Dewara v Lamela

Facts: Eduardo Dewara (A) and Elenita Dewara (b) married before the FC took effect,
separated in fact because B worked in California, A in Bacolod. A, while driving jeep, hit
Lamela (C), who filed and won a case of serious physical injuries against A. The Court ordered
A to pay 62k as civil indemnity and 10k as moral damages. A could not pay so the sheriff
levied a parcel of land registered under Bs name, which was bought by C at a public auction.
Bs attorney-in-fact claimed that land was paraphernal property of Elenita and could not be
used to pay for personal liabilities of her husband. Respondents claim that property was
conjugal as it was bought using As money, B being a simple housewife at the time of purchase
of the land. RTC declared property as paraphernal and ruled in favor of the petitioner, tracing
the ownership of the property to Bs grandfather, and was sold to her by her father and her
aunt for a much lower price, indicating that it was a donation to B alone.

CA reversed the decision, claiming that A and B acquired the property during their marriage

Issue: Is the property is conjugal?

Ruling: NO. Registration under the name of one spouse alone does not prove that property
is not conjugal. Separation-in-fact without judicial approval, does not affect conjugal nature
of property. B was unable to show that property was sold to her as a donation, as she failed
to show evidence that her payment was much less than the value of the property. Gross
disparity in price does not affect the contract of sale and may merely signify a defect in
consent. Despite of being conjugal in nature, property may not necessarily be used to pay for
the liabilities of one spouse, the FC provides that said spouse must first be shown to have no
property of his own, and only in such a case can the conjugal property be used.

Uy v CA

Facts: Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza (A) suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda (B), his
wife, filed a petition to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property and be
authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his
functions. She further contested that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that
would require her to sell their property in Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet such
necessities. RTC ruled in favor of B contending that such decision is pursuant to Article 124
of FC and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings.

The son of the spouses, Teodoro (C), filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
petition made by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and
properties of his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions
on summary proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing special proceedings
in the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for
notice and a hearing on the merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes
under the heading on Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife contemplating a
situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued that this should not
be applied in their case.
During the pendency of the motion, B sold the property to her daughter and son in law. Upon
the appeal by C, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.

Issue: May B as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular accident
rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements?

Ruling: No. The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases where the non-
consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, trial court
found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a
diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship
proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. The law provides that a wife who assumes sole
powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a
spouse who desires to sell real property as administrator of the conjugal property, must
observe the procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians, and
not the summary judicial proceedings under FC. SC further held that such incapacity of the
trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of
due process.

Borromeo v Descallar

Facts: Wilhelm Jambrich (A), an Austrian,married respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar

(B). They bought a house and lot and an Absolute Deed of Sale was issued in their names.
However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration, it was refused on
the ground that A was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain.
Consequently, his name was erased but his signature remained and the property was issued
on the name of the Respondent alone. However, the spouses eventually separated.

A then contracted a loan from the petitioner who was engaged in business and sold some of
his properties to him to pay his debt. A Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment was issued in his
favor. However, when the Petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment it found out
that said land was registered in the name of Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint against
respondent for recovery of real property.

Issue: Does A have title to the properties in question and can transfer and assign any rights
and interest in favor of the petitioner?

Ruling: Yes. The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and A, it was A who
possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the
acquisition of the properties, A was the source of funds used to purchase the three parcels of
land, and to construct the house. A was the owner of the properties in question, but his name
was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. Nevertheless, his
signature remained in the deed of sale where he signed as a buyer. Thus, A has all authority
to transfer all his rights, interest and participation over the subject properties to petitioner
by virtue of Deed of Assignment. Furthermore, the fact that the disputed properties were
acquired during the couples cohabitation does not help the respondent. The rule of co-
ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage, but otherwise capacitated to marry each other does not
apply. At the case at bar, respondent was still legally married to another when she and A
lived together. In such an adulterous relationship and no co-ownership exists between the
parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the
acquisition of property in order to able to lay claim to any portion of it.

Matthew v Taylor

Facts: Respondent Benjamin, a British subject, married Joselyn, a 17-year old Filipina. While
their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a lot (Boracay property)
The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters
funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a
vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. All required permits and
licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino,
Joselyns sister. However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with
Kim Philippsen. Joselyn executed a SPA in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to
maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with
respect to their Boracay property. Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee,
entered into an Agreement of Lease involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years,
with an annual rental of P12,000.00. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property
and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort. Claiming that the Agreement was null and
void since it was entered into by Joselyn without Benjamins consent, Benjamin instituted an
action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the
petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement
of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyns husband, any
transaction involving said property required his consent.

Issue: 1. Is the Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wife without
the consent of her British husband is valid?

2. Is Benjamin the actual owner of the property since he provided the funds used in
purchasing the same?

Ruling: No for both questions. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited
constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary
purpose of this constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. Our
fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the public domain is
reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which
is owned by Filipinos.

The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private
lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is no rule
more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to
circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through another.

Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner.
Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in
the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed
of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain
Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such
contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no
reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the
subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event,
he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay
property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative
of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance
indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared
conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land,
as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have