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To: Barack Obama, President of the United States of America

From: Dario deCamara Eubank, Paramilitary Operations Officer, CIA

Date: January 15, 2010

Subject: Expanding Targeted killing operations of High Value Targets of Al-Qaeda and Taliban

personnel in Pakistan

CC: Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Leon E Panetta, US CENTCOM Commander,

General David H. Petraeus

Executive Summary

The purpose of this brief Mr. President is to provide you with a policy recommendation

that will enable you to see the positives effects of the US drone operations against High Value

Targets (HVT) in Pakistan, specifically in the Federal Administered Tribal Region (FATA). The

three policy options I propose are: (1) increase Special Forces operations in conjunction with

drone attacks, (2) expanding area of operation and increase number drone raids (3) allow the

Pakistani intelligence (ISI) and military to conduct their own raids using American Hunter-Killer

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). I recommend that policy option two be implemented without

delay in order to disrupt and destroy the terror networks leadership cadre that help fuel the

insurgency in Afghanistan. Without a more expanded and sustained drone program to eliminate

key leadership personnel in the Taliban and Al'-Qaeda, they will further hamper our efforts to

make Afghanistan a stable and viable country and it will enable them to have yet another base of

operations to train and recruit jihadist fighters.

Statement of the Problem and Background

From 2008 through 2009 the US witnessed a new, more robust insurgency from the

Taliban and other terror organizations operating from Pakistan in Afghanistan. Coalition forces

lost 295 and 595 military personnel during those times respectively; American forces lost 155 and

319 services members also during the same time period (iCasualties.org). By geographical area,

Qandahar and Helmand have become hot beds for insurgent activity and where most of the
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casualties have taken place for US and Coalition forces (iCasualties.org). Two other regions in

Afghanistan have also experienced an increase in attacks and KIAs; the provinces North East of

Kandahar and the region North East of Kabul. The Pakistani government has also seen a rise in

terror attacks by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban within the past year and these attacks are furthering

the deteriorating situation in Pakistan. The increase in casualties in Afghanistan and the

frequency of attacks in Pakistan can be credited to three prominent insurgent and terror groups

who are now gaining ground in Afghanistan that we must continue to pursue with our Reaper and

Predator drone program.

There are three main insurgent/terror groups that direct operations in Afghanistan from

Pakistan, as well as groups already operating in Afghanistan that are hampering efforts to sustain

security. The Quetta Shura (QS), which is run by Mullah Omar, have its leadership based in

Quetta, Pakistan. They are attempting to take control of the Southern region of Afghanistan and

are profiting from the very lucrative opium trade in the Helmand province (McChrystal report).

They are also pushing into the Northern areas of the country as well spreading terror to the local

peoples and recruiting them to plant Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). The Haqqani Network

(HQN) now being led by Sirajuddin Haqqani operates in three provinces in the North East;

Khost, Paktia and Paktika near the Pakistani border (Golovnina, 2009). Our intelligence suggests

HQN has pledge allegiance to Mullah Omar of the QS and has close ties to AQ in Pakistan. The

last group is the Hezb-I-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), which has bases in Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kapisa

and Kunar provinces in Eastern Afghanistan (McChrystal report). From our perspective the QS

and HQN networks that operate from Pakistan are the main suppliers of man power fueling the

insurgency in Afghanistan along with the Al’Qadea elements that have safe haven in the FATA

region (McChrystal report).

The CIA, in conjunction with the Pakistani military and Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI)

have conducted over 78 drone attacks from 2008-09 (Roggio & Alexander, 2009). We have been

fairly successful in eliminating HVT in both the Taliban and AQ with our recent targeted killing
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of Baitullah Mehsud causing a power grab within the Taliban (Al Jazeera.net) and the killing of

Mustafa al Jaziri, a senior military commander for al Qaeda who sat on Al Qaeda's military shura

(Roggio & Alexander, 2009) In total, we have successful eliminated over 30 AQ, Taliban and

other terror HVTs and their logistical, and field expertise have been very difficult to replace

(Roggio & Alexander, 2009). While we continue to find and eliminate these key people, the

enemy is now shifting its command location south towards the Baluchistan region, so that it is not

exposed to the CIA’s drone efforts and the Pakistani military’s new offensive against them. If the

US does not expand our area of operations we will allow them to regroup in areas where there is

no drone presence or military operations and establish a new Command and Control center to

direct and divert manpower to fight coalition forces in Afghanistan and continue their terror

campaign against Pakistan.

Statement of your organization’s interests in the issue

The CIA’s interest in select targeted killing operations of HVTs of AQ and Taliban cadre

are such that it furthers our efforts in the Global War on Terror and Operation Enduring Freedom

by disrupting the insurgency in Afghanistan by eliminating key field commanders. While the US

military is engaged in two wars, the low kinetic war that the CIA is engaged through the use of

drones is able to produce positive results and a continuation of the program in Pakistan will allow

the CIA to carry out our goal of hunting top members of AQ and the Taliban.

Pre-Existing Policies

Our Drone program as it exists today has successfully eliminated 30 AQ and Taliban

HVTs in the Federally Administered Tribal region of Pakistan. From these targeted killings we

have shaken up the command structures of the Taliban, AQ and other insurgent elements and

made it hard to replace key positions. Most of our strikes have taken place in Southern and

Northern Waziristan with attacks in remote locations of these two areas (Roggio & Alexander,

2009). We have also made a few raids with Special Forces personnel in conjunction with drone

attacks (Walsh, 2009), but these incursions have led to a souring of relations with the Pakistani
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government and its military command. None the less, our Drone program is eliminating key AQ

and Taliban personnel.

Policy Options

Alternative 1- Increase Special Forces operations in conjunction with drone attacks.

Inserting members of the our Special Forces to conduct targeted killing operations on

HVT would greatly increase our success rate as well as enable us to gather more HUMIT on

future targets that we had lacked before.

Alternative 2: Expand area of drone operations and increase drone raids.

Conducting targeted killing operations where we know HVTs are escaping to in order to

avoid our current operations in the FATA and NWFP. Increasing drone raids by acquiring more

Hunter Killers will increase our ability to target more HVTs during our operations and disrupt the

insurgent and terror groups.

Alternative 3: Allow the Pakistani intelligence and military to conduct their own raids using

American Hunter Killer Unmanned Ariel Vehicles (UAVs).

Train trusted ISI and military personnel in Pakistan in the use HKUAVs. By training our

counterparts, this will free up CIA operations and allow us to pursue other HVTs in the region as

well as allow us to conduct other secondary targeted killing operations that we deem necessary to

further our efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Policy Options-Advantages and Disadvantages

Alternative 1: Increase Special Forces operations in conjunction with drone attacks.

 Increased chance SF personnel or CIA officers can be captured or killed during mission
 Combining the two will increase mission success; either by ensuring the target is
eliminated or capturing a HVT to interrogate for intelligence
• Violate Pakistani sovereignty even more by placing troops in country
• Provoke Pakistani military to attack American incursion forces whereby creating
international incident
Alternative 2: Expand area of drone operations and increase drone raids.

 Eliminates key personnel in groups previously mentioned

 Create power vacuum voids that are filled by less experienced personnel
 Assists Pakistani military by creating two fronts
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 Operate in areas where terror elements are fleeing to, whereby cutting them off from a
new command center
 Decrease need to use Special Forces operators
 Gather intelligence at a faster rate, eliminates HTV at a faster rate
• Likely increase in civilian collateral damage
Alternative 3: Allow the Pakistani intelligence and military to conduct their own raids using

American Hunter Killer Unmanned Ariel Vehicles (UAVs).

Take away attention from US efforts in Pakistan

Free up Intelligence personnel to conduct intelligence gathering operations in Pakistan
•Could use UAVs against India in Kashmir creating another incident
•Corrupt elements of the Pakistani government could pass technology or information from
UAVs onto AQ or other terror elements.
Recommendation

Based on my analysis, I recommend Alternative 2: Expand area of drone operations and

increase drone raids. By expanding our operational area we can target insurgent and terror

personnel that are fleeing our current operational area and are attempting to set up a new

Command and Control center. We will also be able to gather new intelligence in these areas that

we did not have before through an increase in drone raids. By expanding our operational area and

increase in drone raids we further help the Pakistani military in its efforts to battle the Taliban and

AQ groups that are in the FATA by eliminating HVTs and providing much needed intelligence of

insurgent movements for the military to use. We will also lessen the flow of experienced

personnel from leaking into Afghanistan to help with the insurgent activity there.

Adopting Alternative 2 does pose additional challenges which are: civilian causalities

and continued violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. While we have an unwritten agreement with

Pakistan to carry out drone operations in their tribal territory expanding operations south will put

us closer to a major city, Quetta. While we have limited collateral damage during targeted killing

operations, expanding our operations near a major city might increase these numbers and put

pressure on the Pakistani government to halt drone raids. In order to decrease collateral damage

we must continue to gather intelligence of our targets before we carry out a strike, doing so will

increase our chances of a successful operation and shield our Pakistani counterparts from the

political fallout. If we do not implement this plan of action and carry it out carefully, we will
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continue to see an increase in troop loss and growing instability in neighboring Pakistan. This

must be avoided if we are to ensure that the Taliban and more importantly AQ do not have a base

of training for terror operations against the US and its partners.

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Works Citied

Bill Roggio & Alexander Mayer. “Analysis: A look at US airstrikes in Pakistan through
September 2009”. October 1, 2009. The Long War Journal
<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/10/analysis_us_airstrik.php>
Accessed on December 20, 2009
(Graphs that show MQ-9 strikes, number of strikes, personnel killed, and area of strikes)

Bill Roggio & Alexander Mayer. “US Predator strikes in Pakistan: Observations, July 21,
2009”. The Long War Journal.
<http://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/US-strikes-Pakistan-Sept2009/>
Accessed on December 20, 2009
(Graphs that show MQ-9 strikes, number of strikes, personnel killed, and area of strikes)

McChrystal, Stanley. “Commander’s Initial Assessment”. Commander NATO International

Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan U.S. Forces, Afghanistan. August 30, 2009.
<http://media.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacte
d_092109.pdf?hpid=topnews>
Accessed on January 15, 2010
(Unclassified document detailing situation in Afghanistan, what groups are involved in
insurgency, what is being done to combat groups, what is needed to help combat
insurgency, role of NATO in security/reconstruction efforts)

Al Jazeera.Net. “Pakistan Taliban say Mehsud is dead”. August 25, 2009

<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/08/2009825162948155681.html>
Accessed on January 15, 2010
(Article detailing Mehsud and his death and how this shook up the Taliban)

Maria, Golovnin. “FACTBOX: Insurgency in Afghanistan: who are they?” Reuters.

October 1, 2009.
<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5903X920091001>
Accessed on January 10, 2010
(Detailed analysis of main insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan as well as
Pakistan)
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iCausalties.org: Operation Enduring Freedom. <http://icasualties.org/oef/>

Accessed on January 6, 2010
(Data base for all KIAs in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom)

Declan,Walsh. “US forces mounted secret Pakistan raids in hunt for al-Qaida”. The Guardian.
December 21, 2009.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/21/us-forces-secret-pakistan-raids>
Accessed on January 16, 2010
(Article detailing the effects of a cross border rapid by Special Forces members and how
this effected US/Pakistani relations)