded guilty. After Alicando's plea of
guilt, the trial court ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. It also set the case for
reception of evidence for Alicando, if he so desired. On 20 July 1994, the trial court found
Alicando guilty and sentenced him to death, and to indemnify the heirs of the offended party,
Khazie Mae D. Penecilla, the sum of P50,000.00. Hence, the automatic review.

Issue: Whether the pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains, evidence derived
from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from Alicando, may be
admitted as evidence.

Held:
It is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized as inadmissible
evidence uncounselled confession or admission. Section 12 paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III
of the Constitution provide that "Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel"; and "Any confession or
admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
against him" respectively.
Herein, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce the all important
confession of Alicando in writing. Neither did he present any writing showing that Alicando
waived his right to silence and to have competent and independent counsel. It is not only the
uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence derived
therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were evidence derived from
the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from Alicando.
The Court has not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in Philippine
jurisdiction. It has also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the
poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of
Nardone v. United States. According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown
to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived
from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct
result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the
same illegal act.
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized
evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence
illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally
illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. The burden to prove
that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before making
a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the
burden of the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted as
"fruit of the poisonous tree." The burden has to be discharged by clear and convincing
evidence.

SECTION 13- RIGHT TO BAIL

People vs. Donato [GR 79269, 5 June 1991] En Banc, Davide Jr. (J): 13 concur, 1 took no
part

Facts:
In the original Information filed on 2 October 1986 in Criminal Case 86-48926 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, later amended in an Amended Information which was filed on
24 October 1986, Rodolfo Salas, alias "Commander Bilog" (of the New People's Army [NPA]),
and his co-accused were charged for the crime of rebellion under Article 134, in relation to
Article 135, of the Revised Penal Code. At the time the Information was filed, Salas and his co-
accused were in military custody following their arrest on 29 September 1986 at the Philippine
General Hospital, Taft Ave., Manila; he had earlier escaped from military detention and a cash
reward of P250,000.00 was offered for his capture.
A day after the filing of the original information, or on 3 October 1986, a petition for
habeas corpus for Salas and his co-accused was filed with the Supreme Court which was
dismissed in the Court's resolution of 16 October 1986 on the basis of the agreement of the
parties under which Salas "will remain in legal custody and will face trial before the court
having custody over his person" and the warrants for the arrest of his co-accused are deemed
recalled and they shall be immediately released but shall submit themselves to the court
having jurisdiction over their person.
On 7 November 1986, Salas filed with the court below a Motion to Quash the
Information alleging that:

(a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense;

(b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and
(d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished, to which the Solicitor General filed an
Opposition.

In his Order of 6 March 1987, Judge Procoro J. Donato (Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch XII, Manila) denied the motion to quash. Instead of asking for a reconsideration
of said Order, Salas filed on 9 May 1987 a petition for bail, which the Solicitor General opposed
in an Opposition filed on 27 May 1987 on the ground that since rebellion became a capital
offense under the provisions of PD 1996, 942 and 1834, which amended Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code, by imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on those who
promote, maintain, or head a rebellion, the accused is no longer entitled to bail as evidence of
his guilt is strong.
On 5 June 1987, the President issued Executive Order 187 repealing, among others,
PDs 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Thus, the original penalty for rebellion,
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000.00, was restored. ExecutiveOrder 187 was
published in the Official Gazette in its 15 June 1987 issue (Vol. 83, No. 24) which was officially
released for circulation on 26 June 1987. In his Order of 7 July 1987 the Judge, taking into
consideration Executive Order 187, granted Salas' petition for bail, fixed the bail bond at
P30,000.00 and imposed upon Salas the additional condition that he shall report to the court
once every 2 months within the first 10 days of every period thereof.
 In a motion to reconsider the above order filed on 16 July 1987, the Solicitor General
asked the court to increase the bail from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00 alleging therein that per
Department of Justice Circular 10 dated 3 July 1987, the bail for the provisional release of an
accused should be in an amount computed at P10,000.00 per year of imprisonment based on
the medium penalty imposable for the offense and explaining that it is recommending
P100,000.00 because Salas "had in the past escaped from the custody of the military
authorities and the offense for which he is charged is not an ordinary crime, like murder,
homicide or robbery, where after the commission, the perpetrator has achieved his end" and
that "the rebellious acts are not consummated until the well-organized plan to overthrow the
government through armed struggle and replace it with an alien system based on a foreign
ideology is attained."
On 17 July 1987, the Solicitor General filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration
indirectly asking the court to deny bail to Salas and to allow it to present evidence in support
thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main
condition of his bail to appear in court for trial."
In a subsequent Order dated 30 July 1987, the Judge granted the motion for
reconsideration of 16 July 1987 by increasing the bail bond from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00
but denying the Solicitor General's supplemental motion for reconsideration of 17 July 1987
which asked the court to allow the Solicitor General to present evidence in support of its prayer
for a reconsideration of the order of 7 July 1987. The People of the Philippines, through the
Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, the City Fiscal of Manila and the Judge a
Advocate General, filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for restraining
order/ preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether Salas should be granted temporary liberty pursuant to his right to bail.

Held:
Bail cannot be denied to Salas for he is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined
in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is attached the penalty of prision mayor and
a fine not exceeding P20,000.00. It is, therefore, a bailable offense under Section 13 of Article
III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "all persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
prescribed by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides that "all persons in
custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those
charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission
and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence
of guilt is strong."
Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter
of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua.
To that extent the right is absolute. Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to
present evidence for the denial of bail in the instances where bail is a matter of right. The 1987
Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; overturning the
Supreme Court's ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile. However, Salas has waived his right
to bail in GR 76009 [In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina
Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, et al. v. Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, Brig.
Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montao and Col. Virgilio Saldajeno].
On 3 October 1986, or the day following the filing of the original information in
Criminal Case 86-48926 with the trial court, a petition for habeas corpus for Salas, and his co-
accused Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion, was filed with the Supreme Court by Lucia Cruz,
Aida Concepcion Paniza and Beatriz Salas against Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Brig.
Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montao, and Col. Saldajeno praying, among others,
that the petition be given due course and a writ of habeas corpus be issued requiring
respondents to produce the bodies of Salas and his co-accused before the Court and explain by
what authority they arrested and detained them.
When the parties in GR 76009 stipulated that "Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in
legal custody and face trial before the court having custody over his person," they simply meant
that Salas will remain in actual physical custody of the court, or in actual confinement or
detention, as distinguished from the stipulation concerning his co-petitioners, who were to be
released in view of the recall of the warrants of arrest against them; they agreed, however, "to
submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their persons." Note should be made of
the deliberate care of the parties in making a fine distinction between legal custody and court
having custody over the person in respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having jurisdiction over
the persons of his co-accused. Such a fine distinction was precisely intended to emphasize the
agreement that Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but should remain in custody. Had the
parties intended otherwise, or had this been unclear to Salas and his counsel, they should
have insisted on the use of a clearer language. It must be remembered that at the time the
parties orally manifested before the Supreme Court on 14 October 1986 the terms and
conditions of their agreement and prepared and signed the Joint Manifestation and Motion, a
warrant of arrest had already been issued by the trial court against Salas and his co-accused.
The stipulation that only the warrants of arrest for Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion
shall be recalled and that only they shall be released, further confirmed the agreement that
Salas shall remain in custody of the law, or detention or confinement.
Consequently, having agreed in GR 76009 to remain in legal custody, Salas had
unequivocably waived his right to bail. The right to bail is another of the constitutional
rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver
would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

People vs. Fortes [GR 91155, 25 June 1993]

Third Division, Davide Jr. (J): 4 concur
Facts:
On 26 November 1983, Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog,
Province ofSorsogon, accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of
the said municipality toreport a rape committed against the latter by Agustin Fortes y Garra at
around 11:00 a.m. of that day.Following this, Fortes was forthwith apprehended. Thereupon,
on 5 December 1983, Agripino Gine filed onbehalf of Merelyn a complaint for rape against
Fortes before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) ofMatnog-Sta. Magdalena in Matnog,
Sorsogon. Finding probable cause to exist after a preliminaryexamination was conducted, the
MCTC issued on 9 December 1983 an order for the arrest of Fortes. Thebond for the latter's
temporary liberty was initially fixed at P30,000.00 but was later reduced to P25,000.00
upon motion of Fortes. The latter then put up the required bond; upon its approval, the court
ordered hisrelease on 15 December 1983. When the case was finally called for preliminary
investigation on 5 December1984, Fortes, through his counsel de oficio, informed the court
that he was waiving his right thereto. Thecourt then ordered the transmittal of the records of
the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Sorsogon.
On 25 January 1985, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, through 1st Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Manuel C.Genova, filed with Branch 55 of the RTC at Irosin, Sorsogon a
complaint for rape against Fortes. Fortes pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment on 28
February 1985. The protracted trial began on26 June 1985 and ended nearly 3 years later
when the case was finally submitted for decision on 22 February1988.
On 25 January 1989, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting Fortes of the
crime charged,and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify
Merelyn Gine the sum ofP20,000.00 as damages and to pay the costs. The court also order the
commitment of Fortes to the SorsogonProvincial Jail through the Provincial Warden or through
any of his provincial guards and eventually Fortes'commitment to the National Penitentiary in
accordance with law. On the same day, Fortes filed his notice ofappeal, wherein he requested
that the amount of the appeal bond be fixed by the trial court. The followingday, 26 January
1989, the trial court gave due course to the appeal but did not resolve the request to fix the
amount of bail.
Thus, on 11 April 1989, Fortes filed an "Application for Bail on Appeal" reiterating his
earlierrequest that the bail bond for his provisional liberty pending appeal be set. This was
subsequently denied bybeyond reasonable doubt of the offense of rape and sentenced to
Reclusion Perpetua and his appeal from thedecision already approved by the Court."
Thereupon, on 10 August 1989, the trial court issued a Commitment
of Final Sentence turning over the person of the accused to the Director of Prisons in
Muntinglupa, MetroManila.
On 25 August 1989, the accused filed a motion to reconsider the RTC's 19 June 1989
Order denyinghis application for bail pending appeal, but the same was denied in the Order of
6 September 1989. In themeantime, the trial court, on 12 September 1989, transmitted to the
Supreme Court the records of CriminalCase 219 (GR 90643). On 9 December 1989, Fortes filed
with the Supreme Court a special civil action forcertiorari to set aside the orders of the trial
court denying his application for bail and his motion to reconsiderthe said denial (GR 91155).
On 18 June 1990, the said cases were ordered consolidated.

Issue: Whether Fortes, a convicted rapist, is entitled to bail on appeal.

Held: It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114
of the RevisedRules of Court, as amended, that "before conviction bail is either a matter of right
or of discretion.
It is amatter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower
than reclusion perpetua. To thatextent the right is absolute." Upon the other hand, if the
offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetuabail becomes a matter of discretion.
It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong.
The court's discretionis limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong. But once it is determined that the evidenceof guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a
matter of right." The clear implication, therefore, is that if anaccused who is charged with a
crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court andsentenced to
suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of
discretion
on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not have only determined that
the evidence ofguilt is strong which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before
conviction it would havelikewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
Bail must not then begranted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from
the judgment of conviction. Construing Section3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, the Supreme Court, in the en bancResolution of 15 October 1991 in
People vs. Ricardo Cortez, ruled that "Pursuant to the aforecited provision,an accused who is
charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall nolonger
be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his
convictionclearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong." Herein,
the rape for which theaccused was indicted is punishable by reclusion perpetua pursuant to
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code;he was convicted therefor and subsequently sentenced to
serve that penalty. It is thus evident that the trialcourt correctly denied his application for bail
during the pendency of the appeal.

MANOTOC VS CA
Banc, Fernan (J): 9 concur, 1 took no part

Facts:
Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
Management, Inc.and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. Having
transferred the management of the latterinto the hands of professional men, he holds no
officer-position in said business, but acts as president of theformer corporation. Following the
"run" on stock brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight fromthis jurisdiction,
Manotoc, who was then in the United States, came home, and together with his co-
stockholders,filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the
appointment of amanagement committee, not only for Manotoc Securities, Inc., but likewise for
Trans-Insular Management,Inc. The petition relative to the Manotoc Securities, Inc. (SEC Case
001826, "In the Matter of theAppointment of a Management Committee for Manotoc Securities,
Inc., Teodoro Kalaw, Jr., RicardoManotoc, Jr., Petitioners"), was granted and a management
committee was organized and appointed.
Pendingdisposition of SEC Case 001826, the SEC requested the then Commissioner of
Immigration, Edmundo Reyes,not to clear Manotoc for departure and a memorandum to this
effect was issued by the Commissioner on 4February 1980 to the Chief of the Immigration
Regulation Division. When a Torrens title submitted to andaccepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc.
was suspected to be a fake, 6 of its clients filed six separate criminalcomplaints against
Manotoc and one Raul Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-president, respectively, of
Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due course, corresponding criminal charges for estafa were filed by
theinvestigating fiscal before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Criminal Cases 45399
and 45400,assigned to Judge Camilon; Criminal Cases 45542 to 45545, raffled off to Judge
Pronove).
In all cases,Manotoc has been admitted to bail in the total amount of P105,000.00,
with FGU Insurance Corporation assurety.
On 1 March 1982, Manotoc filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled,
"motion forpermission to leave the country", stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the
United States, "relative tohis business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution
opposed said motion and after due hearing, bothJudge Camilon and Judge Pronove in their
orders dated 9 March 1982, and 26 March 1982, respectively,denied the same. It appears that
Manotoc likewise wrote the Immigration Commissioner a letter requestingthe recall or
withdrawal of the latter's memorandum dated 4 February 1980, but said request was also
deniedin a letter dated 27 May 1982.
Manotoc thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of
Appeals seeking to annul the judges' orders, as well as the communication-request of the
Securities andExchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. On 5 October 1982,
the appellate court rendered adecision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. Dissatisfied
with the appellate court's ruling, Manotoc filed the petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court. Pending resolution of the petition, Manotoc filedon 15 August 1984 a motion
for leave to go abroad pendente lite. On 20 September 1984, the Supreme Court
in a resolution en banc denied Manotoc's motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite.

Issue: Whether a court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines.

Held:
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is anecessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1
of the Rules of Courtdefines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person
who is in the custody of the law, thathe will appear before any court in which his appearance
may be required as stipulated in the bail bond orrecognizance. The condition imposed upon
Manotoc to make himself available at all times whenever the courtrequires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.
As held in People v. Uy Tuising (61
Phil. 404 [1935]), "the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused
amenable atall times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said
accused from leaving thejurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and
processes will be nugatory, and inasmuchas the jurisdiction of the courts from which they
issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines theywould have no binding force outside
of said jurisdiction." Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without
sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. The effect of a recognizance
or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the prisoner released thereunder, is to
transfer the custody of the accused from the public officials who have him in their charge to
keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as a continuation of the
original imprisonment. The sureties become invested with full authority over the person of the
principal and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state. If the sureties have
the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state,
more so then has the court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose
jurisdiction over the person of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the
latter. In fact, this inherent right of the court is recognized by petitioner himself,
notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to leavethe country, for he would not
have filed the motion for permission to leave the country in the first place, if it
were otherwise.

Government of the United States of America, Represented by the Philippine Department

of Justice, vs. Purganan [GR 148571, 24 September 2002]

Facts:
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government,
through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale 0522 dated 16
June 1999, supplemented by Notes0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly
authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario
Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA)
transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to
Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the
Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petitionfor his extradition.
The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before
theSupreme Court in GR 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the
Petition. The SOJ wasordered to furnish Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant the latter areasonable period within which to file a comment
and supporting evidence. Acting on the Motion forReconsideration filed by the SOJ, the
Supreme Court issued its 17 October 2000 Resolution. By an identicalvote of 9-6 -- after three
justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision.
Itheld that Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extraditionprocess. This Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America,
represented by thePhilippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on 18 May 2001, the appropriate Petition
for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter
alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida on 15 April 1999.
The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-
00281 CRSEITZ:

(1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title
18 USCode Section 371;
(2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201;
(3) wire fraud;
(4) false statements; and
(5) illegal campaign contributions
In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order
for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD 1069.
 Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," which prayed that Jimenezs application for an arrest warrant
be set for hearing.
In its 23 May 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for
hearing on 5 June 2001. In that hearing, Jimenez manifested its reservations onthe procedure
adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.
In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant
should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The alternative prayer of
Jimenez was also set for hearing on 15 June 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its 3 July
2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary
liberty at P1 million in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required
cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated 4 July
2001. The DOJ filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Jimenez is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending.

Held:
Extradition is different from ordinary criminal proceedings. There is no provision in the
Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an
extradition request and arrest warrant.
As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail,
as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt."
It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like
extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The provision in the
Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right
to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. The suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion."
Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes
the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be
taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal
in nature. That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the
United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case.
To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial
for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the
criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and
gives life to Article 14 of the Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to
voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention here. Likewise, their
detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the
emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for
their speedy disposition. The rule is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases.
However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and
tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights.
Furthermore, the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to
extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends tothe "life, liberty or property" of every
person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application."
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, after a potential extraditee has been
arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an
exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing:

(1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community;
and
(2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter
of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants
provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis and since it is derived
essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of
proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.

Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 (2007)

Facts
Private respondent Muoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest
were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The
petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private
respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the
same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high flight risk. Private respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject to the
following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that
he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold
himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If
accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion
for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so
desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire,
manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed
with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said
assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be
noted therein accordingly.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge.
Hence, this instant petition.

Issue WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

Ruling A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

Ratio Decidendi Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to
bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the
Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.

In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v.
Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez,
a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail
does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in criminal
proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law:

(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;

(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;

(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling
their treaty obligations; and

(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on
one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the worth
of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling
in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.

Feeder International Line PTE, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals [GR 94262, 31 May 1991]
Second Division, Regalado (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave

Facts:
The M/T "ULU WAI" a foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by
Feeder International Shipping Lines of Singapore, left Singapore on 6 May 1986 carrying 1,100
metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far East Synergy
Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines.
On 14 May 1986, the vessel anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo
without notifying the Iloilo customs authorities. The presence of the vessel only came to the
knowledge of the Iloilo authorities by information of the civilian informer in the area. Acting on
said information, the Acting District Collector of Iloilo dispatched a Customs team on 19 May
1986 to verify the report. The Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board
the required ship and shipping documents, except for a clearance from the port authorities of
Singapore clearing the vessel for "Zamboan." In view thereof, the vessel and its cargo were held
and a Warrant of Seizure and Detention over the same was issued after due investigation.
Feeder International Line PTE Ltd, through its agent Feeder International (Phils.) Inc. then filed
its Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Warrants of Seizure and Detention which the District
Collector denied in his Order dated 12 December 1986. In the course of the forfeiture
proceedings, the parties, through their respective counsel, agreed on a stipulation of facts. On
17 March 1987, the District Collector issued his decision, finding the M/T "ULU WAI" guilty of
violating Section 2530 (a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (PD 1464), as
amended, while her cargo of 1,100 M/T Gas Oil and 1,000 M/T Fuel Oil are found guilty of
violating Section 2530 (a), (f), and (1-1) under the same Code and are hereby forfeited in favor
of the Republic of the Philippines. Feeder International appealed to the Commissioner of
Customs who rendered a decision dated 13 May 1987, affirming the decision of the District
Collector of Customs of Iloilo in toto. On 25 June 1987,Feeder International filed a petition for
review of the decisions of the Collector and the Commissioner of Customs with the Court of Tax
Appeals, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a restraining order
to enjoin the Commissioner from implementing his decision. On 14 December 1988, the Court
of Tax Appeals issued its decision affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs.
Feeder International, on 19 January 1990, filed a petition for review of the Court of Tax
Appeals' decision with the Supreme Court. On 21 March 1990, the Supreme Court issued a
resolution referring the disposition of the case to the Court of Appeals in view of the Court's
decision in Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. holding that final
judgments or decrees of the Court of Tax Appeals are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals. On 8 May 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision
affirming the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. Feeder International's motion for
reconsideration having been denied on 4 July 1990, it interposed the present petition.

Issue: Whether a forfeiture proceeding is penal in nature, and whether the corporation can
invoke the right tobe presumed innocent.

Held:
A forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs laws is not penal in nature, contrary to
the argument advanced by Feeder International. In the case of People vs. Court of First
Instance of Rizal, etc., et al., the Court made an exhaustive analysis of the nature of forfeiture
proceedings, in relation to criminal proceedings, holding therein that "seizure and forfeiture
proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not criminal in nature as they do not result
in the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the penalty provided for in Section
3601 of the Code. As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the code, seizure proceedings are
purely civil and administrative in character, the main purpose of which is to enforce the
administrative fines or forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate
possession. The penalty in seizure cases is distinct and separate from the criminal liability that
might be imposed against the indicted importer or possessor and both kinds of penalties may
be imposed. Considering, therefore, that proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally
imported are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer
nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in
order to justify the forfeiture of the goods. The degree of proof required is merely substantial
evidence which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. Further, a corporate entity has no personality to invoke the right to be
presumed innocent which right is available only to an individual who is an accused in a
criminal case. Herein, the Court finds and so hold that the Government has sufficiently
established that an illegal importation, or at least an attempt thereof, has been committed with
the use of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI," thus warranting the forfeiture of said vessel and its cargo
pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code. Feeder International is guilty of
illegal importation, there having been an intent to unload, is amply supported by substantial
evidence. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are in consonance with the findings of
both the Collector and the Commissioner of Customs, as affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals.
The Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the elementary principle that findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals, and of the administrative and quasi-judicial bodies for that matter,
are entitled to great weight and are conclusive and binding upon this Court absent a showing
of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Baylon v Judge Sison 243 SCRA 284 (1995)

application for bail on offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua/life imprisonment
requires a hearing to give prosecution the chance to present evidence on the guilt of the
accused

Facts: Respondent judge is accused for malfeasance in granting bail to the accused charged
with double murder. Prosecution was not given notice of at least 3 days before the scheduled
hearing for bail in violation of Rule 15, section 4 of the Rules of Court and the filing of petition
for bail has only 2 non-working day interval from the schedule of the hearing. Moreover the
prosecution also assails that they were not given the chance to present evidence that strongly
prove the guilt of the accused. Respondent judge justifies not having committed grave abuse of
discretion since the prosecution did not interpose objection with his orders and the lack of
previous notice was cured with the filing of motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge exercised abuse in discretion in the grant of bail to
the accused.

Held: The Supreme Court held that there was abuse in the discretion of the judge in granting
bail to the accused considering that the motion for bail was filed on a Saturday and the hearing
was immediately conducted on Monday thereby depriving the prosecution to make an
opposition thereto and violating the 3-day notice rule embodied in Rule 15, Sec. 4 of Rules of
Court. It is a well established rule of law that bail is not a matter of right and requires a
hearing where the accused is charged with an offense which is punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. Respondent judge should have carefully scrutinized the validity
of petition for bail before making an outright grant of this motion.

A guided legal principle in the right to bail includes:

. . The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the
very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial
discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other
words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due
process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order
issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and
caprice and outright arbitrariness.

Comendador v De Villa 200 SCRA 80 (1991)

"military members exempted from the right to bail

Facts:
This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were charged with violation
of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman)
and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder). The
petitioners were questioning the conduct of the pre-trial investigation conducted where a
motion to bail was filed but was denied. Petitioner applied for provisional liberty and
preliminary injunction before the court which was granted. However De Villa refused to release
petitioner for provisional liberty pending the resolution of the appeal they have taken before the
court invoking that military officers are an exemption from the right to bail guaranteed by the
Constitution. Decision was rendered reiterating the release for provisional liberty of petitioners
with the court stating that there is a mistake in the presumption of respondents that bail does
not apply among military men facing court martial proceeding. Respondents now appeal
before the higher court.

Issue: Whether or not military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on the
right to bail.
Held: The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is not available in the military as an
exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thus the right to a speedy trial is
given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. Justification to this
rule involves the unique structure of the military and national security considerations which
may result to damaging precedents that mutinous soldiers will be released on provisional
liberty giving them the chance to continue their plot in overthrowing the government. Therefore
the decision of the lower court granting bail to the petitioners was reversed.

SECTION 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS

Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986)

FACTS:
Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his
plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a
bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators
reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then
supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a
communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn.

President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of
people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice
and freedom.

The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version
stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive
affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that
Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only
difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private
respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the
chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them.

Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.

Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in
the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the
restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply
to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit
a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.

But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss
the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from
rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day
period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution
(which apparently was not served on them).

Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate
the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits
that the people are entitled to due process.

However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime
charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents
submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become
moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging
that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in
miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the
sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.

RULING: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the
said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the
requirements of due process.

Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was
no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he
revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by
Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacaang wanted dismissal to the
extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference
planned a scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be
revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice,
Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in
an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice
Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the
room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception
hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached,
Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of
the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to
reciprocate'.

The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and
from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of
the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and
the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure
which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the
case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability.
Pres. Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was
killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source
of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with
his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his
administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure
would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently
acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid
another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer
in office.

More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The
disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera,
"nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment
of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by
virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The
custody of the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail.
The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by Malacaang
personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had
wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its
decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and
partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the
prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded.

The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the
government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial
process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very
worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or
suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."

Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the
handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacaang
conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely
disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have
no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and
duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and
the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.

There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having
been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in
legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone.
All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.

Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion
for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which
had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no
restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately
issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court.
All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part
amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.

With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the
crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all
due process.

The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of
government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no
constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in
accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and
honor.

TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 159 SCRA 70 (1988)

FACTS:
The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with
the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing
charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information
Francisco S. Tatad.
 The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it
became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President
Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet.
On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a
formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint onApril
1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by
Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for
investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan,
recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister
Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were
in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5,
1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed
with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3,
paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-
in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions;
(2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto
Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the
release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the
Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts
for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976
and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived
accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against
him. It was denied hence the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

RULING: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated.
Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had afalling out with
President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for
preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by
the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred
the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The
law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under
preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent
court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be
disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years
can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the
case at bar.

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

Marquez vs COMELEC GR 112889 (April 18, 1995) GR No. 112889,243 SCRA 538, April
18, 1995

FACTS:
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the Province of Quezon filed a petition for
certiorari praying for the reversal of the COMELEC Resolution which dismissed his petition for
quo warranto against Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a
criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal
property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County
of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is
claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged flight from that
country.
 Petitioners subsequent recourse (in G.R. No. 105310) from the COMELECs May 8,
1992 resolution was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a
possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against private respondent.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC for
cancellation of respondents CoC on account of the candidates disqualification under Sec. 40
(e) of the LGC.
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992.
Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private
respondent before the COMELEC.

ISSUE:
Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to
date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his
arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC
and is, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on
to, an elective local office.

HELD:
Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide that a Fugitive from justice in criminal
cases here and abroad are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
It has been held that construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its
enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166,181). However, when there clearly is no obscurity
and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An
administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain
congruent to it.
The confinement of the term fugitive from justice in Article 73 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991 to refer only to a person who has been convicted
by final judgment is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not
private respondent is in fact a fugitive from justice as such term must be interpreted and
applied in the light of the Courts opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC
outrightly dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules
and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court, not being a trier of facts,
is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved
factual matter.

RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE

PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS,
CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO,petitioners, vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. June 29, 2001

Facts:
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter
requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and
other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan. The petitioners invoked other than the freedom of the press, the constitutional
right of the people to be informed of matters of public concern which could only be recognized,
served and satisfied by allowing live radio and television coverage of the court proceedings.
Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual
purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice.
However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case for libel filed by then
President Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to prohibit live radio and television
coverage of court proceedings in view of protecting the parties right to due process, to prevent
distraction of the participants in the proceedings and to avoid miscarriage of justice.

Issue : Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and right to information
of public concern be given more weight than the fundamental rights of the accused.

Ruling : The petition is denied.

The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the
right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most
accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in
acquainting the public with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse,
the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which
must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in
a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention
and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only
by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is
demanded."Television can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses
on."The conscious or unconscious effect that such coverage may have on the testimony of
witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not
at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it.
Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more
than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims
to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights
are not compromised. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that
the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a
courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the
proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract
the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what
they have observed during the proceedings.