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PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS
1N T H E
EMPIRICAL SCIENCE OF SCIENCE:
A FORMAL APPROACH
in the form l have described. That is, try to find features of the presys-
tematic exposition of the theory that can be squeezed into the format I
described I can not prove that ~vhat you come up with will be intuitively
satisfactory. I can point to some (in my view) successful paradigm
applications of this apparatus: my own treatments of classical particle
mechanics (in three equivalent forms) and classical rigid body mechanics
(in [4]) and a quite elegant treatment of classical equilibrium ther-
modynamics due to Moulines([3]).
The structure I will describe is itself something like a 'core' for a theory
of the products of science. We have successfully applied it to some things
in the range of intended applications - scientific theories. We think (some
of us at least) that others will yield with time and work. We think too, with
less good reasons perhaps, that once we squeeze theories into this form
interesting relations among them can be elegantly exhibited. But we
would be wrong. 2
To proceed further we need some notation 3
(DO) (A) M e ~))~= d~t M is a non-empty set. a
(B) For all M, N, R, C,/~, c ~))l;
(1) Pot (M) =d~ the power-set of M;
(2) R: M ~ N = d ~ f R is a function with domain M and
range N;
(3) C is a constraint for M iff 5
(a) 4 , ~ c
(b) Co_Pot (M)
(c) for all X, Y # ch ~ Pot (M), if
X c C a n d Y_~X, then Y e C ;
(4) if R : M--> N then,
: Pot (M) ~ Pot (N) such that, for all
X e Pot (M), f f , ( X ) ~ = the image of X under R ;
(5) if R _c (M N) t h e n / ~ = ~t,,t the converse of R ;
(6) R reductively corresponds M with N (rd(R, M, N)) iff
(a) R _~ (M N)
(b) D , ( R ) = M
(c) /~: D n ( R ) ~ M
(7) if rd (R, M, N) then
l~ = ~,d {(X', X ) ~ Pot (M) Pot (N)]
for all x'~ X' there is an x ~ X such that (x', x) ~ R}
PHII.OSOPHICAL PROBLEMS 123
partial models'. Second, there is the idea of laws formulated with theoret-
ical components. This captured by M which picks out of the set of all
possible models of the full conceptual apparatus just those which satisfy
certain laws. Third, there is the idea that different applications of the
theory-element are interdependent in the sense one may not - at least for
theoretical functions - employ values of function in one application of the
theory without regard for some of the values of the same function in other
applications. This is captured by the constraints C on Mr,. These have the
effect of ruling out certain combinations of theoretical function-values in
different applications. The intuitive idea is that a distinction may be
drawn between what is ruled out by the structure of the theory's models
M and what is ruled out by restriction on the way that structure is applied
'across' a number of different applications C. s
That a theory-element core has these intuitive properties can only be
seen by looking at how it is used to make empirical claims. The intuitive
idea is simple. Given a theory-element core K = (Mr,, Mpp, M, C) a class of
sub-sets of Mpp (that is, a sub-set of Pot(Mpe)) will be selected. Call this
class A (K). The selection rule is this. A sub-set of Mpp is in A (K) if and
only if theoretical components can be added to each member of it in a way
that yields a subset of M (satisfies the theoretical laws) and such that the
whole array of theoretical components satisfies the constraints (7.
The definition of A ( K ) requires some additional notation. The r-
function of (D3-A) simply 'lops-off' the theoretical components from
members of Alp. A ( K ) is then the image of P o t ( M ) m C under f - r
extended twice in the manner of (Do-B-(4) to yield a function f:
Pot(Pot(Me))-*Pot(Pot(Mr, e)). It is convenient here also to introduce
some notation is needed for defining reduction relations. If R is a relation
between the full theoretical structures of two theory-element cores, the/~
is the non-theoretical image of R (D3-C)).
(D3) If K = {Mr,, Mpp, M, C) and K ' = (Mr,, Mep, M, C) are theory-
element-cores then:
(A) r: M~, ~ Mf,p is such that r(nl . . . . . n.,, tl . . . . . tk)= dcf
(nr ..... n,,,);
(B) A (K) = ~ff(Pot(M) c~ C)
(C) if R c M~,' Nip then
/~ = {(x', x)~M'pp xM~.] there is a (y', y ) ~ R and x' = r'(y')
and x = r(y)} 9
PHILOSOPHICAl. PROBI.EMS 125
initial Mpp in the same way that single cores do ((D 12) below). For details
see [1].
Next we define a 'theory-net' as a set of theory-elements together with
the specialization relation. 17 We also require that cores appearing in the
net be uniquely associated with their intended applications (D7-4). This
could be weakened to permit several cores to be associated with a single
range of intended applications, but not conversely.
(D7) N is a theory-net iff there exist IN[ and <~ such that:
(1) N=(IN[, <~);
(2) [NI < ~3~ is a finite set of theory-elements;
(3) ~< is the specialization relation on IN};
(4) for all (K, I), (K', I')6{Nr K= K' iff I = I',
Theory-nets are partially ordered sets (T1-A) and the subsets of Mpv
picked out by specialization-related theory-elements have the properties
that 'specialization' suggests (T1-B). That is A(K)'s determined by
specializations of K' are generally smaller than A (K'). They narrow down
the range of possibilities permitting us to make stronger claims.
(T1) If N is a theory-net then:
(A) N is a partially ordered set;
(B) if T, T'c INI are such that T ~< T' then:
(1) A(K)~_ A(K'),
(2) lc_l',
(3) if l e A ( K ) then IcA(K').
Theory-nets are pretty general. Examples of practical interest appear
to be quite special cases. We shall be mainly concerned with theory-nets
which have a single 'basic theory-element' at the top of the net. Whether
other kinds of theory-nets might prove useful in depicting actual scientific
practice will not he considered here. It might also be possible to specify
more precisely the properties of theory-nets having practical applica-
tions. For example, it is plausible to think that all actual theory-nets might
be 'downward-closed' in the sense that specializations involving combi-
nations of special laws always appear in a theory-net whenever their
range of applications intersect. For present purposes it is not necessary to
further specify the properties of theory-nets, though this is of some
intrinsic interest.
To specify the properties of theory-nets that are of interest to us we
need some notation. We define the 'basic set' of a net as the net of its
128 JOSEPH D. S N E E D
upper bounds (D8-A), and the set of all intended applications appearing
anywhere in the net N, O(N) (D8-B and (-C)).
(D8) If N = ( [ N I, ~<) is a theory-net then:
(A) ~ ( N ) : deflXe IN[ for all z G IN I, if
x~<zthenx=z};
(B) Q(N) = dcf{I] there is a (K', I') ~ ]N I - ~ ( N )
such that I : I'}.
(C) Q(N)=ae, U I.
/'cO(N)
Not only do we need to talk about theory-nets, we must also talk about
'parts of theory-nets'. To this end we introduce the notations of ~expan-
sion' and 'initial part' (D9). N is an expansion of N' iff N' is contained in
N. N' is an initial part of N iff it comprises the 'top' of N.
(D9) If N and N' are theory-nets then:
(A) N is an expansion of N'(N'~ N) iff:
(i) IN'lc_INI;
(2) ~<':(~< c~IN'[xIN'[),
(B) N is an initial part of N' iff:
(1) N' ~N;
(2) for all x a ( I N ] - I N ' l ) , y c IN'I not y ~<x.
Theory-nets have 'core-nets' associated with them in a natural way
(D10) and these core-nets are isomorphic to the theory-nets (T2). ~s
(D10) If N=([N[, <~)is a theory-net then N * = ( I N * I, ~<*)is the
core-net induced by N iff
(1) IN*J : { K [ < K , l ) c INI},
(2) ~<* : {(K, K') ~ (IN*I x IN*I)/(K, I) ~<(K', I')}
(T2) If N is a theory-net then N is a partially ordered set and N* is
isomorphic to N under 0:[N[<--->[N*[ such that O(K, I) = K.
Just as the theory-core K picks out a sub-set of Pot(Mpp), so does a
theory-core-net under the core K. Intuitively, N* picks out just those
members of Pot(M,p) whose elements may be supplied with theoretical
functions in ways which satisfy special laws and constraints in applications
where they are postulated to apply, as well as those laws and constraints
which are postulated to apply, in applications standing above them in the
n e t - including, of course, those of K. The formal definition follows.
( D l l ) If N is a theory-net such that ~ ( N ) = { ( K , I)} then:
A (N*) = {x ~<Mpp Ifor all K ' ~ IN*I, x A M~p 6 A (K')}. m
Pt-I1LOSOPttlCAL PROBLEMS 129
based on (K, I) may develop as just described. But this theory may also
develop by enlarging/~ to/t,, ~nd finding some theory-core-net N under
K so that I~,c A(N). That is, more of the intended applications may be
brought within the scope of what the theory says about extensionally
described applications. Roughly, the theory based on (K, I) may develop
both intensively (more narrowly specifying lt) and extensively (enlarging
I,) by extending and shifting the theory-net under (K, I).
Among theories with intensionally described intended applications,
those whose intended applications are described by 'paradigm examples'
have received particular attention. Prof. Kuhn has suggested that descrip-
tion of intended applications by paradigm examples may be the rule for
'interesting' scientific theories. This possibility may be represented in the
theory-net formalism in the following way. A paradigm set of extension-
ally described applications I0 has associated with it a 'paradigm theory-
net' Np. This paradigm theory-net determines the development of the
theory in two ways. First, I is described roughly as all those things
sufficiently like 10. (This can be made somewhat more precise. For
example see [4], p. 286ff. and [5], p. 148ff., 218ff., 225fi.). Second, the
paradigm theory-net must be a sub-net of any larger net appearing during
the theory's development. That is, certain subtheories and relations
among them 'anchor' the development of the theory.
These intuitive ideas are captured in (D13). T~ is the basic theory-
element consisting of Kb - the basic conceptual structure of the theory -
and / - t h e full range of intended applications. 1(, is the sub-set of
paradigm applications and Ni, is the paradigm theory-net which applies
K~ to I0 - perhaps with the help of specializations of K~ 9W is the set of all
nets which are expansions of Np. One might want to require that N r, be an
initial part of all members of W. This would rule out tampering with the
paradigm net by squeezing new applications in between the old ones.
Whether or not this ever happens is not clear to me.
(D12) ~k is a Kuhn-theory iff there exist
Th, Io, No, W such that:
(1) lk =(Th, 1(,, Np, W),
(2) Th =(Kb, I) is a theory-element such that I 0 - I ;
(3) N o is a theory-net such that:
(a) 23(Np) = {Tb};
(b) Q(N~)=Io
PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS 131
4. THEORETICAL CONCEPTS
5. R E D U C T I O N RELATIONS
kinds of relations that one might look for (but perhaps not find) between
theories historically separated by a 'scientific revolution'.
What I think emerges from this investigation is the realization that our
gross intuitive conception of what counts as 'scientific progress' may be
sharpened in a number of quite different ways. Taking account of the full
complexity of the kinds of things that scientific theories are, one can
distinguish a number of relations among theories that might plausibly
indicate 'scientific progress'. This suggests, at least, that a discussion of
'whether science progresses' in anything like the intuitive sense of
'progress' should be accompanied by a patient examination of the rela-
tions that actually appear to hold between putative examples of theories
historically separated by 'scientific revolutions'.
The most general relation here is that of one theory-element's reducing
to another. It may (but need not) hold between theories elements
completely unrelated conceptual apparatus (different theory-element
cores). It may be used to define other interesting relations among
theory-elements, theory-nets and theories. The intuitive idea of theory-
element reduction is this. Every application of the reduced theory-
element corresponds to at least one application of the reducing
theory-element and what the reduced theory-element says about a given
application is entailed by what the reducing theory-element says about
any corresponding application.
Notation needed to make this precise is provided in (DO-6-7). A
reductive correspondence R between N' and N is simply a one-many
relation from N' to N. The associated/~ simply extends R to the power
sets of N' and N. We need the latter because, on our view, theories
generally make claims about whole sets of applications rather than single
application. We now define a weak reduction relation between theory-
elements. We say R weakly reduces T' to T just when R is a reductive
correspondence between the non-theoretical structures in K' and K and
X 6 A (K) assures that a R-corresponding X' is in A (K'). These are pure
formal requirements. In contrast, (D14-3) requires that the ranges of
application be such that every application of T' R-correspond to some
application of T.
(D14) If T' and T are theory-elements then R weakly reduces T' to
T((RD(R, T', 7))iff
( ! ) rd (R, M~,p, Mp,,)
PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS 137
theory more sharply than that theory itself. Roughly, viewing the reduced
theory from the vantage point of the reducing theory we obtain a 'better'
A ( K ' ) - namely, the/~-image of A(K).
Let us now consider the 'preservation' properties of reduction rela-
tions. One might suspect that, once a reduction relation had been
discovered between theory-elements, it could be preserved in the follow-
ing sense. If R reduces to T' to T and T'~ is some specialization of T' then
there will always be some specialization of T such that R reduces T'~ to
Ti. Roughly, it should always be possible to replicate the effect of any
special laws in the reduced theory by corresponding special laws in the
reducing theory.
For both weak reduction and reduction this is so, provided one is not at
all fastidious about what counts as a special law of the reducing theory.
For weak reduction, the R-image of A(K't) can always be used to
construct the requisite KL. For reduction, one can similarily always
construct a K1 using the R-image of Pot(M') N C. The conditions (D15)
will be preserved under restrictions of R-generated in this way.
These facts are summarized in the following theorem.
(T6) If T' and Tare theory-elements and RD(R, T', T) then for all T'~
such that T't is a specialization of T' there is some T1 such that Tt
is a specialization of T and RD(R~, T'~, Tj) where R+=
R/(M'~x) x (M~I).
These facts about preservation of reduction relations through speciali-
zation suggest that for theories based on (K', I') and (K, I) reduction is
completely captured by a reduction relation between the basic theory-
elements. But this ignores the intuitive requirement that we can not be
completely undiscriminating in choosing refinements of (K, I) which
'reduce' given refinements of (K', I'). Roughly, we can not use arbitrarily
contrived special laws of (K, 1) to reproduce the effect of special laws in
(K', I'); we must use special laws of (K, I) that already have some
'standing' within the latter theory.
One way to handle this intuitive requirement is simply to regard
reduction as a relation between specific theory-nets associated with the
theories. Roughly, the theory-net reduction relation must reduce the
basic theory element T' to the basic theory-element T and every theory-
element of N' to some theory-element of N. -~8The following definition
makes this precise.
140 JOSEPH D. S N E E D
That is, at some time the net N', associated with the old theory will reduce
to Nt associated with the new theory, and not conversely. (Note that N't,
need not necessarily reduce to Np). Such a development would clearly
count as 'progress', but not 'ultimate defeat' for the old theory. There is
nothing in the 'facts' of the situation to prevent the old theory from
developing further in directions that can not be reduced to the net
Nt - though they could be reduced to ad hoc expansions of N,.
Though there is nothing in the 'facts' of the situation to prevent the old
theory from catching up with and even outrunning the new theory, there
may be a great deal in the ~politics' of the situation to discourage this
development. Theories do not develop unless people produce these
developments. Folk wisdom tells us that people usually do not produce
without hope of reward. Once the new theory has pulled ahead of the old,
or even when it appears likely to, the prudent research administrator will
stop or cut-back support for work on the old theory and equally prudent
researchers will stop submitting proposals for such work. Though it has
not been established 'once and for all' that the old theory can't keep up,
though it is perhaps not possible to establish this, it may still be 'irrational'
in a world of scarce resources to continue work with this theory.
Here 'having a reduction relation' between two theories is rather like
'having a theory' (see [4], pp. 265-8 and [5], pp. 189-95). It is an
essentially pragmatic concept. One has discovered a relation R that
reduces the net N t, to the net N,. One believes, perhaps with good reason,
that R will suffice to reduce all nets arising out of the 'natural' develop-
ment of T' to nets arising out of the temporally parallel 'natural' develop-
ment of T. But this belief may not be grounded on conclusive proof.
These considerations suggest that perhaps reduction of theories relative
to specific nets is all we need to deal with the question of 'scientific
progress', They suggest that we do not need a concept of theory in which
the possibilities for its future development are so strongly specified
(through a strong specialization concept) that it can be established 'once-
and-for-all' that one theory can not keep up with another. Though we do
not need such a concept to rationally allocate our research resources, it
would still be nice to have. It would reduce the uncertainty in our
allocation problem - something that is always nice and sometimes pur-
chasable at acceptable cost. Moreover, it could be the case that some
theories have such limitations 'built into' them while others don't. This
144 JOSEPH D. S N E E D
NOTES
1 will not pursue this formal line here. I only remark that, had I realized at sometime that
my discussion of Prof. Kuhn's theory was a logical reconstruction of an empirical theory of
science, I would have been tempted to try casting it in the same framework I suggested for
physical theories. Perhaps fortunately for my readers, my insight was not so sharp.
2 Roughly speaking, the way of talking about scientific theories I am going to describe
invites us to look at set of 'models' for these theories rather than the linguistic entities
employed to characterize these models. That this might be a fruitful way of proceeding was,
for far as I know, first suggested by Suppes [6]. The models in question may be characterized
using the device of a formal language, e.g. first order logic, or 'directly' by defining a
set-theoretic predicate within either an informal or formal set-theory.
3 Here and in what follows I rely heavily on the notation of Stegmfiller [5],
4 We use 'set' to denote both naive sets as well as sets of ordered tuples. So in some cases
'Mc~))~ ' may mean M is a relation or function.
5 The definition of 'constraint' here differs from that in [3], p. 170 and [4], p. 128 in three
respects. First, all singleton sets {x}, x c M are not required to be in C. Ruling out singletons
with constraints appears to be necessary when constraints are used to represent 'invariance
principles'.
But this vitiates the sharp distinction between constraints and laws. Second, the null-set is
excluded from C (D0-B-3-a) and finally a 'transitivity' requirement (D0-B-3-c) is imposed.
The former is a technical nicety required to make (D6-2) intuitively meaningful. The latter is
required in the proof in [4], (p. 282). Because of (D6-6) this condition is not required for any
theorems mentioned here. But weakening (D6-6) to I ' ~ _ M ' e ~ 1 would require us to use
this condition in establishing a partial analogue of (T3).
6 The following definition is a generalization of (D24) ([4]; p. 161) and the corresponding
(D1) ([5], p. 123) which eliminates one of the deficiencies mentioned in the discussions
accompanying the earlier definitions - namely, the restriction of the nature of the relations
in the matrix.
v The r-function appearing in the definition of a 'core for a theory of mathematical physics'
in [4], p. 171 and [5], p. 128 can now be defined in terms of Mp and Mm,. (See (D3) below)
and hence need not appear explicitly. The earlier treatment did not permit this because i't
avoided hanging anything on the less satisfactory definition of 'matrix'.
Actually (D2) is so generally formulated that constraiuts may apply to non-theoretical as
well as theoretical components. Whether such generality is actually needed is an interesting
question. (D2) may easily be modified to restrict the constraints to theoretical components
only, but this complication is not essential here.
PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS 145
Here 'r" denotes the function M'p~ M'pp defined by (D3-1). Generally, we adopt the
convention that c o m p o n e n t s and other sets associated with indexed K ' s will be decorated
with the same index. For example. 'C~' denotes the constraints in K~.
"~ T h e o r y - e l e m e n t s correspond to theories of mathematical physics in [4] and [5]. The
present terminology emphasises the fact that theories are generally more complex entities
than single theory-elements.
~ It is possible to say more in the direction of sufficient conditions. Some tentative steps in
this direction were made in [4], p. 260 and [5], p. 189, but I shall not venture into this
matter here.
~2 This turns out to be the case in one plausible formulation of classical particle mechanics.
See [4], p. 118 and [5], p. 110.
~3 T h e basic idea of this alternative treatment - the specialization relation - was suggested
to me by W. Balser. For a more detailed and extensive treatment of inter-theoretical
relations in this m a n n e r see [1].
~4 A specialization of T is itself a theory-element but it plays the role of the "application
f u n c t i o n ' - i n earlier treatments [4], p. 179 and [5], p. 131.
~5 1 am indebted to Dr. C. U. Moulines for criticism of this naive view and to Prof. A.
Kamlah for criticism of several attempts to arrive at a more sophisticated view. For a full
discussion of this matter see [1].
" Note that (D6-4) and (-5) together with the requirement that T' be a theory element
insure that the special laws M' and special Constraints C' actually hold for s o m e m e m b e r s of
the M'p determined by M'p;,- that is that A(K') is not void. This corresponds to (D9-5-c) in
[5], p. 13 l - a condition that was lacking in defining the application relation in [4], p. l 81.
The counterpart to (D9-5-b) in [5] is (D6-6) which effectively requires that nested
sequences of application sets be associated with nested sequences of laws.
7 Theory-nets are analogous to applied cores for theories of mathematical physics in [~I], p.
181.
~ Core-nets are analogous to expanded cores for theories of mathematical physics m [4], p
179 and [5], p. 130.
'~ A(n) corresponds to N~ [4], p. 181 and A~(E) [5], p. 133.
2o Fhis appears to be an advantage over the earlier 'expanded core' formalism which
suggested that the basic theory element had a structurally unique position.
2~ Prof, K u h n has m e n t i o n e d this sort of little rew)lution in the Appendix of [2].
e2 I owe this example to Dr. U. Majer.
~ Strictly speaking, uniqueness is not required or even usually present. All one needs is that
some properties of the functions are uniquely determined e.g. the ratios of values for
different objects.
-'a This possibility is discussed in detail with examples in [4], Ch. IV and [5], p. 93.
~'~ 1 owe this method of expounding the 'criterion of theoreticity' to discussion with Dr. C.
U. Moulines though I am not sure he would regard it as satisfactory.
~'" ' W e a k reduction' and 'reduction' correspond respectively to "reduction' and 'strong
reduction' in p. 216ff. and [5], Ch. 8, Sec. 9. Stylistic grounds motivate the change in
t e r m i n o l o g y - nothing more profound. Stronger reduction relations might be defined by
requiring reductive correspondences between individual components in the theory mat-
rices.
27 (D16-3) corrects an error in [4]. The 'close reduction' relation (D52) (p. 224) is not such
that its non-theoretical image (R* defined on p. 224) must satisfy (D5 l-2) (p. 223) as is
mistakenly asserted on p. 224. (D 16-4) is stronger than the corresponding (D53-2) in [4],
146 JOSEPH D. S N E E D
but can be justified on the same intuitive grounds. The present formulation appears slighlly
more elegant. 1 am indebted to W. Balzer on both these points.
2s I am indebted to Dr. C. U. Moulines on this point.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Balzer, W. and Sneed, J. D., 1976, Generalized Net Structures in Empirical Science, (to
appear).
[2] Kuhn, T, S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed.) Chicago, 1970.
[-3] Moulines, C. U., 1975, 'A [x~gical Reconstruction of Simple Equilibrium Ther-
modynamics', Erkenntnis, Vol. 9, pp. 101-130.
[4] Sneed, J. D., The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics, Reidel, Dordrecht-
Holland, 1971.
/5] Stegmiiller, W., Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen
Philosophie, Band IL Theorie und Erfahrung: Zweiter Halbband, Theorien Strukturen
und Theoriendynamik. Springer, 1973.
[6] Suppes, P. C., 'A comparison of the Meaning and Use of Models in Mathematics and the
Empirical Sciences', in The Model in Mathematics (ed. by H. Freudenthal), Reidel,
Dordrecht-Holland, 1961.