Professional Documents
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It refers to the official duty of a public officer wherein the officer has no room for
the exercise of discretion, and the performance being required by direct and
positive command of the law. The powers and duties of public officers are, in
general, classified as ministerial and discretionary.
If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide
how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and
not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. (Codilla, Sr. v. de
Venecia, 442 Phil. 139 (2002).
POLITICAL QUESTION
In my more than 40 years of being a lawyer, I have never seen a busier Supreme Court
than the present one, more specifically the Supreme Court after the 1987 Constitution. So
many controversial issues have seen their way into the halls of this highest court in the
land which in the past should have been initially resolved by the lower courts.
Government contracts and transactions of public interests have been brought for scrutiny
at the first instance before this supposed court of last resort by just about any individual
or juridical entity having doubts as to their factual validity and regularity. The emerging
belief, though erroneous, is that the Supreme Court’s approval is required in
government deals or in any government action; a belief that has engendered the tendency
to run to the Supreme Court for all sorts of grievances or disagreements with certain
government decisions. A case in point is the recent filing by two lawyers of a petition
questioning the controversial appointments of two commissioners to the recently vacated
posts in the Comelec.
To be sure, the Supreme Court seems to be "busier" now not because it wants to dip its
finger into every pie. It really has more work to do now because the 1987 Constitution
expanded its power of judicial review not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government (Section 1, Article VIII). The
new provision clearly "did not just grant the court the power to do nothing". It gave the
court greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent such grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government (Estrada vs.
Desierto 353 SCRA 491). But can the Supreme Court use this expanded power to review
the presidential power to appoint, particularly of the two Comelec commissioners?
Under the "political question" doctrine arising from the principle of separation of powers,
the Judicial Branch cannot decide questions "in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government"
(Taada vs. Cuenco 103 Phil.1068). In the matter of the power of appointment, there is no
question that it is executive in nature (Gov’t vs. Springer 50 Phil. 259). It is
essentially a discretionary power of the president performed according to "his best lights".
(Luego vs. CSC 143 SCRA 327). The selection of the appointee–taking into account
the totality of his qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his
personality – is the prerogative and a matter addressed solely to the discretion of
the appointing authority (Lapinid vs. CSC 197 SCRA 106). Thus both the Luego and
Lapinid cases categorically declare that "this is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide".
The 1987 Constitution has indeed limited the scope of the political question doctrine when
it expanded the power of judicial review. Thus in the case of the president’s
appointing power, judicial review may be done if grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction has been committed. This means that the president’s
exercise of the discretionary power to appoint according to his best lights is subject to the
condition that the appointee "should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does,
then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been preferred" (Luego, Supra). If he does not, then the
appointment may be questioned as a grave abuse of discretion.
In the case of the two Comelec Commissioners, there is clearly no grave abuse of
discretion, not even any abuse of discretion. It is unquestionable that the President has the
power to appoint them (Section1[2] Art. IX C, Section 16, Art. VII). Apparently, nobody
has also questioned their qualifications for the position fixed by the Constitution
(Section1[1] Art. IX C). Questions have been raised only as to their character and
personality and their alleged partisan inclinations which have nothing to do with the
minimum qualification requirements for the position. The Supreme Court should
therefore junk the petition for it merely raises issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of their appointment. The wisdom or folly of their appointment, or any
appointment for that matter, is the sole responsibility of the President to the sovereign
people. This is purely a political question.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 532
Section 1. Title. This Decree shall be known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974.
Section 2. Definition of Terms. The following terms shall mean and be understood,
as follows:
a. PHILIPPINE WATERS. It shall refer to all bodies of water, such as but not
limited to, seas, gulfs, bays around, between and connecting each of the Islands of
the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of its depth, breadth, length or dimension,
and all other waters belonging to the Philippines by historic or legal title, including
territorial sea, the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas over
which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.
b. VESSEL. Any vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo
from one place to another through Philippine Waters. It shall include all kinds and
types of vessels or boats used in fishing.
c. PHILIPPINE HIGHWAY. It shall refer to any road, street, passage, highway
and bridges or other parts thereof, or railway or railroad within the Philippines
used by persons, or vehicles, or locomotives or trains for the movement or
circulation of persons or transportation of goods, articles, or property or both.
d. PIRACY. Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the
whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its
complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person,
including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine
waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates
and punished as hereinafter provided.
a. Piracy. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods
shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or
on the occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape,
murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or when
the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or when
the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory
penalty of death shall be imposed.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this
Section has performed knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
Section 5. Repealing Clause. Pertinent portions of Act No. 3815, otherwise known
as the Revised Penal Code; and all laws, decrees, or orders or instructions, or parts
thereof, insofar as they are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of August, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-four.
By the President:
(Sgd.) ALEJANDRO MELCHOR
Executive Secretary
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7438
April 27, 1992
Section 1. Statement of Policy. It is the policy of the Senate to value the dignity
of every human being and guarantee full respect for human rights.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his
place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the
commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known
to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who
shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford
the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent
and independent counsel by the investigating officer.lawphi1
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing
an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting"
officer for any violation of law.
(a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the suspected
person is chargeable with light felonies;
(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected
person is chargeable with less grave or grave felonies;
(c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspected
person is chargeable with a capital offense.
The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality
where the custodial investigation is conducted, provided that if the
municipality of city cannot pay such fee, the province comprising such
municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided, That the Municipal or City
Treasurer must certify that no funds are available to pay the fees of assisting
counsel before the province pays said fees.
Section 4. Penalty Clause. (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any
investigating officer, who fails to inform any person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of Six
thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not less than eight (8)
years but not more than ten (10) years, or both. The penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification shall also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been
previously convicted of a similar offense.
(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any
member of the immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister
chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel,
from visiting and conferring privately with him, or from examining and
treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the
day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four
thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with
custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such
reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his
escape.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9372
March 06, 2007
ANTI-TERRORISM ACT
Section 3 TERRORISM Any person who commits an act punishable under any
of the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code:
a. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in Philippine
Waters);
b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
c. Article 143-A (Coup d Etat), including acts committed by private persons;
d. Article 248 (Murder);
e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);
f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction)
or under
1. Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);
2. Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear
Waste Control Act of 1990);
3. Republic Act No. 5207 (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of
1968);
4. Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);
5. Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law
of 1974) and,
6. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on
Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or
Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)
thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand, shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism and shall suffer the
penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as
provided for under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, as amended.
Section 6 ACCESSORY Any person who, having knowledge of the commission
of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, and without having
participated therein, either as principal or accomplice under Articles 17 and 18 of
the Revised Penal Code, takes part subsequent to its commission in any of the
following manner: (a) by profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit by the
effects of the crime; (b) by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the
effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent discovery; (c) by harboring,
concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal or conspirator of the crime,
shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve years of
imprisonment.
a) When the offender has fired upon the pilot, member of the crew,
or passenger of the aircraft;
Before the AntiHijacking Law or R.A. 6235 may apply, the aircraft must
be of Philippine registry and it must be in flight.
"Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities. The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be
imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any
person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the
proper judicial authorities within the period of twelve (12) hours, for
crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent;
eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional
penalties, or their equivalent, and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the caused of his
detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and
confer at any time with his attorney or counsel."