Essay 1: Fragile or Failed State

Select one fragile or failed state

Write an essay of 1000 1200 words
Include citations and sources
Feel free to add maps or other visual aids at your discretion.
Address the following:
o Overview and short description of the country
o Reasons for which the state is fragile or failed
o Situation in 2015 16 and perspectives for the future
Deadline: 15 October 2016

Democratic Republic of Congo

Fragile States: 4 main characteristics

1) Low income country
2) Low capacity to attend its citizens
3) Vulnerable population
4) Growing gap with developing countries

Social conditions are very tough:

One third of maternal deaths occur
Half of the children die before the age of five

Failed States: 4 main characteristics

1) Loss of control of territory/use of force
2) Erosion of legitimate authority
3) Inability to provide public services
4) Inability to interact with international community

In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics and the Problems of Development, by Douglass C.
North, John Joseph Wallis, Steven B. Webb, Brry R. Weingast
(https://books.google.es/books?id=9lZJtbLEmYwC&pg=PA101&lpg=PA101&dq=congo+fragile+state+quotes&source
=bl&ots=u9ki1EheP5&sig=b3TqcC2ZNUsHHxqpaShz3vVRYIs&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiD-
KHP_JrPAhWG0RQKHTIWAhEQ6AEILTAC#v=onepage&q=congo%20fragile%20state%20quotes&f=false)
There have been a number of notable milestones in the DRCs history. These could be seen as important
watersheds for the DRCs developmental trajectory, but raise the question of whether they are more virtuous
or vicious cycles in terms of stability and prospects for the greater welfare of the Congolese population.
These include the Constitutional Congress (CNS) of the early 1990s, the 2002-3 peace process and
transitional government, and the 2006 constitution and national elections. We would suggest that how elites
managed rents and violence in each of these junctures sheds lights on some of the deeper underlying
dynamics of Congolese state-society relations.
In its first mandate, the Kabila regime can be associated with a small degree of stabilization in the Congo,
essentially through the establishment of basic democratic structures such as the national and provincial
assemblies, and some degree of process in governing.
o However, the country is far from being stable, and outbreaks of violence will likely continue to feature
in the social order in the DRC. In addition, there are worrisome indications that the transparent and
organized elections held in 2006 may have been a one-time phenomenon.
o The 2011 presidential and legislative elections are a clear demonstration that the ruling partys
commitment to democracy is weak at best.
At the same time, the DRCs institutional fabric and state capacity are by all accounts weak. Whether the
existing elite coalition has either the interest or the capability to strengthen these institutions remains doubtful,
especially after the experience of the 2011 election. To date, the experiences from the public and security
sector reforms are not wholly encouraging.
o Continued dependence on traditional international development partners is likely to see continued
negotiations and occasional standoffs with parts of the international community. At the same time, the
resource-for-infrastructure deal with nontraditional partners such as the Chinese highlights the
attraction of bypassing the more rigorous processes associated with receiving international
development assistance.
While beset by a number of fractures, the public face of the AMP coalition has managed to sustain itself.
Incumbent elites decided to remain largely united to contest the 2011 poll. As the passing of the constitutional
amendment in January 2011 indicated, the government prepared to use all means possible to skew the
electoral process in its favour.
o According to the amendment, there will be no run-off election if the winner of the first round fails to
garner a majority. This smoothed the way for Kabila to win, especially as he faced a divided
opposition. There is no doubt that the government did this because it was aware that it had failed to
 make a positive impact on the population, while it also faced a number of very viable and popular
opposition candidates.
As the DRC achieves postconflict stability following a decade and a half of full-fledged violence, do its elites
have the will and capacity to begin tackling the starkest aspects of its dysfunctionality? The factors of external
intervention and/or engagement have clearly played an important part in the various phrases of the DRCs
fragile order.
o Current developments indicate that the ruling elite remains largely disengaged from the government-
citizen compact which would guide its policies and behavior. Whether a transparent electoral contest
may impose this is very much an open question.
o There may be some areas (including provinces) where such an orientation could be built from the
bottom up, but these in turn remain prone to national (and external) intervention and rent seeking.
The prospects for the development of more elite coalitions remain elusive for as long as the ruling elite lacks
the confidence to genuinely believe that its interests are served first by a consolidation of existing political
alliances and second, by genuine attempts in the long run to govern the country in a developmental manner.
o

Security Sector Reform

The Congolese state long ago lost its monopoly on violence, and security sector reform remains one of the
countrys most pressing issues. Without an effective, disciplined, and well-paid military that respects human
rights, the DRC will remain vulnerable to regional military interventions and to the various well-organised
armed groups already operating on its territory. In many cases, wage payment arrears in the Congolese army
remain significant. In part, the failure to fully compensate troops in a regular manner may also be serving
particular interests, not just in terms of diverting resources destined for military wages and ongoing
operations. Even within the military, various commanders may be best placed to buy particular loyalty through
the use of discretionary resource allocation rather than predictable wage payments. Building significant
pockets of capacity in the FARDC could itself prove a potential threat to current elites as it is not always clear
to what ends this capacity could be used.

This figure summarises the differences in rents, elites, violence potential and associated links with the national
elite coalition for three eastern provinces.
o As of 2010, provincial political elites remained largely dependent on the center. If local leadership is
considered as insufficiently collaborating with central authorities, or even risks being a threat, the MP
in Kinshasa has the power to deploy various means to destabilize regional elected leaders.
o In no provinces, with the important exception of Katanga, do sub-national elites appear to have
established coalitions that are resilient or impervious to national intervention. The presidents power
base also currently resides in Katanga, because that is from where his father hailed, as do many of
 his close associates. Ironically, many people in Katanga feel that the AMP government is ignoring
them in favour of other parts of the country. This is perhaps because there were high expectations of
receiving special treatment, as Katanga has in the past. Kinshasas heavy hand in provincial politics
has thwarted provincial development of more stable and longer-term relations with investors, in part
under the knowledge that these are subject to central/external predation.
At the same time, most of the newly created provincial assemblies are dysfunctional, with one interal battle
after another distracting from the business of administering the province. In many cases, these squabbles
emerge as a result of battles over resources available to the provincial deputies not to execute the provincial
program, but for their own earnings packages. As a result of these distractions, provincial programs have
barely been implemented, and very few reform initiatives have been undertaken.
o Finally, very few efforts to sanction corruption or poor performance are successful unless they are
supported by the AMP in Kinshasa.
o This has led to a significant weakening of the provincial assemblies only five years after they were
instituted.
Governors are indirectly elected, but as of a constitutional amendment passed in January 2011, governors
can now be removed from their posts by the president and national assemblies can be dissolved by the
president as well. By May 2010, four governors in three out of eleven provinces have been replaced. A
number of these changes are attributable to corruption scandals, while others have apparently been the result
of shifts in individuals political alliances in Kinshasa.
o Although procedures were followed in the removal of the governors, that is, the provincial assemblies
voted the governors out, the influence of key politicians in the ruling party was frequently cited as
playing the deciding role.
o This would indicate that the newly developed decentralization framework has already been gutted of
its independence, while also demonstrating that provincial elites cannot make credible bargains with
national elites unless they are willing to toe Kinshasa line.
Under these circumstances, a key question in the DRC is where more sustainable forms of elite coordination
with longer-time horizons around prodevelopmental outcomes are likely to evolve.
o Are these likely to emerge bottom up in the context of certain sub-national interests, or be iposed on a
grander scale top down?
o The recent China resource-for-infrastructure deal has offered the president a welcome commitment
device with national reach, while at the same time bypassing the various vested interests associated
with working through the normal public sector investment channels. However, this came late in his
first mandate and at a time when the electorate is already disappointed with the governments failure
to deliver on key campaign promises.
o No doubt the Chinese infrastructure works are a useful campaign image, on that Kabila successfully
leveraged to sustain a dominant position in the 2011 election.
In the presence of uncoordinated, short-term and frequently non-binding elite interactions, elite actions that
promise some significant scope of larger private goods (e.g. sustained industrial mining operations) or public
goods (e.g. health clinics) are confronted with problems of incentive alignment and credit taking.
o However, behind the scenes, this has already evolved spats between various national and provincial
authorities as to who should receive credit for these measures. While there are some examples of
success (often with the support of external donors), the challenge for improved elite coordination
around security, the generation of greater sustainable rent streams, and public good provision
remains significant in the context of the countrys very weak institutional endowments.
o A key challenge moving forward will therefore be to seek to identify the most promising islands of
collective action be it in the area of security, sustainable rent generation, or public service delivery
provision which could in turn add up to a change in the direction of the countrys national and sub-
national developmental trajectories.
The immediate obstacle to a rapid resumption of international engagement in the Congo was the question of
the fate of several hundred thousand Hutu refugees who had simply disappeared during the AFDLs military
campaign. Shortly after Kabila came to power, the question of the fate of these refugees was raised by the UN
and an investigative team went to the Congo to look into the matter.
o The team was repeatedly prevented from doing its work, and in April 1998, the UN withdrew the team.
The subsequent UN report accused the Kabila government of the systematic massacre of
thousands of Rwandan refugees between 1996 and 1997.
o The report also concluded that Rwandan troops shared responsibility for the massacres and
recommended the establishment of an international tribunal to investigate individual responsibilities in
the massacres. The Kabila government rejected the allegations, as did the Rwandan government.
The question essentially blocked the international community from engaging with the new government
in any significant manner.
Kabilas repressive attitude toward the political opposition, civil society and the media in the Congo further
isolated his government. Although Kabila had declared upon taking power than national presidential elections
would be held in 1999, one of his first official acts as president was the promulgation of a law banning all
political activity.
 o In addition, the Kabila government rejected the draft constitution drawn up by the delegates of the
1992 Conference Nationale Souveraine (CNS), the national democratic conference in which the
political opposition and the government mapped out a path toward democracy.
Meanwhile, Kabila, whose attitude toward Western countries was heavily influenced by his quasi-sicalist
background, only became more defensive as a result of the international communitys apprehensive attitude
towards his regime. He could not believe that he, the person who had liberated the country from the corrupt
Mobutu regime, was now being asked by the very same international community that had condoned Mobutus
behavior, to meet high standards on democracy and human rights

Resources as Rents
Resource extraction, both in the formal and artisanal sector, continues to provide the most obvious source of
rents. Additional sources to date included the exploitation of transit points and informal diversion of revenues
notably in customs.
o Public expenditures, including the diversion of public sector wages and provincial budgets, provide
another source of rents.
o While extractive resources in the DRC continue to receive significant attention, poor governance may
be yielding aggregate rent streams well below potential.
o The World Bank (2007) estimates that the government currently collects less than twenty percent of
revenues due under prevailing regulations.
o The governments review of mining contracts provides a vignette into ongoing negotiations negotiating
concerning natural source rents.
In April 2007, the minister of mining established a forty-member Inter-ministerial Commission to review the
contracts signed between the public sector and private firms in the mining sector.
o The impetus for this review was originally given by the Intercongolese gialogue, a resolution of which
was to view all business contracts concluded by all parties during the 1998 2002 war. The initative
was initially welcomed by the mining sector and international NGOs concerned about the fairness of
the contracts.
However, it subsequently became increasingly opaque and subject to significant political
influence and ultimately lost credibility. In the end, all reviewed mining contract s were
renegotiated, one was cancelled outright and one remained under negotiation until late 2010.
Initially announced in 2008 by the Minister of Infrastructure, a USD 9 billion infrastructure for resources deal
with the Chinese has attracted a significant degree of attention.
o Following initial objections from the IMF over associated sovereign guarantees, notably associated
with a pending USD 13 billion HIPC debt reduction from largely traditional Western donors, the deal
was restructured to provide for USD 3 billion in mining-related investments and USD 3 billion for
infrastructure over the next five years (in addition to initial cash signing bonuses). The extent to which
this model averts some of the obsolescing bargain risks encountered by traditional mining
enterprises, and hence prospects for them being expanded in coming years, is uncertain.
o The deals do effectively bypass weak state capacity and offer the quick and highly visible delivery of
infrastructure.
o At one level, this may enhance the legitimacy and election prospects of the AMP through
demonstrable infrastructure while also opening up transport routes across the country.
In the eastern part of the country, where the presence of myriad armed groups has discountaged most
international mining companies from pursuing industrial operations, various armed groups, including the
Congolese army, maintain illegal artisanal mining operations, frequently operating in conjunction with other
armed groups in the area, especially the FDLR.
In 2010, the Congolese government imposed a ban on mining in north and south Kivu, allegedly in order to
put an end to illegal mining and the smuggling of minerals. This ban was lifted in 2011 in spite of the fact that
illegal mining and smuggling by armed groups, the Congolese army and rebel groups continues.
o Attempts to regulate illegally mined ore from eastern DRC (e.g. the US Dodd-Frank Act) have focused
on the ability to track exports bought by publicly listed companies, which are accountable to
institutions in their home countries.
o There is much controversy about whether such measures help or hurt small-scale local Congolese
miners.
The global recession and the collapse in commodity prices, combined with the Congolese governments
diminished credibility due to the bungled mining review process, means that the Congolese mining sector is
unlikely to see a renewed boom in the near future and that opportunities for rent seeking in the formal,
industrial mining sector will be diminished for the time being.
o The governments current pattern of selling mining concession to close business associateds
notably Israeli businessman Dan Gertler at below market value looks set to continue.
o It provides great opportunities forrent-seeking, although it comes at a price: the IMF has raised
concern about opacity in the sector and is making transparency in all mining transactions a
prerequisite of ongoing budget support. Given the high risks around sinking large amounts of capital
for longer-term returns into the country, mining companies will likely demand access to very high-
grade deposits and/or favourable deals to commit and operate large amounts of productive capital
investments.
 There has been growing interest in the DRCs oil sector. Although there are oil extraction operations in the
west and the eastern parts of the country, this remains a largely untapped resource. If the DRC were found to
have significant oil reserves, there is no question that this would serve as a bonanza of rent-seeking
opportunities for the ruling elite, and would also make it even more unlikely that prodevelopmental political
coalitions and bargains will be formed.
o For now, more traditional sources of rents will be tapped revenue services, the Central bank, and so
forth, much to the detriment of efforts at national reconstruction and to the countrys reputation.

For fragile states, peacebuilding and statebuilding come before MDGs (https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/poverty-matters/2011/jun/23/fragile-states-peacebuilding-statebuilding)
International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
While the millennium development goals (MDGs) remain the ultimate objectives for developing countries, not
a single low-income fragile state is likely to achieve any of them soon. A new focus on peacebuilding and
statebuilding is needed: political settlements, security, justice, jobs, growth, revenues and services.
o This means ensuring people are secure in their communities, abuses are addressed through fair legal
processes, jobs are created for young people, former combatants and female headed households,
natural resources are a factor of growth and not a cause of conflict.

Where does power lie in a fragile state like Eastern Congo? What does it mean for aid organisations?,
From Poverty to Power
The roads in DRC are extraordinary; a skeleton-rearranging, dental filling-loosening, vehicle disintegrating
nightmare.
o In the rainy season, trucks charge $1200 to bump and crawl a load of sand the 5 hours from Goma to
an Oxfam-run IDP camp near Rubaya (65 km). On its return, the truck has to go straight into the
garage for repairs that can cost half of that money. Thats no way to run an economy.
o A halfway decent state would invest in roads to unleash markets, connect its communities, but in the
DRC, such enlightened provision of public goods is currently a distant dream. Roads are both a literal
and metaphorical point of entry for understanding the role of the state.
Numerous centres of power and trust, from which can emerge coalitions for short term change and longer
term construction of institutions. Outsiders, whether governments, the UN system or NGOs, can help being
them together in search of solutions and support efforts to include the voices of the biggest missing element
the Congolese people.
Clovis Mwanbutsa, Oxfams Provincial Coordinator in North Kivu: In other countries we work more with
government, but here we have been in a very humanitarian operation, and if you are very operational, and the
government is very weak and cant deliver, you cant work with it. With more long term programming you can
start to engage with government bodies at provincial or national level.
o Supporting Congolese, whether in or out of power, to build a new country from the current wreckage
involves long term commitments, acceptance of reverses and failures, all built on a foundation of the
deepest possible understanding of a complex political and social system.