Cable Star Inc vs Cable Boss (GR No 181058, January 28, 2008) Petitioner alleged that its real

Petitioner alleged that its real properties[4] in Tanza, Cavite were sold
Cant find the full case by its assistant vice-president, Augusto S. Parcero, to Inter-Alia without its
knowledge and consent and without the requisite board resolution
SIGMA HOMEBUILDING G.R. No. 177898 authorizing the same. Inter-Alia, in turn, sold them to DBR. DBR then sold
CORPORATION, the same to Intercon which conveyed them to Hasting.
Petitioner, Present: Summonses were served on all respondents, except Inter-Alia as it
no longer held office at its given address.
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO, For its part, Hasting filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
- v e r s u s - CORONA, complaint stated no cause of action, among others. It stated that the
AZCUNA and annotations in petitioners cancelled TCTs (which were attached to the
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. complaint) clearly showed that Parcero was authorized to sell the lots to
Inter-Alia. Also attached to the complaint were the duly notarized deed of
INTER- absolute sale (signed and executed by Parcero, in representation of petitioner)
ALIA MANAGEMENT and the acknowledged receipt of the total consideration in the amount
CORPORATION, DEVELOPMENT of P1,522,920.00. Hasting went on to allege that, based on the complaint,
BANK OF RIZAL, petitioner might not even be a real party in interest to the subsequent
INTERCON FUND successive transfers of the properties to the different respondents. Thus, it
RESOURCES had no cause of action for annulment of sale.
CORPORATION,
HASTING REALTY and In its comment/opposition to Hastings motion to dismiss, petitioner
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION merely insisted that it had a cause of action but did not controvert Hastings
and REGISTER OF DEEDS for material assertions.
the PROVINCE of CAVITE,
Respondents. Promulgated: Respondent Intercon filed an answer.[5] The other respondents,
August 13, 2008 however, were not able to file their respective responsive pleadings.

x - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x Subsequently, in an order dated July 3, 2002, the RTC dismissed the

complaint for failure to state a cause of action. It also ruled that the action for
RESOLUTION reconveyance was not proper since the properties had already passed on to
CORONA, J.: the hands of innocent purchasers in good faith and for value. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration. It was denied.[6]

Petitioner Sigma Homebuilding Corporation filed a complaint for
annulment of sale, cancellation of titles, reconveyance and damages[1] against
respondents, namely, Inter Alia Management Corporation (Inter-Alia),
Intercon Fund Resources Corporation (Intercon), Hasting Realty and
Development Corporation (Hasting),[2] Development Bank of Rizal
(DBR)[3] and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Trece Martires City, Cavite, Branch 23.
Petitioner appealed to the CA.[7] The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the court a quo.[8] The CA also denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[9]
Petitioners petition for review on certiorari in this Court[10] was
denied for failure to show that the appellate court had committed any
reversible error in the assailed judgment.[11] Its motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied.[12]
 Thereafter, petitioner filed in the CA a petition for annulment of the
order dated July 3, 2002 of the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.[13] It argued that the trial court
overstepped its boundaries when it dismissed the complaint not only against
Hasting but also against the other respondents despite the fact that it was only
Hasting that moved for its dismissal.
The CA denied the petition outright.[14] It held that for an action for
annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction to prosper, it was not
sufficient that respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction; petitioner must show that said court
absolutely lacked jurisdiction or that it should not have taken cognizance of
the case because the law did not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
More importantly, the appellate court found that petitioner had
already availed of the remedy of ordinary appeal before the CA and this
Court. Having been unsuccessful in its appeal before the CA under Rule 41
and the Supreme Court under Rule 45, petitioner could no longer avail of the
petition for annulment of judgment, especially since the issue relied upon in
the petition could have been properly raised in its appeal in the CA (as, in
fact, it was so raised by petitioner and passed upon by the appellate court in
said appeal). The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.[15]
Undeterred, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari in this
Court. It was, however, denied on August 8, 2007 for late filing.[16] On
November 26, 2007, its motion for reconsideration was denied with finality.
Thus, the August 8, 2007 resolution became final and executory on January
18, 2008. Entry of judgment was made on April 25, 2008.
But petitioner stubbornly refuses to give up. In a letter-appeal dated
June 30, 2008,[17] it implored this Court to take another hard look at the
merits of its case. Petitioner reiterated that it was effectively deprived of its
right to due process when the RTC dismissed the complaint against the other
respondents. It also pleaded for a liberal interpretation of the rules of
procedure.
The letter-appeal is without merit.
The letter-appeal is actually in the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading under the Rules of
Court.[18] Worse, it was filed despite the fact that an entry of judgment had
already been made. It was obviously a ruse meant to evade the effects of the
final and executory resolutions of this Court.
Moreover, even if we were to grant petitioners letter-appeal based on
its alleged substantial compliance with the pertinent rules of procedure, the
substantive aspect of its arguments left much to be desired.
Petitioner cannot successfully argue that the dismissal of the
complaint motu proprio against the other respondents effectively deprived it
of its right to due process. It must be pointed out that petitioners complaint
went to great lengths to trace who the first buyer of its properties was (Inter-
Alia) down to the current owner thereof, which is Hasting.As title to the
contested properties is now vested in Hasting, there was really no need for
petitioner to implead all the other respondents for the successful prosecution
of its action for annulment of sale against Hasting. A perusal of the
complaint reveals that all the other respondents were not even real parties in
interest[19] in this case, to begin with. The only real parties in interest in this
particular controversy were petitioner and Hasting for they were the only
ones who stood to be benefitted or injured, as the case may be, by the
judgment in the suit.
Furthermore, the CA was correct in holding that, as petitioner had
already availed of the remedy of appeal, it could no longer avail of a petition
for annulment of judgment. A petition for annulment of judgment is an
extraordinary remedy and is not to be granted indiscriminately by the Court.
It is allowed only in exceptional cases and cannot be used by a losing party to
make a mockery of a duly promulgated decision long final and
executory.[20] The remedy may not be invoked where the party has availed
himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedy and lost, or where he has failed to avail himself of those
remedies through his own fault or negligence.[21]
Litigation must end sometime. It is essential to an effective and
efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment becomes final, the
winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must
therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that undesirable
result.[22] Thus, we deem it fit to finally put an end to the present controversy.
WHEREFORE, the letter-appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
Treble costs against petitioner.
No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.
 SO ORDERED.
DOLORES L. DELA CRUZ, A.C. No. 7781
MILAGROS L. PRINCIPE,
NARCISA L. FAUSTINO, Present:
JORGE V. LEGASPI, and
JUANITO V. LEGASPI, QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
Complainants, CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
- versus - BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
ATTY. JOSE R. DIMAANO, JR.,
Respondent. September 12, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In their complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Jose R.
Dimaano, Jr., Dolores L. Dela Cruz, Milagros L. Principe, Narcisa L.
Faustino, Jorge V. Legaspi, and Juanito V. Legaspi alleged that on July 16,
2004, respondent notarized a document denominated as Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate with Waiver of Rights purportedly executed by them
and their sister, Zenaida V.L. Navarro. Complainants further alleged that: (1)
their signatures in this document were forged; (2) they did not appear and
acknowledge the document on July 16, 2004 before respondent, as notarizing
officer; and (3) their purported community tax certificates indicated in the
document were not theirs.
According to complainants, respondent had made untruthful
statements in the acknowledgment portion of the notarized document when
he made it appear, among other things, that complainants personally came
and appeared before him and that they affixed their signatures on the
document in his presence. In the process, complainants added, respondent
effectively enabled their sister, Navarro, to assume full ownership of their
deceased parents property in Tibagan, San Miguel, Bulacan, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-303936 and sell the same to the
Department of Public Works and Highways.
In his answer, respondent admitted having a hand in the preparation
of the document in question, but admitted having indeed notarized it. He
explained that he notarized [the] document in good faith relying on the
representation and assurance of Zenaida Navarro that the signatures and the
community tax certificates appearing in the document were true and
correct. Navarro would not, according to respondent, lie to him having
known, and being neighbors of, each other for 30 years. Finally, respondent
disclaimed liability for any damage or injury considering that the falsified
document had been revoked and canceled.
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner
of the Office of the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), found the following as established: (1) the questioned
document bore the signatures and community tax certificates of, and purports
to have been executed by, complainants and Navarro; (2) respondent indeed
notarized the questioned document on July 16, 2004; (3) complainants did
not appear and acknowledge the document before respondent on July 16,
2004; (4) respondent notarized the questioned document only on Navarros
representation that the signatures appearing and community tax certificates
were true and correct; and (5) respondent did not ascertain if the purported
signatures of each of the complainants appearing in the document belonged
to them.
The Commission concluded that with respondents admission of
having notarized the document in question against the factual backdrop as
thus established, a clear case of falsification and violation of the Notarial
Law had been committed when he stated in the Acknowledgment that:
Before me, on this 16th day of July 16,
2004 at Manila, personally came and appeared the above-
named persons with their respective Community Tax
Certificates as follows:
xxxx
who are known to me to be the same persons who executed
the foregoing instrument and they acknowledge to me that
the same is their own free act and deed. x x x
For the stated infraction, the Commission recommended,
conformably with the Courts ruling in Gonzales v. Ramos,[1] that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year; that his notarial
commission, if still existing, be revoked; and that he be disqualified for
reappointment as notary public for two (2) years. On September 28, 2007, the
IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-147, adopting
and approving the report and recommendation of the Commission.
We agree with the recommendation of the Commission and the
premises holding it together. It bears reiterating that notaries public should
refrain from affixing their signature and notarial seal on a document unless
the persons who signed it are the same individuals who executed and
personally appeared before the notaries public to attest to the truth of what
are stated therein, for under Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 or the Notarial
Law, an instrument or document shall be considered authentic if the
acknowledgment is made in accordance with the following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a
notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the
country to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is done. The notary
public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify
that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is
known to him and that he is the same person who executed
it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and
deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if
he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate
shall so state.[2]
Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the
document in question, notaries public would be unable to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that
the document is the partys free act or deed.[3] Furthermore, notaries public are
required by the Notarial Law to certify that the party to the instrument has
acknowledged and presented before the notaries public the proper residence
certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter its
number, place, and date of issue as part of certification.[4] Rule II, Sec. 12 of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice[5] now requires a party to the instrument
to present competent evidence of identity. Sec. 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity.The phrase
competent evidence of identity refers to the identification of
an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an
official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the
individual, such as but not limited to, passport, drivers
license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National
Bureau of Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal
ID, voters ID, Barangay certification, Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security System
(SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID,
seamans book, alien certificate of registration/immigrant
certificate of registration, government office ID, certificate
from the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled
Persons (NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare and
Development certification [as amended by A.M. No. 02-8-
13-SC dated February 19, 2008]; or
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness
not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who is
personally known to the notary public and who personally
knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of
whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction
who each personally knows the individual and shows to the
notary public documentary identification.
One last note. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are
mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties
being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. It must be
remembered that notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for
notarization converts a private document to a public instrument, making it
admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its
authenticity and due execution.[6] A notarized document is by law entitled to
full credit upon its face and it is for this reason that notaries public must
observe the basic requirements in notarizing documents. Otherwise, the
confidence of the public on notorized documents will be eroded.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law, the notarial
commission of respondent Atty. Jose R. Dimaano, Jr., if still existing,
is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIEDfrom being commissioned as notary
public for a period of two (2) years and SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon receipt of a copy of this
Decision, with WARNING that a repetition of the same negligent act shall
be dealt with more severely.

Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as
well as the IBP and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this
Decision and be it entered into respondents personal record.
SO ORDERED.
certification[2] from the Government of Singapore showing that he was
vaccinated in the said country on June 17, 1996; and (2) a
certification[3] from the Philippine Bureau of Immigration showing that he
was out of the country from March 21, 1995 to January 28, 1997. To prove
that his signature on the SPA was forged, the complainant presented a
report[4] from the National Bureau of Investigation stating to the effect that
the questioned signature on the SPA was not written by him.

The complainant likewise alleged that because of the SPA, his real
CHARLES B. BAYLON, A.C. No. 6962 property was mortgaged to Lorna Express Credit Corporation and that it was
Complainant, subsequently foreclosed due to the failure of his wife to settle her mortgage
Present: obligations.

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, In his answer, the respondent admitted notarizing the SPA, but he
- versus - PUNO, C.J., argued that he initially refused to notarize it when the complainants wife first
REYES, came to his office on June 17, 1996, due to the absence of the supposed
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and affiant thereof. He said that he only notarized the SPA when the
BRION, JJ. complainants wife came back to his office on June 26, 1996, together with a
person whom she introduced to him as Charles Baylon. He further contended
that he believed in good faith that the person introduced to him was the
complainant because said person presented to him a Community Tax
ATTY. JOSE A. ALMO, Promulgated: Certificate bearing the name Charles Baylon. To corroborate his claims, the
Respondent. respondent attached the affidavit of his secretary, Leonilita de Silva.
June 25, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x The respondent likewise denied having taken part in any scheme to
commit fraud, deceit or falsehood.[5]
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
After due proceedings, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline
This case stemmed from the administrative complaint filed by the recommended to the IBP-Board of Governors that the respondent be strongly
complainant at the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) charging the admonished for notarizing the SPA; that his notarial commission be
respondent with fraud and deceit for notarizing a Special Power of Attorney revoked; and that the respondent be barred from being granted a notarial
(SPA) bearing the forged signature of the complainant as the supposed commission for one year.[6]
principal thereof.
In justifying its recommended sanctions, the IBP-Commission on
Complainant averred that Pacita Filio, Rodolfo Llantino, Jr. and his Bar Discipline stated that
late wife, Rosemarie Baylon, conspired in preparing an SPA[1] authorizing
his wife to mortgage his real property located in Signal Village, Taguig. He In this instance, reasonable diligence should have
said that he was out of the country when the SPA was executed on June 17, compelled herein respondent to ascertain the true identity of
1996, and also when it was notarized by the respondent on June 26, 1996. To the person seeking his legal services considering the nature
support his contention that he was overseas on those dates, he presented (1) a of the document, i.e., giving a third party authority to
 mortgage a real property owned by another. The only saving
grace on the part of respondent is that he relied on the fact
that the person being authorized under the SPA to act as
agent and who accompanied the impostor, is the wife of the
principal mentioned therein.[7]
On October 22, 2005, the IBP-Board of Governors issued Resolution
No. XVII-2005-109 which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondents failure to properly ascertain the true identity of
the person seeking his legal services considering the nature
of the document, Atty. Jose A. Almo is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year and Respondents notarial commission is Revoked and
Disqualified (sic) from reappointment as Notary Public for
two (2) years.[8]
In our Resolution[9] dated February 1, 2006, we noted the said IBP
Resolution.
We agree with the finding of the IBP that the respondent had indeed been
negligent in the performance of his duties as a notary public in this case.
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be
overemphasized. In Santiago v. Rafanan,[10] we explained,
. . . Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act
as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document
into a public document thus making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative
agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended
to a private instrument.
For this reason, notaries public should not take for
granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod
methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to
be countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in
the performance of their duties, which are dictated by public
policy and are impressed with public interest.[11]
Mindful of his duties as a notary public and taking into account the nature of
the SPA which in this case authorized the complainants wife to mortgage the
subject real property, the respondent should have exercised utmost diligence
in ascertaining the true identity of the person who represented himself and
was represented to be the complainant.[12] He should not have relied on the
Community Tax Certificate presented by the said impostor in view of the
ease with which community tax certificates are obtained these days.[13]As a
matter of fact, recognizing the established unreliability of a community tax
certificate in proving the identity of a person who wishes to have his
document notarized, we did not include it in the list of competent evidence of
identity that notaries public should use in ascertaining the identity of persons
appearing before them to have their documents notarized.[14]
Moreover, considering that respondent admitted[15] in the IBP hearing
on February 21, 2005 that he had already previously notarized some
documents[16] for the complainant, he should have compared the
complainants signatures in those documents with the impostors signature
before he notarized the questioned SPA.
WHEREFORE, the notarial commission, if still extant, of
respondent Atty. Jose A. Almo is hereby REVOKED. He is
likewise DISQUALIFIED to be reappointed as Notary Public for a period of
two years.
To enable us to determine the effectivity of the penalty imposed, the
respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to
this Court.
 Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar DECISION
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the courts all over the NACHURA, J.:
country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal
records of the respondent.
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to
Rule 65, of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions
SO ORDERED.
dated April 29, 2010[1] and May 17, 2010,[2] respectively, of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 10-046 (DC).
First, the undisputed facts.

SERGIO G. AMORA, JR., G.R. No. 192280 On December 1, 2009, petitioner Sergio G. Amora, Jr. (Amora) filed
Petitioner, his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol. At that
Present: time, Amora was the incumbent Mayor of Candijay and had been twice
CORONA, C.J., elected to the post, in the years 2004 and 2007.
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, To oppose Amora, the Nationalist Peoples Coalition (NPC) fielded
VELASCO, JR., Trygve L. Olaivar (Olaivar) for the mayoralty post. Respondent Arnielo S.
NACHURA, Olandria (Olandria) was one of the candidates for councilor of the NPC in
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, the same municipality.
BRION,
- versus - PERALTA, On March 5, 2010, Olandria filed before the COMELEC a Petition
BERSAMIN,* for Disqualification against Amora. Olandria alleged that Amoras COC was
DEL CASTILLO, not properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus Election
ABAD, Code (OEC) and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out
VILLARAMA, JR., that, in executing his COC, Amora merely presented his Community Tax
PEREZ, Certificate (CTC) to the notary public, Atty. Oriculo Granada (Atty.
MENDOZA, and Granada), instead of presenting competent evidence of his identity.
SERENO, JJ. Consequently, Amoras COC had no force and effect and should be
considered as not filed.
Promulgated:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and Amora traversed Olandrias allegations in his Answer cum Position
ARNIELO S. OLANDRIA, January 25, 2011 Paper.[3] He countered that:
Respondents.
1. The Petition for Disqualification is actually a Petition to Deny Due
Course or cancel a certificate of candidacy. Effectively, the petition of
Olandria is filed out of time;

2. Olandrias claim does not constitute a proper ground for the

cancellation of the COC;

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 3. The COC is valid and effective because he (Amora) is personally
known to the notary public, Atty. Granada, before whom he took his oath in
filing the document;
4. Atty. Granada is, in fact, a close acquaintance since they have
been members of the League of Muncipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, for
several years; and
5. Ultimately, he (Amora) sufficiently complied with the requirement
that the COC be under oath.
As previously adverted to, the Second Division of the COMELEC
granted the petition and disqualified Amora from running for Mayor of
Candijay, Bohol.
Posthaste, Amora filed a Motion for Reconsideration[4] before the
COMELEC en banc. Amora reiterated his previous arguments and
emphasized the asseverations of the notary public, Atty. Granada, in the
latters affidavit,[5] to wit:
1. The COMELECs (Second Divisions) ruling is contrary to the
objectives and basic principles of election laws which uphold the primacy of
the popular will;
2. Atty. Granada states that while he normally requires the affiant to
show competent evidence of identity, in Amoras case, however, he accepted
Amoras CTC since he personally knows him;
3. Apart from the fact that Amora and Atty.
Granada were both members of the League of Municipal Mayors, Bohol
Chapter, the two consider each other as distant relatives because Amoras
mother is a Granada;
4. It is a matter of judicial notice that
practically everybody knows the Mayor, most especially lawyers and
notaries public, who keep themselves abreast of developments in local
politics and have frequent dealings with the local government; and
5. In all, the COC filed by Amora does not lack the required
formality of an oath, and thus, there is no reason to nullify his COC.
Meanwhile, on May 10, 2010, national and local elections were held.
Amora obtained 8,688 votes, equivalent to 58.94% of the total votes cast,
compared to Olaivars 6,053 votes, equivalent to only 41.06% thereof.
Subsequently, the Muncipal Board of Canvassers of Candijay, Bohol,
proclaimed Amora as the winner for the position of Municipal Mayor of
Candijay, Bohol.[6]
A week thereafter, or on May 17, 2010, in another turn of events, the
COMELEC en banc denied Amoras motion for reconsideration and affirmed
the resolution of the COMELEC (Second Division). Notably, three (3) of the
seven (7) commissioners dissented from the majority ruling. Commissioner
Gregorio Larrazabal (Commissioner Larrazabal) wrote a dissenting opinion,
which was concurred in by then Chairman Jose A.R. Melo and
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento.
In denying Amoras motion for reconsideration and upholding
Olandrias petition for disqualification of Amora, the COMELEC
ratiocinated, thus:
[Amora] himself admitted in his Motion that the Second
Division was correct in pointing out that the CTC is no
longer a competent evidence of identity for purposes of
notarization.
The COC therefore is rendered invalid when [petitioner]
only presented his CTC to the notary public. His defense that
he is personally known to the notary cannot be given
recognition because the best proof [of] his contention could
have been the COC itself. However, careful examination of
the jurat portion of the COC reveals no assertion by the
notary public that he personally knew the affiant, [petitioner]
herein. Belated production of an Affidavit by the Notary
Public cannot be given weight because such evidence could
and should have been produced at the earliest possible
opportunity.
The rules are absolute. Section 73 of the Election Code
states:
Section 73. Certificate of Candidacy. No
person shall be eligible for any elective
public office unless he files a sworn
 certificate of candidacy within the period
fixed herein.
Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 (Rules),
the requirements of notarization of an oath are:
Section 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term
Affirmation or Oath refers to an act in which
an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary
public;
(b) is personally known to the notary
public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as
defined by these Rules; and
(c) avows under penalty of law to
the whole truth of the contents of the
instrument or document.
The required form of identification is prescribed in
[S]ection 12 of the same Rules, to wit:
Section 12. Competent Evidence of Identity.
The phrase competent evidence of identity
refers to the identification of an individual
based on:
(a) at least one current
identification document issued by an official
agency bearing the photograph and
signature of the individual. x x x.
It is apparent that a CTC, which bears no
photograph, is no longer a valid form of identification for
purposes of Notarization of Legal Documents. No less than
the Supreme Court itself, when it revoked the Notarial
Commission of a member of the Bar in Baylon v. Almo,
reiterated this when it said:
As a matter of fact, recognizing the
established unreliability of a community tax
certificate in proving the identity of a person
who wishes to have his document notarized,
we did not include it in the list of competent
evidence of identity that notaries public
should use in ascertaining the identity of
persons appearing before them to have their
documents notarized.
Seeking other remedies, [Amora] maintained that Section 78
of the Election Code governs the Petition. Said section
provides that:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be
filed by the person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may
be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not
later than fifteen days before the election.
[Amora] however failed to note that the Petition relies upon
an entirely different ground. The Petition has clearly stated
that it was invoking Section 73 of the Election Code, which
prescribes the mandatory requirement of filing a sworn
certificate of candidacy. As properly pointed out by
[Olandria], he filed a Petition to Disqualify for Possessing
Some Grounds for Disqualification, which, is governed by
COMELEC Resolution No. 8696, to wit:
B. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A
CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SECTION
68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE
AND PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR
LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS
OR POSSESSING SOME GROUNDS
FOR DISQUALIFICATION
1. A verified petition to disqualify a
candidate pursuant to
Section 68 of the OEC and
the verified petition to
disqualify a candidate
for lack of qualifications
or possessing some
grounds for
disqualification may be
filed on any day after the
last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy
but not later than the date
of proclamation;
xxxx
3. The petition to disqualify a
candidate for lack of
qualification or possessing
some grounds for
disqualification, shall be
filed in ten (10) legible
copies, personally or
through a duly authorized
representative, by any
person of voting age, or
duly registered political
party, organization or
coalition of political parties
on the ground that the
candidate does not possess
all the qualifications as
provided for by the
Constitution or by existing
law or who possesses some
grounds for disqualification
as provided for by the
Constitution or by existing
law.
xxxx
Finally, we do not agree with [Amora] when he stated that
the Second Divisions Resolution practically supplanted
congress by adding another ground for disqualification, not
provided in the omnibus election code or the local
government code. The constitution is very clear that it is
congress that shall prescribe the qualifications (and
disqualifications) of candidates for local government
positions. These grounds for disqualification were laid down
in both laws mentioned by [Amora] and COMELEC
Resolution 8696.[7]
Hence, this petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion
to the COMELEC. On June 15, 2010, we issued a Status Quo Ante Order and
directed respondents to comment on the petition. As directed, Olandria and
the COMELEC filed their respective Comments[8] which uniformly opposed
the petition. Thereafter, Amora filed his Reply.[9]
Amora insists that the Petition for Disqualification filed by Olandria
is actually a Petition to Deny Due Course since the purported ground for
disqualification simply refers to the defective notarization of the COC.
Amora is adamant that Section 73 of the OEC pertains to the substantive
qualifications of a candidate or the lack thereof as grounds for
disqualification, specifically, the qualifications and disqualifications of
elective local officials under the Local Government Code (LGC) and the
OEC. Thus, Olandrias petition was filed way beyond the reglementary period
of twenty-five (25) days from the date of the filing of the disputed COC.
Moreover, Amora maintains that his COC is properly notarized and
not defective, and the presentation of his CTC to the notary public to whom
he was personally known sufficiently complied with the requirement that the
COC be under oath. Amora further alleges that: (1) Olaivar, his opponent in
the mayoralty post, and likewise a member of the NPC, is purportedly a
fraternity brother and close associate of Nicodemo T. Ferrer (Commissioner
Ferrer), one of the commissioners of the COMELEC who disqualified him;
and (2) Olaivar served as Consultant for the COMELEC, assigned to the
Office of Commissioner Ferrer.
Olandria and the COMELEC reiterated the arguments contained in the
COMELEC en banc resolution of May 17, 2010.
Amoras petition is meritorious.
We find that the COMELEC ruling smacks of grave abuse of
discretion, a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. Certiorari lies where a court or any tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[10]
In this case, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandrias
claim that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground
for disqualification. Not by any stretch of the imagination can we infer this as
an additional ground for disqualification from the specific wording of the
OEC in Section 68, which reads:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in
an action or protest in which he is party is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having: (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or
public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c)
spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and
104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261,
paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been
elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this
Code, unless said person has waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in
the elections laws.
and of Section 40 of the LGC, which provides:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons
are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for
an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within
two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of
an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for
violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or
nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country
or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad
and continue to avail of the same right after the
effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not based on any of the
grounds for disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory
provisions. Nowhere therein does it specify that a defective notarization is a
ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Yet, the COMELEC would
uphold that petition upon the outlandish claim that it is a petition to
disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds
for disqualification.
The proper characterization of a petition as one for disqualification under the
pertinent provisions of laws cannot be made dependent on the designation,
correctly or incorrectly, of a petitioner. The absurd interpretation of Olandria,
respondent herein, is not controlling; the COMELEC should have dismissed
his petition outright.
A petition for disqualification relates to the declaration of a candidate as
ineligible or lacking in quality or accomplishment fit for the position of
mayor. The distinction between a petition for disqualification and the formal
requirement in Section 73 of the OEC that a COC be under oath is not simply
a question of semantics as the statutes list the grounds for the disqualification
of a candidate.
Recently, we have had occasion to distinguish the various petitions
for disqualification and clarify the grounds therefor as provided in the OEC
and the LGC. We declared, thus:
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification on the
one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC,
or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to
deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on
a statement of a material representation in the said certificate
that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While
a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely
prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose
certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78
is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a
CoC. Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya, this Court made the
distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section
68 can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC
because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a
person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled
under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is
never considered a candidate.[11]
Apart from the qualifications provided for in the Constitution, the power to
prescribe additional qualifications for elective office and grounds for
disqualification therefrom, consistent with the constitutional provisions, is
vested in Congress.[12] However, laws prescribing qualifications for and
disqualifications from office are liberally construed in favor of eligibility
since the privilege of holding an office is a valuable one.[13] We cannot
overemphasize the principle that where a candidate has received popular
mandate, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the candidates
eligibility, for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the people.[14]
In stark contrast to the foregoing, the COMELEC allowed and confirmed the
disqualification of Amora although the latter won, and was forthwith
proclaimed, as Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.
Another red flag for the COMELEC to dismiss Olandrias petition is
the fact that Amora claims to personally know the notary public, Atty.
Granada, before whom his COC was sworn. In this regard, the dissenting
opinion of Commissioner Larrazabal aptly disposes of the core issue:
With all due respect to the well-written Ponencia, I
respectfully voice my dissent. The primary issue herein is
whether it is proper to disqualify a candidate who, in
executing his Certificate of Candidacy (COC), merely
presented to the Notary Public his Community Tax
Certificate.
The majority opinion strictly construed the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice (the 2004 Notarial Rules) when it
provided that valid and competent evidence of identification
must be presented to render Sergio G. Amora, Jr.s
[petitioners] COC valid. The very wording of the 2004
Notarial Rules supports my view that the instant motion for
reconsideration ought to be granted, to wit:
Section 2. Affirmation or Oath . The term
Affirmation or Oath refers to an act in which
an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person
before the notary public;
(b) is personally known to
the notary public or identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) avows under penalty of
law to the whole truth of the contents of the
instrument or document.
 As quoted supra, competent evidence of identity is
not required in cases where the affiant is personally known
to the Notary Public, which is the case herein. The records
reveal that [petitioner] submitted to this Commission a
sworn affidavit executed by Notary Public Oriculo A.
Granada (Granada), who notarized [petitioners] COC,
affirming in his affidavit that he personally knows
[petitioner].
[Respondent], on the other hand, presented no
evidence to counter Granadas declarations.
Hence, Granada[s] affidavit, which narrates in detail his
personal relation with [petitioner], should be deemed
sufficient.
The purpose of election laws is to give effect to,
rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. The people of
Candijay, Bohol has already exercised their right to suffrage
on May 10, 2010 where [petitioner] was one of the
candidates for municipal mayor. To disqualify [petitioner] at
this late stage simply due to an overly strict reading of the
2004 Notarial Rules will effectively deprive the people who
voted for him their rights to vote.
The Supreme Courts declaration in Petronila S.
Rulloda v. COMELEC et al. must not be taken lightly:
Technicalities and procedural niceties in
election cases should not be made to stand in
the way of the true will of the electorate.
Laws governing election contests must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of
the people in the choice of public officials
may not be defeated by mere technical
objections.
Election contests involve public interest, and
technicalities and procedural barriers must
yield if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the
electorate in the choice of their elective
officials. The Court frowns upon any
interpretation of the law that would hinder in
any way not only the free and intelligent
casting of the votes in an election but also
the correct ascertainment of the results.[15]
Our ruling herein does not do away with the formal requirement that a COC
be sworn. In fact, we emphasize that the filing of a COC is mandatory and
must comply with the requirements set forth by law.[16]
Section 2 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice lists the act to which
an affirmation or oath refers:
Sec. 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term Affirmation or Oath
refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public;
(b) is personally known to the notary public
or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by
these Rules; and
(c) avows under penalty of law to the
whole truth of the contents of the instrument
or document.
In this case, however, contrary to the declarations of the COMELEC,
Amora complied with the requirement of a sworn COC. He readily explained
that he and Atty. Granada personally knew each other; they were not just
colleagues at the League of Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, but they
consider each other as distant relatives. Thus, the alleged defect in the oath
was not proven by Olandria since the presentation of a CTC turned out to be
sufficient in this instance. On the whole, the COMELEC should not have
brushed aside the affidavit of Atty. Granada and remained inflexible in the
face of Amoras victory and proclamation as Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 10-046 (DC) dated April 29, 2010 and
May 17, 2010, respectively, are ANULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9514 April 10, 2013
BERNARD N. JANDOQUILE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. QUIRINO P. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Bernard
N. Jandoquile against respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr.
The Facts of the case are not disputed.
Atty. Revilla, Jr. notarized a complaint-affidavit2 signed by Heneraline
L. Brosas, Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa and Elmer L. Alvarado.
Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Heizel Wynda Brosas Revilla, Atty.
Revilla, Jr.'s wife. Jandoquile complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. is
disqualified to perform the notarial act3 per Section 3( c), Rule IV of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. A notary public is disqualified from
performing a notarial act if he:
xxxx
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or
relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal4within the fourth
civil degree.
Jandoquile also complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not require the
three affiants in the complaint-affidavit to show their valid identification
cards.
In his comment5 to the disbarment complaint, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not
deny but admitted Jandoquiles material allegations. The issue,
according to Atty. Revilla, Jr., is whether the single act of notarizing
the complaint-affidavit of relatives within the fourth civil degree of
affinity and, at the same time, not requiring them to present valid
identification cards is a ground for disbarment. Atty. Revilla, Jr.
submits that his act is not a ground for disbarment. He also says that
he acts as counsel of the three affiants; thus, he should be considered
more as counsel than as a notary public when he notarized their
complaint-affidavit. He did not require the affiants to present valid
identification cards since he knows them personally. Heneraline
Brosas and Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa are sisters-in-law while Elmer
Alvarado is the live-in houseboy of the Brosas family.
Since the facts are not contested, the Court deems it more prudent to
resolve the case instead of referring it to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation.
Indeed, Atty. Revilla, Jr. violated the disqualification rule under
Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. We
agree with him, however, that his violation is not a sufficient ground
for disbarment.
Atty. Revilla, Jr.s violation of the aforesaid disqualification rule is
beyond dispute. Atty. Revilla, Jr. readily admitted that he notarized the
complaint-affidavit signed by his relatives within the fourth civil degree
of affinity. Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
clearly disqualifies him from notarizing the complaint-affidavit, from
performing the notarial act, since two of the affiants or principals are
his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. Given the clear
provision of the disqualification rule, it behooved upon Atty. Revilla, Jr.
to act with prudence and refuse notarizing the document. We cannot
agree with his proposition that we consider him to have acted more as
counsel of the affiants, not as notary public, when he notarized the
complaint-affidavit. The notarial certificate6 at the bottom of the
complaint-affidavit shows his signature as a notary public, with a
notarial commission valid until December 31, 2012.
He cannot therefore claim that he signed it as counsel of the three
affiants.
On the second charge, we agree with Atty. Revilla, Jr. that he cannot
be held liable. If the notary public knows the affiants personally, he
need not require them to show their valid identification cards. This rule
is supported by the definition of a "jurat" under Section 6, Rule II of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A "jurat" refers to an act in which
an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the
notary public and presents an instrument or document; (b) is
personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity; (c) signs the instrument or
document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or
affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or
document. In this case, Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Atty. Revilla,
Jr.s wife; Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa is his wifes sister-in-law; and
Elmer Alvarado is the live-in houseboy of the Brosas family. Atty.
Revilla, Jr. knows the three affiants personally. Thus, he was justified
in no longer requiring them to show valid identification cards. But Atty.
Revilla, Jr. is not without fault for failing to indicate such fact in the
"jurat" of the complaint-affidavit. No statement was included therein
that he knows the three affiants personally.7 Let it be impressed that
Atty. Revilla, Jr. was clearly disqualified to notarize the complaint-
affidavit of his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. While
he has a valid defense as to the second charge, it does not exempt
him from liability for violating the disqualification rule.
such as reprimand, temporary suspension or fine would accomplish
the end desired.1wphi1
Considering the attendant circumstances and the single violation
committed by Atty. Revilla, Jr., we are in agreement that a punishment
less severe than disbarment would suffice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr., is
REPRIMANDED and DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a
notary public, or from performing any notarial act if he is presently
commissioned as a notary public, for a period of three (3) months.
Atty. Revilla, Jr. is further DIRECTED to INFORM the Court, through
an affidavit, once the period of his disqualification has lapsed.
SO ORDERED.

As we said, Atty. Revilla, Jr.s violation of the disqualification rule

under Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice is
not a sufficient ground to disbar him. To our mind, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did
not commit any deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or gross
immoral conduct, or any other serious ground for disbarment under
Section 27,8 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. We recall the case of
Maria v. Cortez9 where we reprimanded Cortez and disqualified him
from being commissioned as notary public for six months. We were
convinced that said punishment, which is less severe than
disbarment, would already suffice as sanction for Cortezs violation. In
Cortez, we noted the prohibition in Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice that a person shall not perform a notarial
act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document
(1) is not in the notarys presence personally at the time of the
notarization and (2) is not personally known to the notary public or
otherwise identified by the notary public through a competent
evidence of identity. Cortez had notarized a special power of attorney
without having the alleged signatories appear before him. In imposing
the less severe punishment, we were mindful that removal from the
Bar should not really be decreed when any punishment less severe