Husserl Stud (2009) 25:1543

DOI 10.1007/s10743-008-9051-5

On Husserls Remark that [s]elbst eine sich als

apodiktisch ausgebende Evidenz kann sich als
Tauschung enthullen (XVII 164:3233):
Does the Phenomenological Method Yield Any
Epistemic Infallibility?

George Heffernan

Published online: 13 February 2009

Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Abstract Addressing Walter Hopps original application of the distinction

between agent-fallibility and method-fallibility to phenomenological inquiry con-
cerning epistemic justification, I question whether these are the only two forms of
fallibility that are useful or whether there are not also others that are needed. In
doing so, I draw my inspiration from Husserl, who in the beginnings of his phe-
nomenological investigations struggled with the distinction between noetic and
noematic analyses. For example, in the Preface to the Second Edition of the Logical
Investigations he criticizes the First Investigation as having been one-sidedly
noetically directed and as having thus neglected the noematic aspects of meaning
(XVIII 1314). Also, in an addendum to the Fifth Investigation he notes that in the
transition from the First Edition to the Second he has learned to broaden the concept
of phenomenological content to include not only the real (reell) contents
(noetic, subjective) of consciousness but also the intentional (noematic, objec-
tive) (XIX/1 411). The fact that, in gradually moving from consciousness (noesis) to
what consciousness is of (noema), Husserl struggled with this distinction is an
indication of the immensity of the perplexing problems and potential solutions that
Hopp has led the phenomenology of knowledge into by introducing his useful
notions of agent-fallibility and method-fallibility. Like Husserl, he has focused
mainly and mostly on the noetic issues; like Husserl as well, I will try to move step
by step from the noetic area into the noematic. I conclude that Hopps approach has
the potential to become seminal.

G. Heffernan (&)
Philosophy Department, Augustinian College, Andover, MA, USA
e-mail: George.Heffernan@merrimack.edu

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16 Husserl Stud (2009) 25:1543

Die wahre Methode folgt der Natur der zu erforschenden Sachen, nicht aber
unseren Vorurteilen und Vorbildern.
Husserl, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, XXV 261

1 Introduction: What is a Philosophical Method?

In his paper Phenomenology and Fallibility, Walter Hopp expresses a crucial

concern about the ability of Husserls phenomenology to deliver on what it seems to
promise. One must, of course, agree with much of what Hopp says about the
problematic relationship between the method of phenomenology and the fallibility
of phenomenologists in particular. The real strength of Hopps analysis, however, is
that it forces philosophers to revisit the freighted relationship between phenome-
nology and fallibility in general. Hence the question: What exactly is the
relationship between method and fallibility from a phenomenological standpoint?
Is this relationship accidental or coincidental or occasionalor perhaps necessary?
And, if not the latter, then what is the point of this method? Finally, does
phenomenology yield any kind of epistemic apodicticity?
Long before Husserl, philosophers and scientists were thinking hard about
method. To be sure, a philosophical method may differ in certain respects from the
scientific method. None the less, the scientific methodinvolving (1) unambiguous
formulation of a problem, (2) meticulous comparison of theories and facts, (3) open-
mindedness to open-endedness with respect to evidence, (4) public dissemination of
results, and (5) replicability of results by oneself and otherscan function as a
generally valid procedure for interdisciplinary intellectual endeavors. It should not
be confused with the experimental method or with the specific methods of the natural
sciences or the social ones, including (1) the use of quantifying techniques, (2) the
implementation of artificially created and controlled experimental situations, and (3)
an interest in the discovery and application of universal generalizations or laws.2
In sharp contrast to the scientific method that was often confusedly and
naturalistically applied to philosophical investigations in his time, for example, by
those thinkers who would have reduced the discipline of mathematical logic to a
branch of empirical psychology,3 Husserl originally developed, for valid and sound
reasons, his own philosophical method, which he refers to as the phenomenolog-
ical method.4 By means of it, he aims to provide what he thinks philosophy,
particularly transcendental philosophy, has been lacking: a genuinely scientific
method for clarifying all the phenomena that human cognition can experience. Yet
the phenomenological method does not consist of a set of rulespace Descartes
Regulae ad directionem ingenii and Discours de la methodethe following of

1
All references to the works of Husserl are to Husserliana by volume (Roman numerals) and page
(Arabic).
2
See the skeletal but helpful account of Hatfield (1998).
3
See Logical Investigations, First Part: Prolegomena to Pure Logic (1900).
4
See Logical Investigations, Second Part: Investigations into Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge
(1901).

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Husserl Stud (2009) 25:1543 17

which guarantees certain felicitous results. Hence the question: Does the proper
application of the phenomenological method yield infallible results, or does it
rather leave phenomenologists liable to fallibility?

2 Clarification: What is the Phenomenological Method?

Thus the inquiry leads from Hopp on the connection between phenomenology and
fallibility to Husserl on the relationship between phenomenology and infallibil-
ity.5 The phenomenological method may be said to exhibit the following
characteristic features (in alphabetical order):6
(1) apodicticit does not yield results that may or may not be reliable but rather
results that are indubitable because demonstrable;
(2) criticalit incessantly and indefatigably reevaluates its own proceedings and
results by means of a process of self-reflection (Besinnung);
(3) descriptiveit eschews presuppositions, constructions, and hypotheses, and
prefers experiences, investigations, and reports;

5
Although Hopp does not usually (and not at all after his introductory remarks) use the words
infallible or infallibility, I will do so regularly. After all, it is a bit unnatural to use the words
fallible or fallibility repeatedly without ever using their corresponding counterparts. What everyone
really wants to know anyway is whether the phenomenological method does grant the highest conceivable
degree of warrant. This is an issue that confronts the readers of Husserl, even if he too does not talk of
infallible or infallibility, nor of fallible or fallibility.
6
Cf., e.g. (M. = method, ph. = phenomenological, tr. = transcendental): I 43 (tr.-ph. M.), 103 ff. (ph. M.;
eidetic-descriptive M.), 106 (special tr. Ms.), 119 (intentional M.), 170 (intentional M.), 179 f. (genuine
ph. M.); II 3, 23 ff. (ph. M. as Denkhaltung), 43, 51, 58 (differentiae specificae of ph. M.); III/1 5 (M.
of epoche), 55, 65 (M. of bracketing), 69, 125 (M. of tr. reduction), 130 (ph. M.), 136 f., 139, 144 (M. of
eidetic science), 145 (M. of Wesenserfassung), 149, 161, 162 (ph. M.), 170 (phenomenological M.;
psychological M.), 171 (inductive M.), 223 (methodology of phenomenology [Methodik der Phanome-
nologie]), 229 (ph. M.), 288 ff. (M. of clarification); V 138, 144, 148, 160, 162; VI 7 f. (new method of
the positive sciences), 10, 12, 14 (ph. M. and apodicticity), 19, 23 (M. of idealization), 24 (productive
M.), 29, 30 (M. and apodicticity), 31, 36 (inductive M.), 39 ff., 41 (methodology [Methodik]), 42 (natural-
scientific M.), 43, 48, 49 (geometric M.), 52 f., 57 f., 60, 61 (natural-scientific M.), 64 (natural-scientific
M.), 67 (M. of expansion or extension of knowledge), 68 (methodologization [Methodisierung]), 73 (ph.
M. and apodicticity), 88, 94 (rational M.), 106 (regressive M.), 103 (transcendental-subjective M.), 113,
116 (regressive M.), 118 (regressive M.), 120 (regressive M.), 121, 135 ff., 149, 156, 173, 182 (eidetic M.
of Wesensforschung), 185, 190 f., 193 ff., 202, 205, 207, 213 (M. of tr. reduction), 219 (naturalistic
M.), 224 ff. (descriptive and explanatory M.), 230 (eidetic M. of theoretical Wesensforschung), 237
(M. of intentional analysis), 239 (die eigentumliche Methode der Epoche), 243, 246, 251 (M. of
epoche), 264 (M. of epoche), 271, 274; VII 8 f. (M. of perfect clarification), 11 (rational doctrine of M.),
13, 17 (doctrine of M. [Methodenlehre]), 26 (M. of truth), 30 ff. (doctrine of M.), 33 (doctrine of M. of
knowledge), 34 (doctrine of M.), 35 (rational doctrine of M.), 53, 54 (doctrine of M.), 73 (methodology
[Methodik]), 91, 123, 138, 139 (M. of Wesensintuition), 142 (philosophical M.), 146 (M. and
intuitionism), 167, 176, 194 (consciousness of M. [Methodenbewutsein]), 195; VIII 4, 5 (M. of
justification), 38, 78, 80, 87, 92 (M. of epoche), 111 (M. of bracketing), 121 (M. of epoche), 128 (ph. M.),
130 (ph. M.), 138, 141 (M. of epoche), 142, 164, 165 (M. of epoche), 166, 168 (tr. M.); XVII 6, 11
(rational M.), 40, 190, 205, 219 (radical M.), 233 (scientific M.), 252 ff. (rigorous M.; eidetic M. of
Wesensforschung), 265 (radical M.), 270 (M. of intentional research), 285, 298; XVIII 35, 37, 38
(algorithmic M.; M. of classification), 39 (mechanical M.), 40, 132 (doctrine of M.), 165, 255; XIX/2 783
(ph. M.); XXV 1617 (M. of clarification), 1825 (the experimental M.), 2537 (the true M.), 3839 (this
ph. M.), 6162 (all indirectly symbolizing and mathematicizing Ms.).

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(4) eideticit imaginatively seeks out the constant essences of things and does
not sensualistically sink in their fleeting accidents;
(5) elucidatoryit inculcates the user with a healthy respect for discerning
clarifications and with a healthy suspicion of generic explanations;
(6) idealisticit posits that the fundamental relation between consciousness and
being is not confrontation but constitution (Konstitution);
(7) intuitiveit looks at what is there in plain view or not and declines to make
deductions in terms of the conditions of the possibility;
(8) phenomenologicalit brackets out things as they may be in themselves and
brackets in things as they appear (it is ephectic [epoche]);
(9) philosophicalit strives to live up to the perennially valid ideal that the
unexamined position is not worth holding for a human being;
(10) rationalit enables the human being to fulfill its highest aspirations
understood as the entelechy of a thinking-speaking-animal;
(11) scientificit aims at rigorously examined and systematically organized
knowledge founded on truth and grounded in evidence;
(12) transcendentalit grasps consciousness as consciousness of something
(Intentionalitat) and focuses on being in so far as, and only in so far as, it
gives itself to and is taken by consciousness (Bewut-sein); and
(13) universalit does not restrict itself to any region or regions of human
cognition but rather comprehends them all, for example, both the Naturwis-
senschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften.
This list is remarkable not only for those features which it does contain but also for
those which it does not. For example, Husserl does not claim that the phenom-
enological method is infallible, that is, that it leads to incorrigible cognitive
results. If he did, then this claim would be as remarkable as it would be risky.
Indeed, todays generally accepted scientific methodwhich has had to deal with
methodological fallibilism,7 anarchism,8 reliabilism,9 and so forthalso does not
make any such claim about its cognitive results. To the contrary, claims of
unfalsifiability are usually regarded as naively untenable and paradigmatically
unscientific, especially by those who view the growth of scientific knowledge as a
matter of conjectures and refutations and take an evolutionary approach to
objective knowledge.10
Yet the observation about method and infallibility is not dispositive, for Hopp
does have a point, and it is a pivotal one. After all, does Husserl not repeatedly
emphasize that the phenomenological method leads to absolute, adequate, and
apodictic knowledge of human consciousness and its contents? Hence the problem
lies not so much with the phenomenological method as much rather with its
purported yield. Whatever Husserl does or does not claim about the method, it
seems clear that, in applying it, he seeks to attain to a certain kind of knowledge,

7
Peirce (1931), sec. 1.120: The Uncertainty of Scientific Results.
8
Feyerabend (1975, 1978, 1987).
9
Goldman (1986, 1992).
10
Popper (1934/35, 1963, 1972).

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that this knowledge involves a certain kind of evidence, and that this evidence can
only be described as absolute, adequate, and apodictic. The cognitive results
justified by such evidence would then be:
(1) absolutethey are obtained in such a way that they cannot be relativized by
any better, other, different findings;
(2) adequatethey are achieved in such a way that they leave nothing that should
be filled qualitatively or quantitatively empty; and
(3) apodicticthey are available in such a degree of certainty that they allow for
no possible dubitability.
So far, so ideal. For obvious reasons, it is useful to call such knowledge triple-A
type. Hence the question is whether the phenomenological method can deliver on
what it seems to promise, namely, triple-A type truths justified by triple-A type
evidence. The point is that, if Husserl does claim that the phenomenological method
yields absolute, adequate, and apodictic evidence, knowledge, and truth, then he
also seems to be claiming, by implication, that the phenomenological method yields,
as well, cognitive results that are not fallible, as well as that, in this sense, the
phenomenological method itself is infallible.
Thus it is not surprising that the basic move of the phenomenological method is
the epoche. Husserl brilliantly appropriates this classic skeptical (!) trope in order to
argue that there is such a thing as an absolute, adequate, apodictic perception of
something (cf. the Stoic [Zenos] notion of the apprehensive appearance
[phantasia kataleptike] as the criterion of truth [kriterion tes aletheias] and the
Academic [Arcesilaus] critique of it).11 Yet the phenomenological method of
epoche differs radically from the skeptical method of epoche. The skeptic, on the
one hand, brackets judgment out, that is, abstains from judgment, in order to avoid
error (cf. the skeptical notion of ineradicable indeterminacy: Pyrrhos epoche and
Sextus ta adela).12 The phenomenologist, on the other hand, brackets objects in,
that is, restricts judgment, in order to achieve knowledge. The guiding idea of the
phenomenological reduction is to lead (reducere) the objects of which conscious-
ness is conscious back (reducere) to the acts of consciousness in which they
constitute themselves.

3 Interpretation: Does the Phenomenological Method Guarantee Any

Epistemic Infallibility?

In Phenomenology and Fallibility, Hopp argues that Husserls position on the

relationship between the certainty promised by the theory of the phenomenological
method and the difficulty presented by its practice is coherent. For my part, I shall
argue that Husserls position is sound, but I will do so in a way substantially
different from the way in which Hopp does. What I will question is whether Husserl
is indeed committed to that apodicticity to which Hoppas well as Husserl

11
Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, VII 54 and IV 28.
12
Idem, op. cit., IX 62, 74 ff., and Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I 113.

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himselfseems to suggest he is. Yet I also propose that we explore other forms of
fallibility than those that Hopp provides, as well as that we analyze the functions of
these other forms of fallibility in the phenomenology of knowledge. Thus I judge
Hopps approachwhich is original, significant, and tenable, and which has the
potential to be seminalnot destructively but constructively, and I even propose
that we extend and deepen it. Finally, I think that Hopps manner of philosophizing
is especially engaging in that it represents a fine case study in how to do
phenomenology analytically.
In his introductory remarks, Hopp begins with that bit of a puzzle which the
discipline of phenomenology presents (12):
On the one hand, Husserl insists that phenomenological inquiry results in
knowledge of a very extraordinary type. it is clear that the knowledge we
acquire through phenomenological reflection does, according to Husserl,
possess a degree of warrant appreciably greater than we could hope to attain in
the sphere of ordinary empirical objects. The objects of phenomenological
inquiry, namely the essential features of types of conscious experiences, are
supposed to be given to us, and given in the most complete manner possible.
Phenomenological cognition is, if not infallible, very nearly so, and much
more nearly so than, say, your knowledge that you have a left hand.
On the other hand, Husserl himself admits that phenomenological inquiry is
exceedingly difficult, that the risk of error confronts us at every step, and that
virtually every concrete result of philosophical substance is a hard-won
achievement. This is something that we can verify for ourselves, simply by
doing phenomenology. Moreover, there exist widespread disagreements
across a number of phenomenological subject matters, such as the nature of
perception, consciousness, self-knowledge, and so forth. And so phenomeno-
logical cognition is supposed to be nearly infallible, and yet we are very
fallible phenomenologists.
Hopp then asks whether such a position is coherent and answers:
I believe it is. By distinguishing between method-fallibility and agent-
fallibility in what follows, I will argue that the fact that we are fallible
phenomenologists does not entail that the phenomenological method itself is
unsuited to discover the essential features of lived conscious experiences. I
will also argue that the fact that we are agent-fallible with respect to the
phenomenological method is perfectly consistent with the claim that we
possess knowledge with a very high degree of epistemic warrant when, on
occasion, we carry out that method properly.
Noting that Husserl does not hold that any knowledge is infallible (1), Hopp
suggests that, in investigating the connection between actual phenomenology and
imagined infallibility, we think about forms of fallibility. In following his lead, I
wonder, first, to what extent he will weight agent-fallibility as a or the source
of the problem of fallibility. I am curious, furthermore, as to whether and to what
extent he will identify and weight other forms of fallibility as well. And I inquire,

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finally, whether we will be able to recognize and make fruitful use of valid forms of
fallibility that he does not mention or develop.
In the First Part of his paper, Hopp begins with the uncontroversial observation
that phenomenological inquiry is often exceedingly difficult, and presents us with
many opportunities to get things wrong (2). Indeed, Husserl emphasizes how
discerning (II 5859), how difficult (XIX/1 1317: Die Schwierigkeiten der rein
phanomenologischen Analyse), how rigorous (XXV 362), and even how
unnatural (III/1 5666, 135137, etc.) phenomenological reflection is. In
addition, the circumstantial evidence that we are fallible phenomenologists is
cogent (3). In fact, there is a lack of any overarching consensus on virtually every
significant issue (3), and this seems to suggest a concomitant lack of replicability
of results by othersa crucial characteristic of the scientific method. This apparent
shortcoming alone cries out for an explanation, says Hopp (3).
The chief source of the problem appears to be the dire disjunction between the
evidentiary achievements promised by the theory of the phenomenological
method, on the one hand, and the evidentiary results delivered by the practice of
it, on the other hand. Thus certain descriptions of phenomenological investigations
in Husserls Logical Investigations (XIX/2 645656), The Idea of Phenomenology
(II 6061), Ideas I (III/1 319321), and Cartesian Meditations (I 5557), for
instance, convey the distinct impression that the phenomenological method will
yield results with an extraordinary degree of warrant. As Hopp says (4): For an
object to be given in the strictest sensegiven in precisely the way in which it is
meant, and meant in just the way in which it is givenis the ideal of adequate
evidence. To be sure, according to Hopp, the objects of ordinary perception do
not permit themselves to be given in this way, since there is always more to them
than what is strictly given intuitively in any perception of them, and experiences
of this sort possess evidence in a looser sense (4). None the less, according to
Husserl, the ideal of adequate evidence remains the gold standard of
phenomenological epistemology. This poses a question to which phenomenology
must find an answer, namely: If the ideal of adequate evidence were to be
realized, then how could there possibly be any room for reasonable doubt or
conceivable uncertainty? Thus Hopp notes (5): If this ideal is what the
phenomenologist does achieve, then phenomenological cognition ought to be
much less fallible than we know it to be.
At this point, I want to anticipate that a great deal is going to depend on which
of Husserls texts we select in order to make our arguments. In fact, and as Hopp
too indicates (34), some of Husserls texts convey extremely one-sided
impressions of exceedingly complicated investigations into the phenomenon of
evidence. In the next section, I will explore how even a very brief Entstehungs-
und Entwicklungsgeschichte of the concept of evidence in Husserls work shows
that it is not at all clear that his dominant way of describing the phenomenon of
epistemic justification is in terms of absolute, adequate, and apodictic
evidence.
In the Second Part of his paper, Hopp makes the distinction that makes a
difference (5 [emphasis added]):

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There are a couple of reasons why we, as individual thinkers, could be fallible
phenomenologists. Either (a) we are rather poor at carrying out the mental acts
prescribed by the phenomenological method, or (b) that method itself is
unsuited to discover the essential features of lived experiences.
Thus the source of our fallibility could be that it is difficult, perhaps exceedingly
so, for us to carry out the required intentional acts to have phenomenological data
given to us in an evidential manner, or it could be that phenomenological data do
not give themselves to us in an evidential manner even when we carry out the acts
prescribed by the phenomenological method in the right way (5). Simply put, then,
according to Hopp (5 [emphasis added again]):
When it comes to acquiring phenomenological knowledgeor any knowl-
edge, for that matterthere are at least two distinct sorts of possible
impediments: we could either be inept at wielding the tools required for the
job, or the tools themselves might be defective.
Referring to these sources of fallibility as agent-fallibility and method-
fallibility, Hopp provides the following definition of the latter (5):
A method M is method-fallible with respect to some subject matter S if
carrying out the mental acts prescribed by M does not result in warranted
beliefs about S. A method that is not method-fallible with respect to S is
warrant-generating or epistemizing. A method that is epistemizing with
respect to some subject matter is one which, when carried out properly, is
capable of generating beliefs about that subject matter which possess a high
degree of epistemic warrant.
And the following definition of the former (5):
A thinker T is agent-fallible with respect to some method M if T is incapable
or barely capable of carrying out the mental acts prescribed by M. The
opposite of this is agent-reliability: a thinker is agent-reliable with respect to
some method if it lies within the scope of that thinkers power to carry out the
cognitive acts prescribed by that method most of the time he attempts to do so.
In general, Hopps remarks on these two (at least) forms of fallibility move me to
think that we should be looking for possible sources of fallibility that he neither
includes nor precludes. In particular, we may wonder whether it makes sense to
think about evidence-fallibility as that kind of fallibility which is rooted in
object-indeterminacy as a useful supplement to Hopps agent-fallibility and
method-fallibility. Therefore, consistently with his definitions, I would define
evidence-fallibility thus:
An evidence E is evidence-fallible with respect to some object (or objectivity)
O if performing the mental acts prescribed by E does not result in warranted
beliefs about O. An evidence that is not evidence-fallible with respect to O is
warrant-generating or epistemizing. An evidence that is epistemizing
with respect to some object (or objectivity) is one which, when properly

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achieved, is capable of generating beliefs about that object (or objectivity)

which possess a high degree of epistemic warrant.
Mutatis mutandis, I would define object-indeterminacy thus:
An object (or objectivity) O is object-indeterminate with respect to some
thinker T if T is incapable or barely capable of performing the mental acts
prescribed by O. The opposite of this is object-determinacy: an object (or
objectivity) is object-determinate with respect to some thinker if it lies within
that thinkers power to perform the cognitive acts prescribed by that object (or
objectivity) most of the time that he attempts to do so.
For example, a football referee may be perfectly agent-infallible and method-
infallible in the perfect game sense (I do not mean American football but rather
football). That is, he is competent, conscious, and conscientious. Yet those factors
may be necessary but not sufficient conditions for his calling the game in a way that
reliably reflects the phenomena on the field. After all, football is (in)famous for
employing only one referee, who must be omniscientnot to mention omnipo-
tentbut who cannot be omnivident. As a result, the football referee is often caught
out on a bad call, and sometimes on a dispositive one (e.g., awarding a game-
deciding penalty shot), because he can only perceive the players, the ball, and the
play itself in so far as they give themselves to him through shadowings forth or
adumbrations (Abschattungen) in the phenomenological sense.13 Hence his
decisions are ineluctably absolute, even as his evidences are inevitably inade-
quate.14 Changing the method of refereeing, for example, by adding additional
referees, regular consultations with the line judges, or instant replays, would entail
altering the pace, flow, and dynamic of the game, and thus also its very nature.
Football might begin to resemble American football, thus allowing for enhanced
commercial exploitation by means of in-game television advertisement. Yet football
fans are content with more drama and less rigor. Nor would the suggested changes
completely eliminate indeterminacy. By popular demand and by official decree,
then, the game stays as it is, that is, delightfully but maddeningly object-
indeterminate and thus fraught with evidence-fallibility. In this case, it lies in the
nature of the things themselves (die Sachen selbst) that evidence-fallibility and
object-indeterminacy dominate method-reliability and agent-infallibility. It is an
essential and ineradicable part of the game.
Given that Hopp has made us wonder about possible forms of fallibility, then, it
makes sense to ask why we should stop at the two that he examines. Why reduce the
matter of phenomenology and fallibility to a matter of either agent-fallibility or
method-fallibility? While the given definitions of evidence-fallibility and object-
indeterminacy may still need some work, for now we may remain Ockhamistically
optimistic: Forms of fallibility should not be multiplied beyond necessity (formae
fallibilitatis non sunt multiplicandae praeter necessitatem).

13
Cairns (1973), p. 2.
14
Husserl, Ding und Raum: Vorlesungen 1907, ed. Ulrich Claesges (The Hague 1973), pp. 105139.

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In the Third Part of his paper, Hopp explains the usefulness of his distinction
between method-fallibility and agent-fallibility (6):
The obvious payoff of this distinction is that we can, at least hopefully,
account for our fallibility as phenomenologists without damning the
phenomenological method itself. If we are fallible phenomenologists, and if
phenomenology is epistemizing with respect to the essential features of lived
conscious experience, then we had better be agent-fallible with respect to that
method. For suppose that the reason for our fallibility were that the
phenomenological method is method-fallible with respect to the essential
features of lived conscious experiences. Such a claim would be fatal to
phenomenology itself. If it were true, then even someone as agent-reliable as
God could not, by employing that method, arrive at warranted beliefs about
the essential features of consciousness.
Thus it emerges that the distinction between agent-fallibility and method-fallibility
is a tactic, whereas the strategy is to locate the fallibility of phenomenology not in
method-fallibility but in agent-fallibility (6): The challenge now is to explain
how we could be agent-fallible with respect to the phenomenological method. Yet
the problem is that, when one applies the phenomenological method, then the matter
analyzed is given (7): But how, if the relevant objects and states of affairs are
given to us, is there any room for agent-fallibility? Hopp champions Husserls
solution by juxtaposing two fundamentally different conceptions of givenness,
the traditional, according to which something is present and someone is passive, and
the phenomenological, according to which something constitutes itself for someone
and that someone is conscious of it (7).
In fact, Husserl clarifies the relationships between being (Sein) and consciousness
(Bewutsein) in terms of what, in the language of transcendental idealism, he calls
constitution.15 Thus the German Evidenz has a substantially different
denotation (not to mention considerably different connotations) from the English
evidence. The latter refers mainly and mostly to whatever speaks for or against
the truth or falsity of a statement or for or against the existence or non-existence of a
state of affairs, whereas the former relates to the showing of that which shows itself
from out of itself.16 According to Husserls mature phenomenological definition,
evidence is the intentional achievement of self-givenness (die intentionale
Leistung der Selbstgebung [XVII 166]). This givenness is as much an
achievement of the having subjectivity as it is a function of the given objectivity.
Hence Husserls concept of the given is, properly understood, also a concept of
the taken. This is especially evident in the cases that involve not acts of sense-
perception and their correlative objects but categorial intuitions and their
corresponding objectivities. These intentional objectivities exhibit variegated
structures in that they involve, for example, founding and founded relations, parts
and wholes, levels and layers, aspects and dimensions, and so forth. As Husserl says
(XI 218):

15
Sokolowski (1970).
16
See Heffernan (1998).

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Das groe Thema der Transzendentalphilosophie ist das Bewutsein

uberhaupt als ein Stufenbau konstitutiver Leistungen, in denen sich in immer
neuen Stufen oder Schichten immer neue Objektivitaten, Objektivitaten immer
neuen Typus konstituieren, sich immer neuartige Selbstgebungen entwickeln,
ihnen zugehorig immer neuartige vorbereitete Wege moglicher Ausweisung,
moglicher Ideen wahren Seins. Alle anderen Stufen sind dabei in die hoheren
aufgehoben, aber in ihnen nicht verloren, vielmehr selbst jederzeit bereit fur
entsprechende Blickrichtungen und Nachweisungen.
Das alles gilt es in phanomenologischer Methode, also im reinen Bewutsein
und in der systematischen Ordnung zum Verstandnis zu bringen.
The acts of evidence, that is, the achievements of self-givenness in which
consciousness intends these structured objectivities in categorial intuitions,
necessarily involve degrees, grades, and levels. This holds for a complex judgment
about a composite state of affairs, for an interpretation of a deep piece of literature,
for an analysis of a complicated game of football, and so forth. The phenomeno-
logical method of intuiting essences itself also requires a gradual procedure (ein
schrittweises Vorgehen [III/1 144145]).17 All these things indicate another kind of
fallibility, namely, the evidence-fallibility that is founded on and grounded in
object-indeterminacy.
Thus Hopp employs the distinction between agent-fallibility and method-
fallibility to inculpate the agent and to exculpate the method (89):
In light of Husserls account of givenness, the fact that we are fallible
phenomenologists can be explained without impugning the phenomenolog-
ical method itself. The fact that acts of phenomenological reflection might
require work, and be founded in complex ways on other actsincluding
those acts in which we effect the various reductionsmeans that there are an
awful lot of ways one can go wrong when carrying them out. We are agent-
fallible with respect to the phenomenological method because it is difficult,
for creatures like ourselves, to do each of the following: (a) perform the
phenomenological reductions in order to prevent ourselves from knowing
about our subject matter in advance of our inquiries; (b) fix our attention on
our acts of consciousness in addition to their objects; (c) formulate concepts,
carried out in the appropriate meaning-intentions, that uniquely pick out the
features and properties of those acts; (d) fix those concepts, with just those
meaning-fulfillments or fulfilling conditions, terminologically; and (e)
perform eidetic abstraction and variation on the properties that we have
managed to fix intuitively and conceptually. Our fallibility as phenomenol-
ogists might be due not to the fact that the phenomenological method is the
wrong tool for the job, but owing to the difficulty creatures like us have
wielding it.
Again, the question is whether any important forms of fallibility are being
overlooked or underestimated. Above all, what about the evidence-fallibility that

17
Sokolowski (1974), pp. 5785.

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26 Husserl Stud (2009) 25:1543

has its source not in the imbecility of the agent but in the indeterminacy of the
objectivity? Yet Hopps account of fallibility appears to be one-sidedly noetic,
whereas the noematic aspects of the phenomenon also need to be investigated and
clarified. Especially, we need to look at the epistemic quality of the acts in which the
objectivities constitute themselves in and for consciousness. This suggests indeed
the possibility of another form of fallibility, namely, evidence-fallibility.
In the Fourth Part and the Fifth Part of his paper, Hopp shifts the focus of the
inquiry from issues of fallibility to items of justification (9):
This might be a satisfactory account of why we are fallible phenomenol-
ogists. It is, at any rate, surely part of the story. But explaining our fallibility
is only half of the problem. The other half is to explain how, given this
account, we can acquire phenomenological knowledge. For if Husserl is
right, correctly using the phenomenological method to uncover the essential
features of consciousness does result in knowledge. Surely he thought that
he himself had acquired knowledge by these means, and so, I reckon, do
many of us. Therefore, when we do employ that method successfully, we
will acquire knowledge; the relevant objects and states of affairs will be
given to us precisely as they are meant. But how, given this account, is that
possible?
How, indeed, is it possible for fallible agents to acquire genuine knowledge
remembering that there is a strong view, going back at least to Plato,18 that
knowledge is of what is real and is thus infallible? Yet, recognizing that the
achievement of evidence does not require the attainment of adequacy or apodicticity
(10; cf. XVII 165170), Hopp proceeds to analyze how to bring together fallible
agents and achievable knowledge.
Along the way, Hopp encounters and eliminates two sets of problems, the one
posed by an internalist theory of epistemic justification, and the other by an
externalist (reliabilist) theory. Against the former, Hopp argues, employing the
example of Husserls Principle of All Principles (Das Prinzip aller Prinzipien
[III/1 51]) as well as his insight that intentionality and evidence are essentially
correlative concepts (XVII 168; cf. XXIV 164), that the internalist claim that all
of the factors that contribute to the justification of a belief be cognitively accessible
to a believer is simply too strong to be credible (10). Against the latter, Hopp
argues, appealing to Husserls observation that givenness is givenness (XVI 300),
that the reliability of an agent, his dispositions to form beliefs in a certain way, is
not a necessary condition of his having evidence in a given situation (13).
These sections of the paper are, of course, useful. They do not, however, do for
method-fallibility what the other parts did for agent-fallibilityconceptually clarify
it. Yet that may be the point, given Hopps strategy of shifting epistemic culpability
from the method to the agent. In any case, these sections did also represent the last
big chance to explore the possibility of other forms of fallibility besides agent-
fallibility and method-fallibility. Still outstanding, then, is the question: Are there

18
Politeia 476d477b, Theaetetus 152c, Timaeus 51e52cleaving out Parmenides.

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Husserl Stud (2009) 25:1543 27

really no phenomenologically important forms of fallibility other than agent-

fallibility and method-fallibility?
In his concluding remarks, Hopp says something that sounds a little odd, given
what he has said thus far (13):
To wrap up, then: by distinguishing agent- and method-fallibility, I have
attempted to provide the beginnings of a non-exhaustive explanation of how it
is that phenomenological insights can have a very high degree of warrant,
even though we are quite fallible phenomenologists. I have also attempted to
explain how our beliefs can have a very high degree of warrant even when we
are agent-fallible with respect to the method whereby we arrived at those
beliefs. This is, of course, only a beginning: I have by no means established
that the method of phenomenological reflection is in fact a good way of
acquiring knowledge of the essential features of conscious lived experiences; I
have only established that its being so is compatible with the facts that
phenomenology is arduous and that the discipline itself is fraught with
controversy and disagreement.
This concluding statement is perplexing because Hopp has usually selected those
passages from Husserls works which make it sound as if the normal case of
evidence there were the ideal of adequation, whereas it is by no means clear that this
normative concept is also the dominant concept of evidence in Husserls writings.
To the contrary, Husserls phenomenological clarification of evidence eventually
but forcefully yields a relativity theory of evidence (VIII 34, XVII 284, 288).
Again, Hopps analysis of the relationship between fallibility and phenomenology is
one-sidedly noetic and not at all noematic. For it examines agent-fallibility and
method-fallibility but does not investigate evidence-fallibility. Yet this form of
fallibility, which is founded on and grounded in object-indeterminacy, is that which
is most intractable to agent and method. Hence the question: Wheres the noema?
After all, the chief leitmotif in Husserls phenomenology of evidence is that
evidence is at least as much a function of the object(ivity) as it is an achievement of
the agent or a yield of the method. This too suggests that there may also be
evidence-fallibility.

4 Explication: What is the Phenomenological Concept of Evidence?

It is hard to find a philosopher who gives a definite description or a precise definition

of evidence.19 Yet Husserl poses the question, was die Evidenz sei (XXX 323),
and provides this answer (XXX 326327):
Vertieft man sich in das Evidenzbewutsein und macht man sich daran klar,
was es eigentlich ist, namlich selbstgebendes Bewutsein im Gegensatz zu

19
An exception to the rule is: Thomas Kelly, Evidence, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy @
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evidence/. A good example of a philosopher who sought to define
knowledge in terms of evidence without ever genuinely defining evidence is Chisholm (1966/1977/
1989).

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28 Husserl Stud (2009) 25:1543

bloem Meinen, ohne selbst zu fassen, [im Gegensatz] zu leerer Intention

ohne Erfullung, macht man sich diesen Unterschied klar, so sieht man, da
selbstverstandlich derart selbstgebendes Bewutsein zwar Ratsel losen, aber
nicht selbst mehr Ratsel enthalten kann. Alles Ratselhafte, alles Problemat-
ische liegt auf seiten des bloen Meinens. Das schauende Selbsterfassen,
Selbsthaben, als ein Ratsel behandeln wollen, das heit selbst nicht verstehen,
es heit von oben her uber Evidenz philosophieren statt sich die Evidenz selbst
anzusehen, sie sich selbst zur Evidenz zu bringen.
There is a special relationship between phenomenology and evidence. Is there also a
special relationship between phenomenology and infallibility? That is, what does
the phenomenological clarification of evidence show about the possibility of
absolute, adequate, and apodictic evidence?
The more selective one is in the choice of which of Husserls texts to base the
answer on, the more likely that answer is to be inadequate.20 On the other hand, to
paraphrase an ancient adage: philosophia profunda est, sed vita brevis.21 To
compromise means to be both as comprehensive and as concise as possible in
providing a synopsis of Husserls views on evidence.

4.1 Logical Investigations (1900/1901, 1913/1921)

The subjective definition of evidence from the Prolegomena to Pure Logicdas

Erlebnis der Wahrheit (XVIII 193)turns out to have been merely provisional.
Now the phenomenon of evidence, clarified in terms of the distinctions between
empty and filled intentions and present and absent objects, proves to be
fundamentally multivalent. On the one hand (LU VI, Chapter Three: Zur
Phanomenologie der Erkenntnisstufen [XIX/2 596631]), there is the loose concept
of evidence in the relative sense (Evidenz im laxen Sinne [XIX/2 650]), according
to which degrees, grades, and levels of evidence are not only possible but also
necessary (XIX/2 651): Von Graden und Stufen der Evidenz zu sprechen, gibt dann
einen guten Sinn. On the other hand (LU VI, Chapter Five: Das Ideal der
Adaquation [XIX/2 645656]), there is the strict concept of evidence in the absolute
sense (Evidenz im strengen Sinne [XIX/2 650]), according to which degrees,
grades, and levels of evidence are not only unnecessary but also impossible (651):
Der erkenntniskritisch pragnante Sinn von Evidenz betrifft aber ausschlielich
dieses letzte, unuberschreitbare Ziel, den Akt dieser vollkommensten Erful-
lungssynthesis, welcher der Intention die absolute Inhaltsfulle gibt.
Remarkably, the distinction between adequate and inadequate perception does not
correlate without further ado with (1) the distinction between categorial and
sensuous intuition (LU VI, 4066, esp. 4448) or with (2) the distinction between
internal and external perception (XIX/2 769771).

20
The best book-length study in English of the formation and development of Husserls concept of
evidence remains Levin (1970). See also Tugendhat (1967) and Levinas (1930).
21
Cf. Seneca, De brevitate vitae 1.1, and Hippokrates, Aphorisms 1.1.

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Husserl Stud (2009) 25:1543 29

Point: The phenomenological quest is for triple-A type evidence, knowledge,

and truth; the philosophical question is with respect to which objects and
objectivities these epistemic values are attainable.

4.2 The Idea of Phenomenology (1907)

Absoluteness, adequacy, and apodicticity of evidence are intimately and repeatedly

associated. The existence of cogitatio is supposed to be guaranteed by ihre
absolute Selbstgegebenheit ihre Gegebenheit in reiner Evidenz (II 8). There is
also Evidenz Selbstgegebenheit of cogitationes, which are fraglos
gegeben im strengsten Sinn adaquat selbstgegeben (II 60). Here evidente
Gegebenheit im echten Sinn is understood as absolute Gegebenheit des reinen
Schauens (II 9). Thus the three features of triple-A type evidence are
inextricably linked (II 910):
Das Fundament von allem ist das Erfassen des Sinnes der absoluten
Gegebenheit, der absoluten Klarheit des Gegebenseins, das jeden sinnvollen
Zweifel ausschliet, mit einem Wort der absolut schauenden, selbst
erfassenden Evidenz.
Triple-A type evidence is pregnant, immediate evidence (II 35):
absolute und klare Gegebenheit, Selbstgegebenheit im absoluten Sinn.
Dieses Gegebensein, das jeden sinnvollen Zweifel ausschliet, ein schlechthin
unmittelbares Schauen und Fassen der gemeinten Gegenstandlichkeit selbst
und so wie sie ist, macht den pragnanten Begriff der Evidenz aus, und zwar
verstanden als unmittelbare Evidenz.
Adequacy is seen as an integral part of the definition of evidence (II 59):
Das Fundamentale ist da Evidenz dieses in der Tat schauende, direkt
und adaquat selbst fassende Bewutsein ist, da es nichts anderes als adaquate
Selbstgegebenheit besagt.
Knowledge is defined in terms of evidence (II 74; cf. 76): Nur in der Erkenntnis
[ist] das Wesen der Gegenstandlichkeit gegeben, ist es evident zu schauen.
Dieses evidente Schauen ist ja selbst die Erkenntnis im pragnantesten Sinn.
Point: The strong focus on consciousness as such suggests that absolute,
adequate, and apodictic evidence is available and attainable.

4.3 Ideas on a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (1913)

The argument of a systematic Phanomenologie der Evidenz (III/1 333337) is

that genuine scientific evidence can be obtained not in regard to facts
(Tatsachen) but in regard to essences (Wesen) (III/1 355), and not in
regard to the world but in regard to consciousness (III/1 56134). Such evidence is
adequate, as distinguished from inadequate (III/1 1316), and apodictic, as
distinguished from dubitable (III/1 1920). These features qualify evidence as

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30 Husserl Stud (2009) 25:1543

absolute (III/1 9194, 9699, 103110, 118119); the evidence being sought is
perfect (vollkommene Evidenz) (III/1 65, 205, 226, 322). As a principle of
evidence, das Prinzip aller Prinzipien says (III/1 51):
da jede originar gebende Anschauung eine Rechtsquelle der Erkenntnis
sei, da alles, was sich uns in der Intuition originar (sozusagen in seiner
leibhaften Wirklichkeit) darbietet, einfach hinzunehmen sei, als was es sich
gibt, aber auch nur in den Schranken, in denen es sich da gibt
The definition of evidence is peculiar: die Einheit einer Vernunftsetzung mit dem
sie wesensmaig Motivierenden (III/1 316). Again, there is a stricter and a looser
sense of Evidenz. Evidence is usually (gewohnlich) absolute, adequate, and
apodictic (III/1 317319). Yet relative, inadequate, and assertoric evidence is also
evidence. The same holds for mediate (mittelbar) or derivative (abgeleitet)
or impure (unrein) evidence, as distinguished from immediate (unmittel-
bar) or original (originar) or pure (rein) evidence (III/1 314333). In the
end, evidence is ein eigentumlicher Setzungsmodus der zu eidetisch
bestimmten Wesenskonstitutionen des Noema gehort, for example, der Modus
ursprungliche Einsichtigkeit zur noematischen Beschaffenheit originar gebende
Wesenserschauung (III/1 334).
Point: The idea that the degree or level of evidence depends on the character and
constitution of the evident begins not only to emerge but also to dominate.

4.4 First PhilosophyPart Two: Theory of the Phenomenological Reduction

(1923/24)

Adequate evidence is defined as [e]ine Evidenz, die die ideale Vollkomm-

enheit [der Selbstgegebenheit] hat (VIII 33). Yet there is a serious question about
the character of the connections between absoluteness, adequacy, and apodicticity
here (VIII 34):
Vielleicht liegt nun in aller und jeder Evidenz als Selbstgebung, als
Bewutsein, Gemeintes als es selbst zu erfassen, eine gewisse Relativitat,
derart da, wo immer wir von einer adaquaten Evidenz sprechen und ihrer als
solcher gewi sind, nur ein ahnlicher und dabei ev. kontinuierlicher und frei
fortzufuhrender Steigerungsproze relativer Evidenzen vorliegt, somit ein
Bewutsein stetiger und freier Annaherung an ein bewutseinsmaig also
mitbeschlossenes Ziel, das als solchesalso nur als Ideeevident wird,
wahrend es trotz der Evidenz der Annaherung dochund evidenterweise
unerreicht bleibt.
On the one hand, the difference between adequacy and apodicticity of evidence
seems to be not extensional but intensional (VIII 35):
Noch eines ist hier zu bemerken als Charakteristikum einer adaquaten
Evidenz: Es tritt hervor in der Probe des Durchgangs durch Negation oder
Zweifel. Versuche ich, eine adaquate Evidenz zu negieren oder als zweifelhaft
anzusetzen, so springt, und wieder in adaquater Evidenz, die Unmoglichkeit

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Husserl Stud (2009) 25:1543 31

des Nichtseins oder des Zweifelhaftseins des Evidenten, des aus absoluter
Selbstgebung Erfaten hervor. Wir konnen diese Eigenheit adaquater Evidenz
auch als ihre Apodiktizitat bezeichnen. Offenbar ist umgekehrt jede apodikti-
sche Evidenz adaquat. Wir konnen daher beide Ausdrucke als aquivalente
gebrauchen und insbesondere den einen oder [den] anderen bevorzugen, je
nachdem wir eben auf die Adaquation oder [auf] die Apodiktizitat besonderen
Wert legen.
On the other hand, the expressed equivalence of adequacy and apodicticity
does not appear to obtain after all (VIII 396397):
Erkenntnis geht auf Sein oder Sosein irgendwelcher Erkenntnisgegenstande.
Mussen Erkenntnisse apodiktisch sein fur Sein und Sosein, damit wir sollen
rechtmaig aussagen durfen, da sie sind und so sind? Oder: Mussen alle
wahrhaft seienden Gegenstande, alle Gegenstande moglicher Wissenschaft,
apodiktisch erfahrbar und demnach auch so erkennbar sein? Und nun gar
adaquat! Selbst das Ich-denke ist, wenn auch apodiktisch erkennbarnamlich
als Erfahrung jederzeit auf die Gestalt einer apodiktischen Seinssetzung zu
bringen, nicht adaquat erkennbar. Und jedes besondere Tatsachenurteil, das
ich innerhalb meiner reinen Subjektivitat aussprechen kann, sofern es
hinausgeht uber den Gehalt des davon Apodiktischendie apodiktische
Strukturform mitgenommen, ist auch nicht mehr apodiktisch begrundbar,
namlich es bringt nicht apodiktische konkrete Gehalte herein.
Hence the phenomenology of evidence gives an ambivalent account of the
relationship between adequacy and apodicticity as absolutenesses.
Point: It is an open question whether the three features of triple-A type
evidence can coincide, since evidence again seems to be also a function of the
evident, the manner of givenness also a matter of the given.

4.5 Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929)

Here it is argued that the possibility of deception (Moglichkeit der Tauschung)

pertains to the evidence of experience (Evidenz der Erfahrung) and therefore
does not cancel its basic character or achievement (XVII 164; cf. 130). The same
is said to hold for jedwede Evidenz or for jede Erfahrung im erweiterten
Sinne (XVII 164): Selbst eine sich als apodiktisch ausgebende Evidenz kann
sich als Tauschung enthullen und setzt doch dafur eine ahnliche Evidenz voraus,
an der sie zerschellt. Evidence is thus not to be confused with eine absolute
Apodiktizitat (XVII 165). According to the definition, evidence is (XVII 166;
cf. 176):
die intentionale Leistung der Selbstgebung die allgemeine ausgez-
eichnete Gestalt der Intentionalitat, des Bewutseins von etwas, in der
das in ihr bewute Gegenstandliche in der Weise des Selbsterfaten,
Selbstgesehenen, des bewutseinsmaigen Bei-ihm-selbst-seins bewut ist
das urtumliche Bewutsein: es selbst erfasse ich, originaliter

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32 Husserl Stud (2009) 25:1543

An internal relation is posited between the Grundgesetzlichkeit der Intentionalitat

and the universale Funktion der Evidenz (XVII 168): Intentionalitat
uberhauptErlebnis eines Bewut-habens von irgend etwasund Evidenz, Inten-
tionalitat der Selbstgebung sind wesensmaig zusammengehorige Begriffe. Hence
the implicit syllogism (cf. XVII 168169):
P1: Intentionality and evidence are inseparable.
P2: But all consciousness is intentional (consciousness of).
C: Therefore all consciousness is evident.
This notion requires a broad concept of evidence. As a result, one can say that
Evidenz [ist] eine universale, auf das gesamte Bewutseinsleben bezogene Weise
der Intentionalitat, durch sie hat es eine universale teleologische Struktur (XVII
168169). Yet the general definition of evidence does not mean that die Struktur
der Evidenz is everywhere the same (XVII 169):
Kategorie der Gegenstandlichkeit und Kategorie der Evidenz sind Korrelate.
Zu jeder Grundart von Gegenstandlichkeiten gehort eine Grundart der
Erfahrung, der Evidenz und ebenso des intentional indizierten
Evidenzstiles.
Indeed, to reduce evidence to an apodiktische, absolut zweifellose und sozusagen in
sich absolut fertige Einsicht is to fail to understand any scientific achievement (XVII
169). In fact, die ublichen Evidenztheorien are mileitet von der Voraussetzung
absoluter Wahrheit (XVII 283). For the traditional theory of evidence views (XVII
283284):
Evidenz als absolute Erfassung der Wahrheit [d]iese absolute Evidenz
wird gefat als ein psychischer Charakter mancher Urteilserlebnisse, der
es absolut verburgt, da der Urteilsglaube nicht blo Glaube ist, sondern ein
solcher, der die Wahrheit selbst zu wirklicher Gegebenheit bringt
This magical theory is untenable (XVII 284). A neglected aspect of evidence and
truth must be respected: die Relativitat der Wahrheit und ihrer Evidenz
(XVII 284). The critical account of evidence continues with a Kritik der
Voraussetzung absoluter Wahrheit und der dogmatischen Theorien der Evidenz
(XVII 286). The purpose is to show that evidence need not be absolute, adequate,
apodictic (XVII 286287), and the task is to learn how to live with imperfect
evidence (XVII 287):
Erfahrung, Evidenz, gibt Seiendes und gibt es selbst, unvollkommen, wenn sie
unvollkommene Erfahrung ist, vollkommener, wenn sie sichihrer Wesensart
gemavervollkommnet, das ist, sich in der Synthesis der Einstimmigkeit
erweitert.
The only way to render Evidenz als Leistung (XVII 288) intelligible is by means
of a Relativitatstheorie der Evidenz (XVII 288). Accordingly, the end of the work
delivers a Vorzeichnung einer transzendentalen Theorie der Evidenz als intentio-
naler Leistung (XVII 289). To understand das Wesen der Evidenz, Evidenz als
Leistung (XVII 289), one must distinguish:

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Husserl Stud (2009) 25:1543 33

1. Die Evidenz der aueren (sinnlichen) Erfahrung (XVII 289290): Not even
God can render this evidence absolute, adequate, and apodictic.
2. Die Evidenz der inneren Erfahrung (XVII 290291): Not even die
einzelne Wahrnehmung is eine abgeschlossene Evidenz fur Seiendes.
3. Die Evidenz der immanenten Zeitdaten (XVII 291295): Since all evidence
is founded on the structure of inner time consciousness, all evidence exhibits
Gradualitaten in der Vollkommenheit der Selbstgebung.
4. Evidenz als apriorische Strukturform des Bewutseins (XVII 295): Since
ein Bewutseinsleben ohne Evidenz nicht sein kann , and
Evidenzen uberhaupt in weiteren Zusammenhangen mit Nichtevidenzen
stehen , it follows that a life of consciousness cannot exist without
Abwandlungen der Evidenzen as Nichtevidenzen.
Hence the explicit syllogism:
P1: There is no consciousness without evidence.
P2: But there are no evidences without non-evidences.
C: Therefore there is no consciousness without non-evidences.

This mature account of evidence recognizes the importance of die konstituierende

Horizontintentionalitat (XVII 207) not only for the investigation of meaning but
also for the clarification of evidence.
Point: Primacy and ultimacy are given not to absolute, adequate, and apodictic
evidence but to relative, imperfect, and dubitable evidence.

4.6 Cartesian Meditations (1931)

As the phenomenological clarification of evidence continues, the question of

justification (Begrundung) (I 51) prompts another, preliminary definition (I 52):
Evidenz ist in einem allerweitesten Sinne eine Erfahrung von Seiendem und
So-Seiendem, eben ein Es-selbst-geistig-zu-Gesicht-bekommen.
Thus evidence can be perfect or imperfect (I 52): Evidenz kann
vollkommener und weniger vollkommen sein. Life is content with relative
Evidenzen und Wahrheiten, but science seeks absolute Wahrheiten (I 5253).
For the systematic reflections, a normierendes methodisches Prinzip der Evidenz
is established (I 54):
ein erstes methodisches Prinzip da ich kein Urteil fallen oder in
Geltung lassen darf, das ich nicht aus der Evidenz geschopft habe, aus
Erfahrungen, in denen mir die betreffenden Sachen und Sachverhalte als sie
selbst gegenwartig sind.
Here Evidenz is understood as die wirkliche Selbstgebung der Sachen (I 54).
Adequacy (Adaquatheit) and apodicticity (Apodiktizitat) are distinguished
as two perfections (Vollkommenheiten) of evidence, whereby a higher
dignity (eine hohere Dignitat) is attributed to the latter than to the former (I 55

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34 Husserl Stud (2009) 25:1543

56). It is said that Adaquation und Apodiktizitat einer Evidenz nicht Hand in Hand
gehen mussen (I 62), so that there may be evidence that is apodictic but not adequate.
For example, only die lebendige Selbstgegenwart offers both apodictic and
adequate evidence (I 62), whereas the evidence of the ich bin is merely apodictic
(I 5861) and the evidence of the existence of the world is not even that (I 5758).
The issue of the extent of the apodictic evidence of the ich bin (I 6163) is raised
(I 6667) but bracketed (I 6770). The definitive definition of Evidenz compre-
hends both self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit) and its derivative variations
(Abwandlungen) (I 9293):
Im weitesten Sinne bezeichnet Evidenz ein allgemeines Urphanomen des
intentionalen Lebensgegenuber sonstigem Bewut-haben, das a priori leer,
vormeinend, indirekt, uneigentlich sein kann, die ganz ausgezeichnete
Bewutseinsweise der Selbsterscheinung, des Sich-selbst-darstellens, des
Sich-selbst-gebens einer Sache, eines Sachverhaltes, einer Allgemeinheit,
eines Wertes usw. im Endmodus des Selbst da, unmittelbar anschaulich,
originaliter gegeben.
This definition is consistent with the notion that the evident cannot be reduced to that
which is evident in the immediate present, since there is always that which can
become evident at any time (I 9394); that there is another respect in which not just
actual evidence counts, since potential evidence in the sense of habitual
evidence also contributes to the constitution of objects (I 9596); and that the ideal
of adequate evidence is unrealizable in regard to the one-sided evidence of external
experience and the objects thereof (I 9697). With respect to a Totalevidenz or
eine absolut vollkommene Evidenz or an adaquate Erfullung or eine absolute
Evidenz (I 98), the aim is no longer to realize the ideal of triple-A type evidence,
but rather to reflect on the implications of its unrealizability (I 9799, esp. 98):
Nicht diese Evidenz wirklich herzustellen sondern ihre Wesensstruktur
bzw. die Wesensstruktur der ihre ideale unendliche Synthesis systematisch
aufbauenden Unendlichkeitsdimensionen nach allen inneren Strukturen
klarzulegen, ist eine ganz bestimmte und gewaltige Aufgabe .
Self-givenness and the given self are thus distinct but inseparable (I 9899). The
real test of the phenomenological method involves the achievement of evidence
with respect to transcendental intersubjectivity (CM V). Can the self have evidence
for or apodictic knowledge of the other (I 133, 136)? Can the self experience the
self-givenness of the other (I 139)? Or does every evidence not posit more than it
presents (I 151)? Is the self-givenness of other selves similar or analogous to that of
other things (I 155)? Has the problem of the other been solved as a problem of
evidence (I 174177)? In the end, access to alterity and inadequacy of evidence are
inextricably linked (I 129): Hier aber fallt uns ein Merkwurdiges aufeine Kette
von Evidenzen, die doch in der Verkettung als Paradoxien anmuten.
Point: There are no necessary connections between absoluteness, adequacy, and
apodicticity here. Also, serious questions arise about the extent of these properties
of evidence even then when they do obtain. Finally, evidence again turns out to be a
function of the evident.

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Husserl Stud (2009) 25:1543 35

4.7 The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology

(19351936)

As far as evidence is concerned, the question about the Lebenswelt, ein Reich
ursprunglicher Evidenzen (VI 130), is about the relation between der wissens-
chaftlichen Evidenz (VI 2, 21, 26, 56, 77, 103, 131, 143144, 159, 203204, 237)
and der lebensweltlichen Evidenz (VI 131133, 143, 232). Evidence is now
defined thus (VI 367 [1936]):
Evidenz besagt gar nichts anderes als Erfassen eines Seienden im Bewutsein
seines originalen Selbst-da.
The answer is that the absolute, abstract, deductive, and objective evidence of the
world of science is founded on or grounded in the relative, concrete, intuitive, and
subjective evidence of the world of life (VI 133): Das Wissen von der objektiv-
wissenschaftlichen [Welt] grundet in der Evidenz der Lebenswelt. The
evidence varies according to the evident (VI 169):
Erfahrung, Evidenz ist nicht eine leere Allgemeinheit, sondern differenziert
sich nach den Arten, Gattungen, regionalen Kategorien von Seiendem und
auch nach allen raumzeitlichen Modalitaten.
Phenomenological evidence is supposed to be something special (VI 192193):
Jede Evidenz ist ein Problemtitel, nur nicht die phanomenologische Evidenz,
nachdem sie sich selbst reflektiv geklart und als letzte erwiesen hat. The quest for
apodictic evidence may not be over yet, but most references to apodiktische
Evidenz are now made from the neutral standpoint of a descriptive detachment (VI
26, 5456, 6162, 7779, 123, 195, 233234). Adequate evidence is harder to find
than genuine evidence (VI 227): Aber es zeigt sich bald, da echte Evidenz
nicht billig zu erkaufen ist. The conclusion is a matter of considerable controversy
(VI 508 [Summer 1935?]): Philosophie als Wissenschaft, als ernstliche, strenge, ja
apodiktisch strenge Wissenschaftder Traum ist ausgetraumt.
Point: The dominant leitmotif of the phenomenological clarification of
evidencethat evidence varies with the evidentis again in evidence.

4.8 Experience and Judgment (1938)

It emerges that the predicative evidence of judgment is founded on and grounded in

the prepredicative evidence of experience (cf. XVII 209230). The accepted notion
that logical evidence is the measure of all evidence is reviewed and revised (Husserl
[1972], p. 10):
Von vornherein glaubte man zu wissen, was Evidenz ist, an einem Ideal
absoluter, apodiktisch gewisser Erkenntnis glaubte man jede Erkenntnis
messen zu konnen, und kam nicht auf den Gedanken, da dieses Ideal der
Erkenntnis und damit auch die Erkenntnisse des Logikers selbst, die doch
diese Apodiktizitat fur sich in Anspruch nehmen, ihrerseits erst einer
Rechtfertigung und Ursprungsbegrundung bedurfen konnten.

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36 Husserl Stud (2009) 25:1543

Accordingly, the evidence of material experience is as legitimate a form of

epistemic warrant as the evidence of formal logic is (Husserl [1972], pp. 1112):
Die Rede von Evidenz, evidenter Gegebenheit, besagt hier also nichts anderes
als Selbstgegebenheit, die Art und Weise wie ein Gegenstand in seiner
Gegebenheit bewutseinsmaig als selbst da, leibhaft da gekennzeichnet
sein kannim Gegensatz zu seiner bloen Vergegenwartigung, der leeren,
blo indizierenden Vorstellung von ihm. Z.B. ein Gegenstand der aueren
Wahrnehmung ist evident gegeben, als er selbst, eben in der wirklichen
Wahrnehmung im Gegensatz zur bloen Vergegenwartigung von ihm, der
erinnernden, phantasierenden usw. Als evident bezeichnen wir somit jederlei
Bewutsein, das hinsichtlich seines Gegenstandes als ihn selbst gebendes
charakterisiert ist, ohne Frage danach, ob diese Selbstgebung adaquat ist oder
nicht.
This approach to evidence also relativizes the claim of absolute, adequate, and
apodictic evidence to be the standard for all evidence (Husserl [1972], p. 12):
Damit weichen wir von dem ublichen Gebrauche des Wortes Evidenz ab, das
in der Regel in Fallen verwendet wird, die richtig beschrieben solche
adaquater Gegebenheit, andererseits apodiktischer Einsicht sind. Auch solche
Gegebenheitsweise ist gekennzeichnet als Selbstgebung, namlich von Idea-
litaten, allgemeinen Wahrheiten. Aber jede Art von Gegenstanden hat ihre Art
der Selbstgebung = Evidenz; und nicht fur jede, z.B. nicht fur raum-dingliche
Gegenstande auerer Wahrnehmung ist eine apodiktische Evidenz moglich.
Gleichwohl haben auch sie ihre Art ursprunglicher Selbstgebung und damit
ihre Art der Evidenz.
It is hard to find a more articulate statement of the evidentiary principle that every
kind of given has its own kind of givenness.
Point: The development of phenomenology from an attraction to the ideal of
absolute, adequate, and apodictic evidence to the acceptance of the reality of
relative, inadequate, and fallible evidence is complete.
The goal of the phenomenological method, as applied to the phenomenon of
evidence, is primarily and ultimately to thematize what is operative in epistemic
experience (XXIV 164): Man lebt in der Evidenz, reflektiert aber nicht uber
Evidenz. Hence the question to which an answer must be sought (XXIV 154): Was
ist das, Evidenz? The problem of evidence is defined as a Problem der
Gegebenheit from the objective side (XXIV 153156, esp. 155): Offenbar ist
Evidenz nichts anderes als ein Name fur den Charakter der Gegebenheit. From the
subjective side, evidence is defined as an experience (ein Erlebnis) (XXIV 316),
an experience of givenness (der Gegebenheit) (XXIV 155), an experience of
givenness involving insight (Einsicht) (XXIV 155). Hence evidence is a matter of
degrees, grades, and levels (XXIV 322): Aber die Evidenz ist von verschiedener
Vollkommenheit. Which degrees, grades, or levels are achievable appears to be first
and foremost a matter of the kind of object or objectivity involved (XXIV 214216,
220230, 309325, 344348).

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Husserl Stud (2009) 25:1543 37

The result of the phenomenological clarification of the phenomenon of evidence,

then, is this: What evidence is, depends on what is evident.22

5 Application: What Kind of Evidence Does the Phenomenological

Method Yield?

The result has a big implication for the question of whether phenomenology in
general or the phenomenological method in particular can yield infallible results.
The reason is that the most important form of fallibility would appear to be neither
agent-fallibility nor method-fallibility but rather evidence-fallibility, which is
ineradicably rooted in object-indeterminacy. After all, the principle of intentionality
not only says that consciousness is consciousness of, but also shows that
consciousness is consciousness of something. This something is not lost but gained
by means of the phenomenological reduction, since it constitutes a substantial part
of what is methodically bracketed in by means of this step. The content of this
something, of which consciousness is consciousness, comprehends all the noematic
(objective) contents of consciousness. To what extent, then, can phenomenologists
make infallible judgments about these intentional contents of consciousness?
Does the phenomenological method guarantee any infallibility in this area? In
fact, if the development of Husserls thinking about evidence is any guide, then in
the end object-determinacy is an ideal surely to be pursued but hardly to be realized
and evidence-fallibility is a reality certainly to be avoided but scarcely to be
eliminated. Thus the achievable quality and quantity of object-determinacy is at
least as much a direct function of the object or objectivity itself as it is of anything
else, for example, of the agent or of the method.
Blending ancient and modern tropes, the expression evidence, as it is
employed in the phenomenological clarifications of knowledge provided by Husserl,
must be counted among what Aristotle refers to as pollachos legomenathings
that are said in many senses.23 For one of the things that a careful review of
Husserls application of the phenomenological method to the phenomenon of
evidence shows is that there is a gradual evolution in his thought from a strong but
abstract preference for absolute, adequate, and apodictic evidence to a healthy and
concrete appreciation for relative, imperfect, and dubitable evidence. There is an old
saying in philosophy that some philosophers are born as Platonists and die as
Aristotelians, but none are born as Aristotelians and die as Platonists. The case of
Husserls thinking on evidence is further confirmation of this hypothesis. His early
thinking on the topic is, of course, strongly oriented on the ideal of adequation. The
longer he thinks about it, however, the more he sees himself compelled to give the
reality of relativity its due.

22
Another way to contextualize Husserls texts on evidence would be to use the texts of other
philosophers on this topic. See Heffernan (2000). Readers are referred to the second, corrected version,
not to the first one, which was printed replete with errors added by the agent-fallible publisher.
23
Metaphysics V (Delta).

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38 Husserl Stud (2009) 25:1543

Anticipating Husserl, Aristotle also articulates the principle of contextual

precision very well: Our discussion will be adequate if we make things
perspicuous enough to accord with the subject matter; for we would not seek the
same degree of exactness in all sorts of arguments alike . Each of our claims,
then, ought to be accepted in the same way . For the educated person seeks
exactness in each area to the extent that the nature of the subject allows .24
Analogously, phenomenological clarification shows that it is not the method under
application but the matter under investigation that primarily and ultimately
determines the character of the evidence that is achievable with respect to it.
Husserl has good grounds for being wary of modern projects such as Descartes
dream of encompassing all human learning by means of methodical rules or
Spinozas nightmare of an ethica more geometrico demonstrata.
From a phenomenological standpoint, what evidence is, depends on what is
evident. The manner of givenness is contingent upon the matter of the given. In
terms of the discussion of the relationship between phenomenology and fallibility,
then, it is not enough to neutralize agent-fallibility and method-fallibility. For there
is another important source of fallibility involved, namely, object-indeterminacy.
From a different perspective, one may also refer to the phenomenon of evidence-
fallibility. The phenomenological method must thematize it, but it cannot eliminate
it. To understand Husserls shocking but not surprising remark in Formal and
Transcendental Logic about the difference between real and apparent apodictic
evidence (XVII 164:3233) is to appreciate why he does not claim that even a
proper application of the most rigorous method guarantees epistemic infallibil-
ityits the evanescence of evidence! Husserl also does not say that evidence
guarantees truth. Such a statement is foreign to his way of thinking about
evidence and truth as well as inconsistent with his withering criticism of the
Cartesian theological theory of evidence (VII 79, 86, 341) as the prime example
of the notion that any evidence can exercise this guarantor function (II 49, XXX
322323, XVII 283, 286).25 In fact, Husserl has a deep aversion to the use of verbs
such as vergewissern or versichernnot to mention garantierenin
connection with talk about evidence. The phenomenology of evidence has no
tolerance for the notion that evidence assures infallibility to any epistemic agent
employing any epistemological method.
Thus the phenomenological method does not guarantee infallibility. It would
be odd, indeed, if it were otherwise than it is. The last century alone has
provided numerous cases of the intractable limitations of human cognition, for
example, Heisenbergs Uncertainty or Indeterminacy Principle (Unscharfeprinzip
[1925/1927]),26 Godels Incompleteness Theorems,27 Gettiers Problem,28 Quines

24
Nicomachean Ethics, tr. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis/Cambridge, MA 1999), 1094b1227.
25
See Heffernan (1997).
26
Heisenberg (1930).
27
Godel (1931).
28
Gettier (1963).

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Husserl Stud (2009) 25:1543 39

Indeterminacy of Translation,29 and Davidsons Indeterminacy of Interpretation30

just to name a few. In this regard, phenomenological philosophy is fully in step with
the Zeitgeist.31 Nor is it difficult to give examples of ineradicable object-
indeterminacy and thus of possible evidence-fallibility with respect to the objective
correlates (noemata) that constitute themselves as the contents of consciousness and
that are thematized as such by means of the phenomenological reduction. The
infinite universe comes to mind. Understanding human history is an infinite task.
The field of ones own consciousness is incomprehensible in a way in which even
the inhabited earth is notone can google a map of the latter but not of the former
on the internet. There are other egos, including not only the irreducible alterities
themselves but also the objects that constitute themselves in their alterior
consciousnesses. One might also examine whether belief in the God who is
supposed to be a person but not to have a body is warranteddoes anybody not
have a body?32 For a literary example, one may consider the undecidable in what is
arguably the most famous novel of the twentieth century: Who is the real stranger in
Camus The StrangerMeursault or the nameless, faceless foreign other (Arab)
whom he unnecessarily kills on the beachand did the author himself know?33
How about the evidence involved in the aesthetic perception of works of art?34 How
about the entire realm of legal evidence and of what is given by means of it?35 There
are many limits even to the impressive horizonality of human consciousness here,
and most of them are set by the indeterminacy and incomprehensibility of objects.
Evidence-fallibility is real and ineradicable.
Understood as the performance of the transcendental reduction, the eidetic
reduction, and perhaps the psychological reduction as well, the phenomenological
method is so general that it cannot possibly yield, without further ado, the kind of
results that those who expect triple-A type epistemic value of it demand. That is
not a weakness but a strength. The whole point of the method is that it be general,
otherwise it would not have the universal applicability that is one of its
characteristic features. The phenomenological method is about giving rich
descriptions of and making fine distinctions with respect to consciousness and its
contents. There is nothing algorithmic or mechanical or even regular (Latin: regula)
about the phenomenological method. As far as the replicability of results is
concerned, it is rather the variability of resultswithin a certain range determined
by rigorous discourse among researchers serious about definite descriptionsthat is
a virtue of the phenomenological method.
The subject matter of the phenomenological method is primarily human
consciousness and its contents. It is not for the phenomenological method to

29
Quine (1960).
30
Davidson (1984).
31
Prigogine and Stengers (1997).
32
Dawkins (2006).
33
Shattuck (1996), pp. 137163.
34
Gadamer (1960), Part One, Section One, Chapter Three: Recovery of the Question about the Truth of
Art.
35
Plato, Theaetetus 172b177c (this is not a digression).

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40 Husserl Stud (2009) 25:1543

prescribe to the contents of consciousness the quality or quantity of the evidence

that they must yield. It is also not for the phenomenological method to eliminate the
chief source of its philosophemes: object-indeterminacy. The phenomenological
method ultimately yields the kind of relatively fallible evidence that the subject
matter to which it is applied is capable of yielding, none better and none worse.

6 Conclusion: How is the Phenomenological Method Like a Road Map?

A methodthe expression derives from the Greek preposition meta (by means
of) and the Greek substantive hodos (way)is a way from where one is to
where one wants to be, especially from a known location to an unknown destination.
Wittgenstein provides an eminently philosophical application of the phenomenon:
A philosophical problem has the form: I dont know my way about (Ein
philosophisches Problem hat die Form: Ich kenne mich nicht aus).36 According
to Socrates, for example, one can get to Larissa without knowing the way thereif
one has a true opinion on it.37 Anxious about the prospect of getting lost in a crazy
maze of city streets or in a deep dark forest, Descartes comes up with a method that
he adopts for himself and offers to others.38 Heidegger employs a phenomenolog-
ical method of investigation that he calls the [emphasis added] phenomenological
method of investigation,39 and, in doing so, eventually takes philosophy on paths
less traveled: wood paths40 leading to commonly neglected phenomena, along
which one can only hope for the right signposts41 to find the way back. Thus have
some philosophers anticipated the metaphorical aspect of method as a way of
proceeding or as a procedure.
In Against the Academicians (386), Augustine attacks the mitigated skepticism of
the Third Academy of Carneades of Cyrene (214129/128 B.C.E.), whose dominant
thought is the plausible (Greek: to pithanon) or the probable (Latin:
probabile), which is what, he claims, the wise human being should follow in the
absence of any knowable truth. Toward the end, Augustine tells the tale of the two
travelers, inadvertently but elegantly illustrating the phenomena of agent-fallibility
and method-fallibility, as well as of object-indeterminacy and evidence-fallibility42:
For, while I was pondering for a long time during my retirement here in the
country [at Cassiciacum in 386] how this plausible or what is like the
true could defend our actions from error, at first the position seemed to me to
be well-protected and well-fortified, as it used to seem to me back then when I
was marketing these notions; but later, when I had examined the whole

36
Philosophical Investigations, 123.
37
Plato, Meno 97ac. But see also Politeia 506c.
38
Discourse on the Method, 1.5, 2.1, 3.3.
39
Sein und Zeit, 7: Die phanomenologische Methode der Untersuchung.
40
Heidegger, Holzwege (1950).
41
Heidegger, Wegmarken (1967).
42
c. Acad. 3.15.34 (my translation).

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Husserl Stud (2009) 25:1543 41

situation more carefully, I then seemed to me to have seen an avenue of access

through which error would rush in upon those who felt safe. I think that he is
in error, namely, not only who is following the false path, but also who is not
following the true one.
Let us suppose, for example, that there are two travelers who are heading to
the same place, and that the one of them has resolved not to believe anyone as
well as that the other is excessively credulous. They have come to a fork in the
road. Here the credulous traveler says to a shepherd or to some rustic who is
there: Hello, my good man! Tell me, please, which is the right road to that
place. He receives this response: If you go this way, then you will not be in
error. And this traveler says to his companion: What he says is truelet us
go this way. The extremely cautious man laughs and very facetiously
ridicules the other for having assented so quickly, and, while the other departs,
this one stands fixed at the fork in the road. And look: Just as the cautious
traveler begins to seem foolish for stopping, someone elegant and urbane
appears on horseback and begins to approach from the other branch of the
road. The traveler is relieved, and then, after having greeted the man as he is
approaching, he indicates his intention to him, he asks him the way, and,
preferring him to the shepherd, he even mentions, in order to make him more
benevolently disposed to himself, the reason for his remaining there. By
chance, however, this man was a tricksterone of those who are now
commonly called samardoci. The mischievous human being held to his
usual practice, and this time he did so gratuitously. He said: Go this way! For
I have just come from there. He deceived and he departed. But when would
this cautious traveler ever be deceived? In fact, he said: I do not give
approval to that information as true, butbecause it is like the true, and
because to be idling here is neither appropriate nor advantageousI should go
this way. Meanwhile, the credulous traveler, who was in error by assenting
judging so quickly that the words of the shepherd were truewas already
relaxing in the place to which they were heading, whereas the cautious
traveler, who was not in error if only he followed the plausible, is still
wandering around in someI do not know whichwoods, and he has not yet
found anyone who knows the place to which he had proposed to go!
Really, I should tell you that, while I was pondering these things, I could not
restrain my laughter in the face of the fact that, according to the words of the
Academicians, it somehowI do not know howhappens that he who holds
to the true road, even by chance, would be in error, whereas he who has been
led by plausibility through mountains without roads, and who has not found
the region for which he was looking, would not seem to be in error. Indeed, so
that I may justly condemn consent without consideration, I should say that it is
more tenable to hold that both travelers are in error than that the latter is not in
error.
As a result of this, I now became more wary against the words of the
Academicians, and I began to reflect on the actions and characters of human

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42 Husserl Stud (2009) 25:1543

beings. But then so many charges and such capital charges against the
Academicians came to mind that I was not laughing at them any longer; rather,
I was partly angered and partly saddened that human beings most learned and
most discerning had fallen for such criminal and shameful views.
To draw the analogy to Hopps forms of fallibility: How the gullible traveler
handles the situation is a common expression of agent-fallibility, and how the
skeptical traveler does it is an extreme exhibition of method-fallibility. The
application is, of course, overdetermined, since the ignorant traveler gets
undeservedly lucky and the arrogant traveler gets deservedly tricked. The point
remains, however, that Augustine does not consider the complexity or indetermi-
nacy or incomprehensibility of the landscape itself. Yet he does hint at it by
thematizing evidence-fallibility.
The phenomenological method is, metaphorically speaking, not merely the way
by means of which one can reach distant phenomena at remote locations. Rather, it
is a road map in the sense that it aims to show its users how to get from some points
to others in a landscape in which many if not most of these users have never traveled
and in which many if not most of the roads that they must travel have not yet been
built. This road map is thus a special one, in that it does not first and foremost lay
out to its users a preexistent landscape. Rather, it aims mainly and mostly to scout
out regions that have yet to be discovered. Thus it does not so much reflect what is
as project what might be.
Yet a road map is not a set of directions regarding how to get from one point to
another. Nor does a road map contain a list of instructions to follow on how to do
this. Most maps do not say anything; they show how to get from one point to
another. And they do this only for those who can read a map and only for those who
can read the relevant map. In terms of its resolution, a road map can range from very
general to very detailed. In these respects, the phenomenological method is, of
course, no different from any other road map. What it maps, however, is sui
generis.43
The phenomenological method is analogous to the kind of map that one needs to
find the location in ancient Athens at which Socrates drank the hemlock. The most
likelybut not the apodictically, infallibly certainplace where Socrates died is
the city-state prison (desmoterion) of the Classical period.44 Its location, which is
removed from and not to be confused with the tourist trap on the Philopappos Hill
known as the Prison of Socrates, is designated bilingually, in Greek and in
English, by a simple stone marker at the far southwest corner of the ancient agora.45

Acknowledgements This paper represents the revised version of my comments on Hopps paper, both
of which were presented at the 38th Annual Meeting of the International Husserl Circle, Marquette

43
At the exchange in Milwaukee, Elizabeth Behnke suggested that the phenomenological method is like
a compass, an instrument for orientation. This thought is worth considering, so long as the idea is not that
the method is anything mechanical, like a global positioning system.
44
Plato, Crito 43a ff., Phaedo 57a ff.
45
The location is not even given on the extraordinarily detailed Historical Map of Athens published by
the Hellenic Ministry of Culture Archaeological Receipts Fund (Athens 2004).

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Husserl Stud (2009) 25:1543 43

University, June 27, 2008. I thank Walter Hopp, Steven Crowell, Sebastian Luft, Pol Vandevelde, and all
the other colleagues, too numerous to name, who contributed to the discussion.

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