IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND. FOR MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA CIRCUIT CIVIL DIVISION CASE NO.: 2017-426 CA32 BRUCE JACOBS, in his personal capacity as Bernie Sanders Delegate to the Democratic National Convention, a life-long member of the Democratic Party, and in his capacity as an At-Large Committee Member for Precinct 583; and Dr. MAE CHRISTIAN, in her capacity as a life-long member of the Democratic Party, an elected Committee Member since 1974, and presently representing Precinct 520, in her capacity as the President of the Miami-Dade Black Caucus, Plaintiffs, JUAN CUBA, in his capacity as Chairman of the Miami-Dade Democratic Executive'Coniiiitteey STEPHEN BITTEL, in his capacity as State Committeeman of the Miami-Dade Denfotrati¢ Executive Committee; and the FLORIDA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, a pol ; ical organizatign, E yo Defendants. a ee) Soe ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT. = 3 THIS CAUSE came before the Court on motions to dismiss filed by the Miami-Dade County Democratic Party, the Florida Democratic Party, and Stephen Bittel, and the Plaintifis’ memorandum of law in opposition to those motions. The Court, having considered the motions and memorandum, and having heard the arguments of the parties, reviewed relevant case law, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby grants the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and makes the following findings: 1. The Amended Supplemental Complaint sets forth four counts. a. Count I, for conspiracy, alleges that Mr. Bittel and others conspired to violate the bylaws of the Miami-Dade County Democratic Party and the Florida Democratic Party, and Florida Statute section 103.091 b. Count Il, for declaratory judgment, seeks a declaration that Mr. Bittel is not eligible to hold the position of Miami-Dade DEC Committee Member or to be the Miami-Dade ‘State Committeeman or the Florida Democratic Party State Party Chair.¢. Count III (one of two counts labelled “Count III”), for injunctive relief, seeks the court to require the Miami-Dade County Democratic Party and the Florida Democratic Party to oust their elected leader and redo their elections and appointments. d. Count IV (the second count labelled “Count IIT”), for injunctive relief, seeks an order requiring the Miami-Dade Democratic Executive Committee to make Mr. Jacobs an elected captain for Precinet 583. 2. Turning to Count I, “[t]he elements of a claim for civil conspiracy are: *(a) an agreement between two or more parties, (b) to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means, (c) the doing of some overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy, and (d) damage to plaintiff as a result of the acts done under the conspiracy.”” MP, LLC v, Sterling Holding, LLC, 42 Fla, L. Weekly D1465 (Fla. 3d DCA June 28, 2017) (quoting Raimi v, Furlong, 702 So.2d 1273, 1284 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)). In addition, a claim for conspiracy requires an actionable underlying tort or wrong which would constitute a cause of action if it were done by one person. Raimi, 702 So. 2d at 1284; see also American Seafood, Inc. v. Clawson, $98 So. 2d 273, 274 (Fla. 34 DCA 1992) (“[T]he conspiracy count necessarily fails to state a cause of action as no tort is properly alleged which the defendants allegedly conspired to commit.”) 3. Here, the Plaintiffs have alleged no underlying tort or wrong which would support a cause of action for conspiracy. Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Bittel and others conspired to violate the bylaws of the Miami-Dade County Democratic Party and the Florida Democratic Party, and conspired to violate Florida statute section 103.091, However, they have cited no authority establishing that a violation of bylaws or section 103.091 is an actionable tort. As such, they have not stated a cause of action for conspiracy. 4. The second and third counts seek declaratory and injunetive relief. Each count seeks to have this court intervene in the elections of the Miami-Dade County Democratic Party and the Florida Democratic Party. (The second count seeks to have the court determine that Mr. Bittel is ineligible to hold the positions to which he was elected and the third count seeks to have the court mandate that the Florida Democratic Party redo all of its elections.) 5. To obtain injunctive relief, the Plaintiffs must prove: “(1) [they] will suffer irreparable harm unless the injunction is entered, (2) there is no adequate remedy at law, (3) there is a substantial likelihood that the partfies} will succeed on the merits, and (4) that considerations of the public interest support the entry of the injunction.” Concerned 2Citizens for Judicial Fairness, Inc. v. Yacucci, 162 So. 3d 68, 72 (Fla. 4" DCA 2014). Because Plaintifis cannot establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits nor ‘would public interest support the entry of the injunction, dismissal must be granted, Counts Il and II] ask this court to involve itself in a political party's election process. Many courts have discouraged any such judicial involvement, citing a strong public policy against such involvement. The United States Supreme Court cautions against such involvement: “Judicial intervention in this area traditionally has been approached with great caution and restraint.” See O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1,4(1972). The Court explained that there is a “large public interest in allowing the political processes to function free from judicial supervision.” Id. at 5. Moreover. a court “may not substitute its own judgment for that of the party.” Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 123— 124 (1981). It appears that Plaintiffs request just this sort of prohibited interference ~- that this Court override the judgment of the party in the selection of its leader. . Judicial interference in political party processes is discouraged in order to protect political organizations’ constitutional right to freedom of association. “It is well settled that part an Political organizations enjoy freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Committee, 489 US. 214, 224 (1989). Such freedom of association “necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify the people who constitute the association, and to limit the association to those people only.” Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122. “[TJhe stringency, and wisdom, of membership requirements is for the association and its members to decide—not the courts—so long as those requirements are otherwise constitutionally permissible.” Jd, at 124, n.25 (1981). The right to freedom of association also “encompasses a political party's decisions about the identity of, and the process for clecting, its leaders.” Eu, 489 U.S. at 229. . Thus, the government, including the judicial system, should refrain from involving itself in a political party’s internal affairs in the absence of prohibited acts of discrimination by the party or of the deprivation of other civil rights by the party. See id. at 232; Republican Party of Miami-Dade County v. Davis, 18 So. 3d 1112, 1118-19 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). In Davis, the Reput an Party of Miami-Dade County failed to notify its members that it changed the required procedure for applicants and candidates to run for the Miami-Dade Executive Committee, by requiring applicants to sign a loyalty oath before the end of the ing period rather than after the qualifying period. Id at 1114-15. Afier the election, 3mn but had not filled out the Party refused to seat the candidates who prevailed in the elec the oath prior to the qualifying period. /d. at 1116. The trial court granted an emergency motion for temporary injunction requiring the Party to seat the candidates. Jd. at 1114. While the Third District recognized the rule against interference in the governance and operations of political parties, the court affirmed because the Party denied its members” fundamental due process rights. The Party was required to seat their elected candidates who had not been notified prior to the election of the changed loyalty oath requirement. istant case show no similar denial of Id. at 1119. The allegations of the PlaintiffS in the fundamental due process. The Plaintiffs were a part of the political process, although they do not approve of the end result. 10. The Plaintiffs assert that their First Amendment right to freedom of association was violated. They argue that the “shenanigans” that allegedly occurred at the Miami-Dade Democratic meetings on December 6 and December 20, 2016, resulted in the Plaintiffs ‘now having to associate with certain members against their will. Specifically, the Plaintiffs argue that they have the right nor to associate with Mr. Bittel based upon his alleged failure to follow the applicable rules, including his alleged failure to sign a loyalty oath in time to qualify for the positions for which he ran. They ask this Court to require a new election and to remove Mr. Bittel to vindicate Plaintiffs’ right not to associate with him. They claim that the issuance of an injunction will serve the public interest “by ensuring a healthy vibrant democracy where at least one major political party will be controlled by the people, not corporate lobbyists.” (¥ 143, Amended Supplemental Complaint) 11. This argument — that a Party member may seek judicial intervention to remove another Party member with whom the claimant objects to associating — if accepted, would result in frequent judicial interference in the inner workings of political party life. Political parties are seldom gatherings of completely like-minded people who all like each other and agree on all things. They are often comprised of coalitions of members which may agree on some matters and disagree on others, and ultimately reach consensus on a platform of ideas. Developing platforms, strategies or overall philosophies, and deciding who party leaders will be are matters squarely within the party’s members’ purview to resolve, and are not areas where courts should tread. If courts were to get involved in a political party’s internal affairs whenever a member of that party disapproves of what others in the party have done, judicial interference in a party’s internal affairs would become frequent and unfettered.12, This court declines to involve itself in intemal party election matters under the allegations set forth in the second and third counts of the amended supplemental complaint. The right to freedom of association enjoyed by the Miami-Dade County Democratic Party and the Florida Democratic Party prevents this court from exercising jurisdiction over these political entities in relation to the matters alleged in those counts. 13. The claim for declaratory relief articulated in Count I must also fail because if there is no injunctive relief to which Plaintiffs would be entitled, there is no real and present need for a declaration that Stephen Bittel was or was not eligible to be elected by the Miami-Dade Democratic Party. 14, Even if this court were to consider the declarative or injunction claims, the Plaintiffs would be very unlikely to prevail given that the elections at issue have already taken place and the parties who won the majority of votes have now been in their respective positions and operating for many months. Moreover, the election conduct of which Plaintiffs complain has been reviewed and has been approved in appeals processes by the statewide party. See Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 2 So. 34 325, 327 Fla. 4” DCA 2008) (explaining that injunctive relieve is generally not granted to prohibit an act that has already occurred); Daniels v. Bryson, 548 So. 2d 679, 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (same). Because injunctive relief may not be granted, the Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief should likewise be denied, where there is no real and present need which would justify this Court issuing a declaration. 15. As to Count IV, for injunctive relief, the Defendants agree that Mr. Jacobs should be made captain for Precinct 583 and stated at oral argument in this matter that they will make him captain at the next meeting.1 Since Mr. Jacobs will, by the parties’ agreement, be placed into the position that he seeks, the issue is moot and there is no likelihood of irreparable harm, so injunctive relief is not proper as to Count IV. See Kirkland v. PeoplesSouth Bank, 70 So. 3d 662, 664 (Fla. Ist DCA 2011) (noting that irreparable harm is required for an injunction). | The same Bylaws violations which Jacobs argues should prevent Bittel from serving in his elected position apply to Jacobs as well,Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Plaintiffs’ Amended Supplemental Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. DONE and ORDERED this_19 day of _ hugar 2017. ee is JUDGE LISA S. WALSH CC: All parties ORIGINAL JupcE Lisa S. WALSH aS Tae SRS DiSPOsiTign eal NUMBER,