People v Acosta
court disagrees.
Facts
Nephew of of Mona Aquino called Mona at 4/5 in afternoon to
alert them that Acosta was carrying a stove and kitchen knife who
said it was to burn the house Marigomen
Marigomens house is situated in Banahaw street, Mountain
Heights subdivisions, adjacent to the house of Aquino with a wall
fence to divide their property
Aquino returned to her house but heard shouting, and throwing of
chairs, and saw appellant inside who poured kerosene on the bed
but the wife of Marigomen put it out
1am the next day barking dogs alerte Lina Videna to the burning
house where she saw appellant standing inform of the burning
house after peeping through the GI sheet fence
The fire truck arrived at 2am and fire investigator Savare did not
find any incendiary devices
Appellant states there is not enough circumstantial evidence, the
1. Appellant testified he knew where monetescarlos Lived
2. Mona Aquinos uncorroborated testimony stands as there is no ill
motice
3. Line Videnas testimony stated she did not see appellant at the
locus criminis but saw him inside the yard of the burning house
DURING not AFTER the fire
Found guilty for DESTRUCTIVE ARSON
One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to
1. one single act of burning, or as a
2. result of simultaneous burnings, or
3. committed on several or different occasions
SC agreed at that the circumstances taken together point to a logical
conclusion because
1. Appellant had motive as shown when Montescarlos tried to burn
their clothes and furniture and it made him angry
2. He tried to set fire to the bed
3. Evidence of a person doing one thing at another time maybe
evidence to prove intent or knowledge of a plant
4. He was seen in the burning yard by Videna
5. 12 noon they went to the kagawad where they saw complainant
who said so what if I burned your house and stared meanly at them
and also threatened Aquino if she would testify against him
In Prosecution for arson Proof of the crime is complete where
evidence establishes
1. Corpus Delicti (substance of te crime)
 2. Identity of the Defendants as responsible for the crime

Corpus Delicti in arson

Satisfied by bare occurance of the fire and having been intentionally
caused even if with just 1 uncorroborated testimony
People v Soriano
WHAT STARTED OUT AS AN ORDINARY LOVERS' QUARREL turned
out to be a nightmarish inferno for the residents of Datu Abing Street,
Calinan, Davao City. The unmitigated passion and impulses incessantly
burning in the heat of the moment ignited the series of events that
resulted in the conflagration of 18 September 1998 mercilessly
destroying the houses along its path. The age-old forewarning that "he
who plays close to the fire shall ultimately be consumed by its flames"
fits literally and figuratively into this tragic tale of lust, love, betrayal and
isolation.|||
Nestor G. Soriano was having an argument with his live-in
partner Honey Rosario Cimagala concerning their son |||
Honey worked as Guest Relations Officer (GRO) in a Metro
Manila beer house
Honey's brother, Oscar Cimagala, took their child out without
the consent of accused-appellant who wanted both Honey
and Otoy instead to return with him to Manila
n accused-appellant intimated to Honey his desire to have sex
with her,|||
he kicked him as her stern rebuke to his sexual importuning.|||
we believe that the applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2,
of PD 1613, 20which imposes a penalty of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties
burned by accused-appellant are specifically described as houses|||
contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. |||
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is
intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited
house or dwelling|||
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by
the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. |||
In the present case, the act committed by accused-appellant neither
appears to be heinous nor represents a greater degree of perversity
and viciousness as distinguished from those acts punishable
No qualifying circumstance was established to convert the offense
to Destructive Arson.
The special aggravating circumstance that accused-appellant was
"motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the
property burned" cannot be appreciated in the present case where it
appears that he was acting more on impulse, heat of anger

we find that there exists a mitigating circumstance that should have

 estor nastily retorted: "[S]he is now arrogant and proud of her
brother who now supported (sic) her and her children." 2 He
added that since he returned from Manila, the house had
become "unlucky,"|||
In the heated exchanges, Nestor struck Honey in the
forehead.|||
Nestor then moved away as he muttered: "It is better that I burn
this house
took a match from the top of a cabinet, lighted a cigarette and
set fire to the plastic partition that served as divider of Honey's
room
With her naked body precariously draped in a towel, Honey
instinctively took off her covering and doused off the flame with
it|||
But Nestor did his worst; he went to Honey's room and set on
fire her clothes in the cabinet
Honey fled to the ground floor; Nestor followed her. As the
conflagration was now engulfing the second story of the house,
Honey frantically shouted to her uncle|||
Nestor grappled with Honey and choked her as he dragged her
towards the kitchen. She told him that it would be better for him
to kill her
Nestor finally laid down his knife and hurriedly went back to the
second floor only to see the entire area in flames. They had no
choice but to leave as the fire spread rapidly to the neighboring
housesAs a result, the house occupied by Honey was totally
burned together with five (5) neighboring houses||| On 3
September 1999, the RTC of Davao City, Branch 17, found
Nestor G. Soriano alias Boyguilty of Destructive Arson
been appreciated by the trial court in determining the penalty to be
imposed on the accused-appellant: a circumstance similar and
analogous to passion and obfuscation
It has been satisfactorily shown by the court a quo that the lovers'
quarrel between Nestor Soriano and Honey Rosario Cimagala ignited
the chain of events that led to the conflagration |||
We are therefore not adequately convinced that imposing the
exceptionally severe penalty of reclusion perpetua is proper in the case
at bar
First. There appears to be no reckless disregard for human lives
indicative of a cold, calculating, wicked and perverse intention to burn
the Cimagala home. The action of accused-appellant was the result of
a lovers'
tiff Second. Neither was there any reckless disregard for the rights of
the neighboring property owners|||
After his impulsive act of setting fire to both the plastic partition of the
room and Honey's clothes, he attempted to mend his ways
immediately by attempting to put out the flames although it was too
late|||
Buebos v People
On January 1, 1994 around 3:00 o'clock in the morning, Adelina
B. Borbe was in her house at Hacienda San Miguel, Tabaco,
Albay watching over her sick child||| She got up and looked
through the window and saw the four accused,|
When she went out, she saw the roof of her nipa hut already on
fire
She shouted for help. Instead of coming to her immediate
succor, the four fled. 5
At some distance away, Olipiano Berjuela heard Adelina scream
for help
On April 7, 1998, the RTC found all of the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of arson. In downgrading the penalty, the CA
opined that the accused could only be convicted of simple
arson,|||
The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for
a conviction:
(a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime
We find that the circumstantial evidence extant in the records is
sufficient to identify petitioners as the authors of the burning of the hut of
private complainant Adelina Borbe:
1. Private complainant heard some noise emanating from outside
her house at around 3:00 a.m.;
2. When she went out to check the disturbance, private
complainant saw petitioners, together with their two other co-accused,
standing in front of the house;
3. Moments later, the roof of her house caught fire;
4. Petitioners and their cohorts absconded while private
complainant desperately shouted for help.
In the case at bench, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements
of petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos. Both of them stood outside the
house of private complainant Adelina. They were part of the group making
boisterous noise in the vicinity. Petitioners also fled together while the roof of
Adelina's house was ablaze
The legal basis of the trial court in convicting petitioners of arson is
 Section 3, paragraph 2 of P.D. No. 1613. The said provision of law reads:
SEC. 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty
of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetuashall be imposed
if the property burned is any of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or
dwelling. 23 Admittedly, there is a confluence of the foregoing elements
here. However, the information failed to allege that what was intentionally
burned was an inhabited house
|||
In fine, petitioners can be convicted only of simple arson, under Section 1,
paragraph 1 of P.D. No. 1613, punishable by prision mayor.|||

This is not a case of first impression. This Court has, on a number of occasions,
modified the RTC and CA judgments for having applied the wrong law and
penalty on arson
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the
degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender.

Prescinding from the above clarification vis--vis the description of the crime as
stated in the accusatory portion of the Information, it is quite evident that
accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Simple Arson for
having "deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO
SEPARA and family .|||
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are:

(a) there is intentional burning; and

 (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally,
these elements concur in the case at bar
People v Baluuntong
Prosecutons Verison
12-year old Jovelyn Santos (Jovelyn) was sleeping in the house
of her grandmother |||
she was awakened by heat emanating from the walls of the
house. She thus roused her cousin Dorecyll and together they
went out of the house.|||
Jovelyn saw appellant putting dry hay (dayami) around the
house near the terrace where the fire started
Appellant's neighbor, Felicitas Sarzona (Felicitas), also saw
appellant near Celerina's house after it caught fire, following
which, appellant fled on seeing Jovelyn and Dorecyll stepping
out |||
Celerina and Alvin sustained third degree burns which led to
their death. Joshua sustained second degree burns.||
Upon the other hand, appellant, denying the charge, invoked
alibi, claiming that he, on his mother Rosalinda's request, went
to Caloocan City on July 15, 1998
appellant raises doubt on prosecution witness Felicitas' claim that she
saw appellant fleeing away from the burning house, it being then 10:30
p.m. and, therefore, dark|||
He raises doubt too on Jovelyn's claim that she saw appellant, given
her failure to ask him to stop putting dried hay around the house if
indeed her claim were true.
There should be no doubt on prosecution witnesses Felicitas' and
Jovelyn's positive identification of their neighbor-herein appellant
as the person they saw during the burning of the house, given, among
other things, the illumination generated by the fire.|||
[I]n cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine
what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether arson, murder or
arson and homicide/murder, |||
if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but
death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is
simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed;
if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person
who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the
means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only;
lastly,
 the trial court found appellant guilty as charged, disposing as
follows:|||
the appellate court brushed aside appellant's claim that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellate court, however, modified the trial court's decision
by reducing the penalty
Amora v people
a fire broke out in the building used by petitioner as residence
if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the
offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover
up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes
committed homicide/murder and arson. |||
he Court finds that there is no showing that appellant's main objective
was to kill Celerina and her housemates and that the fire was resorted
to as the means to accomplish the goal.|||
Absent any concrete basis then to hold that the house was set on fire
to kill the occupants, appellant cannot be held liable for double murder
with frustrated murder
even assuming arguendo that appellant wanted to kill her to get even
with her in light of her alleged desire to drive him out of the
neighboring house, |||
Celerina was outside the house at the time it was set on fire. She
merely entered the burning house to save her grandsons
When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint
or information and that proved, and the offense charged is included or
necessarily includes the offense proved, conviction shall be for the
offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.
The facts show that the crime was committed in a place where bakeries, barber
shops, tailoring shops and other commercial and residential buildings were
situated.|||
 and as a bakery. The fire also gutted nearby houses.
Petitioner's edifice was constructed on a lot owned by Adelfa
Maslog Tagaytay (Adelfa).
Adelfa's father had earlier entered into a contract of lease with
petitioner, whereby the latter was to use the lot and erect a
building thereon for a monthly rental of P50.00, for a period of
twenty (20) years. ||
upon the expiration of the contract on July 10, 1993, ownership
over the building shall be transferred to the lessor.
On January 4, 1993, Adelfa informed petitioner that she would
no longer renew the contract of lease
January 14, 1993, petitioner secured a fire insurance coverage
over the subject building from the Malayan Insurance Company
for P150,000.00, then obtained another fire insurance policy
from Makati Insurance Company for P300,000.00
the amounts of insurance coverage were substantially higher
than the building's market value (pegged at P52,590.00 in the
1985 Tax Declaration|||
during the actual fire, petitioner was within the premises, heard
shouts from his neighbor, ignored the same at first, and only
later on did he finally stand up to see what was going on.|||
(B)ased on the testimonies of witnesses available and after a
It is clear that the place of the commission of the crime was a residential and
commercial building located in an urban and populated area. This qualifying
circumstance places the offense squarely within the ambit of Section 2 (7)
of P.D. 1613, and converts it to "destructive arson," 7 viz.:
Section 2. Destructive Arson. The penalty of Reclusion
Temporal in its maximum period toReclusion Perpetua shall
be imposed if the property burned is any of the
following: TIDHCc
xxx xxx xxx
7. Any building, whether used as a dwelling or not, situated in
a populated or congested area.
It was also established that the subject building was insured against fire for an
amount substantially more than its market value, a fact that has given rise to
the unrebutted prima facie evidence of arson, as provided in Section 6 of P.D.
1613:
Section 6. Prima facie evidence of Arson. Any of the following
circumstances shall constituteprima facie evidence of arson:
xxx xxx xxx
4. If the building or property is insured for
substantially more than its actual value at the
time of the issuance of the policy.
|||
The trial court found that the circumstances enumerated above sufficiently
point to the petitioner as the author of the crime. Indeed, all these
 meticulous study of the fire incident, the investigation concludes
that the cause of fire was intentionally done." ISTDAH
the RTC found petitioner guilty as charged
1. Lease would be terminated
2. Property was insured and worth more than the property
3. Accused was seen during and subsequent to the fire
4. Investigators concluded the fire was intentional
circumstances, taken together, are consistent with the hypothesis that
petitioner is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that
he is innocent.|||
We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court as affirmed
by the appellate court

People v Cedenio It is settled that there is no complex crime of arson with homicide.
The silence of the slumbering night was suddenly shattered by wailing
cries for help. A sheet of fire raged, its crimson brightness overwhelming when fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person who may be in a
the velvet darkness enshrouding the sleepy barangay as it enveloped the house and that objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder
lair of a mandadaut, 1 the flames only fading away with the first blush of only. When the Penal Code declares that killing committed by means of fire is
dawn. As the smoke thinned and the ashes settled, the debris yielded murder, it intends that fire should be purposely adopted as a means to that
five (5) fatalities among them a 22-day old female infant. Unlike the end.
other victims, she did not sustain any stab or hack wound. She could
have died of suffocation if not of burning||| if the main object of the offender is to kill by means of fire, the offense is
murder. But if the main objective is the burning of the building, the resulting
Palomas recounts that on 26 November 1986, at about ten- homicide may be absorbed by the crime of arson.|||
thirty in the evening, he was roused from his sleep by bangs and
slams The rule is otherwise when arson is itself the end and death is a mere
consequence. The crime in such a case would be arson only, absorbing the
It was Hilario Dorio's house on fire. Peeping through his window, homicide|||
Palomas saw around seven (7) persons, among them appellants
Pedro Cedenio, Jurito Amarga and Felipe Antipolo, emerge from The Information in this case however, although erroneously charging the crime
the house of Dorio that was afire||| of "Arson with Multiple Murder," clearly charges appellants with six (6) distinct
criminal acts
The blaze was so bright he was able to recognize them. They
were wielding unsheathed bolos. Afraid, Palomas remained It accuses of them of "wilfully, unlawfully and criminally attack(ing),
 home
The following morning, he narrated to Romeo, son of Hilario
Dorio, what he witnessed the night before. Then he went with
the younger Dorio to the rubble and saw the charred bodies of
his father, Hilario Dorio, his mother Flora, his sister Maria, his
niece Dioscora, and his maternal grandmother Nicanora
Tabanao, said to be a family of sorcerers in the village|||
Policarpio Apostadero was resting at around ten-thirty that
fateful evening when he heard dogs barkingThinking that a
carabao may have gone astray, he went out of his house and
headed for the cornfield.
he noticed some thirty (30) meters away that the house of
Hilario Dorio was on fire. From where he stood, he also saw
people running out of the burning house
he recognized three (3) of them as his neighbors Pedro Cedenio,
Jurito Amarga and Felipe Antipolo
When they drew nearer, he saw them holding bolos stained with
blood so he retreated home
Albino Calunod, Sr., Barangay Captain of Gandingan,
Pangantucan, Bukidnon, also narrated that on 27 November
1986, at around seven o'clock in the morning, he was informed
by Cristituto Gajo that the Dorio residence was gutted by fire
the night before and that five (5) members of the Dorio family
then occupying the house were burned to death.
The five (5) bodies retrieved from the site were those of Hilario
assault(ing) and stab(bing) Hilario G. Dorio, Nicanora G. Tabanao, Maria T.
Dorio, Dioscora T. Dorio and Flora T. Dorio, inflicting on their persons multiple
mortal wounds . . . (and) set(ting) on fire and burn(ing) the house of the victims.
. . ." 13 Since appellants failed to move to quash the information on the ground
of multiplicity of charges or object thereto at any other time, the defect has
been waived)
We accord credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. We see
no reason to depart from the conclusion of the trial court that it was "morally
convinced that the three accused are all guilty.|||
Palomas, Apostadero and Antifuesto are disinterested witnesses and there is
not a shiver of evidence to indicate that they are suborned witnesses
Where the defense failed to show any evil or improper motive on the part of
prosecution witnesses, the presumption is that their testimonies are true and
thus entitled to full faith and credence
These circumstances "form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and
reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused as the perpetrators of the crime
First, appellant Cedenio borrowed the bolo of witness Antifuesto at
around seven o'clock in the evening.
Second, Cedenio together with appellants Antipolo and Amarga were
positively identified as brandishing their bloodstained bolos while
rushing out of the victims' burning house around ten-thirty that same
evening.
Third, Antifuesto's bolo was returned to him at around three o'clock
the following morning after appellants were seen outside the victim's
burning house.
Fourth, the bolo had bloodstains when it was returned.
 Dorio with wounds on the head and chest, Flora Dorio with a
wound on the leg and head almost severed; Maria Dorio with
wounds in the neck and left nipple; Nicanora Tabanao with a
wound in the stomach; and, infant Dioscora Dorio with no
wounds at all but charred to the bone.|||
Perfecto Antifuesto implicated Pedro Cedenio to the heinous
crime. Antifuesto said that on 26 November 1986, at around
seven o'clock in the evening, he was awakened by Cedenio who
borrowed his bolo. At around three o'clock the following
morning, Pito Panla-an woke him up to return the bolo earlier
borrowed by Cedenio
When Panla-an left, Antifuesto got his bolo and found
bloodstains on its handle. Upon unsheathing it, he discovered
fresh blood on its blade. Thirty (30) minutes later, Cedenio
arrived and appeased him, ". . . do not worry, if this incident
reaches the court I will answer (for) everything
Although it appears that around nine (9) persons were involved
in the commission of the felony, 6 only three (3) were convicted
by the trial court
Appellants now argue that there is no direct and positive
evidence showing that they killed the victims and burned their
house
Finally, appellants maintain that their denial and alibi should
prevail over the insufficient evidence of the prosecution. In
asserting their innocence, they allege that they were in the area
because of their moral obligation to save life and property.
Fifth, Cedenio called on Antifuesto at three-thirty that same morning
to appease the latter and assure him not to worry because ". . . if this
incident reaches the court, I will answer (for) everything." 22
Sixth, when retrieved from the burned house, the bodies of the victims
bore stab and hack wounds.." 23
We disagree with appellants' submission that the testimony of prosecution
witness Antifuesto is not in accord with human nature. On the contrary, his
testimony that the bolo was returned to him with bloodstains is worthy of
belief. Appellants never thought that Antifuesto would testify against them
In fine, we believe that when appellants were seen in the vicinity of the burning
house, they were not there to save lives and property but rather to escape from
the locus criminis and avoid being made to answer for the consequences of
their wicked act.|||
Conspiracy, as we said, may be inferred from the acts of the accused when such
acts point to a joint purpose of design.|||
From the evidence adduced, it is evident that after the victims were hacked
and stabbed to death, appellants set the house afire to hide their gruesome
act. This is the only logical conclusion for the burning of the house. |||
If their objective was merely to kill the victims then there would be no reason
for them to burn the victims' abode. On the other hand, if their objective was
merely arson, they would not have attacked the victims with their bolos.
We however cannot consider the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
There is no proof of such fact in the instant case; neither is there any testimony
on how the attack was actually carried out. Where no particulars are known as
to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted
 appellant Cedenio claimed that he cut up banana trunks and
hurled them into the fire while appellant Antipolo gathered soil
and threw it into the blaze. While witnesses might have indeed
seen them (appellants) coming out of the burning house, that
was probably after they (appellants) checked on and tried to
save the occupants of the house.|||
in the death of the victims began and developed, it can in no way be
established from mere suppositions that the killing was perpetrated by
treachery
Nevertheless, we qualify the killing to murder on account of evident
premeditation.
The fact alone that appellants burned the victims' house after inflicting fatal
wounds on them already suggests that they clung to their determination to
commit the crime.
The circumstance that appellant Cedenio borrowed the bolo of witness
Antifuesto and later placated the latter when his bolo was returned to him
already bloodstained strongly indicates that appellants pondered on the
means|||
They cannot be convicted of homicide for the death of the infant who died
presumably of suffocation or incineration but of arson resulting in death, as
defined in Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 1613.