Professional Documents
Culture Documents
5. That Capt. Alejano and I arrived at the meeting at past 9 o'clock in the evening of June 4, 2003
in a house located somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila;
8. That after Sen. Honasan had taken his dinner, the meeting proper started presided by Sen.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Honasan;
On August 4, 2003, an affidavit-complaint was filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) by respondent 9. That Sen. Honasan discussed the NRP, the graft and corruption in the government including
CIDG-PNP/P Director Eduardo Matillano. It reads in part: the military institution, the judiciary, the executive branch and the like;
10. That the discussion concluded that we must use force, violence and armed struggle to
achieve the vision of NRP. At this point, I raised the argument that it is my belief that reforms will
be achieved through the democratic processes and not thru force and violence and/or armed
2. After a thorough investigation, I found that a crime of coup d'etat was indeed committed by struggle. Sen. Honasan countered that "we will never achieve reforms through the democratic
military personnel who occupied Oakwood on the 27th day of July 2003 and Senator Gregorio processes because the people who are in power will not give up their positions as they have their
"Gringo"Honasan, II vested interests to protect." After a few more exchanges of views, Sen. Honasan appeared
irritated and asked me directly three (3) times: "In ka ba o out?" I then asked whether all those
present numbering 30 people, more or less, are really committed, Sen. Honasan replied: "Kung
3.
kaya nating pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga kasamahang
magtataksil." I decided not to pursue further questions;
4. The said crime was committed as follows:
11. That in the course of the meeting, he presented the plan of action to achieve the goals of
4.1 On June 4, 2003, at on or about 11 p.m., in a house located in San Juan, Metro Manila, a NRP, i.e., overthrow of the government under the present leadership thru armed revolution and
meeting was held and presided by Senator Honasan. Attached as Annex "B" is the affidavit after which, a junta will be constituted and that junta will run the new government. He further said
of Perfecto Ragil and made an integral part of this complaint. that some of us will resign from the military service and occupy civilian positions in the new
government. He also said that there is urgency that we implement this plan and that we would be
notified of the next activities.
12. That after the discussion and his presentation, he explained the rites that we were to
4.8 In the early morning of July 27, 2003, Capt. Gerardo Gambala, for and in behalf of undergo-some sort of "blood compact". He read a prayer that sounded more like a pledge and we
the military rebels occupying Oakwood, made a public statement aired on nation all recited it with raised arms and clenched fists. He then took a knife and demonstrated how to
television, stating their withdrawal of support to the chain of command of the AFP and make a cut on the left upper inner arm until it bleeds. The cut was in form of the letter "I" in the
the Government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and they are willing to risk old alphabet but was done in a way that it actually looked like letter "H". Then, he pressed his
their lives in order to achieve the National Recovery Agenda of Sen. Honasan, which right thumb against the blood and pressed the thumb on the lower middle portion of the copy of
they believe is the only program that would solve the ills of society. . . . (Emphasis the Prayer. He then covered his thumb mark in blood with tape. He then pressed the cut on his
supplied). left arm against the NRP flag and left mark of letter "I" on it. Everybody else followed;
The Sworn Statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil referred to by PNP/P Director Matillano is quoted 13. That when my turn came, I slightly made a cut on my upper inner arm and pricked a portion
verbatim, to wit: of it to let it bleed and I followed what Senator HONASAN did;
1. That I am a member of the Communication Electronics and Information Systems Services, 14. That I did not like to participate in the rites but I had the fear for my life with what Senator
Armed Forces of the Philippines with the rank of Major; HONASAN said that "kaya nating pumatay ng kasamahan";
2. That I met a certain Captain Gary Alejano of the Presidential Security Guard (PSG) during our 15. That after the rites, the meeting was adjourned and we left the place;
Very Important Person (VIP) Protection Course sometime in last week of March 2003;
16. That I avoided Captain Alejano after that meeting but I was extra cautious that he would not
3. That sometime in May 2003, Captain Alejano gave me a copy of the pamphlet of the National notice it for fear of my life due to the threat made by Senator HONASAN during the meeting on
Recovery Program (NRP) and told me that: "Kailangan ng Bansa ng taong kagaya mo na walang June 4, 2003 and the information relayed to me by Captain Alejano that their group had already
bahid ng corruption kaya basahin mo ito (referring to NRP) pamphlet. I took the pamphlet but deeply established their network inside the intelligence community;
never had the time to read it;
17. That sometime in the first week of July 2003, Captain Alejano came to see me to return the
4. That sometime in the afternoon of June 4, 2003, Captain Alejano invited me to join him in a rifle that he borrowed and told me that when the group arrives at the Malacaang Compound for
meeting where the NRP would be discussed and that there would be a special guest;
"D-DAY", my task is to switch off the telephone PABX that serves the Malacaang complex. I told 3) Whether respondent DOJ Panel of Investigators committed grave abuse of discretion in
him that I could not do it. No further conversation ensued and he left; deferring the resolution of the petitioner's motion to clarify jurisdiction considering the claim of the
petitioner that the DOJ Panel has no jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation.
18. That on Sunday, July 27, 2003, while watching the television, I saw flashed on the screen
Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, Captain Gerardo Gambala, Captain Alejano and some others who After the oral arguments, the parties submitted their respective memoranda. The arguments of petitioner are:
were present during the June 4th meeting that I attended, having a press conference about their
occupation of the Oakwood Hotel. I also saw that the letter "I" on the arm bands and the banner
is the same letter "I" in the banner which was displayed and on which we pressed our wound to 1. The Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation over all
leave the imprint of the letter "I"; public officials, including petitioner.
19. That this Affidavit is being executed in order to attest the veracity of the foregoing and in 2. Respondent DOJ Panel is neither authorized nor deputized under OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No.
order to charge SENATOR GREGORIO "GRINGO" HONASAN, Capt. FELIX TURINGAN, Capt. 95-001 to conduct the preliminary investigation involving Honasan.
GARY ALEJANO, Lt. ANTONIO TRILLANES, Capt. GERARDO GAMBALA and others for
violation of Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code for the offense of "coup d'etat". (Emphasis
3. Even if deputized, the respondent DOJ Panel is still without authority since OMB-DOJ Joint
supplied)
Circular No. 95-001 is ultra vires for being violative of the Constitution, beyond the powers
granted to the Ombudsman by R.A. 6770 and inoperative due to lack of publication, hence null
The affidavit-complaint is docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1120 and the Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the and void.
Department of Justice (DOJ Panel for brevity) sent a subpoena to petitioner for preliminary investigation.
4. Since petitioner is charged with coup de 'etat in relation to his office, it is the Office of the
On August 27, 2003, petitioner, together with his counsel, appeared at the DOJ. He filed a Motion for Ombudsman which has the jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case, asserting that since the imputed acts were
committed in relation to his public office, it is the Office of the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the
5. The respondent DOJ Panel gravely erred in deferring the resolution of petitioner's Motion to
jurisdiction to conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation; that should the charge be filed in court, it
Clarify Jurisdiction since the issue involved therein is determinative of the validity of the
is the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, that can legally take cognizance of the case considering that
preliminary investigation.
he belongs to the group of public officials with Salary Grade 31; and praying that the proceedings be
suspended until final resolution of his motion.
6. Respondent DOJ Panel gravely erred when it resolved petitioner's Motion in the guise of
directing him to submit Counter-Affidavit and yet refused and/or failed to perform its duties to
Respondent Matillano submitted his comment/opposition thereto and petitioner filed a reply.
resolve petitioner's Motion stating its legal and factual bases.
On August 27, 2003, Senator Gregorio B. Honasan II filed through counsel a "Motion to Clarify
1. The DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation on petitioner pursuant to
Jurisdiction". On September 1, 2003, complainant filed a Comment/Opposition to the said motion.
Section 3, Chapter I, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to
P.D. No. 1275, as amended by P.D. No. 1513.
The motion and comment/opposition are hereby duly noted and shall be passed upon in the
resolution of this case.
2. Petitioner is charged with a crime that is not directly nor intimately related to his public office as
a Senator. The factual allegations in the complaint and the supporting affidavits are bereft of the
In the meantime, in view of the submission by complainant of additional affidavits/evidence and requisite nexus between petitioner's office and the acts complained of.
to afford respondents ample opportunity to controvert the same, respondents, thru counsel are
hereby directed to file their respective counter-affidavits and controverting evidence on or before
3. The challenge against the constitutionality of the OMB-DOJ Joint Circular, as a ground to
September 23, 2003.1
question the jurisdiction of the DOJ over the complaint below, is misplaced. The jurisdiction of the
DOJ is a statutory grant under the Revised Administrative Code. It is not derived from any
Hence, Senator Gregorio B. Honasan II filed the herein petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of provision of the joint circular which embodies the guidelines governing the authority of both the
Court against the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation on offenses charged
Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the in relation to public office.
aforequoted Order of September 10, 2003 on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation.
4. Instead of filing his counter-affidavit, petitioner opted to file a motion to clarify jurisdiction
which, for all intents and purposes, is actually a motion to dismiss that is a prohibited pleading
Respondent Ombudsman, the Office of Solicitor General in representation of respondents DOJ Panel, and under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The DOJ Panel is not
Director Matillano submitted their respective comments. required to act or even recognize it since a preliminary investigation is required solely for the
purpose of determining whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that
a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
The Court heard the parties in oral arguments on the following issues: trial. The DOJ panel did not outrightly reject the motion of petitioner but ruled to pass upon the
same in the determination of the probable cause; thus, it has not violated any law or rule or any
norm of discretion.
1) Whether respondent Department of Justice Panel of Investigators has jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation over the charge of coup d'etat against petitioner;
The arguments of respondent Ombudsman are:
2) Whether Ombudsman-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 violates the Constitution and Republic Act No.
6770 or Ombudsman Act of 1989; and
1. The DOJ Panel has full authority and jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation over the unjust, improper, or inefficient. Petitioner rationalizes that the 1987 Administrative Code and the Ombudsman
petitioner for the reason that the crime of coup d'etat under Article No. 134-A of the Revised Act of 1989 cannot prevail over the Constitution, pursuant to Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Penal Code (RPC) may fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only if the same is
committed "in relation to office" of petitioner, pursuant to Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended
by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249. Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
2. Petitioner's premise that the DOJ Panel derives its authority to conduct preliminary
investigation over cases involving public officers solely from the OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95- When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void
001 is misplaced because the DOJ's concurrent authority with the OMB to conduct preliminary and the latter shall govern.
investigation of cases involving public officials has been recognized in Sanchez vs. Demetriou
(227 SCRA 627 [1993]) and incorporated in Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the
Procedure.
laws or the Constitution.
3. Petitioner's assertion that the Joint Circular is ultra vires and the DOJ cannot be deputized by
and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.2
the Ombudsman en masse but must be given in reference to specific cases has no factual or
legal basis. There is no rule or law which requires the Ombudsman to write out individualized
authorities to deputize prosecutors on a per case basis. The power of the Ombudsman to The Court is not convinced. Paragraph (1) of Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
deputize DOJ prosecutors proceeds from the Constitutional grant of power to request assistance
from any government agency necessary to discharge its functions, as well as from the statutory
authority to so deputize said DOJ prosecutors under Sec. 31 of RA 6770. SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
4. The Joint Circular which is an internal arrangement between the DOJ and the Office of the 1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
Ombudsman need not be published since it neither contains a penal provision nor does it official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
prescribe a mandatory act or prohibit any under pain or penalty. It does not regulate the conduct improper, or inefficient.
of persons or the public, in general.
does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law to investigate and prosecute cases involving
The Court finds the petition without merit. public officials. If it were the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, they would have expressly
declared the exclusive conferment of the power to the Ombudsman. Instead, paragraph (8) of the same
Section 13 of the Constitution provides:
The authority of respondent DOJ Panel is based not on the assailed OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 but on
the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing the DOJ, which
provides: (8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions
or duties as may be provided by law.
Sec. 1. Declaration of policy - It is the declared policy of the State to provide the government with
a principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer Accordingly, Congress enacted R.A. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989." Section 15
the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the thereof provides:
investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional
system;
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions - To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the
following powers and functions:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any
stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the
probation and correction system; (Emphasis supplied)
. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that it is the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation under paragraph (1), Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which confers upon the For purposes of investigation and prosecution, Ombudsman cases involving criminal
Office of the Ombudsman the power to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or offenses may be subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1) those cognizable by the
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The
difference between the two, aside from the category of the courts wherein they are filed, is empowered to "direct the officer concerned," in this case the Special Prosecutor, "to take
on the authority to investigate as distinguished from the authority to prosecute, such appropriate action against a public official x x x and to recommend his prosecution" (Sec. 13[3]).
cases.
The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any
The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman case crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or
may be exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not
any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their assistance, either in their regular capacities or require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from, the performance
as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
The prosecution of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of
exclusive control and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases cognizable by broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that
the regular Courts, the control and supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman is only in are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring
Ombudsman cases in the sense defined above. The law recognizes a concurrence of public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or
jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and other investigative agencies of the dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers. It was
government in the prosecution of cases cognizable by regular courts. (Emphasis supplied) deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office to investigate all criminal complaints
against public officers regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions complained of are
related to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes
It is noteworthy that as early as 1990, the Ombudsman had properly differentiated the authority to investigate perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds of malfeasance,
cases from the authority to prosecute cases. It is on this note that the Court will first dwell on the nature or misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as
extent of the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate cases. Whence, focus is directed to the second mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office" (Sec. 16, R.A. 6770).
sentence of paragraph (1), Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act which specifically provides that the
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the .........
investigation of such cases.
Indeed, the labors of the constitutional commission that created the Ombudsman as a special
That the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not body to investigate erring public officials would be wasted if its jurisdiction were confined to the
exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the provincial, investigation of minor and less grave offenses arising from, or related to, the duties of public
city and state prosecutors has long been settled in several decisions of the Court. office, but would exclude those grave and terrible crimes that spring from abuses of official
powers and prerogatives, for it is the investigation of the latter where the need for an
independent, fearless, and honest investigative body, like the Ombudsman, is greatest.6
In Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, decided in 1990, the Court expressly
declared:
At first blush, there appears to be conflicting views in the rulings of the Court in the Cojuangco, Jr. case and
the Deloso case. However, the contrariety is more apparent than real. In subsequent cases, the Court
A reading of the foregoing provision of the Constitution does not show that the power of elucidated on the nature of the powers of the Ombudsman to investigate.
investigation including preliminary investigation vested on the Ombudsman is exclusive.3
In 1993, the Court held in Sanchez vs. Demetriou,7 that while it may be true that the Ombudsman has
Interpreting the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of the Ombudsman Act, the jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official, the authority of the
Court held in said case: Ombudsman to investigate is merely a primary and not an exclusive authority, thus:
Under Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770 aforecited, the Ombudsman has primary The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of RA 6770 to
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan so that it may take over at any stage investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official. However as we held
from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. The authority only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo vs. Domagas,8 this authority "is not an exclusive
of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged."
exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the
government. Such investigatory agencies referred to include the PCGG and the provincial
and city prosecutors and their assistants, the state prosecutors and the judges of the Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in this case needed
municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial court. the approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the information and amended information
here did not have the approval of the Ombudsman. However, we do not believe that such
approval was necessary at all. In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545 (1990), the Court held that
In other words the provision of the law has opened up the authority to conduct preliminary the Ombudsman has authority to investigate charges of illegal acts or omissions on the part of
investigation of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to all investigatory agencies of any public official, i.e., any crime imputed to a public official. It must, however, be pointed out
the government duly authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation under Section 2, that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act or omission of any
Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the only qualification that the public official" (191 SCRA 550) is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or
Ombudsman may take over at any stage of such investigation in the exercise of his concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the
primary jurisdiction.4 (Emphasis supplied) non-involvement of the office of the Ombudsman in the present case does not have any adverse
legal consequence upon the authority of the panel of prosecutors to file and prosecute the
information or amended information.
A little over a month later, the Court, in Deloso vs. Domingo,5 pronounced that the Ombudsman, under the
authority of Section 13 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, has jurisdiction to investigate any crime committed by a
public official, elucidating thus: In fact, other investigatory agencies of the government such as the Department of Justice
in connection with the charge of sedition, and the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, in ill gotten wealth cases, may conduct the investigation.9 (Emphasis
As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to "act
supplied)
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials" (Sec. 12) and to
"investigate x x x any act or omission of any public official x x x when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." (Sec. 13[1].) The Ombudsman is also
In Natividad vs. Felix,10 a 1994 case, where the petitioner municipal mayor contended that it is the It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not only to be
Ombudsman and not the provincial fiscal who has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation over consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter,
his case for alleged Murder, the Court held: as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. The rule is expressed in the
maxim, "interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi," or every statute
must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
The Deloso case has already been re-examined in two cases, namely Aguinaldo vs. jurisprudence. Thus, in the application and interpretation of Article XI, Sections 12 and 13
Domagas and Sanchez vs. Demetriou. However, by way of amplification, we feel the need for of the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Pres. Decree No. 1861 must be
tracing the history of the legislation relative to the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan since the taken into consideration. It must be assumed that when the 1987 Constitution was written,
Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction is dependent on the cases cognizable by the former. its framers had in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. In the
absence of any express repeal or amendment, the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman
Act of 1989 are deemed in accord with existing statute, specifically, Pres. Decree No.
In the process, we shall observe how the policy of the law, with reference to the subject matter,
1861.12 (Emphasis supplied)
has been in a state of flux.
R.A. No. 8249 which amended Section 4, paragraph (b) of the Sandiganbayan Law (P.D. 1861) likewise
These laws, in chronological order, are the following: (a) Pres. Decree No. 1486, -- the first law
provides that for other offenses, aside from those enumerated under paragraphs (a) and (c), to fall under the
on the Sandiganbayan; (b) Pres. Decree No. 1606 which expressly repealed Pres. Decree No.
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, they must have been committed by public officers or employees
1486; (c) Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; (d) Pres. Decree No. 1860; and (e) Pres.
in relation to their office.
Decree No. 1861.
In summation, the Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the
The latest law on the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 1 of Pres. Decree No. 1861 reads as follows:
Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate
offenses committed by public officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses
"SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 is hereby amended to read involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies such as
as follows: provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of
the government, the investigation of such cases.
'SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases against
'(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at
any stage.
...
Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that the Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent jurisdiction to
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and conduct preliminary investigation, the respective heads of said offices came up with OMB-DOJ Joint Circular
employees in relation to their office, including those employed in No. 95-001 for the proper guidelines of their respective prosecutors in the conduct of their investigations, to
government-owned or controlled corporation, whether simple or wit:
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher that prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine
of P6,000: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned OMB-DOJ JOINT CIRCULAR NO. 95-001
in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine
of P6,000 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Series of 1995
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court."
TO: ALL GRAFT INVESTIGATION/SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICERS OF THE OFFICE OF
A perusal of the aforecited law shows that two requirements must concur under Sec. 4 (a) (2) for THE OMBUDSMAN
an offense to fall under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, namely: the offense committed by the
public officer must be in relation to his office and the penalty prescribed be higher then prision
ALL REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, PROVINCIAL/CITY
correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00.11
PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, STATE PROSECUTORS AND PROSECUTING
ATTORNEYS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.
Applying the law to the case at bench, we find that although the second requirement has been
met, the first requirement is wanting. A review of these Presidential Decrees, except Batas
SUBJECT: HANDLING COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
Pambansa Blg. 129, would reveal that the crime committed by public officers or employees must
EMPLOYEES, THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, PREPARATION OF
be "in relation to their office" if it is to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This phrase
RESOLUTIONS AND INFORMATIONS AND PROSECUTION OF CASES BY PROVINCIAL
which is traceable to Pres. Decree No. 1468, has been retained by Pres. Decree No. 1861 as a
AND CITY PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS.
requirement before the Ombudsman can acquire primary jurisdiction on its power to investigate.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
It cannot be denied that Pres. Decree No. 1861 is in pari materia to Article XI, Sections 12
and 13 of the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 because, as earlier
mentioned, the Ombudsman's power to investigate is dependent on the cases cognizable In a recent dialogue between the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the DEPARTMENT OF
by the Sandiganbayan. Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or JUSTICE, discussion centered around the latest pronouncement of the supreme court on the
thing or to the same class of persons or things, or object, or cover the same specific or extent to which the ombudsman may call upon the government prosecutors for assistance in the
particular subject matter. investigation and prosecution of criminal cases cognizable by his office and the conditions under
which he may do so. Also discussed was Republic Act No. 7975 otherwise known as "an act to
strengthen the functional and structural organization of the sandiganbayan, amending for the
purpose presidential decree no. 1606, as amended" and its implications on the jurisdiction of the (c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
office of the Ombudsman on criminal offenses committed by public officers and employees.
We find no merit in this argument. As we have lengthily discussed, the Constitution, the Ombudsman Act of
The following may conduct preliminary investigations:
1989, Administrative Order No. 8 of the Office of the Ombudsman, the prevailing jurisprudence and under
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, all recognize and uphold the concurrent jurisdiction of the
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants; Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation on charges filed against public officers and
employees.
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
To reiterate for emphasis, the power to investigate or conduct preliminary investigation on charges against
any public officers or employees may be exercised by an investigator or by any provincial or city prosecutor
or their assistants, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. The fact that Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
all prosecutors are in effect deputized Ombudsman prosecutors under the OMB-DOJ Circular is a mere Puno, J., joins J. Ynares-Santiago.
superfluity. The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the Vitug, J., see separate dissenting opinion.
preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's authority to act as the principal law Quisumbing, J., joins the dissent.
agency of the government and investigate the commission of crimes under the Revised Penal Code is Ynares-Santiago, J., see separate dissenting opinion.
derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had been held in the Natividad case13 as not being Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., see dissenting opinion.
contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary
investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman
may assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation. SEPARATE OPINION
Petitioner's contention that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is ineffective on the ground that it was not VITUG, J.:
published is not plausible. We agree with and adopt the Ombudsman's dissertation on the matter, to wit:
Preliminary investigation is an initial step in the indictment of an accused; it is a substantive right, not merely
Petitioner appears to be of the belief, although NOT founded on a proper reading and application a formal or a technical requirement,1 which an accused can avail himself of in full measure. Thus, an
of jurisprudence, that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001, an internal arrangement between the accused is entitled to rightly assail the conduct of an investigation that does not accord with the law. He may
DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman, has to be published. also question the jurisdiction or the authority of the person or agency conducting that investigation and, if
bereft of such jurisdiction or authority, to demand that it be undertaken strictly in conformity with the legal
prescription.2
As early as 1954, the Honorable Court has already laid down the rule in the case of People vs.
Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954) that only circulars and regulations which prescribe a penalty for
its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and The Ombudsman is empowered3 to, among other things, investigate and prosecute on its own or on
theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provision, a law, complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such
regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
said contents and its penalties: said precedent, to date, has not yet been modified or reversed. cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may, at any stage, take
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT contain any penal provision or prescribe a over from any agency of Government the investigation of such cases. This statutory provision, by and large,
mandatory act or prohibit any, under pain or penalty. is a restatement of the constitutional grant to the Ombudsman of the power to investigate and prosecute "any
act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal x x x."4
What is more, in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 453 (1986), the Honorable Court ruled
that:
The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, in taking cognizance of the preliminary
investigation on charges of coup d'etat against petitioner Gregorio Honasan, relies on OMB-DOJ Circular No.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the 95-001. That joint circular must be understood as being merely a working arrangement between the Office of
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is the Ombudsman (OMB) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) that must not be meant to be such a blanket
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors delegation to the DOJ as to generally allow it to conduct preliminary investigation over any case cognizable
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their by the OMB.
duties. (at page 454. emphasis supplied)
While Section 31 of Republic Act No. 6770 states that the Ombudsman may "designate or deputize any
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ and the fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to
Office of the Ombudsman, outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases," the provision cannot be assumed, however, to
and of the Office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. OMB-DOJ Joint be an undefined and broad entrustment of authority. If it were otherwise, it would be unable to either
Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in general. withstand the weight of burden to be within constitutional parameters or the proscription against undue
delegation of powers. The deputized fiscal, state prosecutor or government lawyer must in each instance be
named; the case to which the deputized official is assigned must be specified; and the investigation must be
Accordingly, there is no merit to petitioner's submission that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 conducted under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman remains to have the
has to be published.14 basic responsibility, direct or incidental, in the investigation and prosecution of such cases.
Petitioner insists that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation because The Sandiganbayan law5 grants to the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or
petitioner is a public officer with salary Grade 31 so that the case against him falls exclusively within the felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, committed by the public officials, including
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Considering the Court's finding that the DOJ has concurrent jurisdiction to members of Congress, in relation to their office. The crime of coup d'etat, with which petitioner, a member of
investigate charges against public officers, the fact that petitioner holds a Salary Grade 31 position does not the Senate, has been charged, is said to be closely linked to his "National Recovery Program," a publication
by itself remove from the DOJ Panel the authority to investigate the charge of coup d'etat against him. which encapsules the bills and resolutions authored or sponsored by him on the senate floor. I see the
charge as being then related to and bearing on his official function.
The question whether or not the offense allegedly committed by petitioner is one of those enumerated in the
Sandiganbayan Law that fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan will not be resolved in the On the above score, I vote to grant the petition.
present petition so as not to pre-empt the result of the investigation being conducted by the DOJ Panel as to
the questions whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of the information against the
petitioner; and to which court should the information be filed considering the presence of other respondents
in the subject complaint. DISSENTING OPINION
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
SO ORDERED. The first question to answer is which court has jurisdiction to try a Senator who is accused of coup d'etat.
Behind the simple issue is a more salient question - Should this Court allow an all too restrictive and limiting
interpretation of the law rather than take a more judicious approach of interpreting the law by the spirit, which committed by the public officer or employee in relation to his office. Applying the law to the case at bar, the
vivifies, and not by the letter, which killeth? Majority found that although the first requirement has been met, the second requirement is wanting. I
disagree.
The elemental thrust of the Majority view is that the Department of Justice (DOJ), not the Office
of the Ombudsman, has the jurisdiction to investigate the petitioner, a Senator, for the crime Following its definition, coup d'etat can only be committed by members of the military or police or holding any
of coup d'etat pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 as amended by Republic public office or employment, with or without civilian support. Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code states:
Act No. 8249 (Sandiganbayan Law). The Majority maintains that since the crime for which
petitioner is charged falls under Section 4, paragraph (b) of the Sandiganbayan Law, it is
imperative to show that petitioner committed the offense in relation to his office as Senator. It Article 134-A. Coup d'etat. How committed. The crime of coup d'etat is a swift attack
reasoned that since petitioner committed the felonious acts, as alleged in the complaint, not in accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed against duly
connection with or in relation to his public office, it is the DOJ, and not the Office of the constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, or any military camp or installation,
Ombudsman, which is legally tasked to conduct the preliminary investigation. communications network, public utilities or other facilities needed for the exercise and continued
possession of power, singly or simultaneously carried out anywhere in the Philippines by any
person or persons, belonging to the military or police or holding any public office or employment,
In light of the peculiar circumstances prevailing in the instant case and in consideration of the with or without civilian support or participation for the purpose of seizing or diminishing state
policies relied upon by the Majority, specifically, the Sandiganbayan Law and Republic Act No. power.
6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), I submit that the posture taken by the Majority seriously
deviates from and renders nugatory the very intent for which the laws were enacted.
A coup consists mainly of the military personnel and public officers and employees seizing the controlling
levers of the state, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder. As
The crime of coup d'etat, if committed by members of Congress or by a public officer with a defined, it is a swift attack directed against the duly constituted authorities or vital facilities and installations to
salary grade above 27, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. seize state power. It is therefore inherent in coup d'etat that the crime be committed "in relation to" the office
Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, provides: of a public officer or employee. The violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth which are inherent in the
crime can only be accomplished by those who possess a degree of trust reposed on such person in that
position by the Republic of the Philippines. It is by exploiting this trust that the swift attack can be made.
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction.- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases Since the perpetrators take advantage of their official positions, it follows that coup d'etat can be committed
involving: only through acts directly or intimately related to the performance of official functions, and the same need not
be proved since it inheres in the very nature of the crime itself.
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the It is contended by public respondent that the crime of coup d'etat cannot be committed "in relation" to
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following petitioner's office, since the performance of legislative functions does not include its commission as part of
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the the job description. To accommodate this reasoning would be to render erroneous this Court's ruling
commission of the offense: in People v. Montejo2 that "although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract,"
the facts in a particular case may show that ". . . the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the
accuseds'] respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or
xxxxxxxxx
irregular, of their official functions." Simply put, if murder can be committed in the performance of official
functions, so can the crime of coup d'etat.
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
The Ombudsman is wrong when he says that legislative function is only "to make laws, and to alter and
repeal them." The growing complexity of our society and governmental structure has so revolutionized the
x x x x x x x x x. powers and duties of the legislative body such that its members are no longer confined to making laws. They
can perform such other functions, which are, strictly speaking, not within the ambit of the traditional
legislative powers, for instance, to canvass presidential elections, give concurrence to treaties, to propose
In the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary,1 we clarified the exclusive original jurisdiction of the constitutional amendments as well as oversight functions. As an incident thereto and in pursuance thereof,
Sandiganbayan pursuant to Presidential Decree ("PD") No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act ("RA") Nos. members of Congress may deliver privilege speeches, interpellations, or simply inform and educate the
7975 and 8249, and made the following definitive pronouncements: public in respect to certain proposed legislative measures.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a The complaint alleges that the meeting on June 4, 2003 of the alleged coup plotters involved a discussion on
felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing provision on the the issues and concerns within the framework of the National Recovery Program (NRP), a bill which
jurisdictional offense is not paragraph but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b petitioner authored in the Senate. The act of the petitioner in ventilating the ails of the society and extolling
pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed the merits of the NRP is part of his duties as legislator not only to inform the public of his legislative
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A. 8249] in measures but also, as a component of the national leadership, to find answers to the many problems of our
relation to their office." The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the society. One can see therefore that Senator Honasan's acts were "in relation to his office."
crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's official functions. Thus,
under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position
or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees It is true that not every crime committed by a high-ranking public officer falls within the exclusive original
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It is also true that there is no public office or employment that includes the
same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public commission of a crime as part of its job description. However, to follow this latter argument would mean that
officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. there would be no crime falling under Section 4, paragraph (b) PD No. 1606, as amended. This would be an
8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention undue truncation of the Sandiganbayan's exclusive original jurisdiction and contrary to the plain language of
the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the the provision.
Sandiganbayan.
Only by a reasonable interpretation of the scope and breadth of the term "offense committed in relation to [an
As worded, the Sandiganbayan Law requires that for a felony, coup d'etat in this case, to fall under the accused's] office" in light of the broad powers and functions of the office of Senator, can we subserve the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, two requisites must concur, namely: (1) that the public officer or very purpose for which the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Ombudsman were created.
employee occupies the position corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher; and (2) that the crime is
The raison d' etre for the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant The "primary jurisdiction" of the Office of the Ombudsman in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan was
of its broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able reiterated in Laurel v. Desierto:6
to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and
through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into
malfeasances, and misfeasances committed by public officers.3 Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of
In similar vein, the Constitution provides for the creation of the Sandiganbayan to attain the highest norms of such cases." The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its
official conduct required of public officers and employees. It is a special court that tries cases involving public jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts. The
officers and employees that fall within specific salary levels. Thus, section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
makes it a requirement that for offenses to fall under the exlusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute
public officer involved must occupy a position equivalent to Salary Grade 27 or higher. This salary grade other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the
requirement is not a product of whim or an empty expression of fancy, but a way to ensure that offenses powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of
which spring from official abuse will be tried by a judicial body insulated from official pressure and malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during
unsusceptible to the blandishments, influence and intimidation from those who seek to subvert the ends of their tenure of office.
justice.
"Primary Jurisdiction" usually refers to cases involving specialized disputes where the practice is to refer the
If we were to give our assent to respondent's restrictive interpretation of the term "in relation to his office," we same to an administrative agency of special competence in observance of the doctrine of primary
would be creating an awkward situation wherein a powerful member of Congress will be investigated by the jurisdiction. This Court has said that it cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which
DOJ which is an adjunct of the executive department, and tried by a regular court which is much vulnerable is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal before the question is resolved by the administrative
to outside pressure. Contrarily, a more liberal approach would bring the case to be investigated and tried by tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
specialized Constitutional bodies and, thus ensure the integrity of the judicial proceedings. knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute
administered.7 The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is "to guide a court in determining whether
Second, the "primary jurisdiction" of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation of it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some
an offense within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan operates as a mandate on the question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court."8 It applies where a
Office of the Ombudsman, especially when the person under investigation is a member of Congress. The claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires
Ombudsman's refusal to exercise such authority, relegating the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of
I.S. No. 2003-1120 to the respondent Investigating Panel appointed by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
under DOJ Department Order No. 279, s. 2003, is a dereliction of a duty imposed by no less than the administrative body for its view.9
Constitution.
Where the concurrent authority is vested in both the Department of Justice and the Office of the
Insofar as the investigation of said crimes is concerned, I submit that the same belongs to the primary Ombudsman, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should operate to restrain the Department of Justice from
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, empowers the Ombudsman exercising its investigative authority if the case will likely be cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In such
to conduct the investigation of cases involving illegal acts or omissions committed by any public officer or cases, the Office of the Ombudsman should be the proper agency to conduct the preliminary investigation
employee. Section 15, paragraph (1) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides: over such an offense, it being vested with the specialized competence and undoubted probity to conduct the
investigation.
SECTION 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties: The urgent need to follow the doctrine is more heightened in this case where the accused is a member of
Congress. The DOJ is under the supervision and control of the Office of the President; in effect, therefore,
the investigation would be conducted by the executive over a member of a co-equal branch of government. It
1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
is precisely for this reason that the independent constitutional Office of the Ombudsman should conduct the
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
preliminary investigation. Senator Honasan is a member of the political opposition. His right to a preliminary
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
investigation by a fair and uninfluenced body is sacred and should not be denied. As we stated in
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
the Uy case:
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases; x x x.4
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most
important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed
In Uy v. Sandiganbayan,5 the extent and scope of the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct
the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in
investigations was described as:
ensuring accountability n public office. A review of the development of our Ombudsman laws
reveals this intent.
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or
These pronouncements are in harmony with the constitutional mandate of he Office of the Ombudsman, as
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction
expressed in Article XI of the Constitution.
between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has
been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to
embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee. SECTION 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly
on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
Government, or any agency, subdivision or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in
or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the actions
Section 15 (1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
taken and the result thereof. (Underscoring supplied.)
Sandiganbayan, and Section 11 (4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and SECTION 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases. duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public 1. On 04 June 2003, Senator Honasan presided over a meeting held "somewhere in San Juan,
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, Metro Manila."
improper, or inefficient. x x x.
2. After dinner, Senator Honasan, as presiding officer, "discussed the NRP (National Recovery
Coupled with these provisions, Section 13 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides: Program), the graft and corruption in the government, including the military institutions, the
judiciary, the executive department, and the like."
SECTION 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the 3. "The discussion concluded that we must use force, violence and armed struggle to achieve the
Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government- vision of NRP. x x x Senator Honasan countered that 'we will never achieve reforms through the
owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in democratic processes because the people who are in power will not give up their positions as
every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government they have their vested interests to protect.' x x x Senator Honasan replied 'kung kaya nating
to the people. (Underscoring supplied) pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga kasamahang magtataksil.' x x
x."
The Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 both mention, unequivocally, that the Office of the
Ombudsman has the duty and mandate to act on the complaints filed against officers or employees of the 4. In the course of the meeting, Senator Honasan presented the plan of action to achieve the
Government. It is imperative that this duty be exercised in order to make real the role of the Office of the goals of the NRP, i.e., overthrow of the government under the present leadership thru armed
Ombudsman as a defender of the people's interest specially in cases like these which have partisan political revolution and after which, a junta will be constituted to run the new government.
taint.
5. The crime of coup d'etat was committed on 27 July 2003 by military personnel who occupied
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to GRANT the petition. Oakwood. Senator Honasan and various military officers, one member of his staff, and several
John Does and Jane Does were involved in the Oakwood incident.
The above allegations determine whether or not petitioner committed the alleged crime as a public officer "in
relation to his office." If it was in relation to his office, the crime falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. It is the Ombudsman who has the primary jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the
DISSENTING OPINION complaint for coup d'etat, thus:
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as follows:
I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion for the following reasons: (1) it evades the "SECTION 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
consequence of the statutory definition of the crime of coup d'etat; (2) it violates the principle of stare all cases involving:
decisis without a clear explanation why the established doctrine has to be re-examined and reversed; and (3)
it trivializes the importance of two constitutional offices the Ombudsman and the Senate and in the
process, petitioner's right to due process has been impaired. "a. Violations of Republic No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
I occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting
or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
It is an established principle that an act no matter how offensive, destructive, or reprehensible, is not a crime
unless it is defined, prohibited, and punished by law. The prosecution and punishment of any criminal (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
offense are necessarily circumscribed by the specific provision of law which defines it. director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the
Compensations and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
67 58), specifically including:
Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code defines coup d'etat, thus:
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and The allegations in the complaint and in the pleadings of the DOJ, the Solicitor General, and the Ombudsman
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and (who is taking their side) charging petitioner with coup d'etat show hat he was engaged in a discussion of his
special prosecutor; National Recovery Program (NRP), corruption in government, and the need for reform. The NRP is a
summary of what he has introduced and intended to introduce into legislation by Congress. There is no
doubt, therefore, that the alleged coup d'etat was committed in relation to the performance of his official duty
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of as a Senator.
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
II
In Deloso vs. Domingo3, where the Governor of Zambales and his military and police escorts ambushed the
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without victims who were passing by in a car, we held that the multiple murders were committed in relation to public
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; office. In Cunanan vs. Arceo4, the mayor ordered his co-accused to shoot the victims. We ruled that the
murder was in relation to public office. In Alarilla vs. Sandiganbayan5, the town mayor aimed a gun and
threatened to kill a councilor of the municipality during a public hearing. We concluded that the grave threats
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' or higher
were in relation to the mayor's office. Following these precedents, I am convinced that petitioner's discourse
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
on his National Recovery Program is in relation to his office.
"b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
III
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.
The respondents state that the DOJ is vested with jurisdiction to conduct all investigations and prosecution
of all crimes. They cite PD 1275, as amended by PD 1513, and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 as
"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
the source of this plenary power.
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986."
While the DOJ has a broad general jurisdiction over crimes found in the Revised Penal Code and special
Section 15 of Republic Act 6770, or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:
laws, however, this jurisdiction is not plenary or total. Whenever the Constitution or statute vests jurisdiction
over the investigation and prosecution of certain crimes in an office, the DOJ has no jurisdiction over those
"1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of crimes. In election offenses, the Constitution vests the power to investigate and prosecute in the Commission
any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, on Elections.6In crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, the Ombudsman is given by
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the both the Constitution and the statute the same power of investigation and prosecution.7 These powers may
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, not be exercised by the DOJ.
from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; x x x" (Emphasis
supplied)
The DOJ cannot pretend to have investigatory and prosecutorial powers above those of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman is a constitutional officer with a rank equivalent to that of an Associate Justice of this Court.
Under the above provisions, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank The respondent's Prosecution Office investigates and prosecutes all kinds of offenses from petty crimes, like
of the offender, that is, whether he is one of those public officers enumerated therein. vagrancy or theft, to more serious crimes, such as those found in the Revised Penal Code. The
Ombudsman, on the other hand, prosecutes offenses in relation to public office committed by public officers
with the rank and position classification of Grade 27 or higher. It is a special kind of jurisdiction which
Petitioner, being a Senator, occupies a government position higher than Grade 27 of the Compensation and excludes general powers of other prosecutory offices.
Position Classification Act of 1989. In fact, he holds the third highest position and rank in the Government. At
the apex, the President stands alone. At the second level, we have the Vice-President, Speaker of the
House, Senate President and Chief Justice. Clearly, he is embraced in the above provisions. I agree with the petitioner that a becoming sense of courtesy, respect, and propriety requires that the
constitutional officer should conduct the preliminary investigation and prosecution of the complaint against
him and not a fifth assistant city prosecutor or even a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ National
Following the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction," it is the Ombudsman who should conduct the preliminary Prosecution Service.
investigation of the charge of coup d'etat against petitioner. The DOJ should refrain from exercising such
function.
I do not believe that a mere agreement, such as OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001, can fully transfer the
prosecutory powers of the Ombudsman to the DOJ without need for deputization in specific cases. As
The crux of the jurisdiction of the DOJ lies in the meaning of "in relation to their office." stated by the petitioner, the DOJ cannot be given a roving commission or authority to investigate and
prosecute cases falling under the Ombudsman's powers anytime the DOJ pleases without any special and
explicit deputization. On this point, I agree with Justice Jose C. Vitug that the Joint Circular must be
The respondents start their discussion of "in relation to public office" with a peculiar presentation. They understood as a mere working arrangement between the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ that must
contend that the duties of a Senator are to make laws, to appropriate, to tax, to expropriate, to canvass not be meant to be such a blanket delegation to the DOJ as to generally allow it to conduct preliminary
presidential elections, to declare the existence of a state war, to give concurrence to treaties and amnesties, investigation over any case cognizable by the Ombudsman.
to propose constitutional amendments, to impeach, to investigate in aid of legislation, and to determine the
Petitioner further raises a due process question. He accuses the DOJ of bias, partiality, and prejudgment. He RENATO S. GATBONTON, G.R. NO. 146779
states that he has absolutely no chance of being cleared by the respondent DOJ panel because it has Petitioner,
already decided, before any presentation of proof, that he must be charged and arrested without bail. Present:
As stated by the petitioner, there are precedents to the effect that where bias exists, jurisdiction has to be ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN, C.J., (Chairman)
assumed by a more objective office. In Panlilio vs. Sandiganbayan,8 we recognized that the PCGG has the YNARES-SANTIAGO,
authority to investigate the case, yet we ordered the transfer of the case to the Ombudsman because of the - versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
PCGG's "marked bias" against the petitioner. CALLEJO, SR., and
NAZARIO, JJ.
In Conjuangco vs. PCGG,9 we held that there is a denial of due process where the PCGG showed "marked
bias" in handling the investigation. In Salonga vs. Cruz Pao,10 where the preliminary investigation was NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
tainted by bias and partiality, we emphasized the right of an accused to be free, not only from arbitrary arrest COMMISSION, MAPUA INSTITUTE
and punishment but also from unwarranted and biased prosecution. OF TECHNOLOGY and JOSE
CALDERON, Promulgated:
The petitioner's pleadings show the proofs of alleged bias. They may be summarized as follows: Respondents. January 23, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
First, on July 27, 2003 when the Oakwood incident was just starting, DILG Secretary Lina and
National Security Adviser Roilo Golez went on a media barrage accusing petitioner of complicity
without a shred of evidence. DECISION
Second, petitioner was approached by Palace emissaries, Velasco, Defensor, Tiglao, and Afable
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
to help defuse the incident and ask mutineers to surrender. Then the request was distorted to
make it appear that he went there to save his own skin.
Third, even before any charge was filed, officials of the DOJ were on an almost daily media Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
program prematurely proclaiming petitioner's guilt. How can the DOJ conduct an impartial and
fair investigation when it has already found him guilty? seeks to set aside the Decision[1] dated November 10, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
Fourth, petitioner was given five days to answer Matillano's complaint but later on, it was CA-G.R. SP No. 57470, affirming the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
shortened to three days.
(NLRC); and the CA Resolution dated January 16, 2001, denying the motion for
Fifth, petitioner filed a 30 page Reply but the DOJ Order was issued at once, or only after two
days, or on Sept. 10, 2003. The Order did not discuss the Reply, but perfunctorily glossed over
and disregarded it. reconsideration.[2]
The petitioner states that the DOJ is constitutionally and factually under the control of the President. He
argues that:
Petitioner Renato S. Gatbonton is an associate professor of respondent Mapua Institute of
"No questionable prosecution of an opposition Senator who has declared himself available for the
Presidency would be initiated without the instigation, encouragement or approval of officials at Technology (MIT), Faculty of Civil Engineering. Some time in November 1998, a civil
the highest levels of the Administration. Justice requires that the Ombudsman, an independent
constitutional office, handle the investigation and prosecution of this case. The DOJ cannot act
fairly and independently in this case. In fact, all of the actions the DOJ has taken so far have engineering student of respondent MIT filed a letter-complaint against petitioner for
been marked by bias, hounding and persecution.
unfair/unjust grading system, sexual harassment and conduct unbecoming of an academician.
And finally, the charges laid against Senator Honasan are unfounded concoctions of fertile
imaginations. The petitioner had no role in the Oakwood mutiny except the quell and pacify the Pending investigation of the complaint, respondent MIT, through its Committee on Decorum
angry young men fighting for a just cause. Inspiration perhaps, from his National Recovery
Program, but no marching orders whatsoever."
and Investigation placed petitioner under a 30-day preventive suspension effective January 11,
Prosecutors, like Caesar's wife, must be beyond suspicion. Where the test of the cold neutrality required of
them cannot be met, they must yield to another office especially where their jurisdiction is under question. 1999. The committee believed that petitioners continued stay during the investigation affects
The tenacious insistence of respondents in handling the investigation of the case and their unwillingness to
transfer it to the Ombudsman in the face of their questionable jurisdiction are indications of marked bias. his performance as a faculty member, as well as the students learning; and that the suspension
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition and to order the Department of Justice to refrain from will allow petitioner to prepare himself for the investigation and will prevent his influences to
conducting preliminary investigation of the complaint for coup d'etat against petitioner for lack of jurisdiction.
other members of the community.[3]
decision. His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC on December 13,
1999, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA.
Thus, petitioner filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal suspension, damages and attorneys
On November 10, 2000, the CA promulgated the assailed decision affirming the
Trial Court of Manila in a petition for certiorari but the case was terminated on May 21, 1999 when WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and ORDERED DISMISSED, and the challenged decision and order of public respondent
NLRC AFFIRMED.
the parties entered into a compromise agreement wherein respondent MIT agreed to publish in
SO ORDERED.[7]
the school organ the rules and regulations implementing Republic Act No. 7877 (R.A. No.
7877) or the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act; disregard the previous administrative proceedings and
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied in its Resolution dated
and regulations, as well as the authority of respondent to investigate, hear and decide the Hence, the present petition based on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE NLRC WAS NOT GUILTY
OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RENDERING BOTH THE APPEAL DECISION AND THE
NLRC RESOLUTION.
On June 18, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
B
which reads: THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE NLRCS DISMISSAL OF
PETITIONERS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES.[8]
SO ORDERED.[6] any justification in the Mapua Rules and Regulations considering that at the time of his
preventive suspension on January 11, 1999, the rules have not been promulgated yet as it was
published only on February 23, 1999. Petitioner also contests the lack of award of damages in
Both respondents and petitioner filed their appeal from the Labor Arbiters Decision,
his favor.[9]
with petitioner questioning the dismissal of his claim for damages. In a Decision dated
September 30, 1999, the NLRC granted respondents appeal and set aside the Labor Arbiters
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
Preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure for the protection of the companys concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the
employer or of his co-workers.[10] However, when it is determined that there is no sufficient The Mapua Rules is one of those issuances that should be published for its effectivity, since its
basis to justify an employees preventive suspension, the latter is entitled to the payment of purpose is to enforce and implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a law of general application. [14] In
salaries during the time of preventive suspension.[11] fact, the Mapua Rules itself explicitly required publication of the rules for its effectivity, as
R.A. No. 7877 imposed the duty on educational or training institutions to promulgate provided in Section 3, Rule IV (Administrative Provisions), which states that [T]hese Rules and
rules and regulations in consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or students or Regulations to implement the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 shall take effect fifteen (15)
trainees, through their duly designated representatives, prescribing the procedures for the days after publication by the Committee. Thus, at the time of the imposition of petitioners
investigation of sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions preventive suspension on January 11, 1999, the Mapua Rules were not yet legally effective,
therefor.[12] Petitioners preventive suspension was based on respondent MITs Rules and and therefore the suspension had no legal basis.
Regulations for the Implemention of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, or R.A. No. 7877.
sufficient basis to justify his preventive suspension. Under the Mapua Rules, an accused may
Section 1. Preventive Suspension of Accused in Sexual Harassment Cases. Any
member of the educational community may be placed immediately under preventive suspension
during the pendency of the hearing of the charges of grave sexual harassment against him if the be placed under preventive suspension during pendency of the hearing under any of the
evidence of his guilt is strong and the school head is morally convinced that the continued stay of
the accused during the period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of
the institution or poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of the following circumstances:
educational community.
(a) if the evidence of his guilt is strong and the school head is morally convinced that the continued
stay of the accused during the period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the
normal operations of the institution; or
It must be noted however, that respondent published said rules and regulations only
(b) the accused poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of the
educational community.
[13]
on February 23, 1999. In Taada vs. Tuvera, it was ruled that:
all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as
a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different In petitioners case, there is no indication that petitioners preventive suspension may
effectivity is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the be based on the foregoing circumstances. Committee Resolution No. 1 (Re: Preventive
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
Suspension of Engr. Renato Gatbonton) passed by the Committee on Decorum and suspension is not justified.[16] Consequently, the payment of wages during his 30-day
Investigation states the reasons for petitioners preventive suspension, to wit: preventive suspension, i.e., from January 11, 1999 to February 10, 1999, is in order.
Whereas, the committee believe[s] that the continued stay of the respondent during
the period of investigation,
With regard to petitioners claim for damages, the Court finds the same to be without
1. Affects the respondents performance as a faculty member and laboratory head
considering the psychological effects depression and/or emotional stress during
investigation; basis. While petitioners preventive suspension may have been unjustified, this does not
2. Affects the student[s] learning and other members of the Mapua Institute of
Technology community. automatically mean that he is entitled to moral or other damages. In Cocoland Development
Whereas, the committee believe[s] that this preventive suspension will allow the
respondent to prepare himself for the investigation and will prevent his influences to other members Corp. vs. NLRC,[17] the Court ruled:
of the community.[15]
In Primero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held that " an award (of moral
damages) cannot be justified solely upon the premise (otherwise sufficient for redress under the
Labor Code) that the employer fired his employee without just cause or due process. Additional
Said resolution does not show that evidence of petitioners guilt is strong and that the facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code,
these being, to repeat, that the act of dismissal was attended by bad faith or fraud, or was
oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy; and of
school head is morally convinced that petitioners continued stay during the period of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., resulted therefrom." This was
reiterated in Garcia vs. NLRC, where the Court added that exemplary damages may be awarded
only if the dismissal was shown to have been effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent
investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of the institution; or that manner.
This the private respondent failed to do. Because no evidence was adduced to show
petitioner poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of the educational that petitioner company acted in bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in dismissing the
private respondent, the labor arbiter did not award any moral and exemplary damages in his
decision. Respondent NLRC therefore had no factual or legal basis to award such damages in the
community. exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Even under the Labor Code, petitioners preventive suspension finds no valid The records of this case are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent MIT acted in bad
justification. As provided in Section 8, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in preventively suspending petitioner, thus, the Labor
the Labor Code: Arbiter was correct in not awarding any damages in favor of petitioner.
Sec. 8. Preventive Suspension. The employer may place the worker concerned under
preventive suspension if his continued employment poses a serious threat to the life or property of
the employer or of his co-workers. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated
November 10, 2000 and Resolution dated January 16, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 57470 as well as the NLRC Decision dated September 30, 1999 together with its
As previously stated, there is nothing on record which shows that respondent MIT
Resolution dated December 13, 1999, are hereby SET ASIDE and the Labor Arbiters Decision
imposed the preventive suspension on petitioner as his continued employment poses a serious
dated June 18, 1999 is REINSTATED.
threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers; therefore, his preventive
SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises and further, for failure to comply with Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated April 1, 1994 on forum shopping, the petition
is DISMISSED.
Per Curiam:
On June 25, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own motion for
The judiciary cannot keep those who cannot meet the exacting
standards of judicial conduct and integrity. This being so, in the reconsideration which was also denied in a court order dated September 2, 1996.
performance of the functions of their office, judges must endeavor to act in
a manner that puts them and their conduct above reproach and beyond
suspicion. They must act with extreme care for their office indeed is
Ten (10) years later, in an order dated May 9, 2006, Judge Pamintuan set the case
burdened with a heavy load of responsibility.[1]
for hearing on June 29, 2006 purportedly to formally and finally release the Golden Buddha to
At bench is an administrative case filed by Imelda R. Marcos (Marcos) against Judge Fernando its rightful owner. Marcos was one of the subpoenaed parties, being a person with interest in
Vil Pamintuan (Judge Pamintuan), Presiding Judge, Branch 3, Regional Trial the case.
On August 15, 2006, Judge Pamintuan issued an order, the dispositive portion of
THE FACTS:
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in accordance with the final and executory Order of this Court
From the records, it appears that on November 15, 2006, Marcos filed a complaint-affidavit dated September 2, 1996, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica is awarded to the estate of
Rogelio Roxas. However, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica shall be under custodia legis until
the final settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas, or upon the appointment of his estates
charging Judge Pamintuan with Gross Ignorance of the Law for reversing motu proprio the final administrator.
and executory order of then Acting Presiding Judge Antonio Reyes (Judge Reyes) dated May
This Court further rules that the Golden Buddha in its custody is a fake one, or a mere
replica of the original Golden Buddha which has a detachable head, which has been missing since
30, 1996 (and modified in the September 2, 1996 order), in Civil Case No. 3383-R, 1971 up to the present, or for a period of thirty five (35) years by now, and has been in unlawful
possession of persons who do not have title over it, nor any right at all to possess this original
entitled Albert D. Umali, in his capacity as the exclusive administrator and as President of the Golden Buddha.
Judge Reyes dismissed Civil Case No. 3383-R in an order, dated May 30, 1996, the dispositive Marcos averred that the act of Judge Pamintuan in reversing a final and executory order
portion of which reads: constituted gross ignorance of the law. In her complaint, citing A.M. No. 93-7-696-0, she
argued that final and executory judgments of lower courts were not reviewable even by the
Rogelio Roxas, ordered the hearing on June 29, 2006. (Italics
Supreme Court. Judge Pamintuan reversed a final and executory order not upon the instance supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
of any of the parties in Civil Case No. 3383-R but motu proprio. He even failed to indicate
WHEREFORE, in accordance with the final and executory
where he obtained the information that the Golden Buddha sitting in his sala was a mere Order of this Court dated September 2, 1996, the Buddha
Statuette or Buddha replica is awarded to the estate of
Rogelio Roxas. However, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha
replica. Marcos claimed that his order was in conflict with Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Civil replica shall be under custodia legis until the final settlement
of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas, or upon the
Procedure which provides that a judgment or final order shall state clearly and distinctly the appointment of his estates administrator.
facts and the law on which it (his order) is based xxx. Clearly, the questioned Order conforms to the directive of the Court in its
previous Order dated May 30, 1996, which provides:
counsel, Atty. Robert Sison, entered his appearance and actually appeared in court. With her
And modified in an Order dated September 2, 1996, which reads:
appearance through counsel, she subjected herself to the jurisdiction of the court. She should WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the Solicitor General is DENIED. The Order of this
have filed a motion for reconsideration of the August 15, 2006 Order instead of filing an Court on May 30, 1996 remains insofar as the Buddha
statuette is awarded to the state of the late Rogelio Roxas and
administrative complaint. As she did not, Judge Pamintuan opined that her lost judicial is at the same time MODIFIED in the sense that the Buddha
statuette shall be under the custodia legis until the final
remedies could not be substituted with the filing of this case. settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas or upon the
appointment of his estates administrator.
Marcos, in her Reply-Affidavit, stated that she was not a party in Civil Case No. xxxxxxxxx
As held, execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law. A judgment, if
left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. Bearing
this in mind, respondent issued the questioned Order dated August 15, 2006, the
pertinent text of which reads: Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court, in its July 31, 2007 Resolution,
Despite said Order which was issued almost ten (10) years preventively suspended Judge Pamintuan pending resolution of this administrative case to stop
ago, the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas has not taken
possession of the Buddha Statuette or the Buddha replica
him from committing further damage to the judiciary. Judge Pamintuan moved for
from the Court, thus, this incumbent Presiding Judge, seeing
the necessity of finally disposing of the Buddha Statuette
physically, and finding out the present statue of the late
agreement, he and Rogelio Roxas will share in the profits of their business venture, that is, treasure
hunting and claim for lost treasure.
reconsideration and eventually filed a Motion for Early Resolution of Motion for Reconsideration
He adds, however, that the Buddha with this Court is not the genuine Buddha.
and to Submit the Case for Decision. According to him, he has photographs to prove the existence of the real and genuine golden
Buddha. To be sure, this Court is baffled by the foregoing submission of Mr. Umali, if the subject
Buddha is not the genuine golden Buddha, and therefore a fake one, it cannot be covered by the
memorandum of Agreement.
The matter was referred again to the OCA for evaluation, report and Be it noted that the Memorandum of Agreement speaks of treasure hunting and lost
treasure which could refer to things of great value. Based on Mr. Umalis own claim the subject
Buddha has no appreciable material value. It is therefore outside the scope of the Memorandum of
recommendation. In its Memorandum dated November 22, 2007, the OCA recommended that Agreement. This being the case, what right then does Albert Umali have to demand the return of the
subject Buddha to him? On this score alone, this Court should already reject the claim of Mr. Umali
over the Buddha now in this Courts custody.
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent be GRANTED and that the Order of
xxxxxxxxx
Preventive Suspension dated July 31, 2007, be LIFTED. Thus, in its December 11,
Now, as to whether or not there is that controversial golden Buddha different from the
one now in custody of this Court, there is none. X x x.
2007Resolution, the Court granted the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Judge Pamintuan
the period of his preventive suspension from August to December 13, 2007. In its June 3,
Judge Pamintuan indeed made a serious error in making such a pronouncement in
2008 Resolution, following the recommendation of the OCA, the Court denied said request for
and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered
Now, the Court resolves the complaint against Judge Pamintuan.
it or even by this Court. The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a
two-fold purpose, to wit: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus,
After a thorough study of the case, the Court agrees with the evaluation and
procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (2) to put an end to judicial
recommendation of the OCA.
controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist.
Civil Case No. 3383-R, has long become final and executory. In his assailed August 15,
It is inexcusable for Judge Pamintuan to have overlooked such basic legal principle no matter
2006 Order, Judge Pamintuan made express declarations that were not embodied either in
how noble his objectives were at that time. Judges owe it to the public to be well-informed,
the May 30, 1996 Order or in the September 2, 1996 Order. He ruled that the Golden Buddha in
thus, they are expected to be familiar with the statutes and procedural rules at all times. When
the custody of the court was a fake one, or a mere replica of the original. This may be his
the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross
opinion or the litigants during the hearing of June 29, 2006 but Judge Pamintuan should have
ignorance of the law.[3]
realized that the trial court did not rule on that point in its May 30, 1996 Order (even in its
The Court agrees with the view of OCA that Judge Pamintuan manifested gross ignorance of
September 2, 1996 Order). Insofar as this issue is concerned, the May 30, 1996 Order
the law in issuing the questioned August 15, 2006 Order. Verily, he failed to conform to the
pertinently reads:
high standards of competence required of judges under the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
Albert Umali anchors his claim on the supposed Memorandum of Agreement between
him and the late Rogelio Roxas executed on November 25, 1988. He claims that under this
provides that:
As of this time, there is another administrative case yet to be resolved against Judge
Rule 1.01 - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity,
Pamintuan filed by one Peter Cosalan for gross ignorance of the law. [8] Although, this is not
and independence.
pertinent in the resolution of this case, it is clear from the other undisputed records that Judge
Rule 3.01 - A judge shall x x x maintain professional competence.
Pamintuan has failed to meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. He has
shown himself unworthy of the judicial robe and place of honor reserved for guardians of justice.
Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge exhibits an utter lack of know- As held in the case of Malabed v. Asis:[9]
Respondent Judge must bear in mind that membership in the judiciary circumscribes
how with the rules or with settled jurisprudence, he erodes the publics confidence in the ones personal conduct and imposes upon him certain restrictions, the faithful observance of which
is the price one has to pay for holding such a distinguished position. x x x His conduct must be able
to withstand the most searching public scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a
competence of our courts. It is highly crucial that judges be acquainted with the law and basic judge are essential to the preservation of the peoples faith in the judicial system lest public
confidence in the judiciary would be eroded by the incompetent, irresponsible and negligent conduct
legal principles. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one - not of judges.
even judges.[4]
The Court has held time and again that a judge is expected to demonstrate more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. It is essential that he be familiar with
Notably, this is not Judge Pamintuans first and sole administrative case. In The
basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled doctrines.[10]
Officers and Members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Baguio-Benguet
[5]
Chapter v.Pamintuan, Judge Pamintuan was charged with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross
As fittingly stated in the case of Borromeo v. Mariano,[11] Our conception of good judges has
Violation of the Constitutional Rights of the Accused, Arrogance and Violation of the Canons of
been, and is, of men who has a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in
Judicial Ethics and was suspended for one (1) year.
accordance with law. Thus, this Court has had the occasion to hold that:
In the case of Atty. Gacayan v. Hon. Pamintuan,[6] he was found guilty of violating When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a
principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the
Canons 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Ethics which position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in
bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judges dismissal is in order.
After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant is assured that
amounted to grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of an officer of the judiciary and conduct
occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. [12]
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He was reprimanded and was sternly warned that
a repetition of the foregoing or similar transgressions would be dealt with more severely. He
In this case, the Court finds Judge Pamintuan accountable for gross ignorance of the
was also meted a fine of P10,000.00.
law. He could have simply been suspended and fined, but the Court cannot take his previous
infractions lightly. His violations are serious in character. Having been previously warned and
In a much recent case, Biggel v. Pamintuan,[7] he was charged with manifest
punished for various infractions, Judge Pamintuan now deserves the ultimate administrative
partiality, gross misconduct, ignorance of the law, and unjust and malicious delay in the
penalty dismissal from service.
resolution of the incidents in Criminal Case No. 25383-R entitled People of the Philippines v.
Emil Biggel, a case for estafa. He was found guilty of violating Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
The Court doubts if he ever took seriously its previous warnings that a repetition of
Conduct, which requires judges to dispose of court business promptly. The Court imposed upon
his offenses would merit a more severe sanction from this Court. His conduct in this case and
him a fine in the amount of P20,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
his prior infractions are grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. As shown from the
similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
cited administrative cases filed against Judge Pamintuan, he was liable not only for gross
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, versus ROBERTO QUIACHON Y
ignorance of the law but for other equally serious transgressions. This Court should, therefore, BAYONA, Appellant., G.R. No. 170236, 2006 August 31, En Banc
refrain from being lenient, when doing so would give the public the impression that
DECISION
incompetence and repeated offenders are tolerated in the judiciary.
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, is DISMISSED from the service. He shall Appellant Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of qualified rape committed as follows:
forthwith CEASE and DESIST from performing any official act or function appurtenant to his
office upon service on him of this decision. On or about May 12, 2001, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with one Rowena Quiachon y Reyes, his daughter, 8 years old, a deaf-mute minor, against her
will and consent.
SO ORDERED.
Contrary to law.[1]
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 120929-H. At his arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by
counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Rowel Quiachon, 11-year old son of appellant; Rowena
Quiachon, the victim and appellants daughter; Dr. Miriam Sta. Romana Guialani; and SPO2 Noel Y. Venus.
Rowel testified that he is appellants son. He averred, however, that he no longer wanted to use his fathers
surname describing him as masama for raping his (Rowels) sister Rowena. Rowel recounted that he used
to sleep in the same bedroom occupied by his father, sister and youngest sibling. Rowel slept beside his
youngest sibling while their father, appellant, and Rowena slept together in one bed.
On the night of May 12, 2001, Rowel saw his father on top of his sister Rowena and they were covered by a
blanket or kumot. His fathers buttocks were moving up and down, and Rowel could hear Rowena
crying. He could not do anything, however, because he was afraid of their father. Rowel remained in the
room but the following morning, he, forthwith, told his mothers sister Carmelita Mateo, whom he called Ate
Lita, about what he had witnessed. Together, Carmelita and Rowel went to the police to report what had
transpired. During the police investigation, Rowel executed a sworn statement in Tagalog and signed it using
the surname Mateo.[2]
Rowena, through sign language, testified that her father had sexual intercourse with her and even touched
her breasts against her will. She was
only eight years old at the time. She cried when she was asked if she was hurt by what appellant did to
her. She consistently declared that she does not love her father and wants him to be punished for what he
did to her.[3]
Dr. Miriam Sta. Romana Guialani of the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital Health Services
testified that she received a letter request from the PNP Crime Laboratory to conduct an examination on
Rowena. While she was about to proceed with the forensic interview, she noticed that Rowena was deaf
and mute, hence, could not verbally communicate her ordeal. Dr. Guialani proceeded to conduct a physical
examination and, based thereon, she submitted her medico-legal report.
Dr. Guialani, as indicated in her report, found that Rowena had a contusion hematoma on her left cheek, Upon review, the CA rendered its Decision[11] dated August 25, 2005, affirming with modification the
which was compatible with her claim that she was slapped by her father. Rowena also had an ecchymosis decision of the trial court. In affirming appellants conviction, the CA held that there was no justification to
or kissmark at the antero-lateral border of her left breast as well as ano-genital injuries suggestive of make a finding contrary to that of the trial court with respect to the credibility of the witnesses. The CA
chronic penetrating trauma. particularly pointed out that the trial court, after having meticulously observed the prosecution witness
Rowel and complainant Rowena, had declared that their narration palpably bears the earmarks of truth and
is in accord with the material points involved. When the testimony of a rape victim is simple and
straightforward, unshaken by rigid cross-examination, and unflawed by an inconsistency or contradiction as
Dr. Guialani explained that although the external genitalia did not show any sign of sexual abuse, when it in the present case, the same must be given full faith and credit.[12]
was opened up, the following were discovered: markedly hyperemic urethra and peri-hymenal area with
fossa navicularis and markedly hyperemic perineum, markedly hyperemic urethra layer up to the peri-
hymenal margin up to the posterior hymenal notch with attenuation. Further, the labia was very red all
throughout, with hymenal notch with attenuation, a pale navicular fossa and a very red perineum.[4] All Moreover, the CA ruled that the testimonies of Rowel and Rowena recounting the bestial act perpetrated by
these, according to Dr. Guialani, were compatible with the recent chronic penetrating trauma and recent appellant on the latter were corroborated by physical evidence as presented by Dr. Guialani in her medico-
injury which could have happened a day before the examination. She pointed out that the hymenal legal report.
attenuation sustained by Rowena was almost in the 6 oclock notch.[5]
On the other hand, the CA noted that appellant could only proffer a bare denial. On this matter, it applied the
For its part, the defense presented the lone testimony of appellant Roberto Quiachon. salutary rule that denial is not looked upon with favor by the court as it is capable of easy
fabrication. Consequently, the CA held that appellants bare denial could not overcome the categorical
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, including Rowena, the victim herself.
He testified that, on May 13, 2001, he was invited to the barangay hall by their barangay chairman. He did
not know then the reason for the invitation. At the barangay hall, he was surprised to see the two sisters of
his deceased live-in partner and his two children. He was shocked to learn that his daughter Rowena had The CA believed that Rowena could not possibly invent a charge so grave as rape against her father
accused him of raping her. Thereafter, he was taken to the Karangalan Police Station. He suffered because it is very unlikely for any young woman in her right mind to fabricate a story of defloration against
hypertension and was brought to the hospital. When he recovered, he was taken to the Pasig City Police her own father, undergo a medical examination of her private parts, and subject herself to the trauma and
Station and, thereafter, to jail. scandal of public trial, put to shame not only herself but her whole family as well unless she was motivated
by a strong desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her.[13]
Appellant claimed that Rowena is not deaf but only has a minor speech handicap. He denied raping Rowena
and alleged that Virginia Moraleda and Carmelita Mateo, both sisters of his deceased common-law wife, held In sum, the CA found that the trial court correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
a grudge against him because he abandoned his family and was not able to support them. His common-law crime of qualified rape and in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon him. In the Pre-Trial Order dated
wife died of cancer and her relatives were allegedly all interested in his house and other properties. The said September 10, 2001, the prosecution and the defense agreed on the following stipulation of facts:
house was being leased and they were the ones getting the rental income. Further, the nephew of his
deceased partner was sending financial support of US$100 a month for his child.
According to appellant, even before the death of his common-law wife, his son Rowel was already hostile to
him because he was closer to his daughters. He disclaimed any knowledge of any reason why his children,
Rowel and Rowena, accused him of a very serious offense.[6] 2. That the accused is the father of the victim; and
After consideration of the respective evidence of the prosecution and defense, the Regional Trial Court of 3. The victim is a deaf-mute.[14]
Pasig City, Branch 159, rendered its Decision[7] dated September 9, 2003, finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and B[8] of the
Revised Penal Code. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
According to the CA, the qualifying circumstances of the victims minority and her relationship to the offender
were alleged in the Information and were duly proved during trial. These circumstances, i.e., minority of the
victim and her relationship to appellant, are special qualifying circumstances in the crime of rape that warrant
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, he is hereby the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH, including its accessory penalties, and to indemnify the
offended party in the amount of P75,000.00 as compensatory damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages,
and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The CA, however, modified the trial courts decision with respect to the damages awarded to conform to
prevailing jurisprudence. The decretal portion of the CA decision reads:
SO ORDERED.[9]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated September 9, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 159, in Criminal Case No. 120929-H finding the accused-appellant Roberto Quiachon y Bayona
The case was automatically elevated to this Court by reason of the death penalty imposed on guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape and imposing upon him the DEATH penalty is AFFIRMED,
appellant. However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,[10] the case was transferred and referred to with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is also ordered to pay the victim, Rowena Quiachon, the
the Court of Appeals (CA). amount of P75,000 as civil indemnity; P75,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
PERTINENT PHYSICAL Contusion hematoma about 3x4 cm noted at the
In accordance with A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC which took effect on October 15, 2004, amending Section 13, Rule FINDINGS/PHYSICAL left mandibular area of the left cheek compatible
124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, let the entire records of this case be elevated to the
Supreme Court for review. INJURIES with the disclosed slapping of the cheek by her father;
--------------------------------------
--------------------------------------
In this Courts Resolution dated December 13, 2005, the parties were required to submit their respective EXTERNAL GENITALIA Tanner 2
supplemental briefs. The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it would no longer be filing a
supplemental brief. Similarly, appellant, through the Public Attorneys Office, manifested that he would no Pubic hair none
longer file a supplemental brief.
Labia majora no evident sign of injury at the time of examination
URETHA AND
In reviewing rape cases, this Court has always been guided by three (3) well-entrenched principles: (1) an
accusation for rape can be made with PERIURETHRAL AREA Markedly hyperemic urethra meatus and periurethral area.
facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, though --------------------------------------
innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the
crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the PERIHYMENAL AREA
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[16] Accordingly, the primordial consideration in a AND
determination concerning the crime of rape is the credibility of complainants testimony.[17]
FOSSA NAVICULARIS Markedly hyperemic perihymenal area, and pale fossa navicularis
--------------------------------------
Likewise, it is well settled that when it comes to the issue of credibility of witnesses, the trial court is in a
better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence having the full opportunity to HYMEN Tanner 2
observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying.[18]
Annular hymen; hymenal notch noted at 5 oclock with
--------------------------------------
In convicting the appellant, the trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of Rowel and
Rowena. The trial court observed that Rowel and Rowena never wavered in their assertion that accused DISCHARGE Whitish, foul-smelling discharge, minimal in amount noted
sexually abused Rowena. Their narration palpably bears the earmarks of truth and is in accord with the
material points involved.[20] Further, the trial court accorded great evidentiary weight to Rowenas --------------------------------------
testimony. It justifiably did
IE AND SPECULUM
so as it characterized her testimony to be simple, straightforward, unshaken by a rigid cross-examination,
and unflawed by inconsistency or contradiction.[21] EXAM Not indicated
--------------------------------------
Significantly, Rowel and Rowenas respective testimonies were corroborated by Dr. Guialanis medico-legal ANAL EXAMINATION No evident sign of injury at the time of examination;
report:[22]
--------------------------------------
REMARKS
--------------------------------------
--------------------------------------
FORENSIC EVIDENCE
COLLECTED None SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
--------------------------------------
LABORATORY (a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties
of the Revised Penal Code; or
EXAMINATION Requested a) Urinalysis
IMPRESSIONS
-------------------------------------- The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the principle in criminal law,
favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to accused are given
retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides as
follows:
No verbal disclosure of sexual abuse (pt is a deaf-mute)
Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons
For referral to NCMH for evaluation of developmental stage and competence to appear in court. guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code,
although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same.[28]
Presence of contusion hematoma on the Left Cheek (slapmark) and ecchymosis on the antero-lateral border
of the left breast show clear evidence of Physical Abuse.
However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 provides that persons
convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole.
Ano-genital findings suggestive of chronic penetrating trauma.
With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing jurisprudence,[29] correctly
-------------------------------------- awarded the following amounts: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime is qualified by
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty; P75,000.00 as moral damages because the
victim is assumed to have suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral damages even
without proof thereof, and; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in light of the presence of the qualifying
Dr. Guialani explained during her testimony that the foregoing findings were consistent with Rowenas claim
circumstances of minority and relationship.
of sexual abuse. Specifically, her internal genitalia showed signs of sexual abuse such as: markedly
hyperemic urethra and peri-hymenal area with fossa navicularis, markedly hyperemic perineum, markedly
hyperemic urethra layer up to the peri-hymenal margin up to the posterior hymenal notch with attenuation.
Further, Rowenas labia was very red all throughout, with hymenal notch with attenuation, a pale navicular Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the prohibition in R.A. No.
fossa and a very red perineum.[23] All these, according to Dr. Guialani, were compatible with the recent 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper because, following the ratiocination in People v.
chronic penetrating trauma and recent injury which could have happened a day before the examination. She Victor,[30] the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that
pointed out that the hymenal attenuation sustained by Rowena was almost in the 6 oclock notch.[24] Dr. qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the
Guialani, likewise, confirmed that Rowena was deaf and mute. offense. The Court declared that the award of P75,000.00 shows not only a reaction to the apathetic
societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time but also the expression of the
displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.
Viewed against the damning evidence of the prosecution, appellants simple denial of the charge against him
must necessarily fail. The defense of denial is inherently weak. A mere denial, just like alibi, constitutes a
self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of Notwithstanding the abolition of the death penalty under R.A. No. 9364, the Court has resolved, as it hereby
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[25] resolves, to maintain the award of P75,000.00 for rape committed or effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty would have been imposed prior to R.A. No. 9346.
All told, the trial court and the CA correctly found appellant guilty of raping his daughter Rowena pursuant to
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The special qualifying circumstances of the victims minority and IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated August 25, 2005 of the Court of Appeals finding
her relationship to appellant, which were properly alleged in the Information and their existence duly admitted appellant Roberto Quiachon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with
by the defense on stipulation of facts during pre-trial,[26] warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of MODIFICATION that the penalty of death meted on the appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant
death on appellant. to Republic Act No. 9346.
However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346[27] on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the SO ORDERED.
imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be meted on appellant is reclusion perpetua in accordance
with Section 2 thereof which reads:
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and,
xxxx
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of
Court, praying that the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the
and its Resolution[2] dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside. dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this
court hereby finds accused Victoria Soriano
Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to
Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in Criminal suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor,
as maximum.
Case No. 00-08-11:
INFORMATION
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil
aspect of this case, such as the nullity of accuseds bigamous
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S.
marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their
JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY, committed as follows:
property. This aspect is being determined by the Regional Trial
Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.
That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
Costs against the accused.
named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage with
Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
that assailed Order dated 2 August 2001.[3]
Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on January 12,
1999.
Contrary to law.
V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS
PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY
Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to DESPITE THE SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF
PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL
both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) AND VOID AB INITIO.
the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT
as 1978. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND
VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto. In its V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY
Decision dated July 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when PRESCRIBED.
she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND
marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This EMMANUEL SANTOSUY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.
marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be
1978. discussed jointly. It is true that right after the presentation of the prosecution
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the
dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioners 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioners marriages to Alocillo,
and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillos psychological incapacity. Said decision which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also
became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by
petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her
conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. motion for suspension, while the CA struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis
Court of Appeals,[4] denied reconsideration and ruled that [t]he subsequent v. Bobis,[6] the Court categorically stated that:
declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the
while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the
vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not without legal ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. x x x
consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. [5] xxxx
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first
marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all
legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil
action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second
Rules of Court where petitioner alleges that: marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil
case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore,
not a prejudicial question. x x x[7]
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,[8] where it was held Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable
thus: by prision mayor, which is classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall as 1978; hence, prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who
be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if
petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the raises a fact as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant or
point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage
was annulled.[9] accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing
prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence that as early
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioners
as the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for
As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,[14] the prescriptive period for the
bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore,
crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime
would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or
was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their [agents], as opposed
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.[11]
to being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage. [15] Since
petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of prescription began to run as
Petitioners defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual.
and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty mayor, as maximum.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision
penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as
crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound discretion
of the court to determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the SO ORDERED.
range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner
is proper. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for
bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty next lower is prision correccional, which ranges
from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by
the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the duration of prision
case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its medium
period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial court correctly
petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce
the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months
ATTY. PEDRO M. FERRER, G.R. No. 165300
Petitioner, Version of the Petitioner
Present:
- versus - Petitioner Atty. Ferrer claimed in his original Complaint[6] that on May 7, 1999, the
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, Diazes, as represented by their daughter Comandante, through a Special Power of Attorney
BRION,
SPOUSES ALFREDO DIAZ ABAD, (SPA),[7] obtained from him a loan of P1,118,228.00. The loan was secured by a Real Estate
and IMELDA DIAZ, DEL CASTILLO, and
REINA COMANDANTE and PEREZ, JJ. Mortgage Contract[8] by way of second mortgage over Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
SPOUSES BIENVENIDO RT-6604[9] and a Promissory Note[10] payable within six months or up to November 7,
PANGAN and ELIZABETH 1999. Comandante also issued to petitioner postdated checks to secure payment of said loan.
PANGAN, Promulgated:
Respondents. April 23, 2010
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
Petitioner further claimed that prior to this or on May 29, 1998, Comandante, for a
valuable consideration of P600,000.00, which amount formed part of the abovementioned
DECISION
secured loan, executed in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver of Hereditary Rights and
Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided),[11] the pertinent portions of which read:
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
respondents, Spouses Alfredo and Imelda Diaz (the Diazes) and Reina
On the basis of said waiver, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Adverse
Comandante (Comandante), to petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer (Atty. Ferrer). Likewise
Claim[12] which he caused to be annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 on May 26, 1999.
assailed is the CA Resolution[5] dated September 10, 2004 which denied petitioners as well as
respondents Spouses Diaz and Comandantes respective motions for reconsideration.
The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by
Comandante were dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated demands, said
The parties respective versions of the factual antecedents are as follows: respondents still failed and refused to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed on September 29,
1999 a Complaint[13] for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real Estate Mortgage
Contract against the Diazes and Comandante docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-38876 and exclusive of charges and interests. Comandante alleged that she reminded petitioner that she
raffled to Branch 224 of RTC, Quezon City. was not the registered owner of the subject property and that although her parents granted
her SPA, same only pertains to her authority to mortgage the property to banks and other
Petitioner twice amended his complaint. First, by including as an alternative relief the financial institutions and not to individuals. Petitioner nonetheless assured Comandante that
Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage[14] and, second, by impleading as additional defendants the the SPA was also applicable to their transaction. As Comandante was still hesitant, petitioner
Pangans as the mortgaged property covered by TCT No. RT-6604 was already transferred and his wife threatened to foreclose the formers taxi units and present the postdated checks
under their names in TCT No. N-209049. Petitioner prayed in his second amended complaint she issued to the bank for payment. For fear of losing her taxi units which were the only
that all the respondents be ordered to jointly and solidarily pay him the sum of P1,118,228.00, source of her livelihood, Comandante was thus constrained to sign the mortgage agreement
exclusive of interests, and/or for the judicial foreclosure of the property pursuant to the Real as well as the promissory note. Petitioner, however, did not furnish her with copies of said
Estate Mortgage Contract. documents on the pretext that they still have to be notarized, but, as can be gleaned from the
records, the documents were never notarized. Moreover, Comandante claimed that the SPA
Version of the Respondents alluded to by petitioner in his complaint was not the same SPA under which she thought she
derived the authority to execute the mortgage contract.
In her Answer[15] to petitioners original complaint, Comandante alleged that
petitioner and his wife were her fellow members in the Couples for Christ Comandante likewise alleged that on September 29, 1999 at 10:00 o clock in the
Movement. Sometime in 1998, she sought the help of petitioner with regard to the mortgage morning, she executed an Affidavit of Repudiation/Revocation of Waiver of Hereditary Rights
with a bank of her parents lot located at No. 6, Rd. 20, Project 8, Quezon City and covered by and Interests Over A (Still Undivided) Real Property,[16] which she caused to be annotated on
TCT No. RT-6604. She also sought financial accommodations from the couple on several the title of the subject property with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on the same day.
occasions which totaled P500,000.00. Comandante, however, claimed that these loans were Interestingly, petitioner filed his complaint later that day too.
secured by chattel mortgages over her taxi units in addition to several postdated checks she
issued in favor of petitioner. By way of special and affirmative defenses, Comandante asserted in her Answer to
the amended complaint[17] that said complaint states no cause of action against her because
As she could not practically comply with her obligation, petitioner and his wife, the Real Estate Mortgage Contract and the waiver referred to by petitioner in his complaint
presented to Comandante sometime in May 1998 a document denominated as Waiver of were not duly, knowingly and validly executed by her; that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) pertaining to a waiver of Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) is a useless document as its execution is
her hereditary share over her parents abovementioned property. Purportedly, the execution of prohibited by Article 1347 of the Civil Code,[18] hence, it cannot be the source of any right or
said waiver was to secure Comandantes loan with the couple which at that time had already obligation in petitioners favor; that the Real Estate Mortgage was of doubtful validity as she
ballooned to P600,000.00 due to interests. executed the same without valid authority from her parents; and, that the prayer for collection
and/or judicial foreclosure was irregular as petitioner cannot seek said remedies at the same
A year later, the couple again required Comandante to sign the following time.
documents: (1) a Real Estate Mortgage Contract over her parents property; and, (2) an
undated Promissory Note, both corresponding to the amount of P1,118,228.00, which Apart from executing the affidavit of repudiation, Comandante also filed on October
petitioner claimed to be the total amount of Comandantes monetary obligation to him 4, 1999 a Petition for Cancellation of Adverse Claim (P.E. 2468) Under The Memorandum of
Encumbrances of TCT No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887[19] docketed as LRC Case No. Q- As affirmative defense, the Pangans asserted that the annotation of petitioners
12009 (99) and raffled to Branch 220 of RTC, Quezon City. Petitioner who was impleaded as adverse claim on TCT No. RT-6604 cannot impair their rights as new owners of the subject
respondent therein moved for the consolidation of said case[20] with Civil Case No. Q-99- property. They claimed that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real
38876. On June 24, 2000, Branch 220 of RTC, Quezon City ordered the consolidation of LRC Property (Still Undivided) upon which petitioners adverse claim is anchored cannot be the
Case No. Q-12009 (99) with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876. Accordingly, the records of the source of any right or interest over the property considering that it is null and void under
former case was forwarded to Branch 224. paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.
For their part, the Diazes asserted that petitioner has no cause of action against Moreover, the Pangans asserted that the Real Estate Mortgage Contract cannot
them. They claimed that they do not even know petitioner and that they did not execute any bind them nor in any way impair their ownership of subject property because it was not
SPA in favor of Comandante authorizing her to mortgage for the second time the subject registered before the Register of Deeds.[23]
property. They also contested the due execution of the SPA as it was neither authenticated
before the Philippine Consulate in the United States nor notarized before a notary public in the All the respondents interposed their respective counterclaims and prayed for moral
State of New York where the Diazes have been residing for 16 years. They claimed that they and exemplary damages and attorneys fees in varying amounts.
do not owe petitioner anything. The Diazes also pointed out that the complaint merely refers to
Comandantes personal obligation to petitioner with which they had nothing to do. They thus After the parties have submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, the Diazes filed on
prayed that the complaint against them be dismissed.[21] March 29, 2001 a Motion for Summary Judgment[24] alleging that: first, since the documents
alluded to by petitioner in his complaint were defective, he was not entitled to any legal right or
At the Pangans end, they alleged that they acquired the subject property by relief; and, second, it was clear from the pleadings that it is Comandante who has an
purchase in good faith and for a consideration of P3,000,000.00 on November 11, 1999 from outstanding obligation with petitioner which the latter never denied. With these, the Diazes
the Diazes through the latters daughter Comandante who was clothed with SPA believed that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact against them and, hence, they
acknowledged before the Consul of New York. The Pangans immediately took actual were entitled to summary judgment.
possession of the property without anyone complaining or protesting. Soon thereafter, they
were issued TCT No. N-209049 in lieu of TCT No. RT-6604 which was cancelled. [22] On May 7, 2001, petitioner also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,[25] claiming
that his suit against the respondents is meritorious and well-founded and that same is
However, on December 21, 1999, they were surprised upon being informed by documented and supported by law and jurisprudence. He averred that his adverse claim
petitioner that the subject land had been mortgaged to him by the Diazes. Upon inquiry from annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604, which was carried over in TCT No. 209049 under
Comandante, the latter readily admitted that she has a personal loan with petitioner for which the names of the Pangans, is not merely anchored on the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and
the mortgage of the property in petitioners favor was executed. She admitted, though, that her Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante, but also on the
parents were not aware of such mortgage and that they did not authorize her to enter into Real Estate Mortgage likewise executed by her in representation of her parents and in favor of
such contract. Comandante also informed the Pangans that the signatures of her parents petitioner. Petitioner insisted that said adverse claim is not frivolous and invalid and is
appearing on the SPA are fictitious and that it was petitioner who prepared such document. registrable under Section 70 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. In fact, the Registrar of
Deeds of Quezon City had already determined the sufficiency and/or validity of such
registration by annotating said claim, and this, respondents failed to question. Petitioner further
averred that even before the sale and transfer to the Pangans of the subject property, the As regards the Pangans, the CA ruled that the mortgage contract was not binding upon them
latter were already aware of the existence of his adverse claim. In view of these, petitioner as they were purchasers in good faith and for value. The property was free from the mortgage
prayed that his Motion for Summary Judgment be granted. encumbrance of petitioner when they acquired it as they only came to know of the adverse
claim through petitioners phone call which came right after the formers acquisition of the
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court property.The CA further ruled that as Comandantes waiver of hereditary rights and interests
upon which petitioners adverse claim was based is a nullity, it could not be a source of any
After the filing of the parties respective Oppositions to the said motions for summary right in his favor.Hence, the Pangans were not bound to take notice of such claim and are
judgment, the trial court, in an Order dated May 31, 2001,[26] deemed both motions for thus not liable to petitioner.
summary judgment submitted for resolution. Quoting substantially petitioners allegations in his
Motion for Summary Judgment, it thereafter rendered on June 14, 2001 a Summary Noticeably, the appellate court did not rule on the propriety of the issuance of the Summary
Judgment[27] in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads: Judgment as raised by the Diazes and Comandante. In the ultimate, the CA merely modified
the assailed Summary Judgment of the trial court by excluding the Pangans among those
WHEREFORE, premises considered, summary judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff and against defendants by: solidarily liable to petitioner, in effect affirming in all other respects the assailed summary
a) ORDERING all defendants jointly and solidarily to pay plaintiff the sum of ONE judgment, viz:
MILLION ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT
PESOS (P1,118,228.00) which is blood money of plaintiff;
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
b) ORDERING the Honorable Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City that the rights and Quezon City, Branch 224 in Civil Case No. Q-99-38876 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
interest of the plaintiff over subject property be annotated at the back of T.C.T. No. N-209049;
1. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and Spouses Diaz to jointly and severally pay
c) SENTENCING all defendants to pay plaintiffs expenses of TEN THOUSAND plaintiff the sum of Php 1,118, 228.00; and
PESOS (P10,000.00) and to pay the costs of suit.
2. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and Spouses Diaz to jointly and severally pay
IT IS SO ORDERED.[28] plaintiff the amount of Php10,000.00 plus cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[31]
The Pangans, the Diazes, and Comandante appealed to the CA.[29] The Pangans faulted the
trial court in holding them jointly and severally liable with the Diazes and Comandante for the Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[32] having been denied by the CA in its
satisfaction of the latters personal obligation to petitioner in the total amount Resolution[33] dated September 10, 2004, he now comes to us through this petition for review
of P1,118,228.00. The Diazes and Comandante, on the other hand, imputed error upon the on certiorari insisting that the Pangans should, together with the other respondents, be held
trial court in rendering summary judgment in favor of petitioner. They averred that assuming solidarily liable to him for the amount of P1,118,228.00.
the summary judgment was proper, the trial court should not have considered the Real Estate
Mortgage Contract and the Promissory Note as they were defective, as well as petitioners Our Ruling
frivolous and non-registrable adverse claim.
The petition lacks merit.
In its Decision[30] dated December 12, 2003, the CA declared Comandantes waiver of
hereditary rights null and void. However, it found the Real Estate Mortgage executed by Petitioner merely reiterates his contentions in the Motion for Summary Judgment he
Comandante on behalf of her parents as binding between the parties thereto. filed before the trial court. He insists that his Adverse Claim annotated at the back of TCT No.
RT-6604 is not merely anchored on Comandantes Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests
Over A Real Property (Still Undivided) but also on her being the attorney-in-fact of the Diazes The questions next to be resolved are: Is Comandantes waiver of hereditary rights
when she executed the mortgage contract in favor of petitioner. He avers that his adverse valid? Is petitioners adverse claim based on such waiver likewise valid and effective?
claim is not frivolous or invalid and is registrable as the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City
even allowed its annotation. He also claims that even prior to the sale of subject property to We note at the outset that the validity of petitioners adverse claim should have been
the Pangans, the latter already knew of his valid and existing adverse claim thereon and are, determined by the trial court after the petition for cancellation of petitioners adverse claim filed
therefore, not purchasers in good faith. Thus, petitioner maintains that the Pangans should be by Comandante was consolidated with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876.[35] This is in consonance
held, together with the Diazes and Comandante, jointly and severally liable to him in the total with Section 70 of PD 1529 which provides:
amount of P1,118,228.00.
Section 70. Adverse Claim. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land
adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if
no other provision is made in this Decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing
Petitioners contentions are untenable. setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the
number of the certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a
The Affidavit of Adverse Claim executed by petitioner reads in part: description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimants
xxxx residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be
entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be
1. That I am the Recipient/Benefactor of compulsory heirs share over an undivided effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the
certain parcel of land together with all the improvements found therein x x x as evidenced by annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party
Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over A Real Property, executed by REINA D. in interest: Provided, however, That after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the
COMANDANTE (a compulsory/legitimate heir of Sps. Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz), x x x. same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
2. That in order to protect my interest over said property as a Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the
Recipient/Benefactor, for the registered owners/parents might dispose (of) and/or encumber the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the
same in a fraudulent manner without my knowledge and consent, for the owners duplicate title court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of validity of such adverse claim, and shall
was not surrendered to me, it is petitioned that this Affidavit of Adverse Claim be ANNOTATED at render judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the
the back of the said title particularly on the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6604 registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing,
(82020) PR-18887 which is on file with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an
amount not less than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in its
3. That I am executing this Affidavit in order to attest (to) the truth of the foregoing discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing
facts and to petition the Honorable Registrar of Deeds, Quezon City, to annotate this Affidavit of with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect. (Emphasis ours)
Adverse Claim at the back of the said title particularly the original copy of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887 which is on file with the said office, so that my interest as
Recipient/Benefactor of the said property will be protected especially the registered owner/parents,
in a fraudulent manner might dispose (of) and/or encumber the same without my knowledge and Pursuant to the third paragraph of the afore-quoted provision, it has been held that
consent. (Emphasis ours)
the validity or efficaciousness of an adverse claim may only be determined by the Court upon
petition by an interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the immediate hearing
Clearly, petitioners Affidavit of Adverse Claim was based solely on the waiver of
thereof and make the proper adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And, it is only
hereditary interest executed by Comandante. This fact cannot be any clearer especially so
when such claim is found unmeritorious that the registration of the adverse claim may be
when the inscription of his adverse claim at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 reads as follows:
cancelled.[36]
P.E. 2468/T-(82020)RT-6604 - - AFFIDAVIT OF ADVERSE CLAIM - - Executed
under oath by PEDRO M. FERRER, married to Erlinda B. Ferrer, claiming among others that they
have a claim, the interest over said property as Recipient/Benefactor, by virtue of a waiver of As correctly pointed out by respondents, the records is bereft of any showing that
Hereditary Rights and Interest over a real property x x x[34] (Emphasis ours)
the trial court conducted any hearing on the matter. Instead, what the trial court did was to
include this material issue among those for which it has rendered its summary judgment as
Therefore, there is no basis for petitioners assertion that the adverse claim was also anchored shown by the following portion of the judgment:
on the mortgage contract allegedly executed by Comandante on behalf of her parents.
x x x it will be NOTED that subject Adverse Claim annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887, and carried over to defendants-Sps. Pangans Title No.
N-20909, is not merely anchored on defendant Reina Comandantes Waiver of Hereditary Rights
and Interest Over a Real Property but also on her being the Attorney-In-Fact of the previous
registered owners/parents/defendants Sps. Alfredo and Imelda Diaz about the Real Estate In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of
Mortgage Contract for a loan of P1,118,228.00 which is a blood money of the plaintiff. Moreover,
subject Adverse Claim in LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) is NOT frivolous and invalid and Comandantes Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still
consequently, REGISTRABLE by virtue of Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (now Section
70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529). [37](Emphasis ours) Undivided), succession to either of her parents properties has not yet been opened since both
of them are still living. With respect to the other two requisites, both are likewise present
considering that the property subject matter of Comandantes waiver concededly forms part of
It does not escape our attention that the trial court merely echoed the claim of petitioner that
the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death and, such
his adverse claim subject of LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) is not frivolous, invalid and is
expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature.
consequently registrable. We likewise lament the apparent lack of effort on the part of said
From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a
court to make even a short ratiocination as to how it came up with said conclusion. In fact,
contract involving the formers future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary
what followed the above-quoted portion of the summary judgment are mere recitals of the
Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioners favor.
arguments raised by petitioner in his motion for summary judgment. And in the dispositive
portion, the trial court merely casually ordered that petitioners adverse claim be inscribed at
In Taedo v. Court of Appeals,[39] we invalidated the contract of sale between Lazaro
the back of the title of the Pangans. What is worse is that despite this glaring defect, the CA
Taedo and therein private respondents since the subject matter thereof was a one hectare of
manifestly overlooked the matter even if respondents vigorously raised the same before it.
whatever share the former shall have over Lot 191 of the cadastral survey
Be that as it may, respondents efforts of pointing out this flaw, which we find
of Gerona, Province of Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829 of the Register of Deeds of
significant, have not gone to naught as will be hereinafter discussed.
Tarlac. It constitutes a part of Taedos future inheritance from his parents, which cannot be the
source of any right nor the creator of any obligation between the parties.
All the respondents contend that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante is null and void for being violative of
Guided by the above discussions, we similarly declare in this case that the Waiver
Article 1347 of the Civil Code, hence, petitioners adverse claim which was based upon such
of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by
waiver is likewise void and cannot confer upon the latter any right or interest over the property.
Comandante in favor of petitioner as not valid and that same cannot be the source of any right
or create any obligation between them for being violative of the second paragraph of Article
We agree with the respondents.
1347 of the Civil Code.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be
Anent the validity and effectivity of petitioners adverse claim, it is provided in Section
entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. For the
70 of PD 1529, that it is necessary that the claimant has a right or interest in the registered
inheritance to be considered future, the succession must not have been opened at the time of
land adverse to the registered owner and that it must arise subsequent to registration. Here,
the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited
as no right or interest on the subject property flows from Comandantes invalid waiver of
under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:
hereditary rights upon petitioner, the latter is thus not entitled to the registration of his adverse
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened. claim. Therefore, petitioners adverse claim is without any basis and must consequently be
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and,
adjudged invalid and ineffective and perforce be cancelled.
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely
hereditary in nature.[38]
Section 2. Summary Judgment for the defending party. A party against whom a
Albeit we have already resolved the issues raised by petitioner, we shall not stop here as the claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time,
move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as
Diazes and Comandante in their Comment[40] call our attention to the failure of the CA to pass to all or any part thereof.
upon the issue of the propriety of the issuance by the trial court of the Summary Judgment in Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days
before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits,
favor of petitioner despite the fact that they have raised this issue before the appellate depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and
court. They argue that summary judgment is proper only when there is clearly no genuine admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
issue as to any material fact in the action. Thus, where the defendant presented defenses
tendering factual issue which call for presentation of evidence, as when he specifically denies
As can be deduced from the above provisions, summary judgment is a procedural
the material allegations in the complaint, summary judgment cannot be rendered.
devise resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. When the
pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of facts to be tried, the Rules of Court
The Diazes and Comandante then enumerate the genuine issues in the case which
allows a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment. That is, when the facts
they claim should have precluded the trial court from issuing a summary judgment in
are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the
petitioners favor.First, the execution of the SPA in favor of Comandante referred to by
material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is
petitioner in his complaint was never admitted by the Diazes. They assert that as such fact is
not proper. A genuine issue is such fact which requires the presentation of evidence as
disputed, trial should have been conducted to determine the truth of the matter, same being a
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.[41]
genuine issue. Despite this, the trial court merely took the word of the plaintiff and assumed
that said document was indeed executed by them. Second, although Comandante
Here, we find the existence of genuine issues which removes the case from the
acknowledges that she has a personal obligation with petitioner, she nevertheless, did not
coverage of summary judgment. The variance in the allegations of the parties in their
admit that it was in the amount of P1,118,228.00.Instead, she claims only the amount
pleadings is evident.
of P500,000.00 or P600,000.00 (if inclusive of interest) as her obligation. Moreover, the
Diazes deny borrowing any money from petitioner and neither did the Pangans owe him a
Petitioner anchors his complaint for sum of money and/or judicial foreclosure on the
single centavo. Thus, the true amount of the obligation due the petitioner and how each of the
alleged real estate mortgage over the subject property allegedly entered into by Comandante
respondents are responsible for such amount are genuine issues which need formal
in behalf of her parents to secure payment of a loan amounting to P1,118,228.00. To support
presentation of evidence. Lastly, they aver that the trial court ignored factual and material
this claim, petitioner attached to his complaint (1) the SPA alleged to have been executed by
issues such as the lack of probative value of Comandantes waiver of hereditary rights as well
the Diazes; (2) the Real Estate Mortgage Contract pertaining to the amount of P1,118,228.00;
as of the SPA; the fact that Comandante signed the mortgage contract and promissory note in
and, (3) a Promissory Note.
her personal capacity; and, that all such documents were prepared by petitioner who acted as
a lawyer and the creditor of Comandante at the same time.
Comandante, in her Answer to petitioners Amended Complaint, assailed the validity
and due execution of the abovementioned documents. She asserted that the same were not
Rule 35 of the Rules of Court provides for summary judgment, the pertinent
duly, knowingly and validly executed by her and that it was petitioner who prepared all of
provisions of which are the following:
them. Also, although she admitted owing petitioner, same was not an absolute admission as
Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a she limited herself to an obligation amounting only to P600,000.00 inclusive of charges and
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or interests. She likewise claimed that such obligation is her personal obligation and not of her
admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
parents.
The Diazes, for their part, also denied that they executed the SPA authorizing their
daughter to mortgage their property to petitioner as well as having any obligation to the latter.
Clearly, there are genuine issues in this case which require the presentation of
evidence. For one, it is necessary to ascertain in a full blown trial the validity and due
execution of the SPA, the Real Estate Mortgage and the Promissory Notes because the
determination of the following equally significant questions depends on them, to wit: (1) Are
the Diazes obligated to petitioner or is the obligation a purely personal obligation of
Comandante? and, (2) Is the sum of P1,118,228.00 as shown in the Real Estate Mortgage
and the Promissory Note, the amount which is really due the petitioner?
To stress, trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only
when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by
the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the
place of trial.[42] From the foregoing, it is apparent that the trial court should have refrained from
issuing the summary judgment but instead proceeded to conduct a full blown trial of the
case. In view of this, the present case should be remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings and proper disposition according to the rudiments of a regular trial on the merits
and not through an abbreviated termination of the case by summary judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 12, 2003 insofar as it excluded the respondents Spouses Bienvenido
Pangan and Elizabeth Pangan from among those solidarily liable to petitioner Atty. Pedro M.
Ferrer, is AFFIRMED. The inscription of the adverse claim of petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer
on T.C.T. No. N-209049 is hereby ordered CANCELLED. Insofar as its other aspects are
concerned, the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE and VACATED. The case is REMANDED to
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 for further proceedings in accordance
with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013 miscommunication between the employees at that time because prior to the issuance of the
receipt, Villagonzalo asked Hawayon " Ok na ?," and the latter replied " Ok na ," which the
former believed to mean that the item has already been paid.18 Realizing the mistake,
CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. YBAEZ, Petitioners,
Villagonzalo rushed outside to look for respondent and when he saw the latter, he invited her to
vs.
go back to the shop to make clarifications as to whether or not payment was indeed made.
SHIRLEY G. QUIONES, Respondent.
Instead, however, of going back to the shop, respondent suggested that they meet at the Cebu
Pacific Office. Villagonzalo, Hawayon and Ybaez thus went to the agreed venue where they
DECISION talked to respondent.19 They pointed out that it appeared in their conversation that respondent
could not recall whom she gave the payment.20 They emphasized that they were gentle and
polite in talking to respondent and it was the latter who was arrogant in answering their
PERALTA, J.:
questions.21As counterclaim, petitioners and the other defendants sought the payment of moral
and exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees and litigation expenses. 22
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the ; Rules of Court are the
Court of Appeals Decision1 dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution2 dated November 14, 2006 in
On June 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing both the complaint and
CA-G.R. CV No. 80309. The assailed decision reversed and set aside the June 20, 2003 counterclaim of the parties. From the evidence presented, the trial court concluded that the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC), Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB- petitioners and the other defendants believed in good faith that respondent failed to make
26984; while the assailed resolution denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
payment. Considering that no motive to fabricate a lie could be attributed to the Guess
Michelle Ybaez (Ybaez). employees, the court held that when they demanded payment from respondent, they merely
exercised a right under the honest belief that no payment was made. The RTC likewise did not
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows: find it damaging for respondent when the confrontation took place in front of Cebu Pacific
clients, because it was respondent herself who put herself in that situation by choosing the
venue for discussion. As to the letter sent to Cebu Pacific Air, the trial court also did not take it
On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiones, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu against the Guess employees, because they merely asked for assistance and not to embarrass
Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique at the second floor of or humiliate respondent. In other words, the RTC found no evidence to prove bad faith on the
Robinsons Department Store (Robinsons) in Cebu City. She fitted four items: two jeans, a part of the Guess employees to warrant the award of damages. 23
blouse and a shorts, then decided to purchase the black jeans worth P2,098.00.4 Respondent
allegedly paid to the cashier evidenced by a receipt5 issued by the store.6
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinsons and Mercury Drug Store
(Mercury) where she was heading next, a Guess employee approached and informed her that
she failed to pay the item she got. She, however, insisted that she paid and showed the WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of
employee the receipt issued in her favor.7 She then suggested that they talk about it at the Cebu City, Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984 (for: Damages) is hereby REVERSED and
Cebu Pacific Office located at the basement of the mall. She first went to Mercury then met the SET ASIDE. Defendants Michelle Ybaez and California Clothing, Inc. are hereby ordered to
Guess employees as agreed upon.8 pay plaintiff-appellant Shirley G. Quiones jointly and solidarily moral damages in the amount
of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and attorneys fees in the amount of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00).
When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly subjected her to
humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly demanded payment for the
black jeans.9 They supposedly even searched her wallet to check how much money she had, SO ORDERED.24
followed by another argument. Respondent, thereafter, went home.10
While agreeing with the trial court that the Guess employees were in good faith when they
On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director of Cebu Pacific confronted respondent inside the Cebu Pacific Office about the alleged non-payment, the CA,
Air narrating the incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it did not concern the office and however, found preponderance of evidence showing that they acted in bad faith in sending the
the same took place while respondent was off duty.11 Another letter was allegedly prepared and demand letter to respondents employer. It found respondents possession of both the official
was supposed to be sent to the Cebu Pacific Office in Robinsons, but the latter again refused receipt and the subject black jeans as evidence of payment.25Contrary to the findings of the
to receive it.12 Respondent also claimed that the Human Resource Department (HRD) of RTC, the CA opined that the letter addressed to Cebu Pacifics director was sent to
Robinsons was furnished said letter and the latter in fact conducted an investigation for respondents employer not merely to ask for assistance for the collection of the disputed
purposes of canceling respondents Robinsons credit card. Respondent further claimed that payment but to subject her to ridicule, humiliation and similar injury such that she would be
she was not given a copy of said damaging letter.13 With the above experience, respondent pressured to pay.26 Considering that Guess already started its investigation on the incident,
claimed to have suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental anguish, fright, serious there was a taint of bad faith and malice when it dragged respondents employer who was not
apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation.14 She thus filed the privy to the transaction. This is especially true in this case since the purported letter contained
Complaint for Damages15 before the RTC against petitioners California Clothing, Inc. (California not only a narrative of the incident but accusations as to the alleged acts of respondent in trying
Clothing), Excelsis Villagonzalo (Villagonzalo), Imelda Hawayon (Hawayon) and Ybaez. She to evade payment.27 The appellate court thus held that petitioners are guilty of abuse of right
demanded the payment of moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees and entitling respondent to collect moral damages and attorneys fees. Petitioner California Clothing
litigation expenses.16 Inc. was made liable for its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in the hiring and selection
of its employees; while Ybaezs liability stemmed from her act of signing the demand letter
sent to respondents employer. In view of Hawayon and Villagonzalos good faith, however,
In their Answer,17 petitioners and the other defendants admitted the issuance of the receipt of they were exonerated from liability.28
payment. They claimed, however, that instead of the cashier (Hawayon) issuing the official
receipt, it was the invoicer (Villagonzalo) who did it manually. They explained that there was
Ybaez moved for the reconsideration29 of the aforesaid decision, but the same was denied in taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. 35Malice or bad faith, on the
the assailed November 14, 2006 CA Resolution. other hand, implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity.36
Petitioners now come before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court based on the following grounds: Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent whether she paid or not.
The Guess employees were able to talk to respondent at the Cebu Pacific Office. The
confrontation started well, but it eventually turned sour when voices were raised by both
I.
parties. As aptly held by both the RTC and the CA, such was the natural consequence of two
parties with conflicting views insisting on their respective beliefs. Considering, however, that
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LETTER SENT respondent was in possession of the item purchased from the shop, together with the official
TO THE CEBU PACIFIC OFFICE WAS MADE TO SUBJECT HEREIN RESPONDENT TO receipt of payment issued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such payment was
RIDICULE, HUMILIATION AND SIMILAR INJURY. made on the basis of a mere speculation. Their claim should have been proven by substantial
evidence in the proper forum.
II.
It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard and tried to
force respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the guise of asking for
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES AND
assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to respondents employer not only informing
ATTORNEYS FEES.30 it of the incident but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of respondent.1wphi1 Petitioners
claimed that after receiving the receipt of payment and the item purchased, respondent "was
The petition is without merit. noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store." They also accused respondent that she was not
completely being honest when she was asked about the circumstances of payment, thus:
Respondents complaint against petitioners stemmed from the principle of abuse of rights
provided for in the Civil Code on the chapter of human relations. Respondent cried foul when x x x After receiving the OR and the item, Ms. Gutierrez was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the
petitioners allegedly embarrassed her when they insisted that she did not pay for the black store. x x x
jeans she purchased from their shop despite the evidence of payment which is the official
receipt issued by the shop. The issuance of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the
When I asked her about to whom she gave the money, she gave out a blank expression and
right to verify from respondent whether she indeed made payment if they had reason to believe told me, "I cant remember." Then I asked her how much money she gave, she answered,
that she did not. However, the exercise of such right is not without limitations. Any abuse in the "P2,100; 2 pcs 1,000 and 1 pc 100 bill." Then I told her that that would (sic) impossible since
exercise of such right and in the performance of duty causing damage or injury to another is
we have no such denomination in our cash fund at that moment. Finally, I asked her if how
actionable under the Civil Code. The Courts pronouncement in Carpio v. Valmonte31 is much change and if she received change from the cashier, she then answered, "I dont
noteworthy: remember." After asking these simple questions, I am very certain that she is not completely
being honest about this. In fact, we invited her to come to our boutique to clear these matters
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether but she vehemently refused saying that shes in a hurry and very busy. 37
done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the
damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity Clearly, these statements are outrightly accusatory. Petitioners accused respondent that not
but also universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring from only did she fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but that she deliberately took the same
the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct.
without paying for it and later hurriedly left the shop to evade payment. These accusations
First of these fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under were made despite the issuance of the receipt of payment and the release of the item
Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that " Every person must, in the exercise of his rights purchased. There was, likewise, no showing that respondent had the intention to evade
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
payment. Contrary to petitioners claim, respondent was not in a rush in leaving the shop or the
honesty and good faith."x x x32The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a mall. This is evidenced by the fact that the Guess employees did not have a hard time looking
legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or for her when they realized the supposed non-payment.
injuring another.33
It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to respondents
In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication between the cashier and employer, petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed amount
the invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt to respondent. When they realized
but to tarnish respondents reputation in the eyes of her employer. To malign respondent
the mistake, they made a cash count and discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the without substantial evidence and despite the latters possession of enough evidence in her
price of the black jeans was missing. They, thus, concluded that it was respondent who failed favor, is clearly impermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty
to make such payment. It was, therefore, within their right to verify from respondent whether
and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability.38
she indeed paid or not and collect from her if she did not. However, the question now is
whether such right was exercised in good faith or they went overboard giving respondent a
cause of action against them. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established
and must not be excessive or unduly harsh.39 In this case, petitioners obviously abused their
rights.
Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the
exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in bad
faith, with intent to prejudice another.34 Good faith refers to the state of mind which is Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 2 of the
manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from Civil Code which read:40
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA. THERESA
shall indemnify the latter for the same. PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER DISTRICT AND GASPAR GONZALEZ,*
JR., Respondents.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals or good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. DECISION
In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages and attorney s PERALTA, J.:
fees. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant s wrongful act or omission is
the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. 41 Moral
damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendant s grief and suffering. They
(CA), dated August 28, 2003 and December 17, 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
should, thus, reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong 73000. The CA Decision affirmed with modification the August 15, 2001 Decision 3 of the
done.42 They are awarded not to enrich the complainant but to enable the latter to obtain Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, while the CA Resolution
means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
undergone.43 We find that the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages awarded by the CA is
reasonable under the circumstances. Considering that respondent was compelled to litigate to The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows: cralavvonlinelawlibrary
protect her interest, attorney s fees in the amount of ofP20,000.00 is likewise just and proper.
[Herein petitioner] Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente are owners
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of of a housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City with a lot area of one
Appeals Decision dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. hundred fifty-three (153) square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
CV No. 80309, are AFFIRMED. 69905.
4. That the water and power bill of the subject property shall be for the account of the
Second Party (Ma. Theresa Pastorfide) effective June 1, 1994. (Records, p. 47)
vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the payment of the mortgage loan
secured by Joyce Ardiente from the National Home Mortgage (Records, Exh. A, pp.
468-469)
For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the name of Joyce
Ardiente was never questioned nor perturbed (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 7-8) until on
March 12, 1999, without notice, the water connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off.
Proceeding to the office of the Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) to complain, a
certain Mrs. Madjos told Ma. Theresa that she was delinquent for three (3) months
corresponding to the months of December 1998, January 1999, and February 1999. Ma.
Theresa argued that the due date of her payment was March 18, 1999 yet (T.S.N.,
October 31, 2000, pp. 11-12). Mrs. Madjos later told her that it was at the instance of
Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off (T.S.N., February 5, 2001, p. 31).
On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent bills (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, p.
12). On the same date, through her lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote a letter to the COWD to
explain who authorized the cutting of the water line (Records, p. 160).
On March 18, 1999, COWD, through the general manager, [respondent] Gaspar
Gonzalez, Jr., answered the letter dated March 15, 1999 and reiterated that it was at the
instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off (Records, p. 161).
Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide [and her husband] filed [a]
complaint for damages [against petitioner, COWD and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez]
(Records, pp. 2-6).
acted in bad faith causing prejudice and [injury to] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide. 8
In the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's water line was only restored and reconnected
when the [trial] court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on December 14, As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they failed to give a notice of disconnection
1999 (Records, p. 237).4 and derelicted in reconnecting the water line despite payment of the unpaid bills by the
[respondent spouses Pastorfide].9
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment holding as follows: cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration, but
xxxx these were denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December 17, 2003.
In the exercise of their rights and performance of their duties, defendants did not act with COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court, which was
justice, gave plaintiffs their due and observe honesty and good faith. Before docketed as G.R. No. 161802. However, based on technical grounds and on the finding
disconnecting the water supply, defendants COWD and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales did not that the CA did not commit any reversible error in its assailed Decision, the petition was
even send a disconnection notice to plaintiffs as testified to by Engr. Bienvenido Batar, in- denied via a Resolution10 issued by this Court on March 24, 2004. COWD and Gonzalez
charge of the Commercial Department of defendant COWD. There was one though, but filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied with finality through this
only three (3) days after the actual disconnection on March 12, 1999. The due date for Court's Resolution11 dated June 28, 2004.
payment was yet on March 15. Clearly, they did not act with justice. Neither did they
observe honesty. Petitioner, on the other hand, timely filed the instant petition with the following Assignment
of Errors:
cralavvonlinelawlibrary
They should not have been swayed by the prodding of Joyce V. Ardiente. They should
have investigated first as to the present ownership of the house. For doing the act 7.1 HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (ALTHOUGH IT HAS REDUCED THE
because Ardiente told them, they were negligent. Defendant Joyce Ardiente should have LIABILITY INTO HALF) HAS STILL COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR
requested before the cutting off of the water supply, plaintiffs to pay. While she attempted WHEN IT UPHELD THE JOINT AND SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF PETITIONER JOYCE V.
to tell plaintiffs but she did not have the patience of seeing them. She knew that it was ARDIENTE WITH CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER DISTRICT (COWD) AND ENGR.
plaintiffs who had been using the water four (4) years ago and not hers. She should have GASPAR D. GONZALES FOR THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO SERVE NOTICE UPON
been very careful. x x x5 RESPONDENTS SPOUSES PASTORFIDE PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL DISCONNECTION
DESPITE EVIDENCE ADDUCED DURING TRIAL THAT EVEN WITHOUT
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads, thus: cralavvonlinelawlibrary PETITIONER'S REQUEST, COWD WAS ALREADY SET TO EFFECT
DISCONNECTION OF RESPONDENTS' WATER SUPPLY DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants ACCOUNT FOR THREE (3) MONTHS.
[Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez] to pay jointly and severally plaintiffs, the following
sums: cralavvonlinelawlibrary
7.2 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS
ERROR WHEN IT RULED TOTALLY AGAINST PETITIONER AND FAILED TO FIND
THAT RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WHEN
(a) P200,000.00 for moral damages; chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
THEY FAILED TO PAY THEIR WATER BILLS FOR THREE MONTHS AND TO MOVE
(b) 200,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
FOR THE TRANSFER OF THE COWD ACCOUNT IN THEIR NAME, WHICH WAS A
(c) 50,000.00 for attorney's fee.
VIOLATION OF THEIR MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH PETITIONER JOYCE
The cross-claim of Cagayan de Oro Water District and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales is hereby
V. ARDIENTE. RESPONDENTS LIKEWISE DELIBERATELY FAILED TO EXERCISE
dismissed. The Court is not swayed that the cutting off of the water supply of plaintiffs
DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF THE FAMILY TO MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE
was because they were influenced by defendant Joyce Ardiente. They were negligent too
UNDER ART. 2203 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
for which they should be liable.
7.3 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
SO ORDERED.6
DISREGARDED THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT SPOUSES PASTORFIDE ARE
LIKEWISE BOUND TO OBSERVE ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, i.e., IN THE
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed an appeal with the CA.
EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS AND IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES TO
ACT WITH JUSTICE, GIVE EVERYONE HIS DUE AND OBSERVE HONESTY AND
On August 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision disposing as follows: cralavvonlinelawlibrary
GOOD FAITH.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with 7.4 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED
the modification that the awarded damages is reduced to P100,000.00 each for moral AN AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AS
and exemplary damages, while attorney's fees is lowered to P25,000.00. Costs against AGAINST PETITIONER ARDIENTE.12
appellants.
At the outset, the Court noticed that COWD and Gonzalez, who were petitioner's co-
SO ORDERED.7 defendants before the RTC and her co-appellants in the CA, were impleaded as
respondents in the instant petition. This cannot be done. Being her co-parties before the
The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she has a legal duty to honor the RTC and the CA, petitioner cannot, in the instant petition for review on certiorari, make
possession and use of water line by Ma. Theresa Pastorfide pursuant to their COWD and Gonzalez, adversary parties. It is a grave mistake on the part of petitioner's
Memorandum of Agreement and that when [petitioner] applied for its disconnection, she
counsel to treat COWD and Gonzalez as respondents. There is no basis to do so, with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
considering that, in the first place, there is no showing that petitioner filed a cross-claim
against COWD and Gonzalez. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a cross- In this regard, the Court's ruling in Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing
claim which is not set up shall be barred. Thus, for failing to set up a cross-claim against Corporation17 is instructive, to wit: cralavvonlinelawlibrary
COWD and Gonzalez before the RTC, petitioner is already barred from doing so in the
present petition. xxxx
More importantly, as shown above, COWD and Gonzalez's petition for review This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of ones
on certiorari filed with this Court was already denied with finality on June 28, 2004, rights as well as in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone
making the presently assailed CA Decision final and executory insofar as COWD and his due; and observe honesty and good faith.
Gonzalez are concerned. Thus, COWD and Gonzalez are already precluded from
participating in the present petition. They cannot resurrect their lost cause by filing In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was elucidated that
pleadings this time as respondents but, nonetheless, reiterating the same prayer in their while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and
previous pleadings filed with the RTC and the CA. for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
As to the merits of the instant petition, the Court likewise noticed that the main issues The Court said: cralavvonlinelawlibrary
raised by petitioner are factual and it is settled that the resolution of factual issues is the
function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some
considered binding by the Supreme Court subject only to certain exceptions, none of
basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human
which is present in this instant petition. 13This is especially true when the findings of the
beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION
RTC have been affirmed by the CA as in this case.14
ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the
Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the
In any case, a perusal of the records at hand would readily show that the instant petition
law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were
lacks merit.
"designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience" and
which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as golden
Petitioner insists that she should not be held liable for the disconnection of respondent
threads through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the
spouses' water supply, because she had no participation in the actual disconnection.
sway and dominance of justice." (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that
However, she admitted in the present petition that it was she who requested COWD to
pronounced in Article 19 x x x.
disconnect the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply. This was confirmed by COWD and
Gonzalez in their cross-claim against petitioner. While it was COWD which actually
xxxx
discontinued respondent spouses' water supply, it cannot be denied that it was through
the instance of petitioner that the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply was disconnected in
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
the first place.
rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights, but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require the Spouses Pastorfide
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The
to cause the transfer of the former's account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to
law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the
their Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to
norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by
cause the disconnection of the respondent spouses' water supply. The exercise of a right
itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be
become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which
excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. 15 Otherwise,
does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
liability for damages to the injured party will attach.16 In the present case, intention to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
harm was evident on the part of petitioner when she requested for the disconnection of
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of
respondent spouses water supply without warning or informing the latter of such request.
human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for
Petitioner claims that her request for disconnection was based on the advise of COWD
its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would
personnel and that her intention was just to compel the Spouses Pastorfide to comply
be proper.
with their agreement that petitioner's account with COWD be transferred in respondent
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
spouses' name. If such was petitioner's only intention, then she should have advised
negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same. It speaks
respondent spouses before or immediately after submitting her request for disconnection,
of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for
telling them that her request was simply to force them to comply with their obligation
its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the
under their Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not. What made matters worse is the
standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong
fact that COWD undertook the disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to
is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if the provision
reconnect the Spouses Pastorfides water supply despite payment of their arrears. There
does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20
was clearly an abuse of right on the part of petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez. They are
or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
guilty of bad faith.
The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that
every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
in damages under Article 20 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the [G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005]
circumstances of each case. x x x18
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES,
a.k.a. AMAY BISAYA, respondent.
To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the abovementioned provisions of law is
her unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses' water supply disconnected,
coupled with her failure to warn or at least notify respondent spouses of such intention. DECISION
On the part of COWD and Gonzalez, it is their failure to give prior notice of the impending
disconnection and their subsequent neglect to reconnect respondent spouses' water CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
supply despite the latter's settlement of their delinquent account.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling Nikko)[1] and Ruby Lim assail the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001
of both the RTC and the CA that petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez are solidarily liable. reversing the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well
as the Resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals dated 09 July 2002 which denied petitioners motion
The Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral damages based on the provisions of Article for reconsideration.
2219,19 in connection with Articles 2020 and 2121 of the Civil Code.
The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the human
relations provisions of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes,
As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that exemplary damages may be more popularly known by the screen name Amay Bisaya, alleged that at around 6:00 oclock in
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. Nonetheless, exemplary the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, [5] he
damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached him.[6] Mrs.
deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions. 22 In the Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotels penthouse in celebration of the natal day of
instant case, the Court agrees with the CA in sustaining the award of exemplary the hotels manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.[7] Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for
damages, although it reduced the amount granted, considering that respondent spouses which she replied: of course.[8] Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the
were deprived of their water supply for more than nine (9) months, and such deprivation basket of fruits which was the latters present for the celebrant. [9] At the penthouse, they first
would have continued were it not for the relief granted by the RTC. had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr.
Filart.[10]After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the
With respect to the award of attorney's fees, Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides, buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner
among others, that such fees may be recovered when exemplary damages are awarded, herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof.[11] In a
when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest, and where the defendant acted in at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party (huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka
gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and imbitado, bumaba ka na lang).[12] Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr.
Filart.[13] Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus
demandable claim.
adding to his shame and humiliation.[14] Not long after, while he was still recovering from the
traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of the
WHEREFORE, instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and hotel.[15] Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 28, 2003 and December 17, 2003, policeman.[16] Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000 are AFFIRMED. Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorneys
fees.[17]
SO ORDERED.
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under
the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotels
Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20) years. [18] One of her functions included organizing
the birthday party of the hotels former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. [19] The year 1994 was
no different. For Mr. Tsuruokas party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list and extended
invitations accordingly.[20] The guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr.
Tsuruokas closest friends and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those
invited.[21] At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a
drink.[22]Mindful of Mr. Tsuruokas wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr.
Boy Miller, the captain waiter, to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not
invited.[23] Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart.[24] As Dr. Filart
was engaged in conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she
inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did
not invite Mr. Reyes.[25] Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as
he was not invited.[26] Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms.
Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave. [27] When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw
Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain Batung whom she later approached. [28] Believing that
Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor
from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not
invited.[29] Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she
decided to speak to him herself as there were no other guests in the immediate
vicinity.[30] However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she decided to The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere rudeness or
wait.[31] When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but
said: alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every person who violates this duty
ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo.[32] She then turned becomes liable for damages, especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad
around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest
began screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her.[33] purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to
some motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also gave al., 309 SCRA 603).[44]
her version of the story to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party. [34] According
to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant
as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49. [35] When Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta
they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly Filart the solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of Two
dressed and was not invited.[36] All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place, Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred
but she later saw him at the bar talking to Col. Batung.[37] Then there was a commotion and she Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorneys fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
saw Mr. Reyes shouting.[38] She ignored Mr. Reyes.[39] She was embarrassed and did not want (P10,000).[45] On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision
the celebrant to think that she invited him.[40] as the argument raised in the motion had been amply discussed and passed upon in the
decision sought to be reconsidered.[46]
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,[41] giving more credence
to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court of
trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party Appeals seriously erred in
as he was uninvited:
I.
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the
NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY
birthday celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to which
ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER
he was not invited by the host. Damages are pecuniary consequences which the law imposes
for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Thus, no recovery can be had
against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault (Garciano v. II.
Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the party of defendant Violeta Filart
even if she allowed him to join her and took responsibility for his attendance at the party. His
action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail. [42] HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR.
FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA COULD NOT HAVE
SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION, WERE IT NOT FOR DR. FILARTS INVITATION
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more
commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud
III.
voice within hearing distance of several guests:
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should not finish his DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE
food and to leave the place within the hearing distance of other guests is an act which is CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA
contrary to morals, good customs . . ., for which appellees should compensate the appellant for
the damage suffered by the latter as a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The IV.
liability arises from the acts which are in themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary to
morals or good customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot with
impunity intentionally cause damage to another in a manner contrary to morals or good IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS
customs.[43] POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS
PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several
people to inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled V.
for as she should have approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should have talked to Mr.
Reyes in private: IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANTS BRIEF,
THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by appellee Lim was PROCEEDINGS
to approach appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have told appellant Reyes in private
that the latter should leave the party as the celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit
necessary that Mrs. Filart be the one to approach appellant because it was she who invited injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of
appellant in that occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filarts invitation, appellant could not have being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a gate-
suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally liable. crasher.
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as
... injury[47]) refers to self-inflicted injury[48] or to the consent to injury[49] which precludes the
recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.[55]
even if he is not negligent in doing so.[50] As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine
does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose
risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close
Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and
ridicule and shame. discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary
does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in observing
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto that
Reyes, a.k.a. Amay Bisaya, to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant
thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave
if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with
the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be
her.
heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment
As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable to him. It was plaintiffs reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of
conclusions concerning the same facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left without what transpired between them. . .
choice but to use its latent power to review such findings of facts. Indeed, the general rule is
that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him
law.[51] One of the exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein as the findings of the out.[56]
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court.[52] The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim
did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and
discreetly. The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyess version of the story is that it is unsupported.
she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to leave the It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not
place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts, however, were in agreement that presented any witness to back his story up. All his witnesses Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero
it was Dr. Filarts invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party. and Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party.[57]
The consequential question then is: Which version is credible? Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was
not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower courts findings Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs
of fact. from that of its employee.[58]
First, let us put things in the proper perspective. Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights,[59] is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:
[53]
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel, for-invitation-only, thrown
for the hotels former Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who was clearly
uninvited (by the celebrant)[54] and who could not just disappear into the crowd as his face is Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
known by many, being an actor. While he was already spotted by the organizer of the party, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the celebrant
was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrants instruction to keep the party Elsewhere, we explained that when a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
intimate, would naturally want to get rid of the gate-crasher in the most hush-hush manner in with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
order not to call attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, in the process, risk the thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. [60] The object of this article,
displeasure of the celebrant, her former boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones
Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lims ability to follow the instructions of the rights but also in the performance of ones duties.[61] These standards are the following: act with
celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the hotels personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. [62] Its antithesis,
whom the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1)
could not offer any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining a formal There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed prejudicing or injuring another.[63] When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper
his fate by admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very close. Close enough for under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation
him to kiss: of law[64] which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr.
Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were at
the buffet table? How close was she when she approached you?
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other. morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she shouted?
Article 21[65] refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an
A: Yes. She said, wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang. act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public
policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.[66]
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, [67] and that is, the act complained of
... must be intentional.[68]
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013
Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know each other personally
before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation
for Ms. Lims alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being single at 44 SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners, v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR.
years old, had a very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her AND ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents.
associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen. [69] The lameness of this argument
need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the DECISION
Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and
conjectures. DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise
acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for
on the appellate courts declaration that Ms. Lims act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes [ones] personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and [non]-interference
(without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of demands respect.1
action predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not
only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity. [70] Without proof of any ill-motive on
This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
her part, Ms. Lims act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially
July 10, 2007 Decision3 and the September 11, 2007 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals
because she did inquire from Mrs. Filarts companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite
Mr. Reyes.[71] If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473.
cannot amount to bad faith.
Factual Antecedents
Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel
Nikko be made answerable for exemplary damages [72] especially for the reason stated by the On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint5 for Injunction and Damages with prayer for
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order
Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latters lowly station in (TRO), docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents
life. This has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be established. Social Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.
equality is not sought by the legal provisions under consideration, but due regard for decency
and propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or correction for public Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B)
good and to avert further commission of such acts, exemplary damages should be imposed covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City
upon appellees.[73] of Mandaue, Cebu;6that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources,
Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners;7 that
The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with the very facts respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot
of the case and the evidence on hand. It is not disputed that at the time of the incident in 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and
question, Mr. Reyes was an actor of long standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-
Board Member of the Music Singer Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda 5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence without a
Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official candidate of the KBL valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is
Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee of a number of humanitarian organizations of the adjacent to petitioners property;9 that the court, in that case, denied Aldos application for
Philippines.[74] During his direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations; 10 that, in order to get
income[75] and nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any evidence to support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and
information as to the social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing
conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot withstand scrutiny as it is without basis. petitioners property;11 that respondents, through their employees and without the consent
of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners on-going construction;12 and that the acts
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr.
Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within the
of respondents violate petitioners right to privacy. 13 Thus, petitioners prayed that
bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone. respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from
conducting illegal surveillance.14
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel
Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they did not install the
and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision video surveillance cameras,16 nor did they order their employees to take pictures of
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby petitioners construction.17 They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are
AFFIRMED. No costs. mere stockholders.18
SO ORDERED.
On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order19 granting the application for a
TRO. The dispositive portion of the said Order reads: cralavvonlinel awlibrar y
WHEREFORE, the application for a [T]emporary [R]estraining [O]rder or a [W]rit of THAT THE ILLEGALLY INSTALLED SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS OF RESPONDENTS
[P]reliminary [I]njunction is granted. Upon the filing and approval of a bond by CHOACH[U]Y WOULD CAPTURE THE PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF PETITIONER
[petitioners], which the Court sets at P50,000.00, let a [W]rit of [P]reliminary [I]njunction SPOUSES HING, THEIR CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES.
issue against the [respondents] Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy. They are
hereby directed to immediately remove the revolving camera that they installed at the left III.
side of their building overlooking the side of [petitioners] lot and to transfer and operate it
elsewhere at the back where [petitioners] property can no longer be viewed within a THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT SINCE
distance of about 2-3 meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec, facing the road. THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING IS ALDO DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES, INC.
THEN TO SUE RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY CONSTITUTE[S] A PURPORTEDLY
IT IS SO ORDERED.20 UNWARRANTED PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL.
Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC denied the same in its
IV.
Order22 dated February 6, 2006.23 Thus: cralavvonli nel awlibrar y
Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation of petitioners right to
Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the privacy, and (2) whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.
Rules of Court with application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioners Arguments
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision26 granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA because respondents installation of a stationary camera directly facing petitioners
ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion property and a revolving camera covering a significant portion of the same property
because petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive constitutes a violation of petitioners right to privacy. 34 Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the
writ.27 The CA explained that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which enjoins persons from prying into the private lives of others.35 Although
Civil Code was not violated since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a the said provision pertains to the privacy of anothers residence, petitioners opine that it
residence.28 The CA also said that since respondents are not the owners of the building, includes business offices, citing Professor Arturo M. Tolentino. 36 Thus, even assuming
they could not have installed video surveillance cameras. 29 They are mere stockholders arguendo that petitioners property is used for business, it is still covered by the said
of Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality.30 Thus, they are not the proper provision.37
parties.31 The fallo reads: cralavvonlinelawlibr ar y
As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in this case, petitioners claim
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by that respondents and Aldo are one and the same, and that respondents only want to hide
us GRANTING the petition filed in this case. The assailed orders dated October 18, 2005 behind Aldos corporate fiction.38 They point out that if respondents are not the real
and February 6, 2006 issued by the respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET owners of the building, where the video surveillance cameras were installed, then they
ASIDE. SO ORDERED.32 nadcral avvonli nel awlibr ar y had no business consenting to the ocular inspection conducted by the court. 39
Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that: cralavvonlinelawlibr ar y Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that petitioners cannot invoke
their right to privacy since the property involved is not used as a
I. residence.40 Respondents maintain that they had nothing to do with the installation of the
video surveillance cameras as these were installed by Aldo, the registered owner of the
THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ANNULLED AND SET building,41 as additional security for its building. 42 Hence, they were wrongfully impleaded
ASIDE THE ORDERS OF THE [RTC] DATED 18 OCTOBER 2005 AND 6 FEBRUARY in this case.43
2006 HOLDING THAT THEY WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT The Petition is meritorious.
PETITIONER SPOUSES HING ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF THEIR The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHT TO PRIVACY DESPITE THE FACTUAL
FINDINGS [OF] THE RTC, WHICH RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY FAILED TO REFUTE, The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution44 and in our laws. It is defined as the
right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the
private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary reasonable expectation of privacy test. This test determines whether a person has a
sensibilities.45 It is the right of an individual to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been
live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is not violated.51 In Ople v. Torres,52 we enunciated that the reasonableness of a persons
necessarily concerned.46 Simply put, the right to privacy is the right to be let alone. 47 expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the
individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that
The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy and protects them against the society recognizes as reasonable. Customs, community norms, and practices may,
States abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be therefore, limit or extend an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy. 53 Hence, the
secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except in case of overriding social reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-
need and then only under the stringent procedural safeguards, can disturb them in the case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case. 54
privacy of their homes.48
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for
The right to privacy under Article 26(1) the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however,
of the Civil Code covers business offices should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the
where the public are excluded therefrom consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor
and only certain individuals are allowed should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of anothers residence or business
to enter. office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act
No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individuals right to privacy
and provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that: cralavvonli nel awlibr ary
After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of restraining order. The operation by [respondents] of a revolving camera, even if it were
his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not mounted on their building, violated the right of privacy of [petitioners], who are the owners
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention of the adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus on [respondents] property or the roof
and other relief:cralavvonlinelawli brar y of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans
through a good portion of [the] land of [petitioners].
(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence; chanr obl es virtual awlibr ary
Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why [petitioner] Hing was so
xxxx unyielding in asserting that the revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the
on[-]going construction in his property. The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of
This provision recognizes that a mans house is his castle, where his right to privacy the factory of [Aldo]. If the purpose of [respondents] in setting up a camera at the back is
cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It includes any act of intrusion into, to secure the building and factory premises, then the camera should revolve only towards
peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of the their properties at the back. [Respondents] camera cannot be made to extend the view to
latter.49 The phrase prying into the privacy of anothers residence, however, does not [petitioners] lot. To allow the [respondents] to do that over the objection of the
mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert [petitioners] would violate the right of [petitioners] as property owners. The owner of a
Arturo M. Tolentino: cralavvonlinelawli brar y thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third
person.55
Our Code specifically mentions prying into the privacy of anothers residence. This
does not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
covers also similar acts. A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the their property, whether they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the
public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners property or covering a
come in. x x x50 (Emphasis supplied) significant portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to
privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need
Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be not belabor that the issuance of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to court taking cognizance of the case and should not be interfered with, unless there is
exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase prying into the privacy of anothers grave abuse of discretion committed by the court. 56 Here, there is no indication of any
residence, therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners are not entitled
considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals to an injunctive writ.
may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application
of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences. This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties to this
suit.
The reasonable expectation of privacy
test is used to determine whether there A real party defendant is one who has a
is a violation of the right to privacy. correlative legal obligation to redress
a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason
of the defendant's act or omission which
had violated the legal right of the former.
A real party defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong
done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendants act or omission which had violated the
legal right of the former.57
In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do
not own the building, they could not have installed the video surveillance
cameras.58 Such reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents are not
the registered owners of the building does not automatically mean that they did not cause
the installation of the video surveillance cameras.
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance
cameras in order to fish for evidence, which could be used against petitioners in another
case.59 During the hearing of the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill
testified that when respondents installed the video surveillance cameras, he immediately
broached his concerns but they did not seem to care, 60 and thus, he reported the matter
to the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents
before the RTC.61 He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has already been a
dispute between his family and the Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of their
respective properties.62 With these factual circumstances in mind, we believe that
respondents are the proper parties to be impleaded.
Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its
stockholders, records show that it is a family-owned corporation managed by the
Choachuy family.63
Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are not
owners of the building, allowed the court to enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an
ocular inspection. The counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap
inside the building and answered all her questions regarding the set-up and installation of
the video surveillance cameras.64 And when respondents moved for reconsideration of
the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the arguments they raised is that
Aldo would suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras are removed and
transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of respondents and Aldo
seem to merge.
All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are merely
using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view
of the foregoing, we find that respondents are the proper parties to this suit.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10, 2007 and
the Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP
No. 01473 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18, 2005
and February 6, 200[6] of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil
Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.