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ALSUA-BETTS VS CA

FACTS: (1)Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doa Tinay, together with all their living children, entered into a duly notarized
agreement, (escritura de particion extrajudicial/extra judicial partition) for the inventory and partition of all the spouses
present and existing properties. In the provision of said extra judicial partition, each of the four children was allotted with the
properties considered as their share in the estate or as inheritance left by the deceased where they will be the absolute owner
of the properties assigned in case of death of one of the spouses. (2)Don Jesus and Do a Tinay also separately executed
holographic will with exactly the same terms and conditions in conformity with the executed extra judicial partition naming
each other as an executor without having to post any bond. That in case new properties be acquired same shall be
partitioned one half to the surviving spouse and the other half to children of equal parts.
(3).Spouses subsequently executed separately a codicil of exactly the same terms and conditions, amending and
supplementing their holographic wills stating that they reserved for themselves the other half not disposed of to their
legitimate heirs under the agreement of partition and mutually and reciprocally bequeathed each other their participation as
well all properties which might be acquired subsequently. Doa Tinay died in effect Don Jesus by order of the probate court
was name as executor.
Before Don Jesus died he cancelled his holographic will in the presence of his bookkeeper and secretary and instructed his
lawyer to draft a new will. This was a notarial will and testament of 3 essential features as follows;
1. It expressly cancelled revoked and annulled all the provisions of his holographic will and codicil.
2. It provided for the collation of all his properties donated to his four living children by virtue of the Escritura de Partition
Extra judicial.
3. It instituted his children as legatees / devisees of specific properties, and as to the rest of the properties and whatever
may be subsequently acquired in the future, before his death, were to be given to Francisca and Pablo naming Francisca as
executor to serve without a bond.

ISSUE:
1.W/N oppositors to the probate of the will, are in estoppel to question the competence of testator Don Jesus Alsua.
2.Whether testator Don Jesus can or cannot revoke his previous will.

HELD: 1.The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings ( case of Testate Estate of the Late Procopia
Apostol Benedicta Obispo, et al vs. Remedios Obispo, Probate proceedings involve public interest, and the application
therein of the rule of estoppel, when it will block the ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances surrounding the
execution of a testament, would seem inimical to public policy. Over and above the interest of private parties is that of the
state to see that testamentary dispositions be carried out if, and only if, executed conformably to law.

2. We rule that Don Jesus was not forever bound of his previous holographic will and codicil as such, would remain
revokable at his discretion. Art. 828 of the new Civil Code is clear: "A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before
his death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void." There can be no restriction that may be made on his absolute
freedom to revoke his holographic will and codicil previously made. This would still hold true even if such previous will had as
in the case at bar already been probated (Palacios v. Palacios, 106 Phil. 739). For in the first place, probate only
authenticates the will and does not pass upon the efficacy of the dispositions therein. And secondly, the rights to the
succession are transmitted only from the moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777, New Civil Code). In fine, Don
Jesus retained the liberty of disposing of his property before his death to whomsoever he chose, provided the legitime of the
forced heirs are not prejudiced, which is not herein claimed for it is undisputed that only the free portion of the whole Alsua
estate is being contested.

FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN P.


RAMIREZ, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY PROVINCE, petitioners,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO BUENVIAJE,


FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his guardian, CLOTILDE S. ALSUA and PABLO
ALSUA, respondents.

FACTS:
Nov. 25, 1949- Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Do;a Florentina Rella, together with all
their living children, Francisca, Pablo ,Fernando Alsua thru this judicial guardian Clotilde
Samson, and Amparo Alsua de Buenviaje, entered into a duly notarized agreement, over
the existing. abaca and cacao lands and urban lands registered in the Province of Albay
and in the City of Manila. On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doa Florentina( Doa
Tinay )separately executed their respective holographic wills in which were in conformity
and in implementation of the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949.
Their holographic wills similarly provided for the institution of the other to his or her share
in the conjugal properties, the other half of the conjugal assets having been partitioned
to constitute their legitime among their four living children in the Extrajudicial Partition of
1949. The wigs also declared that in the event of future acquisitions of other properties
by either of them, one-half would belong to the other spouse, and the other half shall be
divided equally among the four children. Don Jesus Alsua executed a separate but
similar holographic will on the same day, Jan. 5, 1955 in exactly the same terms and
conditions of the will of his wife. Spouses Don Jesus and Doa Tinay filed before the CFI
of Albay their respective petitions for the probate of their respective holographic wins in
two separate special proceedings.
Spouses then executed their mutual and reciprocal codicils amending and
supplementing their holographic wills in which the codicil also provided that one half of
all the properties( conjugal and paraphernal) is being conveyed to and portioned among
the legitimate heirs, but they are reserving the other half and they reciprocally
bequeathed to each other as well as the properties they are to acquire subsequently and
that the surviving spouse would be named executor in properties or administrator. Dona
Tinay died, Upon the death of Doa Tinay Don Jesus was named executor. Don Jesus
cancelled his holographic will in the presence of his bookkeeper/secretary He instructed
his new lawyer to draft a new will duly signed by Don Jesus and the attesting witnesses .
The will had three essential features: (a) it expressly cancelled, revoked and annulled all the
provisions of Don Jesus' holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956; (b) it
provided for the collation of all his properties donated to his four living children by virtue of Extrajudicial
Agreement of 1949, and that such properties be taken into account in the partition of his estate among the
children; and (c) it instituted his children as legatees/devisees of certain specific properties, and as to the
rest of the properties and whatever may be subsequently acquired in the future, before his death, were to be
given to Francisca and Pablo, naming Francesca as executrix to serve without a bond.
After all debts, funeral charges and other expenses of the estate of Doa Tinay had
been paid, all her heirs including Don Jesus, submitted to the probate court for approval
a deed of partition, the court approved the partition of 1959 and on January 6, 1961
declared the termination of the proceedings on the estate of Doa Tinay. Don Jesus
Alsua died.

Francisca filed a petition for the probate of the new will. It was opposed by her siblings
Pablo and Fernando, on the ground that Don Jesus was not of sound mind at the time of
the execution of the will. The will was disallowed. The daughter argued that the other
children, Pablo and Fernando, are in estoppel to question the competence of Don Jesus
by virtue of the agreement previously entered.

ISSUE: WON Estoppel is applicable in probate proceedings?

HELD: NO. The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings.


Probate proceedings involve public interest, and the application therein of the rule of estoppel,
when it will block the ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances, surrounding the
execution of a testament, would seem inimical to public policy.

The controversy as to the competency of Don Jesus to execute his will cannot be determined by
the acts of his sons to the will in formally agreeing in writing with Francisca that their father be
appointed by the court executor of the will of their mother.

The SC allowed the probate of the will upon finding that Don Jesus complied with the
requirements of law as to the execution of the will.

FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN P. RAMIREZ AND


THE REGISTER OF DEEDS (ALBAY), PETITIONERS
V.
COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO BUENVIAKE, FERNANDO ALSUA,
REPRESENTED BY HIS GUARDIAN, CLOTILDE S. ALSUA AND PABLO ALSUA, RESPONDENTS.
GR nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
Guerrero, J.

- On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Don a Florentina Rella, both of Ligao, Albay,
together with all their living children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua thru this
judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and Amparo Alsua de Buenviaje, entered into a duly notarized
agreement, Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial , over the then present and existing properties of
the spouses Don Jesus and Don a Florentina.

o of the total properties of the spouses were partitioned between the 4 children (roughly
equally). That the other half, which the spouses hold will belong to the surviving spouse and
the heirs (the children) waive their claim over the said against the surviving spouse in the
event one of the spouses died (ito yung pagkakaintindi ko)

- On Jan. 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doa Florentina, also known as Don a Tinay separately executed their
respective holographic wills, the provisions of which were in conformity and in implementation of
the extrajudicial partition of Nov. 25, 1949. Also any future acquisitions of property will be divided
the same way (1/2 to the children equally, to the surviving spouse). They filed petitions for the
probate of their respective holographic wills.

- On Aug.14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Don a Tinay executed their mutual and reciprocal codicils
amending and supplementing their respective holographic wills. On Feb. 19, 1957, their respective
holographic wins and the codicils thereto were duly admitted to probate. It reflected the agreed
partition before but added that should one spouse be the surviving spouse, whatever belongs to hi or
her or would pertain to him or her, would be divided equally among the four children (after
death). It was also added that the surviving spouse would be the executor or administrator of all
the properties reserved for themselves

- Don a Tinay died in October 1959. In early Nov. 1959, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic and
instructed his attorney to draft a new will. This subsequent last Will and Testament of Don Jesus
executed on Nov. 14, 1959 contained 3 essential features
o an express revocation of his holographic will of Jan. 5, 1955 and the codicil of Aug.14,
1956;
o a statement requiring that all of his properties donated to his children in the Deed of 1949 be
collated and taken into account in the partition of his estate;
o the institution of all his children as devisees and legatees to certain specific properties; a
statement bequeathing the rest of his properties and all that may be acquired in the future,
before his death, to Pablo and Francesca; and a statement naming Francesca as executrix
without bond.

- Don Jesus Alsua died in 1964. Petitioner Francisca Alsua Betts, as the executrix named in the new
will, filed a petition for the probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alsua.

- Pablo, Amparo and Fernando opposed on the ff grounds

o Don Jesus was not of sound and dispoing mind at the time of the execution of the alleged will
o Will was executed under duress or influence of fear or threats; or procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the main beneficiaries; or signature of Don
Jesus was secure by or through fraud
o That the will was not executed according to the formal requirements of the law and
o Alleged will contravened the extrajudicial partition agreed upon by the family, the
holographic will and codicil of Don Jesus. Allegedly, the 1949 partition was already partially
executed

- CFI allowed the probate of the will of Don Jesus Alsua despite the argument of the oppositors that
some of the properties were not included to which Alsua-Betts answered by saying that these were
sold to her by their father. CA reversed: denied the probate of the will, declared null and void the two
sales subject of the complaint and ordered the defendants-petitioners, to pay damages to the
plaintiffs-private respondents. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/s:
1. WON the oppositors were estopped from questioning the competence of Don Jesus Alsua. NO
2. WON CA erred in denying the probate of the will. YES

1. Although the court held that this issue was of no moment, it clarified that estoppel is not applicable in
probate proceedings. Probate proceedings involve public policy and applying estoppel when it will block the
ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances of the execution of the testament would be inimical to
public policy.

2.

- Art. 839 provide the instances where a will may be disallowed. The CA affirmed the findings of
the CFI that the new will complied with the requirements of Arts. 804-806 CC. But CA denied the
probate of the will after noting certain details which were a little bit difficult to reconcile with the
ordinary course of things and of life. CA held that the partiion of 1949 was an enforceable contract
which was binding on Don Jesus. Said contract barred him from violating the partition agreement,
barring him from revoking his will, and further barring him from executing his new will.

o SC: the extrajudicial partition of 1949 was null and void under article 1056 1 in relation to
12712 of the old civil code which are applicable. 1056 refers to a testator or one who has
already made a will and such testator is given the privilege of partitioning ones estate by

1
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall
stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs. ...
2
Art. 1271. All things, even future ones, which are not excluded from the commerce of man, may be the subject-matter of
contracts.
acts inter vivos3, 1056 being an exception cannot include in the exception any person
whether he has made a will or not. Otherwise a partition by acts inter vivos would be
tantamount to making a will which does not subscribe to the forms

o CA cited the same article but held that one can partition his properties by acts inter vivos,
even before the execution of the will as long as the fact is mentioned in the will. It also cited
Legasto v. Verzosa to prove its point but the SC does not agree with this.

o In fact, in Legasto v. Verzosa, the SC categorically declared the necessity of a prior will before
the testator can partition his properties by acts inter vivos among his heirs. The supreme
court of Spain and Manresa are of the same opinion with this interpretation of 1056. A
person who disposes of his property gratis inter vivos is not called a testator, but a donor. In
employing the word "testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish between one who
freely donates his property in life and one who disposes of it by will to take effect after his
death.

o The partition was not ratified by the execution of the will as how the CA ruled. CA erred in
denying the probate of the will just because of the partition which according to it bound Don
Jesus; it was void as a partition and unenforceable because it involved future inheritance. It
was only valid as a donation inter vivos of specific properties to the heirs made by
their parents.

- The court found that there was substantial compliance with the rules on donations inter vivos under
the old civil code in relation to the 1949 donation. But the other half remained as the free portion of
the spouses and no valid donation to the children of this other half.

- When Tinay died, her free portion was distributed in accordance with her holographic will and
codicil. Her children werent instituted as heirs to this free portion since the holographic will (as well
as the codicil)only mentioned that should she acquire more properties then the new properties
would be divided 50/50, one half to the children, the other to her husband. This partition does not
apply to the free portion reserved by the spouses for themselves. Also the court held that Don Jesus
was not bound to partition this free portion bequeathed to him by his wife equally between the
children.

- In fact, the court also held that he was not bound by his holographic will and codicil forever. It would
remain revocable. Art. 828 provides that the testator can revoke the will at any time before his death
even if the previous will had already been probated.

o Probate only authenticates the will and does not pass upon the efficacy of the dispositions in
it

o The rights to the succession are transmitted only from the moment of death.

- Examining the provisions of the will, the court found that those properties distributed under the deed
of 49 were not included in the distribution under the new will of Don Jesus. What he was
redistributing was his remaining estate or that portion of the conjugal assets left to his free disposal.
The court cant do about the motives and sentiments of Don Jesus in favoring Francesca more than his
other children.

Nevertheless, no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritances, except those the object of which is to
make a division inter vivos of an estate, in accordance with Article 1056.
All services not contrary to law or to good morals may also be the subject- matter of contract.
3
This is important for a later topic (partition and distribution by will or by inter vivos)
- The CA in denying the probate considered that Don Juan might have had diminished mental faculties
during the execution of the new will and the administration of the properties had been left to his
assistant who received instructions from Alsua-Betts and husband.

o SC disagreed with this since under Art. 799 mere weakness of the mind during the making of
the will (which is the time that should be the basis for measuring the mental capacity of the
testator) does not render a person incapable of making a will.

o Also sound mind is presumed under Art. 800 until there is proof to the contrary (which was
absent in this case)

o In fact it was Don Jesus himself who gave detailed instructions to his lawyer as to how he
wanted to divide his properties; that the semi final draft was even corrected by Don Jesus;
that on the day of the signing, Don Jesus even engaged in conversation about farming and
French-made wines; and that on the day of the signing of the will, he himself disclosed to the
witnesses why they were meeting

- The CA also used as basis for denying probate details which were a little bit difficult to reconcile with
the ordinary course of things and of life

o It appeared that he had no intention to probate the new will


o That it was redundant to sell to Francisca the properties which were already bequeathed to
her in the new will
o And that they cant find any reason why Don Jesus would favor Francisca (echoserang CA)

- SC: These circumstances do not warrant or justify disallowance of the probate of the will of Don Jesus.

o The law does not require that a will be probated during the lifetime of the testator and for
not doing so there cannot arise any favorable or unfavorable consequence therefrom
o Parties cannot correctly guess or surmise the motives of the testator and neither can the
courts. Same can be said on the sale of properties to Francisca

- There was a discussion on the annulment of the sale between Francisco And Don Jesus. SC found that
the declaration of nullity by the CA was not supported by evidence. No forgery, fraud, force or threat.
The consideration was paid. The alleged inadequacy of the consideration does not vitiate a contract
unless it is proven which in this case was not.

Decision Appealed from SET ASIDE. CFI ruling REINSTATED.

Justin Benedict A. Moreto

DOROMAL V. CA (September 5, 1975)


FACTS:
A parcel of land in Iloilo were co-owned by 7 siblings all surnamed Horilleno. 5 of the siblings gave a
SPA to their niece Mary Jimenez, who succeeded her father as a co-owner, for the sale of the land to
father and son Doromal. One of the co-owner, herein petitioner, Filomena Javellana however did not
gave her consent to the sale even though her siblings executed a SPA for her signature. The co-
owners went on with the sale of 6/7 part of the land and a new title for the Doromals were issued.

Respondent offered to repurchase the land for 30K as stated in the deed of sale but petitioners
declined invoking lapse in time for the right of repurchase. Petitioner also contend that the 30K price
was only placed in the deed of sale to minimize payment of fees and taxes and as such, respondent
should pay the real price paid which was P115, 250.
ISSUE:
WON the period to repurchase of petitioner has already lapsed.

HELD:
Period of repurchase has not yet lapsed because the respondent was not notified of the sale. The
30-day period for the right of repurchase starts only after actual notice not only of a perfected sale
but of actual execution and delivery of the deed of sale.

The letter sent to the respondent by the other co-owners cannot be considered as actual notice
because the letter was only to inform her of the intention to sell the property but not its actual sale.
As such, the 30-day period has not yet commenced and the respondent can still exercise his right to
repurchase.

The respondent should also pay only the 30K stipulated in the deed of sale because a
redemptioners right is to be subrogated by the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract
Doromal vs CA
66 SCRA 575 (1975)
BARREDO, J.:

FACTS:
Lot 3504 of the cadastral survey of Iloilo, situated in the poblacion of La Paz, one of its districts, with
an area of a little more than 2-1/2 hectares was originally decreed in the name of the late Justice
Antonio Horilleno, in 1916, under Original Certificate of Title No. 1314, Exh. A
but before he died, he executed a last will and testament attesting to the fact that it was a co-
ownership between himself and his brothers and sisters,
the co-owners were: beside 1. Justice Horilleno (daughter Mary as heir), 2. Luis,3. Soledad, 4. Fe, 5.
Rosita, 6. Carlos and 7. Esperanza,' all surnamed Horilleno, and since Esperanza had already died, she
was succeeded by her only daughter and heir herein plaintiff, Filomena Javellana, in the proportion of
1/7 undivided ownership each;
even though their right had not as yet been annotated in the title, the co-owners led by Carlos, had
wanted to sell their shares, or if possible if plaintiff Filomena Javellana were agreeable, wanted to sell
the entire property, and they hired an acquaintance Cresencia Harder, to look for buyers, and the
latter came to interest defendants, the father and son, named Ramon Doromal, Sr. and Jr., and
in preparation for the execution of the sale, since the brothers and sisters Horilleno were scattered in
various parts of the country, 1. Carlos in Ilocos Sur, 2. Mary in Baguio, 3. Soledad and 4. Fe, in
Mandaluyong, Rizal, and 5. Rosita in Basilan City, they all executed various powers of attorney in favor
of their niece, Mary H. Jimenez
they also caused preparation of a power of attorney of identical tenor for signature by plaintiff,
Filomena Javellana, and sent it with a letter of Carlos, dated 18 January, 1968
Carlos informed Filomina that the price was P4.00 a square meter,-although it now turns out
according to Exh. 3 that as early as 22 October, 1967, Carlos had received in check as earnest money
from defendant Ramon Doromal, Jr., the sum of P5,000.00 and the price therein agreed upon was five
(P5.00) pesos a square meter
in another letter also of Carlos to Plaintiff Filomina in 5 November, 1967, Exh. 6, he had told her that
the Doromals had given the earnest money of P5,000.00 at P6.00 a square meter
At any rate, Plaintiff Filomina not being agreeable, did not sign the power of attorney, and the rest of
the co-owners went ahead with their sale of their 6/7, Carlos first seeing to it that the deed of sale by
their common attorney in fact, Mary H. Jimenez be signed and ratified as it was signed and ratified in
Candon, Ilocos Sur, on 15 January, 1968, Exh; 2, then brought to Iloilo by Carlos in the same month,
and because the Register of Deeds of Iloilo refused to register right away, since the original registered
owner, Justice Antonio Horilleno was already dead, Carlos had to ask as he did, hire Atty. Teotimo
Arandela to file a petition within the cadastral case, on 26 February, 1968, for the purpose, after
which Carlos returned to Luzon, and after compliance with the requisites of publication, hearing and
notice, the petition was approved,
on 29 April, 1968, Carlos already back in Iloilo went to the Register of Deeds and caused the
registration of the order of the cadastral court approving the issuance of a new title in the name of
the co-owners, as well as of the deed of sale to the Doromals,
as a result of which on that same date, a new title was issued TCT No. 23152, in the name of the
Horillenos to 6/7 and plaintiff Filomena Javellana to 1/7,
the Doromals paid unto Carlos by check, the sum of P97,000,00 of Chartered Bank which was later
substituted by check of Phil. National Bank, because there was no Chartered Bank Branch in Ilocos
Sur, but besides this amount paid in check, the Doromals according to their evidence still paid an
additional amount in cash of P18,250.00 since the agreed price was P5.00 a square meter and thus
was consummated the transaction.
On 10 June, 1968, there came to the residence of the Doromals in Dumangas, Iloilo, plaintiff
Filomenas lawyer, Atty. Arturo H. Villanueva, bringing with him her letter of that date, making a
formal offer to repurchase or redeem the 6/7 undivided share in Lot 3504 for P30,000 in cash which
will be delivered as soon as the contract of sale is executed in favor of Filomena.
the Doromals were aghast, and refused
the next day, 11 June, 1968, plaintiff Filomena filed this case, and in the trial, thru oral and
documentary proofs, sought to show that as co-owner, she had the right to redeem at the price stated
in the deed of sale of P30,000.00
but defendants Sps Doromals in answer, and in their evidence, oral and documentary sought to
show that plaintiff had no more right to redeem, and that if ever she should have, that it should be at
the true and real price paid by them which amounts to P115,250.00

trial judge : plaintiff had no more right, to redeem, because 'Plaintiff was informed of the intended sale of the
6/7 share belonging to the Horillenos.'

Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and held that although respondent Filomena Javellana
was informed of her coowners' Proposal to sell the land in question to petitioners she was, however, "never
notified... least of all, in writing", of the actual execution and registration of the corresponding deed of sale,
hence, said respondent's right to redeem had not yet expired at the time she made her offer for that purpose
thru her letter of June 10, 1968 delivered to petitioners on even date. The intermediate court further held that
the redemption price to be paid by respondent should be that stated in the deed of sale which is P30,000
notwithstanding that the preponderance of the evidence proves that the actual price paid by petitioners was
P115,250.

ISSUE: WON Filomenas right to redeem had expired?

HELD: NO. There is No showing that Filomena was notified.

The letters sent by Carlos Horilleno to respondent and dated January 18, 1968, Exhibit 7, and November 5,
1967, Exhibit 6, constituted the required notice in writing from which the 30-day day period fixed in said
provision should be computed. But to start with, there is no showing that said letters were in fact
received by respondent Filomena and when they were actually received. Besides, petitioners do not
pinpoint which of these two letters, their dates being more than two months apart, is the required notice. In
any event, as found by the appellate court, neither of said letters referred to a consummated sale

It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the letters aforementioned sufficed to comply
with the requirement of notice of a sale by co-owners under Article 1623 of the Civil Code. We are of the
considered opinion and so hold that for purposes of the co-owner's right of redemption granted by Article
1620 of the Civil Code, the notice in writing which Article 1623 requires to be made to the other co-owners
and from receipt of which the 30-day period to redeem should be counted is a notice not only of a perfected
sale but of the actual execution and delivery of the deed of sale. This is implied from the latter portion of
Article 1623 which requires that before a register of deeds can record a sale by a co-owner, there must be
presented to him, an affidavit to the effect that the notice of the sale had been sent in writing to the other co-
owners. A sale may not be presented to the register of deeds for registration unless it be in the form of a duly
executed public instrument.

RATIO:

Petitioners do not question respondent's right to redeem, she being admittedly a 1/7 co-owner of the
property in dispute. The thrust of their first assignment of error is that for purposes of Article 1623 of the
Civil Code which provides that:

"ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from
the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not
be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given
written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners."

while the letters relied upon by petitioners could convey the idea that more or less some kind of
consensus had been arrived at among the other Homeowners to sell the property in dispute to
petitioners, it cannot be said definitely that such a sale had even been actually perfected. The fact
alone that in the later letter of January 18, 1968 the price indicated was P4.00 per square meter while
in that of November 5, 1967, what was stated was P5.00 per square meter negatives the possibility
that a "price definite" had already been agreed upon.
While P5,000 might have indeed been paid to Carlos in October, 1967, there is nothing to show that
the same was in the concept of the earnest money contemplated in Article 1482 of the Civil Code,
invoked by petitioner, as signifying perfection of the sale. Viewed in the backdrop of the factual milieu
thereof extant in the record, We are more inclined to believe that the said P5,000 were paid in the
concept of earnest money as the term was understood under the Old Civil Code, that is, as a guarantee
that the buyer would not back out, considering that it is not clear that there was already a definite
agreement as to the price then and that petitioners were decided to buy 6/7 only of the property
should respondent Javellana refuse to agree to part with her 1/7 share.
the law prefers that all the terms and conditions of the sale should be definite and in writing. As aptly
observed by Justice Gatmaitan in the decision under review, Article 1619 of the Civil Code bestows
unto a co-owner the right to redeem and "to be subrogated under the same terms and conditions
stipulated in the contract", and to avoid any controversy as to the terms and conditions under which
the right to redeem may be exercised, it is beat that the period therefor should not be deemed to have
commenced unless the notice of the disposition is made after the formal deed of disposal has been
duly executed. And it being beyond dispute that respondent herein has never been notified in writing
of the execution of the deed of sale by which petitioners acquired the subject property, it necessarily
follows that her tender to redeem the same made on June 10, 1968 was well within the period
prescribed by law. Indeed, it is immaterial when she might have actually come to know about said
deed, it appearing she has never been shown a copy thereof through a written communication by
either any of the petitionerspurchasers or any of her co-owners-vendees. (Cornejo et al. vs. CA et al.,
16 SCRA 775.)

other issue: REDEMPTION PRICE

from the decision of the Court of Appeals, We gather that there is "decisive preponderance of evidence"
establishing "that the price paid by defendants was not that stated in the document, Exhibit 2, of P30,000 but
much more, at least P97,000, according to the check if not a total of P115,250.00 because another amount in
cash of P18,250 was paid afterwards."

the contention of petitioners here that considering said finding of fact of the intermediate court, it erred in
holding nevertheless that "the redemption price should be that stated in the deed of sale."

Again, petitioners' contention cannot be sustained.

it is impossible for the Supreme Court to sanction petitioners' pragmatic but immoral posture. Being
patently violative of public policy and injurious to public interest, the seemingly wide practice of
understating considerations of transactions for the purpose of evading taxes and fees due to the
government must be condemned and all parties guilty thereof must be made to suffer the
consequences of their ill-advised agreement to defraud the state.

Verily, the trial court fell short of its devotion and loyalty to the Republic in officially giving its stamp of
approval to the stand of petitioners and even berating respondent Javellana as wanting to enrich herself "at
the expense of her own blood relatives who are her aunts, uncles and cousins."

On the contrary. said "blood relatives" should have been sternly told, as We here hold, that they are in pari-
delicto with petitioners in committing tax evasion and should not receive any consideration from any court in
respect to the money paid for the sale in dispute. Their situation is similar to that of parties to an illegal
contract.

Of course, the Court of Appeals was also eminently correct in its considerations supporting the conclusion
that the redemption in controversy should be only for the price stipulated in the deed, regardless of what
might have been actually paid by petitioners.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with costs against Petitioners.

CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,

vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.

Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.


Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.

Ponente: CRUZ

FACTS:

Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the
name of their deceased parents. One of them transferred his undivided share by way of absolute
sale. A year later, his sister sold her share in a Con Pacto de Retro Sale. By virtue of such
agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the
said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with
a fence. with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a
part of the enclosed area.

One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed when it
appeared that he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed her own complaint invoking the
same right of redemption of her brother. Trial court dismissed the complaint, on the ground that
the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales. Although
there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied
the requirement of the law. Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New Civil Code.

HELD:

YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.

RATIO:
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was
given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14
years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without
the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.

While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts] nevertheless have the
right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, [courts] defer not to the letter that
killeth but to the spirit that vivifieth, to give effect to the law makers will.

Chavez v. IAC
G.R. No. L-68282 November 8, 1990
The land in question is the paraphernal property of petitioner Manuela
Buenavista who
had six (6) children, named Antonio, Rosario, Concepcion, Raquel, Presentacion
and
Floserpina. The first three were the plaintiffs and the last three, with their
mother, were
the defendants in this case.
Presentacion, Floserpina and Raquel, with the conformity of their mother, sold
their 1/6 undivided share of the same land to their sister who became the owner
of 4/6
share of the subject land.
In all the deeds of sale, there was the stipulation wherein the owner , Manuela
Buenavista, had assigned or distributed to her children, in equal pro-indiviso
shares, her
paraphernal property.
Despite the transfers or assignments her children had executed with her
conformity ten years earlier, Manuela Buenavista, sold the entire property in
favor of her
daughter, Raquel Chavez, and her husband, Gerardo Jimenez. On October 7,
1968,
Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion filed a civil case against their mother Manuela
and
their sister Raquel. Thereupon, Manuela sold the entire property to Pepito Ferrer,
on
February 4, 1969 with right to repurchase.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deeds of sale were considered as a partition by an act
inter
vivos
YES. Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of
his estate either by an act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be
respected
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitimate of the compulsory heirs. While the
law
prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the partition by the parent, as
provided in
Art. 1080, is a case expressly authorized by law.
Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two options in making a
partition of his estate; either by an act inter vivos or by WILL. When a person
makes a
partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed in
accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person
makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be
oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided that
the partition does not prejudice the legitime of
compulsory heirs.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be
sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant
in
common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in
severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto
have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty,
exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the
existence of the partition.
In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the Deeds of Sale
executed by Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel, all surnamed Chavez in favor of
Concepcion Chavez as evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and
between Manuela Buenavista and her children as she not only gave her authority
thereto but also signed the sales. The Deeds of Sale are not contracts entered into
with
respect to feature inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated during
the
lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who signed the same and gave her consent
thereto.
Such partition inter vivos, executed by the property owner herself, is valid.
Thus, it would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de
Chavez to revoke the sales she herself authorized as well as the sale she herself
executed in favor of her son only to execute a simulated sale in favor of her
daughter
Raquel who had already profited from the sale she made of the property she had
received in the partition inter vivos; it would run counter to the doctrine that no
person
should be allowed to unjustly enrich herself at the expense of another.
CHAVEZ v. IAC
GR No. L-68282, November 8, 1990

FACTS: Manuela Buenavista assigned her paraphernal property in equal pro-diviso


among her 6 children, while possession of such property still remains with her.
Three of her children sold each their share to private respondent Concepcion,
consolidating 4/6 portion thereof. Deeds of sale were therefor executed with the
conformity of Manuela. Despite such transfers, the latter sold the entire property to
one of the siblings, herein petitioner Raquel Chavez. Respondent sued for the
annulment of the later sale to Raquel which was denied by the trail court but which
later decision overturned by the Court of Appeals. On appeal, petitioner also
contends that their mother has left a last will and this will supercedes the earlier
transfers.

ISSUE: Is partition inter-vivos, and sale based on such partition valid? Does a last
will supercede that of the partition inter-vivos?

HELD: Yes. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such
partition must be executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills;
however, when a person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such
partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided
that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs. xxx The
Deeds of Sale are not contracts entered into with respect to future inheritance but a
contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista
who signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos,
executed by the property owner herself, is valid.
It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to
revoke the sales she herself authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in
favor of her son only to execute a simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel
who had already profited from the sale she made of the property she had received
in the partition inter vivos.

G.R. No. 118464 December 21, 1998 HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI and
ROSARIO CUARIO,petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA S.
REYES as Attorney-in-Fact of JOSEFINA S. REYES, BERNARDITA S.
PALILIO, HERMINIA S. PALILIO, REMEDIOS A. SAMPAYO, ILUMINADA A.
SAMPAYO, ENRICO A. SAMPAYO CARLOS A. SAMPAYO, GENEROSO C.
SAMPAYO, MYRNA C. SAMPAYO, ROSALINO C. SAMPAYO, MANUEL C.
SAMPAYO, DELIA A. SAMPAYO, CORAZON C. SAMPAYO, NILO C.
SAMPAYO, and LOLITA A. SAMPAYO in her own behalf and as Attorney-
in-Fact of NORMA A. SAMPAYO,respondents
FACTS: Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuado,
were the co-owners of the property in litigation consisting of a 539-
square meter lot at the corner of Zamora and Abellanosa Streets,
Lucena City, covered by TCT No. T-15374, with a house erected
thereon. Lourdes died intestate and without issue. The private
respondents are all claiming to be collateral relatives of the deceased
Lourdes Sampayo, filed an action for partition and damages before
RTC-Br. 54, Lucena City.
The spouses Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario refused the partition on
the ground that private respondents failed to produce any document to
produce that they were the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. Ignacio
died and he was substituted by his children.
At the trial, private respondents presented Lydia Sampayo Reyes and
Adelaida Sampayo to prove that they were the collateral heirs of the
deceased Lourdes Sampayo and therefore entitled to her rights as co-
owner of the subject lot. Bringing with her the original copy of her
certificate of live birth showing that her father was Inocentes Reyes
and her mother was Josefina Sampayo, Lydia Sampayo Reyes testified
that she was one of the nieces of Lourdes Sampayo, being the
daughter of Josefina Sampayo, the only living sibling of Lourdes. They
also presnted the baptismal certificates of Lourdes deceased siblings
in order to prove their relations and that only Josefina is alive.
Rosario testified that the subject property was coowned in equal
shares by her husband Ignacio Conti and Lourdes Sampayo and that
her family (Rosario) had been staying in the subject property since
1937. She also said that it was Ignacio who pays the real estate tax
and the expenses. Liurdes also left her share to the spouses. no will,
either testamentary or holographic, was presented by petitioners to
substantiate this claim.
On 4 April 1991 the trial court declared private respodents as the
rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. It further ordered private
respondents and petitioners to submit a project of partition of the
residential house and lot for confirmation by the court. Appealed to CA,
which in turn affirmed the decision.
RULING: a prior and separate judicial declaration of heirship was not
necessary and that private respondents became the co-owners of the
portion of the property owned and registered in the name of Lourdes
Sampayo upon her death and, consequently, entitled to the immediate
possession thereof and all other incidents/rights of ownership as
provided for by law, including the right to demand partition under Art.
777 of the Civil Code. the property belongs to the heirs at the moment
of death of the decedent, as completely as if he had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death.
If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spuoses, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the decedent. It was established during the trial that Lourdes
died intestate and without issues. Private respondents as sister,
nephews and nieces now claim to be the collateral relatives of
Lourdes.

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