Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A. General: The midterm consists of 3 questions. All questions will be taken from the study
guide. Generally speaking, full credit answers are typically about 1 to 2 pages in length on an
8.5 by 11 inch blue book.
B. Effective answers will generally include 3 components. First, they will define the core
concepts and their important features. Second, they will use relevant examples or empirical
information (statistics) to illustrate important points. Third, they will explain why the issues being
discussed are important and relevant to the core questions of the course.
C. Keep in mind that you have 20 minutes to answer each question. As a result, keep will
want to keep your introduction to a single thesis sentence if at all possible, and avoid any
conclusion longer than 1 sentence in length. Remember that precision, clarity, and concision
will all be considered a demonstration that you understand the material. I would highly
recommend studying for the exam in groups, but answers do need to be your own.
D. I hold office hours on Wednesdays from 1-3 in my office on the 4th floor of Bunche Hall (RM
4258). Feel free to take a look at the study guide, and come in for clarifying questions
tomorrow.
Questions:
1) In their 1981 paper A Rational Theory of the Size of Government Allan Meltzer and Scott
Richard presented a model that links inequality to support for redistribution. What relationship
does it predict and why? Are the relationships in the Meltzer-Richards model typically born out
in reality? What role does the piece play in the inequality literature? (In other words, how have
other authors responded to it?)
MR model predicts that polities with high levels of income inequality will have higher
levels of government distribution
What we actually see: Countries with low levels of inequality have large welfare states
(Scandinavian countries), and ones with high levels of inequality have smaller welfare
states (U.S.)
As inequality increases so will the distance between the mean and the median incomes
Because of the nature of income distributions the mean is typically higher than the
median
Reasoning behind MR: Since the median voter stands to benefit from additional
redistribution as the income distribution becomes less equal, and politicians will cater to
her in order to win elections, government redistribution will increase as inequality
increases (not what we see)
Many scholars have dedicated careers to trying to explain why MRs predictions dont
manifest in the real world
Two primary reasons that MRs predictions dont manifest
1) The logic or reasoning doesnt actually occur
2) Other factors make it hard to see the effects but MR
is right.
MR assumes that people will act in their self interest this year, and not in a long term
sense
Not a problem if income for individuals is static, or
the order of incomes remains static.
Income mobility could throw a wrench in this logic
EXAMPLE: How income mobility can short-circuit the MR logic
Imagine 2 workers in Los Angeles, who both live alone
Worker 1 - Tim is a 45 year old short order cook with a high school education. He
makes $10.50 an hour, and works 45 hours a week splitting time between 2 jobs.
(Annual pre-tax income: $24,570)
Worker 2 - Sam is a 28 year old statistics graduate student. Sam makes 23.50 an hour
as a teaching and research assistant. Sam can only work 20 hours a week at the
moment as all other work time is devoted to school. (Annual pre-tax income: $24,440)
Income mobility and MR
Tims ~$25,000 income is probably pretty predictive of his lifetime earnings. There is
certainly a greater than zero chance that Tim will become wealthy, but the odds of this
are pretty low.
Sams ~$25,000 income is probably not predictive of either his lifetime earnings, nor
his place in the income distribution 10 years from now. Once Sam finishes graduate
school, he is likely to end up with a salary between $80,000 and $120,000 placing him
towards the top of the income distribution
According to MR: Both should support redistribution.
According to reality: Sam will not likely support redistribution because he wants to
keep the money he has earned, while Tim will likely support redistribution because it
could help him greatly
Income mobility can short-circuit the MR model, even if it is only perceived (i.e. the
American Dream)
2) Inequality has been increasing in most rich societies since the mid-1970s. Do people
perceive the current rates of inequality accurately? How do these perceptions vary by country?
How do the perceptions, and the reality of inequality, compare to peoples preferences? How
might perceptions of inequality lead to attitudes about redistribution?
People most definitely do NOT perceive the current rates of inequality accurately
Americans are the worst at guessing current rates, maybe because of our inaccurate
perceptions about income mobility
Kiatpongsan asks: Do people from different countries and different backgrounds have
similar preferences for how much more the rich should earn than the poor?
Most countries inaccurately perceive the levels of inequality in their country
US actual pay gap from CEOs to unskilled worker is 354:1, respondents estimated it to
be 30:1, while the ideal ratio is 7:1
Same picture across all countries (Taiwan was the closest in the estimated ratio
compared to the ideal ratio)
What makes someone more accurate at estimating inequality?
Bottom 40% of the SES scale
College degree
Older
Politically centrist
All of these factors are only marginally important (People still massively
underestimate unequal pay) - they are statistically significant, and substantively
small
People want smaller pay gaps according to Kiatpongsan
These results demonstrate a strikingly consistent belief that the gaps in incomes
between skilled and unskilled workers should be smaller than people believe them to be
and much smaller than these gaps actually are.
The consensus that income gaps between skilled and unskilled workers should be
smaller holds in all sub- groups of respondents regardless of their age, education,
socioeconomic status, political affiliation, and opinions on inequality and pay.
These results suggest thatin contrast to a belief that only the poor and members of
left-wing political parties desire less income equality people all over the world and from
all walks of life would prefer smaller pay gaps between the rich and poor.
If people believe that pay gaps between CEOs and unskilled workers are too big, then
they should be more supportive of income redistribution. Even when still underestimating
the real gap between these two groups, most respondents believed that the ideal ratio
should still be significantly smaller. U.S. respondents estimated the ratio to be 30:1 and
the ideal ratio to be 7:1. This same pattern can be found in all of the countries surveyed.
3) Some scholars assert that U.S. voting rules and electoral institutions explain in part why
European countries often have larger welfare states than the U.S. Explain how our voting rules
and electoral institutions differ from those frequently seen in other developed democracies.
How could this affect the amount of redistribution within our society?
4) Compare the levels of intergenerational income mobility in the U.S. to those in other
countries. How do these realities compare to perceptions of income mobility and beliefs in
meritocracy? How does intergenerational mobility differ for various classes in our society, and
how is it the same? Explain how this phenomenon has impacted or impacts economic
inequality.
there is less relative mobility in the United States than in many other rich
countries. The United States along with the United Kingdom have a relatively low rate of
relative mobility while Canada, Norway, Finland, and Denmark have high rates of
intergenerational mobility. France, Germany, and Sweden fall somewhere in the middle
The most common measure of intergenerational mobility, called intergenerational
income elasticity, has been estimated to be in the neighborhood of 0.5. This
number means that, on average, if a childs parents income is 20 percent higher than
the average family in the parents generation, then the chances are that as an adult the
child will have an income that is 10 percent higher than the average for his or her
generation. In short, if this mobility measure is 0.5, about half of the advantage of
growing up in a more affluent family is transmitted from parents to their children.
Reality: People think that everyone has the same opportunity to do better than their
parents or peers, but the reality of the situation is much different. The richer your parents
are, the more likely you are to move up in economic status. Those born in the poorest
group CAN see an increase in their income, but a large portion (42%) of those children
will remain in the same economic position as their parents.
Adults whose parents were lower on the ladder can see an increase in their incomes,
both because of economic growth and because they move up the ladder relative to their
parents, and many do.
4/5 children whose parents were in the bottom fifth of the income distribution end up with
higher incomes than their parents.
Contrary to American beliefs about equality of opportunity, a childs economic position is
heavily influenced by that of his or her parents. Forty-two percent of children born to
parents in the bottom fifth of the income distribution remain in the bottom, while 39
percent born to parents in the top fifth remain at the top. Children of middle-income
parents have a near-equal likelihood of ending up in any other quintile, presenting equal
promise and peril for those born to middle-class parents. Only 6 percent of children born
to parents with family income at the very bottom move to the very top.
Meritocracy: In this society those who work the hardest and have the greatest talent,
regardless of class, gender, race, or other less-germane characteristics, have the
highest income. Americans believe that they live in a meritocracy
It is worth noting, however, that even in a meritocracy people are born with different
genetic endowments and are raised in different family environments over which they
have no control, raising fundamental questions about the fairness of even
a perfectly functioning meritocracy.
These circumstances of birth may be the ultimate inequalities in any society. That said, a
meritocracy with a high degree of relative mobility is clearly better than the alternatives.
there is more stickiness at the top and bottom of the earnings ladder in all
countries.
That is, men whose fathers have particularly low earnings are more likely than other men
to have low earnings themselves, and men whose fathers are at the top
of the earnings distribution are likely to attain that top status themselves.
Starting at the bottom of the earnings ladder is more of a handicap in the United
States than it is in other countries.
Impacts Inequality: Because it is harder to get out of the bottom group of income
earners and easier to stay in both the bottom and top groups, inequality is constantly
getting worse. Yes, we see income rising in all income brackets, but it is rising faster for
those in the top 10% than it is for the bottom 20% and even bottom 50%. Because being
in the middle class means you have equal chances of moving down or up and there is a
general stickiness to living in the bottom quintile, economic inequality is getting worse,
specifically in the United States
5) Economic inequality can be measured in several ways. Three of these include wealth,
income, and consumption inequality. Which of these is typically highest in a society, and which
one is typically lowest? Explain the logic behind this order. Why might we care about each?
Most researchers agree that wealth inequality is usually the highest within a society,
while consumption inequality is usually the lowest.
Some economists say income data has too many flaws to be the primary measure of
inequality.
For one thing, many income-inequality measures use income before accounting
for the impact of taxes and transfer payments (such as Social Security, food
stamps and unemployment benefits), which act to reduce inequality.
Critics of the income-based approach note that an individuals (or households)
income can vary considerably over time, and may not reflect all available
economic resources such as credit availability, government assistance or
accumulated family wealth.
Wealth inequality tends to be much higher than either income or consumption inequality,
but it also tends to not vary as much over time.
Lower half of all households have very little or no wealth.
Why?
They have fairly low incomes, which means they cant afford to save their money.
Maybe they are living paycheck to paycheck if they are very poor.
The amount of money you haved saved plus all of your compiled assets is your
wealth
Individuals with high incomes can invest, buy property, buy bonds, and save their
money, which cant normally be done by someone with a low income. The top
10% own more than half of all wealth because of this, which means that wealth
inequality is extremely high
Consumption inequality= income + credit based spending - investments
6) Right now, inequality is growing within many developed countries, but inequality globally is
decreasing. Explain how these two phenomena are linked. What are the most important
implications of these trends for the U.S. as a country, and for the world in general? How is
globalization linked to these phenomena?
Lecture 5
Inequality in the U.S. has risen over the past few Decades
This trend is common over the same period within
most rich countries
Over the past few decades, global inequality has
declined substantially
The Answer? Globalization (Trump Argument)
Corporations are benefiting from:
Cheap labor alternatives
Cheaper component parts
Increased access to foreign consumers
Prior to Globalization
Countries had extremely poor wages. Even the tiny wages that corporations are
paying people in Africa, Mexico and China are higher than jobs previously
located in the area
No middle class
After Globalization
Increased middle class jobs
Increased wages
Increased export driven industry
Only need $10 a day to be part of the global middle class, which corporations are
100% willing to pay over the wages expected in the United States
Substantial reduction in extreme poverty
So while manufacturing and other similar paying jobs are leaving the United States,
creating more inequality in the US, jobs are going to other poorer countries and reducing
inequality by helping to create a middle class. Global inequality is decreasing while
inequality in the US and other similar nations is getting worse.
Automation is mainly affecting the working and middle class in the US. It is cheaper to
use robots to do work previously done by humans, which means there are less jobs
available for people trying to find work in the US and other rich, developed nations.
Trump thinks Globalization is the main problem, but automation is the real problem that
the US and the world currently faces according to experts and researchers. Automation
is also taking wealth and income away from our middle and working class and gives that
money to corporations, which drastically increases inequality.
7) Larry Bartels makes the argument that economic growth is higher when Democrats have
control of the White House. Explain how this pattern impacts upper, middle, and lower income
citizens. How would inequality levels look if only Democrats had been in power since the end of
World War II? How about Republicans?
8) Bartels argues that income growth is higher when Democrats have control of the White
House. Political scientists know that when growth rates are high in the year leading up to an
election, so is support for the incumbent party. Why dont we then see Democrats get elected to
the presidency at much higher rates than Republicans?
The results of his analysis suggest that most Americans support tax cuts not
because they are indifferent to economic inequality, but because they largely fail
to connect inequality and public policy.
Bartels argues that low income voters support economic policies against their
self-interest because they cant predict the outcomes of those policies
Support for the Bush tax cuts was strongly shaped by people's attitudes about their own
tax burdens, but virtually unaffected by their attitudes about the tax burden of the
richeven in the case of the estate tax, which only affects the wealthiest one or two
percent of taxpayers.
Public opinion in this instance was ill informed, insensitive to some of the most important
implications of the tax cuts, and largely disconnected from a variety of relevant values
and material interests.
Public support for the Bush tax cuts derives in considerable part from unenlightened
considerations of self-interest on the part of people who do not recognize the
implications of Bushs policies for their own economic well-being or their broader political
values.
Millions of citizens say that the federal government should spend more on a wide variety
of programs, that the rich are asked to pay too little in taxes, and that growing economic
inequality is a bad thingbut simultaneously support policies whose main effects will be
to reduce the tax burden of the rich, constrain funding for government programs, and
exacerbate growing economic inequality.
One is left to wonder how these people would resolve the contradictions implied by their
simultaneous antipathies toward inequality and taxationif they recognized those
contradictions.
Better-informed respondents were not only much more likely to express views about the
tax cut, but also much more likely to express negative views. Less informed: .84 (lots of
support. More informed: -.06 (way less support for tax cuts)
it appears that the strong plurality support for Bushs tax cut is attributable to simple
Ignorance.
For estate tax: knowledge had no effect on peoples support for it
Since the primary direct effect of repealing the inheritance tax would be to reduce the
long-run tax burden of the wealthiest one or two percent of American taxpayers,
respondents who believe the rich pay too much in taxes should be much more likely to
favor repealing the estate tax, while those who believe the rich pay too little in taxes
should be much more likely to oppose repeal.
Since repealing the inheritance tax would have no direct effect on respondents
own tax burdens (for all but the wealthiest handful) or on the tax burden of the
poor, opinions about whether these taxes are too high or too low are less
obviously relevant.
However, if respondents recognize that repealing the inheritance tax is likely to
lead, eventually, to increases in other, broader-based taxes (in some combination
with reductions in government services and larger budget deficits), those who
believe their own taxes (or the taxes paid by the poor) are too high may be
inspired to oppose repealing the inheritance tax
People are just not informed on the tax cuts to know whether they would hurt
them or help them. Most likely, the tax cuts would hurt them and really only
heavily benefit the richest in society
Question about whether the rich should pay more or less in taxes had no
predictive power
If you thought you paid too much in taxes, then you supported the tax cuts,
regardless of the benefit it would have to your pocketbook.
10) In Why Americans Hate Welfare Martin Gilens argues that several factors explain why
support for welfare and food stamp programs differ substantially from support for most other
welfare programs. What are the two LARGEST factors according to Gilens? How do these
factors impact peoples attitudes?
11) In Why Americans Hate Welfare Martin Gilens compares support for welfare programs in the
U.S. both to each other and to support for similar programs in several European countries.
What are the most striking patterns that he discusses? What programs stand out as being the
most/least popular? Which programs are more popular in Europe than in the U.S.?