ARTICLE 886: LEGITIME
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON
VICENTE NOBLE. JUAN NOBLE v.
MARIA S. NOBLE
Facts: The proceedings for the probate of
the last will of the deceased was instituted
by Juan Noble who was named executor
therein and who had expressed willingness
to assume the trust. This was opposed by
Maria S. Noble, who claimed to be an
illegitimate (spurious) child of the
deceased, born on July 22, 1923 out of an
illicit relation. Furthermore, oppositor
contended that petitioner has an adverse
interest against those immediately
interested in the estate, like her. Thus, she
prayed that the purported last Will and
Testament presented to the court be
disallowed; that she be declared the only
surviving illegitimate daughter of the
deceased; and in case the will sought to be
probated be allowed, the institution of heirs
made therein be declared null and void; the
devises and legacies be declared
ineffective for being inofficious; and
oppositor be declared entitled to one-half
of the entire hereditary estate of the
deceased.
Issue: What is necessary to be established
by an illegitimate not natural child in order
that he may be entitled to successional
rights under Article 887 of the new Civil
Code, the fact of his bare filiation, or a
filiation acknowledged by the putative
parent?
Ruling: While the Civil Code merely
provides that "in all cases of illegitimate
children, their filiation must be duly proved"
(Art. 887), there are cogent reasons, both
legal and moral, which require that such
filiation must be acknowledged by the
presumed parent. For, if the mere fact of
the paternity of the supposed father is all
that need be proved, that construction of
the law would pave the way to
unscrupulous individuals taking advantage
of the death of the presumed parent who
would no longer be in a position to deny the
allegations, to present even fictitious
claims and expose the life of the deceased
to inquiries affecting his character.
But more important than this, the law could
not have demanded anything less than
proof of an acknowledged filiation.
Precisely, under Article 289 of the new Civil
Code, the investigation of the paternity or
maternity of children mentioned in the two
preceding articles (referring to illegitimate
not natural children) is specifically
permitted only in the circumstances
enumerated in Articles 283 and 284 of the
same code. It must be noted that these two
articles refer to compulsory recognition or
acknowledgment. Hence, since the proof
of filiation required in Article 887,
necessarily involves the investigation
mentioned in Article 289, and this
investigation in turn refers to recognition by
the putative parent, it follows that the
filiation to be proven must be one that is
recognized.
In the present case, what is intended to be
proved by appellant is simply the supposed
naked paternity of the deceased. This is
evident from the pertinent allegations of
her opposition to the probate of the will,
which state: That the oppositor is in
continuous possession of status of a child
of the late Don Vicente Noble by the direct
acts of the latter and/or his family; and, that
the oppositor has in her favor evidence
and/or proof that the late Don Vicente
Noble is her father.
It may be pointed out that the first sentence
does not state that the supposed father
had recognized or acknowledged the
oppositor as his child. It is merely claimed
that she was in continuous possession of
the status of a child, an allegation which is
a ground for compelling recognition under
Article 283 of the new Civil Code and,
therefore, presupposes no previous
recognition. The last sentence alleges that
oppositor has in her favor evidence and/or
proof that the late Don Vicente Noble is her
father. Again, there is no assertion that she
has evidence that the deceased had
recognized or acknowledged her as such a
child.
ALICE REYES VAN DORN v. HON.
MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. and
RICHARD UPTON
Facts: Petitioner is a citizen of the
Philippines while private respondent is a
citizen of the United States; that they were
married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after
the marriage, they established their
residence in the Philippines; that they
begot two children born on April 4, 1973
and December 18, 1975, respectively; that
the parties were divorced in Nevada,
United States, in 1982; and that petitioner
has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
Private respondent filed suit against
petitioner stating that petitioner's business
in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for
short), is conjugal property of the parties,
and asking that petitioner be ordered to
render an accounting of that business, and
that private respondent be declared with
right to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the cause of action is
barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged
that he and petitioner had "no community
property" as of June 11, 1982.
Issue: W/N the divorce is not valid and
binding in this jurisdiction, the same being
contrary to local law and public policy. -
VALID
Ruling: It is true that owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public police and
morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to
sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he
is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does,
that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should
not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in
her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V.
ROSALES. IRENEA C. ROSALES V.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, ET. AL.
Facts: On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra
Rosales died intestate. She was survived
by her husband Fortunato Rosales and
their two children Magna Rosales Acebes
and Antonio Rosales. Another child,
Carterio Rosario, predeceased her,
leaving behind a child, Macikequerox
Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales,
the herein petitioner. Magna Rosales
Acebes instituted the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
The trial court ordered that Fortunato,
Magna, Macikequerox and Antonio be
entitled each to share in the estate of
decedent. Irenea, on the other hand,
insisted in getting a share of the estate in
her capacity as the surviving spouse of the
late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased,
claiming that she is a compulsory heir of
her mother-in-law.
Issue: Whether or not Irenea is entitled to
inherit from her mother-in-law.
Ruling: No. Under the law, intestate or
legal heirs are classified into two groups,
namely, those who inherit by their own
right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. There is no provision in the
Civil Code which states that a widow
(surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of
her mother-in-law. The law has already
meticulously enumerated the intestate
heirs of a decedent. The Court held that
Irenea misinterpreted the provision of
Article 887 because the provision refers to
the estate of the deceased spouse in which
case the surviving spouse is a compulsory
heir. It does not apply to the estate of a
parent-in-law. Therefore, the surviving
spouse is considered a third person as
regards the estate of the parent-in-law.
ARTICLES 905, 907 911 AND 1061
VIZCONDE v CA
Facts: Spouses Rafael and Salud Nicolas
have five children, namely: Estrellita
Nicolas-Vizconde (wife of herein petitioner
Lauro Vizconde); Antonio Nicolas; Ramon
Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon; and
Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent. On June
30, 1991, Estrellita and her two daughters
were killed. In an Extra-Judicial Settlement
of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita, Rafael
and Salud, together with petitioner
Vizconde, inherited from Estrellitas estate.
Subsequently, when Rafael died in 1992,
an intestate estate proceeding was
instituted by one of the heirs of Rafael.
Private respondent Ramon, among other
things, averred that petitioner should be
impleaded as one of Rafaels children by
right of representation as the widower of
deceased legitimate daughter Estrellita.
Pursuant to the order of the probate court,
petitioner filed a Manifestation contending
that he was neither a compulsory heir nor
an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no
interest to participate in the proceedings.
The trial court granted Ramons motion.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the inclusion of
petitioner Vizconde in the intestate estate
proceeding regarding Rafaels estate is
proper.
Ruling: No. The enumeration of
compulsory heirs in Article 887 of the Civil
Code is exclusive, which negates the
rulings of the RTC and CA that Lauro shall
be included in the proceeding as a
compulsory heir for he is only a son-in-law
of decedent Rafael. Thus, petitioner who
was not even shown to be a creditor of
decedent is considered a third person or
stranger. Petitioner may not be dragged
into the proceeding herein instituted;
neither may he be permitted to intervene
as he has no personality or interest in the
said proceeding. Thus, petition is granted.
BONIFACIA MATEO, ET AL. V.
GERVASIO LAGUA, ET AL.
Facts: Cipriano Lagua and his
wife Alejandra Dumlao, in a public
instrument, donated the two parcels of land
to their son Alejandro Lagua, in
consideration of the latters
marriage to Bonifacia Mateo. The couple
took possession of the properties, but the
Certificates of Title remained in the donors
name. Cipriano Lagua later executed a
deed
of sale of the same two parcels of land in
favor of his younger son, Gervasio. A TCT
were issued to Gervasio. Bonifacia Mateo
and her daughter, Anatalia, sought the
annulment of the deed of sale in favor of
Gervasio Lagua and for recovery of
possession of the properties which was
granted by the court. The decision became
final, and Bonifacia Mateo, and her
daughter, Anatalia Lagua, were installed in
possession of the land.
Gervasio Lagua and Cipriano Lagua, filed
a complaint for annulment of the
donation of the two lots, insofar as one-half
portion thereof was concerned claiming
that
in donating the two lots, said plaintiff not
only neglected leaving something for his
own
support but also prejudiced the legitime of
his forced heir, plaintiff Gervasio Lagua.
While the cases were pending, plaintiff
Cipriano Lagua died.
The Court of Appeals held
that the donation to Alejandro Lagua of the
2 lots prejudiced the legitime of Ciprianos
other heir, Gervasio Lagua. The donation
was thus declared inofficious, and
defendants-appellees were ordered to
reconvey to plaintiff Gervasio Lagua a
portion of
494.15 square meters to be taken from any
convenient part of the lots.
Issue: Is the court of appeals ruling on the
inofficiousness of the donation proper?
Ruling: No. ART. 908 of the civil code
provides that to determine the legitime, the
value
of the property left at the death of the
testator shall be considered, deducting all
debts,
and charges, which shall not include those
imposed in the will. To the net value of the
hereditary estate, shall be added the value
of all donations by the testator that are
subject to collation, at the time he made
them. In other words, before any
conclusion
about the legal share due to a compulsory
heir may be reached, it is necessary that
certain steps be taken first. The net estate
of the decedent must be ascertained, by
deducting a payable obligations and
charges from the value of the property
owned by
the deceased at the time of his death; then,
all donations subject to collation would be
added to it. With the partible estate thus
determined, the legitimes of the
compulsory
heir or heirs can be established; and only
thereafter can it be ascertained whether or
not
a donation had prejudiced the
legitimes. Certainly, in order that a
donation may be reduced for being
inofficious, there must be proof that the
value of the donated property
exceeds that of the disposable free portion Issue: Whether or not a donation inter
plus the donees share as legitime in the vivos by a donor now deceased is
properties of the donor. In the present inofficious and should be reduced at the
case, it can hardly be said that, with the instance of the donor's widow. Are all
evidence donations subject o collation?
then before the court, it was in any position
Ruling: A person's prerogative to make
to rule on the inofficiousness of the
donations is subject to certain limitations,
donation involved here, and to order its
one of which is that he cannot give by
reduction and reconveyance of the
donation more than he can give by will (Art.
deducted portion to the respondents.
752, Civil Code). If he does, so much of
VDA. DE TUPAS v. REGIONAL TRIAL what is donated as exceeds what he can
COURT OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL give by will is deemed inofficious and the
donation is reducible to the extent of such
Facts: Epifanio R. Tupas died on August
excess, though without prejudice to its
20, 1978 in Bacolod City, childless, leaving
taking effect in the donor's lifetime or the
his widow, Partenza Lucerna, as his only
donee's appropriating the fruits of the thing
surviving compulsory heir. He also left a
donated (Art. 771, Civil Code). Such a
will dated May 18, 1976. Among the assets
donation is, moreover, collationable, that
listed in his will were lots Nos. 837, 838 and
is, its value is imputable into the hereditary
839 of the Sagay Cadastre, admittedly his
estate of the donor at the time of his death
private capital. However, at the time of his
for the purpose of determining the legitime
death, these lots were no longer owned by
of the forced or compulsory heirs and the
him, he having donated them the year
freely disposable portion of the estate.
before (on August 2, 1977) to the Tupas
This is true as well of donations to
Foundation, Inc., which had thereafter
strangers as of gifts to compulsory heirs,
obtained title to said lots.
although the language of Article 1061 of
Claiming that said donation had left her the Civil Code would seem to limit collation
practically destitute of any inheritance, to the latter class of donations. And this
Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas has been held to be a long-established
Foundation, Inc. in the same Court of First rule.
Instance of Negros Occidental (docketed
The fact, therefore, that the donated
as Civil Case No. 16089) to have the
property no longer actually formed part of
donation declared inofficious insofar as it
the estate of the donor at the time of his
prejudiced her legitime, therefore reducible
death cannot be asserted to prevent its
"x x x by one-half or such proportion as x x
being brought to collation. Indeed, it is an
x (might be deemed) justified x x x" and "x
obvious proposition that collation
x x the resulting deduction x x x" restored
contemplates and particularly applies to
and conveyed or delivered to her.
gifts inter vivos.
The Trial Court did not see things her way.
The further fact that the lots donated were
Upon the facts above stated, on which the
admittedly capital separate property of the
parties stipulated , said Court dismissed
donor is of no moment, because a claim of
the complaint for lack of merit.
inofficiousness does not assert that the
donor gave what was not his, but that he
gave more than what was within his power
to give.
Since it is clear that the questioned
donation is collationable and that, having
been made to a stranger (to the donor) it is,
by law chargeable to the freely disposable
portion of the donor's estate, to be reduced
insofar as inofficious, i.e., it exceeds said
portion and thus impairs the legitime of the
compulsory heirs, in order to find out
whether it is inofficious or not, recourse
must be had to the rules established by the
Civil Code for the determination of the
legitime and, by extension, of the
disposable portion.
Deducting the legitimes from the net value
of the hereditary estate leaves the freely
disposable portion by which the donation in
question here must be measured. If the
value of the donation at the time it was
made does not exceed that difference,
then it must be allowed to stand. But if it
does, the donation is inofficious as to the
excess and must be reduced by the
amount of said excess. In this case, if any
excess be shown, it shall be returned or
reverted to the petitioner-appellant as the
sole compulsory heir of the deceased
Epifanio R. Tupas.
For obvious reasons, this determination
cannot now be made, as it requires
appreciation of data not before this Court
and may necessitate the production of
evidence in the Court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is
reversed and petitioner-appellant Partenza
Lucerna Vda. de Tupas is adjudged
entitled to so much of the donated property
in question, as may be found in excess of
the freely disposable portion of the estate
of Epifanio B. Tupas, determined in the
manner above-indicated. Let the case be
remanded to the Trial Court for further
appropriate proceedings in accordance
with this decision.
ARELLANO v. PASCUAL
Facts: Pascual Jr. died intestate on
January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia who is
represented by her daughters Agnes and
Nona, and respondents Francisco and
Miguel.
In a petition for Judicial Settlement of
Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of
Administration, , respondents alleged that
a parcel of land (donated property) located
in Makati, , transferred by the decedent to
petitioner, "may be considered as an
advance legitime" of petitioner.
The probate court provisionally passed
upon the validity of the donation then
further held that the land in contention is
subject to collation following Art. 1061 of
the New Civil Code. On appeal, the CA
sustained the probate courts ruling that the
property donated to petitioner is subject to
collation.
Hence, this petition.
Issues:
I. Whether or not the property donated to
petitioner is subject to collation.
II. Whether or not the property of the estate
should have been ordered equally
distributed among the parties.
Ruling: Petition is GRANTED.
First Issue; Collation takes place when
there are compulsory heirs, one of its
purposes being to determine the legitime
and the free portion.
The term collation has two distinct
concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical
operation by the addition of the value of
donations made by the testator to the value
of the hereditary estate; and second, it is
the return to the hereditary estate of
property disposed of by lucrative title by the
testator during his lifetime. The purposes of
collation are to secure equality among the
compulsory heirs in so far as is possible,
and to determine the free portion, after
finding the legitime, so that inofficious
donations may be reduced.
The records do not show that the decedent
left any primary, secondary, or concurring
compulsory heirs. He was only survived by
his siblings, who are his collateral relatives
and, therefore, are not entitled to any
legitime that part of the testators property
which he cannot dispose of because the
law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.
The decedent not having left any
compulsory heir who is entitled to any
legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his
properties, even if nothing was left for his
siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His
donation to petitioner, assuming that it was
valid, is deemed as donation made to a
"stranger," chargeable against the free
portion of the estate. There being no
compulsory heir, however, the donated
property is not subject to collation.
Second Issue; The decedents remaining
estate should thus be partitioned equally
among his heirs-siblings-collateral
relatives, herein petitioner and
respondents, pursuant to the provisions of
the Civil Code (Arts. 1003 & 1004).
ARTICLE 891
MENDOZA v DELOS SANTOS
Facts: The properties subject in the instant
case are three parcels of land located in
Sta. Maria, Bulacan are presently in the
name of respondent Julia Delos Santos
(respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the other
hand, is also in the name of respondent but
co- owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who
bought one-half of the property from
petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido
Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza
(Dominga). Petitioners alleged that the
properties were part of Placido and
Domingas properties that were subject of
an oral partition and subsequently
adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiels
death, it passed on to his spouse Leonor
and only daughter, Gregoria. After
Leonors death, her share went to
Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate
and without issue. They claimed that after
Gregorias death, respondent, who is
Leonors sister, adjudicated unto herself all
these properties as the sole surviving heir
of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners
claim that the properties should have been
reserved by respondent in their behalf and
must now revert back to them, applying
Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva
troncal.
Issues: THE HONORABLE [CA]
GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES ARE
NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES,
COMING AS THEY DO FROM THE
FAMILY LINE OF THE PETITIONERS
MENDOZAS.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PETITIONERS MENDOZAS DO NOT
HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW
ON RESERVA TRONCAL.
Held:
No, CA is correct.
I. Reserva troncal is not applicable.
Julia, who now holds the properties in
dispute, is not the other ascendant within
the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed
primarily to assure the return of a
reservable property to the third degree
relatives belonging to the line from which
the property originally came, and avoid its
being dissipated into and by the relatives of
the inheriting ascendant.
It should be pointed out that the ownership
of the properties should be reckoned only
from Exequiels as he is the ascendant
from where the first transmission occurred,
or from whom Gregoria inherited the
properties in dispute. The law does not go
farther than such ascendant/brother/sister
in determining the lineal character of the
property. It was also immaterial for the CA
to determine whether Exequiel
predeceased Placido and Dominga or
whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel.
What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned
the properties and he is the ascendant
from whom the properties in dispute
originally came. Gregoria, on the other
hand, is the descendant who received the
properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.
Article 891 simply requires that the
property should have been acquired by the
descendant or prepositus from an
ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A
transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous
title when the recipient does not give
anything in return.18 At risk of being
repetitious, what was clearly established in
this case is that the properties in dispute
were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After
his death, Gregoria
(descendant/prepositus) acquired the
properties as inheritance.
Article 891 provides that the person
obliged to reserve the property should be
an ascendant (also known as the
reservor/reservista) of the
descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is
not Gregorias ascendant; rather, she is
Gregorias collateral relative.
II. Petitioners cannot be considered
reservees/reservatarios as they are not
relatives within the third degree of Gregoria
from whom the properties came. The
person from whom the degree should be
reckoned is the
descendant/prepositusthe one at the
end of the line from which the property
came and upon whom the property last
revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this
case. Petitioners are Gregorias fourth
degree relatives, being her first cousins.
First cousins of the prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and are not reservees or
reservatarios.
They cannot even claim representation of
their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as
Article 891 grants a personal right of
reservation only to the relatives up to the
third degree from whom the reservable
properties came. The only recognized
exemption is in the case of nephews and
nieces of the prepositus, who have the
right to represent their ascendants (fathers
and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters
of the prepositus and relatives within the
third degree.