Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Grild Heggelund
* The author would like to thank all the interviewees in China for their time
and helpful comments, as well as the two anonymous reviewers for their
useful comments. Thanks to Steinar Andresen for useful comments, and
to Susan Hivik and Maryanne Rygg for assistance with language editing
and formatting. The Research Council of Norway provided funding for
the work.
156 Grild Heggelund
Introduction
Economic Development
Energy
Source: World Resources Institute, CAIT; Guri Bang, Grild Heggelund and Jonas
Vevatne, Shifting Strategies in the Global Climate Negotiations, Report 6/2005
(Lysaker: Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2005).
13. Population control is one such measure; see William Chandler, Roberto
Schaeffer, and Zhou Dadi, Climate Change Mitigation in Developing Coun-
tries: Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey (Pew Center on
Global Climate Change, October 2002).
14. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2006 (Paris: IEA/
OECD, 2006). Nan Li, Zhuanjia: Zhongguo qihou keneng jixu biannu-
an; 2050 nian jiang shangsheng 2.2C (Experts: Chinas Climate Will
Most Likely Continue to Warm Up; in 2050 Temperatures Will Rise 2.2
Degrees Celsius), China Climate Change Info-Net (2004), online at www.
ccchina.gov.cn/source/aa/aa2004062402.htm; International Energy
Agency, World Energy Outlook 2000 (Paris: IEA/OECD, 2000).
15. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2004 (Paris: IEA/
OECD, 2004).
16. Development Research Center, Zhongguo nengyuan fazhan zhanlue yu
zhengce yanjiu (National Energy Strategy and Policy Report 2020) (Beijing:
Chinas Economic Science Press, 2004); Jonathan E. Sinton, Rachel E.
Stern, Nathaniel T. Aden, and Mark D. Levine, eds., Evaluation of Chinas
Energy Strategy Options (Berkeley, Calif.: Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratories, 2005); T. Sugiyama and S. Oshita, eds., Virtuous Asia: Policy
Development Cooperation on Energy Efficiency for the Better World (Winnipeg,
Canada: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2006).
17. According to Sinton et al., Evaluation of Chinas Energy Strategy Options,
energy consumption is growing faster than GDP, presenting challenges
162 Grild Heggelund
to sustainable development.
18. Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2005 (China Statistical Yearbook 2005) (Beijing:
China Statistics Press, 2005).
19. China to Cut Energy Consumption by 4 percent in 2006, Peoples Daily
Online, online at http://english.people.com.cn/200603/05/eng20060305_
248040.html.
20. Sinton et al., Evaluation of Chinas Energy Strategy Options.
21. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2004. China and
India will account for 48 percent of total world coal demand, up 40 per-
cent from 2003. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook
2005: Middle East and North Africa Insights (Paris: IEA/OECD, 2005).
22. China was self-sufficient in oil until 1993, when it became a net oil
importer. The country now imports over 40 percent of its oil consump-
tion. Oil consumption increased by 16 percent in 2004, and accounted
for 30 percent of the global demand increase. Transport and the grow-
ing number of vehicles are the main reasons for this increase. Interna-
tional Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2005.
Chinas Climate Change Policy 163
da. The high energy consumption and the ensuing problems have
resulted in policy measures being introduced. The China Medium
and Long-term Energy Development Programme (2004-2020) and a
key policy document for energy conservation, the China Medium
and Long Term Energy Conservation Plan23 approved by the State
Council in June 2004, highlight government support for energy
conservation. The latter document lists ten implementation mea-
sures to improve the energy situation in the country, including
energy conservation in planning of projects and the setting of
energy targets. However, without financial resources to imple-
ment the plan, critics do not see how it can be effective.24
A further sign of attention to energy issues is the govern-
ment work report presented by Wen Jiabao at the National Peo-
ples Congress (NPC) in March 2006. Here, energy efficiency was
emphasized as a key measure of economic growth, and a 4 per-
cent reduction in energy intensity for 2006 was proposed.25 From
2006, the energy consumption per unit of output for all regions
and major industries will be made public on an annual basis.
Moreover, the recently-issued 11th Five-Year Social and Econom-
ic Development Programme26 lists improvement of energy effi-
ciency as a major objective; the goal is to reduce the ratio of total
energy use to GDP by 20 percent in 2010 compared to 2005. Ener-
gy efficiency is also increasingly viewed as a key element of the
countrys energy security.27 In addition, a high-level task force
has been set up to draft a law on energy, with representatives
from several ministries. Furthermore, a Renewable Energy Law
endorsed by the various ministries was approved in February
2005 and went into effect in January 2006.28 Under the law, the
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook 2005; National Development and Reform Com-
mission, China Medium and Long Term Energy Conservation Plan.
Vulnerability
31. A recent publication on the climate change impact in China is Qin Dahe,
Chen Yiyu, and Li Xueyong, eds., Climate and Environment Changes in
China (Beijing: China Science Press, 2005).
32. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo qihou bianhua chushi guojia xinxi tongbao
(PRC Initial National Communication on Climate Change) (Beijing:
China Planning Publishing House, October 2004).
166 Grild Heggelund
33. Josephine Ma, 400m Lives Disrupted by Disasters Each Year, South
China Morning Post (Hong Kong), July 5, 2006, online at http://china.
scmp.com/chimain/ZZZYTL9P7PE.html.
34. Jiahua Pan, China and Climate Change: The Role of the Energy Sector,
Science and Development Network (2005), online at www.scidev.net/
dossiers/index.cfm?fuseaction=policybrief&dossier=4&policy=64.
Chinas Climate Change Policy 167
35. World Bank, 1997, in Paul G. Harris, ed., Global Warming and East Asia:
The Domestic and International Politics of Climate Change (London: Rout-
ledge, 2003).
36. See Ida Bjrkum, China in the International Politics of Climate Change:
A Foreign Policy Analysis, FNI Report 12/2005, Fridtjof Nansen Insti-
tute, 2005.
37. PRC Initial National Communication on Climate Change.
168 Grild Heggelund
38. Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen, The Domestic Context of Chinese
Foreign Policy: Does Public Opinion Matter? in David M. Lampton,
ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform,
1978-2000 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001).
39. PRC Initial National Communication on Climate Change, 2004, p. 11.
Chinas Climate Change Policy 169
44. Authors interview February 2006; see also Pan, China and Climate
Change: The Role of the Energy Sector.
45. Bonnie S. Glaser and Philip Saunders, Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy
Research Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence, China
Quarterly, No. 171 (2002), pp. 597-616.
46. David Shambaugh, Chinas International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving
Structure and Process, China Quarterly, No. 171 (2002), pp. 575-96; Glaser
and Saunders, Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes.
47. Glaser and Saunders (ibid.), in their study of foreign-policy research
institutions, list four types of influence to reach policy makers that are
Chinas Climate Change Policy 171
CCCLSG is the MFA, which ensures that Chinas political and eco-
nomic interests are served in international negotiations. The MFA
plays an important role in the international political process on cli-
mate change, although it has been less involved in the scientific
and technical aspects. In the negotiations, it has argued that the
industrialized countries are responsible for global climate change,
and has continually stressed the need for technology transfer and
for establishing a favorable international funding mechanism. In
general, the MFA has been more in line with the position of the
NDRC in climate policy making to ensure the development needs
of China. With the MFA representing the Chinese government as
head negotiator, climate change is seen as being a foreign-policy
issue and is therefore influenced by other issue areas under the
purview of that ministry (see the section on international negotia-
tions). Moreover, the MFA sees China as speaking for the develop-
ing world, especially the G-77 countries.53
The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) is another
key ministry in the CCCLSG due to its relation to scientific research
and technology transfer. MOST established a research program
on climate change in the 1990s (funded by the then SDPC) and
MOST officials have traditionally been sympathetic to environ-
mental concerns. MOST has been represented in the delegation at
COPs, and one of its officials is a representative on the CDM
Executive Board. MOST is the ministry with the broadest techni-
cal expertise about CDM in Chinas bureaucracy, and has played
a central role in laying the ground for the development of CDM
projects in China.
The State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA)
has participated in climate change work since the 1980s.54 SEPA
has been regarded as a weak administration; but it was strength-
ened as a result of the restructuring process in 1998, when it was
elevated from agency to administration, and received a large
increase in its responsibilities.55 SEPA is still not a full ministry,
nor a full member of the State Council, but the SEPA administrator
has nevertheless been given ministerial status. And the adminis-
tration has become more vocal in the past few years. In particular,
SEPAs vice minister Pan Yue is outspoken on environmental issues.
SEPA is a member of the CDM Approval Board, established a
CDM team in 2004, and has been very active in CDM project devel-
opment such as landfill gas capture/recovery and HFC23 projects.
In sum, several ministries and administrations are engaged in
formulating Chinas negotiation positions, with varying degrees
of influence. The NDRC heads the delegation to climate negotia-
tions (on the vice-minister level) while the lead negotiator is often
from the MFAs Department of Treaty and Law. The NDRC sets
the agenda on domestic issues and MOST provides technical
advice. The NDRC has responsibility for both economic policy
and energy policy, since a precondition for economic develop-
ment is to have sufficient energy resources. In negotiations the
NDRC, together with the MFA, has the responsibility to ensure
that China does not take on commitments that can impede eco-
nomic development or impact on energy security, as would be
the case, in their view, with emission-reduction commitments.
Climate change being defined as a foreign-policy issue, the MFA
exercises great influence on what positions China should take in
climate negotiations. International climate policy in general is
regarded as a highly sensitive topic, as it is seen as closely linked
to the countrys economic development. The positioning is there-
fore usually left to Chinese negotiators with lengthy experience in
handling such delicate foreign-policy questions.
Actors representing core energy interests as well as economic
development interests have dominated the climate decision-mak-
ing process in the past decade, in particular the NDRC. Actors rep-
resenting economic interests may be less positive toward policies
that give priority to climate mitigation measures that may result in
negative effects on economic growth. MFA and NDRC have com-
mon interests to fend off taking on commitments, although the
63. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, The Spokesperson of the MFA
Comments on U.S. Withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol (in Chinese),
online at www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/9966.html.
64. Authors interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, October
2002.
65. Bang et al., Shifting Strategies in the Global Climate Negotiations; Thomas
R. Jacob, Reflections on Delhi, Climate Policy, vol. 3, No. 1 (2003), pp.
103-106.
66. Steinar Andresen, Can Leadership Move the Climate Negotiations
Forward? in G. Sjsted, ed., The Kyoto Protocol: Overcoming Stumbling
Blocks (IIASA, forthcoming).
67. Interview, MFA official, Beijing, 2004. See more on G-77/China in Kasa
178 Grild Heggelund
China has become more willing to enter into dialogue at the cli-
mate negotiations in the past few years, its stance of no commit-
ments has not changed. Moreover, at the latest COP/MOP in
Nairobi 2006, China seemed to be preoccupied with legal aspects
and wording details, which was seen by negotiators as a step
back.75 China thus seems unlikely to bow to the growing interna-
tional pressure and take on new commitments in the near future.
CDM Measures
86. The official list of approved CDM projects lists the following project
types in the energy sector: improvement of energy efficiency, energy
saving, energy saving and efficiency improvement. Table 1 above places
these projects in one category.
87. See Lin Wei, Grild Heggelund, Kristian Tangen and Li Jun Feng, Efficient
Implementation of the Clean Development Mechanism in China? FNI Report
1/2004 (Lysaker: Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2004).
184 Grild Heggelund
Conclusion
97. PRC Initial National Communication on Climate Change, 2004; Qin Dahe,
Chen Yiyu, and Li Xueyong, eds., Zhongguo qihou yu huanjing yanbian
(Climate and Environment Changes in China), vols. I and II (Beijing:
China Science Press, 2005).
Chinas Climate Change Policy 189
Principal References