Women's History Review

ISSN: 0961-2025 (Print) 1747-583X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rwhr20

Citizenship and social order: gender politics in

twentieth-century Norway and Sweden

Gro Hagemann

To cite this article: Gro Hagemann (2002) Citizenship and social order: gender politics in
twentieth-century Norway and Sweden, Women's History Review, 11:3, 417-429

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09612020200200329

Published online: 10 Sep 2007.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 1338

View related articles

Citing articles: 2 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rwhr20

Download by: [68.193.250.6] Date: 07 October 2017, At: 13:22

 Womens History Review, Volume 11, Number 3, 2002

Citizenship and Social Order:

gender politics in twentieth-century
Norway and Sweden

GRO HAGEMANN
University of Oslo, Norway

ABSTRACT This article is about the dilemmas embedded in the economic

status of married women which have caused some of the main controversies
within twentieth-century feminism. In spite of the undoubted success of equal
status politics, no final solution to the ambivalent economic position of
married women has been found. Even in advanced liberal democracies women
are not necessarily included fully in the basic civil right of economic liberty,
Downloaded by [68.193.250.6] at 13:22 07 October 2017

while their position outside the market economy is either not recognised or is
undervalued. These dilemmas are a feature of all industrialised democracies.
Nonetheless, the way in which they have been conceived and managed during
the twentieth century has differed a great deal between countries. This article
uses the case of Norway and Sweden to explore some of these differences.

I
In 1884, the following statement was addressed to the Norwegian
Parliament, Stortinget:
do we dare, in such a serious matter, to remind [you] of the multifarious
character of love; as a basis of enduring economic order it is not well
suited indeed. Nor is the proposal at hand sufficient, allowing the
married woman to establish separate property if she likes. Then the
claim easily would look like an offending exception, which the Woman
most often wants to avoid.[1]
Four authors, Bjrnson, Ibsen, Lie and Kielland had signed the statement.
The serious matter they were referring to was a new marriage act admitting
property and income rights for married women. Influenced by John Stuart
Mill, whose book on the subjection of women was translated into Danish by
Georg Brandes in 1869, the poets regarded wives as bondservants of their
husbands.[2] Their position was a radical one; they spoke in favour of

417
 Gro Hagemann
separate property and income rights as the normal order of marriage. Not
surprisingly, the majority rejected this when the Married Womens Property
Act was passed in 1888. Separate property could only be drawn up by a
separate marriage settlement. Nevertheless, the Act marks an important
milestone in the history of womens citizenship. Although the most radical
ideas were rejected, the fact is that married women now became economic
subjects. They were granted the disposal of their income and the right to
make contracts in economic matters. Five years later, in 1893, the right to
be separately taxed followed the separate property right. For the first time,
then, married women were included in the basic civil right of economic
liberty.
To be sure, the reform did not solve the problems of married womens
economic status. Their civil position was still not equal either to married
men or to unmarried women. Although the husbands right to dispose of the
income and property of the family had been reduced, the practical
consequences of the reform were limited. Most married women did not earn
their own money, and most of them did not have their own property either.
And since the husband was still regarded as the main provider of the family,
this inequality was constantly reproduced in the following decades, through
legislation, negotiated pay settlements, state policies relating to the
distribution of income and other practices of working life. Also, the
Downloaded by [68.193.250.6] at 13:22 07 October 2017

inequality between unmarried and married women remained, leaving

married women with few privileges in their own right as individuals. Their
weak economic position was most clearly demonstrated when a marriage
ended, whether through death or divorce.
The economic status of married women was to cause several
controversies during the next century, and it appears as one of the main
questions within twentieth-century feminism. Another, of equal importance,
is the question of sexuality and body politics, which in the interest of space
will be omitted in this article. Seemingly, the economic barrier has been
among the most difficult for women to surmount. The dilemmas embedded
in the issue will be the main focus of this article. These dilemmas are well
known within all industrialised democracies. The way they have been
conceived and managed, however, has differed a great deal. The case of
Norway and Sweden will clearly demonstrate this point. So similar in many
ways, chiefly through sharing a language, culture and political system, and
with more than 1500 kilometres of common border, the two countries have
still diverged in their management of central gender questions.
II
During the nineteenth century, civil rights in the economic field were
gradually extended to include women. In Norway, women were given access
to craft and commerce (1839-65), equal right of inheritance (1842), and

418
 GENDER POLITICS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY NORWAY AND SWEDEN

property rights (1865). Liberty to pursue a trade was also given to Swedish
women in the same period. In both countries, however, these rights were
distinctly limited to those who were unmarried. Up to this point there was
no serious opposition against the reforms, and no womens movement was
needed to bring them about. To offer a certain economic liberty to women
who were without a male provider could be seen as an act of self-interest for
men who were responsible for public expenditure, in particular on poor
relief, and who might even have unmarried daughters of their own to
provide for. As the Swedish historian, Gunnar Qvist, has pointed out, the
liberation of women so far was the work of men.[3]
Economic liberation was not really controversial until married women
were brought into the debate. To extend these rights to married women was
looked upon as an attack on the idea of marriage itself, and therefore a
threat to the basic order of society. In Norway, this emerged as a dilemma
during the democratic breakthrough of the late nineteenth century. When
the issue was raised in the 1870s, a radical shift was about to take place in
political and cultural circles. A national-democratic movement challenged the
policies of the prevailing political and cultural elite, including the union with
Sweden. This broad political opposition, including peasants as well as the
urban intelligentsia, was brought into power in the following decade, and a
parliamentary system was established. As a part of this heterogeneous
Downloaded by [68.193.250.6] at 13:22 07 October 2017

movement, a radical feminist movement was also established. The right to

vote and economic independence for married women were among their main
demands. Success was surprisingly fast. A Married Womens Property Act
was passed in 1888 and votes for women was adopted in two stages, in 1907
and 1913.
These reforms were both a little ahead of their time, in particular when
Norway is compared to its Scandinavian neighbour, and from this period
Norway and Sweden parted company in their gender policies. Both the
radical political climate and the weakness of the traditional elite made
feminist claims easier to achieve in Norway. In the conservative and far more
elitist Sweden, feminists were also organising and making the same
demands. Like their Norwegian sisters, they could refer to the injustice of
placing married women in the same category as children. This had been
spelt out by John Stuart Mill in 1869 and his arguments were also used by
Swedish feminists. The main difference between the two countries was not
the outlook of the feminist movements, but the strength of their political
allies. In Sweden, both peasants and the urban intelligentsia lacked interest
in democratic reforms in general, and womens emancipation was no
exception. The Norwegian feminists, on the contrary, were supported by an
alliance of radical liberals and democratic peasants, who also recognised the
problems of married womens economic status. The crux of the matter was
formulated by Sren Jaabk, who was leader of the political opposition of

419
 Gro Hagemann
peasants and the one who made the proposal for a new law in the first place.
Why should women lose their civil status when marrying? For conservatives
in both countries the reason was obvious. To include married women in civil
rights was not only a matter of rights, but of utility as well. For the same
reason, married womens economic position has remained a modern
dilemma. Few other questions more directly interfere with deep concerns
about community and social order. When even married women start to act
as individuals in a modern sense, who on earth will then care for the
community and the needs of others?
III
When dealing with the twentieth century, it seems reasonable to analyse the
problem of married women within the framework of Thomas Humphrey
Marshalls typology. His classic essay, Citizenship and Social Class, was first
presented as a lecture at the University of Cambridge in 1949. A historian by
training, a sociologist in his professional practice at the London School of
Economics and a labour politician during the founding years of the British
welfare state, Marshall has been influential both within academic and
political discourses.
According to Marshalls classification, there are three elements of
citizenship which have developed during the last three hundred years of
Downloaded by [68.193.250.6] at 13:22 07 October 2017

British history. Each of them has emerged, with some overlap, in different
centuries: civil rights in the eighteenth century, political rights in the
nineteenth century and social rights in the twentieth century. The civil
element contains the rights required for individual freedom, such as freedom
of speech, the right to own property and the right to justice. As Marshall
sees it, the basic civil right in the economic field is the right to work, which
he defines as the right to follow the occupation of ones choice in the place
of ones choice, subject only to legitimate demands for preliminary technical
training.[4] From a gendered perspective, it is obvious that this basic right
has been only partially enjoyed by women, even in the twentieth century.
The element of social citizenship has been the most controversial in
Marshalls theory. It is defined as a broad category that includes the right to
a modicum of economic welfare and security, and also all that is necessary
for citizens to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a
civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society.[5] When
his classic essay was published in 1950, during the escalation of the Cold
War, it offered a way of combining concepts of rights from the Western
liberal tradition with socialist politics. According to Marshall, equality could
not be created and preserved without invading the freedom of the
competitive market.[6] On the other hand, in recent years his theory has
been criticised for its one-sided focus on class to the neglect of other social
differences like ethnicity and gender.

420
 GENDER POLITICS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY NORWAY AND SWEDEN

Marshall himself was not unaware of a certain gender bias in his

theory. He refers to the status of women, or at least married women, as in
some respects peculiar, but does not develop his ideas on this any further.[7]
Since Marshall, this peculiarity has been broadly analysed by Carole
Pateman as a double face of liberal democracy. In The Sexual Contract, and
also in articles directly dealing with Marshalls theory, she points to the
marriage contract which both formally and informally has defined wives
status under a doctrine of coverage. In economic matters too, they are under
the cover of their husbands.[8]
From this perspective, the twentieth century could be regarded as a
time when there was a gradual fulfilment of womens political, social and
civil citizenship. Contrary to the (male) norm drawn up by Marshall, though,
the element of civil citizenship seems to have been the hardest one to fulfil.
More than political and social rights, it seems to interfere with basic
concerns of utility. Nevertheless, the economic rights of married women
have also been gradually extended. In Norway, the process was completed in
1978, when the Equal Status Act granted access for women to all fields of
employment. The Act marks the realisation of the most basic civil right in
the economic field for women: namely, to repeat Marshalls formulation, the
right to follow the occupation of ones choice in the place of ones choice,
subject only to legitimate demands for preliminary technical training.
Downloaded by [68.193.250.6] at 13:22 07 October 2017

There are other versions of this story, however. Achievement of civil

citizenship for women has been highly controversial, both among feminists
and within a broader political context. There are still those who would tell
the story of twentieth-century feminism not as the fulfilment of equal rights
for married women, but, rather, as the tragic disruption of traditional
community and family values to the advantage of selfishness and
individualism. In any case, the different versions fully demonstrate that a
dramatic shift has taken place during the century, both in the status of
married women and in the basic assumptions of justice and fair politics in
relation to their position.
IV
The Equal Status Act of 1978 has been the key pillar of Norwegian equal
status policy in the last decades of the twentieth century. It is a strong law
against discrimination of any kind. By allowing positive discrimination in
favour of women, it has also advanced the ending of male hegemony in
political life and thereby has contributed to the implementation of political
citizenship for women. This was clearly demonstrated in 1985 when Gro
Harlem Brundtland caused a sensation worldwide by appointing 44% of
women among her ministers. For a short and glorious period Norway was
the world leader in equal status. This was indeed also a victory for the
Norwegian Labour Party, standing in the forefront of the new feminist

421
 Gro Hagemann
movement, implementing equal status for women and giving political power
to a young generation of educated women.
These developments were not an obvious outcome, however, given the
history of the Norwegian Labour Party. Until the 1960s, the Party had taken
a rather conservative standpoint towards feminism and gender questions,
and feminist opposition within the party was not very clear. Unlike Sweden,
there was no long and broad process among party women preceding the
political breakthrough. Christina Florin & Bengt Nilsson have shown the
extensive agency of Swedish women within party and administration during
the 1940s and 1950s.[9] Such a long-standing building of positions seems to
be missing in Norway, and so does a broad alliance of feminist women
across political divisions. Liberal and social democratic women in Sweden
had been cooperating for a long time to influence gender policy.[10] In
Norway, on the other hand, the main feminist opposition came from liberals
outside the Labour Party. According to party documents, hardly any feminist
opposition was expressed within the Party at all.
As a matter of fact, the Norwegian Labour Party did not accept the
principle of equal civil status for women, except in a formal sense, until the
mid-1960s, when there was a feminist turn in the space of a couple of years.
Up to this moment, the Party maintained a low profile on questions dealing
with civil rights; the principle of gender equality had given way to a family
Downloaded by [68.193.250.6] at 13:22 07 October 2017

policy based on complementary gender roles. When forced to choose

between opposite and irreconcilable considerations, the Partys inclination
went in the direction of economic welfare and security for families instead of
individual rights for women. In the party rhetoric, equal status, likestilling,
had mostly been associated with bourgeois politics and ranked second to
questions categorised as social issues. Typical is the following formulation
from the debate on the prohibition of night work for women in 1936, a
proposition which from 1901 onwards was strongly opposed by feminists
and liberals:
Concerning this cry for equal status, I would like to add, on behalf of
my party and myself, that we are more than willing to admit equality for
women in matters like smoking cigarettes, playing football and serving
as priests. The question of night-work is still of another character; it has
a social aspect as well. In this struggle we are not allowed to forget that
women manage one hundred per cent of the human material which is
decisive for the future of our country.[11]
Rhetoric and policy similar to this may be found in all Western welfare
states, and definitely also in the other Nordic countries. Nevertheless, in
some respects, the Norwegian pattern seems peculiar in the Nordic context.
Compared to Scandinavia in general, and specially Sweden, the Norwegian
Labour Party appears to have been far more family-oriented in its policy.

422
 GENDER POLITICS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY NORWAY AND SWEDEN

Also, the polarisation between social democrats and liberals looks to have
been more distinct in Norway than in Sweden.
These differences are clearly demonstrated by the controversial
question of married women working for wages in the 1920s and 1930s.
Demands for a marriage bar for female workers can be seen in most
European countries during the Great Depression; Norway and Sweden were
no exception. The outcome, however, was quite different in the two
countries. Although there were no legal restrictions, the marriage bar was
encouraged by the labour movement in Norway and carried into effect in all
municipalities where labour had the majority. From 1928, married women
were actually fired from positions in schools, health care and local
administration. In Sweden, similar ideas were advanced and supported by
groups within the labour movement, especially by young civil servants, but
they were never carried into effect. Such propositions were beaten off by a
strong alliance of women from several parties, who were also supported by
leaders of the Social Democratic Party. From the late 1920s onwards, a
broad womens movement, including left-wing socialists, social democrats
and liberal feminists, played an important role in this fight. The membership
of womens organisations tripled during the 1930s, and from 1933, large
joint meetings were held around the country to protest against the proposed
restrictions on working women. Social democrats and liberal women were in
Downloaded by [68.193.250.6] at 13:22 07 October 2017

the forefront of these actions. The movement was broader, however. Even
housewives organised in the Housewives Association were active in support
of married womens right to work.
The marriage bar was also opposed even within the Norwegian Labour
Party and finally given up. In fact, the question divided the womens branch
of the party (Kvinnesekretariatet) and stimulated a more outspoken feminist
opposition among unionised women. The main opposition, however, came
from liberals, not from social democrats. The strong link between socialist
and liberal women found in Sweden was non-existent in Norway. Indeed, it
was rejected explicitly by the leaders of the Labour Party. Moreover, the
arguments used differed in the two countries. In Sweden, citizenship and
democratic rights were mentioned as the main reason for the social
democratic leaders to refuse a marriage bar, while arguments of this kind
were totally absent among social democrats in Norway.
In her dissertation on the Swedish debates, Renne Frangeur
concluded that the idea of a two-provider family was settled in Swedish
legislation by the end of the 1930s.[12] She also established that the Social
Democratic government took a progressive stand in favour of women by not
trying to reinforce the existing male breadwinner model. In 1935, the so-
called Womens Work Committee was appointed, with Kerstin Hesselgren as
leader and Alva Myrdal as secretary.[13] The Act coming out of the inquiry
was but one of several progressive laws adopted by the end of the 1930s.

423
 Gro Hagemann
Frangeur also argues that the democratic breakthrough of the early
1920s made conditions favourable for equal rights feminism in this period,
including within the ranks of the Social Democratic Party. For four years,
from 1921 to 1925, Swedish women attained a dramatic improvement in
their civil and political rights. In 1921, they gained the vote and property
rights for married women and in 1925 access to higher positions in the civil
service. Compared to Norway, this was in no way exceptional; here the
corresponding reforms had all been attained before 1914. Nevertheless, this
seems to have enforced a far friendlier attitude to equal status politics in
Sweden than in Norway.
This may seem a paradox, but it is my assertion that this time lag
between Norway and Sweden has had a considerable effect on the content
and meaning of gender equality in the two countries. The civil and political
rights of Norwegian women were distinctly rooted in the liberal mood of the
late nineteenth century, when the broad national democratic movement and
the Liberal Party (Venstre) celebrated their greatest victories. An early
breakthrough of political liberalism in Norway contributed to the early
victories of Norwegian feminists, but also, I suggest, made liberal feminism
less acceptable to the political elite of the twentieth century, the social
democrats. During the period of feminist reforms in Norway, the social
democrats were still few in number and their representation in Parliament
Downloaded by [68.193.250.6] at 13:22 07 October 2017

was weak. They therefore played a minor role in the process of extending
democratic rights to women.
This also made a difference to the post-war period, 1945-65, before the
definite feminist turn. There are many similarities between Norway and
Sweden in this period; they were both ruled by strong social democratic
parties who gave priority to housewives in their politics and ideology. What
distinguished the situation in the two countries, however, was equally
important. In Sweden, there was a greater acceptance of equal status
politics, which was enforced by outspoken feminists. Christina Florin &
Bengt Nilsson have, in their joint work, revealed the impressive feminist
activity in the 1940s and 1950s within the Social Democratic Party of
Sweden and from individual women within public administration.[14] In
Norway, the equal status policy was enforced mainly by liberal feminists
outside the Labour Party, while the female branch of the partys
organisation seems to have been almost silent on gender questions in
particular, the intersection between family policy and gender equality.
V
From representative bodies of the Norwegian Labour Party, then, hardly any
feminist views were expressed in the 1950s and early 1960s. There were
outspoken feminists within the Party in this period, but they seem to have
been marginal and disorganised. There were only a few academic women in

424
 GENDER POLITICS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY NORWAY AND SWEDEN

the Party, and the opposition which had formerly been put forward by
unionised women was no longer heard. Feminists were not represented in
leading agencies of the Party, and there were no publications or meeting
places where feminist standpoints could be formulated and mediated. Also,
the womens branch was very family-oriented in its attitudes, and the only
acceptable way to deal with gender issues seemed to be within a framework
of social policy. On the other hand, there were several outspoken feminists
outside the labour movement, and they mostly belonged to the Liberal
Party. So, while controversies over family politics and gender equality took
place in Sweden among the social democrats themselves, in Norway it was
mainly a conflict between parties.
The Norwegian Labour Party gave priority to housewives, aiming to
improve their welfare and their social status. In Marshalls terms, this can be
seen as an ambition to include married women as social citizens, to
compensate for what he called the peculiar status of married women. By
offering housewives rights and recognition equivalent to the wage-earning
worker, the Labour Party assumed that married women could attain civil
rights even within the framework of a male breadwinner model.
The social democratic policy towards housewives was, indeed, a matter
of both rights and recognition. In 1953, Labour presented an ambitious
programme for housewives, including holiday relief, rationalisation of
Downloaded by [68.193.250.6] at 13:22 07 October 2017

housework and stand-ins for housewives in case of illness. The practical

results of this policy should not be underestimated. Considerable
improvements were seen during the post-war period, both in the social
status and the working conditions of housewives. On the level of economic
rights, however, the effects were negligible. In the 1970s, Tove Stang Dahl,
founder of womens law as an academic field in Norway, raised the question
of married womens civil status. She compared the status of housewives with
that of nineteenth-century cotters: they were dependent on a master, had a
lifelong contract, and were obliged to work with a minimum of
compensation.[15]
However, the policy on housewives was also a policy of recognition,
and in this respect it was more successful. In their rhetoric, the social
democrats upgraded the importance of housework for the welfare of the
country. Unpaid housework was even given an economic status, and
housewives were named workers. Their activity as consumers was
established as equivalent to the male-dominated productive sector and for a
short period women doing housework were counted among productive
members of society. Women from the National Association of Housewives
and the Labour Party made serious attempts to estimate the worth of
housework and to include it in statistics of national economic activity. When
this was done, it demonstrated that their contribution was fundamental to
the welfare and wealth of society.[16]

425
 Gro Hagemann
The housewife policy of the 1940s and 1950s is not solely a Norwegian
invention. The same politics and the same rhetoric were also enforced by
social democrats in Sweden. This golden age of the housewife, as Berge
Furre has called it, is partly based on demographic trends.[17] A record
number of young families were establishing themselves in the post-war
period. The number of married women was higher than ever, and so was the
number of women giving birth. In demographic terms, marriage rates and
fertility rates both rose considerably, while the age of marriage was falling.
Sweden had a similar pattern, but less prominence was given to family
policy. In contrast to the Norwegian Labour Party, gender politics in Sweden
were in two parts: housewife politics and labour market politics. Since
Sweden did not participate in the War, its economy was prosperous and the
demand for labour was urgent from the 1940s. Large efforts were made to
recruit women into industry and services. In this, employers and social
democrats were for the most part in agreement with equal status feminists
in attempting to overcome traditional attitudes and to recruit women into
new sectors.[18] Norway lagged far behind in this modernisation, although
the shortage of labour was increasing here as well. Within an expanding
public sector both schoolteachers and nurses were in short supply. From an
economic point of view, then, there were growing reasons for Norway to also
adopt a Swedish model of a two-part gender politics.
Downloaded by [68.193.250.6] at 13:22 07 October 2017

The dilemma embedded in this was clearly demonstrated during the

long-standing debates on joint taxation. The question goes back to the
Married Womens Property Act of 1888, and the individual taxation
established in 1893. The arrangement was from the very beginning looked
upon as unjust from a social point of view. Social considerations were also
the reason why joint taxation was reintroduced as the only possibility in
1921. The question released a long debate in the post-war period and
became a troublesome issue for the Labour Party. According to their
principles, taxation first of all was a question of distribution and social
justice. By earning two incomes, some families would achieve living
conditions which were better than the normal male breadwinner family. An
inquiry was started in 1948 and after eleven years of investigations and
delays the issue was debated in Parliament in 1959. Here Labour was
confronted by an equal status position from the Liberal Party, represented
by Eva Kolstad, who was also chair of the Feminist Association (Norsk
Kvinnesaksforening). She argued on the basis of civil rights and full
citizenship for married women. The outcome of the discussion was
paradoxical indeed. Labour was now willing to accept separate taxation as
an alternative solution. On the other hand, restrictions were still placed on
this principle and the Partys standpoint was distinctly in favour of the
family. Individual justice for married women was still looked upon as less

426
 GENDER POLITICS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY NORWAY AND SWEDEN

important than social justice and any claim for individual rights was
characterised as selfish.
From this background, the feminist turn of the Labour Party in the
early 1960s seems to have occurred very suddenly. After having stressed
family concerns, a new direction was introduced at the national meeting of
the Party in 1963. The powerful party secretary, Haakon Lie, made his usual
speech on the coming election, and he now for the very first time gave
womens rights broad attention: if we do not reach the women as a group,
we will lose them and fail to strengthen our party.[19] This marks the first
step to an equal status policy, which was included into the working
programme of the Party in 1965.
Labours feminist turn, as it occurred during the following decade,
1965-75, far surpassed the expectations of the party leaders. There is still
much research to be done to understand what happened during this period.
What can easily be observed, though, is the increasing radicalism of Labour
Party women. The Party had indeed created its own opponents by working
against feminism for so long, and at the same time giving education to a
large number of young women growing up in the 1950s and 1960s. A new
generation was now joining the Party, and at the same time a new feminist
movement appeared outside political parties and the established
associations. The young generation of feminists took a critical stand towards
Downloaded by [68.193.250.6] at 13:22 07 October 2017

gender politics as so far practised by both liberals and social democrats.

While the breakthrough of gender equality in Sweden has with some
justice been called feminism without feminists, this was not at all the case
in Norway.
VI
So far, no industrialised democracy has been able to escape the dilemmas
attached to the status of married women. At the beginning of a new century,
it is still a real dilemma, with no easy solutions at hand. Seemingly, the
predominant political discourse has not been able to contain both social and
civil citizenship for women at the same time. In their collective actions
women have found themselves between two main strategies to deal with the
problem. One way has been a policy of including married women in social
citizenship within a framework of a complementary gender concept. Another
strategy has been a consequent claim for civil citizenship and equal status
for married women. Often, this has been a rather polarised debate; by taking
one position, the other has automatically been seen as antagonistic. In
Norway, the positions have at times been taken to extremes in the tension
between social democrats and liberal feminists. Equal status feminists have
argued in favour of equal status without taking into consideration the social
consequences of their standpoint. The housewife politics of recognition and
rights enforced by Labour in the 1940s and 1950s did not find supporters

427
 Gro Hagemann
among equal status feminists. They even worked against pensions for
widows in a situation where the majority of married women were actually
housewives. On the other hand, the social democrats hesitated for a long
time before they recognised the claim of full civil citizenship for women as
legitimate.
In spite of the undoubted success of equal status politics, however,
there has been no satisfactory solution to the dilemmas at the heart of this
whole issue. In the history of the womens movement in the twentieth
century there has been a double vision: both equal status and protest
against the primacy of the market. At the start of a new century, this double
vision of rights and recognition is still relevant. On a global level, the
household-centred informal economy plays an important role and is the
object of an increasing interest. Not only is this activity undervalued from an
economic point of view, women (and men) within this sector are also
undervalued as citizens. In dealing with civil, political and social citizenship,
the old discussion of rights and recognition is therefore still highly relevant.
It could even be regarded as a main challenge in the age of global markets
we are now entering.

Notes
Downloaded by [68.193.250.6] at 13:22 07 October 2017

[1] Letter from the poets Bjrnson, Ibsen, Lie and Kielland on the subject of
separate property for married women, 1884, quoted from Eva Kolstads
speech in Parliament 1959: Stortingets forhandlinger: Tidende O, p. 486
(Oslo).
[2] John Stuart Mill (1970 reprint edition) The Subjection of Women, in John
Stuart Mill & Harriet Taylor Mill Essays on Sex Equality (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press).
[3] Gunnar Qvist (1960) Kvinnofrgan i Sverige 1809-1846: studier rrande
kvinnans nringsfrihet inom de borgerliga yrkena (Gteborg: Gumperts).
[4] Thomas Humphrey Marshall (1992 reprint edition) Citizenship and Social
Class, p. 10 (London: Pluto Press; first published 1950).
[5] Ibid., p. 8.
[6] Ibid., p. 7.
[7] Ibid., p. 12.
[8] Carole Pateman (1996) Democratisation and Citizenship in the 1990s: the
legacy of T.H. Marshall, Vilhelm Aubert Memorial Lecture 1996 (Oslo:
Institute for Social Research); Pateman (1988) The Sexual Contract
(Cambridge: Polity Press).
[9] Christina Florin & Bengt Nilsson (2000) Ngot som liknar en oblodig
revolution: jmstlldhetens politisering under 1960- och 70-talen (Ume:
Jmstlldhetskommittn, Universitetet).

428
 GENDER POLITICS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY NORWAY AND SWEDEN

[10] Rene Frangeur (1998) Yrkeskvinna eller makens tjnerinna? Striden om

yrkesrtten fr gifta kvinnor i mellankrigstidens Sverige (Eslv: Arkiv).
[11] Magnus Johansen in the Norwegian Parliament (1936) Stortingets
forhandlinger: Tidende O, p. 254 (Oslo).
[12] Frangeur, Yrkeskvinna eller makens tjnerinna?
[13] SOU: 1938:47 Betnkande angende gift kvinnas frvrvsarbete m. m.
(Public report: Stockholm).
[14] Florin & Nilsson, Ngot som liknar en oblodig revolution.
[15] Tove Stang Dahl (1982) Kvinners rett til penger et husmorrettslig
perspektiv, in Runa Haukaa (Ed.) Kvinneforskning: bidrag til en
samfunnsteori (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget).
[16] Linda Sangolt (1999) To Count or Not to Count: increasing the visibility of
household labour in national accounts, Nora: Nordic Journal of Womens
Studies, 7, pp. 66-67.
[17] Berge Furre (1992) Norsk historie 1905-1990: vrt hundrer (Oslo: Det
norske samlaget).
[18] Yvonne Hirdman (1998) Med kluven tunga: Lo och genusordningen
(Uddevalla: Atlas).
[19] Elisabeth Lnn (1996) Stolthet og kvinnekamp: Norsk
kvinnesaksforsnings historie fra 1913, p. 204 (Oslo: Gyldendal).
Downloaded by [68.193.250.6] at 13:22 07 October 2017

GRO HAGEMANN is professor of modern history at the University of Oslo,

Box 1008, Blindern, N0315 Oslo, Norway (gro.hagemann@hi.uio.no). She
has written several books on Norwegian gender and labour history. Co-
author of a book on gendered perspectives on Norwegian national history,
Med kjnnspektiv p norsk historie fra vikingtiden til 2000-rsskiftet (1999),
she is now working on a project on modern housework in a context of
citizenship.

429
 Downloaded by [68.193.250.6] at 13:22 07 October 2017

430
Gro Hagemann