Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 98423-24 May 22, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAFAEL ACURAM, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Cirilo A. Goc-Ong for defendant-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

Appellant Rafael Acuram impugns and would have this Court reverse the decision 1 of
the Regional Trial Court of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, Branch 21 finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of selling marijuana in violation of Sec. 4 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 and imposing on him the penalty of "life imprisonment and a fine of
P20,000 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency."

Two separate informations were filed against appellant on August 9, 1989. Although
both informations referred to the same incident on June 20, 1989 in the municipality of
Bansalan, Davao del Sur, the first information charged appellant with violation of Sec. 8
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179 for
alleged unlawful and felonious possession of one hundred thirty-five point eight (135.8)
grams of marijuana leaves (Crim. Case No. XXI-137 [89]). The second information
charged appellant with violation of Sec. 4 of the same law for willful, unlawful and
felonious sale and distribution of one gram of marijuana leaves (Crim. Case No. XXI-
137-A [89]).

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. 2 At the joint
trial of the two cases, the prosecution presented only three witnesses: Philippine
Constabulary (PC) members Sgt. Candelario Lahaylahay, Lt. Salome Jose and CIC
Manuel Peleo.

Sgt. Lahaylahay came to know the "asset" named Tonton through CIC Noel
Masongsong. Tonton used to buy marijuana from Acuram. In the morning of June 20,
1989, Tonton informed him that Acuram, also known as Bebot, was selling marijuana
obtained in Pikit. Thus, Sgt. Lahaylahay organized a team to conduct a buy-bust
operation. Before proceeding with the operation, he asked permission from Col. Jesus
Magno at the PC headquarters in Digos. Col. Magno instructed him and his team to
conduct a surveillance on Acuram. They forthwith proceeded to Bansalan but they did
not drop by the police station there anymore. 3

Together with CIC Masongsong, CIC Manuel Peleo and Tonton, Sgt. Lahaylahay
arrived in the Bansalan poblacion at around 2:30 in the afternoon. All of them were in
civilian clothes and they carried sidearms. 4 Upon reaching Lily St., they gave Tonton
one hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) with which to buy marijuana from Acuram. While
standing by a store around twenty (20) meters from the house of Acuram, they watched
as Acuram handed over marijuana to Tonton in exchange for P150. When Tonton
returned to them with the marijuana, they "went directly" to the house of Acuram. There,
they met Acuram whose wife informed them that there was marijuana in the basket of
dried fish. Indeed, they found marijuana leaves in two baskets ("bangkat") of dried fish
covered by an old newspaper beside the stove in the kitchen. 5

The constabulary men then took pictures of the marijuana which, including the one
gram bought by Tonton, was later found to weigh 135.8
grams. 6 The camera they used had been lent to them by Col. Magno. They asked for
the P150 purchase money from Acuram but he returned to them only P135 on the
pretext that he had bought something out of the missing P15. 7 Aside from Acuram and
his wife, the other persons in Acuram's house were a man "extracting corn grits" and
Acuram's two small children. 8

CIC Peleo fetched barangay captain Doroteo Parawan who recorded the
apprehension of Acuram and witnessed the inventory and photographing of the seized
marijuana. 9 Acuram executed a "receipt" stating that intelligence operatives of the
435th PC company had been able to "confiscate" in his possession "more or less 2
grams of dried marijuana leaves" in his residence and that said operatives did not take
anything else from him (Exh. D). Later, Acuram was brought to the PC barracks for
proper investigation. The PC team deposited the marijuana seized from Acuram with
Cpl. Impang, the investigator. The latter in turn, brought it to the PC Crime Laboratory in
Davao City for examination. 10

Sgt. Salome Jose, forensic analyst of the said PC Crime Laboratory, received a request
for laboratory examination on June 22, 1989 (Exh. A). With said request was a
specimen consisting of 135.8 grams of "suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops wrapped
with old newspapers and placed in a white plastic bag marked "DATU COMPLEX
DIGOS'" (Exh. C). After subjecting the specimen to the Duquenois-Levine test, Sgt.
Jose found that it was "positive for marijuana" (Exh. B).

CIC Manuel Peleo corroborated Sgt. Lahaylahay's testimony. According to him, they
were standing at a distance of around thirty (30) meters from the nipa hut of Acuram.
After seeing Tonton buy marijuana from Acuram at the stairs of the latter's house, they
proceeded to investigate Acuram who confessed that there was more marijuana in the
basket of dried fish. They told Acuram to get the marijuana and then they took pictures
of it. 11 They also retrieved the purchase money from Acuram and later turned it over to
Cpl. Impang. 12 CIC Peleo added that the buy-bust team did not secure a search
warrant because they caught Acuram "in the act." 13

In his defense, Acuram interposed alibi and denial that he had possessed or sold
marijuana. According to Acuram, 14 before noon of June 20, 1989, he was in barangay
Mabunga looking for bamboos which he intended to use for the bodega of his newly-
harvested corn. At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he and his companion, Jimmy
Labajo, were able to buy five bamboo poles from Mrs. Garciano. After cutting the
bamboos, Acuram and Labajo had them hauled by a carabao. 15

Upon reaching his house, Acuram saw PC soldier Pelenio (Peleo) at the door of the
kitchen. He also saw Lahaylahay, Masongsong, the "asset" and Doroteo Parawan.
Pelenio invited him to go upstairs. Lahaylahay then "forced him to admit (ownership of)
the marijuana which was placed on top of the table." 16 Lahaylahay also asked him if he
sold marijuana to Tonton but he denied that he did so. 17 Lahaylahay then asked him to
go with the PC team to the barracks. He acceded on condition that the incident be
blottered at the office of the barangay captain. On their way to Digos, they passed by
the house of barangay captain Parawan who recorded the incident in a logbook. They
did not, however, pass by the police station to have the arrest duly recorded.

Acuram asserted in court that the PC team and the barangay captain arrived in his
house ahead of him. He was allegedly surprised to see the marijuana leaves on the
table and when the barangay captain confronted him about it, he retorted that they did
not belong to him.

When showed the "receipt" stating that marijuana had been confiscated from him,
Acuram claimed that he was in a state of shock when he signed it. 18 Later, however,
he admitted having signed it in the house of barangay captain Parawan and that the
latter signed the same document as a witness. 19

For his part, barangay captain Doroteo Parawan testified that at around 4:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of June 20, 1989, some members of the 435th PC Company went to his
house to report that they had "raided" the house of Acuram and seized five (5) grams of
marijuana. Parawan himself recorded the report (Exh. 1).

When he arrived at Acuram's house, he found only the "raiding team" there and,
although at first he did not know the names of the team members, he recorded the fact
of the confiscation of about two grams of marijuana from Acuram's residence. In the
kitchen, the team opened a paper bag and he saw marijuana inside it. 20 Besides the
PC team, the only other person he saw in Acuram's house was Mrs. Acuram. He did not
see Acuram arrive but he saw Acuram "went down the house." He asked him if he really
owned the marijuana but Acuram replied that he had "just arrived." 21
Victoria Vda. de Garciano corroborated Acuram's story that he went to her place to buy
bamboos and that Acuram and Labajo left her house at past 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of June 20, 1989. 22 In defense of her husband, Lucresia Acuram, testified
that Acuram and Labajo left after lunch of June 20, 1989 to get bamboos from Mrs.
Garciano. While her husband was away, four persons arrived. As one of them called
her, she met them downstairs. The men were looking for Acuram because they had
"something to take up with" him. 23 Three of the men went upstairs and later, the fourth
person followed them. These men had with them a plastic bag marked "Datu Complex."
24 They went to the kitchen and opened three baskets but they did not find anything.
They searched the clothes around and looked into her children's food boxes. Not finding
what they were looking for, all four of them sat down in the balcony.

When barangay captain Parawan arrived, her husband was not yet home. Her brother
Dingkong fetched Acuram who arrived with Labajo and the carabao hauling five pieces
of bamboo. The constabulary men left with her husband and the barangay captain at
past 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

With these pieces of evidence, on January 15, 1991 the lower court rendered the
aforementioned decision. On the strength of the ruling in People v. De Jesus 25 that
possession of prohibited drugs is inherent in the crime of selling them, the lower court
held Acuram liable only for violation of Sec. 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act as amended
by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179 penalizing sale and distribution of prohibited drugs, and
dismissed the charge of illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Sec. 8 of the said
law.

Acuram appealed to this Court. He alleges that the lower court erred in: (a) giving
credence to the "hearsay testimonies" of Sgt. Lahaylahay and CIC Peleo; (b) admitting
in evidence the marijuana leaves and stems presented as evidence; (c) holding that
Parawan's testimony refuted appellant's claim that he had just arrived from Mabunga
and therefore he (Acuram) could not have sold the marijuana to the constabulary
"asset," and (d) discrediting the testimonies of the defense witnesses. The bottomline of
this assignment of errors is the credibility of the witnesses presented by both the
prosecution and the defense.

The credibility of witnesses has always been the area of responsibility of the trial court
and its findings and conclusions on the matter are respected and given great weight by
the appellate courts. The trial court's findings on the matter may only be disregarded by
this Court if there are facts and circumstances which were overlooked by the trial court
and which would substantially alter the results of the case; where the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts; and where the inferences of the trial court from the facts
are manifestly absurd or impossible. 26 The Court finds that none of these instances
exists in this case to warrant deviation from the rule of vesting great weight and reliance
on the trial court's findings regarding the credibility of the witnesses herein. Be that as it
may, the Court shall confront the first three matters raised in the assignment of errors to
insure a thorough appreciation of the merits of the appeal. Needless to say, discussion
on the fourth assigned error shall be dispensed with.
Appellant's allegation that the testimonies of Lahaylahay and Peleo are "hearsay" is
baseless. Both constabulary men were eyewitnesses to the "buy-bust" operation and
appellant had not refuted their respective testimonies, let alone established that they
were somewhere else when the buy-bust operation transpired such that they could not
have witnessed it. Thus, Peleo categorically stated that he saw Tonton as he bought
marijuana from Acuram at the stairs of the latter's house. 27 Although Peleo failed to
estimate the quantity of the marijuana bought by Tonton from appellant, be affirmed in
court that the piece of paper delivered by appellant to Tonton contained marijuana. 28

Lahaylahay himself narrated how, from a distance of twenty meters, he saw appellant
and Tonton exchange marijuana with the money the constabulary men themselves had
provided Tonton. Repetitious questions by both the prosecutor and the defense counsel
failed to move Lahaylahay to depart from his testimony that he actually saw appellant
deliver marijuana to Tonton and the latter receive P150 from the former. 29 Hence, while
the distance between these two PC operatives and the house of appellant where the
sale transpired could have prevented Peleo and Lahaylahay from hearing the
conversation between Tonton and the appellant, proof of aural access has become
unnecessary in this case in view of the positive testimonies of Peleo and Lahaylahay
that they witnessed the marijuana and the purchase money change hands. Said
testimonies on the sale are sufficient evidence to establish guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. 30

While the appellant does not expressly deny the actual occurrence of the sale of
marijuana between him and Tonton, he proposes the probability that Tonton could have
hidden marijuana in his person and then presented it as the one he bought from
appellant. Completely baseless as it does not stand on solid evidence, the proposition
could have merited scrutiny had the defense presented proof that Tonton was impelled
by an improper motive in imputing criminal liability on the appellant. The defense of a
frame-up which appears to be the object of the appellant's disquisition on probabilities,
was never raised below much less propped up by evidence. Like alibi, a frame-up
should be established by clear and convincing evidence for it is easy to concoct but
hard to prove. 31 Similarly, appellant's allegation that he was forced to admit ownership
of the marijuana leaves is not supported by evidence except for his own self-serving
testimony. Even his wife and the barangay captain did not corroborate this allegation
when they testified.

Neither was there proof that the arresting officers were guided by considerations other
than the fulfillment of their task to enforce the law. 32 That the PC operatives had no evil
motives to harass and implicate the appellant is supported by their testimonies that the
incident was the first meeting between them and the appellant. 33 Said testimonies
were affirmed in court by the appellant who even added that he bore no grudges against
or had a misunderstanding with the PC men, Tonton and Parawan. 34 Moreover, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official functions has not been rebutted by
the defense's evidence. Thus, in this case, since it is not the sole basis for conviction,
the presumption of regularity of performance of official functions prevails over the
constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused. 35
Appellant bewails the fact that Tonton was not presented by the prosecution as a
witness. It should be remembered, however, that the option to present a witness is
discretionary on the part of the prosecution. If the fiscal or prosecutor deems it improper
to present an informer as a witness, he does so in the exercise of sound discretion
guided in all probability by the fact that an informer has to preserve his cover so that he
could continue with his
invaluable service. 36 There is also the overriding consideration that an informer risks
his life in playing his role in the apprehension of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law.
The prosecution's failure to present Tonton as a witness did not, therefore, weaken its
case. Tonton's testimony would merely be corroborative or cumulative to those of the
constabulary men who were themselves eyewitnesses to the sale of marijuana. 37
Moreover, nonpresentation of a civilian informer as a witness is not a sufficiently
plausible defense. At the trial, the accused can always avail of an informer's testimony
even through compulsory judicial process, if necessary. 38

With regard to appellant's contention that his arrest and the seizure of the marijuana
were illegal as the constabulary men were not armed with a warrant, it should be
observed that said processes were effected immediately after the sale of marijuana. As
the law allows warrantless arrests when a crime has just been committed, it was not
imperative for the arresting officers to obtain a search warrant or a warrant of arrest. It is
of judicial notice that in the arrest of a violator of the Dangerous Drugs Act as a result of
a buy-bust operation, the offender is invariably caught red-handed. 39 Hence, the
admissibility of the seized marijuana is beyond question. Furthermore, the seized
marijuana was duly authenticated the PC operatives testified that they gave it to the
investigator who then transmitted it to the forensic analyst who likewise testified that she
received it with a letter-request for examination. 40

The appellant stresses emphatically that barangay captain Parawan's testimony proved
that the sale could not have transpired because appellant was not yet at home at the
time the "buy-bust" operation occurred. However, as proven by the prosecution and
even by the defense, Parawan arrived at the residence of appellant after the "buy-bust"
operation. Appellant himself admits that Parawan "would not be in a position to know if
accused just arrived from barangay Mabunga. The only thing he could know was he
saw the accused." 41

Appellant's alibi and denial of having sold or possessed marijuana crumbles in the face
of his positive identification as the seller of marijuana by prosecution witnesses
Lahaylahay and Parawan. 42 Besides, the five-kilometer distance between appellant's
residence and barangay Mabunga where he was allegedly buying bamboos at the time
of the sale, 43 was not too far as to prevent him from being home before 3:00 o'clock in
the afternoon when the "buy-bust" operation was in progress. Neither could the
testimony of Mrs. Garciano help she did not have a watch and her testimony on the
time when appellant was supposed to be in Barangay Mabunga was, as she herself
admitted, based on estimates. 44
A "buy-bust" operation is the method most frequently used by law enforcers in catching
violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act. While this method is not exactly fool-proof for in
its application law enforcers are liable to commit abuses, still it has been proven to be
an effective means of entrapment of persons who, for obvious reasons, clandestinely
peddle or possess prohibited drugs. The courts cannot be too cautious in the
determination of whether or not the operation has been properly conducted.
Unfortunately for the defense in this case, there is nothing on record to overturn the
decision of the lower court.

WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the instant appeal is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 138400 July 11, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SERGIO CAETE, accused-appellant.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The brothers Sergio, Alfredo, Ruben and Trinidad together with their 67-year old father, Sotero,
all surnamed Caete, were temporarily detained at the municipal jail in Liloan, Cebu in relation
to a murder case filed against them for the slaying of one Edith Tumayao. Upon learning that
they would be "salvaged," they refused to leave their cell and started a riot when the police came
to transfer them to the Cebu Provincial Jail. For allegedly bashing the head of his 67-year old
father, Sotero Caete, with the wooden leg of a prison bunk during the ensuing melee, which
resulted in the latter's death, Sergio Caete was charged with Parricide in Criminal Case No. DU-
6233 in an Information1 which alleges:

That on the 1st day of June 1997, at about 9:30 o'clock in the morning, at Liloan Police
Station Jail, Municipality of Liloan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, and by
means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously strike the head of Sotero Caete, his own father, with the use of a piece of
wood, which caused the death of the victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge.2 After trial,
the court a quo3 rendered judgment finding accused guilty as charged, thus:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered finding the

herein accused Sergio Caete guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Parricide,
the said accused is hereby sentenced to undergo the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay the costs.

Accused being a detention prisoner shall be credited in the service of his sentence [the]
full time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.
 SO ORDERED.4

On appeal to this Court, accused-appellant faults the trial court with the lone assigned error that

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF PARRICIDE.

Culled from the testimonies of its witnesses, the prosecution's version of what transpired is
summed thus by the Solicitor General in the People's brief:

Accused-appellant Sergio Caete, his three (3) brothers Alfredo, Ruben and Trinidad, and their
father Sotero Caete, were detained at the municipal jail of Liloan, Cebu, in connection with the
murder of a certain Edith Tumayao of which they were being accused. On June 1, 1997 at about
9:30 a.m., they staged a riot inside the municipal jail to prevent their transfer to the provincial
jail. They threw stones at the policemen outside the jail. The police had to use tear gas and water
cannons to flush them out. Alfredo, Ruben and Trinidad were forced to come out of the detention
cell, while Sergio and Sotero Caete remained inside. PO3 Ricardo Cabalda Enriquez then
entered the jail followed by SPO2 Eleazar Salomon and SPO1 Danilo Latoza. Enriquez was
struck by accused-appellant with a piece of concrete on the right side of his face. After he was
hit, his companions Salomon and Latoza dragged him out of the detention cell and brought him
to a clinic.5

Thereafter, accused-appellant went amuck and started throwing broken pieces of concrete from
inside the jail. This compelled the firemen outside to fire their water cannon at him to immobilize
him. The policemen were then able to handcuff accused-appellant and pull him out of his cell.
The police then loaded the Caetes aboard the municipal service vehicle and brought Sotero to
the hospital while delivering the rest to the provincial jail. Upon arrival at the hospital, Sotero
Caete was still conscious, but he later expired.6

Dr. Jose Dacudao of the Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center in Cebu City conducted
the autopsy on the body of the victim. He testified that the victim suffered severe head injury due
to a skull fracture. He also testified that the victim's chances of survival even with medical
intervention was practically nil and that he would have died owing to the severity of the injury
sustained.7

Accused-appellant had a different version of the incident.

In a nutshell, he claims that it was actually PO3 Ricardo "Eking" Enriquez who bludgeoned his
father to death.8 He narrates that he, his victim-father and his brothers were the only prisoners
remaining in detention at the time because the others had already been transferred.9 They were
ordered to come out of their cell preparatory for transfer but they refused to leave because they
overheard Enriquez saying at the time they were incarcerated that they would be "salvaged."10
They pleaded with their captors not to transfer them to the provincial jail because it was a
Sunday but their entreaties fell on deaf ears.11 Thus, they refused to come out of their cell,
prompting the police and firemen to fire tear gas and water cannons at them.12 Accused-appellant
and his father covered their faces to protect themselves from the tear gas and lay on the floor
when the water cannon was fired at them. As accused-appellant and his father lay prostrate side
by side on the ground, the police entered. It was at that time that PO3 Enriquez clubbed the
deceased.13 Accused-appellant pleaded with Enriquez to stop, but he was punched by another
policeman named "Toto."14

Accused-appellant's account was corroborated by his sister-in-law, Charito Caete, who was
there at that time. She testified that shortly after, tear gas and water cannons were fired into the
cell, Alfredo, Ruben and Trinidad called that they be let out. Sotero and Sergio, however,
remained defiant and refused to leave. She overheard Sotero say, "Which of my children will
come with me to the end?" and it was Sergio who replied, "Pa, I will be with you." Water hoses
were then fired at the two (2) remaining prisoners. A commotion ensued and she saw someone
with a club enter the cell. She did not know what happened after that because they were taken to
a vehicle and padlocked inside for about thirty (30) minutes. After that, the vehicle was opened
and Sergio, who had several wounds on his face, was thrown inside. She then stepped out of the
vehicle and proceeded to the cell where she saw an unconscious Sotero with broken wrists being
carried by the police.15

Accused-appellant's mother and widow of the victim, Florentina Caete, confirmed Charito's
account of what happened. She testified that she was at the plaza on June 1, 1998 when she
noticed that people were converging towards the municipal hall. She went there to find out what
the commotion was all about and saw her husband and her sons being fired upon with tear gas.
She saw Charito waving at the police to open the door of the prison cell because the inmates
wanted to get out. Shortly thereafter, three of her sons emerge from the cell but her husband and
Sergio remained.16 She was able to enter the municipal hall but was prevented from going any
further, was dragged out and locked inside a truck.17 Later, she saw her husband and accused-
appellant being brought out. Accused-appellant, who was badly injured and unconscious, was
thrown inside the vehicle. She went with accused-appellant when the latter was brought to the
Southern Islands Hospital where her husband was also admitted for treatment. On the 21st, they
went to the hospital to secure a copy of the medical records but they were not able to.18

Generally, findings of the trial court are entitled to respect, considering that it was in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and having observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during trial.19 Nonetheless, this rule is circumscribed by
well-established exceptions.20 Thus, the factual findings of the trial court may be reversed if by
the evidence or lack of it, it appears that the trial court erred.21 In other words, a trial court's
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that it
overlooked certain facts and circumstances of substance that, if taken into account, could have
materially affected the outcome of the case.22

In the case at bar, we find several material circumstances which were overlooked by the court a
quo, to wit:

First, PO3 Ricardo "Eking" Enriquez claimed he was pounced upon and assaulted by accused-
appellant who hit him on right side of the head when he entered the cell. The severity of the
alleged attack which purportedly drew blood from the wound,23 coming as it does from a
supposedly desperate assailant, was such that he had to be brought to a clinic for treatment by his
co-policemen. However, no medical certificate to prove the alleged attack on his person was
presented. Neither was the supposed weapon used in the assault produced to substantiate this
claim. Indeed, other than the prosecution witnesses' bare avowals on this point, the wooden post
of the bunk or the piece of cement allegedly used in fatally bludgeoning the victim was never
presented in court. On the contrary, there is evidence on record which shows that it was one of
the responding policemen who entered the cell where accused-appellant and his victim-father
held out who carried a club.24

Second, the alleged assault imputed on the accused-appellant and his father becomes even more
questionable considering that they both were forced to lay flat on the ground at the time
Enriquez, Salomon and Latoza entered because of the tear gas and water cannon fired into their
cell. In fact, the physical evidence tends to support the claim of the defense that it was accused-
appellant and his victim-father who were actually assaulted and beaten up by the police. The
record discloses that a severely injured accused-appellant who sustained many wounds on his
face25 was taken out of the cell and thrown into the truck.26 He was unconscious with broken
wrists.27 Needless to state, such physical condition renders impossible the prosecution's claim
that he attacked the policemen who came to take them out.

Third, the prosecution witnesses, all of them police officers who claim to have been at the scene
of the incident, were one in declaring that accused-appellant assaulted PO3 Enriquez.28 Curiously
for all their supposedly eyewitness declarations of what transpired inside the cell, they were
totally silent on the injuries sustained by accused-appellant, notably his broken wrists and the
wounds on his face. Interestingly too, the medical certificate29 issued by examining physician Dr.
Dacudao but signed by Dr. Lemuel Lecciones30 detailed only the head injuries of the victim but
made no mention of the other wounds he sustained and described by Charito Caete when he and
accused-appellant were both thrown unconscious into the truck.

Fourth, even assuming arguendo that accused-appellant and his father were dangerous inmates
with a predisposition for violence, as the prosecution pictured them to be, they practically had no
opportunity to perpetrate the acts imputed on them on account of the extreme measures adopted
by the police to subdue them. It appears that tear gas was first fired at them causing them to
cover their faces to protect their eyes thus effectively limiting their movements. They were next
blasted with water cannon forcing them to lie prone on the floor effectively immobilizing them.
It was at this juncture, as they lay helpless and vulnerable on the ground, blinded by tear gas and
dazed from the pounding they sustained from a high pressure water cannon, that PO3 Enriquez,
SPO2 Salomon and SPO1 Latoza entered the cell.

Fifth, the conveniently dovetailing accounts of the prosecution eyewitnesses, all of them police
officers belonging to the Liloan police unit, with regard to the alleged assault on their co-officer
SPO3 Enriquez and the victim engenders doubt as to their credibility. Identical features in the
testimony of witnesses cannot but generate the suspicion that the material circumstances testified
to by them were integral parts of a well thought-out and prefabricated story.31 It was in fact held
in one case that because of the close camaraderie that developed between the witnesses-members
of the same police force to which an accused belonged, they could not be expected to testify
truthfully.32 Furthermore, a circumspect scrutiny of their testimonies shows that having testified
uniformly only to material facts, they have been forgetful or non-committal with particulars and
details having relation with the principal facts. Worth remembering in this regard is People v.
Alviar,33 where we said that:

. . . "[i]t often happens with fabricated stories that minute particulars have not been
thought of."34 It has also been said that "an honest witness, who has sufficient memory to
state one fact, and that fact a material one, cannot be safely relied upon as such weakness
of memory not only leaves the case incomplete, but throws doubt upon the accuracy of
the statements made. Such a witness may be honest, but his testimony is not reliable."35

Sixth, the deportment of SPO2 Salomon on the witness stand as he testified on the particulars of
a serious crime which claimed the life of the victim only deepens the suspicion of the
prosecution witnesses' claims on the alleged culpability of the accused-appellant. He was smiling
even as he recounted the details of the supposed deadly assault by accused-appellant on SPO3
Enriquez.36 It has been pointedly stated in People v. Ganan, Jr.37 citing the old case of U.S. v.
Burns38 that:

The experience of courts and the general observation of humanity teach us that the
natural limitations of our inventive faculties are such that if a witness undertakes to
fabricate and deliver in court a false narrative containing numerous details, he is almost
certain to fall into fatal inconsistencies, to make statements which can be readily refuted,
or to expose in his demeanor the falsity of his message.

Seventh, going by the account of the prosecution witnesses that the accused-appellant and his
father were desperate and dangerous men with a propensity for violence, it stands to reason that
they should have properly armed and protected themselves against a possible assault before
entering the cell where the accused-appellant and his father defiantly held out. SPO1 Latoza,
however, declared they went inside barehanded:

Q So that when you and your companions allegedly got inside the cell you were already
aware that there might be some untoward incidents that may happen and you may sustain
injuries and you were risking your lives and limbs?

A. Yes.

Q. Being aware with that what precaution[s] have you made in order to avoid any
untoward incident that would happen to your lives?

A. First the door was sprayed with water and that is why we were able to have
chance to go inside.

Q. What do you want to impress [to] this Honorable Court is that while you were in
a single file going inside there were hoses which were directed to that area?

A. Yes.

xxx xxx xxx

 Q. By the way, being aware of the risk that you faced at that time, of course you
did get inside the cell with some arms?

A. No sir.

Q. Do you mean to say you entered with bare hands?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you want to impress [upon] this Honorable Court that you wanted to save
people who were very brave at that time and who threw stones at you as you said with
only your bare hands?

A. Yes. Because at that time there were only few stones left with them because
(sic) the others were already thrown outside.

Q. While you cannot see how many few stones left?

A. That is the work of the policeman and we are all indispensable.39

Eighth, the Court notes that the measures the police adopted to get the inmates out of their cell
were far too excessive and unwarranted by the occasion. Tear gas was fired at accused-appellant
and his father. They were later sprayed with water cannon purportedly to immobilize them. The
excessiveness of the means employed by the police in fact conforms to the theory of the defense
that it was accused-appellant and his father who were mauled by the police to punish them for
their recalcitrance. In the process, the victim was fatally injured on account of the severe beating
they were subjected to.

Ninth, accused-appellant, his victim-father and his brothers could hardly be faulted for their fears
that they would be rubbed out because, aside from the declaration of SPO3 Enriquez that they
would be "salvaged,"40 the record discloses that they were the only prisoners left in the jail41 and
there has been no satisfactory reason given why they should be left behind instead of being
transferred together along with the other prisoners.

The foregoing circumstances, seemingly trivial when taken singly but decisive when considered
together, were glossed over by the trial court with the presumption that the prosecution witnesses
were in the regular performance of their bounden duties at the time of the incident. However, it
should be stressed that "[W]hile the Court is mindful that the law enforcers enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over
the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent42 and it cannot, by itself constitute
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt."43 The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-appellant's conviction because "First,
the presumption is precisely just that a mere presumption.44 Once challenged by evidence, as in
this case, xxx [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that
prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt."45 The presumption also cannot
prevail over positive averments concerning violations of the constitutional rights of the
accused.46 In short, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by
itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.47

The attendant circumstances enumerated above, negate the presumption accorded to the
prosecution witnesses. Where inculpatory facts and circumstances are susceptible of two or more
interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, while the others
may be compatible with a finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused because the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty required for conviction.48 Viewed vis--vis the
peculiar factual milieu of this case, it is worth repeating what we previously stated in People v.
Ratunil49 that courts are mandated to put the prosecution evidence through the crucible of a
"severe testing" and that the presumption of innocence requires them to take "a more than casual
consideration of every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused."50 It is a
well-entrenched rule in criminal law that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own weight51 and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.52

In view of the foregoing considerations, the evidence adduced by the prosecution failed to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence of accused-appellant. What is required is
that there be proof of beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was committed and that the
accused-appellant committed the crime.53 It is only when the conscience is satisfied that the
crime has been committed by the person on trial that the judgment be for conviction.54

All told, we are not satisfied that the constitutional presumption of innocence accorded accused-
appellant has been overcome. Corollarily, we find it unnecessary to examine the other
corroborative evidence presented by the prosecution. Where the principal and basic evidence
upon which the prosecution rests its case fails, all evidence intended to corroborate or support it
must likewise fail.55

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue
City, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. DU-6233, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
appellant Sergio Caete is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of
reasonable doubt. He is ordered RELEASED unless held for other lawful causes.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Vitug, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.