C

G.R. No. L-19650

o Caltex Philippines, Inc., petitioner-appellee

Vs.

p FACTS:
Enrico Palomar, in his capacity as The Postmaster General, respondent-appellant

y In the year 1960, Caltex Philippines conceived and laid the ground work for a promotional
scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. The contest was entitled Caltex Hooded
Pump Contest, which calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters as hooded gas

r pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specific period.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the
contest but also for the transmission of communications, representations were made by Caltex with the

i postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing. This was formalized in a letter
sent by Caltex to the Post master General, dated October 31, 1960, in which Caltex, thru its counsel,
enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not

g violate the The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal Law.

Unfortunately, the Palomar, the acting Postmaster General denied Caltexs request stating that

h
the contest scheme falls within the purview of the Anti-lottery Provision and ultimately, declined
Clatexs request for clearance.
Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there being no consideration involved in part of the

t
contestant, the contest was not commendable as a lottery. However, the Postmaster General maintained
his view that the contest involves consideration, or even it does not involve any consideration it still
falls as Gift Enterprise, which was equally banned by the Postal Law.
ISSUE:
1.Whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief?
2.Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex the appellee is within the coverage of the

1 HELD:
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law?

9 I.
By express mandate of Section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court which deals with the
applicability to invoke declaratory relief which states: Declaratory relief is available to person whose

9 rights are affected by a statute, to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the
statute and for a declaration of rights thereunder.

4
In amplification, conformably established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain conditions:
1.There must be a justiciable controversy.
2. The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse.

-
3.The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy.
4.The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
With the appellees bent to hold the contest and the appellants threat to issue a fraud order if carried

2 out, the contenders are confronted by an ominous shadow of imminent and inevitable litigation unless
their differences are settled and stabilized by a declaration. And, contrary to the insinuation of the
appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be said that merely the appellees desires are

0 thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others which admittedly does not confer a cause of

1
action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it
was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested.
Construction
Is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of
the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful,
amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is not without
precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation
engaged in promotional advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its proposed sales
promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales promotion were conducted, the
corporation would be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled to
maintain a declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales
promotion plan.
II.
Is the Contest Scheme a Lottery?
Lottery
Extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance
e.g. policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles and fairs as well as various forms of
gambling.
Three Essential Elements:
1.Consideration
2. Prize
3.3. Chance
No, according to the Supreme Court, the contest scheme is not a lottery but it appears to be
more of a gratuitous distribution since nowhere in the rules is any requirements that any fee be paid,
any merchandise be bought, any services be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the
privilege to participate. Since, a prospective contestant has to do is go to a Caltex Station, request for
the entry form which is available on demand and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of
the winner. Because of this, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would
brand it as a lottery.
Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no
consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but it does condemn
as criminal scheme in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the
chance to draw a prize.
Is the scheme, as sales promotion which would benefit the sponsor in the way of increased
patronage be considered as a consideration and thus violates the Postal Law?
No, the required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the
sponsors of the contest. The true test lies on whether or not the participant pays a valuable
consideration for the chance of winning and not whether or not those conducting the enterprise receiver
something of value for the distribution of the prize.
Is the Contest Scheme a Gift Enterprise?
 Even if the term Gift Enterprise is not yet defined explicitly, there appears to be a consensus
among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is common applied to a sporting artifice of
under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement to purchase the product,
the purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.
And thus, the term of gift enterprise cannot be established in the case at bar since there is not
sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest
is open to all qualified contestant irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellees products.
The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is that every case must be
resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision. It is only logical
that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent
with the nature of the word associated therewith.
In the end, the Supreme Court ruled out that under the prohibitive provision of the Postal Law, gift
enterprise and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they
involve the element of consideration. Finding non in the contest, it was ruled out that the appellee may
not be denied the use of the mails for the purpose thereof.

Rcbc vs iac 213 scra 830

This is a petition for the review of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), dated
April 8, 1986 in AC-G.R. No. SP-06313, entitled "BF Homes, Inc. v. Judge Ansberto P. Paredes, etc.,
Et Al.," annulling the decision of the trial court and directing the Register of Deeds to suspend issuance
of the owners copies of the land titles to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation ("RCBC"),
purchaser of the foreclosed properties of private respondent BF Homes, Inc. ("BF Homes") until the
matter shall have been resolved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in SEC Case No.
002693 and its Resolution on May 28, 1986 denying RCBCs motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case are narrated in the Court of Appeals decision.

On September 28, 1984, B.F. Homes filed a "Petition for Rehabilitation and for Declaration or
Suspension of Payment" (SEC Case No. 002693) with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).

One of the creditors listed in its inventory of creditors and liabilities was RCBC.

On October 26, 1984, RCBC requested the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to extra-judicially foreclose its
real estate mortgage on some properties of B.F. Homes. A notice of extra-judicial foreclosure sale was
issued by the Sheriff on October 29, 1984, scheduled on November 29, 1984, copies furnished both
B.F. Homes (mortgagor) and RCBC (mortgagee).

On motion of B.F. Homes, the SEC issued on November 28, 1984 in SEC Case No. 002693 a
temporary restraining order (TRO), effective for 20 days, enjoining RCBC and the sheriff from
proceeding with the public auction sale. The sale was rescheduled to January 29, 1985.cralawnad

On January 25, 1985, the SEC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon petitioners
filing of a bond. However, petitioner did not file a bond until January 29, 1985, the very day of the
auction sale, so no writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the SEC. Presumably, unaware of the
filing of the bond, the sheriffs proceeded with the public auction sale on January 29, 1985, in which
RCBC was the highest bidder for the properties auctioned.

On February 5, 1985, B.F. Homes filed in the SEC a consolidated motion to annul the auction sale and
to cite RCBC end the sheriff for contempt. RCBC opposed the motion.

Because of the proceedings in the SEC, the sheriff withheld the delivery to RCBC of a certificate of
sale covering the auctioned properties.

On February 13, 1985, the SEC in Case No. 002693 belatedly issued a writ of preliminary injunction
stopping the auction sale which had been conducted by the sheriff two weeks earlier.

On March 13, 1985, despite SEC Case No. 002693, RCBC filed with the Regional Trial Court, Br. 140.
Rizal (CC 10042) an action for mandamus against the provincial sheriff of Rizal and his deputy to
compel them to execute in its favor a certificate of sale of the auctioned properties.

In answer, the sheriffs alleged that they proceeded with the auction sale on January 29, 1985 because
no writ of preliminary injunction had been issued by SEC as of that date, but they informed the SEC
that they would suspend the issuance of a certificate of sale to RCBC.

On March 18, 1985, the SEC appointed a Management Committee for B.F. Homes.

On RCBCs motion in the mandamus case, the trial court issued on May 8, 1985 a judgment on the
pleadings, the dispositive portion of which states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, petitioners Motion for Judgment on the pleadings is granted and judgment is hereby
rendered ordering respondents to execute and deliver to petitioner the Certificate of the Auction Sale of
January 29, 1985, involving the properties sold therein, more particularly those described in Annex C
of their Answer." (p. 87, Rollo)

On June 4, 1985, B.F. Homes filed an original complaint with the IAC pursuant to Sec. 9 of B.P. 129
praying for annulment of the judgment, premised on the following:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

". . .: (1) even before RCBC asked the sheriff to extrajudicially foreclose its mortgage on petitioners
properties, the SEC had already assumed exclusive jurisdiction over those assets, and (2) that there was
extrinsic fraud in procuring the judgment because the petitioner was not impleaded as a party in the
mandamus case, respondent court did not acquire jurisdiction over it, and it was deprived of its right to
be heard." (CA Decision, p. 88, Rollo)

On April 8, 1986, the IAC rendered a decision, setting aside the decision of the trial court, dismissing
the mandamus case and suspending issuance to RCBC of new land titles, "until the resolution of case
by SEC in Case No. 002693," disposing as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the judgment dated May 8, 1985 in Civil Case No. 10042 is hereby annulled and set
aside and the case is hereby dismissed. In view of the admission of respondent Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation that the sheriffs certificate of sale has been registered on B.F. Homes TCTs
Nos. 51001, 51002, 51003, 51005, 51006, 51007, 51011, 51013, 51014, 51015, 51017, 51018, 51019,
51020, 51021, 51022, 51022 (sic), 51286, 51287, 51283, 51290, 51292, 51297, 51309, 51319, 51321,
51331, 51332, 51333, 51334, 51335, 51336, 51337, 51338, 51339, 51340, 51342, 51343, 51344,
51345, 51346 (sic), 51347, 48151, 48165 (sic), 48128, 48194, 68603, 71273, 71275, and 71276, the
Register of Deeds for Pasay City is hereby ordered to suspend the issuance to the mortgagee-purchaser,
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, of the owners copies of the new land titles replacing them
until the matter shall have been resolved by the Securities and Exchange Commission in SEC Case No.
002693." (p. 91, Rollo) (Emphasis ours).

On June 18, 1986, RCBC filed its present petition on the following assigned errors:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

1. Petitioner did not commit extrinsic fraud in excluding private respondent as party defendant in
Special Civil Case No. 10042 as private respondent was not indispensable party thereto, its
participation not being necessary for the full resolution of the issues raised in said case.

2. SEC. Case No. 2693 cannot be invoked to suspend Special Civil Case No. 10042, and for that
matter, the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage in petitioners favor, as these do not
constitute actions against private respondent contemplated under section 6(c) of Presidential Decree
No. 902-A.

3. Even assuming arguendo that the extra-judicial sale constitutes an action that may be suspended
under section 6(c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the basis for the suspension thereof did not exist
so as to adversely affect the validity and regularity thereof.

4. The Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Special Civil Case No. 10042.

5. The Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over Special Civil Case No. 10042." (p. 5, Rollo)

On November 12, 1986, We gave due course to the petition.

On November 24, 1986, RCBC filed a "Manifestation" informing Us that on October 16, 1986, the
SEC in Case No. 002693 had issued an Order denying the consolidated Motion to Annul the Auction
Sale and to cite RCBC and the sheriff for contempt, disposing as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the petitioners Consolidated Motion to Cite Sheriff and Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation for Contempt and to Annul Proceedings and Sale, dated February 5, 1985, should be, as it
is, hereby DENIED.

"While we cannot direct the Register of Deeds to allow the consolidation of the titles subject of the
Omnibus Motion dated September 18, 1986 filed by the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, and
therefore, denied said Motion, neither can this Commission restrain the said bank and the Register of
Deeds from effecting said consolidation.

"SO ORDERED." (p. 138, Rollo, Emphasis ours)

as a consequence of which, "the Register of Deeds of Pasay City effected the transfer of title over the
subject properties to petitioner and caused the issuance of new titles in its name," and therefore "the
interest of petitioner to continue prosecuting the instant petition has become moot and the issues raised
therein have become academic." Petitioner RCBC further prayed that." . . the (instant) petition be
deemed as mooted by the events that transpired, . . . and that "this petition be thereby dismissed."cralaw
virtua1aw library

We note the precipitate manner in which the transfers of title in RCBCs name had been
effected.chanrobles law library

Aggrieved by the appellate courts decision, RCBC had invoked this Courts jurisdiction. We gave due
course to its petition on November 27, 1986. It now manifests its loss of interest to pursue the case
because it had "effectively achieved" what had been nullified by the appellate court, without awaiting
Our final ruling on its petition.

Based on its manifestation, it would seem that the Pasay City Register of Deeds had taken the SEC
Resolution dated October 16, 1986 as its cue for proceeding with the transfers of title, despite an
explicit directive in the Court of Appeals decision "to suspend issuance . . . until the matter shall have
been resolved by the Securities and Exchange Commission in SEC Case No. 002693."cralaw virtua1aw
library

SEC Case No. 002693 is BF Homes rehabilitation. On the other hand, SEC Resolution dated October
16, 1986 is a denial of BF Homes Consolidated Motion to Annul the auction sale and to cite RCBC
and sheriff for contempt.

By specifically mentioning the case number (002693) the appellate court could only have meant the BF
Homes rehabilitation and not any indiscriminate action taken by the SEC. Hence, until final
rehabilitation, both RCBC and the Pasay City Register of Deeds had to abide by the explicit directive
of the appellate court to suspend, in the meantime, issuance of new land titles, or effect registration in
RCBCs name.

Against this background, We do not see any merit in considering the case closed or terminated, for
being moot and academic, since there is basis for nullifying and setting aside the TCTs in RCBCs
name.

We now discuss the merits of the case.

The appellate court had ruled on the illegality of the mandamus case and thus set aside the decision of
the lower court, directing the delivery of the certificates of auction sale. This ruling effectively upholds
the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC (under Sec. 5(d) of PD 902-A as amended) over the assets and
properties of a distressed firm under PD 902-A. as amended. In the cases of BF Homes, Inc. v. CA, Et
Al., G.R. No. 76879 and Roa v. CA, G.R. No. 77143, October 3, 1990, We clarified that when a
corporation threatened by bankruptcy is taken over by a receiver, all the creditors should stand on an
equal footing, not anyone should be given preference by paying one or some of them ahead of the
others.

RCBC and the Pasay City Register of Deeds must have premised their action on SECs refusal in the
resolution dated October 16, 1986 to exercise jurisdiction on the contempt case, thus:cralawnad

"x x x

"While we cannot direct the Register of Deeds to allow the consolidation of the titles subject of the
Omnibus Motion dated September 18, 1986 filed by the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation and,
therefore, denies said Motion, neither can this Commission restrain the said bank and the Register of
Deeds from effecting said consolidation.

"SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library

as their go-signal to disregard the appellate courts directive and proceed with the registration of titles.
Their action of course, is clearly contumacious and both are equally guilty of contempt.

Since the properties, subject of the motion for contempt (in the SEC) involved assets of a distressed
firm, SEC would have been fully justified in issuing the corresponding restraining order against the
consolidation of title in RCBC, pursuant to Sec. 6(a), PD 902-A, as amended. However, We do not
know if the SEC Resolution dated October 16, 1986 was ever questioned by BF Homes. At any rate,
since this was not raised is an issue here, We shall refrain from discussing this.

The fact remains that by ordering the suspension of registration of titles, the appellate court clearly
intended to have BF Homes assets/properties remain untouched during the period of rehabilitation so
as not to render the SEC Management Committee irrelevant and inutile and to give it unhampered
"rescue efforts" over the distressed firm.

We also agree with BF Homes that has owner, it should have been impleaded in CC 10042 to allow it
to protect its rights.

Nevertheless, since RCBC had gone ahead with the registration of title in complete defiance of the
Court of Appeals directive, We have no recourse except to set aside such transfer and nullify the TCTs
issued in RCBCs name.

While it is recognized that RCBC is a preferred creditor and likewise the highest bidder at the auction
sale, We have however stated that whenever a distressed corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation
and suspension of payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert such preference, but as earlier
stated, stand on equal footing with other creditors. Foreclosure shall be disallowed so as not to
prejudice other creditors, or cause discrimination among them. If foreclosure is undertaken despite the
fact that a petition for rehabilitation has been filed, the certificate of sale shall not be delivered pending
rehabilitation. Likewise, if this has also been done, no transfer of title shall be effected also, within the
period of rehabilitation. The rationale behind PD 902-A, as amended, is to effect a feasible and viable
rehabilitation. This cannot be achieved if one creditor is preferred over the others.

In this connection, the prohibition against foreclosure attaches as soon as a petition for rehabilitation is
filed. Were it otherwise, what is to prevent the petitioner from delaying the creation of the Management
Committee and in the meantime dissipate all its assets. The sooner the SEC takes over and imposes a
freeze on all the assets, the better for all concerned.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
with the modification that RCBC and Vicente A. Garcia, Pasay City Register of Deeds, are hereby
found guilty of CONTEMPT and FINED One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) each. The new torrens titles
issued in RCBCs name are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE and BF Homes TCTs Nos. 51001,
51002, 51003, 51005, 51006, 51007, 51011, 51013, 51014, 51015, 51017, 51018, 51019, 51020,
51021, 51022, 51286, 51287, 51288, 51290, 5129Z, 51297, 51309, 51319, 51321, 51331, 51332,
51333, 51334, 51335, 51336, 51337, 51338, 51339, 51340, 51342, 51343, 51344, 51345, 51347,
48151, 48128, 48194, 68603, 71273, 71275, and 71276 are reinstated. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Nocon and Melo, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Bellosillo, JJ., concur in the result.

Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Campos, Jr., J., took no part.

RCBC vs iac 32o scra 279

RCBC vs. IAC G.R. No. 74851, December 9, 1999

Facts: On September 28, 1984, BF Homes filed a Petition for Rehabilitation and for Declaration of
Suspension of Payments with the SEC.

RCBC, one of the creditors listed in BF Homes inventory of creditors and liabilities, on October 26, 1984,
requested the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to extra-judicially foreclose its real estate mortgage on some
properties of BF Homes. BF Homes opposed the auction sale and the SEC ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction upon petitioners filing of a bond. Presumably unaware of the filing of the bond on the
very day of the auction sale, the sheriff proceeded with the public auction sale in which RCBC was the highest
bidder for the properties auctioned. But because of the proceedings in the SEC, the sheriff withheld the
delivery to RCBC of the certificate of sale covering the auctioned properties.

On March 13, 1985, despite the SEC case, RCBC filed with RTC an action for mandamus against the
provincial sheriff of Rizal to compel him to execute in its favor a certificate of sale of the auctioned properties.
On March 18, 1985, the SEC appointed a Management Committee for BF Homes.

Consequently, the trial court granted RCBCs motion for judgment on the pleading ordering respondents to
execute and deliver to petitioner the Certificate of Auction Sale.

On appeal, the SC affirmed CAs decision (setting aside RTCs decision dismissing the mandamus case and
suspending issuance to RCBC of new land titles until the resolution of the SEC case) ruling that whenever a
distressed corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation and suspension of payments, preferred creditors may no
longer assert such preference but stand on equal footing with other creditors. Hence, this Motion for
Reconsideration.

Issue: When should the suspension of actions for claims against BF Homes take effect?

Held: The issue of whether or not preferred creditors of distressed corporations stand on equal footing
with all other creditors gains relevance and materiality only upon the appointment of a management
committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body.

Upon cursory reading of Section 6, par (c) of PD 902-A, it is adequately clear that suspension of claims
against a corporation under rehabilitation is counted or figured up only upon the appointment of a
management committee or a rehabilitation takes effect as soon as the application or a petition for rehabilitation
is filed with the SEC may to some, be more logical and wise but unfortunately, such is incongruent with the
clear language of the law. To insist on such ruling, no matter how practical and noble would be to encroach
upon legislative prerogative to define the wisdom of the law --- plainly judicial legislation.

Once a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body is appointed pursuant to PD 902-A, all
actions for claims against a distressed corporation pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be
suspended accordingly; Suspension shall not prejudice or render ineffective the status of a secured creditor as
compared to a totally unsecured creditor. What it merely provides is that all actions for claims against the
corporation, partnership or association shall be suspended. This should give the receiver a chance to
rehabilitate the corporation if there should still be a possibility for doing so. In the event that rehabilitation is
no longer feasible and claims against the distressed corporation would eventually have to be settled, the
secured creditors shall enjoy preference over the unsecured creditors subject only to the provisions of the Civil
Code on Concurrence and Preferences of Credit.

China banking corp vs ortga

G.R. No. L-34964 January 31, 1973

Facts:
Petitioner refuses to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor by
invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 (Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) which allegedly prohibits
the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits.

Issue:
Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank
deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.

Held:
No. It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee report of the two
houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under
Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there
is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely
incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to
enable debtors to evade payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of
converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank

chavz vs jbi

G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL,
G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C.
TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:

NATURE:
The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior decision rendered July 17, 2012 that
JBCs action of allowing more than one member of the congress to represent the JBC to be
unconstitutional

FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and
one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate
meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C.
Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this
practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. it should mean one representative each from both
Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends that the phrase a representative of
congress refers that both houses of congress should have one representative each, and that these two
houses are permanent and mandatory components of congress as part of the bicameral system of
legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of
the constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one
representative from congress.

ISSUE:
Whether the JBCs practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives
making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution.

HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase a representative of
congress should be construed as to having only one representative that would come from either house,
not both. That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the
legislative.
It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the
role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-
play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy
that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation
because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term
Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the
JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.

FALLO: The motion was denied.

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015 ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO S. LIM PETITIONER-INTERVENOR,

VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

NATURE:
These are petitions including:
1) a Petition for Certiorari filed by Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal, which essentially prays for the issuance of
the writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the April 1, 2013 and April 23, 2013 Resolutions of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division and En banc, respectively.

(2) a Petition-in-Intervention[ filed by Alfredo S. Lim praying to be declared the 2013 winning
candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in view of private respondent former President Joseph
Ejercito Estradas) disqualification to run for and hold public office

FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of
the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence
and perpetual absolute disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive
clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada explicitly states that He is hereby restored to
his civil and political rights.

On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy[7] for the position of
President but was opposed by three petitions seeking for his disqualification. None of the cases
prospered and MRs were denied by Comelec En Banc. Estrada only managed to garner the second
highest number of votes on the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections.

On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a
Certificate of Candidacy,[10] this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of
Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the
COMELEC because of Estradas Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to
Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification. Petitioner relied on
Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC)

In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for
disqualification holding that President Estradas right to seek public office has been effectively restored
by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim garnered
the second highest votes intervene and seek to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention
of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office
as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.

HELD:
No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions. The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to
adequately demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions
were issued in a whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or
refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or were so patent and gross as to constitute grave
abuse of discretion.

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored allhis civil and political
rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this
controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is
that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The
sentence which states that (h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights, expressly remitted
the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we
apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that
the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly
remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section
12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms,
Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition a plenary pardon or amnesty. In
other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty
after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and
hold any public office, whether local or national position.

FALLO:

Petition is dismissed