CASE DIGEST: CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC.

(CREBA) v. THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM

FACTS:

Oct 1997 Sec of DAR issued DAR A.O. entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures
Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses. The said AO
embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands
reclassified by LGU into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988. March 1999, Sec
DAR issued Revised Rules and Regulations on Conversion of Agricultural Lands to
Non AgriculturalUses, it covers the following: (1) those to be converted to
residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural
purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as
livestock, poultry, and fishpond the effect of which is to exempt the land from the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those to be
converted to non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized; and (4)
those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural
uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 and other pertinent laws and regulations, and
are to be converted to such uses. The 2 earlier AOs was further amended by an AO
issued Feb 2002 - 2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion; covers all
applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another
agricultural use.The AO was amended again in 2007 to include provisions
particularly addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities. To
address the conversion to lands to non agricultural, Sec of DAR suspended
processing and approval of land conversion through DAR Memo 88. CREBA claims
that there is a slowdown of housing projects because of such stoppage

ISSUES: Is DAR's AO unconstitutional?

HELD:

RA 6657 and 8435 defines agricultural land as lands devoted to or suitable for the
cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock,
poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm
activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming
operations done by a person whether natural or juridical, and not classified by the
law as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. However, he issued
an AO included in this definition - lands not reclassified as residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988. In effect, lands
reclassified from agricultural to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-
agricultural uses after 15 June 1988 are considered to be agricultural lands for
purposes of conversion, redistribution, or otherwise. This is violation of RA 6657

1
because there is nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or in any other
provision of law that confers to the DAR the jurisdiction or authority to require that
non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be submitted to its conversion authority. It
also violates Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, because it was not provided
therein that reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to conversion procedures or
requirements, or that the DARs approval or clearance must be secured to effect
reclassification.The said Section 2.19 of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, also
contravenes the constitutional mandate on local autonomy under Section 25, Article
II and Section 2, Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. There is deprivation of
liberty and property without due process of law because under DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, lands that are not within DARs jurisdiction are unjustly, arbitrarily and
oppressively prohibited or restricted from legitimate use on pain of administrative
and criminal penalties. More so, there is discrimination and violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because the aforesaid administrative order is
patently biased in favor of the peasantry at the expense of all other sectors of
society.

DISMISSED

G.R. No. 183409 June 18, 2010

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA), petitioner, vs.THE
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent.

FACTS:

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No. 07-97, 3 entitled "Omnibus
Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses," which
consolidated all existing implementing guidelines related to land use conversion. The aforesaid rules
embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, and all
untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-
agricultural uses after 15 June 1988.

Subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 01-99, 4
entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses,"
amending and updating the previous rules on land use conversion. Its coverage includes the following
agricultural lands, to wit: (1) those to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and
other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as
livestock, poultry, and fishpond the effect of which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that
previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-
agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657.

Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled
"2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion," which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR
AO No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all
applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use.

2
 To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development, the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which temporarily
suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications.

By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slow down of housing projects, which, in
turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the substantial
prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members but more so of the whole nation.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTION OVER LANDS THAT HAVE BEEN RECLASSIFIED AS
RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, OR FOR OTHER NON-AGRICULTURAL USES.

HELD: yes?

Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other
non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" have been included in the definition of agricultural lands. In so
doing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely acted within the scope of his authority stated in the aforesaid
sections of Executive Order No. 129-A, which is to promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian reform
implementation and that includes the authority to define agricultural lands for purposes of land use
conversion. Further, the definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers
to the category of agricultural lands that may be the subject for conversion to non-agricultural uses and is
not in any way confined to agricultural lands in the context of land redistribution as provided for under
Republic Act No. 6657.

More so, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which Opinion has been recognized in
many cases decided by this Court, clarified that after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988
the DAR has been given the authority to approve land conversion. 38 Concomitant to such authority, therefore,
is the authority to include in the definition of agricultural lands "lands not reclassified as residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" for purposes of land use
conversion.

It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and conversion that agricultural
lands though reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses must still
undergo the process of conversion before they can be used for the purpose to which they are intended.

Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DARs conversion authority can only be
exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988. 45 The said date served as the cut-off
period for automatic reclassification or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR
conversion clearance or authority.46 Thereafter, reclassification of agricultural lands is already subject to
DARs conversion authority. Reclassification alone will not suffice to use the agricultural lands for other
purposes. Conversion is needed to change the current use of reclassified agricultural lands. It bears stressing
that the act of reclassifying agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses simply specifies how agricultural
lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses and does not automatically convert agricultural lands to non-
agricultural uses or for other purposes.

City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila , GR 14355 (1D), 31 October 1919

3
FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be
expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement namely, the
extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such expropriation was
necessary.
Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said
expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been
used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and
that the same should not be converted into a street for public purposes.
The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the
particular strip of land in question.
Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it
(petitioner) has the authority to expropriate any land it may desire; that the only
function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in
question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the
advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the
necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in
expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method
adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.
ISSUE: W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the
expropriation?
HELD: Yes. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a
genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The
ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the
taking of the land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166 Ind., 511;
Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72
Ohio St., 368.)
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused
with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to
confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the State, general
authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the
courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused
with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal
corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply
with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the
authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is
admittedly within the power of the legislature . But whether or not the municipal
corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions
imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to
inquire into.
The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the necessity for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain is purely legislative and not
judicial, arises generally in the wisdom and propriety of the legislature in
authorizing the exercise of the right of eminent domain instead of in the question of

4
the right to exercise it in a particular case. (Creston Waterworks Co. vs. McGrath, 89
Iowa, 502.)
By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the exercise of
eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the
purposes designated by the law. (Fairchild vs. City of St. Paul. 48 Minn., 540.)
THECITYOFMANILA,plaintiffappellant,
vs.
CHINESECOMMUNITYOFMANILA,ETAL.,defendantsappellees.
G.R.No.L14355,October31,1919
FACTS
Theimportantquestionpresentedbythisappealis:InexpropriationproceedingsbythecityofManila,may
thecourtsinquireinto,andhearproofupon,thenecessityoftheexpropriation?
TheCityofManilapresentedapetitionintheCourtofFirstInstanceofsaidcity,prayingthatcertainlands,
thereinparticularlydescribed,beexpropriatedforthepurposeofconstructingapublicimprovement.Thepetitioner
allegedthatforthepurposeofconstructinganextensionofRizalAvenue,Manila,itisnecessaryfortheplaintiffto
acquireownershipofcertainparcelsoflandsituatedinthedistrictofBinondo.ThedefendantstheChinese
CommunityofManila,IldefonsoTambunting,andFelizaConcepciondeDelgadoallegedintheirAnswer(a)
thatnonecessityexistedforsaidexpropriationand(b)thatthelandinquestionwasacemetery,whichhadbeen
usedassuchformanyyears,andwascoveredwithsepulchresandmonuments,andthatthesameshouldnotbe
convertedintoastreetforpublicpurposes.Oneofthedefendants,IldefonsoTampbunting,offeredtograntaright
ofwayforthesaidextensionoverotherland,withoutcosttotheplaintiff,inorderthatthesepulchers,chapelsand
gravesofhisancestorsmaynotbedisturbed.
TheHonorableSimpliciodelRosario,decidedthattherewasnonecessityfortheexpropriationofthe
particularstripoflandinquestion,andabsolvedeachandallofthedefendantsfromallliabilityunderthe
complaint,withoutanyfindingastocosts.Onappeal,theplaintiffcontendedthatthecityofManilahasauthority
toexpropriateprivatelandsforpublicpurposes.Section2429ofActNo.2711(CharterofthecityofManila)
providesthat"thecity(Manila)...maycondemnprivatepropertyforpublicuse."
ISSUE
WhetherornottheCityofManilacancondemnprivatepropertyforpublicuse
HELD
No.ItistruethatSection2429ofActNo.2711,ortheCharteroftheCityofManilastatesthat"thecity
(Manila)...maycondemnprivatepropertyforpublicuse."Butwhenthestatutedoesnotdesignatethepropertyto
betakennorhowitmaybetaken,thenecessityoftakingparticularpropertyisaquestionforthecourts.Whenthe
applicationtocondemnorappropriatepropertyismadedirectlytothecourt,thequestionofnecessityshouldbe
raised(Wheeling,etc.R.R.Co.vs.Toledo,Ry,etc.,Co.[72OhioSt.,368]).Thenecessityforconferringthe
authorityuponamunicipalcorporationtoexercisetherightofeminentdomainisadmittedlywithinthepowerof
thelegislature.Butwhetherornotthemunicipalcorporationorentityisexercisingtherightinaparticularcase
undertheconditionsimposedbythegeneralauthority,isaquestionwhichthecourtshavetherighttoinquireinto.
Theimpossibilityofmeasuringthedamageandinadequacyofaremedyatlawistooapparenttoadmitof
argument.Todisturbthemortalremainsofthoseendearedtousinlifesometimesbecomesthesaddutyofthe
living;but,exceptincasesofnecessity,orforlaudablepurposes,thesanctityofthegrave,thelastrestingplaceof
ourfriends,shouldbemaintained,andthepreventativeaidofthecourtsshouldbeinvokedforthatobject.
(RailroadCompanyvs.CemeteryCo.,116Tenn.,400;EvergreenCemeteryAssociationvs.TheCityofNew
Haven,43Conn.,234;Andersonvs.Acheson,132Iowa,744;Beattyvs.Kurtz,2Peters,566.)
Whetherornotthecemeteryispublicorprivateproperty,itsappropriationfortheusesofapublicstreet,
especiallyduringthelifetimeofthosespeciallyinterestedinitsmaintenanceasacemetery,shouldbeaquestionof
greatconcern,anditsappropriationshouldnotbemadeforsuchpurposesuntilitisfullyestablishedthatthe
greatestnecessityexiststherefor.Inthepresentcase,evengrantingthatanecessityexistsfortheopeningofthe
5
streetinquestion,therecordcontainsnoproofofthenecessityofopeningthesamethroughthecemetery.The
recordshowsthatadjoiningandadjacentlandshavebeenofferedbyTambuntingtothecityfreeofcharge,which
willanswereverypurposeoftheplaintiff.
Thejudgmentofthelowercourtwasaffirmed.
RATIO/DOCTRINE
[1]Thetakingofprivatepropertyforanyuse,whichisnotrequiredbythenecessitiesorconvenienceofthe
inhabitantsofthestate,isanunreasonableexerciseoftherightofeminentdomain,andbeyondthepowerofthe
legislaturetodelegate.(Bennettvs.Marion,106Iowa,628,633;Wilsonvs.Pittsburg,etc.Co.,222Pa.St.,541,
545;Greasy,etc.Co.vs.Ely,etc.Co.,132Ky.,692,697.)Tojustifytheexerciseofthisextremepower(eminent
domain)wherethelegislaturehasleftittodependuponthenecessitythatmaybefoundtoexist,inorderto
accomplishthepurposeoftheincorporation,thepartyclaimingtherighttotheexerciseofthepowershouldbe
requiredtoshowatleastareasonabledegreeofnecessityforitsexercise(NewCentralCoalCo.vs.George'setc.
Co.[37Md.,537,564]).
[2]Thegeneralpowertoexercisetherightofeminentdomainmustnotbeconfusedwiththerightto
exerciseitinaparticularcase.Thepowerofthelegislaturetoconfer,uponmunicipalcorporationsandother
entitieswithintheState,generalauthoritytoexercisetherightofeminentdomaincannotbequestionedbythe
courts,butthatgeneralauthorityofmunicipalitiesorentitiesmustnotbeconfusedwiththerighttoexerciseitin
particularinstances.Themomentthemunicipalcorporationorentityattemptstoexercisetheauthorityconferred,it
mustcomplywiththeconditionsaccompanyingtheauthority.
[3]Therightofexpropriationisnotaninherentpowerinamunicipalcorporation,andbeforeitcan
exercisetherightsomelawmustexistconferringthepoweruponit.Whenthecourtscometodeterminethe
question,theymustonlyfind(a)thatalaworauthorityexistsfortheexerciseoftherightofeminentdomain,but
(b)alsothattherightorauthorityisbeingexercisedinaccordancewiththelaw.Inthepresentcasetherearetwo
conditionsimposedupontheauthorityconcededtotheCityofManila:First,thelandmustbeprivate;and,second,
thepurposemustbepublic.Ifthecourt,upontrial,findsthatneitheroftheseconditionsexistsorthateitheroneof
themfails,certainlyitcannotbecontendedthattherightisbeingexercisedinaccordancewithlaw.
[4]Theexerciseoftherightofeminentdomain,whetherdirectlybytheState,orbyitsauthorizedagents,is
necessarilyinderogationofprivaterights,andtheruleinthatcaseisthattheauthoritymustbestrictlyconstrued.
Nospeciesofpropertyisheldbyindividualswithgreatertenacity,andnoneisguardedbytheconstitutionand
lawsmoresedulously,thantherighttothefreeholdofinhabitants.Whenthelegislatureinterfereswiththatright,
and,forgreaterpublicpurposes,appropriatesthelandofanindividualwithouthisconsent,theplainmeaningof
thelawshouldnotbeenlargedbydoubtlyinterpretation.(Benselyvs.MountainlakeWaterCo.,13Cal.,306and
casescited[73Am.Dec.,576].)

Sangalang v. IAC (G.R. No. 71169. December 22, 1988)

18AUG

FACTS:

The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to opening of several streets to the
general public, after a series of developments in zoning regulations. All but Jupiter St. was voluntarily
opened. The strong opposition later gave way when the municipal officials force-opened the gates of
said street for public use. The area ceased to be purely residential. Action for damages was brought
against Ayala Corporation and BAVA for alleged breach of contract, to maintain the purely residential
status of the area. Other similarly situated also filed their respective cases. All were dismissed in the trial
court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said dismissals.

ISSUE:
6
Whether or not there is a contract between homeowners and Ayala Corporation violated in opening the
Jupiter street for public use.

HELD:

No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence nothing was violated.

RATIO:

Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Ayala Corporation, to build a [f]ence
along Jupiter [street] with gate for entrance and/or exit as evidence of Ayalas alleged continuing
obligation to maintain a wall between the residential and commercial sections. Assuming there was a
contract violated, it was still overtaken by the passage of zoning ordinances which represent a legitimate
exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown why Courts should hold otherwise other than
for the supposed non-impairment guaranty of the Constitution, which is secondary to the more
compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary
or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed.

Short Facts:

GR 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281 are efforts to enforce the deed restrictions against
specific residents of Jupiter Street and, with respect to GR 78182, Reposo Street. The
residents have allegedly converted their residences into commercial establishments (a
restaurant in GR 74376, a bakery and coffee shop in GR 76394, an advertising firm in GR
78182; and a construction company, apparently, in GR 82281) in violation of the said
restrictions. Their mother case, GR 71169 is, on the other hand, a petition to hold the
vendor itself, Ayala Corporation (formerly Makati Development Corporation), liable for
tearing down the perimeter wall along Jupiter Street that had theretofore closed its
commercial section from the residences of Bel-Air Village and ushering in, as a
consequence, the full commercialization of Jupiter Street, in violation of the very
restrictions it had authored. The Court of Appeals dismissed all 5 appeals on the basis
primarily of its ruling in AC-GR 66649, Bel-Air Village, Inc. v. Hy-Land Realty Development
Corporation, et al., in which the appellate court explicitly rejected claims under the same
deed restrictions as a result of Ordinance 81 enacted by the Government of the
Municipality of Makati, as well as Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance 8101 promulgated by
the Metropolitan Manila Commission, which two ordinances allegedly allowed the use of
Jupiter Street both for residential and commercial purposes. It was likewise held that these
twin measures were valid as a legitimate exercise of police power.

Issue: WON Makati Resolution No. 81 and MMC Ordinance 81-01 are unconstitutional as
violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.

7
Decision: No. Both are constitutional. All contracts are subject to the overriding demands,
needs, and interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate
exercise of police power. The Court guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the
law between the contracting parties, but while it is so, it cannot contravene law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy. Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent
to police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the
common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary. Police power is
the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety and general welfare of the people. Invariably described as the most
essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers and in a sense, the greatest and most
powerful attribute of government, the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into
and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been
a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.
Police power is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not
confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it must
follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life. Public welfare, when clashing with the
individual right to property, should be made to prevail through the states exercise of its
police power. Herein, the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police power,
as the ordinance is neither capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable; but that it is based on
compelling interests of general welfare. The restrictive easements are similar to any other
contract, and should not deter the valid exercise of police power. The MMC has reclassified
Jupiter Street into a high density commercial zone, pursuant to Ordinance 81-01.
Sangalang, BAVA, et. al., thus have no cause of action on the strength alone of said deed
restrictions.

MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village [328 SCRA 836; G.R. No. 135962; 27 Mar 2000]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a

Government Agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air
Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter of request from the
petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said
opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons and to
regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act
No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall
separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a
preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the
8
MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to
open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can practice
police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.

Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic
pursuant to its regulatory and police powers.

Held: The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power.
Police power is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be
delegated to government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a
political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because it
cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act
No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable
in the said act that grants MMDA police power.

It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with
various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic
services in the vast metropolitan area.

MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Assoc.

March 27, 2000
Puno, J.

Facts

Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members
are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered
owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.

On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December
22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996.

Actions Filed:

9
 1. BAVA applied for injunction; trial court issued temporary restraining order but after due hearing,
trial court denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
2. BAVA appealed to CA which issued preliminary injunction and later ruled that MMDA has no
authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition
of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.
3. MMDA filed motion for reconsideration but was denied by CA; hence the current recourse.

Issues

1. Has the MMDA the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and
police powers?
2. Is the passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the MMDA may order the opening of
subdivision roads to public traffic?

Held

The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its functions are administrative in
nature.

The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power.

The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government
units, acting through their respective legislative councils that possess legislative power and police power. In
the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering
the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent
Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling.

The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the
powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a
private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not
antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.

Dispositive

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are affirmed.
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC v. CA
G.R. No. 94759, Jan. 21, 1991, 201 SCRA

FACTS:

Technology Developers, a corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of charcoal

briquette, received a letter from acting mayor Pablo Cruz: 1) ordering the full cessation of
its plant in Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan until further order, and 2) requesting its Plant

10
Manager to bring before the office of the mayor its building permit, mayor's permit, and
Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit.

Technology Developers undertook to comply with the request to produce the required
documents. It sought to secure the Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural
Resources Anti-Pollution Permit although prior to the operation of the plant, a Temporary
Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation was issued to it. Petitioners also sent its
representatives to the office of the mayor to secure a mayors permit but were not
entertained.

Eventually, the acting mayor ordered that the plant premises be padlocked, effectively
causing the stoppage of operation. This was done without previous and reasonable notice.

Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary injunction against the acting mayor with Bulacan RTC, alleging that the
closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion.

The RTC found that the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was
proper, ordering the acting mayor to immediately revoke his closure order and allow
Technology Developers to resume its normal business operations until the case has been
adjudicated on the merits.

Upon MR, the Provincial Prosecutor presented evidence as to the allegation that "Due to
the manufacturing process and nature of raw materials used, the fumes coming from the
factory may contain particulate matters which are hazardous to the health of the people.
As such, the company should cease operating until such a time that the proper air
pollution device is installed and operational."

Reassessing the evidence, the RTC set aside its order granted the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction. The CA denied Technology Developer's petition for certiorari for lack
of merit.

ISSUE:

W/N the acting mayor had a legal ground for ordering the stoppage of Technology
Developer

HELD:

YES. The following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the writ of
preliminary injunction sought by petitioner:

1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining
whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of
the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be recognized
that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from
11
pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to
operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to
control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the
emissions in the operation of the business.

2. The Acting Mayor called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes
of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the
health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation
until further orders.

3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of
Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through
channels.

4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made
by Marivic Guina who in her report observed that the fumes emitted by the plant goes
directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollutiondevice has been
installed.

5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria, but
instead presented a building permit issued by an official of Makati on March 6, 1987.

6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National
Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May
25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less
to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the
residents of the community.

Court takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this dollar-
earning industry. It must be stressed however, that concomitant with the need to promote
investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential imperative
of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of the
pollution of the environment.

The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is
addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and itsaction shall not be
disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction or otherwise, in grave abuse of its discretion. By the same token the court
that issued such a preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ as the circumstances
may warrant.
Technology vs CA (193 scra 147)

Facts:

Technology Developers Inc. is engaged in manufacturing and exporting charcoal briquette. On

February 16, 1989, they received a letter from respondent Acting Mayor Pablo Cruz, ordering the full
cessation of the operation of the petitioners plant in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The letter also requested the
company to show to the office of the mayor some documents, including the Building permit, mayors permit,
and Region III-Pollution of Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit.
12
 Since the company failed to comply in bringing the required documents, respondent Acting Mayor,
without notice, caused the padlock of companys plant premises, effectively causing stoppage of its
operation.

Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohiition, mandamus with
preliminary injuction against respondents, alleging that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of
discretion. The lower court ruled against the company. The CA affirmed the lower courts ruling.

Issue:

Whether of not the mayor has authority to order the closure of the plant. YES.

Whether or not the closure order was done with grave abuse of discretion. NO.

Ruling:

1. Nomayor'spermithadbeensecured.Whileitistruethatthematterofdeterminingwhetherthereisa
pollutionoftheenvironmentthatrequirescontrolifnotprohibitionoftheoperationofabusinessis
essentiallyaddressedtothethenNationalPollutionControlCommissionoftheMinistryofHuman
Settlements,nowtheEnvironmentalManagementBureauoftheDepartmentofEnvironmentand
NaturalResources,itmustberecognizedthatthemayorofatownhasasmuchresponsibilitytoprotect
itsinhabitantsfrompollution,andbyvirtureofhispolicepower,hemaydenytheapplicationfora
permittooperateabusinessorotherwiseclosethesameunlessappropriatemeasuresaretakento
controland/oravoidinjurytothehealthoftheresidentsofthecommunityfromtheemissionsinthe
operationofthebusiness.
2. TheActingMayor,intheletter,calledtheattentionofpetitionertothepollutionemittedbythefumes
ofitsplantwhoseoffensiveodor"notonlypollutetheairinthelocalitybutalsoaffectthehealthofthe
residentsinthearea,"sothatpetitionerwasorderedtostopitsoperationuntilfurtherordersanditwas
requiredtobringthefollowing:
a. Buildingpermit;
b. Mayor'spermit;and
c. RegionIIIDepartmentofEnvironmentandNaturalResourcesAntiPollutionpermit.
3. ThisactionoftheActingMayorwasinresponsetothecomplaintoftheresidentsofBarangayGuyong,
Sta.Maria,Bulacan,directedtotheProvincialGovernorthroughchannels.
4. TheclosureorderoftheActingMayorwasissuedonlyafteraninvestigationwasmade.Itfoundthat
thefumesemittedbytheplantofpetitionergoesdirectlytothesurroundinghousesandthatnoproper
airpollutiondevicehasbeeninstalled.
5. PetitionerfailedtoproduceabuildingpermitfromthemunicipalityofSta.Maria,butinsteadpresented
abuildingpermitissuedbyanofficialofMakati.
6. WhilepetitionerwasabletopresentatemporarypermittooperatebythethenNationalPollution
ControlCommissiononDecember15,1987,thepermitwasgoodonlyuptoMay25,1988.Petitioner
hadnotexertedanyefforttoextendorvalidateitspermitmuchlesstoinstallanydevicetocontrolthe
pollutionandpreventanyhazardtothehealthoftheresidentsofthecommunity.

Petitionertakesnoteofthepleaofpetitionerfocusingonitshugeinvestmentinthisdollarearningindustry.
Itmustbestressedhowever,thatconcomitantwiththeneedtopromoteinvestmentandcontributetothegrowthof
theeconomyistheequallyessentialimperativeofprotectingthehealth,naytheverylivesofthepeople,fromthe
deleteriouseffectofthepollutionoftheenvironment.

13
 CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY AKLAN,

G.R. No. 211356; September 29, 2014

DOCTRINE: Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order
the closing and demolition of establishments. This power granted by the LGC, as earlier explained, We
believe, is not the same power devolved in favor of the LGU under Sec. 17 (b)(2)(ii), as above-quoted,
which is subject to review by the DENR. The fact that the building to be demolished is located within a
forestland under the administration of the DENR is of no moment, for what is involved herein, strictly
speaking, is not an issue on environmental protection, conservation of natural resources, and the
maintenance of ecological balance, but the legality or illegality of the structure. Rather than treating this
as an environmental issue then, focus should not be diverted from the root cause of this debacle
compliance.

FACTS

Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management
Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove). On January 7, 2010, the company applied for a zoning
compliance with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan. 2 While the company was already operating
a resort in the area, and the application sought the issuance of a building permit covering the
construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located in Sitio Diniwid,
Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for
Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in
favor of Boracay West Cove.

Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied
petitioners application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the no build zone
demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance).

Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action was ever
taken by the respondent mayor. A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government,
enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan
issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Coves hotel.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA Alleging that the
order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion.

PETITIONER CONTENTION: The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se,
given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture. And the Municipality of Malay,
Aklan should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the demolition.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor
has the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally
constructed buildings.

ISSUE

Whether or not a judicial proceedings be conducted first before the LGU can order the closure and
demolition of the property in question.

RULING

14
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a
nuisance per se.

Despite the hotels classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, we still find in this case that
the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotels demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police
power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to
promote the general welfare.

Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the
requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition.

One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal governments, acting
through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the office of the
mayor is given powers not only relative to its function as the executive official of the town; it has also
been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with
an effective order or resolution thereon. 20 Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b) (3) (vi) of the LGC, which
empowered the mayor to order the closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing
to secure the necessary permits.

G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014

CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, Petitioner,
v.
MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, Respondent.
VELASCO JR., J.:

NATURE:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the Decision 1 and the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals. The assailed rulings denied Crisostomo Aquinos Petition for Certiorari for not being the proper
remedy to question the issuance and implementation of Executive Order No. 10, Series of 2011 (EO 10),
ordering the demolition of his hotel establishment.

FACTS:
Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. applied for a building permit covering the
construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land in Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest
Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioners application on the
ground that the proposed construction site was within the no build zone demarcated in Municipal
Ordinance 2000-131.

Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action was ever
taken by the respondent mayor.

A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the
resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering
the closure and demolition of Boracay West Coves hotel.

EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two more instances followed wherein
respondents demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay West Cove.

15
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA Alleging that the order
was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion

Contentions of West Cove:

1) The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred million
peso-worth of capital infused in the venture.
2) Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the
demolition.

Contention of the Mayor: The demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor has the
express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally constructed
buildings

The CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ of certiorari can only be
directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and since the
issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive functions, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial
functions, certiorari will not lie.

ISSUE:
Whether the judicial proceedings should first be conducted before the LGU can order the closure and
demolition of the property in question.

HELD:
The Court ruled that the property involved cannot be classified as a nuisance per sewhich can therefore
be summarily abated. Here, it is merely the hotels particular incident, its location and not its inherent
qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone,
Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without issue. As such, even if the
hotel is not a nuisance per se, it is still a nuisance per accidens

Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a
nuisance per se. Despite the hotels classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, the LGU may
nevertheless properly order the hotels demolition. This is because, in the exercise
ofpolice power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Moreover, the Local
Government Code authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through their local chief
executives, to issue demolition orders. The office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the
closing and demolition of establishments.

FALLO:

Petition is denied
CASIO V. CA
204 SCRA 449
REGALADO, December 22, 1991

NATURE
Petition for Review

16
FACTS
-Prior to the Passage of Resolution No. 49, Code Ordinance, Series of 1984, The Don Romulo Rodriguez Coliseum (Coliseum)
was licensed as a cockpit under Sec. 2285 to 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code. However, the said ordinance classified
certain areas of Gingoog City as residential zones, declaring among others, the site of the Coliseum as such. The classification
led to the cancellation of the cockpit license.
-Resolution 378, Code Ordinance, Series of 1985, reclassified Block 125 (where the cockpit is located) as within the
recreational zone, thus allegedly amending Resolution No. 49. 9 mems of the sangguniang panlungsod participated, 4 voting
for amendment, 4 voted against it, 1 abstained. Vice-mayor, as presiding officer, voted for amendment to break the deadlock.
-When Resolution No. 378 was transmitted to then Mayor Paderanga for approval, he merely returned the same within 10 days,
stating that his approval was not necessary as it did not involve a disposition of city government funds.
-with Resolution No. 378, next mayor issued the Coliseum permit to operate cockpit dated April 2, 1986. It was renewed on
January 5, 1987
-Private respondent Gingoog Gallera, Inc. (Gallera) protested the operation of Coliseum before the Philippine Game Fowl
Commission (PGC): no certificate of registration issued by PGC
-PGC: sent telegram to station Commander of Gingoog City to suspend temporarily the operation of the cockpit. Subsequently
sent telegram to mayor to stop any cockfight in the coliseum in lieu of its failure to register with PGC.
-Gallera filed Special Civil Action for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction before RTC Gingoog City against
Casino: Resolution No. 378 is invalid: the classification of Coliseums site is still within the residential zone of Gingoog City
therefore Mayors permit issued are null and void for being in violation of Sec. 6 of the Rules and Regulations of PGC
-RTC: issued preliminary injunction until PGC finally decided the controversy; subsequently declared the Mayors permits to be
null and void.
-Casino appealed; CA affirmed

ISSUES
1. WON the PGC controls the operations of the Coliseum with respect to local/ordinary cockfights during Sundays, holidays and
fiestas, despite the fact that the mayor of Gingoog City had issued permits
2. WON the mayors permits are null and void as Resolution 378 did not amend Resolution 49 the votes not obtained

HELD
1. YES, power of review
Reasoning. The PGC has the power not of control but only of review and supervision.
-Review is a reconsideration or re-examination for purposes of correction. The power of review is exercised to determine
whether it is necessary to correct the acts of the subordinate and to see to it that he performs his duties in accordance with law.
This the PGC did by bringing to the attention of the local authorities the non-compliance by petitioner with the rules involved in
this case which we find reasonable and necessary in the discharge of the regulatory functions of PGC. PGC may, for that
purpose and as it did here, indicate its disapproval of the acts of the local officials concerned to stress and perform its role with
respect to the regulation of cockpits.

17
-The task of granting licenses to operate cockpits is lodged with City and Municipal Mayors with the concurrence of their
respective Sanggunians. This is specifically granted to them by Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1802 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1802-A. This is not to say that the power to grant licenses is absolute. It must be noted that certain
requirements must be complied (with) before a license may issue. First, the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission in connection with the operation of cockpits must be observed. And second, that there must be concurrence of the
Sanggunians.

2. YES, null and void and votes necessary

Reasoning. Although the charter of the City of Gingoog and the Local Government Code require only a majority for the
enactment of an ordinance, Resolution No. 49 cannot be validly amended by the resolution in question without complying with
the categorical requirement of a three-fourths vote incorporated in the very same ordinance sought to be amended. The
pertinent provisions in the aforesaid city charter and the Local Government Code obviously are of general application and
embrace a wider scope or subject matter. In the enactment of ordinances in general, the application of the aforementioned laws
cannot be disputed. Undeniably, however, Section 6.44 of said ordinance regarding amendments thereto is a specific and
particular provision for said ordinance and explicitly provides for a different number of votes. Where there is in the same statute
a particular enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the
former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general statement must be taken to affect only such cases within its
language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment.
-In sum, Block 125 where Coliseum is located remains classified as a residential area, hence the operation of a cockpit therein
is prohibited. This weighty consideration, which should actually be the principal basis for the nullification by respondent court of
the two mayor's permits issued to petitioner (private respondent-appellant therein), was explained as follows:

Disposition. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated on May 30, 1989 and its resolution dated October 27, 1989 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED

G.R. No. L-23979

August 30, 1968
FACTS
The Mayor and the Municipal Board of the City of Manila passed Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 on
December 31, 1963, to take effect on January 1, 1964, declaring a state of emergency in view of
the prevailing scarcity of lands and buildings for residential purposes in the City of Manila which
shall provide housing accommodations especially for the poor at reasonable rates. An action was
brought by the Homeowners Association of the Philippines, Inc. and its President, Vicente A. Rufino
against the Mayor and the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to nullify the aforementioned
Municipal Ordinance.
ISSUE
Whether or not Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 is constitutional?
HELD
The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment declaring said ordinance ultra vires,
unconstitutional, illegal and void ab initio upon the ground that the power to declare a state of
18
 emergency exclusively pertains to Congress; that there is no longer any state of emergency
which may justify the regulation of house rentals; that said ordinance disconstitutes an
unreasonable and unjustified limitation on the use of private properties and arbitrarily encroaches
on the constitutional rights of property owners; that the power of the City of Manila to regulate
the business of letting or subletting of lands and buildings does not include the authority to
prohibit what is forbidden in said ordinance; and that the same cannot be deemed sanctioned by
the general welfare clause in the City Charter.
GARCIA V. COMELEC
Sept. 30, 1994
FACTS:
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul
Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which includes the Municipaloty of Morong as part of the
Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with the RA No. 7227.
The municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission; so, they
resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. They solicited the
required number of signatures to repeal the said resolution.
However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon, and the Presiding Office of the Sangguniang Bayan ng
Morong wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to deny the petition for local initiative and/or referendum.
On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition for local initiative because its subject is merely a
resolution and not an ordinance.
ISSUE:
w/n the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is the proper subject of an initiative?
Sub-issue: w/n the decision of the Comelec to deny the petition be set aside?
HELD:
The petition is granted and the decision of the Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled and set aside.
RULING:
The 1987 Constitution installed back the power to the people regarding legislation because of the event
in February 1986. The new Constitution became less trusting of public officials.
Through initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution under Sec. 2 Art. 17 which
provides amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voter therein.
The Comelec was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an initiative and referendum.
On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA No. 6735 entitled An Act Providing for a System of
Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
YES. Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides the Congress shall provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and
the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local
legislative body.
Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the 3 systems of initiative, namely:
1. Initiative on the Constitution petition to amend the Constitution
2. Initiative on statutes petition proposing to enact a national legislation
3. Initiative on local legislation petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or
barangay law, resolution or ordinance
Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations on local initiatives, which is the power of local initiative
shall not be exercised more than once a year.

19