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retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice vested rights. Article 40 is a rule of procedure and
Brillantes has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Art. 40.
Casupanan and Capitulo vs Laroya
August 26, 2002- Lawyers Review/September 30, 2002
The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect considering the well-
settled rule that x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of the passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that
sense and to that extent.
CANCIO vs. ISIP
November 12, 2002
-The modes of enforcement of the civil liabilities are provided for in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Though the assailed order of the trial court was issued on March 20, 1998, the said Rules, which
took effect on December 1, 2000, must be given retroactive effect in the instant case considering that
statutes regulating the procedure of the court are construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage.
CARLOS vs. SANDOVAL (expressly provides for prospectivity despite being a rule of procedure) December
16, 2008
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family
Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in application.
CHENG vs. SY 592 SCRA 155 (July 7, 2009)
-The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants rights does not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural
laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws.
Other exceptions:
2. Penal laws favorable to the accused provided he is not a habitual delinquent.
3.Curative laws. 4. Emergency laws. 5. Laws creating new rights. and 6. Tax laws.
Article 9- In case of silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of laws no judge shall decline to render judgment.
Applies only civil cases not to criminal proceedings because of the principle that there is no crime when
there is no law punishing it (nullum crimen, nulla sine poena lege).
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC
537 SCRA 373 (October 19, 2007)
Silverio successfully underwent sex reassignment surgery and petitioned the court that his name be
changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely and that his sex shall also be changed from male to female to
reflect the result of said surgery.
The Republic opposed the same alleging that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
Issue: May the trial court apply Article 9 of the Civil Code on the ground of equity?
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It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that no judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law. However, it is not a license for
courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or
amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law
on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or
interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do
an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this
case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law
and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
174 SCRA 653
- Foreigner husband sought a divorce decree against Filipina wife which was granted. Thereafter,
he filed a criminal case of adultery against the former spouse WON he has legal standing to file the
case?
-We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the
accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates
the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the
accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in
our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
3
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a
United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a
civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying
that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage
the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such
stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was
the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Garcia a.k.a. Grace Garcia- Recio vs. Recio
October 2, 2001
-A marriage between 2 Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because
of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.
-But a divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. Therefore, before our courts
can recognize a foreign divorce decree, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient. Under Rule 132 Sections 24 and 25, a writing or document may be proven as
public record of a foreign country by either (1) official publication of the writing or document or (2)
a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document.
QUITA vs. CA 300 SCRA 406
Fe and Arturo were married in 1941. After the relationship turned sour Fe went to the US and in 1954
obtained a decree of absolute divorce. Fe got married thrice. In 1972, Arturo died intestate. Fe is now
claiming her right over the estate of the deceased spouse.
The SC remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether the second marriage of the
spouse during the subsistence of the first marriage was contracted before or after her changed of
citizenship. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her 1 st divorce, Van Dorn
would become applicable and Fe could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
ELMAR O. PEREZ vs. CA, CATINDIG
January 27, 2006
Filipino spouses Tristan and Lily decided to separate from each other and upon advice of a friend
obtained a divorce from the Dominican Republic. On July 14, 1984, Tristan married Elmar in the State of
Virginia, USA. Elmar later on learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic
dissolving the marriage of Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to
Tristan was void under Philippine law. When confronted, Tristan assured her that he would obtain an
annulment of his marriage with Lily. In 2001, he filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Lily.
Elmar then filed a motion for leave to file intervention claiming that she has an interest in the matter
in litigation that was granted by the lower court.
Issue: Does Elmar have a legal interest in the annulment case between Tristan and Lily?
SC: Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must be in the matter in litigation and of
such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation
and effect of judgment. Such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent and
expectant.
The claim of petitioner, that her status as the wife and companion of Tristan for 17 years vests her
the requisite legal interest, lacks merit. Under the law, she was never the legal wife of Tristan hence her
claim of legal interest has no basis. When they got married in 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily.
The divorce decree obtained by Tristan and Lily from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the
marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he/she was married here or abroad, initiates a petition
abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an
absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce.
When Tristan and Lily got married in 1968, their marriage was governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code which took effect on August 30, 1950. In Tenchavez vs. Escano we held:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the present Civil Code (RA No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as
valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another
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party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce,
entitled to validity in the country.
SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS divorce decree, how proved.
February 6, 2007
Felicisimo T. San Luis contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. His 1 st marriage was terminated
when his wife died leaving behind 6 children. Five years later Felicisimo married Mary Lee, an American
citizen with whom he had 1 child. The marriage ended when Mary Lee divorced Felicisimo. The decree of
absolute divorce was granted in December 1973. He then contracted his 3 rd marriage in June 1974 with
Felicidad. When he died, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo s estate and prayed that letters of administration be issued to her. Two of the
children of the 1st marriage filed a motion to dismiss citing as ground, among others, that Felicidad has no
legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the
time of his death was still legally married to Mary Lee. Petitioners (Felicisimo s heirs) cited Articles 15 and 17
(3) of the NCC in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned.
SC: In resolving the issue, there is no need to retroactively apply the provisions of the FC, particularly
Article 26 (2) as there is sufficient jurisprudential basis to rule in the affirmative.
In the light of the ruling in Van Dorn, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated in his own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of Felicidad
and Felicisimo under the laws of the USA. In Garcia vs. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines
for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. The presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular official of the Philippines who is stationed in the
foreign country where the document is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to Felicidad s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, USA, she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with said law. As stated in
Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved.
FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN vs. CA and ORLANDO CATALAN and MEROPE BRAGANZA 514 SCRA 607
(February 6, 2007)
Felicitas and Orlando were married in June 1950 in Pangasinan but migrated to the United States
after the marriage. Allegedly, they became naturalized citizens thereof and after 38 years of marriage or in
1988, they divorced. Two months after the divorce, Orlando married Merope in Pangasinan. Felicitas then
filed a petition for declaration of nullity with damages against Orlando and Merope alleging that Merope
had a prior subsisting marriage with one Eusebio Bristol. Orlando and Merope moved for the dismissal of
the case on the ground of lack of cause of action as Felicitas was not a real party-in-interest.
SC: However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the national
law of Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner
has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, thus:
Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest nor should
each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might subsequently contract. x x x
Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlandos subsequent marriage since
the validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced status
of Orlando and Felicitas. x x x26
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even
in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of
marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to
declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest27 and must be based on a cause of action.28 Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog,29 the Court
held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of the marriage of their
deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.1awphi1.net
Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically provides:
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife.
xxxx
Bayot vs Bayot
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Art. 16 -law governing real and personal property is the law of the place where the property is situated
exception in cases of succession it is the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration par. (2) (76,77,84,85,86,89,91,95,98,01,02,04).
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persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much
less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage.
BUENAVENTURA vs. CA & ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA,
March 31, 2005 no moral damages in PI cases
Is the aggrieved spouse in a marriage declared void by reason of psychological incapacity
of the other spouse entitled to moral and exemplary damages under article 21 of the New Civil
Code?
SC: It must be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or
injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. It is
contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond
the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the
same set of acts as willful. By declaring Noel as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of
awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages
should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence
that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his/her disability
and yet willfully concealed the same.
ACI PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. COQUIA
559 SCRA 300 (July 14, 2008)
The appellate court s citation of Article 21 is misplaced not only because of the pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties which bars the application of this provision, but more importantly
because we cannot deem ACI to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Art. 26 (77) Acts though not constituting a criminal offense but may produce a cause action for
damages, prevention and other relief.
CASTRO vs. PEOPLE
559 SCRA 676 (July 23, 2008)
Castro, assistant headmaster of Reedly International School (RIS), was informed thru phone that
Tan, the parent of the child dismissed by RIS but whose dismissal was overturned by Dep-Ed, was planning
to sue the officers of RIS in their personal capacities. Before they hung up, Castro told the caller: Okay,
you too, take care and be careful talking to [Tan], that s dangerous. Sued, he was found guilty by the
MeTC of Grave Oral Defamation.
The SC however, enunciated that At most, petitioner could have been liable for damages under
Article 26 of the Civil Code21 :
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Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
Petitioner is reminded that, as an educator, he is supposed to be a role model for the youth. As such, he
should always act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.
2 elements:
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1. the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related with to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action; and
2. the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed (as
amended by the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure and cited in the case of Dreamwork
Construction, Inc. vs. Janiola 591 SCRA 466, June 30, 2009).
- Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must
precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can
be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil
action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. (Dreamwork vs.
Janiola)
- The present criminal action shall be suspended as the resolution of the issue in the civil
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal. But court has no
authority to motu proprio suspend or dismiss the criminal action but only upon petition of
the defendant in accordance with the Rules of Court (Yap vs. Paras, 205 SCRA 605).
- Petition (generally, by the accused) to suspend the criminal proceedings may be filed in
the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. If the
criminal action has already been filed in court for trial, it shall be made in the same
criminal action before the prosecution rests its case.
Where Prejudicial Question was considered even if one action is not criminal but administrative.
1) Quiambao vs. Osorio
158 SCRA 674
-The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and administrative in character, it is
obvious that technically, there is no prejudicial question to speak of. Equally apparent, however, is
the intimate correlation between said two (2) proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of
private respondent to eject petitioner from the disputed portion depends primarily on the pending
administrative case.
Where the cases are both civil in nature.
1) City of Pasig vs COMELEC
314 SCRA 179
-The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil
and criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil as in the instant case.
The SC held that while this may be the general rule, this Court has held in Vidad vs RTC of Negros
Oriental, Br. 42, that, in the interest of good order, we can very well suspend action on one case
pending the outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the first .
Other cases:
2) Umali vs. IAC
186 SCRA 680
-No prejudicial question.
-Even if the civil case were to be finally adjudged to the effect that the said deed of sale should be
annulled, such declaration would be of no material importance in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case, the latter involving violation of BP 22.
3) Tuanda vs. Sandiganbayan
249 SCRA 342
-All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in this case. There is
no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action and the criminal case are clearly
related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on petitioners alleged partiality and evident
bad faith in not paying private respondents salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives,
while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the designation of private
respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law.
4) Bobis vs. Bobis
July 31, 2000
-Not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the
suspension of the criminal action.
-Respondent thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage only after
petitioner sued him for bigamy. The obvious intent therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to
the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his
criminal prosecution.
Beltran vs. People
334 SCRA 106
- The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid 2 conflicting decisions.
For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the
latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the civil case involves
the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
-The accused s argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his
marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.
-In the case at bar it must be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who
cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage runs the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy or for concubinage.
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Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI) vs. Lichauco
496 SCRA 588 (July 27, 2006)
Then DOTC Secretary Lagdameo, Jr. confirmed, by letter, the government s assignment of Phil.
orbital slots 161E and 153E to PASI for its Agila Satellites. PASI thereupon undertook preparations for the
launching, ownership, operation and management of its satellites by, among other things, obtaining loans.
In connection with the loan, PASI President de Guzman later informed Landbank President and CEO Lapuz
about the assignment of the orbital slots and requested the bank s confirmation of its participation in a
club loan amounting to US$11 million, the proceeds of which would be applied to PASI s interim satellite.
Lapuz sent a copy of the letter to then Undersecretary Lichauco who denied the assignment of the 2
orbital slots to PASI but that PASI is only getting 144E orbital slot. Subsequently, Lichauco issued a Notice of
Offer for several orbital slots including 153E. Claiming that the offer was made without its knowledge and
that another company was awarded for orbital slot 153E, PASI filed a complaint for injunction, nullity and
damages against Lichauco and the unknown awardee . A month later PASI filed a complaint against
Lichauco before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Upon evaluation by the said office it found the existence of a prejudicial question and recommended its
dismissal. The recommendation was approved by then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto.
Issues: 1. Whether there exists a PQ and, in the affirmative, 2. whether the dismissal of the complaint
on that account is proper.
Held: If the award to the undisclosed bidder of orbital slot 153E is, in the civil case, declared valid
for being within Lichauco s scope of authority to thus free her from liability for damages, there would be
no prohibited act to speak of nor would there be basis for undue injury claimed to have been suffered by
PASI. The finding by the Ombudsman of the existence of a prejudicial question is thus well taken.
As laid down in Yap vs. Paras, said rule directs that the proceedings may only be suspended, not
dismissed, and that it may be made only upon petition, and not at the instance of the judge alone or as in
this case, the investigating officer.
To give imprimatur to the Ombudsman s dismissal of petitioner s complaint due to a prejudicial
question would only not run counter to the provision of Section 6 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. It would
sanction the extinguishments of criminal liability, if there be any, through prescription under Article 89 vis--
vis Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
OMICTIN vs. CA and LAGOS
512 SCRA 70 (January 22, 2007)
Omictin, Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag, Phils., filed a complaint of estafa against Lagos
due to the latter s refusal, despite repeated demands, to return the 2 company vehicles entrusted to him
while he was still the president of the firm. Lagos moved for the suspension of the criminal proceedings due
to the existence of a prejudicial question in view of a pending case before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) filed by the latter against Omictin, Saag Pte. (S) Ltd., Ng, Yeo and Tan. The case before
the SEC stemmed from the appointments of Tan as President Ad Interim and Omictin as Operations
Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Incorporated. Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. is a foreign corporation organized
under the laws of Singapore. Lagos was appointed Area Sales Manager in the Philippines where he was
authorized to organize a local joint venture corporation known as Saag, Phils., with Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. as the
majority stockholder and Lagos was appointed as one of the directors. Due to intra-corporate disputes, 2
of the directors resigned and divested their shares in Saag Corporation. Lagos resigned as president while
retaining his post as director. He later requested Executive Director Yeo to call for a board meeting
because in their joint venture agreement (JVA) between Saag Phils. and Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. it was agreed
that should the controlling interest in the latter company be acquired by any other person or entity without
his prior consent, he has the option to either require the other stockholders to purchase his shares or
terminate the JVA and dissolve Saag Phils., Inc. No meeting was made, instead Tan was appointed as
president ad interim and Omictin as operations manager ad interim.
SC: Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in the intra-corporate dispute will determine the
guilt or innocence of Lagos in the crime of estafa. One of the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence
under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC is a demand made by the offended party to the offender.
Logically, under the circumstances since the alleged offended party is Saag Phils., Inc., the validity of the
demand for the delivery of the subject vehicles rests upon the authority of the person making such
demand on the company s behalf. Lagos is challenging petitioner s authority to act for Saag Phils., Inc. in
the corporate case. If the supposed authority of petitioner is found to be defective, it is as if no demand
was ever made, hence, the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.
MAGESTRADO vs. PEOPLE and LIBROJO
527 SCRA 125 (July 10, 2007)
Librojo filed a criminal complaint for perjury against Magestrado. It was alleged that Magestrado
executed an affidavit of loss before a notary public stating therein that he lost Owner s Duplicate Copy of
TCT No. N-173163 when in truth the said title was surrendered by Magestrado to Librojo as security for a
loan. Subsequently, Magestrado filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial
question because he alleged that Civil Cases No. Q-98-34348 to 9, cases for cancellation of mortgage,
delivery of title and damages and recovery of a sum of money, must be resolved first before the criminal
case may proceed since the issues in the said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised
in the criminal action.
SC: A perusal of the allegations in the civil cases are principally for the determination of whether a
loan was obtained by petitioner from Librojo and whether Magestrado executed a real estate mortgage
involving the property covered by TCT No. N-173163. On the other hand, the criminal case involves the
determination of whether petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to support his
request for issuance of a new owner s duplicate copy of TCT No. 173163.
It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each other.
Regardless of the outcome of the 2 civil cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in
the criminal case for perjury. The purchase by Magestrado of the land or his execution of a real estate
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mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a
false affidavit of loss.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS (PHILS.), INC. vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION (SSC)
560 SCRA 719 (July 31, 2008)
Dr. Climaco was the retainer physician of the company s Bacolod plant. Their contract explicitly
provided that no employer-employee relationship shall exist between the company and Climaco while
the contract is in effect. Meantime, upon inquiry from DOLE and the SSS, he was informed by both
agencies that he is an employee of the company. He then filed a complaint before the NLRC for
recognition as a regular employee of the company and demanded payment of 13th month pay, COLA,
and all other benefits. During the pendency of the complaint, Coca Cola terminated its retainer
agreement with Dr. Climaco, thus he filed another complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. While
the NLRC cases were pending, he filed before the SSC a petition that Coca Cola be ordered to report him
for compulsory coverage.
Coca Cola contended that the previous complaint for regularization and/or illegal dismissal, which
is now pending resolution before the SC, poses a prejudicial question to the subject of the present case.
SC: Here, no prejudicial question exists because there is no pending criminal case. The
consolidated NLRC cases cannot be considered as previously instituted action. In Berbari v.
Concepcion, it was held that a prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which must precede the
criminal action, that which requires a decision with which said question is closely related.
Neither can the doctrine of prejudicial question be applied by analogy. The issue in the case filed
by Dr. Climaco with the SSC involves the question whether or not he is an employee of Coca-Cola and
subject to compulsory coverage of the SSS. On the contrary, the cases filed by Climaco before the NLRC
involved different issues. In his 1st complaint, Climaco sought recognition as a regular employee of the
company and demanded payment of his 13th month pay, COLA, holiday pay, service incentive pay,
X mas bonus and all other benefits. The 2nd complaint was for illegal dismissal, with prayer for
reinstatement to his former position as company physician, without loss of seniority rights, with full payment
of back wages, other unpaid benefits, and for the payment of damages. Thus, the issues in the NLRC cases
are not determinative of whether or not the SSC case should proceed. It is settled that the question
claimed to be prejudicial in nature must be determinative of the case before the court.
YAP vs. CABALES 588 SCRA 426 (June 5, 2009)
Yap purchased several parcels of land from Te. In consideration of the sale, he issued several
postdated checks to Te. Subsequently, Te had the checks rediscounted. While the 1st few checks were
good the remaining checks were dishonored for the reason that the account is closed . Mirabueno and
Dimalanta, the persons who rediscounted the checks, filed separate cases for collection of sum of money.
Subsequently, on various dates, several informations for violation of BP 22 were filed against Yap. Yap
subsequently filed an action for the rescission of the sale and moved for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings on account of existence of a prejudicial question.
SC: The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal case against him, and there is no necessity that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal cases.
Even if Yap is declared not liable for the payment of the value of the checks and damages, he
cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of BP Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthless
checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself an offense.
Art. 37-(96) definition of terms re: Juridical Capacity and Capacity to Act; Art.38-(85) restrictions on
capacity to act; Art. 39-(85) circumstances modifying or limiting capacity to act.
Art. 43 If there is a doubt as to who died first involving persons who are called to succeed each other;
the person alleging the death of one prior to the other has the burden of proof and in the absence of
proof it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to
the other. Applies only in cases of succession between two or more persons who are called to succeed
each other, all other cases apply presumption of survivorship under the Rules of Court. Ex. Between a
parent and a child. (98,99,00)
Ex. (2000 Bar) Cristy and her late husband Luis had 2 children, Rose aged 10 and Patrick, 12 years
old. One summer, her mother-in-law, aged 70, took the 2 children with her on a boat trip to Cebu.
Unfortunately, the vessel sank en route, and the bodies of the 3 were never found. None of the survivors
ever saw them on the water. On the settlement of her mother-in-law s estate, Cristy filed a claim for a
share of her estate on the ground that the same was inherited by her children from their grandmother in
representation of their father, and she inherited the same from them. Will her action prosper? Ans. No, her
action will not prosper. Since there was no proof as to who died first, all the 3 are deemed to have died at
the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to another, applying Article 43 of the
NCC. The survivorship provision of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the problem. It applies
only to those cases where the issue involved is not succession.
(1998 Bar) Jaime, aged 65, and his son Willy, 25 years old and married to Wilma, died in a plane
crash. There is no proof as to who died 1st. Jaime had a life insurance policy with his wife Julia, and his son,
Willy, as the beneficiaries. Can Wilma successfully claim that of the proceeds should belong to Willy s
estate? Ans. Yes, Wilma can invoke the presumption of survivorship and claim that of the proceeds
should belong to Willy s estate, as the dispute does not involve succession. Under this presumption, the
person between the ages of 15 and 60 years is deemed to have survived one whose age was over 60 at
the time of their deaths. The estate of Willy endowed with juridical personality stands in place and stead of
Willy, as beneficiary.
ARTICLES 44 TO 47
44 Who are juridical persons:
1. State and its political subdivision;
2. Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law;
their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law; and
3. Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose.
45 Law that governs these juridical persons:
a. 1 and 2 are governed by the laws creating or recognizing them.
b. Private corporations are governed by laws of general application.
c. Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code.
46 Rights and obligations of juridical persons:
1. Acquire and possess property of all kinds.
2. Bring criminal or civil actions.
3. Enter into obligations.
ARTICLES 50 51 DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE
50 Domicile of a natural person for the exercise of his civil rights and fulfillment of civil
obligations shall be the place of his habitual residence.
- DOMICILE means permanent home and has 2 requisites:
1. The fact of residing or personal presence in a particular place.
2. The intention to remain in said place permanently (animus manendi).
Distinction between DOMICILE and RESIDENCE:
DOMICILE is a legal or juridical relation, which can exist without actually living in the place
while RESIDENCE is a material fact, that is, connoting the physical presence of a person in a place.
16
RESIDENCE however, when used in election, suffrage and naturalization laws, means
DOMICILE (political or legal residence) which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed
place, but also personal presence in the place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention
(Arevalo vs. Quilatan 116 S 700).
Thus, a man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another (Koh vs. CA 70 S
298).
17
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic)
to Marriage License Number 2990792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our force locating the above
problem.
San Juan, MetroManila
March 11, 1994
(SGD) RAFAEL ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
SC: The certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document
does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search.
Note that the first 2 certifications bear the statement that hope and understand our loaded work
cannot give you our full force locating the above problem. It could easily be implied from the said
statement that the Office of the Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the
existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its loaded work. Likewise, both certifications failed to
state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued. This implication is confirmed by the
testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, who stated that
they could not locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had
already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not
appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony
could not be secured. Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts
were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official functions by the LCR in issuing certifications is
effectively rebutted.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License
No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be
found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily
accept that the absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. Semper praesumitor pro matrimonio Always presume
marriage.
Instances of irregularity that would not affect the validity of marriage as enunciated by the SC in the case
of Alcantara vs. Alcantara 531 SCRA 466 (August 28, 2007):
1. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of
the contracting parties.
2. Issuance of a marriage license despite absence of publication or prior to the
completion of the 10-day period for publication.
REPUBLIC VS ALBIOS. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent,
but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely
no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1wphi1 Albios and Fringer had an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to
acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their
objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There
was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit
for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a
conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with
law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes
other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore,
so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
Art. 5 re. Age of parties to the marriage (1989, 2006); Article 7 (06)- those authorized to solemnize
marriages (enumeration is exclusive) 1. Incumbent members of the judiciary within the court s jurisdiction;
2. Priest, rabbi, imam or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious
sect and registered with the civil registrar general; 3. Only in marriages in articulo mortis (awareness of an
impending death) ship captain or airplane chief whether crew members or passengers and military
commander of a unit in the absence of the chaplain during military operation whether the parties are
members of the military or civilians; 4. Consul-general, vice consul or consul - only between Filipinos
residing or sojourning abroad; and 5. Mayors by virtue of the Local Government Code effective January 1,
1992 (99); Article 8 place where the ceremony shall be held (89); Article 10- authority of consul-general,
vice consul, or consul to solemnize marriages between Filipino citizens abroad but the contracting parties
are not exempt from the license requirement as Article 10 states that the issuance and duties of the LCR as
well as that of the solemnizing officer shall be performed by the said consular official (94); Art. 14-necessity
of parental consent if one or both contracting parties are between the ages of 18 & 21 no parental
consent voidable (99).
DE LA ROSA, et. al. vs. HEIRS of MARCIANA RUSTIA vda. de DAMIAN
January 27, 2006
- Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado s cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be
doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband
and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as spouses.
- Although the marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its
absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. The evidence need not
necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen
the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as
19
Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under
oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles
to the properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado more than
adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents that are
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
- The baptismal certificate was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the
priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and
statements contained therein, such as the alleged single or unmarried (senorita) civil
status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
- In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact, married. This
is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves
out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and
propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.
CORPUS VS STO. TOMAS. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the
Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.[24] Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for
that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse
since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil
Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated
in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated
the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to
contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the
alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law.
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient
basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to
petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
FUJIKE VS MARINAY. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the
foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment
may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment
through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of
the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may
be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean
that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the
petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54
the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will
defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and
issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v.
Raada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits,
the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation."
20
Art. 26- Validity of marriages celebrated abroad subject to certain exceptions (89, 92, 96, 99,05,06)
GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE GARCIA-RECIO vs. RECIO
October 2, 2001
- In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES vs. CRASUS IYOY
470 SCRA 508 (September 21, 2005)
Crasus and Fely s marriage ended when the latter left for the United States in 1984. In 1985, Fely
divorced her husband and contracted a subsequent marriage with an American. In 1988, she obtained
American citizenship. She now claimed that her marriage to her American husband was legal because
now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality.
Is the argument tenable?
SC: As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the married
couple is a foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino spouse. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said
provision cannot be applied to the case of Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her
divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. At the time she filed for divorce she was still a Filipino citizen, and
pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, she was still bound by
Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was
already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce
Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from Crasus.
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
October 5, 2005
Issue: Given a valid marriage between 2 Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Facts: Cipriano and Lady Myros were married in 1981. They had 2 children. In 1986 Lady Myros left
for the United States, obtained American citizenship and in 2000 obtained a decree of divorce and
married one Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter, filed a petition for authority to remarry invoking par. 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. The Republic thru the OSG contends that the cited provision is not
applicable to the instant case because it applies only to a valid mixed marriage; that is, between a Filipino
citizen and an alien.
Held: On its face, Article 26 does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at
hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 Quita vs. Court of Appeals. The Court therein
hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
par. 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the
other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be
to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal
import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the literal purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the spirit of the law.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of par. 2 of Article 26 as
follows:
1. There is a valid marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.
-In the case at bench, the SC held that the absence of the legal impediment is only required at the
time of the celebration of the marriage no longer during the entire 5-year period of cohabitation.
De Castro vs. De Castro 545 SCRA 162 (February 13, 2008)
The parties applied for a marriage license but forgot about it. The license expired so parties
executed an Affidavit of Cohabitation in lieu of the license.
SC: Falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity. The false affidavit has no
value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper.
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT vs. JOSE A. DAYOT
550 SCRA 435 (March 28, 2008)
Jose and Felisa were married in November 1986 and in lieu of a marriage license, the parties
executed a sworn affidavit attesting, among others, that both of them being unmarried lived together as
husband and wife for at least 5 years. It turned out that the statement is a complete falsity for they started
living together barely 5 months before the celebration of their marriage.
Issue: Whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth
fallen short of the minimum 5-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of
marriage license.
SC: For the exception in Article 76 of the Civil Code to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that a man
and a woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least 5 years.
- The Civil Code in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of 5 years of
cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise.
-The minimum requisite of 5 years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of
the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed
with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but one that partakes of a mandatory
character.
- To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow circumvention
of the law.
- The falsity of the allegation in the sworn statement relating to the period of Jose and
Felisa s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to the
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the
parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn statement is a lie, then it is merely a
scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS vs. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL and TEOFILO CARLOS II
GR No. 179922, December 16, 2008
- The failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the marriage contract
evidencing the marriage between Felicidad and Teofilo, although irregular, is not as fatal
as Juan represents it to be. Felicidad s affirmation of the existence of said marriage
license, the Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, corroborated
her statement stating that the number of said marriage license was inadvertently not
placed in the marriage contract for the reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled the
blanks in the marriage contract who in turn may have overlooked the same.
BANGAYAN VS BANGAYAN. We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be
void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a
license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No.
N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the
month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage
void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules
on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err
in sustaining the trial courts ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab
initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the
trial courts decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did
notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring
22
that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial courts discussion that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.1wphi1 The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and
void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no
evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage
contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but
for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed.
ALCANTARA VS ALCANTARA. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official
business.[27] The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less
than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of
doubt as to an officers act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.[28]
Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued
in Carmona, Cavite.[29]
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that
neither hehe nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no
sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or
municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license
despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are
considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.[30] An irregularity in any of
the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
ABAS VS ABAS. Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and
relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said
license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification
that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was
allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official
record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in
the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that
the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance
of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be
found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the
duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and
such other relevant data.
23
-Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a
partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which
brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery
of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of
family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is
a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a
long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but
sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
-In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above
marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
-An ungiven self is an unfulfilled self.
3) Republic v. CA and Molina Molina Guidelines
February 13, 1997
-No clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity . It appears to be
more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations.
-SC laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36. M A P E
-Root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.
-Made definite and clear as to what are the essential marital obligations of marriage (Articles 68-
71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code).
4) Marcos vs. Marcos
343 SCRA 755
- The personal or medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement
for a declaration of psychological incapacity. The totality of evidence presented may
serve as basis of the determination of the merits of the petition.
- The guidelines in the Molina case incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos v CA: psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The foregoing guidelines
do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be medically or clinically identified. What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party s
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
- Although this court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part.
There is no showing that his defects were already present at the inception of the marriage
or that they are incurable. The behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that
he had lost his job and was unemployed for 6 years.
- And because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid
down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner has not faithfully
observed them. She failed to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability; and for her failure to
observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
5) Hernandez vs. CA and Hernandez
December 8, 1999
-Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves
constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality which made respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to respondent s youth and self-conscious
feeling of being handsome.
- Expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of spouse s
psychological incapacity, if only to show, that it existed at the time of the marriage.
6) REPUBLIC vs. DAGDAG
351 SCRA 425
-May a spouse be declared psychologically incapacitated based on the following grounds?
1. would disappear for months;
2. if with his family, often drunk and in such a state forced the wife to have sexual
intercourse, in case of refusal beats the wife; and
24
3. had been unheard of since last disappearance although rumored to have escaped
from jail.
-In Republic vs. Molina, the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code. Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda
failed to comply with Guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband.
7.) PESCA vs. PESCA
356 SCRA 588
- In 1994 wife filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 because
of the alleged emotional immaturity and irresponsibility of her cruel and violent husband.
A habitual drinker who, when advised to stop, would beat, slap and kick her. Prior to the
filing of the case, petitioner was battered black and blue that led to the imprisonment of
respondent for 11 days.
- Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity.
- The phrase psychological incapacity, borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel
provision in the statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family
Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first
time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally given the
procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of
marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not
overturned, Santos. At all events petitioner utterly failed, both in her allegations in the
complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the
part of her husband, let alone at the time of the solemnization of the marriage, so as to
warrant a declaration of nullity of marriage.
- The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the of the family that the State cherishes and protects (Section 2, Article XV,
1987 Constitution).
8. BARCELONA vs. CA the new Rules require the petition to allege physical manifestations
indicative of psychological incapacity.
412 SCRA 41
-Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Void Marriages (effective March 15, 2003). Procedural rules
apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. The obvious effect of the new Rules
providing that expert opinion need not be alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to allege
the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral
sciences are competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do
not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is no
need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity. What the new Rules require
the petition to allege are physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity.
(Facts: Petitioner merely alleged that his wife was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage which exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage and which
incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in the
psychological examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent. In
her motion to dismiss, the wife argued that the petition falls short of the guidelines set forth in Santos and
Molina. Specifically the petition is defective because it failed to allege the root cause of her alleged
psychological incapacity. It is also devoid of any reference of the grave nature of her illness to bring about
her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage which were not even stated what those
marital obligations that she failed to comply due to psychological incapacity.)
DEDEL vs. CA
421 SCRA 461
Sharon is an immature wife and mother and had extramarital affairs with several men one of whom
she ran away with and had 2 children with him. She was also confined once in a hospital for treatment by
a clinical psychiatrist. During the trial, a doctor testified that Sharon was suffering from anti-social
personality disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions
and had no capacity for remorse. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her
repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of anti-social personality
disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Held: Sharon s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychologically ill to such an
extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that Sharon s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the
inception of the marriage.
Respondent s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts
are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
TENEBRO vs. CA
423 SCRA 272
What is the effect of a judicial declaration of nullity of a 2 nd or subsequent marriage on the
individual s criminal liability for bigamy?
Veronico married Leticia on April 10, 1990. Sometime 1991 Veronico informed Leticia that he was
previously married to Hilda in 1986. He then left the former to live with the latter. When Veronico
25
contracted another marriage in 1993 with one Nilda, Leticia filed a complaint for bigamy. Convicted. On
appeal he argued that the declaration of nullity of the 2 nd marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date on which the 2nd marriage was celebrated.
Held: A declaration of nullity of the 2nd marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is
absolutely of no moment insofar as the State s penal laws are concerned. As a second or subsequent
marriage contracted during the subsistence of Veronico s valid marriage to Hilda, Veronico s marriage
to Leticia would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of Leticia s psychological incapacity or
capacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void,
the nullity of this 2nd marriage is not per se an argument of the avoidance of the criminal liability for
bigamy. Although the judicial declaration of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects, Article 54 states that
children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered
legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability
for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and
allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and thus
escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women
with the promise of futurity and commitment.
NAJERA vs. NAJERA 591 SCRA 542 (July 3, 2009) conclusion that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on her personal
knowledge and evaluation of respondent
Digna prayed that her marriage with Eduardo be declared void by reason of the alleged
psychological incapacity of Eduardo to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. In
support of her petition she presented Dr. Gates who testified that Eduardo is afflicted with Borderline
Personality Disorder as marked by his pattern of instability in his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-
image and self-destructive tendencies, his uncontrollable impulses. Eduardo s psychological impairment
as traced to his parent s separation, aggravated by the continued meddling of his mother in his adult life,
antedates his marriage to Digna. Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances (alcohol and
marijuana), known to cause irreparable damage organically, and the manifest worsening of his violent
and abusive behavior across time render his impairment grave and irreversible.
Likewise, during the pendency of the petition, Digna also filed a petition for annulment of her
marriage before the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church based on
psychological incapacity under Canon 1095. And twelve (12) days before the decision of the appellate
court was issued, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal declared her marriage annulled stating that
the husband-respondent upon contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract. The trial court decreed only the legal
separation of the spouses, but not the annulment of their marriage. The CA affirmed the lower court s
decision.
SC: The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in
Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."[24] The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.[25] In fact, the root cause may be "medically
or clinically identified."[26] What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
27
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not
be resorted to.[27]
In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted by
petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of respondents alleged psychological incapacity
was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates conclusion that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on her
personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is unscientific and unreliable.[28]
Moreover, the trial court correctly found that petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the alleged
personality disorder of respondent was incurable
30
-It is essential that the parties to a marriage must be shown to be insensitive to or incapable of
meeting their duties and responsibilities due to some psychological (not physical) illness, which insensitivity
or incapacity should have been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage even if it becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
-How the doctor arrived at the conclusion, after interviewing Lynnette and considering her
deposition, that such personality disorders of Martini had been existing since Martini s adolescent years
has not been explained.
-While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him/her psychologically
incapacitated is not required, the root cause thereof must be medically or clinically identified. There
must thus be evidence to adequately establish the same. There is none such in the case at bar, however.
DIMAYUGA-LAURENA vs. CA 566 SCRA 154 (September 22, 2008)
Ma. Darlene and Jesse were married on December 19, 1983 and had 2 children. In 1993, Darlene
filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jose. She alleged that the latter s psychological
incapacity was manifested by his infidelity, utter neglect of his family s needs, irresponsibility, insensitivity
and tendency to lead a bachelor s life. During the trial Darlene claimed that the root of Jose s
incapacity was his homosexuality (during their honeymoon, they were accompanied by a 15-year old
boy, and that he had feminine tendencies).
-SC reiterated Santos and Molina decisions. Santos on the 3 characteristics while Molina on the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36. In the case at bar, both the trial and
appellate courts found that petitioner failed to satisfy the guidelines in the Molina case. Sexual infidelity,
repeated physical violence, homosexuality, or moral pressure to compel one to change religious affiliation,
and abandonment are grounds for legal separation but not for declaring a marriage void.
In Marcos vs. Marcos, the court ruled that if the totalities of the evidence presented are enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, there is no need to resort to the actual medical examination
of the person concerned. While the examination by a physician of a person to declare him
psychologically incapacitated is not required, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically identified. Darlene failed to prove that respondent s psychological incapacity was
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In sum, the totality of the evidence failed to show
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated and that such incapacity was grave, incurable, and
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE vs. ROWENA TE
G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009
Edward met Rowena in a gathering. 3 months after their 1st meeting, Rowena asked Edward
that they eloped but he refused. She persisted and so they went to Cebu but Edward s P80,000.00 lasted
only a month. Unable to find jobs, they decided to return to Manila. Rowena went to live in her uncle s
house while Edward returned to his parents home. Edward however, was forced to live with Rowena and
her uncle because she kept on telephoning him, threatening that she would commit suicide if Edward
would not live with her. On April 23, 1996, they got married and continued to stay in her uncle s house
where Edward was treated like a prisoner, as he was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle
showed him his guns and warned not to leave Rowena. When he was able to call home, a brother
suggested that they stay at their parents home and live with them. Rowena instead suggested that
Edward should get his inheritance so they can live on their own. When he relayed this to his father, the
latter got mad and told him that he would be disinherited and insisted that he must go home. Edward
escaped.
After knowing that Edward does not have any money, she stopped tormenting him and informed
him that they should live separate lives.
The clinical psychologist who examined Edward found both parties are psychologically
incapacitated. Edward s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality
disorder, and Rowena s that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. Yet despite said
findings, the CA reversed the earlier ruling of the lower court that granted the petition.
SC: The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which
the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina. The unintended consequences of Molina,
however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and
sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a
straitjacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court in applying
Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is
void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply
provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage. We are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina. And,
to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.
Petitioner s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and
respondent s, that of narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. By the very nature of article 36, courts,
despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties.
Hernandez v. CA emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the
precise cause of a party s psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the
31
marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence
presented as enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a
link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the
essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and
support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make
most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes
they are wrong, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people.
He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of,
and has no goals and clear direction in life.
Respondent s affliction with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the
essential marital obligations. Her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of
others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral
limitations imposed by society. She is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
TING vs. VELEZ-TING 582 SCRA 694 (March 31, 2009)
Did the SC abandon the Molina Doctrine in view of its ruling in TE vs. TE?
Far from abandoning Molina, We (SC) simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements
set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the
rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages inasmuch as to require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the
psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist
or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice for
poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available. The need for
the examination of the party or parties by a psychologist or psychiatrist and the presentation of psychiatric
experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.
But if the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert opinions of psychiatrist
tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party s alleged psychological incapacity then, such
expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to
grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
MARIETTA C. AZCUETA v. REPUBLIC GR. No. 180668 (May 26, 2009)
Marietta married Rodolfo 2 months after their 1st meeting. The marriage lasted only for 4 years and
subsequently Marietta filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36. She alleged
that Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself to married life
and perform the essential responsibilities and duties of a husband. He never bothered to look for a job and
instead relied upon his mother for financial assistance including the payment of rentals of the room they
were occupying. He pretended that he found a job but when confronted as Marietta discovered that he
really did not actually get a job and the money he gave her (which was supposedly his salary) came from
his mother, he cried like a child and told the wife that he did it so she would stop nagging about applying
for a job. When they discussed about their sexual problem as theirs is an unsatisfactory sex once a month,
Rodolfo would always say that sex is sacred and should not be enjoyed or abused. He did not even want
to have a child yet because he was not ready. The psychiatrist testified that Rodolfo was suffering from
Dependent Personality Disorder whose response to ordinary way of life was ineffectual and inept,
characterized by loss of self-confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and
dependency on other people.
SC: The root cause of the above clinical condition is due to a strong and prolonged dependence
with a parent of the opposite sex, to a period when it becomes no longer appropriate. This situation
crippled his psychological functioning related to sex, self-confidence, independence, responsibility and
maturity. It existed prior to the marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration due to marital
stresses and demands. It is considered as permanent and incurable in nature, because it started early in his
life and therefore became so deeply ingrained into his personality structure. It is severe and grave in
degree, because it hampered and interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual
adjustment.
His inhibitions in a sexual relationship, is referable to an unconscious guilt feelings of defying the
mother s love. At this point, he has difficulty in delineating between the wife and the mother, so that his
continuous relationship with his wife produces considerable anxiety, which he is unable to handle, and
crippled him psychologically.
The SC also cited Santos, Marcos, and Te decisions. It further stated that, there was sufficient
compliance with Molina to warrant the annulment of the parties marriage under Article 36.
SO vs. VALERA 588 SCRA 319 (June 5, 2009)
Renato So was a 17-year old high school student while Lorna Valera was a 21-year old college
student when they fell in love. They cohabited for about 19 years before they decided to get married. Five
years later, Renato filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for want of the essential and formal
requisites. He also claimed that Lorna is psychologically incapacitated as shown by her refusal and failure
to cohabit and make love with him, does not love or respect him. If he comes home late, Lorna would
refuse to let him in and in several instances he has to sleep in his car. She also refused to practice her
profession by selling her dental equipment that he bought and provided. Instead she joined him in his
electronics business and interfered in his decisions that would sometimes make him lose face before his
employees.
On nullity due to absence of the essential and formal requisites, Renato alleged that Lorna merely
asked him to sign a blank marriage application form and marriage contract and that no marriage
ceremony took place.
32
He presented Dr. Gates, a clinical psychologist, who testified that Lorna suffers from Compulsive
Behavior Patterns evident in her marijuana habit, gambling and habitual squandering of Renato s
money. That her Adjustment Disorder and Compulsive Behavior Patterns already existed prior to her
marriage to Renato. That it is continuing and appears to be irreversible.
SC: The allegation on nullity due to absence of the essential and formal requisites of marriage was
negated by the fact that during the trial Renato himself presented a certified true copy of the marriage
contract/certificate duly signed by the officiating officer.
On psychological incapacity, the SC held that Shorn of any reference to psychology, We
conclude that We have a case here of parties who have very human faults and frailties; who have been
together for some time; and who are now tired or each other. to be tired and to give up on one s
situation and on one s husband are not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of
love be so labeled.
The statements made by Dr. Gates merely testify to Lorna s impulsiveness, lack of restraint, and
lack of civility and decency in the conduct of her life. Dr. Gates failed to prove that all these emanated
from a behavioral disorder so grave and serious that she would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage; that it was rooted in the respondent s medical or psychological history
before the marriage; and that a cure was beyond the respondent s capacity to achieve.
RODOLFO ASPILLAGA vs. AURORA ASPILLAGA G.R. 170925 October 26, 2009
The marriage disintegrated when, after arrival from Japan, Aurora discovered that Rodolfo
cohabited with her cousin in their house and subsequently, left the family abode in favor of the
concubine. On the other hand, Rodolfo, in his petition, alleged that Aurora is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He complained that Aurora is a
spendthrift, domineering and frequently humiliated him. Psychiatrist Maaba explained that the spouses
harbor psychological handicaps that could be traced from unhealthy maturational development. Rodolfo
has an unhealthy familial relationship during the early maturational development specifically in the form of
a domineering and protective maternal lineage.
Deep-seated sense of dejection, loneliness, and emptiness hamper Aurora s objectivity. She also
projected signs of immaturity and has the desire to regress to a lower level of development.
SC: Maaba failed to reveal that these personality traits or psychological conditions were grave or
serious enough to bring about an incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage. While he was
able to establish the parties personality disorder; however, Maaba failed to link the parties psychological
disorders to his conclusion that they are psychologically incapacitated to perform their obligations as
husband and wife. The fact that these psychological conditions will hamper their performance of their
marital obligations does not mean that they suffer from psychological incapacity as contemplated under
Article 36 of the FC. Mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity. Moreover, there is no evidence to
prove that each party s condition is so grave or is of such as to render said party incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage. There is likewise no evidence that the claimed incapacity is
incurable and permanent.
EDWARD LIM vs. MA. CHERYL LIM G.R. No. 176464 February 4, 2010
Dr. Villegas psychiatric report stated that, clinical evidence showed that Mr. Edward Lim is
suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder while Cheryl is suffering from Histrionic Personality Disorder,
associated with immaturity, that render both of them psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties
and responsibilities of marriage.
The conclusion was based on what Villegas termed as psychodynamics of the case where he
alleged that Edward did not build close attachments to his parents. His father was exceptionally
temperamental and moody, while the mother was extremely asocial, isolated, withdrawn and seclusive,
that repelled him from both of them.
Cheryl, on the other hand, was initially congenial, which lasted only for a short period of time. Later,
her immaturity interfered with her behavioral pattern and adjustment. Apparently, she could not
recognized realities in their family set-up and will insist on her fantasized wishes.
SC: It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Villegas with nary a link
drawn between the psychodynamics of the case and the factors characterizing the psychological
incapacity.
Villegas global conclusion of both parties personality disorders were not supported by
psychological test properly administered by clinical psychologists specifically trained in the tests use and
interpretation. The supposed personality disorders of the parties, considering that such diagnoses were
made, could have been fully established by psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to
measure specific aspects of people s intelligence, thinking, or personality.
The SC also cited its rulings in the Santos (characteristics of psychological incapacity and its
definition) and Molina (guidelines) cases.
JORDAN CHAN PAZ vs. JEANICE PAVON PAZ G. R. No. 166579 February 18, 2010
Wife Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jordan. She alleged that
Jordan is psychologically incapacitated to assume the essential obligations of marriage. That it was
manifested by Jordan s uncontrollable tendency to be self-preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well as his
pre-disposition to become violent and abusive whenever his whims and caprices were not satisfied.
According to psychiatrist Gates, Jordan was afflicted with Borderline Personality as manifested in his
impulsive behavior, delinquency and instability.
SC: Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically incapacitated
should be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist, there is nevertheless a need to prove the
psychological incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the person alleging said disorder.
Correspondingly, the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and
incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
33
In this case, the report and testimony of Gates on Jordan s psychological incapacity were based
exclusively on her interviews with Jeanice and the transcript of stenographic notes of Jeanice s testimony
before the trial court.Gates only diagnosed Jordan from the statements of Jeanice, whose bias in favor of
her cause cannot be doubted. Gates did not actually hear, see and evaluate Jordan. Her report and
testimony were hearsay evidence since she had no personal knowledge of the facts she was testifying on.
The SC also cited the following cases: 1. Santos vs. CA on the 3 characteristics of psychological
incapacity;
3. Dimayuga-Laurena vs. CA;
4. Perez-Ferraris vs. Ferraris on certain quirks and idiosyncrasies do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity;
5. Republic vs. Cabantug-Baguio
Other issues:
Requirement of filing motion for recon on denial before appeal (Rule of Procedure on
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage).
SUAZO vs. SUAZO G. R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010
Cases cited by the SC 1. Santos on characteristics;
2. RP vs. CA otherwise known as the Molina doctrine;
3. Marcos vs. Marcos totality of evidence is sufficient to prove that respondent is suffering from
psychological incapacity;
4. Yu-Te vs. Te where the SC states that, Santos doctrinal value was sustained in Te, saying that
its interpretation is consistent with the Canon Law. But the Te doctrine did not abandon Molina;
far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements (Ting
vs. Velez-Ting).
- The SC denied the petition because the methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the
required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be
suffering from psychological disorder. The psychologist meager information coming from a directly
interested party (petitioner).
LIGERALDE vs. PATALINGHUG G.R. No. 168796 April 15, 2010
Wife had an extra marital affair with whom she subsequently lived with after telling the husband
that she had no more love for him. Thus, the husband came to believe that with the wife s irresponsible,
immature and immoral behavior, she is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.
SC: The psychologist failed to show the root cause of her psychological incapacity. The root cause
of the psychological incapacity must be identified as psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully
explained and established by the totality of evidence presented during the trial.
The acts of the respondent do not even rise to the level of the psychological incapacity that the
law requires. Her act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a psychological
disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at
the inception of marriage. Petitioner must be able to establish that respondent s unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.
34
In the case at bar, the acts attributed to Juvy, do not per se rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that the law requires. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
a person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage-
had to be shown. Thus, her acts only showed indications of immaturity and lack of sense of
responsibility, resulting in nothing more than the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations.
The psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her conclusions exclusively
from the information given her by Nestor. Evidence from independent sources who immediately
knew Juvy before and after the celebration of her marriage would have made a lot of difference
and could have added weight to the psychologist s report. The psychologist failed to trace the
history of Juvy s psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
36
1.) Republic vs. Nolasco art 41 applies when the 2nd marriage happened during the
effectivity of the FC.
220 SCRA 20
-Four requisites that must be met for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41. These
are 1. the absentee spouse must have been absent for 4 consecutive years or 2 years if the
disappearance is accompanied by any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 391 of the Civil
Code; 2.the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absentee spouse is already dead; 3.
there is a judicial decree of presumptive death; and 4. for the purpose of remarriage.
-Spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of them leaves the
conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage.
NOTE:
IN NCC, ART 83.
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse
of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee,
though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if
the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted
shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. (29a)
HOWEVER, IN ART 41, FC... Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code,
an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse. (83a)
2.) Calisterio vs.Calisterio
April 16, 2000
-Subsequent marriage was solemnized on May 8, 1958 the law in force at that time was the Civil
Code (Article 83).
-A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the
prescribed period of absence (7 consecutive years or if less, generally considered to be dead and
believed to be so) is met. In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent
marriage may exceptionally be considered the following conditions must concur: (1) the prior
spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for 4 consecutive years or 2 years where
there is danger of death under Article 391 of the NCC, (2) the spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse is already dead, (3) there is a judicial declaration of presumptive
death and (4) for the purpose of remarriage.
3.) EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE
November 29, 2005
Is the spouse who contracts a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage
still liable for bigamy despite the absentee spouse having been missing for 21 years?
Facts: Eduardo married Rubylus in 1975. She went missing also in the same year and was unheard
of since then. In 1996, he married Tina. When he left Tina in 2001, the latter became curious and made
inquiries with the NSO in Manila and learned that Eduardo had been previously married. Sued for bigamy,
Eduardo avers that when he married Tina in 1996, Rubylus had been absent for 21 years since 1975. He
points out that, under the 1st paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code she was presumed dead as a
matter of law because if one has been absent for 7 years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be
presumed dead for all purposes except for succession. Thus, the presumptive death of the absentee
spouse arises by operation of law upon the satisfaction of 2 requirements: the specified period and the
present spouse s reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil
Code does it require that there must be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive
death would apply.
Held: It was the burden of petitioner to prove his defense that when he married Tina in 1996, he was
of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more
than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court
declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the RPC (Bigamy- The penalty
x x x x or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in a proper proceedings.), in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration
constitutes proof that petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he
married Tina and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy. The requirement of judicial
declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the State
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Marriage is a social
institution of the highest importance.
REPUBLIC vs. CA and ALEGRO
37
December 9, 2005
Alan filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) when barely
a month after the marriage, Lea left their conjugal abode. He then looked for her in his in-laws house, in
her friend s house where the brother-in-law of Lea s friend told him that his wife left for Manila. He also
inquired from his friends of Lea s whereabouts but to no avail. He also sought the help of Barangay
Captain Magat who promised to help him locate his wife. In 1995, he left for Manila and went to the house
of Lea s friend but despite repeated talks with her, he failed to find her. He also looked for Lea in the malls
but to no avail. In 1997, he decided to return to Catbalogan and again looked for his wife but failed. In
2001, he reported Lea s disappearance to the local police and also to NBI. Magat corroborated his
statements during the trial.
SC: The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage. The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent
spouse is already dead, in Republic vs. Nolasco, the Court warned against collusion between the parties
when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means. It is also a maxim
that men readily believe what they wish to be true.
In this case, Alegro failed to present a witness other than Magat. He failed to present Janeth or
Nelson or any other person from whom he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate his
testimony. What is worrisome is that, Alegro failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law considering that
Lea s father was the owner of DYMS. He did report and seek the help of the local police and the NBI to
locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his
petition.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS) and the SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION (SSC) vs. TERESITA JARQUE vda. DE
BAILON
March 24, 2006
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead, Bailon contracted a
subsequent marriage with Teresita in Casiguran, Sorsogon. When Bailon died Teresita claimed the death
benefits from the SSS. It now appears that Alice is very much alive and that it was Bailon who abandoned
or deserted the spouse. Alice alleged that she lived with her parents at Barcelona, Sorsogon because she
found out that Bailon was having an extra marital affair but Bailon used to visit her there after their
separation. That she only recently knew of the petition filed by Bailon to declare her presumptively dead.
The SSS denied Teresita s claim contending that her subsequent marriage with Bailon is void as it was
contracted while Bailon s marriage with Alice was still subsisting and that there is no need to require Alice
to execute an affidavit of reappearance as there is no disappearance of Alice. In fact, the CFI order
declaring Alice presumptively dead did not become final, her (ALICE) presence being contrary
proof against the validity of the order. Teresita, however, maintains that her marriage with Bailon was not
declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and subsisting for
all legal intents and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his beneficiary. Went to the Social Security
Commission but the SSC upheld the denial of the SSS respecting Teresita s claim for death benefits.
SC: The 2 marriages having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code specifically Art. 83 which was the law in effect
at the time of their celebration. Under the said provision, a subsequent marriage contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or
contracted under any of the 3 exceptional circumstances (7 continuous years absence or if less than 7
years, generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or disappeared
under any of the circumstances mentioned in Articles 390 or 391) falling under said Article. It bears noting
that the marriage under any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid until declared null and void by
a competent court. It follows that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the
second marriage.
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years when
Bailon sought the declaration of presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a
requirement then for purposes of remarriage. Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being
voidable,48 it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who
reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article
42 thereof provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by
the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling
the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of
the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due
notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance
being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision of the
Family Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee
and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.49
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or
by court action, such absentees mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the
38
subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.50 Since the second marriage has been
contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite
of the spouses physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an
absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.51
x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the effects of
dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be raised,
because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except in a direct
action for annulment.52 (Underscoring supplied)
Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioners
capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of well-founded belief is not required.
Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code was not
yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not
change this conclusion. The Family Code itself states:
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit well-founded belief
will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was
celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go against the objectives that the Family
Code wishes to achieve.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of Sofios
death can be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation of law.
However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was
celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.
Art. 43 effects of termination of subsequent marriage upon reappearance of absentee spouse (90)
Art. 44- Void- status of subsequent marriage falling under Article 41 if both parties acted in bad faith- (90)
Art. 45 -Voidable marriages; Art.46-what constitutes fraud under Art. 45 (3), & Art. 47-period within which to
institute action for annulment-(90, 91, 93, 95, 96, 97, 02)
VILLANUEVA vs. CA
505 SCRA 565 (October 27, 2006)
Orlando and Lilia got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992,
Orlando filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress
forced him into marrying Lilia, that he never cohabited with her after the marriage. Lilia moved for the
dismissal of the complaint, arguing that Orlando freely and voluntarily married her.
SC: The letters admitted to be written by Orlando contained expressions of love and concern for his
wife, and hardly the rantings of a man under duress. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul
a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of the marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can
terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it
arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of
parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify
his failure to cohabit with Lilia on any of those grounds, the validity of the marriage must be upheld.
MANUEL ALMELOR vs. RTC OF LAS PINAS CITY and LEONIDA ALMELOR
39
563 SCRA 447 (August 26, 2008)
Leonida filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Manuel based on Article
36. The court instead, annulled the marriage based on Article 45 (3) in relation to Article 46 (4) of the Family
Code. She alleged that she noticed Manuel to be peculiarly close to his male companions. That she
caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller and that
she found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. Worse, she saw Manuel kissed
another man on the lips that she identified as Doctor Nogales.
SC: Even assuming that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground
to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear- a marriage may be annulled when the consent of
either party was obtained by fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality. Nowhere in the said decision
was it proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage
and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not
homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad
faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage.
The lower court considered the public perception of Manuel s sexual preference without the
corroboration of witnesses. It took cognizance of Manuel s peculiarities and interpreted it against his
sexuality.
The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances constituting fraud.
Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its concealment. It is only a ground for legal
separation.
Article 48 Court orders the prosecuting attorney to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Par. (2)- no
judgment shall be based on stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA
424 SCRA 725
Spouses Rodolfo and Marietta separated-in-fact but had their conjugal partnership property
dissolved judicially. One of the properties adjudicated in her favor was a resort named Munting Paraiso
that is now used as residence of Marietta and the children. Rodolfo intending to remarry filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of the wife docketed as Sp.
Proc. NC-662. Although Rodolfo knew that Marietta is residing at Munting Paraiso he had the summons
served at another address. For failure to file an Answer Rodolfo had the respondent wife declared in
default and was allowed to adduce evidence ex parte. After the grant of the petition, Rodolfo
contracted another marriage with Teresita on February 14, 1998. Marietta then filed a petition for the
annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite.
Held: The public prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he interposed no objection
to the motion of the respondent. The trial court forthwith rendered judgment against Marietta without a
whimper of protest from the public prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor
are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code which states that In all cases of annulment or declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. They also ignored Rule 18, Section 6, 1985 Rules of Court now
Rule 9, Section 3 (e) of the 1997 Rules of Court that there is no default in actions for annulment of
marriage or legal separation.
Art. 50, 51, 52 delivery of presumptive legitimes of common children in cases of termination of marriage
& in Art. 52-necessity of recording in the appropriate civil registry and in the registry of property the decree
of annulment or nullity, dissolution, liquidation and partition of either the conjugal partnership or absolute
community property and the delivery of the children s legitimes- (89,91,92,93,99)
Art. 53- Effect re: non-compliance of the requirements under Art. 52-(89,90,93)
Subsequent marriage is void. Art. 54- children born of 1.an annullable marriage but prior to
annulment, and 2. void marriages under Arts. 36 and 53 are legitimate.
Art. 57- prescriptive period in instituting petition for legal separation (94)
- 5 years from the occurrence of the cause.
Arts. 61 64 effects of legal separation.
SIOCHI v. GOZON 616 S 87 March 18, 2010
40
Elvira obtained a decree of legal separation against her husband Alfredo. The dispositive portion
reads: x x x. Being the offending spouse, respondent Alfredo is deprived of his share in the net profits and
the same is rewarded to their child Winifred R. Gozon whose custody is awarded to petitioner.
ISSUE: Does the forfeiture refer to one-half undivided share of Alfredo in the property?
Article 63 shall have the following effects:
(1) x x x x;
(2) The absolute community or conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but
the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the
absolute community t conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with
the provisions of Article 43 (2);
(3) X x x x.
Article 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall
produce the following effects:
(1) x x x.
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, x
x x x his or her share of the net profits community property or conjugal partnership
property shall be forfeited in favor of their common children or, x x x x x;
Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the community property or
conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to
any share of the net profits of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredo s
share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Article 102 (4) of the FC provides that
for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43 (2)
and 63, No. 2, the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the
community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the
time of its dissolution. Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo s share in the
conjugal partnership property but the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.
Arts. 65 66 reconciliation of spouses.
Article 73 exercise by either spouse even without the consent of the other of any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity. Objection shall be based only on valid, serious, and moral grounds
otherwise the act of the husband in preventing the wife from engaging in such activity shall constitute a
violation of RA 9262 (VAWC Law).
-In case of disagreement the court shall decide whether objection is proper or not and if proper,
when did the benefit accrue if prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against
the community or conjugal partnership property. If benefit accrued after, the obligation shall be charged
to the separate property of the spouse who did not obtain consent.
Art. 74, 75, 76, & 77-property regime of future spouses, requisites (92,95,05)
-Property relations between husband and wife is governed in the following order:
1. Marriage settlements which might either be the a. absolute community property or b.
conjugal partnership of gains or c. complete separation of property;
2. By the provisions of this Code; and
3. By local customs.
-Absence of marriage settlement or if regime agreed upon is void system of absolute community
of property.
-The marriage settlement as well as any modification thereof must be in writing, signed by the
parties, and executed before the celebration of the marriage.
Art. 83 Formalities to be observed involving donations propter nuptias are the formalities on the ordinary
rules of donation unlike that of the Civil Code where donations propter nuptias are governed by the Statue
41
of Frauds (Article 1403 (2), -an agreement made in consideration of marriage other than a mutual
promise to marry as enunciated by the SC in Locquiao vs. Valencia).
NOTE: If what has been donated is a real property, the donation must be in a public instrument and the
acceptance must be in a public instrument. If the property donated is a personal property the value of
which is greater than Php. 5, 000.00 then the donation must be in writing, the acceptance must be in
writing too.
Article 121 (2) Charges upon and obligation of the conjugal partnership (00,06)
1. Ayala Investments vs. CA
286 SCRA 272
-The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a
spin-off of the loan itself.
-Benefits such as prospects of longer employment and probably increase in the value of stocks
might have been already apparent or could be anticipated at the time the accommodation
agreement was entered into are not only incidental but also speculative and too small to qualify
the transaction as one for the benefit of the surety s family.
-While the husband derives salaries, dividend benefits from PBM (the debtor corporation), only
because said husband is an employee of said PBM. These salaries and benefits are not the
benefits contemplated by Articles 121 and 122 of the Family Code. The benefits
contemplated by the exception in Art. 122 (Family Code) are those benefits derived directly from
the use of the loan. In the case at bar, the loan is a corporate loan extended to PBM and used by
PBM itself, not by petitioner-appellee-husband or his family.
2. CARLOS vs. ABELARDO
380 SCRA 361
-May the husband notwithstanding his alleged lack of consent in obtaining a loan be held solidarily
liable for such together with the wife?
- While respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed
by the wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was
used to purchase the house and lot that became the conjugal home of respondent and
his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under
Article 121 of the Family Code, shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.
3. CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS
423 SCRA 357
Facts: On September 28, 1978, Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a 9-million
peso loan from Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). As added security for the loan, Alfredo Ching together
with 2 other persons executed a continuing guaranty with ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally
guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the extent of 38 million pesos.
PBMCI defaulted in the payment of its loans which, exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank charges
amounted to P12,612,972.88. After the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment the sheriff then levied
the 100,000 common shares of CityCorp. stocks registered solely in the name of Alfredo Ching. The wife of
Mr. Ching then moved to set aside the levy on attachment claiming that the 100,000 shares of stocks were
acquired by her and her husband during the marriage out of conjugal funds after the CityCorp Investment
42
Philippines was established in 1974. Furthermore, the indebtedness did not redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
Is the argument of Mrs. Ching tenable?
Ruling: The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of
CityCorp Investment solely in the name of Alfredo does not constitute proof that the husband, not the
conjugal partnership, owned the same. It was, thus, the burden of ABC to prove that the source of the
money utilized in the acquisition of the shares of stocks was that of the husband alone. ABC failed to
adduce evidence to prove this assertion. In AIDC vs. CA, this Court ruled that the signing as a surety is
certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. It is not embarking in a business. No matter how often
an executive acted on or was persuaded to act as surety for his own employer, this should not be taken to
mean that he thereby embarked in the business of guaranty or suretyship.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone,
there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. No presumption can be inferred
that when a husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal
partnership would thereby be benefited.
It could be argued that Alfredo was a member of the Board of Directors of PBMCI and was one of
the top 20 stockholders, and that his shares of stocks and his family would appreciate if the PBMCI could
be rehabilitated through the loans obtained; that Alfredo s career would be enhanced should PBMCI
survive because of the infusion of fresh capital. However, these are not the benefits contemplated by
Article 161 of the Civil Code (Article 121 FC). The benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan.
They cannot merely a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself (citing AIDC vs. CA).
In the present case, the deed of sale was executed on February 27, 1987. Rafael Ayuste died on
October 13, 1989. However, it was only on March 2, 1990 that Christina Ayuste filed her complaint
with the lower court asking for the annulment of the sale. Although the action was filed within ten
years from the questioned transaction, it was not brought during the existence of the marriage
which was dissolved upon the death of Rafael Ayuste in 1989.[17] Clearly, the action for annulment
filed by Christina Ayuste was barred for having been filed out of time.
NOTE: During NCC, sale or encumbrance of conjugal property without consent of other spouse
renders the sale voidable which can be annulled by the other spouse lacking consent within
10years from date of execution and during the existence of marriage. But in FC, the transaction is
void and the action to nullify the sale is not subject to prescription.
45
SC: In Spouses Ching vs. CA, this Court that the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be
deemed a stranger to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It must further be settled whether the obligation of
the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not.
Unlike in the system of absolute community property where liabilities incurred by either spouse by
reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or
insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the
system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance
payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising
from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
RAVINA v. VILLA ABRILLE 604 S 120 (October 16, 2009)
In 1982, spouses Pedro and Mary Ann acquired a 555-square meter lot adjacent to the land that
was acquired by Pedro while still single. They then introduced improvements on the property. In 1991,
Pedro offered to sell the house and the 2 lots to Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified Ravina of her
objections but Pedro, nonetheless, sold the house and 2 lots without Mary Ann s consent.
SC: The lot acquired during the marriage was conjugal in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively
owned by Pedro.
A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the FC is void if done
a.) without the written consent of both the husband and the wife, or b.) in case of one spouse s inability
the authority of the court.
If the sale is with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in
disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given 5 years from the date of the
contract implementing the decision to institute the case.
HEIRS OF HERNANDEZ, SR. v. MINGOA, SR. 608 S 394 12/18/2009
Hernandez married to Sergia, was awarded a piece of real property by PHHC by way of salary
deduction. After full payment, TCT No. 107534 was issued to the spouses. It bears a restriction of any
unauthorized sale to 3rd persons within a certain period. The heirs learned, after Hernandez s death in 1983
that TCT No. 107534 was cancelled in 1982 and in lieu thereof TCT No. 290121 was issued in favor of
respondents. Apparently, Hernandez was unable to fully pay the purchase price so to prevent forfeiture of
his right to purchase, Hernandez sold his rights to Camisura in 1963. To circumvent the prohibition, the
spouses Hernandez executed an irrevocable special power of attorney to enable Dolores to sell the lot to
Plaridel Mingoa without the need of requiring Hernandez to sign a deed of conveyance. Plaridel then sold
the property to his daughter Melanie, then 20 years old. It was alleged that Sergia s signature on the SPA
was falsified. The forgery is so blatant as to be remarkably noticeable to the naked eye of an ordinary
person. Petitioners now contend that the SPA and the deed of sale are fictitious, hence null and void
under Article 1409 of the NCC. The declaration of the non-existence of a contract under Article 1410 does
nor prescribe.
SC: Articles 1409 and 1410 are not applicable. The subject matter involves conjugal property. The
events occurred before the effectivity of the FC. Article 173 of the NCC governs these transactions and it
states: The wife, may during the marriage, and within 10 years from the transaction questioned, ask the
courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest
in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the
dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of the property fraudulently alienated by the
husband.
The failure of Sergia to file an action for annulment of the contract during the marriage and within
10 years from the transaction necessarily barred her from questioning the sale of the subject property to 3rd
persons.
FUENTES v. ROCA 618 S 702 04/21/2010
Tarciano married but separated-in-fact sold a parcel of land to the Fuentes spouses by way of an
agreement to sell. The vendees gave a down payment with the balance to be paid as soon as Tarciano
clears the lot of structures an occupants and secure the consent of the estranged spouse Rosario to the
sale. Allegedly, Atty. Plagata worked on the requirements including Rosario s consent to the sale. He
alleged that Rosario signed the affidavit of consent in Manila but notarized it in Zamboanga City. Tarciano
then executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses.
When Tarciano and Rosari died in 1990, their children, in 1997, filed an action for annulment of sale
and reconveyance of the land claiming that the sale was void since Rosario did not give consent to the
sale. Her signature on the affidavit was forged.
SC: Rosario had been living separately from Tarciano for 30 years since 1958, it would have been
quite tempting for Tarciano to just forge her signature and avoid the risk that she would not give her
consent to the ale or demand a stiff price for it.
The affidavit of consent has a defective notarization that strip the document of its public character
and reduce it to a private instrument, a falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of forgery in the
signature, dooms such document as proof of Rosario s consent to the sale of the land.
While Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, the property was sold on January 11, 1989, a few
months after the FC took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 124 of the FC provides that without the other
spouse s consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void.
Under the provisions of the NCC governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force
and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive
provision of the law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouse s written
consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be
validated either by ratification or prescription.
46
Ultimately, the Roca s ground for annulment is not forgery but the lack of written consent of their
mother to the sale. The forgery is merely evidence of lack of consent.
The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to Rosario, whose consent was not obtained, that the law
gave the right to bring an action to declare void her husband s sale of conjugal land. But Rosario died in
1990, the year after the sale. Does this mean that the right to have the sale declared void is lost forever?
No. The sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of
Tarciano and Rosario despite the sale. When the 2 died, they passed on the ownership of the property to
their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the NCC, to
exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.
Art. 147 Property of Unions without Marriage (92,97) art 35 par 2,3,5,6 art 36, art 40
Valdes vs. RTC B. 102, Q.C., Gomez-Valdes
July 31, 1996
-Marriage was declared void under Art. 36.
-Property acquired during the union is governed by Art. 147. It applies when a man and a woman
so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage.
-The term capacitated (1st par. of Art. 147) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract
marriage, i.e. any male or female of the age of 18 years or upwards not under any of the
impediment mentioned in Art. 37 and 38 of the Code .
-If the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common
and in proportion to their respective contributions.
-Art. 50 (Family Code) applying pars. (2), (3), (4) and 5 of Art. 43, relates only, by its explicit terms to
voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Art. 40 of the Code i.e. the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage
before the latter is judicially declared void.
BUENAVENTURA vs. CA
March 31, 2005
Noel and Isabel got married in 1979. The marriage later on was declared void by reason of Noel s
psychological incapacity. The court, among others, ordered for the liquidation of the assets of the
conjugal partnership where the wife was given of Noel s retirement benefits with 12% int. from date of
decision, and of his outstanding shares of stocks with Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of
Companies. Noel opposed the sharing claiming that the retirement benefits he received from Far East
Bank are gratuitous in nature and therefore, his exclusive property. He likewise acquired the shares of
stocks with the mentioned companies before his marriage and are, again his exclusive properties.
SC: Here, what was done was one-half (1/2) portion of the house was ceded to defendant so that
she will not claim anymore for past unpaid support, while the other half was transferred to their only child
as his presumptive legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in the
conjugal properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of the
separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same being part of their conjugal partnership
48
properties having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or profession of said defendant
husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the Family Code. For the same reason, she is entitled to
one-half (1/2) of the outstanding shares of stock of the plaintiff husband with the Manila Memorial Park
and the Provident Group of Companies.[22]
Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of
Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42, and 43 of the Family Code, providing dissolution of the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rules applies,
which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be
liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of co-ownership. The trial court did not commit a reversible
ruling that petitioner and respondent own the family home and all their common property in equal
shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by
them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles
102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid
and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of
the co-ownership that exists between common law spouses.
Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple s separate property are not
included in the co-ownership. Since the properties to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both
by the trial and appellate courts, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would
be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have
been included or involved in the distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
owned by the parties herein ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis
of co-ownership and not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
JOHN ABING vs. JULIET WAEYAN
July 31, 2006
In 1986, Juliet and John decided to live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. During the cohabitation, they purchased a 2-storey house where the tax declaration was
transferred in the name of Juliet. The house was renovated as annexed to it is a new structure that housed
a sari-sari store. In 1991, Juliet went to Korea and while there she would send money to John who would
deposit it in their joint bank account. When she returned from Korea, they continued to live together, with
John working as an employee of Lepanto Mines and Juliet managing the store. In 1995, they partitioned
their properties and executed a Memorandum of Agreement that was unsigned by the parties but signed
by their witnesses where it was agreed that John shall leave the house with Juliet paying him the amount
of P428,870.00 representing John s share in the properties. Juliet made a down payment of P232,397.66
with the balance to be paid in 12 monthly installments. She failed however, to make good the balance so
John demanded that she vacate the annex. When she refused John filed an ejectment suit against Juliet
claiming that he alone spent for the construction of the annex using his own funds with the tax declaration
for the structure under his name and thru money he borrowed from his relatives as proofs. The proof of
indebtedness is a 1990 affidavit of one Macaraeg who stated that John borrowed P30,000.00 from him.
The MTC found for John which decision was affirmed by the RTC. The CA however, reversed the ruling of
lower courts holding that their property relations cannot be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code
but by the rules on co-ownership . John went to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the property subject of the suit pertains to the exclusive ownership of John.
SC: Other than John s bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and money he borrowed
form his relatives, spent for the construction of the annex, evidence is wanting to support such naked
claim. For sure, John failed to reveal how much he spent therefore. Neither did he divulge the names of
the alleged relatives from whom he made his borrowings, let alone the amount of money he borrowed
from them. All he could offer by way of reinforcing his claim is the affidavit of Macaraeg but the affidavit
stated that it was in 1990 when John borrowed P30,000.00 from him. The annex structure was constructed
in 1992 or 2 years after he borrowed the P30,000 from Macaraeg. There is a paucity of evidence,
testimonial or documentary, to support John s self-serving allegation that the annex structure was put up
thru his own funds and/or money borrowed by him. Tax declarations do not prove ownership but at best
an indicia of claims of ownership.
In this connection Article 147 of the Family Code is instructive. (Cite Article 147 in toto).
The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by
common-law spouses during the period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint
efforts, work or industry and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by
the rules in co-ownership. And under this regime, they owned their properties in common in equal
shares. Being herself a co-owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as correctly stated by the CA, may
not be ejected therefrom.
True, under Article 487 of the Civil Code, a co-owner may bring an action for ejectment against a
co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of a common property. In this
case, evidence is totally wanting to establish John s or Juliet s exclusive ownership of the property in
question. As borne by the record, Juliet was in possession of the subject structure by virtue of being a co-
owner thereof. As such, she is as much entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as John.
Juliet s failure however, to pay the balance of John s share in their common properties could at
best give rise to an action for a sum of money against Juliet, or for rescission of the said agreement and
not for ejectment.
METROBANK v. PASCUAL 547 S 246 02/29/2009
The marriage was declared void under Article 36. In said decision, the court ordered the
partition/dissolution of the conjugal partnership. No liquidation was, however, made. Subsequently, ex-wife
Florencia mortgaged the property to Metro Bank to secure a loan. Attached to the loan documents were
the decision of the court nullifying the marriage to Nicholson and a waiver purportedly signed by
Nicholson where he waived his share in the conjugal property. Florencia failed to pay the loan so Metro
49
Bank foreclosed the mortgage. When Nicholson learned of the foreclosure proceedings, he instituted a
complaint for declaration of nullity of the mortgage as it was made without his consent.
SC: While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond
and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration
continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.
This conclusion holds true whether we apply Art. 129 of the Family Code on liquidation of the conjugal
partnerships assets and liabilities which is generally prospective in application, or Section 7, Chapter 4, Title
IV, Book I (Arts. 179 to 185) of the Civil Code on the subject, Conjugal Partnership of Gains. For, the relevant
provisions of both Codes first require the liquidation of the conjugal properties before a regime of
separation of property reigns.
In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that pending its liquidation following its dissolution, the
conjugal partnership of gains is converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership among the surviving
spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.[17]
In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between the
former spouses, where:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on April 30, 1997, or a little less
than two years after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation
of the partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of the former spouses when the
mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493. Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell
her one-half (1/2) undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson.
However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that
Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided
portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half..
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was
contracted. Under Article 40, [t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus we ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting
a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void.11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which
are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.12 In
both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of
property13 or conjugal partnership of gains14 unless the parties agree to a complete separation of
property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the
parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to
liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not
the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code
and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by
petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property
relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code.16 The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should
be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil
Code, [p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is .
Art. 148- other kinds of cohabitation (91,92,98,00) art 35 par 1,4 art 37, 38
Agapay vs. Palang
July 28, 1997
50
-Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast
to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or
work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares.[9]
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and
sell and had a sari-sari store[10] but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the
subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was
only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S.
Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed
P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property,[11] there being no proof of the same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually
cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended to exclude their case
from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the precise date when they commenced
their adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced, we cannot state definitively that the riceland
was purchased even before they started living together. In any case, even assuming that the subject
property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual
contribution would still be essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland in
Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal
partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in
favor of their daughter Herminia in 1975. The trial court erred in holding that the decision adopting their
compromise agreement in effect partakes the nature of judicial confirmation of the separation of
property between spouses and the termination of the conjugal partnership.[12] Separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial
conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements.[13] The judgment which
resulted from the parties compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of property and
should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975
when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of
conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that
Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlindas name alone be
placed as the vendee.[14]
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and
inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the
Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to
donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage,[15] for
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union
Tumlos vs. Fernandez
330 SCRA 718
-Applicable law is Art. 148 of the Family Code.
-Art. 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not
incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void from the
beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage.
-Article 148 of the Family Code has filled the hiatus in Art. 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.
-Nothing in Art. 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the property amounts to
a contribution in its acquisition.
Mallilin, Jr. vs. Castillo
333 SCRA 628
Both parties were already married when they cohabited together. During the relationship they
established a business enterprise and by reason thereof acquired several properties. The properties
however, were all registered in the name of Castillo. When they decided to end the relationship, Mallilin
demanded for his share in the properties they acquired during the cohabitation. Castillo countered that
Article 144 of the Civil Code cannot be applied as the same covers only properties acquired by a man
and a woman living together as husband and wife but not married or under a void marriage. In their case,
their union suffered the legal impediment of a prior subsisting marriage.
SC: Art. 148 of the Family Code now provides for a limited co-ownership in cases where the parties
in union are incapacitated to marry each other.
- It applies as all but one property were acquired after the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988. With respect to the property acquired under the regime of the New Civil Code, then it should be
excluded. The legal relation of the parties is already specifically covered by Article 148 of the Family Code
under which all properties acquired out of their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry
shall constitute a co-ownership.
-Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the other.
-A trust relation already inheres in a co-ownership.
Carino vs. Carino
February 2, 2001
51
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage,[12] and the
absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions,[13] renders the marriage void ab initio.[14]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall
within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v.
Court of Appeals,[15] the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by
the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been
sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and
that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial
court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in
her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue
and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed
validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages
exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to
respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there
must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party
can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and
petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan
Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree
declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses
according to the applicable property regime.[16] Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio,
the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but
rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of
Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman
are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man,[17] -
... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall
belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively.
Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral
inspiration, are excluded in this regime.[18]
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage,
having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid
(between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation,
Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies
earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary,
it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary
benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the
deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the
said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal
wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code
governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the
absence of a marriage license.
52
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the
cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them,
even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto.[19] Conformably, even
if the disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article
147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is
no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in
good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her
share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate
succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
6. JACINTO SAGUID vs. CA
June 10, 2003
-Under the property regime governed by Art. 148 x x x x only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions x x x x. Proof of actual contribution
is required.
- In the case at bar, nowhere in Gina s testimony did she specify the extent of her
contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction
materials on 11/17/95 and 12/23/95 in the amount of P11,413.00. With respect to the disputed
personal properties both claimed that the money used in the purchase thereof came partly from
their joint account. There is however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective
shares in the said account. And pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof
of extent of the parties respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal. Here,
the disputed properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not
questioned by Jacinto, hence, their share therein is equivalent to , P55,687.50 each. And on the
basis of the evidence established, the extent of Gina s co-ownership over the disputed house is
only up to the amount of P11,413.00 her proven contribution in the construction thereof.
-In Adriano vs. CA, the SC ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name
of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence
of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
RIVERA vs. HEIRS OF ROMUALDO VILLANUEVA
496 SCRA 135 (July 21, 2006)
- Because the cohabitation of Villanueva and Gonzales from 1927 to 1963 was adulterous, their
property relations during those 36 years were not governed by Article 144 of the Civil Code which
applies only if the couple living together is not in any way incapacitated from getting married.
According to the doctrine laid down in Juaniza vs. Jose (89 SCRA 306), no co-ownership exists
between parties to an adulterous relationship. In Agapay vs. Palang, we expounded on this
doctrine by declaring that in such a relationship, it is necessary for each of the partners to prove his
or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any
portion of it. The presumption of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.
LUPO ATIENZA vs. YOLANDA DE CASTRO
508 SCRA 593 (November 29, 2006)
Lupo, married and the president and general manager of 2 corporations, hired the services of
Yolanda as accountant thereof. The 2 became intimate and eventually lived together and had 2 children.
The relationship turned sour and they parted ways. Lupo then filed a petition for judicial partition involving
a parcel of land with improvements located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City. He alleged that the
property was acquired during their union and hence, the property is co-owned by them. He claimed that
the funds used in the acquisition of the said property were his exclusive funds and that the title was
transferred to Yolanda s name alone was done without his knowledge and consent. And since the
property was acquired in 1987, therefore Article 144 of the Civil Code should be applied. That he is not
burdened to prove that he contributed to the acquisition thereof because with or without contribution by
either partner, he is deemed a co-owner of the subject property. He added that Article 484 of the Civil
Code states that as long as the property was acquired by either or both of them during their extramarital
union, such property would be legally owned by them in common and governed by the rules on co-
ownership, which shall apply in default of contracts or special provisions.
SC: Here although the adulterous relationship commenced in 1983, Article 148 of the Family Code
applies because this provision is intended to fill up the hiatus/gap in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before
Article 148 of the FC was enacted, there was no provision governing property property relations of couples
living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the
property occurred before the FC took effect, Article 148 of the FC governs.
Rather than presenting proof of his actual contribution to the purchase used as consideration for
the property, Lupo diverted the burden upon him to Yolanda as a shrewd and scheming woman without
capacity to purchase any property. Petitioner s claim of ownership is without basis because not only did
he fail to substantiate his allege contribution but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its
purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say
so and voluminous bank records, which sadly finds no relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to
overcome his burden of proof.
Respondent had sufficiently established that she derived funds used to purchase the property from
her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency
trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She presented clientele and promissory notes evincing
substantial dealings with her clients, her bank account statements and bank transactions.
BORROMEO vs. DESCALLAR 580 SCRA 175 (February 24, 2009)
Austrian Jambrich met and fell in love with Descallar, a married but separated woman, who was
working as waitress at a local hotel in Cebu City. She was earning P1,000.00 per month and another
P1,000.00 in the form of tips. Subsequently, they bought 3 parcels of land with a house constructed
53
thereon. The deed of sale originally included Jambrich as buyer but because of the refusal of the Register
of Deeds to register the property in Jambrich s name on the ground that a foreigner could not acquire
alienable lands of public domain they erased his name but not his signatures appearing in all pages of the
document. Jambrich and Descallar however, separated.
Subsequently, Jambrich incurred debts and to pay the obligation, he sold his rights and interest in
the property that is now registered in Descallar s name in favor of his creditor. Is the sale made by
Jambrich valid?
SC: The transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich could have been
declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the property to Borromeo. Citing United
Church of Christ vs. Sebastian, the Court reiterated the consistent ruling that if land is invalidly transferred to
an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is considered valid.
Art. 150 who are members of the same family for purposes of Art. 151
Art. 151 Suit between members of the same family
1) O Laco vs. Co Cho Chit and CA
220 SCRA 656
-It is well settled that earnest efforts towards a compromise as well as the inability to succeed is a
condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same family. Hence, the
defect in the complaint is assailable at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, for lack of
cause of action.
- Admittedly, the present action is between members of the same family since petitioner Emilia
O'Laco and respondent O Lay Kia are half-sisters. Consequently, there should be an averment in
the complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, pursuant to Art. 222 of
the New Civil Code, 6 or a motion to dismiss could have been filed under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of
the Rules of Court. 7 For, it is well-settled that the attempt to compromise as well as the inability to
succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same family. 8
Hence, the defect in the complaint is assailable at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal,
for lack of cause of action. 9
But, plaintiff may be allowed to amend his complaint to correct the defect if the amendment does
not actually confer jurisdiction on the court in which the action is filed, i.e., if the cause of action
was originally within that court's jurisdiction. 10 In such case, the amendment is only to cure the
perceived defect in the complaint, thus may be allowed.
54
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as
required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as
contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest
before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: N D D
D
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as
such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home
whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law
only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle
on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by
petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that
"the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that
all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing
family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does
not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited No. The debt or
liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on
March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on
January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not
fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
Manacop vs. CA and E & L Mercantile, Inc. occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or
by any of its beneficiaries must be actual.
215 SCRA 773
- Petitioner contends that he should be deemed residing in the family home because his stay in the
United States is merely temporary. He asserts that the person staying in the house is his overseer and
that whenever his wife visited this country, she stayed in the family home. This contention lacks
merit.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by
any of its beneficiaries must be actual. That which is actual is something real, or actually
existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or
constructive.[10] Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically.
Rather, the property may be occupied by the beneficiaries enumerated by Article 154 of the
Family Code.
Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of the family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the
family for lead support.
This enumeration may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the
husband and wife.[11] But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers.
Taneo, Jr. vs. CA 304 SCRA 308
-Reiterated ruling in Modequillo and Manacop cases
-In the case at bar, Taneo constituted the house in question as the famly home on March 7, 1964
but the instrument constituting the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The
money judgment against Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus at the time when the
debt was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered.
55
-The house should be constructed on a land not belonging to another as by the very definition of
the law that the family home is the dwelling house where a person and his family resides and the
land on which it is situated.
-The constitution of a family home by Taneo was merely an afterthought in order to escape
execution of their property.
PERLA PATRICIO vs. MARCELINO DARIO III requisites to be considered as beneficiary of a family
home
507 SCRA 438 (November 20, 2006)
Marcelino died intestate and survived by his wife Perla and 2 sons, Marcelino Marc and
Marcelino III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-
school building constructed thereon located at Oxford St., Cubao, Quezon City. After the heirs
extra-judicially settled the estate, Perla and Marcelino Marc advised Marcelino III that they intend
to partition the property and terminate the co-ownership but the latter refused on the ground that
a minor beneficiary who is Marcelino III s 12-year old son and a grandson of the decedent still
resides in said home. He contended that as long as the minor is living in the family home, the same
continues as such until the beneficiary comes of age. That despite the expiration of 10 years from
the date of death of Marcelino in 1987 i.e. even after July 1997, the subject property continues to
be considered as the family home considering that his minor son, who is a beneficiary of said family
home, still resides in the premises.
SC: The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner
thereof or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual. Actual occupancy, however, need not be
by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the
beneficiaries enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which include the in-laws where the
family home is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife. But the law definitely excludes
maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code.
To be a beneficiary of the family home, 3 requisites (A L D)must concur: (1) they must be
among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family
home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Moreover, Art. 159 of the FC provides that the family home shall continue despite the death
of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long
as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or
constituted the family home.
Thus, may Marcelino Lorenzo IV, minor son of respondent be considered as a beneficiary
under Article 154 of the FC? As to the 1st requisite, the term descendants contemplates all
descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence,
it must necessarily include the grandchildren and the great grandchildren of the spouses who a
family home. Thus, Marcelino III s minor son, who is a grandchild of Marcelino satisfies the 1 st
requisite.
2nd requisite: minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the
benefits derived from Article 159. Marcelino Lorenzo IV has been living in the family since 1994, or
within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the 3rd requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo IV cannot demand support from his
paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal
support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo IV s parents, especially his father, herein private
respondent who is the head of his immediate family. And only in default of his parents is the
obligation imposed on the grandparents.
Marcelino Lorenzo IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his
father. Thus despite, residing in the family home and his a descendant of Marcelino Dario,
Marcelino Lorenzo IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154
because he did not fulfill the 3rd requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support.
KELLY, JR. vs. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. 557 SCRA 499 (July 9,2008)
GR: FAMILY HOME EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION
XPN: THOSE MENTIONED IN ART. 155 and ART. 160-claim is not among those mentioned in Article 155
obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually
worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157 (urban-300k, rural - 200k)
In 1989, Kelly failed to pay the value of the agricultural chemical products that he obtained on
consignment from Planters Products. The sheriff levied and sold on execution a real property located in
Naga City to satisfy the judgment award. The Kelly spouses questioned the levy and the subsequent sale
alleging that the property is a family home and is, therefore, exempt from execution.
SC: The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and
lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover, the debts for which the family
home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise, (that is, if it was
incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted either
judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.
The rule, however, is not absolute. The express exceptions are found in Articles 155 and 160 of the
Family Code.
JOSEF vs. SANTOS 572 SCRA 57 (November 27, 2008)
Judgment was rendered against Josef for the P404,836.50 he owed Santos representing the price
of shoe materials which he bought on credit from the latter on various dates in 1994.
Josef opposed the writ of execution claiming that was levied is their family home and that the
household furniture and appliances found therein belonged to his children.
SC: The family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a sacred symbol of family love
and repository of cherished memories that last during ones lifetime.23 It is the sanctuary of that union
56
which the law declares and protects as a sacred institution; and likewise a shelter for the fruits of that
union. It is where both can seek refuge and strengthen the tie that binds them together and which
ultimately forms the moral fabric of our nation. The protection of the family home is just as necessary in the
preservation of the family as a basic social institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement
destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect,24 the trial courts failure to observe the proper
procedures to determine the veracity of petitioners allegations, is unjustified.
The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction. Despite petitioners
allegations in his Opposition, the trial court did not make an effort to determine the nature of the same,
whether the items were exempt from execution or not, or whether they belonged to petitioner or to
someone else.
CABANG vs. BASAY 582 SCRA 172 (March 20, 2009) where to build the family home
Cabang mistakenly occupied the lot owned by Basay that was the subject matter of a case that
was earlier decided up to the Supreme Court. The writ of execution was opposed on the ground that the
houses of petitioners family home was still subsisting and being such, it is not subject to execution.
SC: The family home must be established on a) the absolute community, or b) the conjugal
partnership, or c) the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the other. It cannot be
established on a property held in co-ownership with third persons. However, it can be established partly on
the community property, or conjugal partnership and partly on the exclusive property of either spouse with
the consent of the owner-spouse.
In the case at bar, the stark and immutable fact is that the property on which their alleged family
home stands is owned by respondents and the question of ownership had been long laid to rest with the
finality of the appellate court s judgment. Thus, Cabang s continued stay on the subject land is only by
mere tolerance of respondents.
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their
parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder
morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate.[8] This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical
impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that
sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse.[9] Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170,[10] and in
proper cases Article 171,[11] of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the
presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.[12]
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners,
in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de
Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for
the child born in wedlock, and only the father,[13] or in exceptional instances the latters heirs,[14] can
contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the
legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
4.) LIYAO, JR. vs. TANHOTI-LIYAO
378 SCRA 563
Husband and wife were separated-in-fact. The wife then lived with William Liyao and had a child
with him. During the birth of the child it was William who attended to the needs of Corazon, visited and
stayed with the mother and child at the hospital. He also shouldered the hospitalization expenses of
Corazon and William, Jr. The children of Corazon with her husband also acknowledged that William, Jr. is
the illegitimate child of William Liyao, Sr.
Whose child is William?
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the
time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it
bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the
Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth
under Article 262 of the Civil Code.[27] Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of
the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted
with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved.[28] It is
only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases,
none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory.[29]
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of
the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as
the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid
marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress.[30] We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present
petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances,
his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself
cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy
of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his
mothers alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child
cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption.[31]
Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with
Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter?
We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are
allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo
has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this
proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon
Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period
limited by law.
Article 168 rule, in the absence of proof to the contrary, if wife contracted a subsequent marriage
within 300 days after termination of prior marriage and gives birth thereafter. (99)
59
We hold that by virtue of the above-discussed declarations, and in view of the other circumstances
of this case, 'reopista Toring Tufiacao has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro
Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as such.
2) Fernandez vs. CA
230 SCRA 130
-Photographs showing the presence of the alleged father in the baptism of the child are far from
proofs that he is the father of the child.
-Pictures showing putative father showering affection to the child fall short of the evidence required
to prove paternity.
-Baptismal certificate naming respondent as father of the child has scant evidentiary value. No
showing that he participated in its preparation.
-Certificate of live birth identifying the alleged father as father of the child is not also competent
evidence on the issue of paternity if records do not show that the alleged father had a hand in the
preparation of said certificate.
-while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the
entries with respect to the childs paternity.9 Thus, certificates issued by the local civil registrar and
baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be
admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
3) Trinidad vs. CA
289 SCRA 188
-Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of the other
means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws to show pedigree.
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article
172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers
only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence.[18] Its evidentiary
worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or
nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the Local
Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the badges of nullity. Without
doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified
Certificate of Live Birth.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that
"(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In this case, the glaring discrepancies
between the two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the genuineness of
60
Exhibit "D" entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil
Registry General.
Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin
cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation,[19] lest we recklessly set a very dangerous
precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture
taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the
deceased.
8. BERNABE vs. ALEJO (2005 Bar Exam)
January 21, 2002
The child was born in 1981. The alleged father died in 1993. May the child be allowed to
prove his filiation despite the clear provision of Art. 175 of the Family Code which requires that if the
action to establish illegitimate filiation is based on the 2 nd paragraph of Art. 172 the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent?
HELD: The child should be allowed to prove his filiation as he was born in 1981, and
therefore, his rights are governed by Art. 285 of the Civil Code, Article 285 of the Civil Code
provides the period for filing an action for recognition as follows:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime
of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file
the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing
had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been omitted by Articles
172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which we quote:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and
shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these
cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or
both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the
lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still
a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to
dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy
and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. x x x The putative parent should
thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the childs filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if
he or she is already dead.[10]
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to its
enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:
ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
62
Even an inexperienced eye will come to the conclusion that they were all written by one and the same
person, petitioner, as found by the courts a quo.
In his memorandum, Verceles admitted his affair with Clarissa, the exchange of love letters
between them, and his giving her money during her pregnancy.
The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aiza s filiation
under Article 172(2) of the FC. In addition, the array of evidence presented by respondents, the dates,
letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed,
petitioner s illegitimate child.
FIDEL vs. CA 559 SCRA 186 (July 21, 2008)
A baptismal certificate was the only evidence submitted by respondents that they are the heirs of
Primitivo Espineli, the only child of Vicente and Juliana Asas.
SC: Records show that Primitivo was born in 1895, at that time, the only records of birth are those
which appear in parochial records. As to the nature and character of the entries in parochial books and
the certificates thereof issued by a parish priest, the same have not lost their character of being public
documents for the purpose of proving acts referred to therein, inasmuch as from the time of the change of
sovereignty in the Philippines to the present day, no law has been enacted abolishing the official and
public character parochial books and entries made therein. Parish priests continue to be the legal
custodians of parochial books kept during the former sovereignty, and as such they may issue certified true
copies of the entries contained therein in the same manner, as do keepers of archives. The birth certificate
of Primitivo is, therefore, a valid and competent evidence to prove his filiation with Vicente.
DELA CRUZ v. GRACIA 594 S 648 07/31/2009
Jenie and Dominique lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They
stayed in Dominique s parents house. During his lifetime, Dominique wrote his autobiography that reads
in part:
As of now I have my wife named Jenie de la Cruz x x x. Then we fell in love with each
other. X x x. And as of now she is pregnant and for that we live together. X x x.
After Jenie gave birth, she applied for registration using the deceased s surname AQUINO in
support of which she attached the Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father
(AUSF) signed by Jenie and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique s father. Attached to
the AUSF is the autobiography. The LCR denied the registration citing that the child cannot use the
surname of the father because the child was born out of wedlock and the father died prior to his birth and
has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity. Moreover, the AUSF was unsigned by the father.
Jenie argued that Article 176 as amended by RA 9255 does not require the signature of the putative
father.
SC: Article 176 of the Family Code as amended by RA 9255, does not, indeed, explicitly state that
the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child s paternity must be signed by the putative
father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the FC which require
that recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus:
Article 175 in relation to Article 172 particularly paragraph 1 (2). An admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child s paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary.
That a father who acknowledges paternity through a written document must affix his signature
thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the FC.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique s
autobiography, though unsigned substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
1st. Dominique died about 2 months prior to the child s birth.
2nd. The relevant matters in the autobiography, unquestionably written by Dominique, correspond
to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proferred.
3rd. Jenie s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique s father
and testimony of his brother whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the
questioned recognition of the child.
These circumstances indicating Dominique s paternity of the child give life to his statements that
JENIE DELA CRUZ is MY WIFE as WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER and NOW SHE IS PREGNANT
AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER.
The SC now adopts the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a
legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1.) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone evidence submitted
to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement
that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2.) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other
relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation
therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such evidence.
NEPOMUCENO vs. LOPEZ G.R. No. 181258 March 18, 2010
Araceli, for and in behalf of minor Arhbencel filed a complaint for recognition and support against
Nepomuceno.
She alleged that Arhbencel is the product of her extramarital affair with Nepomuceno but that the
latter refused to affix his signature on the child s birth certificate. But as proof of his acknowledgment that
the child is his child, Araceli presented as proof a handwritten note where he obligated himself to give
financial support in the amount of P1,500.00 on the 15th and 30th of each month. She claimed that the
child s filiation was established by the said note.
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SC: Arhbencel s demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to Nepomuceno as his
illegitimate daughter falls under Article 195 (4). As such, her entitlement to support from petitioner is
dependent on the determination of her filiation.
To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing
must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is
admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be
a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions,
together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written
consent to father s operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be
taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism or family pictures are sufficient
to establish filiation.
In the present case, Arhbencel relies on the handwritten note executed by petitioner:
I, Ben Hur Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to give and provide financial support in the
amount of x x x x x , to Arhbencel Ann Lopez, presently in the custody of her mother Araceli Lopez
without the necessity of demand, subject to adjustment later depending on the needs of the child
and my income.
The above-quoted note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencel s filiation
to Nepomuceno. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of Article 172 (2) vis--vis Article 175 of the FC, which
admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the
child. For it is not even notarized. And the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the putative
father s admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has
petitioner not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.
The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Live
Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides that an action for recognition of natural children may be brought
only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had
been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from discovery of the document.
The rationale for the rule is to give the alleged parents opportunity to be heard. The reason for the
exceptions is to protect the heirs. 5
In Conde vs. Abaya, 6 we held that the right of action for the acknowledgment of natural children to
which Article 285 (Article 137, Old Civil code) refers, can never be transmitted. The reason is that the code
makes no mention of it in any case, not even as an exception. 7
In the case at bench, it is evident that Bibiana was a natural child. She was born out of wedlock on
December 2, 1926, of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of Eutiquio Marquino who at that time was single.
Bibiana sued for compulsory recognition while Eutiquio was still alive. Sadly, she died on March 17, 1983
before she could present her proof of recognition. Her death tolled the action considering its personal
nature and intransmissibility. Art. 174 rights of a legitimate child (90)
- The second issue for resolution is whether or not after the death of the putative father the action for
recognition of a natural child can be continued against the heirs of the former.
We rule against its continuance. In an action for compulsory recognition, the party in the best position to
oppose the same is the putative parent himself. 10 The need to hear the side of the putative parent is an
overwhelming consideration because of the unsettling effects of such an action on the peace and
harmonious relationship in the family of the putative parent. For this reason, Article 285 provides only two
(2) exceptions when an action for recognition transcends the death of the putative parent. Neither of
these exceptions obtains in the case at bench. Firstly, the death of Eutiquio did not occur during the
minority of Bibiana. In fact, she was already forty-five (45) years old when the recognition case was filed on
January 10, 1971. Secondly, no document was discovered, before unknown, in which Bibiana was
expressly acknowledged as a natural child. Consequently, the respondent court erred in ruling that the
action can still be continued against the heirs of Eutiquio.
- Our law providing for the intransmissibility of an action for recognition, however, has been superseded by
the New Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. Under Article 173 of the Family Code, it is now
provided:
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The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs
shall have a period of five (5) years within which to institute the action.
The action commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the
parties. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to this provision, the child can bring the action during his or her entire lifetime (not during the
lifetime of the parents) and even after the death of the parents. In other words, the action does not
prescribe as long as he lives. 13
Be that as it may, Article 173 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply to the
case at bench because it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of
the death of their father, Eutiquio Marquino.
RA 9858 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE LEGITIMATION OF CHILDREN BORN TO PARENTS BELOW MARRYING
AGE
- Amended Article 177 of the Family Code that now reads Art. 177. Children conceived and born
outside of wedlock of parents, who at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by
any impediment to marry each other, or were so disqualified only because either or both of them were
below eighteen (18) years of age, may be legitimated. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 18 of RA 8552 does not give the adopter the right of representation because this does not
involve a reciprocal right between a parent and child.
RA 9523 AN ACT REQUIRING THE CERTIFICATION OF THE DSWD TO DECLARE A CHILD LEGALLY AVAILABLE
FOR ADOPTION.
- This law effectively made the adoption process administrative in nature as it now
requires a certification signed by the DSWD Secretary in lieu of a judicial order.
- The certification, in cases of abandoned and neglected children, shall be, for all intents
and purposes, the primary evidence that the child is legally available in a domestic
adoption proceeding as provided in RA 8552, and in an inter-country adoption
proceeding as provided in RA 8043.
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- Said certification by itself shall be the sole basis for the immediate issuance by the local
civil registrar of a foundling certificate that mandates the said office to transmit the
foundling certificate to the National Statistics Office (NSO).
- Repealed Sections 2 (iii), 3(b), (d), (e), and 8(a) of RA 8552, Section 3(f) of RA 8043, Title
VII, Chapter 1, of PD 603.
LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC written consent of natural parent is indispensable
June 27, 2006
Minors Elaine, Elma, and Eugene were the children of Amelia and the late Manuel Ramos. After
Manuel s death, the children were left under the custody of their paternal grandmother because Amelia
left for Italy. When the paternal grandmother died, the children were taken cared of by a paternal uncle.
Landingin, the 57-year old aunt and sister of the late Manuel and an American citizen residing in Guam,
now desires to adopt the 3 children. In her petition, she alleged that the mother of the children had
abandoned them and had not communicated with her children neither with her in-laws. In fact Amelia
has already remarried and has 2 children with her 2nd husband. That petitioner and her other siblings were
the ones financially supporting the children. That she is already a widow and living alone because all her
children are already married and are gainfully employed. They have given their consent in writing to the
adoption, and also promised to help her in supporting the children financially. Likewise, the paternal uncle
where the children are currently staying also signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors
while in petitioner s custody.
The Child Study Report submitted by Social Welfare Officer Pagbilao stated that the surviving
parent consented to the adoption as evidenced by the Affidavit of Consent executed by the children s
mother Amelia as the mother came home on May 2, 2002 and stayed for 3 weeks. The minors likewise,
consented to the proposed adoption. Pagbilao then recommended that the children be adopted by
petitioner. During the trial however, Landingin failed to present Pagbilao as witness and also failed to
adduce documentary evidence that, indeed, Amelia assented to the adoption.
Issues: 1. Whether petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of the
biological mother?
2.Whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by petitioner s children sufficiently
complies with the law? and
3.Whether or not petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees?
SC: Section 9 of RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) provides: Whose consent is necessary to
the adoption:
X x x x.
(b) The biological parents of the child, if known x x x .
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interest of the child.
Clearly, the written consent of the natural parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of
adoption. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia to the adoption.
Petitioner s argument that her consent is no longer necessary because she left for Italy and never
came back, hence, Amelia had abandoned the children and it was just by twist of fate that after 12 years
Amelia was on vacation and was able to meet Pagbilao, must be rejected. If, as claimed, that the
biological mother had abandoned them, she should have adduced the written consent of the children s
legal guardian. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others does not
constitute abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown
to have existed at the time of adoption.
Here, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine, the eldest of the 3, to prove that
Amelia abandoned them.
The Home Study Report tends to show otherwise. Elaine during the interview said that in serious
problems she already consult her mother and petitioner-aunt. And while petitioner and other paternal
relatives are continuously providing for most of their needs and education, Amelia would also send
financial support ranging from P10,000.00 to P15,000.00 a month through her parents and share P3,000.00 to
P5,000.00 thereof with the children.
Thus, Amelia left for Italy without intention of abandoning her children, or to permanently sever their
mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even
while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing her children to
her now deceased mother-in-law.
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao s report and the joint affidavit of consent
purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove. As to her
financial capacity, the Report stated that petitioner is 57 years old, employed on a part-time basis as a
waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000.00 per month. That she owns her house at
Quitugua Subd., Yigo, Guam but the same is still being amortized. Given these limited facts, it is doubtful
whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the 3 children in the US.
While she claims that she has the financial support and backing of her children, the OSG is correct in
stating that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal
relation between the former and the latter. Moreover, no proof was adduced to prove her allegation that
her children and siblings are willing to support the minors herein.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELE P.LIM and MICHAEL JUDE LIM 588 SCRA 98 (May 21, 2009)
Michelle was given to the spouses Lim in 1977 while Michael was delivered in 1983. They were only
about 11 days old when they were given to the spouses Lim who had them registered as if they were their
own children. They were reared and cared for and were sent to exclusive schools and used the surname
Lim in all their school records and documents. In 1988, the husband died and the surviving spouse
entered into another marriage with an American citizen, Olario. Monina (the surviving spouse) then filed
two separate petitions to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 or the
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Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 to those individuals who simulated the birth of the child. Both children, who
are already of legal age, gave their consent including Michelle s husband to the adoption. Olario likewise
executed an affidavit of consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael. The lower court denied the
petition because inasmuch as Monina has remarried, her petition should have been jointly filed with her
new husband.
ISSUE: Whether Monina, who has remarried, can singly adopt?
SC: It is undisputed that at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. She filed the petition by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. The law is explicit.
Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads Husband and wife shall jointly adopt subject to the exceptions. The
word shall means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt
jointly. The rule is to insure harmony between the spouses.
Neither would the exceptions apply. 1st the children are not the legitimate children of the petitioner
or of her husband; 2nd the children are not the illegitimate children of the pettioner ; and 3rd, petitioner and
Olario are not legally separated from each other.
There are also certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. None of
the qualifications were shown and proved during the trial. Neither are the requirements on residency and
certification waivable as the children are not relatives within the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity of
petitioner or Olario.
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation- that is, when he attains the age of
majority or 18 years of age-emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of
the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is
merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.
Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered the legitimate
child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child as provided for under Article 174 of the Family
Code. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to
which biological parents are entitled such as support and successional rights.
While petitioner insists that joint adoption is no longer possible because Olario has filed a case for
dissolution of his marriage to petitioner before the Los Angeles Superior Court, the filing of said case is of no
moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. until and unless there is a judicial
decree for the dissolution of the marriage between Monina and Olario, the marriage still subsists.
SC: Such manifestation does not bar the mother from filing a subsequent case for support on behalf of the
same child against the same defendant because such manifestation and the agreement to dismiss the
case on condition that the defendant will not pursue the counterclaim constitute a form of renunciation as
they severed the vinculum that gives the child the right to claim support from the putative parent.
-The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person.
-To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to support is
virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden.
-An agreement for the dismissal of a complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon
the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise that cannot be countenanced.
-If paternity is at issue in a case, its existence or absence must be judicially established and cannot
be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
1) Espiritu vs. CA
242 SCRA 362
-The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to
be determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or
over seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child s interests.
-In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family
Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under 7 years of age, the law
presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It
can be overcome by compelling reasons.
-Either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody
but it is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the
child which is the paramount consideration.
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In a petition for habeas corpus, the child s welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and
Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody of the
child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
Article 213 of the FC deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for
the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counterargument for Loran s
petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said
provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under 7 years of age.
GAMBOA-HIRSCH vs. CA 527 SCRA 380 (July 11, 2007)
Spouses Franklin and Agnes have a 4-year old daughter named Simone. Their problem started
when Agnes wanted to stay in Makati while Franklin would like to stay in their conjugal home in Diniwid,
Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. One day, Agnes went to Boracay, asked for money and for Franklin s
permission for her to bring their daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation. He later however, discovered
that neither Agnes nor their daughter would be coming back to Boracay. He then filed a petition for
habeas corpus for Agnes to produce Simone. The CA granted joint custody of the minor child to both
parents.
SC: The CA committed grave abuse of jurisdiction when it granted joint custody of the minor child
to both parents.
The Convention of the Rights of the Child provides that in all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interest of the child shall be a primary consideration.
The so-called tender age presumption under Article 213 of the FC may be overcome only by
compelling evidence of the mother s unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her
children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a
communicable diseases. Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring
for her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the
mother s custody.
MADRINAN vs. MADRINAN 527 SCRA 487 (July 12, 2007)
Spouses Felipe and Francisca have 4 children. On May 12, 2002, after a bitter quarrel, Felipe left the
conjugal home taking with him their 3 sons and went to Ligao, Albay. Patching up things proved futile so
Francisca filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA. Felipe questioned the jurisdiction of the CA
claiming that the family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide a petition for habeas
corpus as provided for in Section 5 (b) of RA 8369 otherwise known as the Family Courts of 1997 .
SC: Citing Thorton vs. Thorton (436 SCRA 550), the SC resolved the issue of the CA s jurisdiction to
hear writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision of RA 8369
giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions.
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that
revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
The family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and the SC in petitions for habeas corpus
where the custody of minors is at issue.
HERALD DACASIN vs. SHARON DACASIN G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010
Sharon, Filipino, married to an American, Herald, obtained a decree of divorce from an Illinois
court. The court awarded to Sharon sole custody of their daughter Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over
the case for enforcement purposes. Subsequently, the parties executed in Manila an agreement for the
joint custody of their daughter and chose the Philippine courts as the exclusive forum to adjudicate
disputes arising from the agreement. Sharon, in fact undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order
relinquishing jurisdiction to Philippine courts. In 2004, Herald sued Sharon for alleged violation of the
agreement as the latter exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
SC: At the time the parties executed the agreement on January 28, 2003, 2 facts are undisputed:
(1) Stephanie was under 7 years old (having been born on September 21, 1995); and (2) Sharon and
Herald were no longer married under the laws of the US because of the divorce decree. The relevant
Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law is also undisputed: no child under 7
years of age shall be separated from the mother x x x. (Article 213 (2) FC) . This award of sole parental
custody to the mother is mandatory, grounded on sound policy consideration, subject only to a narrow
exception not alleged to obtain here. The agreement s object to establish a post-divorce joint custody
regime between them over their minor child under 7 years old contravenes Philippine law.
The agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law
provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together. However, upon separation of the spouses,
the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is below 7 years old and any agreement to the
contrary is void. The separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code on the
maternal custody of children below 7 years anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who is
unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will
have sole custody of a child under 7 as these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the application
of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the 2nd paragraph of Article 213.
The rule s seeming harshness or undesirability is tempered by ancillary agreements the separated
parents may wish to enter such as granting the visitation and other privileges. These arrangements are not
inconsistent with regime of sole maternal custody under the 2 nd paragraph of A. 213 which merely grants
to the mother final authority on the care and custody of the minor under 7 years of age, in case of
disagreements.
Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outside of the ambit of the
mandatory maternal custody regime under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of the default
standard on child custody proceedings the best interest of the child.[
- Default custodial regime or mandatory maternal custody regime 2nd paragraph of A.
213 of the FC vesting on the mother sole custody of a child under 7 years of age.
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- Default standard on child custody proceedings - the best interest of the child.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10165 THE FOSTER CARE ACT OF 2012
- CHILD refers to a person below 18 years of age, or one who is over 18 but unable to fully take
care of or protect oneself from ( DANCE ) abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because
of a physical or mental disability or condition.
- Child with Special Needs refers to a child with developmental or physical disability.
- Foster Care the provision of planned temporary substitute parental care to a child by a foster
parent.
- Foster Placement Authority (FPA) the document issued by the DSWD authorizing the placement
of a particular with the foster parent. The Foster Family Care License is renewable every 3 years unless
earlier revoked by the DSWD.
- Matching the judicious pairing of a child with foster parent and family members based on the
capacity and commitment of the foster parent to meet the individual needs of the particular child and
the capacity of the child to benefit from the placement.
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a. return of the child to his biological parents or placement in an adoptive family is
not imminent;
b. foster parent continues to possess the qualifications required this Act and a valid
foster family care license for the entire duration of the foster care;
c. if the child is 10 years or over, assisted by a social worker, give written consent for
a long-term stay with the foster parent; and
d. the DSWD, aside from regular monitoring, shall reassess and reevaluate the foster
home situation every 3 years, to determine it is in the best interest of the child to
continue living in the foster home on a long-term basis.
- LFTA grants the foster parent custody over the foster child without the requirement of the
eventuality of adoption of the child. The child shall enjoy the rights of the child under
Article 3 of PD 603, and other laws. There shall be no mandatory rights to succession in
favor of the foster child.
- Unilateral termination of LFTA by foster parent before child reaches the age of majority or
finishes tertiary education, the foster parent shall make provisions for the education and
basic needs of the child, in accordance with the standards in which the child had been
raised or has become accustomed to within said period if the foster has the means to
support the child in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
- Adoption of foster child by foster parent conditions:
a. must have all the qualifications as provided by RA 8552 or RA 8048;
b. trial custody is waived: Provided, that a harmonious relationship exists between
the child and his foster parent and family members;
c. procedure is governed by RA 8552 or RA 8043, as the case may be.
- Assistance to a Foster Child:
a. is entitled to a monthly subsidy from the DSWD. It is primarily aimed at supporting
the expenses of the child to lessen the foster parent s financial burden. It may
be waived if the foster parent is capable of supporting the child.
b. Is automatically a PhilHealth beneficiary of the foster parent. If not, the foster
parent must seek enrollment with PhilHealth.
Articles 218 and 219- (03)
ST.MARY S ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS
376 SCRA 474
-Under Art. 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: 1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or
2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. Such authority and responsibility applies to field
trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever
authorized by the school or its teachers. Under Art. 219 those exercising special parental authority are
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor
under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
-For a school to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent
was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to
the accident.
SCHOOL OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON CITY vs. TAGUIAM 558 SCRA 223 July 14, 2008
Taguiam was an adviser of a Grade V class of the above said school. The grade school principal
granted the written request of the class president authorizing the class to hold a year-end celebration at
the school grounds and to use the swimming pool. Taguiam distributed the parents/ guardian permit forms
to the pupils. One of the pupils , Chiara Mae Federico, form was unsigned but Taguiam presumed that
she was allowed to join the activity since her mother personally brought her to the school with her packed
lunch and swimsuit. Taguiam warned the children not to go the deeper portion of the pool. Subsequently,
2 of the children sneaked out and went after them. While she was away Chiara Mae drowned.
SC: As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, Taguiam should have made sure that
the children were protected from all harm while in her company. She should have known that leaving the
pupils in the swimming pool area all by themselves may result in an accident. A simple reminder not to go
the deepest part of the pool was insufficient to cast away all the serious dangers that the situation
presented to the children, especially Taguiam knew that Chiara Mae cannot swim. Dismally, respondent
created an unsafe situation which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger. This a clear
violation not only of the trust and confidence reposed on her by the parents of the pupils but of the school
itself.
TITLE XI
The SC in Republic vs. CA (May 6, 2005) said that a petition for declaration of presumptive death is
a summary proceeding under the Family Code and not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of
Court.
In Republic vs. Lorino (January 19, 2005) the SC held that In Summary Judicial Proceedings under
the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are immediately
final and executory. It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the
Republics appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is
immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec,[11] the right to appeal is not a
natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege. Since, by express mandate
of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law
are immediately final and executory, the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein.
The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should
not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001.
Others Constitutional provisions strengthening marriage as an institution (91).
SURNAMES
Art. 364 of the New Civil Code Legitimate and Legitimated Children shall use the surname of the father
Republic vs. CA and Vicencio
300 SCRA 138
-A legitimate child generally bears the surname of the father. It must be stressed that a change of
name is a privilege not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
-More confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if a legitimate child is allowed to use
the surname of the stepfather, who did not legally adopt her.
-While previous decisions have allowed children to bear the surname of their respective stepfather
even without the benefit of adoption such as in the cases of Calderon and Llaneta, wherein the
Court allowed the concerned child to adopt the surname of the stepfather, in those cases the
children were not of legitimate parentage.
- In Republic vs. Hernandez[7], we have recognized inter alia, the following as sufficient grounds to
warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (b) when the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c)
when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based
on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose, or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest.
Art. 368 Surname of illegitimate children
Mossesgeld vs. CA
300 SCRA 464
-Illegitimate children shall generally, use the surname of their mother.
In Re: Petition of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
454 SCRA 2155, March 30, 2005
May a person be allowed to drop his middle name?
Facts: Julian is the legitimated son of spouses Anna Maria Carulasan and Song-Pei Wang. Since the
couple decided to settle in Singapore where Julian will study together with his sister, Anna Maria filed a
petition seeking to drop his middle name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang as he might be discriminated against when he studies in
Singapore because of his middle name since in Singapore middle names or the maiden name surname of
the mother is not carried in a person s name.
Held: Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or affiliation of a person and further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. When an
illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a
public instrument or a private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his mother s surname as his
middle name and his father s surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate
child thus contains a given name, a middle name and a surname.
Before the registered name of a person may be changed he must show proper or reasonable
cause, or any compelling reason that may justify such change. Among the grounds are: (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as
a legal consequence as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and is unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alien parentage, all in
good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there
is no showing that the desired change of name is for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by Julian for dropping his middle name is
convenience. How such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and
convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion
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and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
name.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
March 31, 2005 [2006 Bar]
May an illegitimate child be allowed to use her natural mother s surname as his/her middle name
when the child has been subsequently adopted by his/her natural father?
Facts: Catindig decided to adopt his illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia with
Gemma Astorga Garcia. The petition for adoption was granted and ordered that Stephanie s surname
be changed from Garcia to Catindig but nothing was mentioned with respect to Stephanie s
middle name. In his motion for clarification/reconsideration petitioner Catindig prayed that Stephanie
should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. He contends
that 1. there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one
adopting parent; 2. it is customary for a every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother;
3. the middle name or initial is part of the name of a person; 4. adoption is for the benefit of the and best
interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; 5. permitting
Stephanie to use the middle name Garcia (her mother s surname) avoids the stigma of her
illegitimacy; and; 6. her continued use of Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by either the
Catindig or Garcia families.
SC: As correctly submitted by the parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even
Article 176 of the family Code, as amended by RA 9255, is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother s surname is only considered in Article 375 (1) of the Civil Code, in case
there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle
name or the mother s name shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her mother and father.
Stephanie s continued use of her mother s surname as her middle name will maintain her
maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189 (3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA
8552 provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
To allow Stephanie to use her mother s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her
continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed
to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of
primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill the noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
REPUBLIC vs. CAPOTE
514 SCRA 76 (February 2, 2007) [more on procedure Rule 103 of the Rules of Court]
Capote is the guardian of minor Giovanni Gallamaso who is the illegitimate natural child of
Corazon Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. Giovanni was born in 1982 and his mother used the surname
of the father when she registered the child despite absence of marriage between them. The alleged
father failed to take up his responsibilities on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual
concerns. The child s pleas for attention along that line fell of deaf ears. As his mother is in the US and
might eventually petition the child to join her in the US, the continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the
surname of the natural father, may complicate Giovanni s status as natural child. The Republic contends
that the purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected by the child s change
of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding adversarial.
SC: The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for individualization which serves to distinguish
him from all others; this symbol is his name.
When Giovanni was born in 1982, the provision that will apply is Article 366 of the Civil Code: A
natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the father. If recognized
by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent.
Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mother s surname from birth. The records
do not reveal any act or intention on the part of Giovanni s putative father to actually recognize him.
Meanwhile Art. 176 of the Family Code which repealed, among others, Art. 366 of the Civil Code provides:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. X x x x x.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a
given name and his mother s surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the
unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public
document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother s surname as his middle name
and his father s surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated or an acknowledged child.
RA 9048- AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO
CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR
NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE
ARTICLES 376 AND 412 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Approved: March 22, 2001
- No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order except: 1.
clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which is defined as a mistake
committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the
civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to
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the naked eye or obvious to the understanding, and can be changed only by reference to other existing
record/s; and in Section 4 thereof - 2. the first name or nickname is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; 3. the new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously use and he has been known by that first name or nickname in the community; or 4. the
change will avoid confusion.
- First name refers to a name or a nickname given to a person which may consist of one or
more names in addition to the middle and last names.
- No correction must involve the change of a. nationality; b. age; c. status; or; d. sex.
- The remedy may only be availed of once (2006 Bar)..
- Petition must be verified.
- If the petitioner has migrated to another place in the country and it would be very
expensive and impractical to appear before the local civil registrar keeping the documents
to be corrected or changed then it can be filed, in person, with the local civil registrar of the
place where he is residing or domiciled.
- Filipinos presently residing or domiciled in foreign countries with the nearest Philippine
Consulates.
- The civil registrar general shall exercise his power within 10 working days from receipt of the
decision granting a petition, to impugn such a decision on any of the following grounds: 1.
the correction is substantial or controversial as it affects the civil status of a person; 2. the
correction is not clerical or typographical; or; 3. the basis in changing the first name or
nickname of a person does not fall under Section 4 of RA 9048.
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC 537 SCRA 373 (October 19, 2007)
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex.
SC: The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by
statutes.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under
the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent of the law is to exclude the change of first name from
the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed
and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the
remedy and the proceedings regulating the change of first name are primarily administrative in nature,
not judicial.
Petitioner s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended
to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter one s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction
a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing
petitioner s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry
and the public interest.
Assuming it could be legally done, it was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was
administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper
venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly,
it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all.
RA 9255 AN ACT ALLOWING ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO USE THE SURNAME OF THEIR FATHER
-Approved on February 24, 2004.
-There must be an express recognition by the father either a. record of birth appearing in the civil
register; or b. admission in a public or private handwritten instrument (Article 172 in relation to
Article 175 of the Family Code.)
-Applies to 1. unregistered births; or 2. registered births where the illegitimate children use the
surname of the mother.
-Who may file: 1. father; 2. mother; 3. child, if of age; or 3. guardian where an Affidavit to Use the
Surname of the Father (AUSF) is executed.
-What to file 1. Certificate of live birth with accomplished Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity at the back; 2. Public Document-affidavits of Recognition
executed by the father such as the Affidavit of Admission of Paternity or the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment; and 3. AUSF including all supporting documents.
-When to register the public document not made on the record of birth, or the AUSF shall be
registered within 20 days from the date of the execution at the place where the birth was
registered.
Article 412 Civil Register (87,06) cf. RA No. 9048 An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil
Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of
First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register without need of a Judicial Order. Amending Articles 376 and
412 of the NCC.
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC 537 SCRA 373 (October 19, 2007)
-No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment.
-The change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is substantial change for which
the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
-The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court are those provided for in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code.
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-The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
-To correct simply means to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from while to
change means to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves
as a substitute. The birth certificate of the petitioner contained no error. All entries therein including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
-Sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it
recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
- The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or
his being married or not. X x x. (Salonga, Private International Law, 1995 Edition).
-A person s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person s legal
capacity and civil status.
-The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant by examining the
genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
-While petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason.
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN
565 SCRA 72 (September 12, 2008)
Jennifer was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth
but while growing up, she developed 2ndary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and
female characteristics. She was diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy in her early years and at age 6,
underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age 13, tests revealed that
her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual
development and that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become
a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed
from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
In support of her petition, Dr. Sionzon testified that genetically Cagandahan is female but because
her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has 2 sex organs
female and male. This condition is very rare, and that Cagandahan s uterus is not fully developed
because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. That this condition is permanent
and recommended the change of gender because Cagandahan has made up her mind, adjusted to her
chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.
Does her medical condition i.e. congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) make Jennifer a male ?
SC: Article 412 together with Article 376 of the Civil Code had been amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order.
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.
Cagandahan undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or inappropriate
appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much
androgen, a male hormone. CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex anatomy.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be the subject of outright denial.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically
female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes.
However, respondent s body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a
result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.
We are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor
in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of her/his sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of androgen there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
The Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent s position and his personal judgment of being a
male.
As for respondent s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow. Considering the consequence that respondent s change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent s change of name. Such a change will
conform with the change of the entry of his birth certificate from female to male.
MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS G.R. No. 169902 March 5,
2010
Remo requested the DFA, upon application for the renewal of her passport, to revert to her maiden
name and surname in the replacement passport. The DFA denied her request.
SC: The word may in Article 370 indicates that the use of the husband s surname by the wife is
permissive rather than obligatory.
A married woman has an option, not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways
provided by Article 370 of the NCC. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the 3 names provided
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in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her
maiden once she is married because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her
civil status. This interpretation is consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent.
The conflict between A. 370 of the NCC and Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of
1996), is more imagined than real. RA 8239including its implementing rules and regulations, does not
prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport.
However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband s surname in her passport, she
may not revert to the use of her maiden name except (1) death of the husband, (2) divorce, (3)
annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since Remo s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume
her maiden name in the replacement passport. A married woman s reversion to the use of her maiden
name must be based only on the severance of marriage.
If we allow petitioner s present request definitely nothing prevents her in the future from requesting
to the use of her husband s surname. Undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport
holders will arise.
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