Tan v People (1998)

Petitioners: Alejandro Tan, Ismael Ramilo, and Fred Moreno

Respondents: People of the PH, CA
Ponente: J. Panganiban

Facts:
RTC Romblon found the petitioners guilty of illegal possession of lumber prohibited in Section 68 of
PD 705, as amended by E0 277. A certain Crispin Cabudol was also found guilty of the same offense in
another section of the dispositive portion of the RTC decision, which also included Tan and Ramilo.
Petitioners seek to set aside the decision and resolution of the CA affirming the aforementioned
decision of the RTC.

Oct 26, 1989 Forest Guards Joseph Panadero and Eduardo Rabino apprehended a dump truck laden
with narra and white lauan timber, driven by Moreno in Cajidiocan, Romblon.
Oct 30, 1989 they apprehended another truck loaded with tanguile lumber in Cambajao, driven by
Cabudol.

Both were employees of A&E Construction, owned by Tan. The accused were not able to present any
document ascertaining legal possession of the said lumber, and thus, were confiscated.

Mar. 16, 1990 Ramilo, caretaker and timekeeper of A&E, was charged along with Tan and Moreno by
the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Felix R. Rocero with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended by EO 277, alleging in the Information that they unlawfully had in their possession 13 pieces
of narra lumber (171 board feet) and 31 pieces of tanguile lumber (834 board feet) valued at P8,724.00.

Prisco Marin, OIC of the Bureau of Forest Development of Sibuyan, testified that the seized lumber
were bought by Tan's Cajidiocan Trading from Matzhou Development Corporation. Moreover, he states
that Matzhou had been granted by the director of forestry a Tree Recovery Permit. Also, he inspected
the pieces of lumber, and was shown the auxiliary invoice covering the purchase.

The trial court ruled that the lumber were not legitimate deliveries, and were actually aborted nocturnal
haulings. It held that the accused failed to comply with the requirements of the Forestry Code: (1) )
auxiliary invoice, (2) certificate of origin, (3) sales invoice, (4) scale/tally sheets, and (5) lumber dealer
permit.

The petitioners appealed to the CA, and assigned the following errors in judgment:
(1) liable under Section 68 of EO 227
petitioners' artful distinction between timber and lumber is fallacious. CA upheld OSG's
contention that forest products include wood (defined as the hard fibrous substance beneath the back
of trees and shrubs Webster) To construe otherwise will defeat the intent of the law to prevent an
illegal logger from doing such.

(2) possession of lumber illegal

(3) retroactively applying EO 227
(4) did not have necessary documents to legalize possession
(2,3,4) these relied heavily on the testimony of Marin, which was held to be anything but
credible. At the time he inspected the lumberyard of A&E, he was no longer connected with the Bureau
of Forest Development of Romblon.
(5) absence of corpus delicti
(6) considering seizure receipts as evidence of corpus delicti
(5,6) The Court held that the corpus delicti does not refer literally to the object of the crime
(forest products with no legal documents). The fact that the crimes were perpetrated by the accused was
credibly proven by detailed testimonies by prosecution witnesses + admission of Ramilo. Seizure
receipts merely corroborated testimonies.

(7) aborted nocturnal haulings

(answered in discussions)

(8) Alejandro Tan, conspirator

admission of caretaker Ramilo proved that Tan was involved. He testified that the deliveries
were made pursuant to Tan's instructions, and the drivers were mere employees.

(9) guilty beyond reasonable doubt

(answered in discussions)

(10) constitutionality of EO 227

unnecessary since there are other grounds to resolve the case. It is of no concern to the
petitioners.

ISSUES:

1. WON Section 68 of EO 227 is unconstitutional

2. WON the lower courts' treatment of lumber as timber or forest products within the
contemplation of PD 705
3. WON EO 277 was applied retroactively

HELD:

1. NO. The Court held that the law does not violate the due process clause, as contended by the
petitioners as it requires possession of legal documents to justify mere possession of forest products.
The petitioners fail to prove the existence of an actual controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible to judicial determination. The CA asserts that the petitioners have not been charged with the
unlawful possession of firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, grass, shrub, associated water, or fish, as
enumerated in EO 277, and this is of no concern to them. No legal right has been asserted for which
they are entitled to a judicial determination. No evidence of breach of the Constitution to justify
nullification of it. A statute is always presumed to be constitutional, and the one who challenges it is
burdened with proving it to be as such.

2. YES. The Court cited Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. CA, where lumber is deemed to be included in the
term, timber, further defining lumber as a processed log or processed forest raw material (processed
timber). The Court in Mustang also stated that since there is an absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, the common meaning should be used. Also, Section 68 of PD 705 makes no distinction
between raw and processed timber. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus.
The Court also cited Lalican v. Vergara, it was held that the term forest products is broad enough to
encompass lumber.
In American jurisprudence, lumber has been legally accepted as a term referring to the manufactured
product of logs or to timber sawed or split into marketable form.
3. NO. Petitioners contend that the lumber has been lawfully possessed by Cajidiocan Trading since
March 1987, while EO 277 was issued only on July 25, 1987. The Court does not care. The petitioners
did not claim that the lumber belonged to Cajidiocan Trading during the apprehensions, and the drivers
and Ramilo claimed that these were owned by A&E. Also, the alleged sale by Matzhou to Cajidiocan
occurred in March 1987, 2 years prior to the apprehension. No evidence was shown to prove that the
seized lumber were the same as the ones purchased from Matzhou. Finally, assuming that the seized
lumber were, indeed, the ones purchased, the petitioners failed to present the following requirements:
(1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) sales invoice, (3) delivery receipt, (4) tally sheet, and (5) certificate
of transport agreement.
Petitioners' unlawful possession of the lumber was in October 1989. EO 277, which included
possession of timber and other forest products within the contemplation of PD 705, which has already
been in effect prior to the fate.
The prohibited act is malum prohibitum.

Petition denied for utter lack of merit, judgment affirmed