SENECA'S PEDAGOGIC STRATEGY: "LETTERS" AND "DE BENEFICIIS"

Author(s): MIRIAM GRIFFIN

Source: Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement, No. 94, GREEK AND
ROMAN PHILOSOPHY 100 BC 200 AD: VOLUME I (2007), pp. 89-113
Published by: Wiley
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/43767821
Accessed: 23-11-2017 14:36 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms

Wiley is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Bulletin of the
Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 in - SENECA'S PEDAGOGIC STRATEGY:
LETTERS AND DE BENEFICIIS

MIRIAM GRIFFIN

'He was not thorough enough as a philosopher, but he was an outstanding denouncer
(in philosophia parum diligens , egregius tarnen vitiorum insectator fuit). So Quin
(10.1.129) wrote of Seneca a generation later. Despite the criticism, Seneca would hav
the implication that he was more concerned with persuading and dissuading others th
being a learned philosopher. After all, he characterized the Wise Man as the instructo
human race (generis humani paedagogus, Ep. 89.13), viewed Socrates as returning p
sophy to its task of teaching people how to behave themselves and be happy (Ep. 71.
described his own mission as continuing the work of those philosophers who had d
remedies but had not completed the job of showing how and when they were to be
(Ep. 64.8-9, cf. 45.4). Self-improvement he thought inseparable from teaching othe
7.8), and he went so far as to say that if sapientia were given to him on condition that h
to keep it to himself, he would reject it (Ep. 6.4). His teaching was designed to affect no
his contemporaries but future generations, for whose benefit he was writing down the
admonitions (salutares admonitiones) that he had found helpful to himself (Ep. 8.2, cf. 22
The Letters in particular bear ample testimony to his interest in different types of te
giving lectures, reading and excerpting from books, writing essays, and, best of all,
tutorial discussions (Epp. 6.5-6; 22.1; 38.1; 75. 1).2 He discusses the correct style for le
(Epp. 40, 52.9, 1 1 ; 87.40-1 ; 100.12; 108.12-13) and for writing philosophy (Ep. 100.1-1
offers advice on how to derive the most profit from reading (Epp. 2.2; 6.5; 33; 39.1-
84.5). Above all, he is concerned with when and how to make use of different for
persuasion and instruction: examples, precepts, doctrines (exempla, praecepta , dogmat
6.5; 8.2-5; 11.9-10; 13.1; 22.1-3; 38.2; 94; 95). As befits a Roman philosopher, S
emphasis is practical. He stresses that one reads to apply the lessons in conduct (Epp
108.35), and that one should use logic and dialectic to refine one's practice of ethic
89.18; 102.4-5): Barnes calls him a logical utilitarian', prepared to allow that log
instrument to be used in ethical conduct.3 One of his living heroes is Demetrius the
key example of the bowdlerized Roman version of that species, a living example (Epp
62.3; Ben. 7.8.3) admired for his use of pungent eloquence and satire in teaching (Epp.

1 In Ep. 21.5 Seneca expects to enjoy some immortality through his letters, written in imitat
Epicurus whom Seneca has been citing regularly.

2 The ideal of a common life of friends can, however, be achieved in absence (Ep. 55.9) th
imagination, and the Letters , which effect their communication, come to seem like office memor

3 J. Barnes, Logic in the Imperial Stoa (Leiden 1997) 1 3-23.

89

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
90 GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY 100 BC-200 AD - VOLUME I

91.19; Ben. 7.9-1 1), for his physical toughness and austere habits, and for
in theoretical knowledge for its own sake (Ben. 7.1.3-7).4
The Letters to Lucilius evince Seneca's interest in teaching in other way
glimpses of the effective sayings ( sententiae ) of Demetrius the Cynic
secure and without any incursions from fortune is a dead sea'; 91.19; Be
denunciations of vice by his own teachers Attlus (Epp. 63.5-7; 67.15; 72.8
14, 23) and Sotion (Ep. 108.20-2), the first two also providing examples of
preached (Demetrius: Epp. 20.9; 62.3; Attlus: 110.14-20). Seneca indicates
are instruments of instruction comparable to sermones , informal tutorials (
he makes explicit the use of incidents from his own life as teaching examp
well as for others (e.g. Epp. 54.7; 63.14-15; 76.5), for men learn while the
Snyder, in his interesting book on the use of texts in teaching in the ancient
the Letters to Lucilius as 'an inscribed classroom* or an 'enterprise in epist
M. Nussbaum, studying therapeutic technique, finds in the corresponde
solution to the problem of showing what Stoic therapy is like by creating an
dialogue between teacher and pupil with whom the reader will identify.6

1 . The pedagogic strategy of the Letters to Lucilius

Snyder complains that Seneca, in closing his letters with aphorisms dra
writers and philosophers (notably Epicurus), contradicts his own advice ab
books as a whole rather than using excerpts from many (Epp. 33; 39).7 Ho
overlook a key feature of the Letters that has long been recognized by
namely, the way in which their arrangement reflects a dynamic teachin
experience. For this practice of providing tags at the end of letters ceases
first three books of letters (i.e. after Ep. 29). Letter 33, which first criticize
explains why it has been abandoned: Lucilius, says Seneca, is now beyond
choice extracts and brief sayings suitable for memorization will benefit him
is for novices, beginners, boys (33.6-7). As Wilson has suggested, Le
retrospectively Books 1-3 as preliminary protreptic and marks a turning poin
and in the 'epistolary narrative' of moral and intellectual progress.8
Letter 33 represents Lucilius as asking for more excerpts, but he has
writers, and they are better read continuously. This is an implicit comparison
letter where Lucilius was encouraged to select one passage from his varied
to digest, a practice Seneca illustrated with a citation from Epicurus (Ep. 2.
fact that Lucilius, when the correspondence opens, has known Epicu

4 See further, M. Griffin, 'Cynicism and the Romans: Attraction and Repulsion',
R. Bracht Branham and M.-O. Goulet-Caz (Berkeley 1996) 190-204.

5 H. G. Snyder, Teachers and texts in the ancient world (London 2000) 38.

6 M. Nussbaum, The therapy of desire (Princeton 1994) 337-38.

Snyder, Teachers and texts (n.5, above) 32-3.

x M. Wilson, 'Seneca's Epistles reclassified', in Texts, ideas and the classics , ed.
2001) 164-87, at 183-85.

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 MIRIAM GRIFFIN: SENECA* S PEDAGOGIC STRATEGY 9 1

(Ep. 23.9, 'your Epicurus', Epicuri tui),9 though he is beginning to read S

these early letters Seneca frequently represents Lucilius as repr
inconsistency for using sayings of Epicurus when he is supposed to be
opportunity to stress how much common ground between the schools is
sayings which he thinks should be regarded as common property (Ep
33.2). Lucilius writes philosophical poetry, and Seneca quotes from it
occupy this common ground between the two philosophies (Epp. 8.10;
Seneca can be seen to be moving Lucilius on gently by apparently accep
friendship and pleasure by the Epicureans and then modifying their
conception of, these values. So in Letter 9 when asked by Lucilius about
friendship against the Cynic Stilpo, Seneca explains that friendship is v
sake as an opportunity for exercising virtue, hence even to one who is
needs nothing in return, and he ends with a quotation from Epicurus that
defence of self-sufficiency as the key to happiness. Letter 23, before t
tuus , has been occupied with urging on Lucilius joy ( gaudium ), and caref
from pleasure ( voluptas ), based on externals and hope for externals. Th
Lucilius is not in doubt, the Epicurean Lucilius is a creation of Seneca
clearly using Epicureanism as a tool in Lucilius' conversion.11
The way in which this moving on of Lucilius continues into the corre
traced through the theme of anticipation (praemeditatio ).12 In Letter
accept the Epicurean view that rehearsing future misfortunes is foolish
makes them no easier to bear if they occur and means living in perpet
Tusc. 3.33). Yet he makes it clear from the start that he is deliberately usi
teaching than the Stoic message that all misfortunes should be dismissed

9 Cf. Ep. 20.9, 'Though it may make you jealous* ( invideas licet) before a citation
as is rightly pointed out by R. Schottlaender, epikureisches bei Seneca: Ein Rin
Friede und Freundschaft', Philologus 99 (1955) 133-148 at 136-7, the joke on
phrase indicates Lucilius' jealousy of Seneca's use of his own mentor against him
verb invidere in Seneca, see Ep. 84.11; Ben. 3.3.3.) Further on in this letter (
represented as speaking for Epicurus, even if Beltrami's reading 'Epicuree' is not

10 Lucilius is not shown as entertaining Epicurean ideas either in De provident

could be contemporary with the later letters), where his views are explicitly S
naturales 4, pref. 14-18 (a work which seems to be contemporary with the cor
where the views ascribed to him are broadly Stoic, especially on suicide (M. Gr
sopher in politics (Oxford, 1976; 2nd edn 1992) 378, and for the dating 396, 399-

11 Schottlaender, 'Epikureisches bei Seneca' (n.9, above) discusses some of Se

treating Epicureanism. G. Mazzoli, 'Le "Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium" di Sen
filosofico' in ANRW II.36.3, eds W. Haase and H. Temporini (Berlin 1989) 1 872 e
Lucilius' conversion from Epicureanism and thinks Seneca's use of Epicurus' phi
literary model explains his frequent appearance in the correspondence. The two ide
however, as the Epicurean Lucilius is clearly Seneca's creation for the purpos
above).

12 M. Armisen-Marchetti, 'Imagination et Mditation chez Snque', REL 64 (1989) 185-95, though not
all that is said here is traceable to her.

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
92 GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY 100 BC-200 AD - VOLUME I

that his harsher message is in fact true (13.4). By the end of the letter (13
to shame for cosseting Lucilius with such mild remedies, though he is sti
speak in a harsh vein. He goes on to exhort him with the Stoic idea that su
one's good if it prompts virtuous conduct. But he ends with a quotation fr
occupies the common ground between the Epicurean aversion to anti
recommendation to entertain sanguine hopes (e.g. D.L. 2.89; Gnom. Vat. 33
the Stoic aversion to entertaining sanguine hopes and recommendation to r
we should live in the present, not the future.13 Then, in Letter 30 at the sta
the tags end, the death of the Epicurean Aufidius Bassus is celebrated for i
calm, but Seneca ends by telling Lucilius to think of death continually so as n
Epicurean citations naturally begin to thin out after Letter 33, 14 but the pr
tion continues. In Letterl A the exhortation against entertaining fears for the
by congratulations to Lucilius for recognizing that only the honourable is goo
discussion makes it clear that anticipation by people who believe that mis
serves no purpose but to augment their distress (74.3-5; 33-34) and is diffe
awaiting what is inevitable, like death. In Letter 82 Lucilius is exhorted to con
( adsidua meditatici) on death (8) and the denial of death's status as an ev
accompanied by use of the technical terms for the Stoic concept of indiff
adiaphora : in Latin media and indifferentia). In Letter 98.5-6 Seneca spell
reflection on the variability of human affairs, accompanied by the realizati
one might lose do not affect happiness, as opposed to the kind of fear of f
clearly as much a passion as is grief for the loss (5-6), and he distin
anticipatory fear and rational caution (7-8). Seneca ends this discussion by
Epicurus' disciple Metrodorus, 'all the good of mortals is mortal', and contr
what men think of as goods with the real Good, as the Stoics understand i
virtue.

The authorial explanation for dropping the practice of closing letters with little moral tags
is the most explicit, but not the only, indication Seneca gives of Lucilius' spiritual
development and of the corresponding change in the style and philosophical level of the
Letters. At Letter 6.4-5, Seneca notes his own spiritual improvement and rejoices in Lucilius'
progress. He decides to send him the books that have helped him, marking the passages that
have been most beneficial. He makes it clear that Lucilius is being taught through precepts
and examples ( praecepta and exempla ): he should come to visit Seneca in order to have first-
hand experience of an exemplum , 'because the road is long via precepts, short and effective

13 On this common ground, see P. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life (Oxford 1995) (translation by
A. I. Davidson of Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique (Paris 1987)) 209-10. He points out that
Seneca's quotations from Epicurus in the Letters are not an expression of eclecticism but are a means to
convert Lucilius.

14 I. Lana, 'Le "Lettere a Lucilio" nella letteratura epistolare', in Snque et la prose Latine , ed.
P. Grimal, Entretiens Fondation Hardt 36 (1991) 253-305, at 263-67 lists the numbers of letters featuring
citations of Epicurus within the groups of letters: 23 in Epp. 1-29; 1 1 in Epp. 30-97; none in Epp. 98-
1 24. Epicurus is named more often and has more citations than any other philosopher. After Ep. 97,
Metrodorus (twice) and Lucretius supply some Epicurean views (98.9; 99.25; 95.1 1 ; 106.8; 1 10.6).

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 MIRIAM GRIFFIN: SENECA'S PEDAGOGIC STRATEGY 93

through examples' . Then in Letter 13, Lucilius is said to be training

are health-giving and effective at overwhelming hardships' ( praec
vincentibus ), i.e. the more uncompromising Stoic precepts (1), and
from Epicurean advice to Stoic exhortation, is then told (15) that h
admonition ( admonitio ) than of exhortation (< exhortatio ). Clearly a
with the preceptive part of philosophy by Posidonius, as Seneca is t
6), are being used: precept-giving, persuasion, exhortation ( praecep
even consolation (consolatio) in Epp. 63, 91. After Letter 29 comes t
the letters, to which Seneca draws attention in Letter 33, after remar
by Lucilius in the two preceding letters (31.1; 32.1-2). In Letter 3
secure progress' ( certi profectus vir), is told to read books as a whole
chriae in Greek, rendered in Latin as sententiae (7); he should becom
teacher in his own right (8-9). Letters 34 and 35 bring home t
improvement: he is now making rapid progress and helps Seneca
partners in an ideal friendship should. At Letter 75 Seneca describ
moral progressives ( proficientes ) and speaks of himself and Lucilius
Letter 85 inaugurates the series of late letters in which difficult
often discussed at considerable length.15 It is Lucilius who is said
syllogistic proofs for the Stoic tenet that virtue alone is sufficient for
is requested in Letter 87 to some more about virtue and goods (11
about the limitations of logic in improving conduct (40-41). He is sh
discussion of the parts of philosophy in Letter 89.1, while Seneca w
interested in logic for its own sake (18). At Letter 102.3 Lucilius
syllogistic discussion from which he had omitted the parts less rele
difficult questions follow, in Letters 106.1 and 4, 108.1-2; 109.17;
3. In fact, fifteen of the last twenty letters handle such questions
Lucilius who is critical of questions that have no bearing on conduc
the contribution of doctrines ( dogmata ) on human nature, and in 124
Seneca says that Lucilius has the balance just right in practising a
subtle argumentation, so long as it contributes to moral progress.
The Letters to Lucilius are a very clear case of the use of literary
instruction to convey a sense of changing pedagogic strategy. Alm
1967), Hildegard Cancik showed that the Letters were a sophisticat
organized in groups with links between books, suggesting that ther
the whole work, though it has come down to us incomplete.16 Mor
one can see an increasing complexity in Seneca's teaching during
first doxographic letter is 58 and the longer letters start with Book 8

15 The increase in length is particularly clear if one compares the two

manuscript tradition transmits the extant correspondence (1-88 and 89-12
"Lettere a Lucilio" nella letteratura epistolare* (n.14, above) 281-2 and th
the first half the letters average 96 lines as against 1 56 in the second with the
being on average almost twice as long as the 88 of the first group.

16 H. Cancik, Untersuchungen zu Senecas Epistulae Morales (Hildesheim 19

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
94 GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY 1 00 BC-200 AD - VOLUME I

dialectic letters in Book 5, Epp. 45, 48, 49, take dialectic less seriously t
Epp. 82, 93, 85, 87 (pp. 36-42; 138-39), while with Epp. 89-95, we have
handling the various aspects of philosophy itself (p.42).17 She also realiz
situation of the addressee Lucilius, who is represented as a learner, determi
epistolary message. Though Cancik rejected (42, n.70; 79) the idea
presentation of Lucilius as making progress constituted a consistent spir
Hadot recognized that the increasing philosophical difficulty of the lett
increase in length, ran parallel with a portrayal of Lucilius' progress f
Epicurean tendencies to someone capable of grasping full length Stoic
philosophical controversies.18 Gregor Maurach, building on these ideas, r
Seneca intends the reader to see the more theoretical and dialectical discussion in the later
letters to be the response of a skilful teacher to the different level of teaching required by a
pupil who is now ready for more demanding instruction offering a fuller insight into the
fundamentals of the Stoic system.19 The rival explanation of the increasing theoretical
complexity of the late letters was stated by Leeman, who noting that Seneca mentions in
Letters 106, 108, and 109 that he is working on a comprehensive work on moral philosophy,
suggested that it is really this outside project that explains the shift to more technical subject
matter.20 Maurach, however, pointed out that the influence may work the other way, and that,
in any case, Lucilius* progress within the Letters would need to be matched by more
systematic teaching, as deeper knowledge of Stoicism entails seeing the system more and
more as a whole.21 The fictional requests and responses of Lucilius lend verisimilitude to a
fictional spiritual development which is central to the pedagogic strategy of the Letters .
The relationship of writer to addressee that we have been tracing so far is strikingly
expressed in Letter 34, just after Lucilius has been weaned off his mainly Epicurean tags: 'I
claim you for myself: you are my handiwork. When I saw your talent, I laid my hand on you,
I exhorted you, I used the goad and did not let you proceed slowly, but kept on rousing you;
and now I do the same, but I am urging on someone who is already racing and encouraging
me in turn.'22 The last phrase, however, reminds us that the correspondence tells a more
complicated story than the progress of the addressee. It traces the spiritual progress of two

17 Cancik, Untersuchungen (n. 16, above) 36-42; 138-39; 42.

18 1. Hadot, Seneca und die griechisch-rmische Tradition der Seelenleitung (Berlin 1 969) 54-55.

19 G. Maurach, Der Bau von Senecas Epistulae Morales (Heidelberg 1970) 199-206. See also the review
of Cancik by J. M. Andr in Latomus 29 (1970) 201-02, pointing to the way in which the evolution of
Lucilius matches the spiritual maturation of the pedagogue.

20 A.D. Leeman, 'Seneca's plans for a work "Moralis philosophia" and their influence on his later
Epistles' , Mnemosyne 6 (1953) 307-13. Lana, 'Le lettere a Lucilio nella letteratura epistolare' (n.14,
above) 285-86; 289 defends the view, pointing out that Seneca begins to label his theoretical problems
quaestiunculae after his mention of the comprehensive work.

21 Maurach, Der Bau (n.l9, above) 205.

22 Ep. 34. 2: Adsero te mihi ; meum opus es. Ego cum vidissem indolem tuam, inieci manum, exhortatus
sum, addidi stimulos nec lente ire passus sum sed subinde incitavi ; et nunc idem facio, sed iam
currentem hortor et invicem hortantem.

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 MIRIAM GRIFFIN: SENECA'S PEDAGOGIC STRATEGY 95

people, not one, and their stories are not independent, since one frie
{e.g., Epp. 6.6; 35). As Seneca has said in Letter 27, T am not so sham
when I am ill myself, but, as if I am lying in the same hospital ward, I
an evil that we share and handing on my remedies.'23 Both are mak
71.6-7; 75). Both have setbacks and function as counter-examples as
ples.24 But the story overall is of a growing relationship between the
and the developing depth and resolve of the philosophy of both'.25
given in the Letters is in fact, for us, one long rich exemplum , an open
plex story of two concrete lives.'26 Nonetheless, I have been delibera
Seneca as Lucilius' mentor and on Lucilius' progress. That is because i
the Letters exhibit a similar pedagogic strategy to Seneca's lengthy t
sophy of action, De beneficiis. For I hope to show that De beneficiis
structure that reflects a pedagogic strategy, a change in the style of te
parallel with the depiction of the addressee, here Aebutius Liberlis,
progress.

2. The structure ofDt beneficiis

The days are happily gone when Seneca was taken to be incapable o
work, an idea perhaps going back to Caligula's description of his w
lime' ( harena sine calce , Suet. Cal. 38). Albertini in 1923 produced
analysis of this kind,27 and this effectively held sway until in 1967 A
of an internal logic, an implicit organizational structure, for each of th
for all of Seneca's philosophical prose works except the letters was
period to judge from Quintilian's division of his works into speech
dialogues ( orationes , poemata, epistolae and dialogi , 10.1.129). It m
Seneca himself. In any case it reflects the importance in these works to
for Seneca was characteristic of teaching as it should be, even if, more
Letters , the interchange in the dialogi is with a generalized interlocuto
than the addressee.

23 Ep. 27. 1 : Non sum tam improbus, ut curationes aeger obeam, sed tamquam in eodem valitudinario
iaceam, de communi tecum malo conloquor et remedia communico.

24 E.g., Seneca in Epp. 12, 87.5, 63.14; Lucilius in Epp. 60, 93.1.

25 Wilson, 'Seneca's Epistles reclassified' (n.8, above) 185.

26 Nussbaum, The therapy of desire (n.6, above) 340. One result is that there are less ordinary exempla in
the Letters than in Seneca's other works: Seneca and Lucilius are to furnish exempla for the future (Ep.
98.1 3) and meanwhile to each other (R. G. Mayer, 'Roman historical exempla in Seneca', in Snque et
la prose latine , ed. P. Grimal (n. 14, above) 159).

27 E. Albertini, La Composition dans les ouvrages philosophiques de Snque (Paris 1923).

28 K. Abel, Bauformen in Senecas Dialogen (Heidelberg 1967), where he treated five of the twelve
dialogi listed in the Codex Ambrosianus. He discussed the structure of the rest of the twelve dialogi plus
De beneficiis and the Quaestiones naturales in 'Die "beweisende" Struktur des Senecanischen Dialogs'
in P. Grimal (ed.), Snque et la prose latine (n.14, above) 49-81 = K. Abel, Die Sinnfrage des Lebens ,
Philosophie der Antike 3 (Stuttgart 1995), 166-87.

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
96 GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY 1 00 BC-200 AD - VOLUME I

The structure of De beneficiis , except in its broadest outlines, is hardly

Lipsius, despite his deep knowledge of the Senecan corpus and his detaile
work, pronounced himself baffled: The books are good but notably co
treatment, which it is scarcely possible to unravel even for one making a
doing the best I can.' ( Libri boni sunt sed mehercule in ordine et tractat
est vel adnitentem expedire. Tarnen ut possumus.) Many commentator
general condemnation, but not all scholars have been so ready to deny th
ological arrangement.29
Seneca's own indications divide De beneficiis into two sections. The f
prises Books 1-4 which, to follow Seneca's own retrospective description
whole subject of giving and receiving benefits systematically: 'I thought
my task in the preceding books, having treated there how a benefit oug
how it ought to be received'.30 Of the four books in this first section,
indicates en route, already cover the three topics announced in Bo
(1.11.1), receiving (2.18.1) and returning (3.1) benefits, a threefold divi
shadowed in the allegorical discussion of the Three Graces attributed to
8).31 Book 4 is introduced as a treatment of the most essential question,
returning benefits are desirable ends in themselves (4.1.1). The second
covers questions, which Seneca repeatedly characterizes as append
subsidiary topics,32 unnecessary but possibly useful.33

29 Albertini (n.27, above) 92 regarded the treatise as lacking a methodical compositio

it as unusual among Seneca's works, all of which, he aimed to show, were loo
recently and more sympathetically, M. Bellincioni, Potere ed etica in Seneca
amica (Brescia 1984) 122 traces its lack of a perceptible design, as well as its size
ambitious scope of its programme: she quotes with approval the dictum of Didr
est coup mais les ides sont lies' She finds the unity of the work in its central
utilitarian conception of beneficium.

30 In prioribus libris videbar consummasse propositum, cum tractassem, quemad

beneficium, quemadmodum accipiendum

31 This original triadic division of the subject matter is gradually shown to be super
and returning a benefit cannot really be separated, once it is understood that, just a
intentional act that confers the benefit willingly and rationally (not the material
service rendered), so the appropriate return to that act is grateful acceptance
formulation at 4. 1 and at 5. 1 . 1 .

32 'I shall not be serving my subject, but indulging it, since it does not have to b
invites, but only where it leads' (5.1.1); 'Having completed the contents of the sub
study also what is, to tell the truth, not integral to it, but connected' (5.1.2); T
remnants; with the subject exhausted, I am looking around not at what 1 shall say,
said' (7.1.1); 'Now I am recovering anything that has escaped me' (7.1.2). No c
preceding books is claimed at the start of Book 6, which proclaims that some ma
'investigated only to exercise the intellect and lie invariably outside life' (6. 1 . 1 ).

33 'Non-superfluous, rather than necessary' (5.1.1); 'Whoever inspects these things

full return for his work, but will not waste it either' (5.1.2); 'Some things are pleasu
of use when found' (6. 1 .); 'But all that was most needed I concentrated at the begin

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 MIRIAM GRIFFIN: SENECA'S PEDAGOGIC STRATEGY 97

Abel, who applied to De beneficiis his experience of analysing th

succeeded in showing that there is a clear overall structure which is car
that many of the repetitions which have been seen as signs of artistic
deliberate pedagogic ploys or thematic recapitulations designed to
original argument (22-23).34 He also suggested that the last three boo
of puzzles but are crucial to raising the level on which Seneca wishe
interchanges of benefit to be understood and discussed.
The overall symmetry of the work is clear. Book 4, which is ma
treating the most important issues,35 stands in the middle between
which the basic topics indicated in Book 1 are covered, and the last
particular conundrums are resolved. In Book 4 the discussion reaches
subject of benefits in the context of the fundamental tenets of Stoic et
4 that the imitation of the gods is most pervasive, both as a model for
showing gratitude. It is also in Book 4 that the connection of giving
conception of virtue in general (4.9.2-11) and with the Stoic notion
developed. But above all, it is in Book 4 that we are told of the ult
exchange of benefits ( beneficia ) in binding human society togeth
providence in providing this social instinct, which along with reason,
physical weakness (4.18).
The last books consist of a series of dialectical exercises, answeri
solving hard cases. This new style of argument had been antic
particularly in Book 4 which ends with a series of problematic cases t
of the notion that one should always return a benefit (4.40). Some
reason, have called these last books casuistical.36 Strictly speaking,
casuistry is reserved for that part of ethics that resolves particular
which it is difficult to apply the general rules of religion or
circumstances are abnormal or there appears to be a conflict of duties.
have appeared after 1000 AD in a Christian context; the term 'casuis
first attested in the eighteenth century, applied to the activity of the J
its peak in 1550-1650. However, its roots can be found in antiquity.3
by many ancient philosophers that the proof of moral doctrines is in t

34 Senecas lex vitae, Pner Stoische Studien (Marburg 1967) 5-35 = Abel, D
42-73. His analysis is accepted by G. Maurach, Seneca, Leben und Werk , 2
101-10.

35 'Of all the subjects we have treated none can seem so necessary, Aebutius
need of careful treatment, as Sallust puts it, than the one to hand' (4. 1 . 1 ).

36 F.-R. Chaumartin, Le De beneficiis de Snque , sa signification philoso

(Lille-Paris 1985) 12; M. Fuhrmann, Seneca und Kaiser Nero (Berlin 1997) 2
1 06 and 107 appear to apply the term to the books before, as well as those afte

37 A. R. Jonsen and S. Toulmin, The abuse of casuistry: a history of inorai

8-13. They find the inspiration of casuistry in ancient philosophy and rhetor
Aristotle and Cicero, in the judicial practice of Roman law, and in the tradi
debate (47-87).

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
98 GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY 100 BC-200 AD - VOLUME I

requires practice and imagination. As Cicero says, speaking of the differe

different groups of people at De qfficiis 1.59: 'precepts on observing duty c
handed down, as I myself am handing them down, but a matter of such
demands experience and practice.*
It may not be mere coincidence that Cicero's De qfficiis also ended with
Book 3. Many ethical treatises may have ended with a section designed t
practice in using the doctrines developed earlier by presenting him with ha
dilemmas. One inspiration could have been the discussion of friendship ( ph
Nicomachean Ethics , which contains a substantial discussion of reciproc
(notably 8.1162b22ff.): it proceeds by exposition in Book 8 and by conside
of conundrums (including one about benefactions at 1 167b 1 6ff.) at the end
Book 9.38 Moreover, Panaetius himself must have intended such a discus
topic of his Peri tou kathkontos , for it dealt with the question: 'if th
appearance of honourableness conflicts with that which seems beneficia
decide between them'.39 Cicero goes on to give an example of a particular h
of what Panaetius would have included.40 Cicero also cites in De qfficiis
hard cases from Panaetius* disciple Hecato's book Peri tou kathkontos.
deduced, from the fact that they come from the sixth book, that this por
(fr.ll Gomoll) comprised enquiries (ztmata) following upon the systemat
the subject.41 Seneca may have been following a well-established tradition.

3. Precepts and doctrines

Whether or not the structure of De beneficiis fitted into a pre-existing tradit

for ethical treatises, there can be no doubt of its relation to Seneca's ow
philosophical education. For the shape of the work as a whole reflects th
Seneca sees the relationship of the preceptive part (praeceptiva pars) of
translation he offers for the Greek paraintik (. Ep . 95. 1 ), to the dogmatic.
In Letters 94 and 95 Seneca discusses at length the question of the contr
precepts and doctrines to virtuous conduct and the development of virtue. In
he argues against the heterodox Stoic philosopher Ariston of Chios who he
i.e. specific recommendations and advice as to particular courses of action
and useless.42 Seneca defends the preceptive part of philosophy on account

38 D. Ross, Aristotle, the Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford 1925) in his list of the cont
(1 1 62a34- 1 165b36) 'Casuistry of friendship'. Aristotle's word, to judge from 9.2. 1 1

39 Off. 3.7: si id quod speciem habe ret honest i pugnarei cum eo quod utile vide r
discerni oporteret.

40 Off. 3.29-33 on Phalaris being robbed of his clothes by a good man dying of cold.

41 M. Pohlenz, Gttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen (1935) 107, apparently regar

A. R. Dyck, A commentary on Cicero , De officiis (Ann Arbor, Michigan 1996) 612.

42 Cicero Fin. 2.43; 3.12; 3.50 helps us to make sense of Aristo's position on precepts
he recognized no distinctions within indiffrents and regarded the virtuous actio
perfectum officium) as done by the Wise Man as the only appropriate action (o
precepts of course that help us to make the right choices among the indiffrents

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 MIRIAM GRIFFIN: SENECA* S PEDAGOGIC STRATEGY 99

and practical value, but in the second letter, he argues that praecept
attaining wisdom or the happy life: it is also necessary to have an ade
the basic doctrines of the system that alone can provide the rationale f
Seneca explains in Letter 94 that precepts have a role in pr
understanding and adoption of doctrines, but also give us practice, once
applying that knowledge. For precepts as a form of exhortation can
acceptance of doctrines (Ep. 94.25-6; 28-31; 50-2); then when the gras
removed the obstacles to natural behaviour, precepts can remind us o
teach us the details of our duties (Ep. 94.18-19; 22-3; 32), and give u
conduct (Ep. 94.32-4; 36).43 It is clear that precepts belong to what
earlier in Letter 89.14-15 as the third division of the moral part o
concerned with actions (de actionibus) and their proper occasions (i
tempora ), with the 'when, where and how each action should b
quidque et ubi et quemadmodum agi debeat).
Seneca's tripartite division of the moral part of philosophy into t
hormetic (de impetu ), and practical (de actionibus ), is no more his
basic division of philosophy itself into the moral, rational and natur
earlier on in Letter 89 (9-13). Stobaeus (Eel. 2.42.7-45.6W) preserves
philosophy into the three parts Seneca uses, made by the late first
philosopher Eudorus.44 The first is thertifcon , concerned with ends
their attainment, including knowledge of virtue and vice, good and b
Seneca calls this 'the speculative part assigning to each thing its own
the worth of each' (inspectio suum cuique distribuens et aestimans q
sit). Eudorus* second division is hormtikon , the way to deal with th

appropriate actions (kathkonta or officia ), while the Wise Man needs n

virtuously. See also Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. 7.12 who says that Ariston r
hypothetical subject matter (parainetikos topos and hupothetikos topos) of ethic

43 Nussbaum, Therapy of desire (n.6, above), 338 points out that Seneca move
general and back again. B. Inwood, 'Rules and reasoning in Stoic ethics' in To
ed. K. Ierodiakonou (Oxford 1999), 95-127, at 115 notes various uses of pre
J. Sellars, The art of living (Aldershot, 2003), 77 concentrates on the role
training after the doctrines have been learned, but his focus is on asksis , w
than the notion of precepts (76).

44 M. Giusta, I dossografi di etica (Turin 1964 and 1967) vol. I, 151-52 regard
source of the doxographic passages systematizing the teaching of various sc
schema for moral philosophy found in Seneca and Clement of Alexan
reconstructs Eudorus* system at 155-160. His attempt to date Eudorus bef
works is contested: see Chaumartin (n.36, above) 25-26. I agree with R. Dobb
Book 1 (Oxford 1998) 94 that Seneca's division of ethical topics is not the
1.4.1 1 or 3.21-25, despite A. A. Long and D. Sedley, The Hellenistic philos
1987-8), vol. 1, 346, who, however, are right to regard it as a division of ethics
the latter being the view of P. Hadot, La Citadelle intrieure: Introduction au
(Paris 1992) 98-115; Philosophy as a way of life (n.13, above) 192-4, n
Epictetus (Oxford 2002) 117-18; 126.

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 100 GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY 100 BC-200 AD - VOLUME I

to action; for Seneca this is the section de impetu and deals with Curbin
proceeding, instead of rushing, towards action' (< impetus refrenare et ad
ruere). Eudorus' third division is praktikon and corresponds to Sene
actionibu) sketched above. In Eudorus this section includes hypothetikon ,
paramuthetikon , that is, presumably, in Latin suasio , exhortt io, and con
exhortation, consolation),45 forms of teaching that Seneca says in Letter 95
by Posidonius in addition to the giving of moral maxims (praeceptio ).46
section deals with both virtuous actions ( katorthmata ) and ordinary app
( kathkonta ), one category of which concerns our relations with others an
topic peri ton kharitn , Seneca's beneficia. Eudorus' division might have r
it was to reach Stobaeus, through Arius Didymus, but it is not in any case
Seneca's conception of moral philosophy in Ep. 89 in tune with Eudorus' sc
may reflect the treatment of practical ethics by Posidonius indicated in Ep. 9
Seneca's De beneficiis is a 'treatise intensely concerned with the practic
reasoning', as In wood puts it.48 What we have in the first three books is clea
the subject in the manner characteristic, according to Letter 89, of the third
philosophy, the practical. Seneca tells us en route that he is teaching 'what
given and how' (1.11.1); 'how people should conduct themselves in rec
(2.18.1), and, at the start of Book 5, he says he has now treated 'how a ben
given, how it ought to be received, for these are the boundaries of this o
admodum dandum esset beneficium, quemadmodum accipiendum; hi enim
fines). This clearly accords with the 'when, where and how each action shou
of Letter 89.15 and with the link between praecepta and officium made in
95.45. In fact, the language of the teaching in these books shows us that w

45 The identification of Posidonius' Greek terms behind Seneca's Latin renderin

uncertain, given the fluidity of such Greek terms, see I. G. Kidd, Posidonius Vol.
(Cambridge 1988), 647-649 ad F 176.

46 In Ep. 95.65 Seneca also mentions aetiologia , which he renders in Latin as causa
search for causes), and thologia (character sketches, Greek charactrismon) or the
Giusta, I dossografi (n.44, above) vol. I, 165-8 equates the tormer with Eudorus' 'th
causes that bring about certain states or movements' ( 8 tcdv ahcov a7i00Tiic
Tiv %G i i Kivi10i) and takes it to refer to the practical consequences of virtue

47 It is generally agreed that it was the through the work of the philosopher Arius Di
division reached Stobaeus, though scholars differ on which works of his were involv
'Epitome of Didymus', cited by Stobaeus at 4.39.28, is a work by Didymus or a work
For a discussion of the question, see D.E. Hahm, 'The ethical doxography of Ariu
II.36.4 (1990), 2935-3055. Eudorus' division might have reached Seneca through
Dillon, The Middle Platonists (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1977) 121, n. 1 ; C. Brittain, P
last of the Academic Sceptics (Oxford 2001) 279, n.45 who suggests Eudorus' schem
influenced'; M. Schofield, 'Academic therapy: Philo of Larissa and Cicero's project i
Philosophy and power in the Graeco-Roman world , eds G. Clark and T. Rajak (Oxf
is identical with Augustus' friend (Suet. Aug. 89), Seneca knew at least one work b
4.2-5.6).
4X Inwood 'Rules and reasoning' (n.43, above) 1 10.

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 MIRIAM GRIFFIN: SENECA'S PEDAGOGIC STRATEGY 101

precepts. It is not only that Seneca uses the words praecepta and
places the crucial instruction 'never to reproach, not even to rem
among the 'first and most essential precepts' ( inter prima praecept
and alludes to it later (7.22.1) in the phrase 'some things we teach
( quaedam praecipimus ultra modum ); or when he uses the phrase
these things' {cum ista praecipimus) (1.15.2). It is not only that he u
admoneo, which in Letters 94 and 95 characterize this style of teach
the fact that the grammatical forms in which he couches his advice in
those used to illustrate precepts in these letters. There, it is clear th
given in the form of statements, in direct or indirect speech, and answ
'what are' (quid sint) or 'what opinion we ought to hold concernin
quacumque habere debeamus opinionem) (95.54), precepts answer q
'how we should make use of things' (quomodo rebus sit utendum) an
the form of orders or prescriptive utterances in the imperative, or the
jussive subjunctive or the future.50 In fact in Ep. 95.60 Seneca make
explicit when he argues that the proposition that doctrines are unnece
indirect statement) is itself a doctrine, whereas instructions to avoi
he expresses with the gerund/gerundive) would themselves be prece
De beneficiis Books 1-2 in particular turns up a number of such geru
jussive subjunctives and futures,53 oportet (one should) and decet

49 Ben. 1 .14.2: quare si quis existimat nos, cum ista praecipimus ... ne perj
exaudivit ; 1 . 1 2.3: Nemo tam stultus est ut monendus sit ... (an example of pr
monitio (94. 1 2, 21 , 24, 39, 55; 95.63) and admonitio (94.25, 29, 3 1 , 32, 33, 36
characterize the work of praecepta.

50 Imperative: incede , cena (Ep. 94.8), bonus esto (95.50). Gerund/gerun

(94.8), sit utendum (95.54). Jussive subjunctive: ex species (94.5), prohib
(95.55). Future: vives (94.43), fades (95.65). It is clear, however, from Ep. 94
indicative (in prose or in verse) can also perform the work of admonitio
precepts (Ep. 94.27-28; 43).
51 'Moreover, those who reject doctrines do not realise that doctrines are es
rejection. What do they say? That life is sufficiently developed by prec
wisdom, that is dogmas, are superfluous. But the very thing they say is as mu
sake, as if I were now to say that we must give up precepts as superfluous, mu
attention to them alone; it would be a precept I uttered in the very act of deny
taken seriously.' (Praeterea non intellegunt hi, qui decreta tollunt, eo ipso co
Quid enim dicunt? Praeceptis vitam satis explicari, supervacua esse decreta
Atqui hoc ipsum, quod dicunt, decretum est tam me hercules quam si nunc
praeceptis velut supervacuis, utendum esse decretis, in haec sola studium co
negarem curanda esse praecepta, praeciperem.)

52 1 .9. 1 : prospiciendum ; 2.4.2: repraesentanda sunt beneficia ; 2.9. 1 : quae

quaedam secreto ; 2. 1 1 .2: non est dicendum ... non est instandum, non est me

53 Jussive subjunctives at 2. 1 . 1 : sic demus ; 2.4.3: nemo ilia intercipiat, nemo

auribus. Futures at 1.11.6: cavebimus ne muera supervacua mittamus ; 2
utilitatem potius quam voluntatem petentium.

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
102 GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY 100 BC-200 AD - VOLUME I

infinitive, even imperatives.54 Of course, Seneca is much too skilful a wri

straightforward list of precepts in their standard form. He uses all the other
that he lists in Letters 94 and 95 as kinds of advice ( genera monitionum), not
rebukes, encomia (adhortationes, obiurgationes , laudationes ), and dresse
form in many guises.55
When Seneca says at the beginning of Book 5 that he has covered the te
appropriate action or when he introduces Books 7 with 'I do not think ther
pursuing other points after what regulates our conduct has been said', he mea
3, and to a lesser extent Book 4, have provided the precepts one needs to
appropriate acts (officia) involving beneficia . This teaching is firmly at
morally imperfect (< imperfetti ), as Seneca explains in Letter 94.50-1 . 56 In f
beneficiis he frequently makes clear his paramount concern with them {
7.2.1; 7.20.5).57

4. Evolution of teaching style

In defending the necessity for doctrines as well as precepts in Letter 95.45

is not enough when a person is arranging his existence as a whole, to giv
Marcus Brutus in the book which he wrote peri kathkontos , gives many pre
children, and brothers; but no one will do his duty as he ought, unless he h

54 2. 1 0.4: sin adiuvari ilium oportet ; 2. 14.2: initia beneficiorum suorum spedare tum

55 Cancik, Untersuchungen (n.16, above) 16-25 showed in her study of the Letters
theoretical-doxographical style of teaching is characterized by descriptive grammati
paraenetic passages use prescriptive ones. She points out that, in addition to se
prescriptive form, Seneca also uses for paraenetic purposes exempla , instances, com
C. Codoer, 'Los recursos literarios en la obra em prosa de Seneca* in Seneca e il
Convegno intemazionale di Roma-Cassino, 11-14 novembre 1998 , ed. P. Parroni (Ro
rightly emphasizes that paraenetic teaching is not confined to certain grammat
theoretical and paraenetic teaching are combined in single letters.

56 Philo of Larissa, in his division of the ethical part of philosophy, justifies the hy
( hypothetikos logos) on the grounds that those who are not sages need prec
Qyarainetikoi logoi) to help them act correctly in particular situations (Stob. 2.4 1.1 8-2
Seneca's Letters 94 and 95, this reflects controversy over the usefulness of precept
Rufus at Stob. 4.50.94.

57 Seneca switches from the level of virtuous actions ( katorthmata ) to that of a

(kathekonta). At 1 .5.3 he defines a beneficium as a recte factum in which the intentio
Book 4 is much concerned with the Wise Man. But since a virtuous action ( katorth
appropriate action (kathkon) that has all its numbers as done by the Wise Man
naturally concentrates on the deliberations that make an action appropriate, providing
defence' (D.L.7.107), and giving it the quality of rationality required of virtue (B
strictly speaking, the token actions of this type done by anyone but a Wi
(hamartmata). Similarly Eudorus in the practical division of ethics is concerned bo
and katorthmata including those concerned with benefit (kharis) and other activities
can be practised by the Wise Man and others: there is no reason to think he treate
action separately, as Giusta, I dosso grafi (n.44, above) vol. II (1967) 455 suggests.

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 MRIAM GRIFFIN: SENECA'S PEDAGOGIC STRATEGY 103

reference. We must set before our eyes the goal of the Supreme Go
strive, and to which all our acts and words may have reference.' S
Cicero remarked that the precepts on appropriate actions (officio
was about to give, have relevance to the goal of good things, thou
(than in theoretical works) because precepts are more concerne
ordinary life.58
It is in Book 4 of De beneficiis that the precepts of the early b
the doctrines of Stoicism, as has already been shown. The questio
start of Book 4, 'whether giving a benefit and returning gratitude f
for their own sake* (an beneficium dare et in vicem gratiam ref
sint) requires an affirmative answer that is a doctrine. For in Lette
proposition fairness is desirable in itself (aequitatem per se exp
the 'topic of justice* (de iustiti locus), and that it is the notion o
concerned with it that provide the proofs for the particular pre
friend, a citizen or an associate. In the same way, the propositi
returning gratitude for it are things to be sought for their own
notion of virtue, which has intrinsic value (4.16.2), a true benefic
a katorthoma or recte factum ( 1.5.3).59 And it is the character of a
defined by the intention and will of the actor that supports the
gives about how to give, receive, and return. The Wise Man
prominently in Book 4 because his performance of the perfect r
complete grasp of these doctrines. He does not need precepts in o
imitation of the gods that is here recommended.
In the three books that follow Book 4 the effects of that book are
concern with the gods and the Wise Man. But starting with the se
involved in a series of dialectical problems. Cancik in fact noted
type of theoretical argument that Seneca opposes to paraenetic t
compares to it as words vs things (verba vs res , Epp. 83.27; 87.
ductions to Books 5-7 deprecate what lies ahead, though this is
literally.

58 Off. 1 .7: Quorum autem ojficiorum praecepta traduntur, ea quamquam pertinent ad finem bonorum,
tarnen minus id apparet, quia magis ad institutionem vitae communis spedare videntur. Ordinary life,
the vita communis , as is made clear at 3.14-15, is that aspect of human activity shared between Wise
Men and ordinary men. Precepts teach the type of conduct of which a 'reasonable defence* can be given,
the officia media or communia , as Cicero calls them at 3.14. See Inwood, 'Rules and reasoning* (n.43,
above) 102.

59 Defined at 1.6.1 as 'an act of benevolence bestowing joy and deriving joy from the action, performed
from inclination and the spontaneous readiness to do so' (benevola actio tribuens gaudium capiensque
tribuendo in id quod facit prona et sponte sua parata ).

60 Cancik, Untersuchungen (n.l6, above) 23, n.41.

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
104 GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY 100 BC-200 AD - VOLUME I

What we find in the second half of Book 4 and in Books 5-7 are a seri
(referred to as interrogationes or quaestiones ), two paradoxes (5. 12- 17), 61 a
involve paradoxes as conclusions (5.12; 5.15.1) or as premises (7.4.7-7.4). Th
books contain paradoxes, notably Book 2.31-35, and the odd question, not
(3.6, 18, 29), it is only in the last books that they form the principal subjec
introductions to Books 5-7 mark the change, as we have seen.
All of these conundrums feature in Aristotle's discussion in the Topic
problems, most of which he says were also called theseis. Their use, he e
1.1 1.104b-105a9), is to help either with choice and avoidance (action) or w
ledge). Aristotle also divides the problems into universal and particular p
2.1.108b34-35). It was the rhetorician Hermagoras in the mid-second
appropriating this area for rhetoric, divided its sphere of investigation in the
Cicero and Quintilian, i.e. into the treatments of theseis (general or non-s
rendered in Latin as quaestiones infinitae or as proposita ,62 and hyp
questions), rendered as quaestiones definitae (or finitae) or as causae P Th
discussions of rhetoric place these authors on the inclusive side of the rhet
debate.64 Seneca is at home in this area common to philosophy and rhetor
successful orator and was able to deploy the tricks of that trade in the servic
What we meet in De beneficiis are the non-specific problems (theseis
infinitae ), problems that do not involve particular people, places, times or
real or fictional. There is, however, as Quintilian demonstrates, a close con
the universal and the particular, both because the resolution of a particular
'Should Cato marry?' involves the general question 'Should anyone marry?
general and specific are often a matter of degree: 'Should one participate
general; 'Should one participate under a tyranny?' is more specific, but no
particular time and place.65 Some, he says, preferred to distinguish theseis
by their lack of particularity, but by their concern with establishing the truth

61 Another two form part of the questions at 7.4-13, i.e. All things belong to the Wise
all things in common.

62 Quintilian 3.5.5 tells us that, instead of Cicero's propositum {Top. 79), other
universales civiles or quaestiones philosopho convenientis. Cicero also uses consultan
Part. or. 4; 67). See S. F. Bonner, Roman declamation in the late Republic and early
1949), 2.

63 Cic. Inv. 1.8. The principal discussions are in Cicero, De or. 2.78; 3.1 1 1-18; Or. 44-46; Top. 79-86;
Part. or. 61-67; and Quintilian 3.5.5-18, but both authors discuss them elsewhere. All of this is well
analyzed by B. Riposati, Studi sur 'Topica* di Cicerone (Milan 1947) 162-203.

64 See the excellent discussion by M. L. Clarke, The Thesis in Roman rhetorical schools', CQ 1 (195 1)
159-66, who points out that Seneca's father wrongly regarded the thesis as confined to the period before
Cicero. See also Bonner, Roman declamation (n.62, above) 10 and J. Fair weather, Seneca the Elder
(Cambridge 1981) 104-06; 1 17-19.

65 Cicero points out that theseis too, like hypotheseis , can be determinate with regard to one or more of
the specifications (j?eristaseis ), but not in the most important respects (Top. 80, on which see
T. Reinhardt, Cicero's Topica (Oxford 2003) 351-52).

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 MIRIAM GRIFFIN: SENECA'S PEDAGOGIC STRATEGY 1 05

guiding conduct (Quint. 3.5.8-13). Seneca's discussion at times illust

artificiality of this demarcation between the general and the particular
considers, 'Must you keep a promise to give a benefit if you discover la
ungrateful?' The moral dilemma arises from the obligation to keep a p
comes into conflict with the obligation not to give to the ungrateful.66
to give an exemplum involving Philip of Macedn, in which he puts Phi
form of a specific question: 'Will Philip give to you (a soldier who has pr
third party) because he promised, even if he ought not to, even if it mean
and committing a crime?' Another specific question, to be answered in
follows concerning Zeno (4.39). Seneca here exploits his familiarity wi
many of the controversiae and suasoriae recorded by his father have p
implicit in them or were even inspired by them, and the study of theseis f
rhetorical training.67 In fact, the Elder Seneca's controversiae include two t
in the form of specific cases, of the question of ingratitude and the nature
ever, Seneca's purpose in De beneficiis is not rhetorical training, but rather
general question. His arguments here are hard to distinguish from the
casuistry, in the proper sense of the resolution of particular hard cases o
the immediate point of posing the hard cases here is not the practical one o
or deciding oneself what to do but the more theoretical one of exploring
and explaining that promises involve unexpressed reservations (4.39.4). T
ing general principles to particular hard cases helps to refine those princ
standing of them.69
The problems that Seneca treats illustrate the two types of non-
(quaestiones infinitae) distinguished by Cicero and Quintilian in the wake
one type where the aim is knowledge; the other where the aim is action
three subdivisions: an sit (questions of existence, cause); quid sit (question

66 The sort of case envisaged by Aristotle at Top. 1.11. 104b 3 1 -35.

67 According to Quintilian 2.4.25, such theseisy with the addition of named

suasoriae beloved of declaimers. Seneca's Ep. 14.12-13 gives a good examp
accedendum ad rem publicam adapted to the situation of Cato at the time of the
Roman declamation (n.62, above) 8-9 points out, the series of rhetorical que
addressed to Cato in this letter suggests that this is an example of a suasoria
concrete case to illustrate and give practice in handling the general question.

68 Sen. Controv. 2.5 and 9. 1 . See Bonner, Roman declamation (n.62, above) 6-1 1 ; 87

69 T. Reinhardt, 'Rhetoric in the Fourth Academy', CQ 50 (2000) 540-41; Brit

(n.47, above) 89-91.

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1 06 GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY 1 00 BC-200 AD - VOLUME I

quale sit (questions of moral status).70 They are not always easy to distinguis
type, action, has two divisions, questions of how to behave ( officium ) and ques
control the emotions, but in this work Seneca is naturally concerned only
division, officium .
The two questions explored in the early part of Book 4, 'whether to bestow
to return gratitude for it are in themselves desirable ends' (an beneficium d
gratiam referre per se res expetendae sint) belong to the type of non-spec
aiming at knowledge and, within it, to the subdivision quale sit , to which Cicer
84) questions 'about the desirable and undesirable, the fair and the unfairness
and the shameful' (de expetendo fugiendoque, de aequo et iniquo, de honesto
examples of quale sit are 'whether it is disgraceful to be outdone in benef
beneficiis vinci) in Ben. 5.7.1; 'whether they are right in doing this [sc. pr
misfortune may befall their benefactor so they can prove their gratitude],
dutiful desire' (an hoc recte faciantetpia volntate) in Ben. 6.25.
Probably to be assigned to the subdivision quid sit are a series of question
define beneficium more precisely:

already in Book 3.18: 'the question is raised whether it is possible for a sl

give a benefit to his master'.72

in Book 5.7.2: 'whether it is possible for a man to bestow a benefit on hims

5.20.1: 'If two brothers are at variance, and I save the life of one, do I g
benefit to the other who will probably regret that the brother he hated d
die?'74

in Book 6.2: 'whether it is possible to take away a benefit'.75

Questions in Book 7 concern the different senses in which things can belong to, or be
possessed by, people:

7.4.1: 'How can anyone give anything to a Wise Man if everything is already
his?',

70 These subdivisions are staseis or status in Latin and their use in classifying lawsuits or political
debates is associated with Hermagoras, Philo being credited with extending their application to the
theseis (see Brittain, Philo of Larissa (n.47, above) 339-43; Reinhardt, 'Rhetoric in the Fourth Academy'
(n.69, above) 535-40; Reinhardt, Cicero 's Topica (n.65, above) 14-17; 346-48.

71 See Brittain, Philo of Larissa (n.47, above) 309-10, and Reinhardt, Cicero's Topica (n.65, above) 348,
n.3 for the criticism of a certain Archedemos as reported by Quintilian 3.6.31 and 33: he thought the
third sub-division, qualitasy was already covered by the second, definido.

72 The question turns on whether everything a slave does for his master is a ministerium (something he
cannot choose not to do).

73 The negative answer involves exploring the essentially social character of benefits (5.8- 1 1 ).

74 The solution turns on whether doing good to a person against his will counts as a benefit.

75 The solution turns on whether a benefit is the act of giving or the thing given.

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 MIRIAM GRIFFIN: SENECA'S PEDAGOGIC STRATEGY 107

and

'How can anyone give anything to his friend, if friends have all things in
common?'

or they concern the meaning of 'returning':

7.14.1: 'Whether anyone who has done everything in his power to return a
benefit has returned i.

The question about promises in Book 4.34.3, discussed above (p. 105), clearly belongs to the
category of non-specific questions aiming at action and concerned with appropriate action,
under the sub-heading how we should use things (quomodo utamur ), as Quintilian puts it
(3.5.).76 Others occur:

in Book 4.26.1: 'Would a good man bestow a benefit upon one who was
ungrateful, knowing that he was ungrateful?'

4.40.1: 'Ought we in every case to show gratitude, and ought a benefit in all
cases to be returned?'

in Book 5.20.6: 'ought repayment ever be demanded?'

in Book 6.5.4: (of a benefactor who later injures us) 'Ought I to return to him the
benefit...or ought I to combine the two into one and take no action at all, leaving
the benefit to be wiped out by the injury, and the injury by the benefit?'

in Book 7.16.5: 'Ought a person to return the benefit that he has received from a
Wise Man if he has ceased to be wise and has turned into a bad man?'

7.26. 1 : 'how are we to deal with the ungrateful?'

It was already remarked by Theon, a rhetorician contemporary with Seneca that this last
category of quaestiones infinitae aimed at actio is often hard to distinguish from questions
dealing with cognitio .77 It is not difficult to find examples of such ambiguity in Seneca's
questions. So in Book 5.18.1, questions of conduct arise in determining to whom gratitude is
owed, 'How far am I to pursue the list of relatives?', e.g. 'Should a benefit be reclaimed from
the recipient's father?' (5.19.8). But these questions of conduct are really designed to raise
the question 'Where does a benefit stop?' and to make us distinguish between a benefit con-

76 Quintilian divides the non-specific questions relating to action into two divisions: how to acquire and
how to use (quomodo adipiscamur; quomodo utamur). Cicero in Part . or. 63 gives to pursue and avoid
something; what relates to some convenience or use (ad persequendum aliquid aut declinandum; quod
ad aliquant commoditatem usumque referatur). Both divisions clearly belong to the appropriate action
half of action (De orat. 3. 1 1 8).

77 The quale sit subdivision of cognitio is the most obvious to be involved in such ambiguity. Theon in
his Progymnasmata (ii 121 Spengel, 14-17), notes 'It makes no difference whether someone says
"Should one marry or not?" or again "Is marriage something to be sought or avoided?"; for it is one and
the same thing that is indicated by all such questions'.

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
108 GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY 100 BC-200 AD - VOLUME I

ferred knowingly and intentionally on someone and the profit that person m
benefit given to another. Again, in 6.7, 'whether a person who does us a
wishing to, imposes any obligation on us' turns into a discussion of the inte
the notion of a benefit, for, as Seneca says, 'Both this question and any simila
raised will be easily settled if in every case we direct our attention to the thou
is always something that is conveyed to us, in the first place, by intention,
kind and friendly intention* (6.7.2).
The relation between these questions about action and those about philoso
somewhat analogous to the intimate connection Seneca made in Letter 95 b
and doctrines. That is not surprising, given the close link between action q
cepta , on the one hand, and between truth questions and decreta , on the oth
raised by the action questions, the non-specific questions concerned with ap
are clearly ways of exploring the realm of the precepts given earlier in the w
them: indeed Cicero calls this category of question the praecipiendi genus
though Seneca can speak in Letter 94 of precepts as giving, not univ
instructions appropriate to each persona , the personae meant are social
husband, father, master (1), and he soon makes it clear that they are not gear
and specific occasions, i.e. 'token actions' (14-15).78 For they would have
Precepts cover categories of action: they are praecepta generalia (35). Thu
answer to the non-specific questions of action, but without the examination t
as questions invites.
As for the non-specific questions relating to knowledge, they explore the a
doctrines. This type of logical puzzle in the later part of the work brings o
need to be explored if we are to understand the rationale behind the precep
early part of the work. However, Seneca is eager to keep even this level of
quite a practical level, the early part of Book 4 being the closest he gets to
the highest level of theory, while many of the questions considered, as
closely related to questions of conduct. Indeed in the last book, he endorses
Demetrius the Cynic that the basic principles to be learned are few and
reduces them to a regula (7.2), a rule for deciding easily whether what he has
he defines it in Letter 95.39. This is the same rule of thumb as Cicero had offered in De
officiis 3.81, 'there is no evil except what is shameful and no good except what is
honourable'.79 It is significant that Seneca puts the recital of basic essential principles there in

78 See Inwood, 'Rules and reasoning* (n.43, above) 109 on praecepta as providing instructions for the
kinds of actions that are normally appropriate and why. 'The distinction between normally and except-
ionally appropriate actions operates at the level of types; it is a distinct point about token actions that the
concrete particulars of each situation, including the character of the agent and the place of the action in
his life as a whole, determine the final moral evaluation of that particular action.'

79 Inwood, 'Rules and reasoning* (n.43, above) 120 n.74, 124 points out how slippery are the terms
formula, praecepta, lex, regula. His own suggestion (126) that the Stoic theory used general rules of
thumb as a reference point in moral reasoning, enabling the moral reasoner to find the balance between
abstract theory and the demands of a particular context, is helpful. He notes (120), as have others (e.g.
H. Gomoll, Der stoische Philosoph Hekaton, seine Begriffswelt und Nachwirkung, unter Beigabe seiner
Fragmente (Bonn 1933) 48-52), the use by Cicero of the resources of Roman legal reasoning in his

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 MIRIAM GRIFFIN: SENECA'S PEDAGOGIC STRATEGY 1 09

the mouth of the Cynic Demetrius, who confines them to ethics and is
as precepts of wisdom (praecepta sapientiae , 7.1.3). This is a kind o
terms, for, in the language of Letters 94 and 95, what he gives are d
general statements of philosophical truth, not counsels to action. Ho
Letter 94.31, trying to show the close relationship between precepts
the latter are nothing but generalia praecepta , and that most praecept
One is tempted to argue that of the two basic functions that Senec
in this pair of letters (p. 99), the first, that of awakening the natural
preparing one to receive doctrines, is covered by Books 1 -3 of De b
one for Book 4. The logical puzzles, starting in the second half of that
to refine the precepts and the practice in applying them correctly in c
enabling them to fulfil their second function.80 Even a person who has
says in Letter 94.32, 'has indeed been taught to do what he ought to
with sufficient clearness what the things that he ought to do actually
from accomplishing praiseworthy deeds not only by our emotions
practice in discovering the demands of a particular situation. Our min
control, and yet at the same time are inactive and untrained in find
Precepts help but they are not the whole solution, for Seneca had p
correspondence (Ep. 22.2) how difficult it is to apply general rules of
particular circumstances, and Cicero similarly had stressed that the pre
be supplemented by experience and practice in fitting them to part
become 'good calculators of our duties', and he does this precis
beneficence though he extends the relevance of what he says to al
Accordingly, Seneca can often be seen in these last books of De be
precise character of the obligations enshrined in familiar precepts (
of De beneficiis is comparable to a graduate level course in officia

formula in De officiis 3.19-20. But regula too has such credentials, as ma

Regulae , which seem to have been handbooks giving short statements of the
law, without going into all the subtleties and qualifications.

80 It is worth noting that, in the functional ordering of ethical teaching devise

Larissa in the 90' s BC and paraphrased by Stobaeus (Eel. 2.7 [39-41 W]), the
with safeguarding happiness puts in parallel the precepts ( parangelmata ) o
health and the doctrines on type of life (thermata peri bin ), of which th
specific questions: should the sensible man participate in politics or consort w
class; should the sage marry? In an appendix, it is said that men who are not w
condition' may need the hypothetical statement (hypothetikos logos) so that th
maxims for handling each matter securely and correctly. Thus bare precept
below the non-specific questions and are said to be derivable from them by t
then is operating at the level of appropriate actions in Eudorus' scheme (Brit
above) 288, but clearly at a more advanced and demanding level than particu
individual to cope with problematic situations by analyzing them' and gene
(Reinhardt, 'Rhetoric' (n.69, above) 540). For the Stoics, of course, only
either.

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 ! 10 GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY 100 BC-200 AD - VOLUME I

progressive (proficiens), just as Demetrius' advice in the last book is aimed at

( proficiens ) on the verge of becoming a Wise Man.81

5. The Progress ofAebutius Liberlis

Having considered the evolution of teaching style, we can now raise the que
evance to the level of progress of the imagined recipient.
Long ago Sonntag suggested that Aebutius Liberlis, attested in Seneca's
real person, was selected as the addressee merely because of the appropriaten
nomen. He adduced in support the fact that Liberlis is not addressed at lengt
add, characterized) until the 'addimenta' in 5.1 and 6.41. 82 No doubt the cog
an important part in Seneca's choice, as did his choice of Serenus as the dedic
quillitate animi ,83 but that does not mean that the persona of the addressee
In fact, this emergence from the shadows in the latter part of the work is
suggests that Seneca wishes the reader to see the role of the addressee becom
as he progresses towards parity with the author in the course of the work.
As is customary in Seneca, Liberlis is addressed in the preface to each bo
is just a name in Books 1 and 2. In 3.1.2 reference is made to a previous de
with Seneca over forgetfulness and ingratitude, but the distance between Seneca
essee is made clear: Seneca simply puts him right, without acknowledging an
argument.
At the start of Book 4 ('Of all the questions that we have discussed, Aebutius
Liberlis,...'), there is perhaps some hint of collaborative effort in the work so far, but it is
really in Books 5-7 that Liberlis is depicted as becoming more active. With 5.1.2 'Since,
however, such is your wish' (quia ita vis), the fiction is that Liberlis wants the author to
continue writing or, specifically, to elaborate particular puzzles. Then at 5.1.3-5, we are
shown Liberalis in action as a kind of exemplum of liberality: he has goodness (bonitas), he is

81 In Ben. 7.2.1 Demetrius wants the progressive (proficiens) to rehearse the necessary tenets until they
come to him spontaneously and he can distinguish right and wrong without hesitation. At the end of his
prescribed meditation, Seneca speaks of the pleasure experienced by the Wise Man. The slide from one
to the other is clearly supposed to suggest the metamorphosis.

82 M. Sonntag, De beneficiis libri explanantur (Leipzig 1913) 63.

83 Griffin, Seneca (n.10, above) 319, n.5. Though there would be nothing unusual in Seneca addressing
Liberlis by his cognomen alone (as with Serenus), Seneca does use Liberlis' nomen as well, but the
fact that he delays doing this until Book 3 and then inverts gentilicium and cognomen , suggests that it is
the cognomen that he wants to emphasize. See E. Dickey, Latin forms of address (Oxford 2002) 50, 53,
68-70.

84 Mazzoli, 'Le "voci" dei dialoghi di Seneca* in Seneca e il suo tempo (n.55, above) 25 1 marks this as a
characteristic of the dialogi in the Codex Ambrosianus, but it is true of De dementia and De beneficiis
as well. The Naturales quaestiones forms a partial exception, though Lucilius is addressed in the
prefaces of those books that have them (1,3, 4A), at the beginning and end of Book 6, and at the end of
Books 2 and 5. Book 4B is incomplete at the start, so only Book 7 lacks any invocation of the addressee.
But the incompleteness of parts of the work and the confused order of the books makes it difficult to be
clear about the pattern.

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 MIRIAM GRIFFIN: SENECA* S PEDAGOGIC STRATEGY 1 1 1

an excellent man (< optimus vir), and a great soul ( ingens animus). Th
ascribes to him fits very well with Seneca's teaching so far,85 yet at 5.2.1-
Liberlis most admires, It is shameful to be outdone in bestowing benef
At 5.12.1-2, Liberlis is first represented as finding the preceding di
being able to do oneself a benefit, useless and a waste of effort for S
imagines him becoming even more annoyed with the puzzles to come an
kind of thing that Seneca himself says in some of the Letters to Lucilius ,
laboriously untying knots which you yourself have made in order that yo
(cf. Epp. 45.4; 82.19). But here Seneca defends the practice of dialectic i
clear the distance between an unskilled person ( imperitus ), like Liber
untying such knots difficult, and the person who has tied the knots and c
(clearly Seneca himself), for whom they provide pleasure and a mental c
away complacence and sloth.
However, at the start of Book 6, Liberlis is assigned the task o
indicating by his facial expression how long he should dwell on certain t
not to dismiss some at once. The pleasure and profit to be derived from
seem to be accessible to both. At 6.5.3-7.1, Liberlis is shown actually p
He first steers Seneca away from a theoretical question ('whether a bene
if we are not under obligation to repay') to a more practical one abou
someone who first confers a benefit, then an injury (6.5.4): then
discussion altogether: Tour face, by which I agreed to be guided, i
frowning, as if to indicate that I am straying too far afield.' At 6.12. 1 Lib
face suggests a question following on from whether we are oblig
benefactor, i.e. are we obliged to a self-interested one? And Seneca addr
complaint that he has frequently heard Lucilius make. At 6.41.1 Liber
anxious about returning benefits, and at 6.42 Seneca says Liberlis is
requiting benefits and should not try to do it too soon. At the start of
attributes to Liberlis his decision to continue writing. In 7.17.1, perhap
the addressee, Seneca associates himself with Liberlis as imperfect pe
contrast with the Wise Man: in contrast with the perfect benefit, he sp
common benefit which we ignorant men exchange'.86
In De beneficiis Seneca has not provided his addressee with biographi
learn that (Aebutius) Liberlis came from Lyons in Letter 91. But one
managed to do is to build up a consistent picture of Aebutius Liberlis
advice in Book 6.41-42 fits with the portrait in Book 5 of Liberlis as s
generous, and who is perhaps too willing to overestimate what has be
(benignus etiam levissimorum officiorum aestimator). In Book 5 Liber
being outdone as a benefactor; in Book 6 he worries about not repaying q

85 Especially, to give the earlier passages in the order of the points in the Book 5 po
1.7.1; 2.17.6; 1.1.12; 2.11; 1.1.10; 2.9; 1.2.4-5.

86 Seneca's 'we', 'I', and 'you' are often ambiguous as between the personal and i
appear to be specifically himself and Lucilius, whereas in 7.28.2 (mentioning sena
(stulte) we are clearly in the territory of the impersonal.

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
1 12 GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY 100 BC-200 AD - VOLUME I

Of greater importance to understanding the structure and strategy of

however, is the fact that Liberlis' role as addressee develops in parallel wit
the style of teaching. He is a recipient of precepts in the first three books, an
straightforward admonition at 3.1.2. But after the precepts have been succee
in Book 4 and a new level of instruction has been reached, he becomes mo
now a more advanced progressive (proficiens ), but still not at the level of h
In Book 6, he is guiding the enquiry, though still receiving advice, and by
distinction is drawn between mentor and addressee as imperfecti. The rol
addressee in fact develops in parallel with the change in the style of teachin
mentor and addressee, like the readership of De beneficiis , are not Wise Men i
the realistic advice that follows about tactful requests for repayment being
even more by the characterization of Seneca's earlier sterner teaching as hy
and by the indication that we are all ungrateful (7.28).
The idea that Seneca's educational strategy involves matching the moral p
addressee to the evolution in teaching technique during De beneficiis , can
Seneca's practice in other works. Paul Veyne has suggested that the striki
between the concept of clemency in Book 1 of De dementia , where it is us
for pity and pardon (misericordia and venia), and that in Book 2, whe
distinguished from them, is to be explained by the need to woo the young N
with the ordinary confused commonsensical concept of mercy (dementia), s
be expected to understand: young and morally green in Book 1, he is then
more rigorous training in Book 2. But De dementia is incomplete, perhaps un
strategy is not unambiguous.87 Then again, the three dialogues addressed to
De constantia sapientis, De tranquillitate animi , and De otio (if we trust the en
the index to the Codex Ambrosianus) certainly show the addressee underg
development from avowed Epicurean scoffing at the Stoics (Const, sap. 3.
imperfectus striving to follow Stoic doctrine (Tranq. an. 1.10; 1.17) to an
championing those doctrines against the apparent heresy of the author (Ot
the fact that this happens across separate works makes it harder to disce
between Serenus' development and changes in Seneca's teaching techn
tranquillitate animi is clearly more therapeutic and the others more polem
advancing more complicated and subtle arguments. In particular, the Letter
we have seen, attribute to the addressee a fictional spiritual development t

87 But Veyne' s analysis is not incompatible with the idea, adduced as an explanation
Griffin, Seneca (n.10, above) 153-54, that the two books belong to different genres.

88 Griffin, Seneca (n.10, above) 316-17; 353-55.

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 MIRIAM GRIFFIN: SENECA* S PEDAGOGIC STRATEGY 1 1 3

change in the style and content of the Letters and is thus central to their
Liberlis, like Lucilius, is also shown gradually becoming capable o
philosophical understanding, even as the philosophy offered becomes
technical. But Liberlis, like Lucilius, remains an imperfectus. Nonethel
Letters or of De beneficiis , who identifies with the addressee, and ind
feel that the extended course he has undergone has set him firmly on t
happiness.

Somerville College , Oxford

89 Griffin, Seneca (n.10, above) 351-53, 417 gives, as confirmation of the fictionality of this
development, both its speed (the correspondence covers just one year, 63-64, or two, 62-64, according to
the internal indications, 400) and the wavering of the image of Lucilius resulting from Seneca* s
inconsistent tone of voice in addressing him, now from above, now as a tellow-learner. See on the
complexities, the discussion by C. Edwards, 'Self-scrutiny and self-transformation in Seneca's Letters',
Greece and Rome 44 (1997) 23-38.

This content downloaded from 129.234.0.31 on Thu, 23 Nov 2017 14:36:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms