Silberman, Yugoslavia's Old Communism Europe's Fiddler On The Roof

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Yugoslavia's "Old" Communism: Europe's Fiddler on the Roof

Author(s): Laurence Silberman
Source: Foreign Policy, No. 26 (Spring, 1977), pp. 3-27
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YUGOSLAVIAS
"OLD"COMMUNISM:
EUROPE'S
ON THE ROOF
FIDDILER
by Laurence Silberman
American policy toward Yugoslavia is hos-

tage to two false assumptions: The first is
that our only important interest there is to
sustain Yugoslavia's independence from the
Soviet Union. The second is that we foster
that independence by providing bilateral
support to the Yugoslav government, with-
out regard to notions of reciprocity. At least
the first assumption was correct when our
policy was formed in the 1950s in response
to Marshal Tito's electrifying 1948 break
with Stalin, and, although I doubt the sec-
ond was ever sound, it was less vulnerable
when our interest in Yugoslavia was con-
fined to a single objective.
Throughout the 1950s, and into the next
decade, we supplied Tito's regime with enor-
mous amounts of military and economic aid,
as well as intangible but significant political
support. Although direct aid tailed off as
the Yugoslav economy developed, our poli-
cy is still based on a psychology outmoded
in light of the negative impact Yugoslavia
has on various American interests. Moreover,
there is no reason to believe that insisting on
a reciprocal relationship with Yugoslavia will
result in Yugoslavia's absorption into the
Soviet bloc. Indeed, a continuation of an ir-
resolute American policy toward Yugoslavia
will likely have a more dangerous impact on
Soviet-Yugoslav relations.
In 1948, world communism and the So-
viet empire were exactly coextensive, and re-
sistance to Soviet imperial expansionism was
virtually our sole foreign policy objective.
Our blanket support of Yugoslavia when it
first sought liberation from the Russian yoke
3.

was, therefore,inevitable.But the continued
riseof WesternEuropeanCommunistparties
-which, like Yugoslavia, assert structural
and at least a measureof ideological inde-
pendencefrom Moscow-presents new and
more subtle challengesto the industrial de-
mocracies.We initially saw Yugoslavia'sin-
dependentcommunismweakeningthe Soviet
hold on Eastern Europe, without realizing
its other dimension in Western Europe.
Moreover, Yugoslavia has fashioned an
activeforeign policy of particularsignificance
in the developing world which we have
largely ignored. Although from the begin-
ning of our post-break relationship with
Yugoslavia, Tito did not always reciprocate
our aid with considerationof our own world
interests, we tended to overlook occasional
conflictsbecausewe did not take Yugoslavia
seriouslyas a separateforce. We always rec-
ognized Yugoslavia's importanceas a stra-
tegic piece of territory, but we did not see
how a nation of some 22 million people,
threatenedby the centrifugalforceof diverse
nationalities, with only a modest, if grow-
ing, economicbase, could significantlyaffect
world affairs.But it has.
In the middle of the 1950s, Tito achieved
a rapprochementwith the Russians (which
led to an uneasymodus vivendi) and turned
his attention to the fashioning of a "non-
aligned" block of nations. He succeeded,
with Nasser and Nehru, in creatinga move-
ment which today attractssome 86 nations.
They range, politically, from Saudi Arabia,
Brazil, and Argentina on the right to such
hard-line Communist states as Cuba, North
Korea,and Vietnam. But the centerof grav-
ity is decidedly to the dictatorial left, and
Yugoslavia has played a major leadership
role in ensuring that orientation. In the last
two decades, as our relationship with the
developing, largely nonaligned world has
become more and more important, Yugosla-
via's leadership role in multilateral forums
and nonaligned conclaves increasingly hostile
to the United States has likewise assumed
greater importance.
4.

Silberman
SinceYugoslavia is at the junctureof East-
ern and Western Europe, and is a leader of
the nonaligned world, our bilateraldealings
with that Balkan Communist country have
implicationsfar beyond its borders.Indeed,
Tito's enormousinternationalprestigestems
in no small part from his acknowledgeddeft-
ness in handling the United States (as well
as the Soviet Union). Handle us he does.
We treatYugoslavia as a friend, but the Yu-
goslavs see the United States as the most im-
portant impediment to the world changes
they seek-and they act accordingly.At the
same time, they cleverly encourageour illu-
sions by focusing our attentions on Yugo-
slav-Soviet relations,with assurancethat we
will simplisticallyconcludethat if Yugosla-
via maintainsa measureof independencefrom
Moscow, our interestsare fully served.
The truth is, we areat the sametime both
tacit allies and active adversaries:Allies in
that we share the objective of diminishing
Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe and,
particularly,preservingthe relativeindepen-
denceof Yugoslavia, but adversariesalso, be-
causea mainspringof Yugoslavia's "socialist
nonaligned"policy is de facto opposition to
Westernidealsas well as to Americanpoliti-
cal and economic power. Unfortunately,
both in and outside of our government,
among the cognoscenti who closely follow
Yugoslav affairs,and who have a vested in-
terest in an outmoded policy, there is a dis-
position to overemphasize,even exaggerate,
common interestswe sharewith Yugoslavia
accompaniedby a corollary effort to mini-
mize the extent to which the Yugoslavs pur-
sue a path calculatedto injure other Ameri-
can interests.
Geostrategicfactors
It has become a truism-but one reflecting
continuing geostrategic realities-to say that
a Soviet-free Yugoslavia is critical to the
present balance of power in Europe. Wheth-
er one considers the resulting isolation of
NATO's southern allies-Greece and Turkey
-should Soviet power outflank them to the
5.

North, whether one worries about the bal-
ance of Mediterraneanseapower if Soviet
naval bases on the Adriatic were available
to provide addedsustenanceto a Soviet fleet,
or whether one focuseson the psychological
threat to Western Europe should a proto-
domino be seen to fall, it is clearthat a Yu-
goslavia brought into the EasternEuropean
Soviet empire would gravely injure NATO's
positions.
Yet Soviet pursuit of military advantages
in Yugoslavia is constant. Only a few years
ago, in likely conjunction with a Soviet
agreementto sell Yugoslavia certain arma-
ments, the Yugoslavs passed a ship repair
law designedto permit Soviet ships (partic-
ularly submarines)refittingand repairfacili-
ties in certainYugoslav ports. Although the
numberof a foreign nation's naval ships in
those ports is limited by the same law, the
Soviets repeatedlyseek expandedrights and,
despite stories of dramatic Yugoslav rejec-
tions of Soviet requests,the firmnessof Yu-
goslav resistanceis questionable.Soviet abili-
ty to send ships that only ostensibly carry
merchant designations into Yugoslav ports
is a troubling indication of Yugoslav will-
ingness to relax limits on Soviet military
use of their territory. Thus, if a crisis in
southern Europe or the Mediterraneanin-
volves a serious clash of U.S. and Soviet
power, we cannot be sanguineas to the Yu-
goslav reactionto a likely Soviet requestfor
cooperation. Nonetheless, for the moment,
Yugoslavia's unwillingness to jeopardizeits
separatepolitical developmentby permitting
a complete Soviet military embrace is of
greatpositive significanceto the West.
Does this mean that any forceful Soviet
effort to sharply change Yugoslavia's status
compels an American-ledmilitary response?
It is a close question. Helmut Sonnenfeldt,
in a controversial and troubling speech in
London last year on U.S. policy toward the
rest of Eastern Europe, neatly foreshadowed
the confusion of the presidential campaign
by describing Yugoslavia's present status as
"bordering on our vital interest." It is, in-
6.

Silberman
deed, in light of these considerations, that
we have indicated readiness to sell the Yugo-
slav military certain weapons particularly
suitable for defensive purposes.
Ideological Interests
Tito's 1948 break with Stalin and the
subsequent Yugoslav pursuit of a "different
path to socialism" (in truth, adopted to pro-
vide an ideological post hoc rationale for a
nationalistic course, despite Yugoslav pro-
tests to the contrary) raises the question:
What are our ideological interests in the do-
mestic Yugoslav political experiment? Here
the answer is less clear. Concededly, Tito's
courageous nationalistic step was of consid-
erable importance in beginning the loosening
of Communist unity-a loosening which
subsequently saw the emergence of the Sino-
Soviet split as well as the inevitable revolts
in Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), and
Czechoslovakia (1968). But no one fears
real pluralism in Eastern Europe more than
Tito and his colleagues, since its contagion
would endanger their own dictatorial rule.
Although the Yugoslavs publicly condemned
the brutal Soviet crushing of the Czech lead-
ership, Tito (as recently described in the
Yugoslav magazine NIN) shared Khrush-
chev's horror of the democratic sympathies
of the earlier Hungarian freedom fighters,
and he supported Soviet strategy in 1956,
even if he did not approve the timing and
severity of the Soviet tactics. For the Yugo-
slavs, it is one thing to approve of relaxa-
tion of Communist dictatorships, but it is
quite another to welcome pluralism-mean-
ing competing political parties or any real
challenge to Communist party control.
Although the Yugoslav leaders recoil from
domestic pluralism in Eastern Europe, they
are quite calm concerning its much-trum-
peted embrace by Western European Com-
munist parties. In part, this is because any
Communist party's effort to achieve some
autonomy from Moscow commands Bel-
grade's approval. More importantly, it is be-
cause most Yugoslav Communists believe
7.

that their Western colleagues are only fol-
lowing a necessary tactic similar to that em-
ployed by Communist parties in Eastern
Europe during the 1940s. As one party in-
tellectual recently said to me, if a Western
European Communist party truly committed
itself to pluralism, it would mark an entire-
ly new phase of communism. Thus, it should
be no surprise to those familiar with the im-
mediate postwar history of Eastern Europe
to hear that the Yugoslavs stand for cooper-
ation between "workers' parties" in Europe.
Most threatening to them is a sharp split,
such as occurred in Portugal, between all
democratic parties (including the socialists)
and left-wing parties following nondemo-
cratic ideology. Since that is precisely the
split we seek-a divide between libertarian
and totalitarian values-in this respect, our
policies could not be more conflicting.
Yugoslavia's internal development has
been marked by greater theoretical and actual
economic and political freedom than that
seen anywhere to the East. "Self-manage-
ment," the Yugoslav term for worker con-
trol of individual economic units, while no-
where near as free of central control from
either the government or the party as Yugo-
slav doctrine asserts, is, nonetheless, from
our point of view, a great advance over
czarist communism. And political repression
in Yugoslavia occurs at a later stage or, per-
haps more accurately, with greater selectivity
than the Soviets or their satellites would tol-
erate.
Many Westerners have come to see the
Yugoslav development as promising a grad-
ual evolution to that acceptance of political
pluralism which is a distinguishing charac-
teristic of Western democracy. Even some
thoughtful Yugoslavs believe that elements
of an adversary or a competitive relationship
introduced into the Yugoslav economy will
be, over time, a compelling analogue to po-
litical competition. In the meantime, the
League of Communists exercises a jealously
guarded political monopoly, and its repres-
sion of competing political ideas, although
8.

Silberman
selectively employed, is no less abhorrent to

those concerned with human rights.'
In fact, since 1971, when a developing
liberal spirit combined with some mani-
festations of nationalism in the separate
Yugoslav republics frightened Tito into a
tightening of political control-including a
delegation of virtually unchecked power to
the secret police-Yugoslavia has been tend-
ing toward more, rather than less, repression.
This trend, put in post-1948 perspective,
appears as one more swing of the cycle or
zig in the Yugoslavs effort to chart their sep-
arate course. In Arthur Koestler's terms, they
sail without coherent conceptual ballast. Al-
though reams have been written about Yu-
goslav self-managing socialism, the propo-
nents have never truly come to grips with the
central question: How much individual lib-
erty can be permitted in a dictatorial society?
The pull of Western pluralism, accentuated
by West European and American cultural
and economic influence, is ineluctable; but
the Communist party, fearful of the impact
of these influences on its own monopoly of
political power, is drawn to tighter and
tighter control (even while ostensibly decen-
tralizing). It is in this context that I see
Yugoslavia as Europe's Fiddler on the Roof.
One slope leads to pluralism and individual
liberty, and the other returns to neo-Stalin-
ism; the peak is conceptually narrow and the
Fiddler clings to his perch buffeted by com-
peting ideological winds. To the Communist
leadership, the Western wind is more dreaded.
Perhaps the great French Socialist Revel
is correct when he asserts that in reality there
is no communism, only greater or lesser de-
grees of Stalinism-Yugoslavia representing
the lesser. But no accusation is more provoca-
tive to the Yugoslavs, who continually fight
1In
particularly egregious examples, a Slovenian judge
(an ex-partisan Christian Socialist) was recently im-
prisoned, in part for thoughts revealed in a private
diary, seized by the secret police, which the authorities
believed suggested fealty to democracy for Slovenia,
and a courageous Yugoslav lawyer ran afoul of the
secret police when he defended a dissident by asserting,
in court, that the dissident's criticism of the regime was
truthful and thus protected by the constitution.
9.

in international Communist gatherings for
recognition of their own path as a legiti-
mate, separateCommunist development,not
to be subordinatedto a Moscow center nor
patronized by other seats of Marxist learn-
ing. And since the Yugoslav strugglefor rec-
ognition as an independentMarxist theology
buttressestheir military independencefrom
Moscow, we should applaud their resistance
to Soviet efforts to blanket them within the
Socialist camp. In so doing, however, we
must not romantically describe Yugoslav
"socialism" as communism with a human
face. At a time when the Communistparties
in Western Europe seek legitimacy in the
context of Western democracy,it is particu-
larly importantthat we not indulge the Yu-
goslav propensityto exaggeratethe degreeof
freedomaffordedtheir citizens.
This decidedly does not mean that U.S.
policy has been or should be directedtoward
any destabilizationof the existing govern-
ment-a paranoidfear of the Yugoslavs; it
does meanthat we should lose no opportuni-
ty to respondpositively to pluralisticdevel-
opments in Yugoslavia. By the same token,
we must hope that our pressand other writ-
ers will continue to expose examples of re-
pressioninextricablyassociatedwith this, or
any other, dictatorship.
The Clash of Yugoslav
U U.S. Foreign Policies
Two common misconceptions of Yugo-
slav nonalignment burden even the most ex-
perienced Yugoslav hands in and out of the
State Department. The first is that nonalign-
ment, as practiced by skilled Yugoslav poli-
ticans/diplomats, is in reality a kind of neu-
trality. The Yugoslavs themselves openly
disdain neutrality as a passive concept that
insufficiently recognizes their vigorous pur-
suit of a new world order: the redistribution
of political influence through reduction of
the military, political, and economic power
of the major countries (particularly the
United States). The second misconception is
that nonalignment-whatever the Yugo-
10.

Silberman
slavs actually say-is really designed to pro-
vide Yugoslavia with a kind of political
collective security against a Soviet military
threat. The Yugoslavs have always known
that their security against Soviet military
power rests almost entirely on their own
demonstrated will and purported capacity to
fight a messy, long-term, irregular war, aided
equally by partisan traditions richly earned
in World War II and their rugged Balkan
terrain. The Yugoslavs have no illusions-
to paraphrase Stalin-as to the number of
nonaligned divisions, and although their
prominent place in that "nonbloc bloc" raises
the political cost to Moscow of a rash anti-
Yugoslav act, it is only a marginal addition-
al cost. No, Yugoslav nonalignment is not a
defensive policy, but one that seeks maxi-
mum influence and leverage for a nation
whose political ambition exceeds its limited
population and economic weight.
The Yugoslavs are fond of saying that
their nonaligned foreign policy grows nat-
urally out of their domestic self-management
socialism, and they are, in my view, abso-
lutely correct. As an independent Communist
nation, they seek to steer the nonaligned in
accordance with a Marxist compass struc-
turally independent of the Soviet bloc but
in fundamental agreement with Lenin's as-
sumptions and directions. Thus, the Yugo-
slavs see the North-South dialogue-the de-
veloping countries' demands of the industrial
nations-as a corollary to Marxian domestic
revolutions. In both cases, although the ter-
minology is economic, it is a redistribution
of political power that is sought.
Although Yugoslav diplomats eschew the
role of most radical of the nonaligned states,
and sometimes vigorously reject Soviet ef-
forts to bracket them with other Communist
nations-Cuba, Vietnam, Korea-that hyp-
ocritically claim nonaligned status, when
push comes to shove, State Department stud-
ies show that the Yugoslavs are almost in-
variably found on the opposite side of every
issue in world politics that matters to the
United States. Often American diplomats
11.

are told, and indeed sometimesbelieve, Yu-
goslav fairy storiesto the effectthat the Yu-
goslavs are working mightily behind non-
aligned closed doors to moderateresolutions
or positions to make them less unfair to the
United States and other Western countries.
Moderatethey occassionallydo-not for our
benefit, but to maintain nonaligned unity
which, becauseof the powertherebyafforded,
is also a Yugoslav foreign policy imperative.
Thus, if too many nonalignedstates gag at
Cuban, North Korean, or Iraqi resolutions,
either at a nonalignedsummit conferenceor
at the U.N. General Assembly itself, the
Yugoslavs will indefatigablyseek a compro-
mise solution that can be characterizedas
only grosslyoffensiveratherthan outrageous.
Insofar as they appeal to the radical states
to modify these positions, it is an appeal
couchedin pragmaticterms, and the Yugo-
slavs are to be relied on to help forge the
worst possible consensusfrom our point of
view. Their occasional tactical duplicity in
pursuitof theseobjectivessends some of our
multilateral specialists into paroxysms of
frustratedrage. Although the Soviets, who
are intolerantof any world movement they
do not absolutely control and, therefore,
bent on dividing the nonalignedbetweenthe
"progressives"and the "moderates,"arealso
frustratedat Yugoslav efforts to avoid such
splits, the resulting "compromises"always
ideologically favor the Communist world
view.
The recent neuralgic multilateral issues
for the United States are well known: The
"decolonization"of Puerto Rico, Guam,and
the Virgin Islands; the North Koreaneffort
to marshal world pressureagainst the con-
tinuation of Americantroops in South Ko-
rea; the Middle East, includingthe infamous
Zionism is racismresolution; a'ndthe Pana-
ma Canal (where, it must be admitted, we
deserve criticism). On these issues-as well
as the more overtly ideological questions in-
volving the U.N. Human Rights Commis-
sion or transnational corporations--one
finds the Yugoslavs playing an ambiguous,
12.

Silberman
murky role, normally calculated to inflict

maximum feasible damage to our position,
becausethey regardthe United States as the
majorobstacleto their desiredworld change.
Yugoslav flirtationswith the PuertoRican
independence movement-incredible for a
nation that constantly demands and right-
fully gets from the United States complete
political support for its territorialintegrity
and concomitantopposition to Croatian,Al-
banian, or Slovenian independencemove-
ments-were manifested last year at Co-
lombo, where the Yugoslavs supported a
nonalignedresolutioncalling for decoloniza-
tion. Even the Indians, hardly our best
friends, drew the line there and openly ex-
pressedreservation.Although at the United
Nations a few months later, the Yugoslavs
helped persuadethe Cubans to withdraw a
similar resolution, they did so not out of
recognitionof our interestsor the absurdity
of the Cuban position, but becauseit likely
would have been defeatedin light of grow-
ing opposition among nonalignedmoderates.
Regardingthe Middle East, although the
Yugoslavs have repeatedlyopposed the ul-
timate step of expulsion of Israel from the
United Nations, they have done so because
of the dangerto the United Nations itself, in
light of congressionalpredictions as to the
consequentwithdrawal of Americansupport.
More significantly, they subtly support the
most radical states and the PLO in internal
Arabstruggles.(They have particularlyclose
economic connectionswith Libya and Iraq;
the latter provides oil at less than market
prices.) Although carefulto avoid open con-
demnationof any Arab countries,the Yugo-
slavs make particularly snide comments in
privateabout Sadat, whom they view as too
sympatheticto Western ideas and too will-
ing to work closely with the United States.
Not surprisingly then, they view with ill-
disguised concern a developing moderate
grouping of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and
Jordan. And when Libya sponsored the re-
cent attempted coup in Sudan, the Yugoslav
ambassador in Khartoum was sharply re-
13.

buked for expressing mild support for Presi-
dent Numayri.
North Korean arrogance and intransigence
concerning their effort to gain support for
U.N. action ending the U.N. Command in
Korea and opposing U.S. troops in South
Korea is legendary and has even succeeded in
offending the Yugoslavs, who appreciate giv-
ing rather than taking advice from non-
aligned nations. However, the Yugoslav
commitment to North Korea's basic goals
remains unshakable, notwithstanding the ob-
vious impact on the world's balance of pow-
er. Although the Yugoslavs speak of a uni-
fied, nonaligned Korea as a desirable goal,
let there be no mistake; they mean a Com-
munist Korea, poised, to be sure, between
the Soviet Union and China, but part of an
unstructured worldwide Communist move-
ment. When asked how they distinguish
Korea from Germany, Yugoslav officials re-
spond with historical non sequiturs, but the
truth is that West Germany's relative strength
and geographical position always precluded
a union from the East, whereas South Korea
is geostrategically more vulnerable.
Puzzled Americans often ask why the
Yugoslavs are not concerned about the rela-
tive decline in worldwide U.S. power and
influence, which would surely follow a Com-
munist anschluss in Korea. The answer is
that they do not manifest a clear concern for
maintenance of power balances anywhere,
even in Europe. In this respect, the Yugo-
slavs are to be sharply distinguished from
the Chinese, who appearvaguely as the phan-
tom members of NATOand in that guise lose
no opportunity to urge upon the West the
need for heightened defense and resistance
againist Soviet power everywhere. By con-
trast, the Yugoslavs, who usually have a
view on every problem under the sun, are
quite muted with respect to crucial European
issues involved in the MBFR and SALT nego-
tiations that ostensibly affect their own se-
curity. Insofar as their press has dealt with
these issues at all, it has seemed to accept the
Soviet view. But officially, the government
14.

Silberman
would preferto devote its attention to non-
aligned favorites like world disarmament
sessionsof the United Nations, where deriv-
ative technology advancesof the arms race
can be exposed as contributing to Western
and to a lesserextent Soviet power.
Moreover, Soviet efforts to bring their
military force to bear outside Europe have
actually been aided by the Yugoslavs, not-
withstanding the obviously dangerousprece-
dent for Yugoslavia and the rest of Europe.
During the 1973 Middle East war, the Yu-
goslavs openly permitted Soviet military
over-flights to supply Arab armies, and
causeda chill in U.S.-Yugoslav relations in
the process, notwithstanding the reluctance
of the EasternEuropeansection of the State
Department to respond. Then, Yugoslav
apologistscould and did makethe point that
since the nonaligned world was united be-
hind the Arabs, the Yugoslavs could not do
otherwise in light of their long held Middle
East policies. But in 1976, at the height of
the Angolan civil war, the Yugoslavs again
permittedSoviet military over-flightsto sup-
ply the MPLA-at a time when Africa itself
was badly split over the factional struggle.
In responseto Americanprotests,the foreign
ministry complained unconvincingly that
the Yugoslavs couldn't tell the differencebe-
tween Soviet military and civilian flights.
God help Yugoslavia if that were true.
In Africa, Yugoslav efforts to gain in-
fluencewith radicalnational liberationmove-
ments continuesapace.Although the Soviets
are content with their Cuban allies and do
not look kindly at Yugoslav efforts to gain
a piece of the action, we should not lose
sight of the fact that it is, after all, the same
action.
In hindsight, Yugoslavia'simmediaterec-
ognition of the MPLA last November was
not without significance. At that time, many
in the nonaligned world saw a clear oppor-
tunity for a negotiated arrangement between
the three competing Angolan groups, and
were therefore holding back. It was a clear
indication of the course the Yugoslavs will
15.

adopt when a Marxist revolutionarygroup
is opposedanywherein the world. However,
theirwillingness to permitSoviet over-flights
revealsa deeperand more ominous willing-
ness to aid the application of Soviet mili-
tary power at world flashpointsof U.S.-So-
viet competition. We ignore such lessons at
our peril.
BilateralRelations
It is assumedby the Yugoslavs, and wide-
ly acceptedin Washington, that the major
purposeof U.S.-Yugoslav bilateralrelations
is to politically supportYugoslavia'srelative
independence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
Specifically,Yugoslav internal economicde-
velopmentsshould be aidedby Americanef-
forts to facilitatetrade,investment,and tech-
nological transfer. Indeed, all other aspects
of our relations should be subordinatedto
this central objective. American diplomats
assumean affirmativeresponsibilityto assure
that Yugoslavia'simagein the United States
is painted in attractive colors, so that the
flow of investment technology and trade is
not discouraged,and that, whateverthe im-
portanceof other Americanconcernsand in-
terests,our bilateralrelationswith Yugosla-
via not be harmed. This notion leads the
Yugoslavs to act with confidencethat the
United States values bilateralrelationsmore
than they do themselves,and thereforethe
Yugoslavs are consistently tempted to treat
Americanmultilateraland bilateralinterests
as insignificant.Our relations are, for that
reason, asymmetrical.A distinguished for-
mer ambassadorto Yugoslavia once put it
more graphically: "Yugoslavia sees the
United States as a milk cow rather than a
bull-all teats and no horns."
The entire State Departmenthas not ac-
cepted this concept. In the last few years,
we have on variousoccasionsforcefully told
the Yugoslavs that we would not concur in
such a self-serving view of our bilateral rela-
tions. But, given its pull on virtually all of
our own Yugoslav experts, pursuing a poli-
cy of credibly seeking symmetry in our
16.

Silberman
relationship has been an uphill struggle.
Because of the relatively modest size of
the Yugoslav market, our economic interest
there is not now, nor ever will be, of great
significance to us. But, conversely, Yugoslav
interests in economic relations with the
United States are of enormous importance
to them. We are their fourth largest trading
partner behind the Soviet Union, West Ger-
many, and Italy, and increasing our share.
Our trade is of disproportionate importance,
however, because we are the only non-Com-
munist industrialized country with which
they have an approximately balanced ac-
count. (The European Community and Ja-
pan sell much more to Yugoslavia that they
buy.) Further, American capital and tech-
nology play a significant role in developing
the Yugoslav economy. Eximbank alone has
approximately a billion dollars in outstand-
ing loans, and there are more American joint
ventures in Yugoslavia than those of any
other country. But the Yugoslavs act as if
the flow were reversed. They often dissemble
or cut corners in dealing with us.
Thus, for purposes of the industrial
world's export control program, which lim-
its the sale of strategic goods to the Soviet
Union and its satellites, Yugoslavia has been
treated as a Western country. For years, high
civilian technology of strategic significance
has been sold to Yugoslavia, with the caveat
that it not be resold to Eastern Europe. In
the late 1960s, we began to learn that some
Yugoslav firms had resold or diverted some
of this sensitive equipment to restricted des-
tinations. (Western firms have been known
to do the same thing.) Faced with U.S. pro-
tests, Yugoslav authorities assured Ameri-
cans in some detail that violators had been
severely punished. The United States govern-
ment, not wholly satisfied, sought for sev-
eral years to allay lingering doubts and en-
sure no further lapses by gaining further
information as to the exact methods of di-
version. These efforts were consistently re-
buffed until---quite by accident-it was
discovered that the draconian punishments
17.

were fictional. Only after the United States
refused to go forward with further ship-
ments was a satisfactory resolution offered.
Similarly, in 1975, when Yugoslavia was
hard hit by unfavorable balance-of-pay-
ments trends, import restrictions were secret-
ly imposed and senior Yugoslav officials,
undoubtedly concerned about their dubious
legality, kept flatly denying their existence to
Americans months after their imposition.
Yugoslavs justify such conduct in terms
of the disparity in size of our two countries;
because we are a "superpower," reciprocal
rules of fair dealing do not apply, and be-
sides, it's ego-satisfying to so easily gull the
supposedly sophisticated Americans. The
risk of discovery is minimal, since Americans
rarely respond anyway.
When negotiating with the U.S. govern-
ment, Yugoslavs do not hesitate to employ
whatever leverage is available to them blunt-
ly, fully, even extravagantly. Early last
year, the Yugoslav airline sought Civil Aero-
nautics Board certification to fly to the
United States. Characteristically, they an-
nounced their intention by publishing the
date for initial service before approaching
the U.S. government. Then, as negotiations
started, they demanded that U.S. procedures
be short-circuited. Various dire threats were
made, including the ejection of Pan Ameri-
can World Airways from Belgrade (a mar-
ginal operation at best) and refusal to buy
wide-bodied jets from U.S. companies if the
announced date of service was not met.
Examples of this style of negotiating are
legion; particularly revealing was the ap-
proach used by the Yugoslav government
when seeking elimination of our armed
forces broadcasting in Germany on the same
wave length as Radio Sarajevo, which
wanted to reach Yugoslav workers in Ger-
many. Our U.S. Information Center in
Sarajevo was held hostage to a satisfactory
resolution. As long as the dispute pended,
our center was threatened with closing and
treated as unwelcome. The Yugoslavs as-
sumed that our desire to gain understanding
18.

Silberman
in Yugoslavia by accessto our books, rec-
ords,etc., could be used as leverageagainstus.
We have funded 90 per cent of a Ful-
bright program for the mutual exchange of
scholars. The Yugoslavs have always seen
this programas an opportunity to servetheir
aim of technology transfer to Yugoslavia;
they would send only scientists and engi-
neers to the United States, not social scien-
tists. We have sought a balancebecause,al-
though we sympathize with Yugoslav
desiresto train scientists,it is very much in
our interest to have Yugoslav economists
and political theorists see and study first-
hand in the United States. Even if the gov-
ernment of Yugoslavia (or, more particu-
larly, its secret police) carefully screens
applicantsso that only committed Commu-
nists aresent, the resultingincreasein under-
standing is worth the cost. But, not atypical-
ly, in negotiations with the Yugoslavs to
achievea fair balance,the AmericanEmbassy
found itself between resolute, unyielding
Yugoslav negotiators and a fluttering State
Department that has lost sight of the rela-
tive interestsinvolved (we, after all, pay for
the program) and has neverlearnedthe pur-
pose of disagreementin reachingultimately
satisfactory agreements.
Although the government-controlledYu-
goslav pressmissesfew opportunitiesto por-
tray the United States in unflatteringterms,
viewed through a Marxist prism, the Yugo-
slavs continually complain to the State De-
partment in Washington (and try to com-
plain to the AmericanEmbassyin Belgrade)
about articles by American reporterswho
expose Yugoslav government repressionor
even microfailuresof the Yugoslav system.
Since a favorable Yugoslav image in the
United States has important economic and
political dividends, the Yugoslavs are not
content with sympathetic expressions from
Washington diplomats. An enormously so-
phisticated effort to influence the American
press is waged in Belgrade; "unfriendly" re-
porters are quickly cut off from all official
and quasi-official sources, and subject to
19.

various kinds of unpleasantpressureto in-
ducea positive slant. This techniquepredict-
ably hardensthe resolveof informedAmeri-
can reportersstationed in Yugoslavia, but
those who travel through in brief spurts are
morevulnerableand susceptible,particularly
since they often spend much time with Yu-
goslav correspondentsworking for Western
pressorgans, whose job--and I use the term
advisedly-is to influencevisiting correspon-
dents. (The efforts of these ancillaries to
push disinformation on Western reporters
reachednew levels of frenzy during the re-
cent flap causedby the ominous visit to Bel-
gradeof the internationalterroristCarlos.)
Of course, even if the Yugoslav govern-
ment offereda reciprocalarrangement,such
as it concludedwith the Soviets a few years
ago, whereby mutual press criticism would
be eschewed, the United States could not
constitutionally comply. And in light of
the constant Yugoslav press attacks on the
United States, efforts by our State Depart-
ment to color Yugoslavia in artificiallyat-
tractivehues is particularlyanomalous.
Perhapsthe most sensitiveof all bilateral
issues involves Yugoslav emigres in the
United States. The Yugoslavs have every
right to bitterly complainabout assaultsand
violenceagainsttheir diplomats in our coun-
try. But the truth of the matteris that their
objectivehas neverbeen limited to the pun-
ishment of such acts or even to their pre-
vention. Indeed, for Yugoslav purposes,an
occasionalincidentprovidesa useful lever to
press in pursuit of the largerobjective-the
marshaling of U.S. government efforts
against all political activity (violent or not)
aimedagainst the presentregime.
Since, under their system, political dis-
sent is qualitatively no less dangerous or
illegal becauseit takespaths that, if followed
in the United States, would be protectedby
the first amendment,there is no disposition
to accept our constitutional distinctions.
(After continuous prodding, the Germans
and Swedes have actually banned certain
Yugoslav imigri groups, making an appre-
20.

Silberman
ciation of the American restraints doubly
difficult.) And, from a propaganda view-
point, emigres' capacity to appeal to Western
sympathies is undermined when they engage
in violent conduct. For this reason, Croatian
emigres are always described as Ustashi
(evoking memories of the World War II
Croatian Fascist state), no matter what po-
litical views they espouse. Furthermore, sen-
ior Yugoslavs are either convinced or find
it useful to claim that the American govern-
ment sponsors the activities of these imigres.
Usually the charge is made elliptically. In
June, when the Yugoslav Embassy in Wash-
ington was bombed and in September, when
the TWA plane was hijacked by Croatian
emigres, the Yugoslav press and diplomats
pressed the line that both acts were supported
by "certain circles" in and out of the Ameri-
can government. After repeated questioning
as to the identity of these circles, Yugoslavs
alluded to such disparate groups as "the
Jewish lobby," the FBI and CIA, and con-
servative political groups, all of which al-
legedly conspire to support this activity. But
in conversations with non-American officials,
senior Yugoslav foreign office officials with
responsibility for American affairs were more
direct and lurid-the American Embassy in
Belgrade was accused of complicity in the
Washington bombing, and nonaligned am-
bassadors were told that all of the passengers
on the TWA flight were FBI agents.
Yugoslav frustration with their inability
to prevent antiregime activity abroad, leads
its security services to reach out for emigres
who travel back to Yugoslavia with new
citizenship. Thus, Americans of Yugoslav
birth are particularly vulnerable to police
questioning pointed toward their behavior
in the United States as well as the behavior
of other imigris who are targets of Yugo-
slav concern. Sometimes, when an American,
such as Laszlo Toth, refuses to cooperate,
arrest, and in his case lengthy imprisonment
pursuant to a trumped-up charge, follows.
Since Tito gives the Interior Ministry un-
checked power to root out real or imagined
21.

enemies in Yugoslavia (and to pursue them
in European cities), a case like Toth's pre-
sents great problems to our government,
charged with the responsibility of protect-
ing citizens abroad. The Yugoslavs claim
that such persons (if they have not re-
nounced Yugoslav citizenship and had that
renunciation accepted by the Yugoslav gov-
ernment) are Yugoslavs and not within the
jurisdiction of the American government if
their "crimes" are political, and therefore
refuse access or explanation as to the reasons
for arrest. These cases arise with sufficient
frequency so as to oblige the State Depart-
ment to more effectively warn Americans of
Yugoslav birth of the dangers in traveling
to Yugoslavia and, also, to more determined-
ly convey to the Yugoslav government the
consequent deleterious impact on bilateral
relations of a continuation of this practice.
It is crucial to an understanding of U.S.-
Yugoslav relations to realize that Yugoslav
U.S.-watchers perceive, or claim to perceive,
anti-Tito actions of emigris in the United
States and unfavorable press articles as gov-
ernment-directed and conspiratorially har-
nessed to our foreign policy objectives. Thus,
in February of last year, Foreign Minister
Minic, in an incredible speech to senior mili-
tary officers, said:
There exist two problems in our political
cooperation with Western countries: the
acts of Yugoslav terrorists/Fascists and
other anti-Yugoslav emigres, and political
pressure campaigns against Yugoslavia.
... Fascist bands which fled our country
together with Nazis enjoy the hospitality
and enormous financial and material sup-
port of intelligence services and govern-
ments of Western countries with which
we now have good relations. The intelli-
gence services continue their cooperation
with emigris and they do not forgo us-
ing them whenever they need to exert
pressure on Yugoslavia.
... Periodic campaigns with the aim of
attempting to discredit the internal struc-
ture and foreign policy of Yugoslavia are
also a characteristic form of pressure which
comes from the West . . . the American
press writes especially harsh things about
Yugoslavia. All of it is synchronized. The
22.

Silberman
direction comes from one place and then
all the machinery goes into operation:
intelligence,diplomatic,information,pro-
paganda and so on-now, for example,
during preparationsfor the fifth confer-
ence of nonalignedcountriesat Colombo,
it is known that Yugoslavia will very ac-
tively participatein all of that, so it is
necessaryto exert pressureon Yugoslavia.
Such things from the West will now be-
come very frequent.....2
Since Yugoslav leadershippredictedthat
the West and particularlythe United States
would, through propagandaand "directed"
activitiesof emigre circles,"pressure"Yugo-
slavia, the subsequentflapsover the Sonnen-
feldt Doctrine in April, the bombing of the
Yugoslav Embassy in Washington in June,
American press attention to the Toth case
in August, and the TWA hijacking in Sep-
tember, were seen by certainelements in the
Yugoslav governmentas a fulfilledprophecy,
a coordinated campaign to pressureYugo-
slavia vis-a-vis the Colombo conference.
Of course, it is true that, in Yugoslavia,
activitiesof foreignemigres and a particular
press line could not develop without guid-
ance from centralpolitical control. Thus, it
may well be that many Yugoslavs find it in-
conceivablethat the same rules don't apply
in the United States. This processof projec-
tion is buttressedby their a priori view of a
capitalist society. On the other hand, I re-
tain a lurking suspicion that senior Yugo-
lays know their analysis of the United
States is flawed, but find it useful to spread
these outrageouscanardsfor internaland ex-
ternalpurposes.If they can blamethe United
States government for terrorist activity or
unfavorable press reporting, it is easier to
turn aside American complaints about real
grievancesarisingout of Yugoslavia'smulti-
lateral activities or bilateral disputes.
A sound policy toward Yugoslavia must
proceed from an accurate assessment of con-
flicting interests-the true extent of the clash
"The speech was published in a restricted military
journal, which accidentally fell into the hands of an
Asian diplomat, who distributed it widely in Belgrade,
but it has not yet been reported.
23.

of the two nations' respective goals and val-
ues as well as our mutual geostrategic con-
cerns. Such an appraisal belies the facile and
fatuous description of Yugoslavia as a friend-
ly country. It is not. It is predominantly an
adversary that shares with the United States
a limited, but important, concurrence of in-
terest. Of course, a traditional task of di-
plomacy is the attempt to widen the area of
agreement between nations, but it is not
helpful to fool ourselves as to the reality and
it is positively harmful to lead the Yugo-
slavs to believe we are satisfied with the pres-
ent relationship; it makes it easier for them
to take the United States for granted.
All of that described above is well known
to those in our government whose job it is
to follow Yugoslav affairs-and a good deal
more which cannot be revealed here. Why
then is there such reluctance to admit the
evident?
In an ironic twist, the Foreign Service's
disastrous experience with China policy 25
years ago casts a shadow over Yugoslavia.
Then Foreign Service officers, quite correct
about what was happening in China, and
correct also about the opportunities for U.S.
policy there, were pilloried by politicians un-
willing to recognize the subtle differences be-
tween Chinese and Soviet communism. So,
in much of the Foreign Service, the fear per-
sists that politicians will similarly perceive
Yugoslavia as just another Communist na-
tion, and therefore they overemphasize the
degree of Yugoslav independence from the
Soviet Union, and minimize the extent of
Yugoslav opposition to the United States.
Furthermore, to Eastern European spe-
cialists, perhaps irretrievably scarred by ir-
rati6nal but understandable feelings of guilt
and despair over U.S. impotence to aid Hun-
gary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968,
Yugoslavia represents a victory of sorts-
although the extent to which American di-
plomacy or aid contributed to the victory is
questionable. Victors never appreciate any
tarnishing of their trophy. Our perception of
Yugoslavia remains suspended in a 20-year-
24.

Silberman
old glow of self-congratulation, while dis-
quieting trends are dismissed as nothing new
and attempts to refashion our approach are
bitterly resisted.
A Suggested Policy Toward Yugoslavia
The first step in this refashioning should
be the rejection of the notion, put forward
in various corridors in Washington, that
we must support Yugoslavia's independence
from the Soviets-such as it is-by provid-
ing that country with economic and political
support without regard to Yugoslavia's treat-
ment of our bilateral or multilateral con-
cerns. This view, so firmly held in the
Eastern European section of the State De-
partment, is occasionally nourished-when
American exasperationand suspicion begin
to threatenit-by cleverYugoslav whispers
into credulousWestern ears about exagger-
ated Yugoslavs confrontations with the So-
viets. Not that the Soviets aren't always
reaching,but both their alleged crudity and
the fiercenessof Yugoslav resistanceis em-
broideredfor Westernand particularlyAmer-
ican consumption. The purpose, of course,
is to divert our attention from what the
Yugoslavs are actually doing.
The weaknessof this policy approachis
that not only does it underrateother Amer-
ican interests,but, if followed, it also will
have a perverseeffecton U.S.-Yugoslav rela-
tions. Insofaras we havepositively influenced
Yugoslavia's distancefrom the Soviets, it is
our strength which has been of significance,
and a passive,supinedefenseof Americanin,
terestsdoes not convey an imageof strength.
Surely Tito, whatever he may say, knows
that great nations that so behave are mov-
ing in the directionof becomingex-greatna-
tions. It may well be that Tito no longer
respects American strength as he once did,
and this more than any other factor explains
our increasing difficulties with Yugoslavia.
In any event, we have never really been
able to affect Yugoslav-Soviet relations. Tito
did not break with Stalin to please us: we
didn't even know about it until after it hap-
25.

pened, and he maintained his position for
severalyears with no support from us. The
degreeof distancefrom Moscow sought by
Yugoslav leadership has always depended
and will continue to depend on their own
drive for independenceand their own ap-
praisalof the Soviet threat. To take the ex-
treme (which I do not recommend), even
if the United States turned implacablyhos-
tile to Yugoslavia, it does not follow that
Yugoslavia would return to the Warsaw
Pact. Those who think in these terms, mis-
conceiveand indeedpatronize Yugoslav in-
dependence.In fact, it may well be that the
less supportYugoslaviagets from the United
States the more they feel obliged to resist
Soviet pressure,to maintaintheir relativeau-
tonomy. Of course,they do use the United
States as a prop in their relations with the
Soviets,but not necessarilyto widen the dis-
tance from Moscow. We should concentrate
our effortson U.S.-Yugoslav relationsrath-
er than Yugoslav-Soviet relations---not be-
cause we are uninterestedin the latter, but
becauseof the limitations and unpredictabil-
ity of our impact on that relationship.
In our bilateral relations, we should not
hesitate to meet tough probes with equally
tough responses. Naturally, we shouldn't
look for disputes, but we should not give
the impression that we must at all costs
avoid thenm,or else the Yugoslavs cannot
help but conclude we have a greaterstake
in our bilateral relations than they do-
which is decidedlynot so. Furthermore,we
should not hesitate to link together various
aspectsof our relations,so that we are not
without recoursewhen the Yugoslavs cause
damageto our interests.
The Yugoslavs call such an approach
"pressure,"and although no country uses it
more effectively than Yugoslavia, against
any and all comers, they have psychologi-
cally disarmed American diplomats by mak-
ing them guilty or uncomfortable about
U.S. power. If Yugoslav support for a pal-
pably offensive resolution in the United Na-
tions on Puerto Rico elicits an American
26.

Silberman
protest,the Yugoslavswill, with a straight
face, contend that Yugoslav action stems
from nonaligned principles which cannot be
abandoned in the face of superpower pres-
sure. Instead of defending the merits of any
specific position, the Yugoslavs shrewdly
obfuscate by asserting that any protest, no
matter how narrow, is an attack on their
whole nonaligned position. Since we fool-
ishly and repeatedly express approval for
Yugoslav nonalignment (on the false as-
sumption that it is a kind of neutrality),
they thus turn our own statements against
us. Similarly, if an American citizen is ca-
priciously arrested and we vigorously com-
plain, the Yugoslavs will cynically contend
that our protest is pressure designed to in-
terfere in their internal affairs. In fact, in
both instances, "pressure" is really coming
from the Yugoslavs: It is their unjustified
action that caused the clash.
One career diplomat explained to me that
the present generation of foreign service of-
ficerscame to maturity during a period when,
because of our overwhelming military and
economic power, it was not necessary for
American diplomats to struggle for Amer-
ican interests; our enormous power cast its
own implicit weight. Today we can no
longer afford that luxury.
It is often said that Yugoslavia, on the
eve-a long eve, one might add--of Tito's
death, is understandably brittle; so con-
cerned with imaginary hobgoblins and real
dangers that it is too much to ask for re-
ciprocal consideration for the United States,
that we can best ensure a smooth transition
to new leadership resolved to protect Yu-
goslav independence by turning the other
cheek when our interests are transgressed.
But the new leadership in Yugoslavia,
like the old Marshal, will carefully eye the
United States for signs of will, political
strength, and preparedness to defend our in-
terests. We impress no one, we generate no
confidence, and we do not advance our long-
term goals by passively abandoning our im-
mediate ones.
27.


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Yugoslavia's "Old" Communism: Europe's Fiddler on the Roof

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American policy toward Yugoslavia is hos-

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selectively employed, is no less abhorrent to

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murky role, normally calculated to inflict

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