Intestate Estate of Petra V. Rosales.

Irenea C. Rosales v. Fortunato Rosales, et. al.

G.R. No. L-40789, February 27, 1987

FACTS:

On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her
husband Fortunato Rosales and their two children Magna Rosales Acebes
and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosario, predeceased her, leaving behind
a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein
petitioner. Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased. The trial court ordered that Fortunato, Magna, Macikequerox
and Antonio be entitled each to share in the estate of decedent. Irenea, on the other
hand, insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of
the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of
her mother-in-law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Irenea is entitled to inherit from her mother-in-law.

RULING:

No. Under the law, intestate or legal heirs are classified into two groups, namely, those
who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow
(surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The law has already
meticulously enumerated the intestate heirs of a decedent. The Court held that Irenea
misinterpreted the provision of Article 887 because the provision refers to the estate of
the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. It does not
apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Therefore, the surviving spouse is considered a
third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.

Teotico vs. Del Val

G.R. No. L-18753, March 26, 1965 Anna

Facts:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila
with no ascendants or descendants. She left properties worth P600,000.00 and a will
written in Spanish which she executed at her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo,
Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of
each and every page thereof in the presence of three witnesses who in turn affixed
their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every
page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was
acknowledged before a Notary Public by the testatrix and her witnesses.
In said will Maria stated among others that she was possessed of the full use of her
mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from
the beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear or threat and that she freely
and spontaneously executed said will.
 She left P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to her niece named Josefina Mortera;
and the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building to the said spouses. However, the
naked ownership of the building was left in equal parts to the legitimate children of said
spouses. She also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the
remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
Thereafter, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the
Court of First Instance of Manila. However, Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted
child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged
natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix.

Issues:
(1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?;
(2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?;
(3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by
the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?

Held:
1. Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene
because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or
administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the
will, because nowhere in the will was any provision designating her as heir,
legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in
the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim
against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof.
Additionally, if the will is denied probate, she would not acquire any interest in any
portion of the estate left by the testatrix. She would acquire such right only if she were
a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is true that she
claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose and also an adopted daughter of
Francisca. But the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of Maria
because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the
legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; .
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as
legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.

2. On the secon issue, the claim that the will was not properly attested to
is contradicted by the evidence of record. The will was duly executed because
it was signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the notary
public in the manner provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied
by the evidence.
Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina and her husband Rene had the opportunity to
exert pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived in their house several years
prior to the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering from hypertension
in that she was virtually isolated from her friends for several years prior to her death is
insufficient to disprove what the instrumental witnesses had testified in court. The
exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial
evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the
testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her express the will of another rather
than her own

3. On the third issue, the question of whether the probate court could
determine the intrinsic validity of the provisions of a will has been decided by
this Court in a long line of decisions. In Castaeda v. Alemany, the Court had
stated, thus:
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was
executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to
make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate
of a will. The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing
more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made
in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one
is valid.

Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo
declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set
aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said
pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to
defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding.
As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of the estate in
favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.

De los Santos v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. L-29192, 22 February 1971

02OCT
[VILLAMOR, J.]
FACTS
The parties admit that the owner of the estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial partition
agreement, was Pelagia de la Cruz, who died intestate; that defendant-appellant (De la
Cruz)is a nephew of the said decedent; that plaintiff-appellee (De los Santos) is a
grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, her mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a niece who
predeceased said Pelagia de la Cruz; and that the purpose of the extrajudicial partition
agreement was to divide and distribute the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.
ISSUE
What is the effect of an extra-judicial partition which included a person who is not an heir
of the deceased?
RULING
The extrajudicial partition agreement is void with respect to plaintiff-appellee.
Article 1105 of the Civil Code provides: A partition which includes a person believed to
be a heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person. Partition of
property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner thereof
and another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and lawfully
such, to the prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the
deceased, is null and void. A fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the
agreement the right to have its terms enforced.

Gertrudes De Los SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

Maximo De La CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-29192, February 22, 1971
FACTS:

Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue. She had a niece named
Marciana who is the mother of herein defendant, Maximo. Gertrudes, who is Pelagias
grandniece, and several co-heirs including Maximo, entered into an Extrajudicial
Partition Agreement purposely for the distribution of Pelagias estate. They agreed to
adjudicate three (3) lots to Maximo, in addition to his share, on condition that the latter
would undertake the development and subdivision of the estate which was the subject
matter of the agreement. Due to Maximos failure to comply with his obligation,
Gertrudes filed a complaint for specific performance. In Maximos answer, he stated that
Gertrudes had no cause of action against him because the said agreement was void
with respect to her, for the reason that she was not an heir of Pelagia and was included
in the agreement by mistake. The lower court held that Maximo, being a party to the
extrajudicial partition agreement, was estopped from raising in issue the right of the
plaintiff to inherit from Pelagia, hence, he must abide by the terms of the agreement.
Maximo filed a Motion for New Trial but was denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, Gertrudes de los Santos, a grandniece of the decedent, is an heir of

the latter.

RULING:

Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, could not inherit

from the latter by right of representation.

Article 972. The right of representation takes place in the

direct descending line, but never in the ascending.

In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the

children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or
half blood.

Much less could plaintiff-appelle inherit in her own right.

Article 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in

degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of
representation when it properly takes place.

In the present case, the relatives nearest in degree to Pelagia de la Cruz are her
nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee,
a grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance.
Case Digest: Diaz vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case Digest: Diaz vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66574, February
21, 1990

Doctrine: Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda (what is generally spoken

shall be
generally understood)

Facts:
It is undisputed:
1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who
together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate child of the
spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion;
2) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the
mother of Pablo Santero;
3) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents;
4) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona
Santero in 1976;
5) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother
Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with
Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

Issue:
Who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero her niece Felisa
Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?

Held:

Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to
be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.

The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In
accordance therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be
understood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a
general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not
make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguera debemus.
The term relatives in Article 992 of New Civil Code in more restrictive sense
than it is used and intended; is not warranted by any rule of interpretation.
Besides, when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it
qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the
New Civil Code.