Batch 3

CAPILI V PEOPLE
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of
the Decision1 dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows: cralavvo nline lawlib rary
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City in an Information which reads: cralavvon line lawlib rary
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been
legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage
with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law.3
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for
declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili;
(2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of
bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as
a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing of the
Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of
the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage
contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of
the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage between him and
private respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.
In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioners Manifestation and Motion to
Dismiss, to wit:cralavvon line lawlib rary
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision dated December 1,
2004 had already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-
6043 (entitled: Karla Medina-Capili versus James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo, a case for declaration
of nullity of marriage) nullifying the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo
and said decision is already final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among others, that the issues
raised in the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned case and that
the resolution of the issues in said civil case would not determine whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, this Court is of the humble
opinion that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it appears that the second marriage
between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 72 of Antipolo City which has declared the voidness, non-existent or incipient invalidity of the said
second marriage. As such, this Court submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.

Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTCs decision.
The falloreads: cralavvon line lawlib rary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 152 in Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6 nadcralavvonli nelawli bra ry
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was denied in a
Resolution7 dated July 24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that: cralavvon line lawlib rary
1. THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD EXISTING

JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO REVERSE
THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG
CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO
DISMISS THE CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF
THE SAID ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION
WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE
TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER
P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043,
IS ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY
SUCH FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII,
SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE
BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE
LAWS AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
3. THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO

EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS
APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE
IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR ABANDONING EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE
INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE
OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE BY RESPONDENT
SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME CAPILI IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043
DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND
SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE
SAID DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES
IN THE CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY
AND THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE.8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a
ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows: c ralavvonl inelawl ibra ry
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the
Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on
December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-
Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous
nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial
declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner
for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy,
even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage
was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accuseds conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy
is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one having been
judicially declared null and void, viz.: c ralavvonl inelawl ibra ry
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners
assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question
in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had
no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage
be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his
first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before
the first marriage was annulled.11nad cralavvo nli nelawlib rary
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that what makes
a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted
to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and
only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.12
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the
offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.13 It is clear
then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage
with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners second marriage
does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
n September 1999, James Capili married Karla Medina. But then, just three months later in
December 1999, he married another woman named Shirley Tismo.
In 2004, Karla Medina filed an action for declaration of nullity of the second marriage between Capili
and Tismo. In June 2004, Tismo filed a bigamy case against Capili.
Before a decision can be had in the bigamy case, the action filed by Karla Medina was granted and
Capilis marriage with Tismo was declared void by reason of the subsisting marriage between
Medina and Capili. Thereafter, Capili filed a motion to dismiss in the bigamy case. He alleged that
since the second marriage was already declared void ab initio that marriage never took place and
that therefore, there is no bigamy to speak of.
The trial court agreed with Capili and it dismissed the bigamy case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a declaration of nullity of the second marriage avoids a prosecution for
bigamy.
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
When Capili married Tismo, all the above elements are present. The crime of bigamy was already
consummated. It is already immaterial if the second (or first marriage, see Mercado vs Tan) was
subsequently declared void. The outcome of the civil case filed by Karla Medina had no bearing to
the determination of Capilis guilt or innocence in the bigamy case because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage
is contracted. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The Supreme Court also notes that even if a party has reason to believe that his first marriage is void,
he cannot simply contract a second marriage without having such first marriage be judicially
declared as void. The parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration
the presumption is that the marriage exists.
BUSUEGO V OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Private respondent Rosa S. Busuego (Rosa) filed a complaint for: (1) Concubinage under Article 334 of the
Revised Penal Code; (2) violation of Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children); and
(3) Grave Threats under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, before the Office of the Ombudsman against her
husband, Alfredo. Alfredo is the Chief of Hospital, Davao Regional Hospital. They have 2 children. However, their
marriage turned sour. She saw photographs of, and love letters addressed to Alfredo from, other women. She
confronted her husband but he claimed ignorance of the existence of such letters.
An opportunity to work as nurse in N.Y. USA. Alfredo opposed. Nonetheless, Rosa completed the
requirements. However, before leaving, furious with Rosas pressing, Alfredo took his gun and pointed it at Rosas
temple. Alfredo was only staved off because Rosas mother arrived at the couples house.
Rosa went to the US and was eventually joined by her 2 children, Alfred and Robert. Robert eventually
returned to Davao City to study medicine. Sometime in 1997, Rosa learned that a certain Emy Sia (Sia) was living at
their conjugal home. When Rosa asked Alfredo, he said that Sia, nurse at the Regional Hospital, was just in a sorry
plight and was allegedly raped by Rosas brother-in-law so he allowed her to sleep at the maids quarters.
In October 2005, Rosa finally learned of Alfredos extra-marital relationships. Robert and the housekeepers
executed a joint affidavit to support Rosas allegations. Rosa and the other son Alfred flew to Davao without informing
Alfredo. She gathererd and consolidated information of her husbands sexual affairs. She also averred that during the
course of the marriage, Alfredo physically and verbally abused her and her family. Alfredo denied all accusations. In
their subsequent exchange of responsive pleadings, Rosa maintained Alfredos culpability, and naturally, Alfredo
claimed innocence.
In the course thereof, the procedural issue of Rosas failure to implead Sia and de Leon as respondents
cropped up. Alfredo insisted that Rosas complaint ought to be dismissed for failure to implead his alleged concubines
as respondents.
Specifically to dispose of that issue, the Ombudsman scheduled a clarificatory hearing where both Rosa and
Alfredo were represented by their respective counsels. The office of the Ombudsman explained that the position of
Alfredo would just prolong the conduct of the preliminary investigation since Rosa can just re-file her complaint. The
doctrine of res judicata does not apply in the preliminary investigation stage. Hence, the counsel for Rosa was directed
to submit to this Office the addresses of the alleged mistresses so that they could be served with the Order directing
them to file their counter-affidavits. Rosa submitted an Ex-Parte Manifestation on the last known addresses of Julie de
Leon and Emy Sia (alleged mistresses.)
Ombudsman issued a Joint Order4 impleading Sia and de Leon as party-respondents in the complaint for
Concubinage and directing them to submit their respective counter-affidavits within a period of time. Sia and de Leon
did not submit their respective counter-affidavits.
Alfredo opposed the Ombudsmans ruling to simply amend the complaint and implead the alleged mistresses.
He filed his Comment to the Provincial Prosecutor praying for the dismissal of the complaint for failure to implead the
two mistresses.
Ombudsman issued herein assailed Resolution, disposing of the procedural issues, which states that the short
cut procedure would delay the proceedings is misplaced, since Rosa could still amend her complaint and re-file the
case for the doctrine of res judicata will not apply. Alfredo filed a Motion for Reconsideration excepting to the
Ombudsmans ruling on the automatic inclusion of Sia as respondent in the complaint and their indictment for the crime
of Concubinage.
Nonetheless, the Ombudsman stood pat on its ruling, declared that the Partial Motion for Reconsideration was
filed out of time. Alfredo now comes to us on petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion in the
Ombudsmans finding of probable cause to indict him and Sia for Concubinage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has full discretionary authority in the determination of probable cause during
a preliminary investigation.
RULING:
Yes. Therefore the Court sustain the Ombudsmans decision.
The Ombudsman has full discretionary authority in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation. This is the reason why judicial review of the resolution of the Ombudsman in the exercise of its power
and duty to investigate and prosecute felonies and/or offenses of public officers is limited to a determination of whether
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Courts are not empowered to
substitute their judgment for that of the Ombudsman.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. In this regard, petitioner failed to demonstrate the
Ombudsman's abuse, much less grave abuse, of discretion.
The Ombudsman merely followed the provisions of its Rules of Procedure. No information may be filed and
no complaint may be dismissed without the written authority or approval of the ombudsman in cases falling within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbyan, or of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases.
Notably, Rosas complaint contained not just the Concubinage charge, but other charges: violation of Republic
Act No. 9262 and Grave Threats. Upon the Ombudsmans perusal, the complaint was supported by affidavits
corroborating Rosas accusations. Thus, at that stage, the Ombudsman properly referred the complaint to Alfredo for
comment. Nonetheless, while the Ombudsman found no reason for outright dismissal, it deemed it fit to hold a
clarificatory hearing to discuss the applicability of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the issue having been insisted
upon by Alfredo.
Surely the procedural sequence of referral of the complaint to respondent for comment and thereafter the
holding of a clarificatory hearing is provided for in paragraph b, Section 2 and paragraphs d and f, Section 4 of Rule II,
which the Court have at the outset underscored. The Ombudsman merely facilitated the amendment of the complaint
to cure the defect pointed out by Alfredo. The Ombudsmans primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, to
conduct preliminary investigation of crimes involving public officers, without regard to its commission in relation to office,
had long been settled in Sen. Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ.
The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as
amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers or
employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is
concurrent with other government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the
Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at
any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases against
public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.
Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that the Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary investigation, the respective heads of said offices came up with OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-
001 for the proper guidelines of their respective prosecutors in the conduct of their investigations.
WHEREFORE the petition is DISMISSED.
TANENGGEE VS PEOPLE
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
December 12, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23653 affirming with
modification the June 25, 1999 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30, in
Criminal Case Nos. 98-163806-10 finding Carlos L." Tanenggee (petitioner) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of five counts of estafa through falsification of commercial documents. Likewise
questioned is the CA's September 6, 2007 Resolution4 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration5 and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.6
Factual Antecedents
On March 27, 1998, five separate Informations7 for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents were filed against petitioner. The said Informations portray the same mode of
commission of the crime as in Criminal Case No. 98-163806 but differ with respect to the numbers of
the checks and promissory notes involved and the dates and amounts thereof, viz:
That on or about July 24, 1997, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a
private individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud, thru falsification of
commercial document, the METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented by
its Legal officer, Atty. Ferdinand R. Aguirre, in the following manner: herein accused, being then the
Manager of the COMMERCIO BRANCH OF METROBANK located at the New Divisoria Market
Bldg., Divisoria, Manila, and taking advantage of his position as such, prepared and filled up or
caused to be prepared and filled up METROBANK Promissory Note Form No. 366857 with letters
and figures reading "BD#083/97" after the letters reading "PN", with figures reading "07.24.97" after
the word "DATE", with the amount of 16,000,000.00 in words and in figures, and with other words
and figures now appearing thereon, typing or causing to be typed at the right bottom thereof the
name reading "ROMEO TAN", feigning and forging or causing to be feigned and forged on top of
said name the signature of Romeo Tan, affixing his own signature at the left bottom thereof
purportedly to show that he witnessed the alleged signing of the said note by Romeo Tan, thereafter
preparing and filling up or causing to be prepared and filled up METROBANK CASHIERS CHECK
NO. CC 0000001531, a commercial document, with date reading "July 24, 1997", with the name
reading "Romeo Tan" as payee, and with the sum of 15,362,666.67 in words and in figures, which
purports to be the proceeds of the loan being obtained, thereafter affixing his own signature thereon,
and directing the unsuspecting bank cashier to also affix his signature on the said check, as
authorized signatories, and finally affixing, feigning and forging or causing to be affixed, feigned and
forged four (4) times at the back thereof the signature of said Romeo Tan, thereby making it appear,
as it did appear that Romeo Tan had participated in the preparation, execution and signing of the
said Promissory Note and the signing and endorsement of the said METROBANK CASHIERS
CHECK and that he obtained a loan of 16,000,000.00 from METROBANK, when in truth and in
fact, as the said accused well knew, such was not the case in that said Romeo Tan did not obtain
such loan from METROBANK, neither did he participate in the preparation, execution and signing of
the said promissory note and signing and endorsement of said METROBANK CASHIERS CHECK,
much less authorize herein accused to prepare, execute and affix his signature in the said
documents; that once the said documents were forged and falsified in the manner above set forth,
the said accused released, obtained and received from the METROBANK the sum of
15,363,666.67 purportedly representing the proceeds of the said loan, which amount, once in his
possession, with intent to defraud, he misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said METROBANK in the same sum of
15,363,666.67, Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
On May 27, 1998, the RTC entered a plea of not guilty for the petitioner after he refused to enter a
plea.9 The cases were then consolidated and jointly tried.
The proceedings before the RTC as aptly summarized by the CA are as follows:
During the pre-trial, except for the identity of the accused, the jurisdiction of the court, and that
accused was the branch manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch from July 1997 to December
1997, no other stipulations were entered into. Prosecution marked its exhibits "A" to "L" and sub-
markings.
xxxx
The prosecution alleged that on different occasions, appellant caused to be prepared promissory
notes and cashiers checks in the name of Romeo Tan, a valued client of the bank since he has
substantial deposits in his account, in connection with the purported loans obtained by the latter from
the bank. Appellant approved and signed the cashiers check as branch manager of Metrobank
Commercio Branch. Appellant affixed, forged or caused to be signed the signature of Tan as
endorser and payee of the proceeds of the checks at the back of the same to show that the latter
had indeed endorsed the same for payment. He handed the checks to the Loans clerk, Maria
Dolores Miranda, for encashment. Once said documents were forged and falsified, appellant
released and obtained from Metrobank the proceeds of the alleged loan and misappropriated the
same to his use and benefit. After the discovery of the irregular loans, an internal audit was
conducted and an administrative investigation was held in the Head Office of Metrobank, during
which appellant signed a written statement (marked as Exhibit "N") in the form of questions and
answers.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses:
Valentino Elevado, a member of the Internal Affairs Department of Metrobank, testified that he
conducted and interviewed the appellant in January 1998; that in said interview, appellant admitted
having committed the allegations in the Informations, specifically forging the promissory notes; that
the proceeds of the loan were secured or personally received by the appellant although it should be
the client of the bank who should receive the same; and that all the answers of the appellant were
contained in a typewritten document voluntarily executed, thumbmarked, and signed by him (Exhibit
"N").
Rosemarie Tan Apostol, assistant branch manager, testified that the signatures appearing on the
promissory notes were not the signatures of Romeo Tan; that the promissory notes did not bear her
signature although it is required, due to the fact that Romeo Tan is a valued client and her manager
accommodated valued clients; that she signed the corresponding checks upon instruction of
appellant; and that after signing the checks, appellant took the same which remained in his custody.
Eliodoro M. Constantino, NBI Supervisor and a handwriting expert, testified that the signatures
appearing on the promissory notes and specimen signatures on the signature card of Romeo Tan
were not written by one and the same person.
Maria Dolores Miranda, a Loans Clerk at Metrobank Commercio Branch, testified that several
cashiers checks were issued in favor of Romeo Tan; that appellant instructed her to encash the
same; and that it was appellant who received the proceeds of the loan.
For his defense, appellant Carlos Lo Tanenggee testified that he is a holder of a Masters degree
from the Asian Institute of Management, and was the Branch Manager of Metrobank Commercio
Branch from 1994 until he was charged in 1998 [with] the above-named offense. He was with
Metrobank for nine (9) years starting as assistant manager of Metrobank Dasmarias Branch,
Binondo, Manila. As manager, he oversaw the day to day operations of the branch, solicited
accounts and processed loans, among others.
Appellant claimed that he was able to solicit Romeo Tan as a client-depositor when he was the
branch manager of Metrobank Commercio. As a valued client, Romeo Tan was granted a credit line
for forty million pesos (40,000,000.00) by Metrobank. Tan was also allowed to open a fictitious
account for his personal use and was assisted personally by appellant in his dealings with the bank.
In the middle of 1997, Tan allegedly opened a fictitious account and used the name Jose Tan. Such
practice for valued clients was allowed by and known to the bank to hide their finances due to
rampantkidnappings or from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) or from their spouses.
According to appellant, Tan availed of his standing credit line (through promissory notes) for five (5)
times on the following dates: 1) 24 July 1997 for sixteen million pesos (16,000,000.00), 2) 27
October 1997 for six million pesos (6,000,000.00), 3) 12 November 1997 for three million pesos
(3,000,000.00), 4) 21 November 1997 for sixteen million pesos (16,000,000,00), 5) 22 December
1997 for two million pesos (2,000,000.00). On all these occasions except the loan on 24 July 1997
when Tan personally went to the bank, Tan allegedly gave his instructions regarding the loan
through the telephone. Upon receiving the instructions, appellant would order the Loans clerk to
prepare the promissory note and send the same through the banks messenger to Tans office,
which was located across the street. The latter would then return to the bank, through his own
messenger, the promissory notes already signed by him. Upon receipt of the promissory note,
appellant would order the preparation of the corresponding cashiers check representing the
proceeds of the particular loan, send the same through the banks messenger to the office of Tan,
and the latter would return the same through his own messenger already endorsed together with a
deposit slip under Current Account No. 258-250133-7 of Jose Tan. Only Cashiers Check dated 21
November 1997 for sixteen million pesos (16,000,000.00) was not endorsed and deposited for,
allegedly, it was used to pay the loan obtained on 24 July 1997. Appellant claimed that all the
signatures of Tan appearing on the promissory notes and the cashiers checks were the genuine
signatures of Tan although he never saw the latter affix them thereon.
In the middle of January 1998, two (2) Metrobank auditors conducted an audit of the Commercio
Branch for more than a week. Thereafter or on 26 January 1998, appellant was asked by Elvira Ong-
Chan, senior vice president of Metrobank, to report to the Head Office on the following day. When
appellant arrived at the said office, he was surprised that there were seven (7) other people present:
two (2) senior branch officers, two (2) bank lawyers, two (2) policemen (one in uniform and the other
in plain clothes), and a representative of the Internal Affairs unit of the bank, Valentino Elevado.
Appellant claimed that Elevado asked him to sign a paper (Exhibit "N") in connection with the audit
investigation; that he inquired what he was made to sign but was not offered any explanation; that he
was intimidated to sign and was threatened by the police that he will be brought to the precinct if he
will not sign; that he was not able to consult a lawyer since he was not apprised of the purpose of the
meeting; and that "just to get it over with" he signed the paper which turned out to be a confession.
After the said meeting, appellant went to see Tan at his office but was unable to find the latter. He
also tried to phone him but to no avail.10
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After the joint trial, the RTC rendered a consolidated Decision11 dated June 25, 1999 finding
petitioner guilty of the crimes charged, the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Carlos Lo Tanenggee, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents charged in each of the five (5)
Informations filed and hereby sentences him to suffer the following penalties:
1. In Criminal Case No. 98-163806, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum including the accessory penalties provided by law.
maximum including the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the
sum of 16 Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 27 November 1997 until
fully paid.
sum of 6 Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 27 October 1997 until fully
paid.
sum of 2 Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 22 December 1997 until fully
paid.
sum of 3 Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 12 November 1997 until fully
paid.
Accused shall serve the said penalties imposed successively.
As mandated in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum duration of the sentence
imposed shall not be more than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the
penalties imposed upon him and such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty (40) years.
SO ORDERED.12
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to the CA where the case was docketed as CA-G.R.
CR No. 23653. On December 12, 2006, the CA promulgated its Decision13 affirming with modification
the RTC Decision and disposing of the appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision dated 25 June 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30 convicting the accused-appellant Carlos Lo
Tanenggee on five counts of estafa through falsification of commercial documents is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 98-163806, he is further ordered to
indemnify Metrobank the sum of 16 Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 24 July
1997 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.14
On December 29, 2006,15 petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied per its
September 6, 2007 Resolution.16
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the
basic issues of: (1) whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs admission in evidence of the
petitioners written statement based on its finding that he was not in police custody or under
custodial interrogation when the same was taken; and, (2) whether the essential elements of estafa
through falsification of commercial documents were established by the prosecution.17
The Parties Arguments

While he admits signing a written statement,18 petitioner refutes the truth of the contents thereof and
alleges that he was only forced to sign the same without reading its contents. He asserts that said
written statement was taken in violation of his rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution,
particularly of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two
rights. Hence, the same should not have been admitted in evidence against him.
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), maintains that petitioners written statement is admissible in evidence since the constitutional
proscription invoked by petitioner does not apply to inquiries made in the context of private
employment but is applicable only in cases of custodial interrogation. The OSG thus prays for the
affirmance of the appealed CA Decision.
Our Ruling
We find the Petition wanting in merit.
Petitioners written statement is admissible in evidence.
The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained
in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the
OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation.
Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner.
Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the
commencement thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above.19 In the present
case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement regarding an
anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not
initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and,
(2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant manner during the
questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial investigation and to have been
deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written statement.
Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,20 we declared that the right to counsel "applies
only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation." Amplifying further on the matter, the Court made clear in the recent case of Carbonel
v. Civil Service Commission:21
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is
meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under
paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.22
Here, petitioners written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his
employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his
employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence and in
giving due consideration to petitioners written statement as there is no constitutional impediment to
its admissibility.
Petitioners written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.

Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed, under duress and intimidation, an already
prepared typewritten statement. However, his claim lacks sustainable basis and his supposition is
just an afterthought for there is nothing in the records that would support his claim of duress and
intimidation.
Moreover, "it is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the contrary is
proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary."23 Petitioner failed to overcome
this presumption. On the contrary, his written statement was found to have been executed freely and
consciously. The pertinent details he narrated in his statement were of such nature and quality that
only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish. The details contained therein attest to its voluntariness.
As correctly pointed out by the CA:
As the trial court noted, the written statement (Exhibit N) of appellant is replete with details which
could only be supplied by appellant. The statement reflects spontaneity and coherence which cannot
be associated with a mind to which intimidation has been applied. Appellants answers to questions
14 and 24 were even initialed by him to indicate his conformity to the corrections made therein. The
response to every question was fully informative, even beyond the required answers, which only
indicates the mind to be free from extraneous restraints.24
In People v. Muit,25 it was held that "one of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of petitioners
extrajudicial statement is that it contains many details and facts which the investigating officers could
not have known and could not have supplied without the knowledge and information given by him."
Also, the fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest and file any charges, criminal or
administrative, against the investigator and the two policemen present who allegedly intimidated him
and forced him to sign negate his bare assertions of compulsion and intimidation. It is a settled rule
that where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any
criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of
violence was presented, his extrajudicial statement shall be considered as having been voluntarily
executed.26
Neither will petitioners assertion that he did not read the contents of his statement before affixing his
signature thereon "just to get it over with" prop up the instant Petition. To recall, petitioner has a
masteral degree from a reputable educational institution and had been a bank manager for quite a
number of years. He is thus expected to fully understand and comprehend the significance of signing
an instrument. It is just unfortunate that he did not exercise due diligence in the conduct of his own
affairs. He can therefore expect no consideration for it.
Forgery duly established.
"Forgery is present when any writing is counterfeited by the signing of anothers name with intent to
defraud."27 It can be established by comparing the alleged false signature with the authentic or
genuine one. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of government
handwriting experts whose opinions do not mandatorily bind the courts. A trial judge is not precluded
but is even authorized by law28 to conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature
in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.
In this case, the finding of forgery on the signature of Romeo Tan (Tan) appearing in the promissory
notes and cashiers checks was not anchored solely on the result of the examination conducted by
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Document Examiner. The trial court also made an
independent examination of the questioned signatures and after analyzing the same, reached the
conclusion that the signatures of Tan appearing in the promissory notes are different from his
genuine signatures appearing in his Deposit Account Information and Specimen Signature Cards on
file with the bank. Thus, we find no reason to disturb the above findings of the RTC which was
affirmed by the CA. A rule of long standing in this jurisdiction is that findings of a trial court, when
affirmed by the CA, are accorded great weight and respect. Absent any reason to deviate from the
said findings, as in this case, the same should be deemed conclusive and binding to this Court.
No suppression of evidence on the part of the prosecution.
Petitioner claims that the prosecution should have presented Tan in court to shed light on the matter.
His non-presentation created the presumption that his testimony if given would be adverse to the
case of the prosecution. Petitioner thus contends that the prosecution suppressed its own evidence.
Such contention is likewise untenable. The prosecution has the prerogative to choose the evidence
or the witnesses it wishes to present. It has the discretion as to how it should present its
case.29 Moreover, the presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not apply where
the evidence was at the disposal of both the defense and the prosecution.30 In the present case, if
petitioner believes that Tan is the principal witness who could exculpate him from liability by
establishing that it was Tan and not him who signed the subject documents, the most prudent thing
to do is to utilize him as his witness. Anyway, petitioner has the right to have compulsory process to
secure Tans attendance during the trial pursuant to Article III, Section 14(2)31 of the Constitution.
The records show, however, that petitioner did not invoke such right. In view of these, no
suppression of evidence can be attributed to the prosecution.
Petitioners denial is unavailing.
The Court is also not persuaded by the bare and uncorroborated allegation of petitioner that the
loans covered by the promissory notes and the cashiers checks were personally transacted by Tan
against his approved letter of credit, although he admittedly never saw Tan affix his signature
thereto. Again, this allegation, as the RTC aptly observed, is not supported by established evidence.
"It is settled that denials which are unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative
and self-serving evidence. They merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value
over the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters."32 The chain of events
in this case, from the preparation of the promissory notes to the encashment of the cashiers checks,
as narrated by the prosecution witnesses and based on petitioners own admission, established
beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the unlawful acts alleged in the Informations.
Elements of falsification of commercial documents established.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) refers to falsification by a private individual or a public officer or employee, who
did not take advantage of his official position, of public, private or commercial document. The
elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1) that the
offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the
RPC;33 and, (3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.
All the above-mentioned elements were established in this case. First, petitioner is a private
individual. Second, the acts of falsification consisted in petitioners (1) counterfeiting or imitating the
handwriting or signature of Tan and causing it to appear that the same is true and genuine in all
respects; and (2) causing it to appear that Tan has participated in an act or proceeding when he did
not in fact so participate. Third, the falsification was committed in promissory notes and checks
which are commercial documents. Commercial documents are, in general, documents or
instruments which are "used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit
transactions."34Promissory notes facilitate credit transactions while a check is a means of payment
used in business in lieu of money for convenience in business transactions. A cashiers check
necessarily facilitates bank transactions for it allows the person whose name and signature appear
thereon to encash the check and withdraw the amount indicated therein.35
Falsification as a necessary means to commit estafa.
When the offender commits on a public, official or commercial document any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in Article 171 as a necessary means to commit another crime like estafa,
theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime. Under Article 48 of the RPC, there are
two classes of a complex crime. A complex crime may refer to a single act which constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies or to an offense as a necessary means for committing another.
In Domingo v. People,36 we held:
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa,
because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification
has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the
crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. In other words, the crime of
falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or commercial
document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of estafa, not
by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or commercial
document is only a necessary means to commit estafa.
"Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or
by means of deceit, and (b) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable
of pecuniary estimation."37Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or
conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been
disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal
injury."38
The elements of estafa obtain in this case. By falsely representing that Tan requested him to
process purported loans on the latters behalf, petitioner counterfeited or imitated the signature of
Tan in the cashiers checks. Through these, petitioner succeeded in withdrawing money from the
1w phi1
bank. Once in possession of the amount, petitioner thereafter invested the same in Eurocan Future
Commodities. Clearly, petitioner employed deceit in order to take hold of the money,
misappropriated and converted it to his own personal use and benefit, and these resulted to the
damage and prejudice of the bank in the amount of about 43 million.
Taken in its entirety, the proven facts show that petitioner could not have withdrawn the money
without falsifying the questioned documents. The falsification was, therefore, a necessary means to
commit estafa, and falsification was already consummated even before the falsified documents were
used to defraud the bank. The conviction of petitioner for the complex crime of Estafa through
Falsification of Commercial Document by the lower courts was thus proper.
The Proper Imposable Penalty
The penalty for falsification of a commercial document under Article 172 of the RPC is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000.00.
The penalty in estafa cases, on the other hand, as provided under paragraph 1, Article 315 of the
RPC is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period39 if the
amount defrauded is over 12,000.00 but does not exceed 22,000.00. If the amount involved
exceeds the latter sum, the same paragraph provides the imposition of the penalty in its maximum
period with an incremental penalty of one year imprisonment for every 10,000.00 but in no case
shall the total penalty exceed 20 years of imprisonment.
Petitioner in this case is found liable for the commission of the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of commercial document. The crime of falsification was established to be a necessary
means to commit estafa. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Code, the penalty to be imposed in such case
should be that corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied in its maximum
period. The applicable penalty therefore is for the crime of estafa, being the more serious offense
than falsification.
The amounts involved in this case range from 2 million to 16 million. Said amounts being in
excess of 22,000.00, the penalty imposable should be within the maximum term of six (6) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years of prision mayor, adding one (1) year
for each additional 10,000.00. Considering the amounts involved, the additional penalty of one (1)
year for each additional 10,000.00 would surely exceed the maximum limitation provided under
Article 315, which is twenty (20) years. Thus, the RTC correctly imposed the maximum term of
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.
There is need, however, to modify the penalties imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the CA in
each case respecting the minimum term of imprisonment. The trial court imposed the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum which is beyond the lawful
range. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the penalty should be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law for the offense. Since the penalty
prescribed for the estafa charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
Thus, the Court sets the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty at four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional. Petitioner is therefore sentenced in each case to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 23653 dated December 12, 2006 and September 6, 2007, respectively, are hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence to be
imposed upon the petitioner should be four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional.
SO ORDERED.
ONG VS PEOPLE 659 SCRA 588 FENCING
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 18 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
affirmed the Decision2 dated 06 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Manila. The RTC
had convicted accused Jaime Ong y Ong (Ong) of the crime of violation of Presidential Decree No. (P.O.)
1612, otherwise known as. the Anti-Fencing Law.
Ong was charged in an Information3 dated 25 May 1995 as follows: chan roblesv irtualawli bra ry
That on or about February 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines. the said accused, with intent of gain
for himself or for another. did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and acquire from
unknown person involving thirteen (13) truck tires worth P65, 975.00, belonging to FRANCISCO AZAJAR Y
LEE, and thereafter selling One (1) truck tire knowing the same to have been derived from the crime of
robbery.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Ong entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued, and the RTC found him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612. The dispositive portion of its Decision reads: chan roblesv irt ualawli bra ry
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that the prosecution has established the guilt of the
accused JAIME ONG y ONG beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 also
known as Anti-Fencing Law and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 10 years and 1
day to 16 years with accessory penalty of temporary disqualification.
SO ORDERED.4 chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry
Dissatisfied with the judgment, Ong appealed to the CA. After a review of the records, the RTC's finding of
guilt was affirmed by the appellate court in a Decision dated 18 August 2009.
Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.
The Facts
The version of the prosecution, which was supported by the CA, is as follows: chanro blesvi rtua lawlib rary
Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires, described as T494 1100 by 20 by
14. He acquired the same for the total amount of P223,401.81 from Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation,
a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of Firestone tires. Private complainant's
acquisition was evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated November 10, 1994 and an Inventory List
acknowledging receipt of the tires specifically described by their serial numbers. Private complainant marked
the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them inside the warehouse in 720 San Jose St., corner Sta.
Catalina St., Barangay San Antonio Valley 1, Sucat, Paraaque, owned by his relative Teody Guano. Jose
Cabal, Guano's caretaker of the warehouse, was in charge of the tires. After appellant sold six (6) tires
sometime in January 1995, thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside the warehouse.
On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal that all thirty-eight (38) truck
tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly opened. Private complainant, together
with caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery to the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.
Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous business establishments in
an attempt to locate the stolen tires. On February 24, 1995, private complainant chanced upon Jong's
Marketing, a store selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by appellant. Private complainant
inquired if appellant was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone tires, to which the latter
replied in the affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire fitting the description, which private complainant
recognized as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the serial number
thereon. Private complainant asked appellant if he had any more of such tires in stock, which was again
answered in the affirmative. Private complainant then left the store and reported the matter to Chief
Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the Southern Police District.
On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation on
appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team was composed of six (6) members, led by SPO3 Oscar Guerrero
and supervised by Senior Inspector Noel Tan. Private complainant's companion Tito Atienza was appointed
as the poseur-buyer.
On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team, in coordination with the Western Police District,
proceeded to appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team arrived thereat at around 3:00 in the afternoon.
Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store while the rest of the team posted themselves across the
street. Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14 Firestone truck tires available. The
latter immediately produced one tire from his display, which Atienza bought for P5,000.00. Atienza asked
appellant if he had any more in stock.
Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his warehouse, which was
located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck tires were brought in, private complainant entered the
store, inspected them and found that they were the same tires which were stolen from him, based on their
serial numbers. Private complainant then gave the prearranged signal to the buy-bust team confirming that
the tires in appellant's shop were the same tires stolen from the warehouse.
After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust team went inside appellant's
store. However, appellant insisted that his arrest and the confiscation of the stolen truck tires be witnessed
by representatives from the barangay and his own lawyer. Resultantly, it was already past 10:00 in the
evening when appellant, together with the tires, was brought to the police station for investigation and
inventory. Overall, the buy-bust team was able to confiscate thirteen (13) tires, including the one initially
bought by poseur-buyer Tito Atienza. The tires were confirmed by private complainant as stolen from his
warehouse.5 chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary
For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had been engaged in the business
of buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24) years and denying that he had any knowledge that he was
selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing. He further averred that on 18 February 1995, a certain Ramon Go
(Go) offered to sell thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires allegedly from Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City,
for P3,500 each. Ong bought all the tires for P45,500, for which he was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18
February 1995 and with the letterhead Gold Link Hardware & General Merchandise (Gold Link).6 chan roblesv irt ualawli bra ry
Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12) others in his bodega. The poseur-
buyer bought the displayed tire in his store and came back to ask for more tires. Ten minutes later,
policemen went inside the store, confiscated the tires, arrested Ong and told him that those items were
stolen tires.7cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary
The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13) tires found in the
possession of Ong constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. Having failed to overcome the presumption
by mere denials, he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612.8 chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's findings with modification by reducing the minimum penalty from ten
(10) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correcional.9 cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary
OUR RULING
The Petition has no merit.
Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself
or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or
in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to
him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been
committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells,
or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that the said article,
item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
(4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.10 chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry
We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite quantum of evidence in
proving that all the elements of fencing are present in this case.
First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar), whose testimony was
corroborated by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were stolen
testified that the crime of robbery had been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar was able to prove
ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice No. 456511 dated 10 November 1994 and an Inventory
List.12 Witnesses for the prosecution likewise testified that robbery was reported as evidenced by their
Sinumpaang Salaysay13 taken at the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.14 The report led to the
conduct of a buy-bust operation at Jong Markerting, Paco, Manila on 27 February 1995.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never denied the
fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do not establish that Ong was
neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13) out of thirty-eight (38)
missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the serial numbers of stolen tires
corresponds to those found in Ong's possession.15 Ong likewise admitted that he bought the said tires from
Go of Gold Link in the total amount of ?45,500 where he was issued Sales Invoice No. 980.16 chanro blesvi rtua lawlib rary
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should know" denote the fact
that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to
another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists.17 Ong, who was in the business
of buy and sell of tires for the past twenty-four (24) years,18 ought to have known the ordinary course of
business in purchasing from an unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the
thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask for proof of ownership of the tires.19 The entire transaction, from
the proposal to buy until the delivery of tires happened in just one day.20 His experience from the business
should have given him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was his first time
to transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the
streets.
In Dela Torre v. COMELEC,21 this Court had enunciated that: chanroble svi rtualawl ib rary
Circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object of the
sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such circumstances include the time and
place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord with the usual practices of commerce. The nature and
condition of the goods sold, and the fact that the seller is not regularly engaged in the business of selling
goods may likewise suggest the illegality of their source, and therefore should caution the buyer. This
justifies the presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that "mere possession of any goods, . . .,
object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence
of fencing" a presumption that is, according to the Court, "reasonable for no other natural or logical
inference can arise from the established fact of . . . possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft." xxx.22
chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary
Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires. Section 6 of P.D. 1612 requires
stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of any good, article, item, object or
anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure the necessary
clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where
that store, establishment or entity is located before offering the item for sale to the public. In fact, Ong has
practiced the procedure of obtaining clearances from the police station for some used tires he wanted to
resell but, in this particular transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman who should
have exercised prudence.
In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go. Logically, and for all practical
purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate transaction and may be raised as
a defense in the charge of fencing; however, that defense is disputable.23 In this case, the validity of the
issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove that Gold Link and its address
were fictitious.24 Ong failed to overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution and to prove the
legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the prima facie presumption under Section 5 of
P.D. 1612.
Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust operation, Ong
was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima fqcie presumption of fencing from evidence of
possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has been the
subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the 25 property.
The RTC and the CA correctly computed the imposable penalty based on P5,075 for each tire recovered, or
in the total amount of P65,975. Records show that Azajar had purchased forty-four (44) tires from Philtread
in the total amount of P223,40 1.81.26 Section 3 (p) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court provides a
disputable presumption that private transactions have been fair and regular. Thus, the presumption of
regularity in the ordinary course of business is not overturned in the absence of the evidence challenging the
regularity of the transaction between Azajar ,and Phil tread.
In tine, after a careful perusal of the records and the evidence adduced by the parties, we do not find
sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the CA affirming the trial court's conviction of Ong for violation of
P.D. 1612 and modifying the minimum penalty imposed by reducing it to six ( 6) years of prision
correccional.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30213 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ABELLA VS PEOPLE
It all started with an altercation during a basketball game. Three days later, or on 10
March 1992, the bodies of MARLON[1] Ronquillo; JOSEPH Ronquillo; ERWIN Lojero;
ANDRES Lojero, Jr.; and FELIX Tamayo were fished out of the murky waters of the Pasig
River, filthy, bloated, putrid, and decomposing. Postmortem examinations on the
cadavers showed signs of foul play.
MARLONs hands were tied at the back with a black electric cord. He had lacerated
wounds, contusions, ligature marks and hematoma. He died from a gunshot wound on
the head.[2]
ANDRES hands were bound at the back with a plastic flat rope with four loops. His
genitals were cut off; and he had ligature marks, contusions, and hematoma. The cause
of his death was asphyxia by strangulation; hemorrhage, intracranial, traumatic. [3]
JOSEPHs hands were hog-tied at the back using a basketball T-shirt. He also had
ligature marks, contusions, lacerated wounds and fracture. He died of asphyxia by
strangulation; hemorrhage, intracranial, traumatic with skull fracture.[4]
ERWINs body showed abrasions and burns. There were cord impressions on his
wrists and depressed fracture on his head and at the base of his skull. He died of asphyxia
by drowning with blunt head injury.[5]
FELIX had abrasions on the left cheek and tie impressions on the wrists. The cause
of his death was asphyxia by drowning.[6]
On 18 March 1992, five informations for murder were filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (hereafter the trial court) against Juanito ABELLA, Diosdado GRANADA,
Benjamin DE GUZMAN, Edgardo VALENCIA, Renato Dante, and Virgilio de
Guzman. The cases were raffled to Branch 52 presided over by the late Judge David
Nitafan. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 92-104529 to -33, the informations[7] identically
read as follows:
That on or about March 8, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together with others whose true
names, real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping
one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent
to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use
personal violence upon one Marlon Ronquillo y Alepda [(Criminal Case No.
92-104529), one Felix Tamayo y Pascual (Criminal Case No. 92-104530), one
Andres Lojero, Jr. y Pascual (Criminal Case No. 92-104531), one Joseph
Ronquillo y Alepda [(Criminal Case No. 92-104532), one Erwin Lojero y
Pascual (Criminal Case No. 92-104533)] by then and there hitting his head
with guns, kicking him, tying his hands, [neck and private organ (additional
allegation in Criminal Case No. 92-104531)] and thereafter throwing his body
into the river thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Contrary to law. [Enclosures supplied].
On 25 March 1992, the informations were amended to include three other accused,
namely, Joselito Crespo, Bienvenido Dugay and Danilo Abarete. [8] Upon arraignment all
the accused pleaded not guilty to the charges against them. On 26 August 1992, Joselito
Crespo, Renato Dante, Bienvenido Dugay, Danilo Abarete and Virgilio de Guzman were
dropped from the information.[9]
The prosecutions version of the events is as follows: In the morning of 7 March 1992,
MARLON, JOSEPH, and an unidentified companion played three rounds of basketball
against the team of JOEY de los Santos at the vicinity of Dalisay and Lakas Streets,
Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila. The Ronquillos won the first two rounds; but the third round
ended in a brawl, which the neighbors quickly pacified. JOEY later went back to Dalisay
Street carrying two pillboxes. A certain Donald Ancheta saw him, took the pillboxes and
turned them over to a policeman.[10]
On 8 March 1992, between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m., JOEY and his brother GENER threw
stones at the Ronquillos house, attracting the attention of neighbors, who forthwith ran
after the brothers. JOEY and GENER were overtaken and mauled before they were
released.[11]
Between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. of the same day, WILFREDO Lojero, a certain Daniel,
and the victims were in front of the Ronquillos house in Lakas Street, trading stories while
awaiting a certain Aling Flor.[12] JOSEPHINE del Rosario was then at the corner of Lakas
Street on her way to a friends house when the victims called her and asked her about her
mother, who was a barangay kagawad at Bacood. They told her that they were waiting
for Aling Flor to report to her that JOEY and GENER threw stones at the Ronquillos
house.[13] Later, EVELYN de la Cruz joined the group in the conversation.[14] The area was
then illuminated by a streetlight at the corner of Damayan and Dalisay Streets about ten
arms-length away.
Suddenly, a dirty white Ford Fiera without a plate number stopped in front of the
group. There were about ten to thirteen people on board. Among them were JOEY and
GENER, who looked out of the van and pointed at the victims. All the passengers except
for JOEY and GENER alighted. Their faces were covered with black handkerchiefs, and
they were armed. Someone shouted, Pulis ito! Another exclaimed, Walang
tatakbo! FELIX ran but stopped when shots were fired; he was hit with a gun then dragged
into the van. WILFREDO Lojero, however, managed to sneak into the Ronquillos house
and was able to see everything. The other victims were boxed, kicked, and also hit with
a gun and dragged into the van. Before the van sped away, one of the abductors warned
JOSEPHINE, Ikaw huwag kang maingay, wala kang nakita, wala kang narinig.[15]
Meanwhile, at about 6:00 p.m. inside the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), Sta. Ana compound
in Bacood, ELENA Bernardo was waiting for Pastor Cesar Almedina to seek his advice
regarding her son-in-laws problem. Pastor Almedina asked her to wait, and she did
so. She waited until 10:00 p.m. Suddenly the guard switched off the lights inside the
compound. With only the MERALCO light illuminating the compound from outside, she
saw a dirty white Ford Fiera loaded with passengers enter and park in front of the pastoral
house near the path leading to the basement. JOEY, GENER, all the accused and the
victims were inside the van. Four of the victims were made to alight from the van, while
the fifth one lay on the floor of the vehicle as though dead. The victims were brought to
the basement, which was at the back of the chapel and beneath the choir office. ELENA
followed. Inside the basement the victims were continually mauled, whipped with a gun,
and beaten with steel tubes, lead pipes and other blunt instruments. One of the victims
was tied with wire. Filemon Garcia arrived with a blowtorch and also entered the
basement. ELENA heard the victims beg for mercy. Unable to endure the sight she sat in
front of the chapel and stayed for 30 minutes. Pastor Almedina arrived and told her that
they would talk about her problem at another time. Afterwards the victims were herded
back to the Fiera. They seemed almost dead.[16]
On 10 March 1992, at 8:45 a.m., the lifeless body of FELIX was found floating on the
Pasig River near Beata-Tawiran in Pandacan. At 12:25 p.m., ERWINs body was retrieved
from the same river at the back of the Sta. Ana market. At about the same time, the
decomposing bodies of ANDRES, MARLON and JOSEPH were also fished out of the
Pasig River near Lambingan Bridge.[17]
SPO3 Myrna Ricasa prepared the crime report and was part of the group that
conducted the police line-up on 13 March 1992. Witnesses to the abduction identified the
accused from among five line-ups. JOSEPHINE identified ABELLA as among the
passengers of the Ford Fiera. EVELYN pointed to GRANADA; Roy Ronquillo and Noel
Estorel, who were not presented as witnesses, identified DE GUZMAN and VALENCIA,
respectively.[18]
Appellants advanced alibi as their defense. They all claim to have attended
the panata at the Punta Sta. Ana chapel on 8 March 1992 from 8:00 to 10:00 p.m., save
for ABELLA whose attendance was excused. The panata isa religious practice of the INC
held for seven consecutive days as preparation for the santa cena or holy supper. In
1992, the panata was held from 8 to 14 March 1992 and the santa cena, on 15 March
1992.[19] VALENCIA testified that after the panata on 8 March 1992, he went home to San
Juan, Metro Manila; it was then about 11:00 p.m.[20] For his part, GRANADA claimed that
after attending the panata, he left the Iglesia compound with Filemon and Marilou
Garcia. The three arrived at the Garcia residence in Bacood, Sta. Mesa, at 11:00 p.m.
Filemon and GRANADA had snacks and watched two movies on the video player. It was
already past midnight when GRANADA went home.[21] GRANADAs testimony was
corroborated by both Filemon and Marilou.[22]
ABELLA was a member of the PNP highway patrol group assigned to Mobile Unit No.
13 in March of 1992. His tour of duty was from 2:00 to 10:00 p.m. He was previously
granted exemption from attending the panata.Together with PO3 Ferdinand Parolina, he
patrolled Roxas Boulevard from the corner of T.M. Kalaw St. to the corner of Vito Cruz
St. on 8 March 1992. ABELLA and Parolina parted ways at 10:15 p.m.[23] PO3 Parolina,
who drove the mobile car, corroborated ABELLAs testimony.[24]
According to former accused Bienvenido Tugay, on 11 March 1992 at 11:00 p.m.,
Major Joe Pring arrived at the Iglesia compound in Punta, Sta. Ana, with police officers,
demanding entrance inside the premises. Since there was no order from his superior
allowing outsiders to enter the compound, Tugay refused. Enraged, Pring asked for the
names of Tugays companions. Tugay enumerated the names of appellants.[25]
The following day, appellants read their names in newspapers as among the
perpetrators of the crime. Alarmed, they consulted the INC Central Office on what steps
to take. Accompanied by Atty. Restituto Lazaro of the Iglesias legal department,
appellants proceeded to see Gen. Diokno at the Western Police District Headquarters on
13 March 1992 to clear their names. Major Pring brought them to his office and hurriedly
organized a police line-up. During the line-up Major Pring allegedly tapped all the accused
on the shoulder as a signal to the prosecution witnesses for identifying them. Accordingly,
appellants were identified.[26]
On 7 February 1995, after several instances where defense counsel questioned his
orders and doubted his partiality, Judge Nitafan inhibited himself from further hearing the
cases. The cases were re-raffled to Branch 35 presided over by Judge Ramon P.
Makasiar, who penned the decision on 15 November 1996 convicting the accused. [27] The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered pronouncing the four accused in these

cases: JUANITO ABELLA y GARCIA, DIOSDADO GRANADA y SALCEDO,
BENJAMIN DE GUZMAN y LABASAN, and EDGARDO VALENCIA y
VILLANUEVA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER on five (5) counts,
and sentencing each of them to the penalties of five (5) reclusion perpetua,
and to pay the costs in proportionate shares.
The said four accused are further ordered, jointly and severally, to pay:
A. To Erlinda Ronquillo and Betty Ronquillo

1. P91,607.70 for actual damages,
2. P500,000.00 to each of them for moral damages,
3. P500,000.00 to each of them for exemplary damages;
B. To Domingo Tamayo

2. P500,000 for moral damages,
3. P500,000 for exemplary damages;
C. To Andres Lojero, Sr.

2. P1,000,000.00 for moral damages,
3. P1,000,000.00 for exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[28]
This decision was amended to include an award of P50,000 as indemnity for the
death of each of the victims.[29]
Appellants are now before us contending that the trial court erred:
I
IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS POSITIVE AND CLEAR

IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED IN THE ALLEGED ABDUCTION
OF THE VICTIMS;
II
IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ALLEGED EYEWITNESS

ELENA BERNARDO;
III
IN HOLDING THAT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE

PROSECUTION IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION;
IV
IN FINDING ACCUSEDS DEFENSE OF ALIBI WEAK;

V
IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY WAS PRESENT TO QUALIFY THE
CRIME TO MURDER; and
VI
IN RULING THAT THE VOLUNTARY SURRENDER OF THE ACCUSED

DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE.[30]
As to the first assignment of error, appellants contend that reliance on the testimonies
of JOSEPHINE and EVELYN is misguided. In JOSEPHINEs testimony she expressly
named the abductors as GRANADA and a good-looking guy, referring to ABELLA, who
could be easily remembered; but in her sworn statement she only mentioned
GRANADA. Such omission of an important detail casts doubt on the veracity of her
identification of ABELLA.Neither did EVELYN identify ABELLA, De Guzman and Valencia
during the police line-up and in her sworn statement of 11 March 1992, although she
pointed to all appellants when she testified in court. That GRANADA was recognized both
by JOSEPHINE and EVELYN in a dimly lit place at night because of his gray hair is
likewise unworthy of belief.
Appellants claim in their second assignment of error that ELENAs testimony was a
mere concoction with loopholes that were revealed during cross-examination. Her
insistence that all the victims were stabbed was disproved by medico-legal findings. Her
testimony was uncorroborated by either testimonial or physical evidence and was even
contradicted by the ocular inspection as observed by the presiding judge
himself. Admittedly holding a grudge against GRANADA, she is a biased witness
motivated by vindictiveness.
In their third assignment of error, appellants allege that the circumstances relied upon
by the trial court were not established with certainty. The only circumstances proven were
the basketball altercation, the stoning of the Ronquillos house, FELIXs attempt to flee and
the fact that the victims were fished out of the Pasig River. Testimonies on the abduction
are patently inconsistent with each other. Nothing connects the appellants to the
basketball altercation or the stoning of the Ronquillos house. The link between appellants
and the De los Santos brothers is tenuous.
Appellants next assert that their defense of alibi gained strength because they were
not positively identified. They further maintain that the use of superior force as a qualifying
circumstance was not alleged in the information and could not therefore serve to elevate
the killing to murder. Neither could treachery be considered, as there were no witnesses
to the actual killing. Lastly, appellants equate their move to clear their names to the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
We affirm the conviction of appellants. After a careful scrutiny of the witnesses
testimonies, we find that all the appellants were positively identified as the ones who
abducted and killed the victims.
I
JOSEPHINE readily recognized GRANADA from among the abductors who alighted
from the Fiera, as he was her neighbor and she has known him since she was a child. In
spite of the black handkerchief covering GRANADAs face, JOSEPHINE was familiar with
his physique and physical features, particularly his prematurely graying hair. She was in
front of the victims when they were abducted.[31] When part of the face of the accused is
not visible, positive identification is difficult. Nevertheless when despite such artifice the
witness is familiar with the accused,[32] or his identity is not sufficiently hidden due to his
physical appearance,[33] or there are extraneous factors,[34] recognition is
facilitated. Identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance,
once a person has gained familiarity with another.[35]
With regard to ABELLA, JOSEPHINE was able to recognize him as one of the
abductors because he had no cover on his face and he was a good-looking guy who could
easily be remembered. The alleged inconsistency between her sworn statement where
she failed to mention ABELLA and her testimony in court is imaginary. JOSEPHINEs
testimony was merely an amplification of her sworn statement in which she admitted:
21. T: Maliban kina BOBOT, JOEY at GENER, mayroon ka pa bang nakilala?
S: Mayroon pa po akong namukhaan ngunit hindi ko alam ang kanilang mga pangalan.[36]
It is probable that she found out ABELLAs name only after the sworn statement was
executed. There is no inconsistency when what the witness stated in open court are but
details or additional facts not mentioned in the affidavit.[37]
EVELYN testified that she recognized the appellants as among the abductors of the
victims and then proceeded to name them in court.[38] She particularly recognized
GRANADA, as she had seen him on several occasions.Her assertion that GRANADAs
face was not covered, contrary to JOSEPHINEs testimony, does not detract from the fact
that GRANADA was indeed one of the abductors. The handkerchief covering GRANADAs
face could have fallen off in the course of the commotion. Besides, it is not to be expected
that all witnesses viewed the abduction at the same stages.
WILFREDO was part of the victims group when the abduction took place, but he ran
for safety after one of the abductors fired warning shots. He allegedly recognized
GRANADA despite the handkerchief on the latters face.GRANADAs white hair and
pointed nose became rooted in WILFREDOs consciousness as GRANADA got off the
van, introduced himself as a policeman, and fired two warning shots. Most often the face
and body movements of the assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased
from memory.[39]
Not only was WILFREDO physically present and an eyewitness when the abduction
took place, but more importantly two of the victims were his brothers. Blood relatives have
a definite stake at seeing the guilty person brought before the courts so that justice may
be served. It would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to
accuse somebody other than the real culprit.[40]
II
ELENAs testimony is sufficient to convict appellants. She positively identified all the
appellants as among the passengers of the Fiera and whom she saw torturing the
victims. She could not have been mistaken in identifying them because she knew them
very well, they being deacons of the INC.[41] She was only four meters away when the
Fiera passed by her. [42]Her identification must have been confirmed when appellants
alighted from the Fiera and proceeded to the so-called basement. Out of curiosity, she
followed and stayed near the door of the basement[43] where she saw appellants and their
cohorts maul and torture the victims. Although the electric lights inside the compound
were switched off she could see the culprits and the mauling of the victims, since the
place was illuminated by two streetlights outside.[44]
The appellants attack, for being contrary to physical evidence, ELENAs testimony
that she saw some of their cohorts, particularly Boy Valencia and Virgilio de Guzman,
stab the victims. Indeed, the post -mortem examination on the bodies of the victims
yielded no finding of stab wounds. This physical evidence is a mute and an eloquent
manifestation of truth; it rates high in the hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. [45] Thus, where
the physical evidenceruns counter to the testimony of the prosecution witness, as in this
case, the former should prevail.[46] At any rate, when asked on cross-examination whether
the victims suffered stab wounds, ELENA answered, Siguro po, hindi ko po alam.[47]
ELENA must have been mistaken in her observation of the events or in her
recollection. But this is understandable, as several persons were actively engaged in the
mauling of the victims. It would have been highly unlikely for her to remember accurately
their movements. Lapse of time blurs recollections. Human memory can be
treacherous. It is a very common thing for honest witnesses to confuse their recollection
of what they actually observed with what they have persuaded themselves to have
happened or with impressions and conclusions not really drawn from their actual
knowledge.[48]
While ELENAs testimony on the stabbing does not ring true in the face of the physical
evidence, this does not mean that her entire testimony is false or had been contrived. It
is significant to note that her identification of the appellants as malefactors was
corroborated by the other prosecution witnesses, who pointed to them as the victims
abductors. Moreover, her testimony that they and their cohorts had beaten the victims by
using lead pipes and blunt instruments was corroborated by the autopsy report, which
revealed that most of the victims sustained lacerated wounds, contusions and hematoma.
There is a general principle of law that where a witness has testified falsely to some
material matter in a case, his testimony in other respects maybe disregarded unless it is
corroborated by other proof. This rule of law is expressed in the maxim Falsus in
uno, falsus in omnibus. This rule, however, has its own limitations, for when the mistaken
statement is consistent with good faith and is not conclusively indicative of a deliberate
perversion, the believable portion of the testimony should be admitted. Although a person
may err in memory or in observation in one or more respects, he may have told the truth
as to other respects.[49] Elsewise stated, the maxim deals only with the weight of evidence
and is not a positive rule of universal application and should not be applied to portions of
the testimony corroborated by other evidence, particularly where the false portions could
be innocent mistakes.[50]
Notwithstanding the false or mistaken statements, the trial judge, Judge Makasiar,
found ELENAs version impressive, as the manner of her narration was straightforward,
sincere, candid, frank and terse.[51] Like the other prosecution witnesses, she had been
subjected to searching, grueling and consuming cross-examination by a determined,
brilliant, veteran and astute defense counsel, no less than retired Supreme Court Justice
Serafin Cuevas, such that any falsehood and fabrication in [her] narration and
identification of the four accused could have been easily detected and exposed. But she
passed the test.
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility
of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect. This is so because the trial court has
the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness
or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion, the sudden pallor of a
discovered lie, the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer, or the forthright tone of a ready
reply; or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or
the flippant sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack
of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien. [52]
Admittedly, ELENAs testimony has some discrepancies. However, the trial court
emphasized:
[I]t is to be expected that some discrepancies, and even self-

contradictions, will appear on cross-examination, especially where the
witness is of inferior mental capacity and without any experience in court
proceedings, like Elena Bernardo.[53]
The trial court correctly likened Elenas testimony against appellants, all of whom were
ranking members of the Iglesia ni Cristo, as a declaration against interest. This was so
because her act of testifying against them put her in danger of being expelled from the
said sect. In fact, as admitted by Pastor Cesar Almedina, he and many other local officials
of the Church recommended her expulsion allegedly on grounds of non-attendance at
church services and violation of the teachings, doctrines, laws and tenets of the Iglesia,
which were not, however, specified by him. But the recommendation was disapproved by
the Central Office because of these cases.[54]
While ELENA admitted to having a grudge against GRANADA for arresting his son-
in-law sometime in 1991, her identification of him as one of the perpetrators of the crime
charged cannot be disregarded because it was strongly corroborated by the three other
prosecution witnesses, who categorically pointed to him as one of the abductors. Her
honesty in admitting her dislike against GRANADA should be considered in her
favor.[55] The existence of such grudge does not automatically render her testimony false
and unreliable.[56] It must be noted that she had no known quarrel with the other appellants
to be considered as sufficient motive in implicating them.Where there is no evidence and
nothing to indicate that a witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive,
the presumption is that she was not so actuated.
As to her long silence or reluctance to give her statement or to testify, ELENA
explained that she was initially barred by then Judge Nitafan from testifying. Besides,
there was a threat on her life by one of the suspects in the killing of herein five
victims.[57] Nevertheless, she had already reported the incident to a certain Brother Cerilo
del Rosario, who replaced Pastor Almedina after the latter was transferred to another
chapel, and that sometime in 1993 she went to the Central Office of the INC and related
the whole event to Brother Eduardo Manalo.[58]
At any rate, the failure of a witness to report to the police authorities the crime that
she had witnessed is not a matter affecting her credibility. The natural reticence of most
people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice.[59]
III
Concededly, there were no eyewitnesses to the actual killing of the victims. But the
following of circumstances leave no shred of doubt that the appellants were the
perpetrators of the crime:
1. On the morning of 7 March 1992, the victims MARLON and JOSEPH had a basketball
altercation with JOEY and his two companions;
2. Later that day, JOEY was caught bringing two pillboxes to Dalisay Street, where the
victims reside;
3. Between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. of 8 March 1992, JOEY and GENER, both members of
the INC, threw stones at the Ronquillos house, attracting the attention of neighbors
who in turn mauled them;
4. Between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. of that same date, after the De los Santos brothers
pointed at the victims, the appellants and their cohorts picked up and herded the
victims into a Ford Fiera, which then sped away;
5. At about 10:00 p.m. the victims, except the one lying in the vehicle who seemed either
unconscious or dead, were brought to a so-called basement in the Iglesia compound
in Punta, Sta. Ana. There, they were mauled, tortured and beaten by appellants, who
were deacons of the INC, as well as by their cohorts, using steel tubes, lead pipes,
guns and other blunt instruments. Thereafter, they were loaded into the van, which
forthwith sped out of the compound; and
6. Three days later, or on 10 March 1992, the victims bodies were found floating on the
Pasig River, showing signs of foul play.
These circumstances are sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. They constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the appellants, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
persons.[60]
IV
As for appellants defense of alibi, we have consistently held this to be the weakest of
all the defenses. Appellants were unable to show that it was physically impossible for
them to have been present at the scene of the crime. GRANADA, DE GUZMAN and
VALENCIA claimed to have been attending the Panata rites on 8 March 1992, the date
of the abduction and mauling of the five victims. However, considering that there were at
least 200 members of the INC who attended the panata, it was possible for them to have
sneaked out unnoticed into the Ford Fiera to Lakas Street, picked up the five victims and
waited in the evening for the grounds to be deserted before bringing them inside the INC
compound. Neither was ABELLA able to show by clear and convincing evidence that it
was physically impossible for him to go from his alleged post at the corner of T.M. Kalaw
St. and Roxas Boulevard to Lakas Street, Bacood, Sta. Mesa. Thus, appellants defense
of alibi must fail. Besides, such defense is worthless in view of the positive identification
of appellants as the culprits.
V
We agree with the trial court that the killing was characterized by treachery. It is true
that treachery should normally attend at the inception of the aggression. However, when
the victim was first seized and bound and then slain, treachery is present.[61] In this case,
it is enough to point out that the victims hands were tied at the back when their bodies
were found floating in Pasig River. This fact clearly shows that the victims were rendered
defenseless and helpless, thereby allowing the appellants to commit the crime without
risk at all to their persons.
The circumstance of abuse of superior strength was absorbed in treachery and
cannot be considered as an independent aggravating circumstance. It need not be
alleged in the information, as treachery was adequate to elevate the killing to murder.
VI
We cannot equate appellants move to clear their names as voluntary surrender. For
a surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous and should show the intent of the
accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because (1) he
acknowledges his guilt or (2) he wishes to save the government the trouble and expense
necessarily included for his search and capture. [62] In an analogous case, we have held
that when the accused goes to a police station merely to clear his name and not to give
himself up, voluntary surrender may not be appreciated.[63]
Lastly, we affirm the awards made by the trial court except as to the awards of moral
and exemplary damages, which are, however, reduced from P500,000 to P50,000 each.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-104529 to -33 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the awards of moral and exemplary damages are hereby reduced
from P500,000 to P50,000 each.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC VS REYES-BAKUNAWA
Assets or properties, to be considered as ill-gotten wealth, must be shown to have originated from the
Government itself, and should have been taken by former President Marcos, the members of his immediate
family, relatives, close subordinates and close associates by illegal means. That one served as a government
official or employee during the Marcos administration did not immediately make her a close subordinate or
close associate of former President Marcos.1 cralaw virtua law lib rary
The Case
The Republic appeals the adverse decision rendered on April 10, 2002,2 and the resolution issued on
November 8, 2007,3 whereby the Sandiganbayan respectively dismissed the complaint for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages filed against respondents in Civil Case No. 0023, and denied
the Republics motion for reconsideration.
Antecedents
Civil Case No. 0023 is an action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages brought
by the Republic against respondents Luz Reyes-Bakunawa, Manuel Bakunawa, Jr., Manuel Bakunawa III,
President Marcos and First Lady Imelda R. Marcos for having allegedly acquired and accumulated ill-gotten
wealth consisting of funds and other property in unlawful concert with one another and in flagrant breach
of trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with grave abuse of right and power and in
brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines, thus resulting in their unjust
enrichment. 4 cralaw virtualaw l ibrary
The complaint alleged that respondent Luz Reyes-Bakunawa (Luz Bakunawa) had served as Imelda Marcos
Social Secretary during the Marcos administration; that it was during that period of her incumbency in that
position that Luz Bakunawa and her husband Manuel Bakunawa had acquired assets, funds and other
property grossly and manifestly disproportionate to her salaries and their other lawful income;5 and that Luz
Bakunawa, by herself and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos, taking undue advantage of her position, influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses,
for their benefit and unjust enrichment and in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of assets illegally
obtained, engaged in devices, schemes and stratagems,6 particularly:
1) acted as dummies, nominees, and/or agents of the Marcos spouses and, with the active collaboration,
knowledge and willing participation of the other defendants, established several corporations engaged in a
wide range of economic activities, such as construction and cattle ranching; chanr0ble svirtualawl ibra ry
2) secured favorable contracts with the Department of Public Works and Communications for the construction
of government projects through grossly undercapitalized corporations and without complying with such usual
requirements as public bidding, notice and publication of contractors; chanr0b lesvi rtua lawlib rary
3) unlawfully acquired heads of cattle from the government dispersal program and raised them on ranch lands
encroaching on forest zones; chan r0ble svirtualawl ibra ry
4) unlawfully encroached upon a mangrove-forested section in Masbate, Masbate and converted it into a
fishpond;chan r0b lesvi rtua lawlib rary
5) unlawfully amassed funds by obtaining huge credit lines from government financial institutions, and
incorporating into their contracts a cost-escalation adjustment provision to justify collection of grossly arbitrary
and unconscionable amounts unsupported by evidence of increase in prices; cha nr0 blesv irt ualawli bra ry
6) unlawfully imported hundreds of brand-new units of heavy equipment without paying customs duties and
other allied taxes amounting to millions of pesos, by falsely representing said heavy equipment to be for
official government use and selling them at very low prices to avoid paying the required taxes.7 cralaw vi rtualaw l ib rary
The Republic prayed for: (a) the reconveyance to itself of all funds and other property impressed with
constructive trust, as well as funds and other property acquired by respondents abuse of right and power
and through unjust enrichment, plus interests; (b) accounting of all beneficial interests in funds, properties
and assets in excess of their unlawful earnings; and (c) payment of actual damages to be proved during the
trial, moral damages of P50,000,000,000.00, temperate, nominal and exemplary damages, attorneys fees,
litigation expenses and treble judicial costs.8 cralaw vi rtualaw lib rary
In their amended answer, the Bakunawas alleged that Luz Bakunawa was never the Social Secretary of
Imelda Marcos, but only an employee in the office of the Social Secretary; that the properties acquired while
Luz Bakunawa was employed in the Government were purchased with honestly earned money and their
acquisition was well within their legitimate income; that their family owned and controlled five closed family
corporations, namely: (1) Hi-Tri Development Corporation; (2) 7-R Development Corporation; (3) 7-R
Heavy Equipment, Inc.; (4) 7-R Sales Company, Inc.; and (5) 7-R Ranch, Inc.; that their public works
contracts were awarded to them in accordance with law; that their acquisition of the heads of cattle were
legal;9 and that they did not commit any breach of trust while in public office, and did not possess illegally
acquired funds that rendered them liable under constructive trust in favor of the Republic.10 cralaw virt ualaw lib ra ry
During the pre-trial on August 26, 1999, the Bakunawas admitted that: (a) the properties enumerated in
Annex A of the complaint11 belonged to or were connected to them, except three corporations, namely:7-R
International Trading, 7-R Enterprise, Inc., and 7-R Group of Companies; and (b) two parcels of land that
belonged to one of their children.12 cralaw virtua law lib rary
Also during the pre-trial, the parties agreed on the following statement of the issues, to wit:
[t]he fundamental issue in this case is whether or not defendant Luz Bakunawa, considering her position in
Malacaang during the incumbency of President Ferdinand E. Marcos from 1970 up to 1986, occupied a
confidential position in Malacaang, and was able to obtain contracts, run businesses and acquire real
properties as enumerated in the Complaint, using her office and the influence of either or both of the [s]pouses
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. The parties agreed that it is the use of the influence of the Spouses Marcos
that constitutes the essence of the case, and not the failure to report the Statement of Assets and Liabilities
or any other impropriety in the acquisition of the properties herein, this case having been filed under the
authority given to the Presidential Commission on Good Government under Executive Orders No. 1,2, 14 and
14-a.13cralaw vi rtualaw l ibra ry
After the Republic rested its case, respondents filed their motion to dismiss,14 insisting that the Republic
has failed to establish even prima facie, its case and/or charges against them.15 cralaw virtualaw l ibrary
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
On April 10, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in favor of respondents, to wit:16 cralaw virtua law lib rary
x x x x
As the evidence stands, neither the presence of the link with the Marcoses, nor the irrefutability of the evidence
against the Bakunawas for their misuse of that connection exists to justify the instant action by the PCGG.
In view of all the above, this Court is constrained to grant the Motion to Dismiss, as it hereby dismisses, the
Complaint of the plaintiff for its failure to prove the essential allegations thereof.
The writs of sequestration issued and in force against the properties of the Bakunawas as enumerated in
Annex A of the Complaint (page 24 and p. 34, Vol. I, Record) are lifted, set aside and declared of no further
force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
The Sandiganbayan justified its decision in the following manner:
x x x x
Many of the plaintiffs allegations in its specific averments (Article V) in the complaint are alluded to in the
evidence in a general fashion: engaging in cattle ranching and construction [para. 12 (a)], entering into public
works contracts [para.12 (b)], acquisition of mangrove areas [para. 12 (c)]. Nothing exists in the record,
however, with respect to undercapitalization of the corporation, non-compliance with bidding requirements,
encroachment of ranches into forest zones, huge credit lines, unjustified claims of cost escalation adjustment,
and importation of heavy equipment.
Properties have been shown in the name of the spouses Bakunawa or either of them; testimonies have been
rendered about eviction, official documents presented with respect to public works contracts, and finally, a
Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1985. Indeed, to hear some of the witnesses, acts of oppression
appear to have been committed if not by the wife then by the husband Manuel Bakunawa. There is no indication
however, that the acts of oppression involved the improper use of influence on the part of the defendant Luz
Bakunawa by reason of her having been employed in the office of the Social Secretary of Imelda Marcos when
the latter was the First Lady.
x x x x
An examination of the testimonial evidence for the Plaintiff, as summarized in the first part of this decision,
shows its concentration in the alleged dispossession of some landowners of their occupied land in the province
of Masbate by the defendants Bakunawa and the allegedly (sic) inaction by the Bureau of Forestry and the
police agencies thereon. Thus, the almost uniform allegation of witnesses is that they were dispossessed of
pasture lands which they believed they were entitled to possess. There were documents presented to prove
that, indeed, the witnesses had claims to these pieces of property or had occupied them and had introduced
improvements thereon.
The tenor of the testimony of the said witnesses is that while there was no force directly applied in the
dispossession of their properties, their lands, however, were fenced in, and occupied by, other people,
allegedly the Bakunawas and secured by armed and uniformed men.
There is likewise the contention of the plaintiffs witnesses that they did not know who these men were,
although it has been said that one or two of the men who helped in fencing off these properties were employees
of the Bakunawas.
What is clear is that with the evidence thus far, the Bakunawas, or more specifically, Manuel Bakunawa,
ignored the Bureau of Forestry summons, and caused the unceremonious exclusion of people who had
apparently occupied rather large tracts of land under permits for the Bureau or those with pending applications.
There also seems to be evidence that defendant Luz Bakunawa did quite a bit of work in her capacity as a
member of the staff of the Social Secretary of Imelda Marcos. While the influence of Luz Bakunawa may be
assumed or conjectured, there has been no evidence which would categorically show that the position of
defendant Luz Bakunawa in Malacaang in concert with the spouses Marcos or either of them was the
explanation for the absence of the law enforcement officers or the inaction of the administrative officers of the
government.
x x x x
The influence may be assumed and in common parlance, it might be reasonably made. But to conclude that
there was abuse of office by Luz Bakunawa or her utilization of the influence of her office or of the spouses
Marcos cannot be assumed or stated in any certainty.
And since, as aforesaid, the action herein is confiscatory in character, assumptions will not do to obtain
judgment against the defendants Bakunawa.17 cralaw virtua law lib rary
The Sandiganbayan ruled that in civil suits initiated by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) for the recovery of illegally acquired property pursuant to Republic Act No. 1379,18 the Republic
must show not only that defendant was a subordinate of the Marcos spouses or of either of them, but also
that the relationship was similar to that of an immediate member of the Marcos family or a dummy of the
Marcoses.19 It concluded that no proof established the link between the alleged acts of the Bakunawas and
those of the Marcoses, or even the proximity of Luz Bakunawa as a Marcos relative or Marcos dummy.
The Republic sought the reconsideration of the decision, arguing that the Sandiganbayan erred in holding
that it did not show the Bakunawas link with the Marcoses, and in ruling that it did not prove that the
Bakunawas had abused their connections or close association with the Marcoses.20 cralaw virt uala w libra ry
On November 8, 2007, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republics motion for reconsideration,21 reiterating its
ruling that the Republic did not discharge its burden of proving the close links between the Bakunawas and
the Marcoses, and of proving how the Bakunawas had abused said links, assuming that the links existed.
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
The Republic ascribes the following errors, to wit:
I.
THE QUANTUM OF PROOF REQUIRED TO PROVE PETITIONERS CASE AGAINST THE BAKUNAWAS IS MERE
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
II.
THE LINK BETWEEN AND/OR AMONG THE BAKUNAWAS AND THE MARCOSES WAS SATISFACTORILY
ESTABLISHED BY PETITIONER.
III.
PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE BAKUNAWAS AMASSED ASSETS, FUNDS AND PROPERTIES
GROSSLY AND MANIFESTLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO THEIR SALARIES AND OTHER LAWFUL INCOME BECAUSE
OF THEIR POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT AND/OR CLOSE ASSOCIATION AND CONNECTION WITH THE
MARCOSES TO THE PREJUDICE OF PETITIONER AND THE FILIPINO PEOPLE.22 cralaw virtualaw lib rary
In their comment,23 respondents mainly submit that the Republic failed to present a justiciable issue to
warrant the reversal of the Sandiganbayans decision; and that the April 10, 2002 decision already become
final and could no longer be reviewed and modified because of the belated filing of the petition for review.
On her part, First Lady Marcos opted not to file her comment.24 cralaw virt ualaw lib ra ry
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
1.
Appeal of the Republic was timely
The Bakunawas contend that the April 10, 2002 decision already became final because of the Republics
failure to file the petition for review on time.
We cannot sustain the contention.
The Republic had until November 24, 2007 within which to file the petition for review. It filed a motion
seeking an extension of 30 days of its period to file, or until December 24, 2007. Although it did not file the
petition within the requested extension period, the Court directed it on June 30, 2008 to file the petition for
review within 15 days from notice. Considering that it received the resolution of June 30, 2008 on August
11, 2008,25 its filing of the petition for review on August 26, 2008 was timely.
2.
Preponderance of evidence is required in actions brought to recover ill-gotten wealth
In its decision of April 10, 2002, the Sandiganbayan stated as follows:
Considering the confiscatory character of proceedings described in E.O. No. 14 in actions for recovery of
alleged unlawfully acquired property such as the instant case, evidence must be substantial, if not beyond
reasonable doubt, akin to the actions for forfeiture under Republic Act. No. 1379; this, notwithstanding the
statements in Sec. 3 of the Executive Order which states the adequacy of mere preponderance of evidence.26
virtua law lib rary
cralaw
The Republic argues that the Sandiganbayan thereby erred in seemingly requiring a degree of proof greater
than that required by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 14-A.27 This was also its submission in the motion for
reconsideration vis--vis the decision of April 10, 2002.
In denying the Republics motion for reconsideration through the November 8, 2007 resolution, the
Sandiganbayan agreed with the Republics submission to the effect that preponderance of evidence was all
that was required for this case. However, the Sandiganbayan pointed out that even on that basis the
Republic still did not satisfy its quantum of proof because the facts it established were not sufficient to prove
its case against respondents.28 cralaw virtualaw li bra ry
We uphold the Sandiganbayan.
We first clarify that the Republic correctly submits that only a preponderance of evidence was needed to
prove its demand for reconveyance or recovery of ill-gotten wealth. That is quite clear from Section 1 of E.O.
No. 14-A, which provides:
Section 1. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986 is hereby amended to read as follows: cralawl ibra ry
Sec. 3. The civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired property under Republic Act No. 1379 or for restitution,
reparation of damages, or indemnification for consequential and other damages or any other civil actions
under the Civil Code or other existing laws filed with the Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda
R. Marcos, members of their immediate family, close relatives, subordinates, close and/or business associates,
dummies, agents and nominees, may proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved
by a preponderance of evidence.
By preponderance of evidence is meant that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to
that of the other side. Essentially, preponderance of evidence refers to the comparative weight of the
evidence presented by the opposing parties. As such, it has been defined as the weight, credit, and value of
the aggregate evidence on either side, and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater
weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. It is proof that is more convincing to the
court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.29 cralaw virt ualaw lib ra ry
Here, the Bakunawas filed a motion to dismiss, by which they specifically demurred to the evidence adduced
against them. A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action to the effect that the
evidence that his adversary produced, whether true or not, is insufficient in point of law to make out a case
or to sustain the issue. The demurring party thereby challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to
sustain a judgment. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence, is required merely to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or claim, or to support
a verdict of guilt or liability.30 cralaw virtualaw l ibra ry
Under the rule on preponderance of evidence, the court is instructed to find for and to dismiss the case
against the defendant should the scales hang in equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence that tilts the
scales to one or the other side. The plaintiff who had the burden of proof has failed to establish its case, and
the parties are no better off than before they proceeded upon their litigation. In that situation, the court
should leave the parties as they are.31 cralaw virt ualaw lib ra ry
Moreover, although the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no
preponderance of evidence on the plaintiffs side if its evidence alone is insufficient to establish its cause of
action.32 Similarly, when only one side is able to present its evidence, and the other side demurs to the
evidence, a preponderance of evidence can result only if the plaintiffs evidence is sufficient to establish the
cause of action. For this purpose, the sheer volume of the evidence presented by one party cannot tip the
scales in its favor. Quality, not quantity, is the primordial consideration in evaluating evidence.
3.
The evidence of the Republic did not preponderantly establish the ill-gotten nature of the
Bakunawas wealth
The decisive query is whether the Republic preponderantly showed that the Bakunawas had acquired ill-
gotten wealth during Luz Bakunawas employment during the Marcos administration.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), decided on April 12, 2011,33 the Court settled not only the
meaning of ill-gotten wealth but also who were the persons liable to illegally acquire or amass such
wealth, viz:
xxxx
II
The Concept and Genesis of Ill-Gotten Wealth in the Philippine Setting
A brief review of the Philippine law and jurisprudence pertinent to ill-gotten wealth should furnish an
illuminating backdrop for further discussion.
In the immediate aftermath of the peaceful 1986 EDSA Revolution, the administration of President Corazon
C. Aquino saw to it, among others, that rules defining the authority of the government and its instrumentalities
were promptly put in place. It is significant to point out, however, that the administration likewise defined the
limitations of the authority.
The first official issuance of President Aquino, which was made on February 28, 1986, or just two days after
the EDSA Revolution, was Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1, which created the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG). Ostensibly, E.O. No. 1 was the first issuance in light of the EDSA Revolution having come
about mainly to address the pillage of the nations wealth by President Marcos, his family, and cronies.
E.O. No. 1 contained only two WHEREAS Clauses, to wit:

WHEREAS, vast resources of the government have been amassed by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad; chanr0ble svirtualawl ibra ry
WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth;

Paragraph (4) of E.O. No. 234 further required that the wealth, to be ill-gotten, must be acquired by them
through or as a result of improper or illegal use of or the conversion of funds belonging to the Government of
the Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by
taking undue advantage of their official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich themselves at the expense and to the grave damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
Although E.O. No. 1 and the other issuances dealing with ill-gotten wealth (i.e., E.O. No. 2, E.O. No. 14, and
E.O. No. 14-A) only identified the subject matter of ill-gotten wealth and the persons who could amass ill-
gotten wealth and did not include an explicit definition of ill-gotten wealth, we can still discern the meaning
and concept of ill-gotten wealth from the WHEREAS Clauses themselves of E.O. No. 1, in that ill-gotten
wealth consisted of the vast resources of the government amassed by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates both here and abroad. It is clear, therefore,
that ill-gotten wealth would not include all the properties of President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
and close associates but only the part that originated from the vast resources of the government.
In time and unavoidably, the Supreme Court elaborated on the meaning and concept of ill-gotten wealth.
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, or BASECO, for
the sake of brevity, the Court held that:
x x x until it can be determined, through appropriate judicial proceedings, whether the property was in
truth ill-gotten, i.e., acquired through or as a result of improper or illegal use of or the conversion of funds
belonging to the Government or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or
financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection
or influence, resulting in unjust enrichment of the ostensible owner and grave damage and prejudice to the
State. And this, too, is the sense in which the term is commonly understood in other jurisdictions.
The BASECO definition of ill-gotten wealth was reiterated in Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Lucio C. Tan, where the Court said:
On this point, we find it relevant to define ill-gotten wealth. In Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc.,
this Court described ill-gotten wealth as follows: cralawli bra ry
Ill-gotten wealth is that acquired through or as a result of improper or illegal use of or the conversion of funds
belonging to the Government or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial
institutions, or by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence,
resulting in unjust enrichment of the ostensible owner and grave damage and prejudice to the State. And this,
too, is the sense in which the term is commonly understood in other jurisdiction.
Concerning respondents shares of stock here, there is no evidence presented by petitioner that they belong
to the Government of the Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial
institutions. Nor is there evidence that respondents, taking undue advantage of their connections or
relationship with former President Marcos or his family, relatives and close associates, were able to acquire
those shares of stock.
Incidentally, in its 1998 ruling in Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, the Court rendered
an identical definition of ill-gotten wealth, viz: cralawl ibra ry
x x x. We may also add that ill-gotten wealth, by its very nature, assumes a public character. Based on the
aforementioned Executive Orders, ill-gotten wealth refers to assets and properties purportedly acquired,
directly or indirectly, by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates
through or as a result of their improper or illegal use of government funds or properties; or their
having taken undue advantage of their public office; or their use of powers, influence or
relationships, resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines. Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly
originated from the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the
people. As such, upon reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the
satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts. Another declared
overriding consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is that it may be used for national
economic recovery.
All these judicial pronouncements demand two concurring elements to be present before assets or properties
were considered as ill-gotten wealth, namely: (a) they must have originated from the government itself,
and (b) they must have been taken by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close
associates by illegal means.
But settling the sources and the kinds of assets and property covered by E.O. No. 1 and related issuances did
not complete the definition of ill-gotten wealth. The further requirement was that the assets and property
should have been amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates
both here and abroad. In this regard, identifying former President Marcos, his immediate family, and relatives
was not difficult, but identifying other persons who might be the close associatesof former President Marcos
presented an inherent difficulty, because it was not fair and just to include within the term close
associates everyone who had had any association with President Marcos, his immediate family, and relatives.
Again, through several rulings, the Court became the arbiter to determine who were the close associates
within the coverage of E.O. No. 1.
In Republic v. Migrio, the Court held that respondents Migrio, et al. were not necessarily among the persons
covered by the term close subordinate or close associate of former President Marcos by reason alone of their
having served as government officials or employees during the Marcos administration, viz:
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee
during the administration of former Pres. Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the
respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with
former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. This is so because otherwise the respondents case will fall under
existing general laws and procedures on the matter. x x x
In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, the Court declared that the petitioner was not a close associate as the term
was used in E.O. No. 1 just because he had served as the President and General Manager of the GSIS during
the Marcos administration.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the Court stated that respondent Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas having been
a Commanding General of the Philippine Army during the Marcos administration d[id] not automatically make
him a subordinate of former President Ferdinand Marcos as this term is used in Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos.
It is well to point out, consequently, that the distinction laid down by E.O. No. 1 and its related issuances, and
expounded by relevant judicial pronouncements unavoidably required competent evidentiary substantiation
made in appropriate judicial proceedings to determine: (a) whether the assets or properties involved had
come from the vast resources of government, and (b) whether the individuals owning or holding such assets
or properties were close associates of President Marcos. The requirement of competent evidentiary
substantiation made in appropriate judicial proceedings was imposed because the factual premises for the
reconveyance of the assets or properties in favor of the government due to their being ill-gotten wealth could
not be simply assumed. Indeed, in BASECO, the Court made this clear enough by emphatically observing:
6. Governments Right and Duty to Recover All Ill-gotten Wealth
There can be no debate about the validity and eminent propriety of the Governments plan to recover all ill-
gotten wealth.
Neither can there be any debate about the proposition that assuming the above described factual premises of
the Executive Orders and Proclamation No. 3 to be true, to be demonstrable by competent evidence, the
recovery from Marcos, his family and his minions of the assets and properties involved, is not only a right but
a duty on the part of Government.
But however plain and valid that right and duty may be, still a balance must be sought with the
equally compelling necessity that a proper respect be accorded and adequate protection assured,
the fundamental rights of private property and free enterprise which are deemed pillars of a free
society such as ours, and to which all members of that society may without exception lay claim.
x x x Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in the Constitution, embraces as its necessary components freedom
of conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom in the pursuit of happiness. Along with these freedoms are
included economic freedom and freedom of enterprise within reasonable bounds and under proper control. x
x x Evincing much concern for the protection of property, the Constitution distinctly recognizes the preferred
position which real estate has occupied in law for ages. Property is bound up with every aspect of social life in
a democracy as democracy is conceived in the Constitution. The Constitution realizes the indispensable role
which property, owned in reasonable quantities and used legitimately, plays in the stimulation to economic
effort and the formation and growth of a solid social middle class that is said to be the bulwark of democracy
and the backbone of every progressive and happy country.
a. Need of Evidentiary Substantiation in Proper Suit
Consequently, the factual premises of the Executive Orders cannot simply be assumed. They will
have to be duly established by adequate proof in each case, in a proper judicial proceeding, so that
the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth may be validly and properly adjudged and
consummated; although there are some who maintain that the fact that an immense fortune, and vast
resources of the government have been amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad, and they have resorted to all sorts of clever
schemes and manipulations to disguise and hide their illicit acquisitions is within the realm of judicial notice,
being of so extensive notoriety as to dispense with proof thereof. Be this as it may, the requirement of
evidentiary substantiation has been expressly acknowledged, and the procedure to be followed
explicitly laid down, in Executive Order No. 14.
Accordingly, the Republic should furnish to the Sandiganbayan in proper judicial proceedings the competent
evidence proving who were the close associates of President Marcos who had amassed assets and properties
that would be rightly considered as ill-gotten wealth.
xxxx
As can be gleaned from the foregoing pronouncement, evidentiary substantiation of the allegations of how
the wealth was illegally acquired and by whom was necessary. For that purpose, the mere holding of a
position in the Marcos administration did not necessarily make the holder a close associate within the
context of E.O. No.1. According to Republic v. Migrio,35 the term subordinate as used in E.O. No. 136and
E.O. No. 237 referred to a person who enjoyed a close association with President Marcos and/or his wife
similar to that of an immediate family member, relative, and close associate, or to that of a close relative,
business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee. Indeed, a prima facie showing must be made to show that
one unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of a close association or relation with President Marcos and/or
his wife.38 It would not suffice, then, that one served during the administration of President Marcos as a
government official or employee.
The Republic particularly insists that Luz Bakunawa served as the Social Secretary or the Assistant Social
Secretary of First Lady Marcos; and mentions several other circumstances that indicated her close
relationship with the Marcoses, such as her assumption of office in the early part of the Marcos
administration,39 the accommodations extended to her during her various travels,40 the fact that her close
relationship with the Marcoses was of common knowledge among the Masbateos,41 and the negotiated
contracts the Bakunawas entered into during the Marcos administration.42 cralaw virtualaw li bra ry
However, Luz Bakunawa maintains that she was not First Lady Marcos Social Secretary but a mere member
of the staff of the Social Secretary; and that the assets of the Bakunawas were honestly earned and
acquired well within the legitimate income of their businesses.
We hold that the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the evidence of the Republic was able to establish, at
best, that Luz Bakunawa had been an employee in Malacaang Palace during the Marcos administration, and
did not establish her having a close relationship with the Marcoses, or her having abused her position or
employment in order to amass the assets subject of this case. Consequently, Luz Bakunawa could not be
considered a close associate or subordinate of the Marcoses within the context of E.O. No. 1 and E.O. No. 2.
The determination by the Sandiganbayan of the equiponderance or insufficiency of evidence involved its
appreciation of the evidence. We cannot undo such determination unless the Republic makes a strong
demonstration to us that the determination was whimsical or capricious.43 Alas, the Republic did not make
such demonstration. Its evidence could not sustain the belief that the Bakunawas had used their influence,
or the Marcoses influence in acquiring their properties. Nor did it prove that the ties or relationship between
the Bakunawas and the Marcoses had been similar to that of an immediate member of the family or a
dummy.
On another important aspect, the evidence of the Republic was likewise wanting. The Sandiganbayan
enumerated in its decision five activities in which the Bakunawas had acquired their ill-gotten wealth,
namely: (a) land-grabbing and cattle-ranching; (b) engaging in government construction projects; (c)
operating fishponds; (d) obtaining credit lines from government financial institutions; and (e) importing
heavy equipment.44 However, the decision dwelt only on land-grabbing and the construction projects for the
reason that the Republic attempted to substantiate only those two activities. The Court is thus limited to the
review of the findings on the two activities.
Anent land-grabbing, the records show that although the Bakunawas had ignored the summons from the
Bureau of Forestry, and that the several persons occupying large tracts of land under permits from the
Bureau of Forestry or under still-pending applications had been dispossessed thereof, the dispossessed
persons whom the Republic presented as witnesses could not tell in court that the Bakunawas had employed
the people who had fenced or occupied the lands in question. Such witnesses admitted that they did not put
up much resistance against their forcible dispossession because of their belief that the Bakunawas had been
very influential and had enjoyed very close ties with the Marcoses. However, they did not show that they
had at the time any direct contact or communication with the Bakunawas, which could only mean that they
only surmised and suspected the participation of the Bakunawas in their dispossession. As such, the
Republics evidence in that regard could not be sufficient, for surmises and suspicions could not support any
conclusion either that the Bakunawas had taken advantage of their close ties with the Marcoses in order to
dispossess the affected witnesses, or that Luz Bakunawa had abused her influence arising from her close
association with the Marcoses.
The Republic presented documents tending to prove that the dispossessed witnesses had retained claims to
the affected properties,45 and that the Bakunawas themselves had been issued pasture leases over the
same areas.46 Given that both the dispossessed witnesses and the Bakunawas held legal rights of
possession respecting the same areas independently of each other, the Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling
that the plaintiffs evidence is not conclusive proof of the ill-gotten character of the lands in the possession
of the defendants Bakunawas.47 This is really a good reason for the Sandiganbayan to hold that the
Republic had not preponderantly shown that the acts of dispossession and oppression had involved the
improper use of her influence by Luz Bakunawa on account of her close association with the Marcoses.48 cralaw virtualaw l ibra ry
Concerning the negotiated construction contracts, the Republic posits that the contracts had been entered
into when Luz Bakunawa was a member of the Presidential Staff during the Marcos administration, laying
heavy emphasis on the notations and handwritten instructions by President Marcos found on the written
communications from Manuel Bakunawa to then DPWH Secretary Baltazar Aquino.
Yet, the Republic offered the negotiated contracts solely to prove that the Bakunawas had been
incorporators or owners, or had held key positions in the corporations that entered into the contracts.49The
Sandiganbayan correctly ruled, therefore, that the contracts could be considered and appreciated only for
those stated purposes, not for the purpose of proving the irregularity of the contracts, opining as follows:
x x x. The documents appear to be public documents and are, therefore, considered prima facie evidence of
the fact of their issuance and that they were signed by the persons whose signatures appear therein. It is,
indeed, apparent on the face of the documents that government projects were awarded to the defendants
Bakunawas through negotiated contracts, and that at least one was approved by then President Marcos
himself. Outside of these, however, there can be no other facts that can be inferred from the aforesaid
documents.50 cralaw virtualaw l ibra ry
The Court upholds the Sandiganbayan. It was basic enough that the Sandiganbayan could not consider any
evidence that was not formally offered; and could consider evidence only for the purposes it was specifically
offered. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly states:
Section 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
The need to formally offer evidence by specifying the purpose of the offer cannot be overemphasized. This
need is designed to meet the demand for due process by apprising the adverse party as well as the trial
court on what evidence the court would soon be called upon to decide the litigation. The offer and purpose
will also put the trial court in the position to determine which rules of evidence it shall apply in admitting or
denying admission to the evidence being offered. According to Union Bank of the Philippines v. Tiu:51 cralaw virt ualaw lib ra ry
x x x a formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment
only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. It has several functions: (1) to enable
the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence; (2) to
allow opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility; and (3) to facilitate review by
the appellate court, which will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial
court. x x x.
Expounding on the office of the offer and statement of the purposes, the Court has cogently said in Candido
v. Court of Appeals:52 cralaw virt ualaw lib ra ry
A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is simply marked for identification; it must
be formally offered, and the opposing counsel given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the witness
called upon to prove or identify it. A formal offer is necessary since judges are required to base their findings
of fact and judgment only - and strictly - upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To allow a party
to attach any document to his pleading and then expect the court to consider it as evidence may draw
unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will be deprived of his chance to examine the document and
object to its admissibility. The appellate court will have difficulty reviewing documents not previously
scrutinized by the court below. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Court on the inclusion on
appeal of documentary evidence or exhibits in the records cannot be stretched as to include such pleadings
or documents not offered at the hearing of the case.
At any rate, the Court must point out that negotiated contracts are not per se illegal. A negotiated contract
is one that is awarded on the basis of a direct agreement between the Government and the contractor,
without going through the normal procurement process, like obtaining the prior approval from another
authority, or a competitive bidding process. It is generally resorted to for convenience, or when time is of
the essence, or where there is a lack of qualified bidders or contractors, or where there is conclusive
evidence that greater economy and efficiency would be achieved.53 The Court has upheld the validity of a
negotiated contract made pursuant to law, like a negotiated contract entered into by a City Mayor pursuant
to the then existing Local Government Code,54 or a negotiated contract that eventually redounded to the
benefit of the general public, even if there was no specific covering appropriation pursuant to COA
rules,55 or a negotiated contract that was made due to an emergency in the health sector,56 or a
negotiated contract for long overdue repair and renovation needed to provide better health services.57 cralaw virtualaw lib rary
Absent evidence proving that the negotiated construction contracts had been irregularly entered into by the
Bakunawas, or that the public had been thereby prejudiced, it is pointless for the Court to declare their
invalidity. On the contrary, the Sandiganbayan correctly observed that the presumption of the validity of the
contracts prevailed.58 cralaw virtualaw l ibra ry
It is true that the recovery of ill-gotten wealth should be relentlessly pursued. But the pursuit should not be
mindless as to be oppressive towards anyone. Due process requires that there be sufficient competent
evidence of the asset being ill-gotten wealth, and of the person or persons charged with the illegal
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth being a close associate or subordinate of the Marcoses who took advantage of
such ties with the Marcoses to enrich themselves. In that effort, the Republic carries the heavy burden of
proof, and must discharge such burden fully; otherwise, the effort would fail and fall.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari for its lack of merit; and AFFIRM the decision
rendered on April 10, 2002, without pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS. BARRA

Before this Court is an appeal of the February 11, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 041552 affirming with modification the August 24, 2009 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 30, San Jose, Camarines Sur in Crim. Case No. T-2678 and finding appellant Joseph4 Barra
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted robbery with homicide instead of special complex
crime of robbery with homicide.
On March 21, 2004, an information5 for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide was filed
against appellant, to wit:
cralavvonli nelawlib ra ry
That on or about 11:00 P.M. of October 9, 2003, at Barangay Tinawagan, Tigaon, Camarines Sur, and within
the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused, while armed with a firearm, after gaining
entrance into the residence of his victim, with intent to gain, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and steal money from Elmer Lagdaan y Azur; that on the
occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling him to take and steal the money, the herein
accused, with intent to kill, did then and there feloniously shoot said Elmer Lagdaan, thereby inflicting upon
him gunshot wound which caused his death, to the prejudice of his heirs. (Emphases deleted.)
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.6 Trial ensued thereafter.
Dr. Peafrancia N. Villanueva, Municipal Health Officer of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, examined the corpse of
Elmer Lagdaan and stated in her Postmortem Report7: cralavvon linelaw lib ra ry
Findings:
1. Gunshot wound, point of entry, 0.5 x 0.5 cms, circular, with inverted edges at the mid left
frontal area. Hematoma formation is noted at the site of entry.
CAUSE OF DEATH: cralavvonlinelawlibrar y
MASSIVE HE[M]ORRHAGE SECONDARY [TO] GUNSHOT WOUND
Dr. Villanueva testified that the victim sustained a gunshot wound due to the circular and inverted edges of
the point of entry. She concluded that since there was no point of exit, the victim was shot at close range.8
Ricardo de la Pea testified that he knew appellant for a long time. He stated that he was on his way home
to the neighboring barangay, when, at around 9:00 p.m. on October 9, 2003, in the light of a bright moon,
he saw appellant enter the house of Lagdaan, which was lit with a lamp, and poked a gun to the victims
right forehead and demanded money. De la Pea hid behind a tree ten meters away. When the victim
stated that the money was not in his possession, appellant shot him. He went home and reported the
incident the following morning.9
Ely Asor testified that on the night of October 9, 2003, he was on his way to the victims house to collect his
daily wage when he saw appellant in the yard of the victims house. He inquired from appellant if the victim
was around. Appellant responded that the victim was not around. Asor went home. It was while Asor was
in his house that he heard a gunshot. It was the following morning that he learned that the victim
died. Asor then proceeded to report the incident.10
The victims mother, Flora Lagdaan, testified that she spent for funeral and burial expenses in the amount of
P33,300.00.
In his defense, appellant denied the charges against him. Appellant claimed that he was in Batangas City,
with his brother Benjamin, visiting his sister when he was arrested and brought to Camarines Sur and
charged with the crime of robbery with murder.11 Appellants brother, Benjamin, tried to corroborate his
testimony.12
The RTC, after taking into consideration all the evidence presented, found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. It stated that the affirmative testimony of the
prosecutions witnesses deserved more weight than the appellants defense of denial and alibi. Thus, finding
the prosecutions witnesses to be credible and that the killing of the victim to be by reason of the robbery,
the RTC decisions decretal portion read: c ralavvonl inelawl ibra ry
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, Joseph Barra GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide as defined and penalized under Article 291(1)
of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. To pay the
surviving heirs of Elmer Lagdaan, the sum of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death, as actual damages
in the amount of Php55,579.80, as moral damages in the sum of Php50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The accused is entitled to the full credit of his preventive imprisonment if he abides by the disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners during his confinement, otherwise he shall only be entitled to four-fifths
(4/5) thereof.13
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals only found appellant guilty of attempted robbery with
homicide. It stated that:cralavvonlinelaw lib rary
Regarding the trial courts finding that accused-appellant is responsible for the death of Lagdaan, WE will not
disturb the same as it is well supported by the evidence on record and in accord with prevailing law and
jurisprudence. However, WE disagree with its determination of the nature of the crime that accused-appellant
committed. Instead of robbery with homicide at its consum[m]ated stage, accused-appellant should have
been declared guilty only of attempted robbery with homicide.
As correctly observed by the OSG,14 the only evidence introduced by the government to establish robbery is
the statement of De la Pea that when accused-appellant reached the victims place, the latter barged into
the said residence, poked a gun at the victims forehead, demanded money and when the victim refused to
accede to his demand, fired a gun and shot the victim. Indeed, no iota of evidence was presented to establish
that accused-appellant took away the victims money or any property, for that matter.
The fact of asportation must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Since this fact was not duly established,
accused-appellant should be held liable only for the crime of attempted robbery with homicide as defined and
penalized under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
When by reason of or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is committed, the person
guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua,
unless the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code.
The appellant is guilty of attempted robbery with homicide only when he commenced the commission of
robbery directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce robbery by
reason of some causes or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
The claim of the defense that accused-appellant should be convicted only of the crime of homicide is bereft of
merit. The killing of the victim herein was by reason of or on the occasion of robbery.
The attendant circumstances clearly show accused-appellants intent to rob the victim. That motive was
manifested by accused-appellants overt act of poking a gun at the victims forehead demanding money from
the latter. When the victim refused to accede to the demand, accused-appellant shot the former. The killing
was an offshoot of accused-appellants intent to rob the victim. Accused-appellant was bent on resorting to
violent means to attain his end. Due to the victims failure to give his money, the crime of robbery was,
however, not consummated.15 (Citations omitted.)
Thus, the Court of Appeals stated: cralavvon linelawl ib rary
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed Judgment is hereby MODIFIED as follows -
1) Accused-appellant is adjudged GUILTY of the crime of Attempted Robbery with Homicide and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA,
2) Accused-appellant is directed to pay the heirs of Elmer Lagdaan the following: cra lavvonl inelawli bra ry
a) the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; chan roblesv irtualawl ibra ry
b) the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages; chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary
c) the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages; chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary
d) the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

e) the cost of suit.16
Appellant filed his notice of appeal on February 18, 2011.17
After appellants confinement was confirmed, both the OSG and appellant manifested that they would adopt
the pleadings filed in the Court of Appeals in lieu of supplemental briefs.18
Appellant argues that his identity as the perpetrator of the crime was not sufficiently established by the
prosecution. Appellant stated that the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses were rife with
inconsistencies. Moreover, appellant argued that the elements for the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide were not proven particularly the element of taking of personal property.
We affirm the February 11, 2011 decision of the Court of Appeals with modification on the award of
damages.
In People v. Bocalan and Gatdula19 we stated that: cralavvonli nelawli bra ry
[F]indings of facts of the trial court, its calibration and assessment of the probative weight of the testimonial
evidence of the parties and its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded by the appellate court high
respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial court in observing at close range
the demeanor, conduct and deportment of the said witnesses as they testify, unless the trial court ignored,
misunderstood and misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which if considered will change the outcome
of the case. x x x. (Citation omitted.)
In the present case, while appellant questions the credibility of the prosecutions witnesses, he does not
present any sufficient evidence to prove that the RTC indeed ignored, misunderstood and misinterpreted the
facts and circumstances of the case. We also found, after reviewing the records, nothing that would indicate
any misinterpretation or misapprehension of facts on the part of the appellate court that would substantially
alter its conclusions.
Appellant in this case was charged with robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides: c ralavvon line lawlib rary
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties. Any person guilty of robbery
with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer: cralavvon line lawlib rary
1. The penalty of from reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed; or when the robbery shall have
been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
In People v. Quemeggen,20 this Court gave the requisites to be proven by the prosecution for appellant to
be convicted of robbery with homicide, to wit: c ralavvonl inelawl ibra ry
1. The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against

persons;chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry
2. The property taken belongs to another; chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary
3. The taking is animo lucrandi; and

4. By reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed. (Citation
omitted.)
In the case before us, appellants intention was to extort money from the victim. By reason of the victims
refusal to give up his personal property - his money - to appellant, the victim was shot in the head, causing
his death. We, however, agree with the Court of Appeals that the element of taking was not complete,
making the crime one of attempted robbery with homicide as opposed to the crime appellant was convicted
in the RTC. Appellant is, therefore, liable under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code, not under Article 294
as originally held by the RTC. Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code states: cralavvonlinelawl ib rary
Article 297. Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain circumstances. When by reason or
on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is committed, the person guilty of such offenses
shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, unless the homicide
committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code.
The elements to be convicted under Article 297 were discussed in People v. Macabales,21 to wit: cralavvon linelawl ibrary
The elements of Robbery with Homicide as defined in Art. 297 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) There is an
attempted or frustrated robbery. (2) A homicide is committed.
In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the victim refused to give his
money to appellant and no personal property was shown to have been taken. It was for this reason that the
victim was shot. Appellant can only be found guilty of attempted robbery with homicide, thus punishable
under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the RTC and the Court of Appeals found appellants
crime to be aggravated by disregard of dwelling, the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the maximum
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Anent the awards of damages by the Court of Appeals, after a careful review of existing rules and recent
jurisprudence, we find the same to be in order and need not be disturbed.22
However, in conformity with current policy, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at
the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.23
WHEREFORE, the February 11, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04155
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of exemplary damages shall be increased to
P30,000.00 and all monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from
date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ALBERTO VS CA
When a putative father manifests openly through words and deeds his recognition of a child, the
courts can do no less than confirm said acknowledgment. As the immortal bard Shakespeare
perspicaciously said: "Let your own discretion be your tutor; suit the action to the word, the word to
the action." Herein deceased father cannot possibly be charged with indecisiveness or vacillation for
he suited his action to his word and his word to his action.
In the instant case, we have, therefore, affirmed the decision of the probate court declaring petitioner
as having acquired the status of a natural child of the deceased Juan M. Alberto and, as such,
entitled to participate in the latter's estate.
On September 18, 1953, a child named Ma. Theresa Alberto was born out of wedlock to one Aurora
Reniva with Juan M. Alberto as the alleged father. Accordingly, she used "Alberto" as her surname in
all her school records and correspondences.
On September 18, 1967, Juan M. Alberto, felled by a bullet from an assassins gun, died intestate.
His widow, Yolanda R. Alberto, filed a petition for the administration of his estate on January 10,
1968. After the publication of notices, she was appointed as the administratrix of the estate. After the
Inventory and Appraisal and the Administratrix' Accounting were approved on August 1, 1970 and on
April 29, 1971 respectively, the proceedings were ordered closed and terminated.
On September 15, 1978, Ma. Theresa Alberto filed a motion for leave to intervene as oppositor and
to re-open the proceedings praying that she be declared to have acquired the status of a natural
child and as such, entitled to share in the estate of the deceased. The motion was granted by the
probate court.
Upon the presentation by the parties of their respective evidence during the trial, the probate court
was convinced that indeed, Ma. Theresa Alberto had been in continuous possession of the status of
a natural child. Thereupon, it rendered a decision compelling the decedents heirs and estate to
recognize her as a natural daughter and to allow her to participate in the estate proceedings. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of oppositor and against the

estate of the deceased Juan M. Alberto
(a) Declaring oppositor Ma. Theresa R. Alberto as having acquired the status of a
natural child of the late Gov. Juan M. Alberto;
(b) Ordering the administratrix and widow of the deceased and their children, namely,
Mary Joy, Maria Rebecca, Juan, Jr., Juan III, Maria Yolanda and Juan IV, all
surnamed Alberto, to recognize and acknowledge oppositor as an acknowledged
natural child of the late Gov. Alberto;
(c) Declaring oppositor as one of the heirs of the late Gov. Juan M. Alberto;
(d) Ordering the administratrix to partition the deceaseds estate and turn over to
oppositor her participation therein equivalent to one-half (1/2) of the share of each
legitimate child; and
(e) Ordering the administratrix to pay oppositor the sum of P10,000.00 as attorneys
fees and expenses of litigation.
Costs against the administratrix.
SO ORDERED. 1
The probate courts findings are quoted hereunder, to wit:
1) In the case at bar, the Court believes, and so holds, that the oppositor has been in
continuous possession of the status of a child of Juan Alberto by his direct acts as
well as the acts of his family, as follows:
(a) The deceased gave the oppositor sums of money for her schooling;
(b) The deceased made known to his friends and relatives that she was his daughter;
and
(c) He made known to the personnel of the International School where oppositor was
enrolled that she was his daughter.
2) The following incidents would show the direct acts of the family of the deceased.
(a) When the deceaseds younger sister, Mrs. Aurita Alberto Solidum asked that the
oppositor be sent to her house in her Sunday best to meet her father for the first
time;
(b) When Fr. Arcilla brought the oppositor to the bedside of the deceased in the
hospital and Fr. Arcilla asked the guard to give way to her as she was a member of
the family;
(c) When the step-mother of the deceased, during the wake, introduced the oppositor
to her youngest sister as an elder sister.
3) Prescinding from the foregoing, there is sufficient evidence to prove that the
oppositor is the child of the deceased.
1. Oppositors mother, Aurora Reniva, testified:
(a) of an indiscretion that led to the conception of and giving birth to the oppositor;
(b) that Mrs. Aurita Solidum arranged the meeting between the oppositor and the
deceased at the MOPC; (This particular testimony was corroborated by Cristeta
Andaya, former maid of Mrs. Solidum, and by the oppositor) and
(c) that Juan Alberto had been sending her money from time to time.
2) Oppositor also testified that:
(a) She had her first meeting with her father at the MOPC where he gave her
P500.00 personally and two telephone numbers where he could be contacted and
where they talked about her name, age and other matters.
(b) She had other meetings with her father at the MOPC on which occasions her
father also gave her money.
(c) The deceased visited her two times at the International School whose rules on
visitors were strict and when her father visited her, the secretary of the principal told
her that her father was waiting for her. This showed that the deceased had identified
himself to the personnel of the school that he was the father of the oppositor.
(d) He promised to see her in her school during her birthday on September 18, 1968
but was not able to do so because of his untimely death.
(e) The deceased promised to bring the oppositor to Catanduanes but failed likewise
because of his death.
(f) When oppositor and her mother went to the PGH on the occasion of her fathers
death, Fr. Arcilla held her by the hand and asked the guard to make way for her
because she was a child of Juan Alberto.
(g) After the wake for her deceased father, the deceaseds step-mother, Saturnina
Alberto, introduced her as a sister to Joy Alberto her half-sister.
(h) Congressman Jose Alberto allowed her associates, upon her representations, to
use the ballroom of the Regent of Manila for practice purposes. Congressman
Alberto was the owner of the Regent of Manila.
(i) Her uncles and aunts, i.e., brothers and sisters of her father, regarded her as their
niece and introduced her to others as the eldest daughter of Juan Alberto.
(j) The children of the brothers and sisters of Juan Alberto recognized her as their
cousin.
3) Jose Tablizo testified that:
(a) There was a strong physical resemblance between the deceased and the
oppositor.
(b) The deceased and the oppositor wrote similarly.
(c) It was known among the friends of the deceased, particularly the Breeze Gang,
composed of the witness, Jose Tablizo, the deceased and 4 others.
(d) Sometime in 1967, the deceased showed him the report card of the Oppositor
and boasted of her high grades.
(e) The friends of the deceased had a party in Virac, Catanduanes for the oppositor
whom they considered as the deceaseds daughter. (This was corroborated by
Silverio Taberara.)
4) Atty. Martiniano Vivo testified that Commissioner of Immigration Edmundo Reyes,

as lawyer for the deceased, made an appointment with him (Atty. Vivo) for a
conference, at which they discussed the latters letter to the deceased regarding the
oppositor. In said conference, Com. Reyes said that the deceased was not denying
that he was the father of the oppositor. And because of his marital status and the fact
that he was a public official, he wanted to avoid public scandal with the promise to
support the oppositor quietly through a cousin, Fr. Arcilla. 2
The Court of Appeals reversed the above decision of the probate court on the strength of the
following observations:
Assuming the foregoing to be true, we do not believe they satisfy the degree of proof
to establish that oppositor was in continuous possession of the status of a natural
child of the deceased.
In one case, the following facts were proved; that two nurses took
care of the children at the expense of the defendant; that said
defendant kissed the children, called them sons, and ordered that
they be taken care of very well; that he gave the money for the
necessities of the mother and the six children, the oldest of whom
called the father; that he visited the mother, complained of his big
family, and was publicly regarded as the father of the children. It was
held that these were not sufficient to be a basis for a declaration of
paternity. They may show that the defendant was convinced of his
paternity in relation to the children; but they do not show any intent on
his part to place such children in the possession of status of natural
children. The continued possession of such
status cannot be founded on conjectures and presumption. So, also,
the mere fact that defendants mother used to visit the child, cannot
be considered as conduct of his family sufficient to confer
the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child.
(1 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1983 ed., pp. 604-605,
citing, Sentencia, 12 October 1907; Gustilo vs. Gustilo, et al., 14
SCRA 149; Sentencia, 9 May 1921; Potot vs. Ycong, No. 6651, 22
March 1941, 40 O.G. No. 4, 26 July 1941, p. 748)
We find the evidence of oppositor-appellee even weaker than that proven in the
aforequoted citation. As a matter of fact, oppositor's Exhibit W-1, a letter written by
oppositor to Jose Tablizo after the death of the deceased, betrays a lack of
association between the deceased and oppositor such as normally characterizes the
relationship between father and child. It gives the impression that the deceased
studiously distanced himself from the oppositor and had no intention whatsoever of
recognizing oppositor as his child. The pertinent portion of the letter reads:
I have always been proud to be JMAs eldest daughter, and I feel

even prouder after I heard from people like you. You were the ones
that knew him most, shared his dreams as a young man, and
witnessed his struggle from Palmeras slums to Forbes Park. You
saw him rise from cargador to lawyer and, finally, to governor; I only
heard about them through Mama. His life was a novel, and if I were to
help write it, I would be able to contribute but a few pages, for I knew
him only as a Big Man. It is YOU who had a part in the first
adventures of that same novel, and I envy you. (p. 35, Folder of
Exhibits) 3
Hence this petition.
May the estate and heirs of deceased Juan M. Alberto be ordered to recognize petitioner as the
deceaseds natural daughter on the basis of the evidence presented by petitioner to establish her
claim that she has been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child?
We rule in the affirmative.
In the probate court, the following have been established:
1) that prior to Juan M. Alberto's marriage to Yolanda Reyes, herein private respondent, Juan M.
Alberto and Aurora Reniva, mother of herein petitioner, were sweethearts;
2) that as a consequence of an indiscretion, Aurora Reniva conceived and gave birth to herein
petitioner Ma. Theresa Alberto on September 18, 1953;
3) that petitioner used 'Alberto' as her surname in all her school records and Juan M. Alberto was
known to be her father;
4) that through Fr. Arcilla, a first cousin of Juan M. Alberto, money was given to Aurora Reniva;
5) that when petitioner was about nine (9) years old, Mrs. Aurita Solidum, the youngest sister of Juan
M. Alberto, arranged the first meeting between petitioner and Juan M. Alberto at the MOPC and
during said meeting, they talked about petitioner, the deceased gave petitioner P500.00 and two
telephone numbers;
6) that Juan M. Alberto would have visited petitioner on her birthday in her school, International
School, if not for his untimely death on September 18, 1967;
7) that when petitioner and her mother went to the PGH on the occasion of Juan M. Albertos death,
Fr. Arcilla held her by the hand and asked the guard to make way for her as she was a daughter of
Juan M. Alberto;
8) that after the wake for deceased Juan M. Alberto, his step mother, Saturnina Alberto introduced
petitioner to Joy Alberto as the latters sister;
9) that the siblings of Juan M. Alberto regarded petitioner as their niece and introduced her to their
children as the eldest daughter of Juan M. Alberto;
10) that the children of Juan M. Albertos siblings regarded her as their cousin;
11) that petitioner was known by Juan M. Albertos friends as his daughter;
12) that Juan M. Alberto showed Jose Tablizo the grades of petitioner and remarked that those were
the grades of his daughter.
Private respondent, Yolanda Alberto, the sole witness for private respondents, denied that Juan M.
Alberto ever recognized Ma. Theresa Alberto as his daughter. She presented in evidence Aurora
Renivas letters to Juan M. Alberto dated December 23, 1955, September 27, 1954 and March 15,
1960; Aurora Renivas letter to Fr. Arcilla dated December 23, 1955; letter of Zenaida Reniva to
Juan M. Alberto dated September 16, 1953, to prove that Juan M. Alberto refused to recognize Ma.
Theresa Alberto as his own. 4
However, these letters do not prove that Juan M. Alberto refused to recognize Ma. Theresa Alberto.
All that the letters stated was that Aurora Reniva was having a difficult time raising a child by her
own self and therefore, she was seeking the assistance of Juan M. Alberto. Private respondent
quoted as Exhibit "3-B" the portion of Aurora Renivas letter dated March 15, 1960 which says:
. . . I am just wondering why after all those years of patient waiting, you still do not
give a damn to her. 5
The full text of the paragraph, however, reads as follows:
On the 23rd of this month, Maria Theresa P. Alberto will graduate from the Prep
School of Holy Ghost College. I am just wondering why after all those years of
patient waiting, you still do not give a damn to her. I thought, as I was told before by
Fr. Arcilla, that I just pray and wait because he said pretty soon you will be sending
her money for support. So far, only the 300 pesos was received by us last October,
1959. For it, I am very grateful because it helped me a lot in our wants. 6
The letter itself shows that Juan M. Alberto was not completely indifferent towards Ma. Theresa
Alberto. He did provide her support whenever he could.
The latest letter that was presented in evidence was dated March 15, 1960. At the time, petitioner
and Juan M. Alberto had not yet met. About two years later, when petitioner was nine years old, Mrs.
Aurita Solidum arranged the first meeting between petitioner and the deceased. This initial meeting
was followed by many more. Moreover, it is noteworthy that Juan M. Alberto never took any step to
stop petitioner from using his surname. The testimony of Jose Tablizo established his recognition of
Ma. Theresa Alberto as his daughter. He testified that Juan M. Alberto showed him two report cards
of Ma. Theresa which showed straight "A's." He said "Boy! Great!" and Juan M. Alberto said that
those were the grades of his daughter. 7 This testimony is now being discredited for being hearsay.
This Court holds that the same falls within the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Sec. 38, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court provides as follows:
Sec. 38. Declaration Against Interest. The declaration made by a person

deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact
asserted at the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's
own interest that a reasonable man in his position would not have made his
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against
himself or his successors in interest and against third persons.
As found by the trial court, recognition of petitioner's status as a natural daughter of Juan M. Alberto
was made, not only by the latter, but by his relatives as well Fr. Cipriano Arcilla, Jose Alberto,
Aurita Solidum and Saturnina Alberto, among others. Private respondent only had to present any
one of those relatives to negate petitioner's testimony that she had been acknowledged by them as
the eldest daughter of the deceased. Her failure to do so baffles this Court. If indeed Ma. Theresa
Alberto were fabricating her testimony, the family of the deceased would have been more than
willing to destroy the claims of an intruder. Under the circumstances, it is safe for us to assume that
had any of the relatives mentioned by petitioner been presented as witness for private respondent,
their testimonies would be detrimental to the latter's cause.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that petitioner has been in continuous possession of the status of a
natural child of the deceased in accordance with Article 283 of the Civil Code which
provides, inter alia:
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as
his natural child:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged
father by the direct acts of the latter or his family.
The Court of Appeals, in reversing the decision of the probate court, stated as follows:
We find the evidence of oppositor-appellee even weaker than that proven in the
aforequoted citation. As a matter of fact, oppositor's Exhibit W-1, a letter written by
oppositor to Jose Tablizo after the death of the deceased, betrays a lack of
association between the deceased and oppositor such as normally characterizes the
relationship between father and child. It gives the impression that the deceased
studiously distanced himself from the oppositor and had not intention whatsoever of
recognizing oppositor as his child. The pertinent portion of the letter reads:
I have always been proud to be JMAs eldest daughter, and I feel even prouder after
I heard from people like you. You were the ones that knew him most, shared his
dreams as a young man, and witnessed his struggle from, palmeras slums to Forbes
Park. You saw him rise from cargador to lawyer and, finally, to governor; I only heard
about them through Mama. His life was a novel, and if I were to help write it, I would
be able to contribute but a few pages, for I knew him only as a Big Man. It is YOU
who had a part in the first adventures of that same novel, and I envy you. 8
What a poignant novel this daughter could well author as she now seeks to establish indubitable
parental links with a father who sired her some forty-one years ago. Why he desisted from marrying
the mother of this girl at a time when no impediment blocked the way is a matter one can merely
conjecture at.
While he did contract marriage subsequently with another woman, it was only too clear that he had
no intentions of closing definitively that chapter in his life when he begat his first-born. Of the
different categories of illegitimate children under the old Civil Code, the natural child occupies the
highest position, she being the child of parents who, at the time of her conception, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other and could, therefore, have contracted a valid
marriage. Often the fruit of first love, she is ensconced firmly in her parent's hearts. No subsequent
liaisons, though blessed with legitimate offspring, can completely obliterate those early memories.
A shared past intimacy between the putative parents and the clear marks of heredity stamped on the
brow of their offspring are not to be denied. Thus, whether openly or furtively, a father in the situation
of Juan M. Alberto could not have resisted manifesting signs of concern and care insofar as his
firstborn is concerned. If, at an early age, the child shows much talent and great promise as
petitioner in this case apparently did, it is understandable, and even to be expected, that the father
would proudly step forward to claim paternity either through his direct acts or those of his family,
or both, as in instant case.
In the case at bench, evidence is not wanting from which it may logically be concluded that the
deceased Juan M. Alberto took no pains to conceal his paternity. No less than his younger sister, his
stepmother, his priest-cousin, several relatives and close friends were categorically informed of the
relationship and they accepted the same as fact.
Understandably, considering the strait-laced mores of the times and the social and political stature of
Juan M. Alberto and his family, those who were privy to the relationship observed discreetness. But
he himself openly visited his daughter in school, had meetings with her at the MOPC on which
occasions he gave her money and introduced her proudly to his gangmates.
Where the daughter admits to envy in a letter to her fathers friend because the latter played a
greater role in her fathers life, this is but the natural expression of a wistful longing of a child to
reach out to her biological father. Far be it for us to interpret such sentiment as a betrayal of "a lack
of association between the deceased and oppositor such as normally characterizes the relationship
between father and child." In this instance, the lack of association cannot be helped for the
relationship was far from normal.
Much less do we take it as giving the impression that the deceased "studiously distanced himself
from the oppositor and had no intention whatsoever of recognizing oppositor as his child." On the
contrary, during his lifetime, Juan M. Alberto acted in such a manner as to evince his intent to
recognize Ma. Theresa Alberto, herein oppositor, as his flesh and blood, first, by allowing her from
birth to use his family name; second, by giving her and her mother sums of money by way of support
and lastly, by openly introducing her to members of his family, relatives and friends as his daughter.
Supplementing such unmistakable acts of recognition were those of his kin and gangmates
manifesting open acceptance of such relationship. Taken altogether, the claimed filiation would be
hard to disprove.
Since the oppositor seeks a judicial declaration that she be recognized as a natural child to enable
her to participate in the estate of the deceased, Article 285 of the Civil Code prescribing the period
when such action should be brought governs. It provides:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during
the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter
may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his
majority.
xxx xxx xxx
The oppositor's case falls clearly under the above exception.
Juan M. Alberto died during the minority of petitioner, that is, on September 18, 1967 the day
petitioner turned fourteen. As such, petitioner had four years from the time she reached twenty-one
on September 18, 1974, which was then the age of majority, within which to bring the aforesaid
action. Thus, petitioner had until September 18, 1978 within which to file the action for recognition.
Petitioner filed her motion for leave to intervene as oppositor and to re-open the proceedings with
the prayer that she be declared to have acquired the status of a natural child and as such, entitled to
share in the estate of the deceased, on September 15, 1978. Said motion was, therefore,
seasonably filed three days before the expiration of the four-year period.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of the Court
of Appeals is REVERSED and that of the probate court AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
VIRAY VS PEOPLE
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 to reverse and set aside the August 31, 2012
Decision1 and January 7, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33076, which
affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 16 (RTC), in
Criminal Case No. 66-07.
The factual backdrop of this case is as follows:
An Information for qualified theft was filed against petitioner Ryan Viray before the RTC, which reads: chanRoblesvi rtual Lawli bra ry
That on or about 19 October 2006, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, then being employed as a helper of ZENAIDA
VEDUA y SOSA with intent to gain and with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously steal, take and carry away several pieces of jewelry, One (1) Gameboy, One (1) CD
player, One (1) Nokia cellphone and a jacket with a total value of P297,800.00 belonging to the said Zenaida
S. Vedua, without the latters consent and to her damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount of
P297,800.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
When arraigned, the accused pleaded not guilty.4 At the pre-trial, the defense proposed the stipulation,
and the prosecution admitted, that the accused was employed as a dog caretaker of private complainant
ZenaidaVedua (Vedua) and was never allowed to enter the house and he worked daily from 5:00 to
9:00 in the morning.5
During trial, the prosecution presented evidence to prove the following:
Private complainant Vedua maintains seventy-five (75) dogs at her compound in Caridad, Cavite City.6To
assist her in feeding the dogs and cleaning their cages, private complainant employed the accused who
would report for work from 6:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.7 On October 19, 2006, at around 6:30 in the morning,
accused arrived for work. Half an hour later or at 7 oclock, private complainant left for Batangas. Before
leaving, she locked the doors of her house, and left the accused to attend to her dogs. Later, at around
7:00 in the evening, private complainant arrived home, entering through the back door of her house. As
private complainant was about to remove her earrings, she noticed that her other earrings worth PhP
25,000 were missing. She then searched for the missing earrings but could not find them.8
Thereafter, private complainant also discovered that her jacket inside her closet and her other pieces of
jewelry (rositas) worth PhP 250,000 were also missing. A Gameboy (portable videogame console), a
compact disc player, a Nokia cellular phone and a Nike Air Cap were likewise missing. The total value of the
missing items supposedly amounted to PhP 297,800. Private complainant immediately checked her premises
and discovered that the main doors of her house were destroyed.9 A plastic bag was also found on top
of her stereo, which was located near the bedroom. The plastic bag contained a t-shirt and a pair of shorts
later found to belong to accused.10
Witness Nimfa Sarad, the laundrywoman of Veduas neighbor, testified seeing Viray at Veduas house at
6:00 a.m. By 11:00 a.m., she went out on an errand and saw Viray with an unidentified male companion
leaving Veduas house with a big sack.11
Another witness, Leon Young, who prepares official/business letters for Vedua, testified that he went to
Veduas house between 10:00 and 11:00 am of October 19, 2006 to retrieve a diskette and saw petitioner
with a male companion descending the stairs of Veduas house. He alleged that since he knew Viray as an
employee of private complainant, he simply asked where Vedua was. When he was told that Vedua was in
Batangas, he left and went back three days after, only to be told about the robbery.12
Prosecution witness Beverly Calagos, Veduas stay-out laundrywoman, testified that on October 19, 2006,
she reported for work at 5:00 a.m. Her employer left for Batangas at 7:00 am leaving her and petitioner
Viray to go about their chores. She went home around 8:30 a.m. leaving petitioner alone in Veduas house.
Meanwhile, petitioner never reported for work after that day.13
For his defense, Viray averred that he did not report for work on the alleged date of the incident as he was
then down with the flu. His mother even called up Vedua at 5:30 a.m. to inform his employer of his intended
absence. Around midnight of October 20, 2006, Vedua called Virays mother to report the loss of some
valuables in her house and alleged that Viray is responsible for it. Petitioners sister and aunt corroborated
his version as regards the fact that he did not go to work on October 19, 2006 and stayed home sick.14
After the parties rested their respective cases, the trial court rendered a Decision dated December 5,
2009,15 holding that the offense charged should have been robbery and not qualified theft as there was an
actual breaking of the screen door and the main door to gain entry into the house.16 Similarly, Viray cannot
be properly charged with qualified theft since he was not a domestic servant but more of a laborer paid on a
daily basis for feeding the dogs of the complainant.17
In this light, the trial court found that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to conclude that Viray was
the one responsible for the taking of valuables belonging to Vedua.18 Hence, the RTC found petitioner
Viray guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery and sentenced him, thus: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused RYAN VIRAY GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of robbery and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate imprisonment
ranging from FOUR (4) years, TWO (2) months and ONE (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT
(8) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.19
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the CA.
The appellate court found that the Information filed against Viray shows that the prosecution failed to allege
one of the essential elements of the crime of robbery, which is the use of force upon things. Thus, to
convict him of robbery, a crime not necessarily included in a case of qualified theft, would violate the
constitutional mandate that an accused must be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.20
Nonetheless, the CA held that a conviction of the accused for qualified theft is warranted considering that
Viray enjoyed Veduas confidence, being the caretaker of the latters pets. Viray committed a grave abuse of
this confidence when, having access to the outside premises of private complainants house, he forced open
the doors of the same house and stole the latters personal belongings.21 In its assailed Decision, the
appellate court, thus, modified the ruling of the trial court holding that the accused is liable for the crime
of qualified theft.
As to the penalty imposed, considering that there was no independent estimate of the value of the stolen
properties, the CA prescribed the penalty under Article 309(6)22 in relation to Article 31023 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).24 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads, viz: cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision of the
court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant be convicted for the crime of
QUALIFIED THEFT and is hereby sentenced to suffer indeterminate imprisonment of four (4) months and one
(1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as maximum. The appellant is also ordered to return the pieces of jewelry and other personal
belongings taken from private complainant. Should restitution be no longer possible, the accused appellant
must pay the equivalent value of the unreturned items.
SO ORDERED.25
When the appellate court, in the adverted Resolution of January 7, 2013,26 denied his motion for
reconsideration,27 Viray interposed the present petition asserting that the CA committed a reversible error
in finding him guilty. Petitioner harps on the supposed inconsistencies of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses in advancing his position that the evidence presented against him fall short of the quantum of
evidence necessary to convict him of qualified theft.28
In the meantime, in its Comment29 on the present petition, respondent People of the Philippines asserts
that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are so insignificant and do
not affect the credibility and weight of their affirmation that petitioner was at the crime scene when the
crime was committed.30 In fact, these minor inconsistencies tend to strengthen the testimonies because
they discount the possibility that they were fabricated.31 What is more, so respondent contends, these
positive testimonies outweigh petitioners defense of denial and alibi.32
In resolving the present petition, We must reiterate the hornbook rule that this court is not a trier of facts,
and the factual findings of the trial court, when sustained by the appellate court, are binding in the absence
of any indication that both courts misapprehended any fact that could change the disposition of the
controversy.33
In the present controversy, while the CA modified the decision of the trial court by convicting petitioner of
qualified theft rather than robbery, the facts as found by the court a quo were the same facts used by the
CA in holding that all the elements of qualified theft through grave abuse of confidence were present. It is
not, therefore, incumbent upon this Court to recalibrate the evidence presented by the parties during trial.
Be that as it may, We find it necessary to modify the conclusion derived by the appellate court from the
given facts regarding the crime for which petitioner must be held accountable.
Art. 308 in relation to Art. 310 of the RPC describes the felony of qualified theft: c hanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latters consent.
x x x
Art. 310. Qualified Theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees
than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with
grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists
of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or property is
taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident
or civil disturbance. (Emphasis supplied.)
The crime charged against petitioner is theft qualified by grave abuse of confidence. In this mode of
qualified theft, this Court has stated that the following elements must be satisfied before the accused may
be convicted of the crime charged:
1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owners consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon
things; and
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.34
As pointed out by both the RTC and the CA, the prosecution had proved the existence of the first four
elements enumerated above beyond reasonable doubt.
First, it was proved that the subjects of the offense were all personal or movable properties, consisting as
they were of jewelry, clothing, cellular phone, a media player and a gaming device. Second, these properties
belong to private complainant Vedua. Third, circumstantial evidence places petitioner in the scene of the
crime during the day of the incident, as numerous witnesses saw him in Veduas house and his clothes were
found inside the house. He was thereafter seen carrying a heavy-looking sack as he was leaving private
complainants house. All these circumstances portray a chain of events that leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that petitioner took the personal properties with intent to gain, especially considering
that, fourth, Vedua had not consented to the removal and/or taking of these properties.
With regard to the fifth and sixths elements, however, the RTC and the CA diverge in their respective
Decisions.
The RTC found that the taking committed by petitioner was not qualified by grave abuse of confidence,
rather it was qualified by the use of force upon things. The trial court held that there was no confidence
reposed by the private complainant on Viray that the latter could have abused. In fact, Vedua made sure
that she locked the door before leaving. Hence, Viray was compelled to use force to gain entry into Veduas
house thereby committing the crime of robbery, not theft.
The CA, on the other hand, opined that the breaking of the screen and the door could not be appreciated to
qualify petitioners crime to robbery as such use of force was not alleged in the Information. Rather, this
breaking of the door, the CA added, is an indication of petitioners abuse of the confidence given by private
complainant. The CA held that [Viray] enjoyed the confidence of the private complainant, being the
caretaker of the latters pets. He was given access to the outside premises of private complainants house
which he gravely abused when he forced open the doors of the same house and stole the latters
belongings.35 Committing grave abuse of confidence in the taking of the properties, petitioner was found
by the CA to be liable for qualified theft.
This Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the taking committed by petitioner cannot be qualified by the
breaking of the door, as it was not alleged in the Information. However, we disagree from its finding that the
same breaking of the door constitutes the qualifying element of grave abuse of confidence to sentence
petitioner Viray to suffer the penalty for qualified theft. Instead, We are one with the RTC that private
complainant did not repose on Viray confidence that the latter could have abused to commit qualified
theft.
The very fact that petitioner forced open the main door and screen because he was denied access to
private complainants house negates the presence of such confidence in him by private complainant. Without
ready access to the interior of the house and the properties that were the subject of the taking, it cannot be
said that private complaint had a firm trust on petitioner or that she relied on his discretion36 and that
the same trust reposed on him facilitated Virays taking of the personal properties justifying his conviction of
qualified theft.
To warrant the conviction and, hence, imposition of the penalty for qualified theft, there must be an
allegation in the information and proof that there existed between the offended party and the accused such
high degree of confidence37or that the stolen goods have been entrusted to the custody or vigilance of the
accused.38 In other words, where the accused had never been vested physical access to,39 or material
possession of, the stolen goods, it may not be said that he or she exploited such access or material
possession thereby committing such grave abuse of confidence in taking the property. Thus, in People v.
Maglaya,40 this Court refused to impose the penalty prescribed for qualified theft when the accused was not
given material possession or access to the property: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
Although appellant had taken advantage of his position in committing the crime aforementioned, We do not
believe he had acted with grave abuse of confidence and can be convicted of qualified theft,
because his employer had never given him the possession of the machines involved in the present
case or allowed him to take hold of them, and it does not appear that the former had any special
confidence in him. Indeed, the delivery of the machines to the prospective customers was entrusted, not to
appellant, but to another employee.
Inasmuch as the aggregate value of the machines stolen by appellant herein is P13,390.00, the crime
committed falls under Art. 308, in relation to the first subdivision of Art.309 of the Revised Penal Code, which
prescribes the penalty of prisin mayor in its minimum and medium periods. No modifying circumstance having
attended the commission of the offense, said penalty should be meted out in its medium period, or from 7
years, 4 months and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months of prisin mayor. The penalty imposed in the decision
appealed from is below this range. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The allegation in the information that the offender is a laborer of the offended party does not by itself,
without more, create the relation of confidence and intimacy required by law for the imposition of the
penalty prescribed for qualified theft.41 Hence, the conclusion reached by the appellate court that petitioner
committed qualified theft because he enjoyed the confidence of the private complainant, being the
caretaker of the latters pets is without legal basis. The offended partys very own admission that the
accused was never allowed to enter the house42 where the stolen properties were kept refutes the existence
of the high degree of confidence that the offender could have allegedly abused by forc[ing] open the doors
of the same house.43
Without the circumstance of a grave abuse of confidence and considering that the use of force in breaking
the door was not alleged in the Information, petitioner can only be held accountable for the crime of simple
theft under Art. 308 in relation to Art. 309 of the RPC.
As for the penalty, We note with approval the observation made by the appellate court that the amount of
the property taken was not established by an independent and reliable estimate. Thus, the Court may fix
the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case or impose the minimum
penalty under Art. 309 of the RPC.44 In this case, We agree with the observation made by the appellate
court in accordance with the rule that if there is no available evidence to prove the value of the stolen
property or that the prosecution failed to prove it, the corresponding penalty to be imposed on the accused-
appellant should be the minimum penalty corresponding to theft involving the value of
P5.00.45 Accordingly, We impose the prescribed penalty under Art. 309(6) of the RPC, which is arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods. The circumstance of the breaking of the door, even if proven
during trial, cannot be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance as it was not alleged in the
Information.46 Thus, the Court finds that the penalty prescribed should be imposed in its medium period,
that is to say, from two (2) months and one (1) day to three (3) months of arresto mayor.
Lastly, We delete the order for the reparation of the stolen property. Art. 2199 of the Civil Code is clear that
one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him, as he has duly
proved. Since, as aforesaid, the testimony of the private complainant is not sufficient to establish the value
of the property taken, nor may the courts take judicial notice of such testimony, We cannot award the
reparation of the stolen goods.47 ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry
WHEREFORE, the CA Decision of August 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33076

is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Ryan Viray is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of SIMPLE THEFTand is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1)
day to three (3) months of arresto mayor. Further, for want of convincing proof as to the value of the
property stolen, the order for reparation is hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
GARCIA VS DRILON
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93
percent of a total population of 93.3 million adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the
admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and
gave himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence against
Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that,
for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and
violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate
partners such as their husbands and live-in partners."3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress
enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for
Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and
their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or
any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common
child.5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the
commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay
officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care providers, and
other local government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of
the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to
barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her
minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C.
Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional,
psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with
threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support.7
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was eleven
years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the
natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years
old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around her
husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling,
and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray,
and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and even when she was
already working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her
to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of
some men, at one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's
Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when
private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household help about
his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was
just using the woman because of their accounts with the bank.10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and
emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms
and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit
private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his
ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom
he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. When
private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if the
latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware of private respondent's
sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because of
his cruelty to private respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On
December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by
her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital.
Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered
to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has been undergoing
therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant medications.12
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file
charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's job.
He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even
told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, that private respondent
should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not
sired a child with her.13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her
children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if
she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is the
President of three corporations 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros
Trading Corporation of which he and private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to the
absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly
salary of 20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation. Household
expenses amounting to not less than 200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent
through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation together with the
bills for utilities.15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of 60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of
pesos from the corporations.16 After private respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner
forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the
corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about said
businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an
accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos.17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private
respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO18 on March 24, 2006
effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family home
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering
that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable
notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act
No. 9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent
herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the
Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall be
assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March
2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her children from her
when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help and
driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where
the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the Petitioner,
directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her children,
mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation
rights to the children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and
ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the Provincial
Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also be
ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a house
for them, and educational and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received
from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as
President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than 2
April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court by the
Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of
Indirect Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and
considering the financial resources of the Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner
sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO
KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended
TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included the following additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan
Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Paraaque, the
continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient
sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could be finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1)
comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that the
TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent and returning the same to
its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the
bond from 5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at 100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of the TPO to allow him
visitation rights to his children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the following
modifications prayed for by private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings of
Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours
from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in
Indirect Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the conjugal
house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to
remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48 hours after the
petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can remove things
from the conjugal home and make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment and
other things in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and
Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from receipt of
the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of
Court;
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of
Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon
presentation of proof of payment of such expenses.23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply with
the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their children, private respondent
filed another application24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter
was purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex
Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon private
respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two small boys,
Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted to
kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On
another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened
her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint
against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working at the
conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private respondent. This
came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her
children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the
maids' room, private respondent filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola.27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, acts

of violence against the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating

in any form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or agents,
from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers,
her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros,
laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other
household helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the
subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the
three children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact the schools of the children
directly or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other fees
directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through the schools and the TPO will
be rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to
the Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00

for rental for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and support in arrears from
March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and
Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a
Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles,
respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by J
Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the
conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in
which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent
have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville
Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are conjugal assets or those in which
the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an
interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including properties covered by TCT
Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served a
copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow the transfer,
sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties to any person, entity or
corporation without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her
signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that
her signature will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to
defraud her or the conjugal partnership of gains.
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for another
ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO
should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation,30 however, that he
has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court
directed in its Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion.
Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO
dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:
xxxx
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary
Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and
continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further orders,
and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required
comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an
"exercise in futility."33
Proceedings before the CA

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a
petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary
restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due
process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil
case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order36 (TRO) against
the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed36 the petition for failure
of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case,
which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the
trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the
Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE
ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND
THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE
LAW.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT

R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262
RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE
POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID
AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court

Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A.
9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for
prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if
not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial
court, it will not be considered on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law
in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City,
petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality."41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as
Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family
courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against
women and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the
branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities
identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides
that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the
absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant. (Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority
as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal,
special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.44 It is
settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding
laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law."46The Constitution vests the power of
judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this
Court, but in all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution
contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of
any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where
such constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in
part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have
been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before the
RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of this
Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays
down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not
an answer.49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he
himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why
a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate
civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim
and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot
likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a
defending party may have against an opposing party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any
claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein.51Finally, a third-party complaint is a
claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action
for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.52As
pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a
cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint.
Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the
right of private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very statute the validity of
which is being attacked53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid
cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred
petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a
statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.54 Be that as it may, Section
25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues,
among others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it may
issue an order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;

(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of
affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day,
to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary protection
order issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when
necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order
issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30)
days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed
temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private
respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues,
without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary
procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with
prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may
have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted
an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of
a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial
court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of
the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively
hindered the case from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited.
Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its
enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a
time,56 should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a
litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United
States declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their
separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes
are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good
faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be
unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its
extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations
omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the
merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to
protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders
will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine novel
issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and again,
discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in
view of private respondent's plea in her Comment59 to the instant Petition that we should put the
challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child
abuse, which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not
enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,61 which became R.A. 9262,
reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi
Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized measure"62 an amalgamation of
two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate
Relationships Act"63 providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in isolation" but at
the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence and
abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same
measure. We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups have
expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic violence
apart from against women as well as other members of the household, including children or the
husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which the
main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or the female partners in a
relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind
of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves "WIIR"
Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include men in this domestic violence. But
plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the
family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This includes the
men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with the family.65
xxx
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to women
and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that we
would be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.

As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong.
However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the domestic
environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the opportunity
to file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not decade, of battery and
abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by the
women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr.
President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure that
the men in this Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree with this
representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter
how empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in the domestic
environment where the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more superior to
the Filipino woman.
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill because
the family members have been included in this proposed measure since the other members of the
family other than women are also possible victims of violence. While women are most likely the
intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains that
in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that children are almost always
the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection extended to
other family members particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for
instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of abused children. The same law is
inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, fearing
that they may use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women. However, we should also
recognize that there are established procedures and standards in our courts which give credence to
evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as the
basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men and women in
our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband
and wife and their immediate family members, particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a
critical input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports
groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would be
removing the "men and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. That
will be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the
distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined
to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I will
propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President.
xxxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
xxxx
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished
proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas
malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi
iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact, it is
not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-
year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find
out about these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will update that.
It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the bill but
not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment, as
amended, is approved.66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of
Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress
has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be
perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by
the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the
necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.68 We only step in when there is a violation
of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early
case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited
either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law,
as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying
that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should
be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably
arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid
classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection
clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than
men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all
make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly
states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality."70
A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and
Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the
unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based violence".
Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and
take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters,
and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over
women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's
expression of controlling women to retain power.71
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its Resolution
48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating
that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men
and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the
prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial
social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men."72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based
violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the
Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent
portions of which are quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The patriarch of a
family was accorded the right to use force on members of the family under his control. I quote the
early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy the institutional rule of
men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and
intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the
authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she
endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards
the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent Blackstone
has been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one and that one was the
husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to
limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb,
which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict
corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given more importance
than preventing violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English common
law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court to strike down the
common law right of a husband to beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her,
spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now
acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that the
husband can invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The temperance
leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as
the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their
husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette movements,
expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to vote, to own
property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public gaze.
They succeeded in transforming the issue into an important public concern. No less than the United
States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the victims of
severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of every
eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The [American Medical Association]
views these figures as "marked underestimates," because the nature of these incidents discourages
women from reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do not
speak English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is
conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence agree that the true incidence of
partner violence is probably double the above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women
per year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically
assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the United
States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of these incidents
involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes place, moreover, child abuse is often
present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible form of
abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also
common.
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no
superior alternative...Many abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their
husbands, in large part because they have no other source of income... Returning to one's abuser
can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all
homicide victims in the United States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide
victims are killed by their male partners.
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United
States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human
beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also
adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences on the
role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing.
The UN itself established a Commission on the Status of Women.
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half and full steps of all these women's
movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to
recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law
of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the Rights of
the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No.
9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations omitted)
B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"
victims of violence.
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against women
and children show that
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total
cases reported (9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of
4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in especially difficult
circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year
2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx
(T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003.
Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of
these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and
live-in partners.73
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence

against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under R.A.
9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its implementation in 2004,74 thus:
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*
Reported
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Cases
Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832
Incestuous Rape 38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
Attempted Rape 194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
Acts of
580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
Lasciviousness
Physical
3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018 1,588
Injuries
Sexual
53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
Harassment
RA 9262 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974 9,021
Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213
Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15
Concubinage 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128
RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62
Abduction
16 34 23 28 18 25 22
/Kidnapping 29
Unjust Vexation 90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155

Total 6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,104 12,948
*2011 report covers only from January to August
Source: Philippine National Police Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence against
men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because many
men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had
ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared with 11% of the
smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and women constituted 89%
of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic violence.75Statistics in Canada
show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury than the other
way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence from their spouses are
much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to
experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman against a spouse
are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical or emotional abuse.76
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the
Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles
to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-
drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was
challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is limited to
owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals, although not utilized, but
similarly pass through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be non-
vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be negligible and
their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a
menace to the health of the community."77 The mere fact that the legislative classification may result
in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons
or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby
rendered invalid.78
C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against women
are often treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then United
States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress'
authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that the widespread
gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of rape or domestic
violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" first at the hands of the offender and then of the
legal system.79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that
"(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the
parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the
latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of response or
reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating, recurring and often
serious nature of domestic violence."80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the
complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner"
and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila
even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by "insatiable greed" and of
absconding with the contested property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack
of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and
prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures
focused on women does not discriminate against men.82Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that R.A.
9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves
scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all
appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with
a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for
men and women."84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the
character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the development
of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges."85
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to
address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as
follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and
children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect
the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and
children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August
5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on
October 6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with
men before the law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations on the basis of equality of men and
women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two
protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was
promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and
their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3
thereof defines VAWC as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former
wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her
child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as

a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically
attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent
acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the
conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by
force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or
coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional
suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to
property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes
causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of
the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive
injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any

legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the
other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in
Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use
and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal
money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to
research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here are
also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the
argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the difference
between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in
his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate contrast
between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at
its meaning nor differ in its application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92that phrases like "depriving or
threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or
common money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so
vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld
not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather
than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly
delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its
wordings or detailed in its provisions.93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the
culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word
"person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian
relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the
victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of
Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be
proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-
Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient
financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in
repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the

due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections
afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family, property,
guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an
inkling of what happened."95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and
facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is
afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to
safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing
acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award
temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction
by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since
"time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,"99 the court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or
property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is
necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent
such violence, which is about to recur.100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The
victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses'
affidavits to the petition.101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process.
Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the
time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of
his property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing
experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were
required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests,103among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that
notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days
from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served
immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30)
days from service on the respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and
service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five
(5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall
likewise be indicated on the notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the
affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should
not be issued.106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be
apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the
fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment
and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of
an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does
not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial
of procedural due process.107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise,
on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation
rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him five days
(5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not
to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility," conveniently
forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time,
and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause
therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was denied due
process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from the
residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued
to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that
this is so. It states:
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any, some or
all of the following reliefs:
xxxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of
ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or
permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects
from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to
the residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the
residence;
xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence,
regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and
exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the private
respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case

to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging mediation
and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to "protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution."109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof
to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311
of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows:110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an
order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions
voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject
for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the
victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection
is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person
against whom the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of

judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the
Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be established
by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection
orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. Barangay Protection
Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator
to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who
1wphi1
receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing
after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to
act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an
attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the
issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of
an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the
same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong
Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as
the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance."113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a)
causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her
child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in
pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to
"maintain public order in the barangay."114
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of
certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and
the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers."115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding
"whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused
is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe that
an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur that
would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor
is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of a
BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other law
enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would
be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are
nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is
consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear
conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in
such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity
must be beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and
convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality
of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal
executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with
full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare
of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement against
domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the violence of
law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for
equality but will be its fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be,
sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

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CAPILI V PEOPLE

The factual antecedents are as follows: cralavvo nline lawlib rary

Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.

SO ORDERED.6 nadcralavvonli nelawli bra ry

1. THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD EXISTING

3. THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO

We rule in the negative.

WHEREFORE the petition is DISMISSED.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses:

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Accused shall serve the said penalties imposed successively.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Parties Arguments

We find the Petition wanting in merit.

Petitioners written statement is admissible in evidence.

Petitioners written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.

Forgery duly established.

No suppression of evidence on the part of the prosecution.

Petitioners denial is unavailing.

Elements of falsification of commercial documents established.

Falsification as a necessary means to commit estafa.

In Domingo v. People,36 we held:

The Proper Imposable Penalty

ONG VS PEOPLE 659 SCRA 588 FENCING

SO ORDERED.4 chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry

Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.

The Petition has no merit.

Contrary to law. [Enclosures supplied].

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered pronouncing the four accused in these

A. To Erlinda Ronquillo and Betty Ronquillo

1. P33,125.50 for actual damages,

C. To Andres Lojero, Sr.

1. P60,716.00 for actual damages,

IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS POSITIVE AND CLEAR

IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ALLEGED EYEWITNESS

IN HOLDING THAT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE

IN FINDING ACCUSEDS DEFENSE OF ALIBI WEAK;

IN RULING THAT THE VOLUNTARY SURRENDER OF THE ACCUSED

[I]t is to be expected that some discrepancies, and even self-

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

Hence, this appeal.

The Republic ascribes the following errors, to wit:

The appeal lacks merit.

We cannot sustain the contention.

In its decision of April 10, 2002, the Sandiganbayan stated as follows:

We uphold the Sandiganbayan.

E.O. No. 1 contained only two WHEREAS Clauses, to wit:

WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth;

a. Need of Evidentiary Substantiation in Proper Suit

PEOPLE VS. BARRA

On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.6 Trial ensued thereafter.

CAUSE OF DEATH: cralavvonlinelawlibrar y

MASSIVE HE[M]ORRHAGE SECONDARY [TO] GUNSHOT WOUND

Thus, the Court of Appeals stated: cralavvon linelawl ib rary

a) the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; chan roblesv irtualawl ibra ry

d) the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

Appellant filed his notice of appeal on February 18, 2011.17

In People v. Bocalan and Gatdula19 we stated that: cralavvonli nelawli bra ry

1. The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against

3. The taking is animo lucrandi; and

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of oppositor and against the

The probate courts findings are quoted hereunder, to wit:

1. Oppositors mother, Aurora Reniva, testified: