Interpretation of Statutes

Ejusdem Generus And

Aids to construction

Submitted to:- Submitted by:-

Mrs.Sital Vaibhav Malhotra

Asst.Professor Bcom.LLb. (Hons.)

Interpretation of Statutes Roll No.232/15

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University Institute of Section-D

Legal Studies
INDEX
1.Acknowledgement _________________________________________3

2.Table of Authorities _________________________________________4-5

3.Introduction _______________________________________________6

4.Ejusdem Generis____________________________________________7-11

5. Internal Aids to Construction__________________________________12-21

(a)Short Title________________________________________________12

(b)Long Title________________________________________________12-13

(c)Preamble________________________________________________13-14

(d)Marginal Notes___________________________________________14-15

(e)Headings________________________________________________16

(f)Definition or Interpretation Clause____________________________16-17

(g)Provisos_________________________________________________17-18

(h)Illustrations______________________________________________18

(i)Explanation and saving Clauses________________________________19

(j)Explanations______________________________________________20

(k)Schedules________________________________________________20-21

(l)Punctuations_____________________________________________21-22

Bibliography_______________________________________________23

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3
 Acknowledgment
I have made this project with full dedication and zeal. A lot of people helped me in
the completion of this project. I am really thankful to my friends and peers whose
faith in me kept me going. I am also thankful to the authorities of the library of the
department for the access to the invaluable books. Most of all, I am thankful to my
subject teacher, Mrs. Sital, who has always been the guiding light and a source of
inspiration, for giving me an opportunity to work on this project.

So, with the concrete efforts and utmost intentions, I hereby present this project.

-Vaibhav Malhotra

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 Table of Authorities
1. Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board v. Harishanker

2. State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan

3. N.A.L.C.O. v. Bolton Corporation

4. Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay

5. Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India

6. M/s Siddeshwari Cotton Mills Private Limited v. Union of India

7. Express Hotels Private Limited v. State of Gujarat

8. Jagdish Chandra Gupta v. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd

9. Jiyajirao Cotton Mills Ltd., v. Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board

10. M.Kumar v. Bharat Earth Movers Limited

11. M/s Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay

12. Maharashtra University of Health Sciences v. Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal

13. Kedar Nath v. State of West Bengal

14. Fisher v. Raven

15. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali

16. Kedar Nath v. State of West Bengal

17. Rashtruya Mill Mazdoor Sangh v. NTC (South Maharashtra Ltd.)

18. Modern Industries v. M/s. Steel Authority of India Limited

19. Tara Prasad v. Union of India

20. S.P. Gupta v. President of India

21. Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah

22. M/s. Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories v. Deputy Labour Commissioner

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23. Ramanlal Bhailal Patel v. State of Gujarat

24. Jagir Singh v. State of Bihar

25. Tata Tea Limited v. State

26. R. v. Leeds Prison(Governor)

27. Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das

28. Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad

29. State of Punjab v. Kailash Nath

30. Nagar Palika Nigam v. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti

31. Shambhu Nath v. State of Ajmer

32. Agricultural and Processed Food Products v. Union of India

33. Collector of Customs v. M/s. Modi Rubber Limited

34. Sulochna Amma v. Narayanan Nair

35. Hardeo Motor Transport v. State of Madhya Pradesh

36. M/s. Aphali Pharmaceuticals Limited v. State of Maharashtra

37. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras

38. Shambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of West Bengal

39. Ashwini Kumar v. Arabinda Bose

40. Geetika Panwar v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi

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 Introduction
The expression ejusdem generis means of the same kind. Normally, general
words should be given their natural meaning like all other words unless the
context requires otherwise. But when a general word follows specific words of a
distinct category,the general word may be given a restricted meaning of the same
category. This principle is limited in its application to general word following less
general word only. If the specific words do not belong to a distinct genus, this rule
is inapplicable. Consequently, if a general word follows only one particular word,
that single particular word does not constitute a distinct genus and, therefore,
ejusdem generis rule cannot be applied in such a case. The basis of the principle of
ejusdem generis is that if the legislature intended general words to be used in
unrestricted sense, it would not have bothered to use particular words at all.

The Supreme Court in Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board v. Harishanker1, has
laid down the following five essential elements of this rule : (1) the statute
contains an enumeration of specific words; (2) the subjects of enumeration
constitute a class or category; (3) that specific class or category is not exhausted
by the enumeration; (4) the general terms follow the enumeration; and (5) there
is no indication of a different legislative intent.

Internal Aids to Construction

Besides its various sections, a statute has many other parts, such as the short title,
preamble, marginal notes, headings, definition or interpretation clauses, provisos,
illustrations, exceptions and saving clauses, explanations, schedules and
punctuation. It is important to know as to whether these parts can be of any help
to the courts in the interpretation of a section. In other words, the question is
whether they can act as internal aids to interpretation.

____________________________________________________
1.AIR 1979 SC 65

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 Ejusdem Generis
The expression ejusdem generis means of the same kind. Normally, general words should be
given their natural meaning like all other words unless the context requires otherwise. But
when a general word follows specific words of a distinct category, the general word may be
given a restricted meaning of the same category, the general expression takes its meaning from
the preceding particular expressions because the legislature by using the particular words of a
distinct genus has shown its intention to that effect. this principle is limited in its application to
general word following less general word only. If the specific words do not belong to a distinct
genus, this rule is inapplicable. Consequently, if a general word follows only one particular
word, that single particular word does not constitute a distinct genus and, therefore, ejusdem
generis rule cannot be applied in such a case. Exceptional stray instances are, however,
available where one word genus have been created by the courts and the general word
following such a genus given a restricted meaning. If the particular words exhaust the whole
genus, the general word following these particular words is construed as embaracing a larger
genus. The principle of ejusdem generis is not a universal application. If the context of a
legislation rules out the applicability of this rule, it has no part to play in the interpretation of
general words. The basis of the principle of ejusdem generis is that if the legislature intended
general words to be used in unrestricted sense, it would not have bothered to use particular
words at all.

In State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan2, the interpretation of Section 6(4)(a) of the Bombay Land
Acquisition Act,1948 which said: State Government may requisition for the purpose of State or
any other public purpose, was involved. It was contended that under the provision the
appellant was entitled to requisition premises for housing a member of the foreign consulate.
The High Court held that the expression any other public purpose should be read ejusdem
generis with purpose of state, and providing accommodation to a member of the foreign
consulate being a purpose of the Union and not of the State, the State Government had no
authority to requisition. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was in error in applying
the principle of ejusdem generis. The general expression any other public purpose follows only
a single expression for the purpose of a State which is not a distinct genus. In the absence of a
genus the rule has no application. Further, the intention of the legislature is quite clear by the
words used in the enactment. By giving the words their natural meaning it is apparent that the
expression any other public purpose includes providing accommodation to a member of a
foreign consulate.

2. AIR 1955 SC 810

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Where the preceding words do not belong to a distinct genus, the rule of ejusdem generis does
not apply. For instance, in N.A.L.C.O. v. Bolton Corporation3, the words or otherwise had to be
interpreted in the definition of a workman as any person who has entered into a work under a
contract with an employer whether the contract be by way of manual labour, clerical work or
otherwise. The court refused to apply the principle of ejusdem generis saying the preceding
words manual labour and clerical work did not form a distinct category to be called a genus.

In Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay4 , the petitioner, the widow of a tenant of a certain premises,
was not residing in it at the time. The respondent requisitioned the premises under Section 6
(4)(a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 for providing accommodation to a government
servant. The petitioner challenged the requisition on the ground that the premises was not
vacant within the meaning of the explanation attached to the section according to which a
vacancy will exist when the tenant ceases to be in occupation upon termination of his tenancy,
eviction or assignment or transfer in any other manner of his interest in the premises or
otherwise. According to her the expression or otherwise should be construed ejusdem generis
with the expressions preceding it. The Supreme Court held that the rule has no application in
the present instance because the expressions preceding the words or otherwise are not species
of the same nature, and, therefore, do not belong to any identifiable genus. Assigning the
natural meaning to the words used in the enactment it is clear that the expression or otherwise
is intended to include all cases not covered by the preceding expressions. This interpretation is
quite consistent with the object of the legislation.

In Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India5, through the Fruits Products Order,1955, issued
under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, it was made obligatory that the
percentage of fruit juice in a fruit syrup should be twenty five. The appellant argued that the
order did not apply to its product Rooh Afza even though it contained fruit juices because
clause 2 (d)(v) of the Order includes squashes, crushes, cordials, barley water, barrelled juice
and ready-to-serve beverages or any other beverages containing fruit juices or fruit pulp should
be construed ejusdem generis. The Supreme Court rejected the contention and held that the
rule had no application here because the things mentioned before the general expression any
other beverages containing fruit juices or fruit pulp did not fall under a determinable genus.
Further, the context makes it clear that all beverages containing fruit juice are intended to be
included.

3. 1943 AC 166

4.AIR 1957 SC 521

5.AIR 1965 SC1167

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In M/s Siddeshwari Cotton Mills Private Limited v. Union of India6 the Supreme Court
observed that the expressions bleaching, mercerizing,dueing,printing, water-
proofing,rubberizing,shrink-proofing, organdie processing,which precede the expression or any
other process in Section 2(f)(v) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 contemplate processes
which import a change of a lasting character to the fabric by either the addition of some
chemical into the fabric or otherwise. Any other process in the section must share one or the
other of these incidents. The expression is used in the context of what constitutes manufacture
in its extended meaning and the expression unprocessed in the exempting notification draws
its meaning from that context.

In Express Hotels Private Limited v. State of Gujarat7, the question of interpretation of

Section2(a) of the Gujarat Tax on Luxuries (Hotels and Lodging House) Act,1977 which defines
charges for lodging to include charges for air conditioning, telephone, television,radio, music,
extra beds, and the life was involved. The Supreme Court held that the expression and the like
would require to be construed ejusdem generis. The genus envisaged by the preceding words
not having been exhaustive, the legislature has deliberately wished to bring other items within
it by using the expression and the like.

In Jagdish Chandra Gupta v. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd 8., interpretation of the words or other
proceeding in the phrase a claim of set off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from
contract appearing in Section 60 of the Partnership Act,1932 was involved. The Supreme Court
did not apply the principle of ejusdem generis because the preceding words a claim of set off
did not constitute a genus.

In Jiyajirao Cotton Mills Ltd., v. Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board 9, interpretation of the words
any other relevant factors was involved. The Electricity Board has been empowered under
Section 49(3) of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 to fix deposit tariff for the supply of electricity
to any person having regard to the geographical position of any area, the nature of the supply
and the purpose for which the supply is required and any other relevant factors. The Supreme
Court did not apply the ejusdem generis principle because the preceding words did not belong
to a distinct category.

6.AIR 1989 SC 1019

7.AIR 1989 SC 1949

8.AIR 1964 SC 1882

9.AIR 1969 SC 788

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In M.Kumar v. Bharat Earth Movers Limited10, the Supreme Court observed that to invoke the
application of the ejusdem generis rule there must be a distinct genus or category. The specific
words must apply not to different objects of the widely different character but to something
which can be called a class or kind of object; where this is lacking, the rule will not apply and
mention of single specie will not constitute a genus.

In M/s Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay11, the Supreme Court observed
that the principle of ejusdem generis applies when particular words pertaining a class, category
or genus are followed by general words. Note1 (a) of Chapter 84 of Customs Tariff Act, 1975
states that this Chapter does not cover : Millstones, grindstones or other articles of Chapter
68. The expression other articles covers within it almost all articles which are covered by
Chapter 68. The principles of ejusdem generis cannot be applied to mean that it covers only
articles similar to millstones and grindstones.

In Maharashtra University of Health Sciences v. Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal 12, the Supreme
Court ruled that the definition of teacher under Section 2(35) of the Maharashtra University of
Health Sciences Act, 1999 is wide enough to include even unapproved teachers. Even though
the approved teachers and those other persons who are teaching and giving instructions fall in
two different classes, both are encompassed within the definition of teacher under Section
2(35). The word and before other persons is disjunctive and indicates a different class of
people. In the group of other persons fall those who, on full time basis, are teaching or giving
instructions in colleges affiliated to the University and they are also teachers even if they are
unapproved. The principle of ejusdem generis to interpret other persons does not apply. The
matter written after these words envisages a different category of persons. Here and is
disjunctive.

10. AIR 1999 Karn. 343

11.AIR 2002 SC 1706

12.AIR 2010 SC 1325

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 Internal Aids to Construction
Short Title
The short title of the Act is only its name and is given solely for the purpose of facility of
reference. It is merely a name given for identification of the Act and generally ends with the
year of passing of the Act, such as the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the Indian Penal Code, 1860,
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, etc. In some modern statutes the short title is sometimes given
in a section near the end of the Act with the use of the language this Act may be cited as the
even though generally it continues to be given in the beginning with the words: This Act may be
called For instance, Section1 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and Section 1 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 inter alia says: This Act may be called the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988. Even though it is a part of the statute, it has no role to play while
interpreting a provision of the Act. Neither can it extend nor can it delimit the clear meaning of
a particular provision.

Long Title
A statute is headed by a long title whose purpose is to give a general description about the
object of the Act. Normally, it begins with the words An Act to. For instance, the long title of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 says: An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to
criminal procedure, and that of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 says: An Act to
consolidate and amend the law relating to the prevention of corruption and for matters
connected therewith.

In the olden days the long title was not considered a part of the statute and was, therefore, not
considered an aid while interpreting it. There has been a change in the thinking of the courts in
recent times and there are numerous occasions when help has been taken from the long title to
interpret certain provisions of the statute but only to the extent of removing confusions and
ambiquities. If the words in a statute are unambiguous, no help is derived from the long title.

In Kedar Nath v. State of West Bengal13, interpretation of Section 4 of the West Bengal
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1949 was involved. Under this section, the State Government
was empowered to choose as to which particular case should go for reference to the Special
Court to be tried under a special procedure. This was challenged as violative of Article 14 of the

13.AIR 1953 SC 404

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Constitution. The Supreme Court rejected the contention and held, inter alia, that the long title
of the Act which said An Act to provide for the more speedy trial and more effective punishment
of certain offences was clear enough to give the State Government a discretion as to which
offences deserved to be tried by the special courts under a special procedure.

In Fisher v. Raven14, interpretation of the words obtained credit in Section 13(1) of the
Debtors Act, 1869 was involved. The House of Lords looked at the long title of the Act which
reads An Act for the Abolition of Imprisonment for Debt, for the punishment of fraudulent
debtors, and for other purposes and held that the words refer to credit for the payment of
money.

Preamble
Preamble contains the main objects of the Act and is, therefore, a part of the statute. On the
basis of this reason, it deserves to be considered by the courts as an integral aid to
interpretation. It is said that preamble is the key to open the mind of the legislature. It has,
however, been unequivocally observed that if the language of an enactment is clear and
unambiguous , the preamble has no part to play in interpretation. But if more than one
interpretation are possible of a particular provision, help can be taken from the preamble of the
Act to find out its true meaning. The modern trend generally is not to have a preamble in an
Act. As a consequence, the importance of preamble as an aid to construction is declining.

In State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali15, the constitutionality of Section 5 of the West Bengal
Special Courts Act,1950 was involved vis--vis Article 14 of the Constitution. This provision
authorized the State Government to select the particular cases which deserved to be tried by
the special courts having followed special procedure. The preamble of the Act reads: Whereas it
is expedient to provide for the speedier trial of certain offences. The Supreme Court held
that the language of the particular provision as well as the preamble clearly and unambiguously
vested discretion in the State Government to choose as to which cases should go before the
special courts for a speedier trial under a special procedureand, therefore, the particular
provision was perfectly legitimate and constitutional.

In Kedar Nath v. State of West Bengal16, the question was whether Section 4, West Bengal
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1949 was violative of Article 14 of the constitution in that it gave

14.1964 AC 210 (HL)

15.AIR 1952 SC 75

16.AIR 1953 SC 404

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arbitrary power to the government to choose the cases which were to be tried by the special
courts under a special procedure denying certain benefits which could be had if the cases were
tried in ordinary courts under normal procedure. The Supreme Court observed that the
preamble of the Act which stated, Where it is expedient to provide for more speedy trial and
more effective punishment of certain offences clearly points out that certain offences were to
be tried speedily under a special procedure by the special courts and that the government had
a right to choose which cases were to be so tried. Consequently, there was no violation of
Article 14 of the Constitution.

In Rashtruya Mill Mazdoor Sangh v. NTC (South Maharashtra Ltd.)17 , the Supreme Court while
interpreting certain provisions of the Textile Undertakings (Take over of Management) Act,
1983 held that when the language of an Act is clear, preamble cannot be invoked to curtail or
restrict the scope of an enactment.

In Modern Industries v. M/s. Steel Authority of India Limited18, the Supreme Court observed
that the preamble to the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial
Undertakings Act, 1993 may not exactly correspond with the enactment; the enactment may go
beyond the preamble. Thus, the expression amount due from buyer, together with the
amount of interest under Section 6(1) is not to be given a restricted meaning. The word
together in this provision would mean alongwith or as well as. Thus, action under Section
6(2) can be maintained for recovery of the principal amount or interest or only interest where
liability is admitted or disputed in respect of goods supplied or services rendered.

Marginal Notes
Marginal notes are those notes which are inserted at the side of the sections in an Act and
express the effect of the sections. These are also known as side notes. In the olden times help
used to be taken sometimes from the marginal notes when the clear meaning of an enactment
was in doubt. But the modern view of the courts is that marginal notes should have no role to
play while interpreting a statute. The basis of this view is that the marginal notes are not parts
of a statute because they are not inserted by the legislators nor are they printed in the margin
under the instructions or authority of the legislature. These notes are inserted by the drafters
and many times they may be inaccurate too. However, there may be exceptional circumstances
where marginal notes are inserted by the legislatures and, therefore, while interpreting such an
enactment help can be taken from such marginal notes. The Constitution of India is such a case.

17.AIR 1966 SC 710

18.AIR 2010 SC 661

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 The marginal notes were inserted by the Constituent Assembly and, therefore, while
interpreting the Indian Constitution, it is always permissible to seek guidance and help from the
marginal notes.

In Tara Prasad v. Union of India19, the Supreme Court held that marginal notes to the sections
of a statute and the titles of its chapters cannot take away the effect of the provisions
contained in the Act so as to render those provisions legislatively incompetent, if they are
otherwise within the competence of the legislature to enact. One must principally have regard
to the object of an Act in order to find out whether the exercise of the legislative power is
purposive, unless, of course, the provisions of the Act show that the avowed or intended object
is a mere pretence for converting a veiled transgression committed by the legislature upon its
own powers. Whether a particular object can be successfully achieved by an Act is largely a
matter of legislative policy.

In S.P. Gupta v. President of India20, the Supreme Court held that if the relevant provisions in
the body of a statute firmly point towards a construction which would conflict with the
marginal note, the marginal note has to yield. If there is any ambiguity in the meaning of the
provisions in the body of the statute, the marginal note may be looked into as an aid to
construction.

Headings
Headings are prefixed to sections or a group or a set of sections. These headings have been
treated by courts as preambles to those sections or set of sections. Naturally, the rules
applicable to the preamble are followed in case of headings also while interpreting an
enactment. Therefore, if the plain meaning of an enactment is clear, help from headings cannot
be taken by the courts. However, if more than one conclusion are possible while interpreting a
particular provision, the courts may seek guidance from the headings to arrive at the true
meaning. Ambiguity in the meaning of a provision can be removed with the aid of the heading,
but where the meaning of an enactment is clear and unambiguous, heading has no role to play
in its interpretation. A heading to one set of sections cannot act as an aid to interpret another
set of sections. But chapter heading can be used to interpret ambiguous provisions.

In Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah21, the Supreme Court remarked that though

19. AIR 1980 SC 1682

20. AIR 1982 SC 149

21. AIR 2005 SC 2119

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 Definition or Interpretation Clauses
Definition or interpretation clauses are generally included in a statute with the purpose of
extending the natural meaning of some words are as per the definition given or to interpret
such words, the meanings of which are not clear, by assigning them the meaning given in the
definition clause. Generally, the meaning given to a particular word in the interpretation clause
will be given to that word wherever it is used in that statute. The only exception to this rule is
that if the court feels that in the context of a particular provision the definition clause, if applied
will result in an absurdity, the court will not apply the definition clause while interpreting that
provision. Similarly, the definition clause of one Act cannot be used to explain the same word
used in another statute. However, if both the statutes are in pari material and the word has
been defined in one Act, the same meaning may be assigned to the word in the other Act also.

Whenever the words means or means and included are used in the definition clause, they
afford an exhaustive explanation of the word in the statute. The word includes is generally used
in the definition clause to enlarge the ordinary and natural meaning of that particular word. In
M/s. Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories v. Deputy Labour Commissioner22, the Supreme Court
observed that when an interpretation clause uses the word includes, it is prima facie
extensive. When it uses the words means and includes, it will afford an exhaustive explanation
to the meaning which for the purposes of the Act must invariably be attached to the word or
expression. In Ramanlal Bhailal Patel v. State of Gujarat23, the Supreme Court observed that
the use of the word includes indicates an intention to enlarge the meaning of the word used in
the statute. The use of the word denotes in the interpretation clause shows that the
expressions denoted therein are covered within the ambit of that particular word. The
expression deemed to be in the interpretation clause creates a fiction.

The Supreme Court in Jagir Singh v. State of Bihar24, was seized of the question of interpreting
the word owner in the Bihar Taxation on Passengers and Goods (Carries by Public Service
Motor Vehicles) Act, 1961 which defined it as the owner and includes bailee of a public career
vehicle or any manager acting on the owners behalf. The Court held that the use of the word
includes gives a wider concept to the word and so it means the actual owner as well as the
others included in the definition.

22. AIR 2008 SC 968

23. AIR 2008 SC 1246

24. AIR 1976 SC 997

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The Supreme Court in Tata Tea Limited v. State25, was required to interpret the expression
agricultural income under Article 366(1) of the Constitution which reads agricultural income
means agricultural income as definition for the purposes of the enactments relating to Indian
Income-Tax. The Court considered various enactments relating to Indian Income-tax including
the Income Tax Acts of 1922 and 1961 as well as the rules made under these Acts for
computation of the income partly from agriculture and partly from business. Thus interpreted it
was held that the State could tax only sixty per cent of the income on sale of tea grown and
manufactured as was unambiguously provided under the rules.

Provisos
The insertion of a proviso to a section has the natural presumption that, but for the proviso,
the enacting part of the section would have included the subject matter of the proviso. The
general rule about the interpretation of a proviso is that proviso is not to be taken absolutely in
its strict literal sense but is of necessity limited to the ambit of the section which it qualifies. A
proviso cannot be construed as enlarging the scope of an enactment when it can be fairly and
properly construed without attributing to it that effect. However, if it is clear from the languge
of the proviso that it had a more extensive operation than the main provision which it
immediately follows, such a wider effect must be given to it. But if a reasonable interpretation
of the proviso leads to the inference that it is contradicting the main enactment, the proviso
should prevail over the main enactment on the principle that it speaks the last intention of the
legislature. Unless the words are clear the court should not so interpret a proviso as to attribute
an intention to the legislature to give with one hand take away with the other. A sincere
attempt should be made to reconcile the enacting clause and in proviso and to avoid
repugnancy between the two. In exceptional cases a proviso may even enact substantive
provision itself. It may always be kept in mind that a proviso must be considered with relation
to the matter to which it exists as a proviso. It has no independent existence of its own; it is
dependent on the main enactment. It must be borne in mind that with the repeal of the main
enactment the proviso is also impliedly repealed. It has been held in R. v. Leeds
Prison(Governor)26, that the main part of an enactment cannot be so interpreted as to render
its proviso unnecessary and ineffective.

In Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das27, the Supreme Court held that the lease of building along

25. AIR 1988 SC 1435

26. (1964) 2 QB 625

27. AIR 1975 SC 1758

17
 with its equipment for cinema business was not an accommodation within the meaning of U.P.
(Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act,1947, the Court stated that if the principal
enactment in a statute is unambiguous the proviso can neither enlarge for restrict its meaning.

In Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad28, the Supreme Court held that a proviso cannot be
permitted by construction to defeat the basic intent expressed in the substantive provision.

In State of Punjab v. Kailash Nath29,the apparent discrepancy between the main part of rule
2.2 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules and its proviso had to be resolved. The enacting power
empowers the government to withhold or withdraw an officers pension in part or in full of
order for its recovery if it is found in a departmental or judicial proceeding that he was guilty of
grave misconduct or negligence in performance of his duties. The proviso reads, No such
judicial proceeding if not instituted while the officer was in service shall be instituted in respect
of a cause of action which arose or an event which took place more than four years before such
institution. The Supreme Court held that the proviso is to be read as an exception to the main
provision.

In Nagar Palika Nigam v. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti30, the Supreme Court observed that as a
general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in
the enactment and ordinarily, a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which it is a
proviso. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a
proviso and to no other.

Illustrations
Illustrations are sometimes appended to a section of a statute with a view to illustrate the
provision of law explained therein. A very large number of Indian Acts have illustrations
appended to various sections. They being the show of mind of the legislature are a good guide
to find out the intention of the framers. But an enactment otherwise clear cannot be given an
extended or a restricted meaning on the basis of illustrations appended therein.

In Shambhu Nath v. State of Ajmer31, the Supreme Court while discussing burden of proof held
that Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is an exception to Section 101 and that the

28.AIR 1960 SC 892

29.AIR 1989 SC 558

30.AIR 2009 SC 187

31.AIR 1965 SC 104

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latter along with its illustration (a) emphasises the basic rule of criminal jurisprudence that it is
the prosecutions obligation to prove a case. Illustration (b) to Section 105 was held to be
applicable to Sections 112 and 113 of the Indian Railways Act 1890. The Court emphasized that
an illustration does not exhaust the full content of the section which it illustrates nor does it
curtail or explained its ambit.

Exceptions and Saving Clauses

Exceptions are generally added to an enactment with the purpose of exempting something
which would otherwise fall within the ambit of the main provision. For instance, as many as five
exceptions have been added to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code which defines murder.
The first four exceptions begin with the words culpable homicide is not murder if while the
fifth exception begins with the words culpable homicide is not murder when. An exceptions
affirms that the things not exempted are covered under the main provision. In case a
repugnancy between an operative part and an exception, the operative part must be relied on.
Some decisions have, however, been given on the principle that an exception, being the latter
will of the legislature, must prevail over the substantive portion of the enactment.

Saving clauses are generally appended in cases of repeal and re-enactment of a statute. By this
the rights already created under repealed enactment are not disturbed nor new rights are
created by it. A saving clause is normally inserted in the repealing statute. In case of a clash
between the main part of statute and a saving clause, the saving clause has to be rejected.

In Agricultural and Processed Food Products v. Union of India32, the Supreme Court while
interpreting the saving clause in the Export Control Order,1988 held that the clause only saved
the rights which were mere in existence before the order was issued and it did not confer any
new rights which were not in existence at that time.

In Collector of Customs v. M/s. Modi Rubber Limited33, the Supreme Court held that whenever
there is a provision in the nature of an exception to the principle clause therof; it must be
construed with regard to that principal clause.

32.AIR 1996 SC 1947

33.AIR 2000 SC 1844

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Explanations
Explanations are inserted with the purpose of explaining the meaning of a particular provision
and to remove doubts which might creep up if the explanation had not been inserted. It does
not expand the meaning of the provision to which it is added but only ties to remove confusion,
if any, in the understanding of the true meaning of the enactment. A large number of Indian
Acts have explanations attached to various sections. For instance Section 108 of the Indian
Penal Code which defines the word abettor has fie explanations attached to it. Sometimes,
explanations are inserted not at the time to enactment of a statute but at a larger stage. For
instance, the two explanations to Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code, which defines the crime
of breach of trust, were inserted in 1973 and 1975 respectively. There may be a case where in
spite of many clauses in a section only one explanation is attached to the section as is the case
with Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In such a case it must be seen as to which
clause the explanation is connected with.

In Sulochna Amma v. Narayanan Nair34, interpretation of the eighth explanation to Section 11

of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was involved. The Supreme Court observed that it is
essential to keep in mind that the object of this explanation, which was added by an
amendment in 1976, is to see to it that an issue once decided by a competent court must not
be reopened again. Thus, it was held that even if the competent court has a limited jurisdiction,
the issue cannot be allowed to be reopened again even if such court has no jurisdict on to
decide the suit.

In Hardeo Motor Transport v. State of Madhya Pradesh35, the Supreme Court observed that
the role of an explanation in a statute is well known. By inserting an explanation 7 in entry (4)
(g) in Schedule 1 of Madhya Pradesh Motoryan Karadhan Adhiniyam, 1992 as amended by
Adhiniyam, 2004 the main provisions of the Act cannot be defeated. By reason of an
explanation, even otherwise, the scope and effect of a provision cannot be enlarged.

Schedules
Schedules attached to an Act generally deal with as to how claims or rights under the Act are to
be asserted or as to how powers conferred under the Act are to be exercised. Sometimes, a
schedule may contain some subjects in the form of list as is the case with the Constitution

___________________________________________________________________________

34.AIR 1994 SC 152

35.AIR 2007 SC 839

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Of India to enable the Union and the states to legislate in their respective fields. Schedules are
parts of the Statute itself and may be looked into by the courts for the purpose of interpreting
the main body of the statute. Similarly, while interpreting the schedules help may always be
taken from the main body of the Act to find out the true spirit of the act. Sometimes, a
schedule may contain transitory provisions also to enable an Act to remain in existence till the
main provisions of the Act begin to operate, such as the Ninth Schedule of the Government of
India Act, 1935.

In M/s. Aphali Pharmaceuticals Limited v. State of Maharashtra36, the Supreme Court held
that in case of a clash between the schedule and the main body of an Act, the main body
prevails and the schedule has to be rejected. The court decided that Ashvagandharist, an
ayurvedic medical preparation containing self generated alcohol but no capable of being
consumed as ordinary alcoholic beverage, would be exempt from excise duty.

Punctuation
In the ancient times, statutes were passed without punctuations and naturally, therefore, the
courts were not concerned with looking at punctuations. But in the modern times statutes
contain punctuations. Therefore, whenever a matter comes before the courts for
interpretation, the courts first look at the provisions as they are punctuated and if the feel that
there is no ambiguity while interpreting the punctuated provision, they shall so interpret it.
However, while interpreting the provision in the punctuated form if the courts feel repugnancy
or ambiguity, the court shall read the whole provision without any punctuations and if the
meaning is clear will so interpret it without attaching any importance whatsoever to the
punctuations.

In A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras37, Chief Justice Kania of the Supreme Court while
emphasizing the importance of the comma in Article 22(7) of the Constitution, observed that
the use of the word which twice in the first part of the sub-clause read with the comma put
after each other, shows that the framers wanted these to be read as disjunctive and not
conjunctive. This view, however, was subsequently overruled by a larger bench of the Supreme
Court in Shambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of West Bengal38, on the ground that the context
desired otherwise.

36.AIR 1989 SC 2227

37.AIR 1950 SC 27

38.AIR 1973 SC 1425

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In Ashwini Kumar v. Arabinda Bose39, the Supreme Court held that a punctuation cannot be
regarded as a controlling element and cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning of the
text.

In Geetika Panwar v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi40, interpretation of the semi colon placed after the
words Administration of Justice in entry 11A of the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule of
the Constitution was in question. The Delhi High Court held that punctuation mark cannot be
allowed to control the plain meaning of the text.

39.AIR 1952 SC 369

40.AIR 2003 Delhi 317

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 Bibliography
For the successful completion of this presentation and project the following sources have
been referred to which have made the preparation for this easy and widened the base of my
knowledge. The sources refereed are as follows:-

1. Prof. T. Bhattacharyya; The Interpretation of Statutes, Ninth Edition.

2. www.indiankanoon.com

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