GR NO. 182839, JUNE 02, 2014 PNB VS. JOSE GARCIA ET. AL.
HELD: NO. Pertinent to the resolution of this second issue is Article 160 of the Civil
Facts: Jose Sr., without the knowledge and consent of his children executed SPAs authorizing
spouses Garcia to convey a property covered with TCT No. T-44422 to secure a loan from PNB
by way of mortgage and an Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB which were
inscribed in the title.
The respondents filed a Complaint for Nullity of the said Amendment against spouses Garcia
and PNB alleging that the property was conjugal, being acquired during the marriage of Jose
Sr. to Ligaya and they became owners pro indivisio upon the death of Ligaya on 1987.
PNB contends that the subject property was registered to Jose Sr. alone, and who was
described in the as a widower.
During the proceedings, Nora, Jose Jr, Bobby and Jimmy executed an SPA dated May 31, 1996
authorizing Jose Sr. to act attorney-in-fact during the pretrial of the case.
Issue: Whether the subject property was a conjugal or was acquired during marriage or
thereafter.
Ruling: Yes. Article 119 of the Civil Code in line with Article 160 applies.
All properties acquired during marriage are conjugal and the registration of it in the name of one
spouse does not destroy the presumption that it is conjugal. What is material is the time when
the property was acquired.
The conjugal partnership was converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership upon the death
of Ligaya thus governed by Article 493 of Civil Code.
The effect of the mortgage with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Thus, Jose Sr.
cannot mortgage the entire property.
Tan v. Andrade GR No. 171904 and 172017 Perlas-Bernabe, J.:
Petition for Review on Certiorari Persons and Family Relations: Property Relations
Rosario Vda. De Andrade was the registered owner of four parcels of which she mortgaged to
one Simon Diu, who foreclosed on the same. When the redemption period was about to expire,
Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby Tan who agreed to redeem the subject properties.
Thereafter, Rosario sold the same to Bobby and her son, Proceso as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale. Proceso executed a Deed of Assignment, ceding to Bobby his interests over the
properties. The Deed of Assignment was signed by Henry, one of Rosarios sons, as
instrumental witness. Bobby extended an Option to Buy the subject properties to Proceso,
giving the latter until 7:00 in the evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase the properties for the sum
of P310,000. When Proceso failed to purchase them, Bobby consolidated his ownership over
the properties, and the TCTs were issued in his name.
On October 7, 1997, Rosarios children, including Proceso and Henry, filed a
complaint for reconveyance and annulment of deeds and damages against Bobby before the
RTC. They alleged that the initial transaction between Rosario and Bobby
was actually an equitable mortgage which was entered into to secure Rosarios
indebtedness with Bobby. They also claimed that since the subject properties were inherited by
them from their father, the subject properties were conjugal in nature, and thus, Rosario had no
right to dispose of their respective shares.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA upheld the trial courts ruling.
ISSUE: Whether the properties belong to the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her late
husband and co-owned by her and her children
Code38which states that "[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." For
this presumption to apply, the party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that
the property was indeed acquired during the marriage.
As held in Go v. Yamane: x x x As a condition sine qua non for the operation of [Article 160] in
favor of the conjugal partnership, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that
the property was acquired during the marriage.
DELA PENA V. AVILA G.R. No. 187490, [February 08, 2012]
FACTS: Antonia Dela Pena (Antonia) obtained from A.C.Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila) a loan in
the sum of P250,000.00 with interest pegged at 5% per month. Antonia executed a promissory
note and a notarized Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a 277 square meter parcel of
residential land, together with the improvements thereon, situated in Marikina City and
previously registered in the name of petitioner Antonia R. Dela Pea (Antonia), married to
Antegono A. Dela Pea (Antegono) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-32315 of
the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.[to secure the payment of the loan obligation.
Antonia executed another notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of Gemma
Remilyn C. Avila (Gemma), for the stated consideration of P600,000.00. As such Gemma
caused the transfer of the aforesaid property to her name. Gemma also constituted a real
estate mortgage over same property in favor of FEBTC-BPI, to secure a loan facility with a
credit limit of P1,200,000.00.
Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, that she was
the true and lawful owner of the property and, that the Deed of Absolute Sale Gemma utilized in
procuring her title was simulated. The Register of Deeds inscribed the adverse claim.
FEBTC-BPI caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted over the
property due to Gemmas failure to pay the loan. As the highest bidder at the public auction
conducted in the premises, FEBTC-BPI later consolidated its ownership over the realty and
caused the same to be titled in its name under TCT No. 415392 of the Marikina registry.
Antonia and her son, petitioner Alvin Dela Pea (Alvin), filed against Gemma the complaint for
annulment of deed of sale as the subject realty was conjugal property, and that the Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage Antonia executed in favor of Aguila was not consented to by Antegono
who was already dead by that time. Gemma specifically denied the material allegations,
maintaining that the realty was the exclusive property of Antonia who misrepresented that her
husband was still alive.
RTC held that the subject property was conjugal in nature and that the Deed of Absolute
Sale Antonia executed in favor of Gemma was void as a disposition without the liquidation
required under Article 130 of the Family Code. CA reversed the RTC decision, stating that the
property was paraphernal in nature for failure of the Dela Peas to prove that the same was
acquired during Antonias marriage to Antegono. Furthermore, that the Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of Avila and the subsequent sale on auction of the subject property to FEBTC-BPI are
upheld as valid and binding. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC holding the house and lot covered by
TCT No. N-32315 conjugal property of the spouses Antegono and Antonia Dela Pea.
HELD: No, petition is denied. CA decision affirmed in toto.
RATIO: Pursuant to Article 160 of the NCC, all property ofthe marriage is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation
of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. In the case of Francisco vs. Court of
Appeals, the Court said that the party who invokes the presumption under Art. 160 of the NCC,
must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption
in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove
said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired during
the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to
be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but
only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive
ownership of one of the spouses.
As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality, the Dela Peas did not even come close
to proving that the subject property was acquired during the marriage between Antonia and
Antegono. Beyond Antonias bare and uncorroborated assertion that the property was
purchased when she was already married, the record is bereft of any evidence from which the
actual date of acquisition of the realty can be ascertained.
In the case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, the phrase married to is merely descriptive of the civil
status of the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is also
a registered owner. Because it is likewise possible that the property was acquired by the wife
while she was still single and registered only after her marriage, neither would registration
thereof in said manner constitute proof that the same was acquired during the marriage and, for
said reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature. Since there is no showing as to when the
property in question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife alone is
determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said spouse.
As such, the nature of the property is paraphernal and the CA correctly ruled that the RTC
reversibly erred in nullifying Antonias sale thereof in favor of Gemma, for lack of the liquidation
required under Article 130 of the Family Code. Furthermore, Antonia treated the realty as her
own exclusive property may, in fact, be readily gleaned from her utilization thereof as security
for the payment of the P250,000.00 loan she borrowed from Aguila.
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO,
G.R. No. 153802 March 11, 2005
FACTS: Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During their
marriage the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from a certain
Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes The Deed of Absolute
Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof
to the exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo,
authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be
secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA,
Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the
same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The
abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took
place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.[
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one
year without the property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by
executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject property, Miguela
learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean its premises and that her
car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which
was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil Case
for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against petitioner. In the latters Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive
property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring the said documents null
and void and further ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this
complaint to the plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff the sum representing the value of the car which
was burned, the attorneys fees, moral and exemplary damages.
The appellate court affirmed the trial courts Decision, but deleted the award for damages and
attorneys fees for lack of basis. Hence, this petition
ISSUE: 1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR.
ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED
SHARE.
2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN
OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO
THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.
HELD: the petition is denied.
1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong
to both spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence
of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent
of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property
pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.
Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a
marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband. With the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in
the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established
before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or
other laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the
late Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a
special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the
proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by
either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of
property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal
partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict
with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the
spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late
husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the
Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of
conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when
the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of
his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed
part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the
absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes
the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article
493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity
of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondents consent.
2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: .
(1) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the
extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . .
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the
husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the
utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.[
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui
negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioners sweeping conclusion that
the loan obtained by the late Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without a
doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not
persuade this Court. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the
payment of the principal obligation.
NOTES: In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner
vigorously asserted that the subject property was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of the
loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner never claimed that the
family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court
below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would
not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice and due process. A party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual
bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in
order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.
MARITAL CONSENT Pelayo vs. Perez G.R. No. 141323
Facts: David Pelayo through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed a deed of sale and transferred
to Melki Perez two parcel of agricultural lands. Loreza Pelayo and another one whose signature
is eligible witnesses such execution of deed.
Loreza signed only on the third page in the space provided for witnesses, as such, Perez
application was denied.
Perez asked Loreza to sign on the first and should pages of the deed of sale but she refused.
He then filed a complaint for specific performance against the Pelayo spouses.
The spouses moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground for lack of marital consent as
provided by art166 of the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale was null and void for lack of marital consent.
Held: Under Art 173, in relation to Art166, both of the NCC, W/C was still in effect on January
11, 1988 when the deed in question was executed, the lack of marital consent to the disposition
of conjugal property does not make the contract viol of initio but Merely violable. Said provisions
of law provide:
Art 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non-compass mentis or a spendthrift, or is under
civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband connot alienate or encumber any
real property not the Conjugal property w/o the wifes consent. If she refuses reasonable to give
her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.
Art 173. The wife may during the marriage and w/in 10 years the transaction questioned, ask
the court for the annulment of any contract of the husband w/c tends to defraud her or impair
interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right she her
heir, after the dissolution of the marriage may demand the value of property fraudulently
alienated by the husband.
Agapay vs. Palang GR No. 116668, July 28, 1997
FACTS: Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to
work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May
1950. The trial court found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina
in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed
alone in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.
The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda Agapay,
herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at
Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On the
other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise
agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their
child Herminia.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were
convicted of concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her
daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against
petitioner. They sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan
allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed
the complaint but CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of
ErlindaAgapay.
HELD: The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and
Erlinda. However, their marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only
the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by
them in proportion to their respective contributions. It is required that there be an actual
contribution. If actual contribution is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares.
Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buy and sell and
had a sari-sari store. However, she failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed
money to but the subjected riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only around 20
years old compared to Miguel who was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US
Government. Considering his youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed the
P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel over
the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal
partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.
It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in
favor of Herminia. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation
in the marriage settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was not specifically
for separation of property and should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the deed of
conveyance for the property revealed the falshood of Erlindas claim that she bought such
property for P20,000 when she was 22 years old. The lawyer testified that Miguel provided the
money for the purchase price and directed Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee.
The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which was clearly void
and inexistent by express provision of the law because it was made between persons guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code,
expressly provides that the prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to
donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
legal union.
GR No. 202370, September 23, 2013 Salas vs. Aguila
Facts: On September 7 1985, Juan Sevilla Salas Jr. and Eden Villena Aguila were
married. Aguila gave birth to their daughter on June 7 1986. Five months later, Salas left their
conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no longer communicated with Aguila or their child.
On October 7, 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they have
no conjugal properties whatsoever.
On May 7, 2007, RTC nullify their marriage and further provides the dissolution of their conjugal
property, if any.
On September 10, 2007, Aguila filed a manifestation and motion stating that she discovered 3
properties registered to Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas.
However, Salas alleged that Aguila waived her rights to the Discovered Properties in
consideration of other properties waived by Salas in favour of Aguila. Thus, he contends that
conjugal properties were deemed partitioned.
RTC directed Salas and Aguila to partition by proper instruments of conveyance the discovered
properties. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the discovered properties are acquired during the marriage of Salas and
Aguila, thus a conjugal property and subject for partition between them.
Ruling: Yes. Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas during the
validity of their marriage.
The phrase married to in the title is merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered
owner, Salas.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Under this property regime, property acquired during marriage is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couples joint efforts and governed by
the rules of co-ownership.
Thus, the Discovered Properties should be partitioned on the basis of co-ownership.
MARIETTA N. BARRIDO vs. LEONARDO V. NONATO
G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014, 738 SCRA 510
FACTS: In the course of their marriage, Leonardo and Marrieta were able to acquire a parcel of
land.
Eventually, their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property over the
property, Leonardo asked Marietta for partition, but the latter refused.
ISSUE: Whether the action for partition is proper.
HELD: YES. Leonardo and Marrietas marriage had been declared void for psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
During their marriage, however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property
relations. Although Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal
partnership regime, however, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the
spouses property relations.
This particular kind of co-ownership under Article 147 applied when a man and a woman,
suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage.
Here, the former spouses both agreed that they acquired the subject property during the
subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have obtained by their joint effort,
work or industry and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares.
Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common by Leonardo and Marietta,
which should be divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.