FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000]

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and
Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity
as the Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree.
That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be given
equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That
is the principle we uphold today.
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established
primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.[1] To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational
program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to
employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities,
such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have
been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-
hires. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire:
a.....What is one's domicile?
b.....Where is one's home economy?
c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for bringing that individual to
the Philippines?[2]
Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a
foreign-hire.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave
travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two
"significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The School explains:
A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country, leave his family and friends, and take the risk of
deviating from a promising career path-all for the purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time in a foreign land.
The new foreign hire is faced with economic realities: decent abode for oneself and/or for one's family, effective means of
transportation, allowance for the education of one's children, adequate insurance against illness and death, and of course the
primary benefit of a basic salary/retirement compensation.
Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the same economic reality after his term: that he will eventually
and inevitably return to his home country where he will have to confront the uncertainty of obtaining suitable employment after a
long period in a foreign land.
The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level in terms of
attracting competent professionals in the field of international education.[3]
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner International School Alliance of Educators, "a
legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members"[4] of the School, contested the difference in salary rates
between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit,
eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.
On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a
compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting
Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo
A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.
Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-
hires constitutes racial discrimination.
The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38 in all, with nationalities other than Filipino, who have
been hired locally and classified as local hires.[5]The Acting Secretary of Labor found that these non-Filipino local-hires received the same benefits as the
Filipino local-hires:
The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless of race. Truth to tell, there are foreigners who have been
hired locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local hires.[6]
The Acting Secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates:
The principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find application in the present case. The international character of the School
requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal with different nationalities and different cultures, among the student population.
We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits accorded to foreign hired personnel which system is
universally recognized. We agree that certain amenities have to be provided to these people in order to entice them to render their
services in the Philippines and in the process remain competitive in the international market.
Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of employment unlike the local hires who enjoy security
of tenure. To apply parity therefore, in wages and other benefits would also require parity in other terms and conditions of
employment which include the employment contract.
A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for salary and professional compensation wherein
the parties agree as follows:
 All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance with Appendix C hereof provided
that the Superintendent of the School has the discretion to recruit and hire expatriate teachers from abroad,
under terms and conditions that are consistent with accepted international practice.
Appendix C of said CBA further provides:
The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff (OSRS) salary schedule. The 25%
differential is reflective of the agreed value of system displacement and contracted status of the OSRS as
differentiated from the tenured status of Locally Recruited Staff (LRS).
To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in the status of two types of employees, hence,
the difference in their salaries.
The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle of constitutional law
that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable
classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily,
there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities
of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching
faculty of the School.[7]
We cannot agree.
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The
Constitution[8] in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code
requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith."
International law, which springs from general principles of law,[9] likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include principles of
equity,[10] i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable.[11] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,[12] the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,[13] the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,[14] the Convention against Discrimination in Education,[15] the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment
and Occupation[16] - all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its
Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer
are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution[17] specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical
workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
The Constitution[18] also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code [19] provides that the State
shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State,
in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and
conditions of employment.[20]
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and penalizes[21] the payment of
lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in Article 7 thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of
work, which ensure, in particular:
a.....Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
i.....Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women
being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;
x x x.
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.[22] This rule applies to the School, its
"international character" notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires.[23] The Court finds this
argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work.
This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain
why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is
for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively
than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.
The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the
principle of equal work for equal pay.
"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services performed." Similarly, the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia
states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid at regular intervals for the rendering of services." In Songco v. National Labor Relations Commission,[24] we
said that:
"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in another man's business. Whether it be
derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the fundamental idea of
compensation for services rendered. (Emphasis supplied.)
While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The
local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation
factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure
affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," [25] "to afford labor full protection."[26] The State, therefore,
has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital.[27] These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with
public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.[28] Should such contracts contain
stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local
hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the
School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.
We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity
to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the
law."[29] The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of
the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual
Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. [30] The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining
rights.[31]
It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The
collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires
enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are
accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel
allowance, are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a
bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated
June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according foreign-
hires higher salaries than local-hires.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CAYAT, defendant-appellant.
Sinai Hamada y Cario for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, was sentenced by the
justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On appeal of the Court of
First Instance, the following information was filed against him:
That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court,
the above-named accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive,
acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called
native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.
Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, he admitted all the facts alleged in the information, but pleaded not guilty to the
charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50) or supper subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The case is now before this court on appeal.
Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 read:
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act
Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating
liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to
make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly
authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found
unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.
SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each
offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court.
The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:
(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;
(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and.
(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state.
Counsel for the appellant holds out his brief as the "brief for the non-Christian tribes." It is said that as these less civilized elements of the Filipino
population are "jealous of their rights in a democracy," any attempt to treat them with discrimination or "mark them as inferior or less capable rate or less
entitled" will meet with their instant challenge. As the constitutionality of the Act here involved is questioned for purposes thus mentioned, it becomes
imperative to examine and resolve the issues raised in the light of the policy of the government towards the non-Christian tribes adopted and
consistently followed from the Spanish times to the present, more often with sacrifice and tribulation but always with conscience and humanity.
As early as 1551, the Spanish Government had assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude toward these inhabitants, and in the different laws of the Indies,
their concentration in so-called "reducciones" (communities) have been persistently attempted with the end in view of according them the "spiritual
and temporal benefits" of civilized life. Throughout the Spanish regime, it had been regarded by the Spanish Government as a sacred "duty to
conscience and humanity" to civilize these less fortunate people living "in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "the moral and material
advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws." (Decree of the Governor-General of the
Philippines, Jan. 14, 1887.) This policy had not been deflected from during the American period. President McKinley in his instructions to the Philippine
Commission of April 7, 1900, said:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes
of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in
peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal government should,
however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised
to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.
Since then and up to the present, the government has been constantly vexed with the problem of determining "those practicable means of bringing
about their advancement in civilization and material prosperity." (See, Act No. 253.) "Placed in an alternative of either letting them alone or guiding
them in the path of civilization," the present government "has chosen to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity and with the
national conscience." (Memorandum of Secretary of the Interior, quoted in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660, 714.) To this end, their
homes and firesides have been brought in contact with civilized communities through a network of highways and communications; the benefits of
public education have to them been extended; and more lately, even the right of suffrage. And to complement this policy of attraction and
assimilation, the Legislature has passed Act No. 1639 undoubtedly to secure for them the blessings of peace and harmony; to facilitate, and not to mar,
their rapid and steady march to civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in this light that the Act must be understood and applied.
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated
by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
(Borgnis vs. Falk Co., 133 N.W., 209; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61; 55 Law. ed., Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660;
People and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. Vera and Cu Unjieng, 37 Off. Gaz ., 187.)
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based
upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian
tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) This distinction is
unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of
certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of
the classification thus established.
That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale,
beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been
accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-
Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors
by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life
and civilization.
The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions
exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing
influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures
of protection and security.
Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain
number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.
Appellants contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the government to seize and
forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law
provided in the Constitution. But this provision is not involved in the case at bar. Besides, to constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not
always necessary. This rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular cases.
(McGehee, Due Process of Law p. 371, cited with approval in Rubi vs.Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) Due process of law means simply: (1) that
there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its
operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens
of the state or to all of the class. (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal by the United States Supreme Court, 218 U.S., 302: 54 Law. ed.,
1049.) Thus, a person's property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or property used in violation of law may
be confiscated (U.S. vs. Surla, 20 Phil., 163, 167), or when the property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case (Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil., 439,
442).
Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the police power is the most insistent and least limitable of
all powers of the government. It has been aptly described as a power co-extensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity.
Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state,
develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.S., 27), is a legitimate exercise of the police power, unless shown
to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual, the same must be upheld.
Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and
intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no
other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines.
The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the
promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in tht enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed
by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has
endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in
view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is indeed gratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding,
are definitely asserting themselves in a competitive world," as appellant's attorney impressively avers, and that they are "a virile, up-and -coming people
eager to take their place in the world's social scheme." As a matter of fact, there are now lawyers, doctors and other professionals educated in the best
institutions here and in America. Their active participation in the multifarious welfare activities of community life or in the delicate duties of government
is certainly a source of pride and gratification to people of the Philippines. But whether conditions have so changed as to warrant a partial or complete
abrogation of the law, is a matter which rests exclusively within the prerogative of the National Assembly to determine. In the constitutional scheme of
our government, this court can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold it
does exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it, are matters which
this court has no authority to pass upon. And, if in the application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer, the justification still
exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populi suprema est lex. When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a
certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental
inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation
(Cf. Boston Beer Co. vs. Mass., 97 U.S., 25; 24 law. ed., 989).
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Conception, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Baguio City

EN BANC

ATTY. VICENTE E. SALUMBIDES, JR., and GLENDA ARAA, G.R. No. 180917
Petitioners,
- versus -
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, RICARDO AGON, RAMON
VILLASANTA, ELMER DIZON, SALVADOR ADUL, and AGNES
FABIAN,
Respondents,

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioners Vicente Salumbides, Jr. (Salumbides) and Glenda Araa (Glenda) challenge the October 11, 2007 Decision and the December 13, 2007
Resolution of the Court of Appeals[1] in CA-G.R. SP No. 96889 affirming the Office of the Ombudsmans decision finding them guilty of Simple Neglect of
Duty.

Salumbides and Glenda were appointed in July 2001 as Municipal Legal Officer/Administrator and Municipal Budget Officer, respectively, of
Tagkawayan, Quezon.

Towards the end of 2001, Mayor Vicente Salumbides III (the mayor) saw the urgent need to construct a two-classroom building with fence (the
projects) for the Tagkawayan Municipal High School[2](TMHS) since the public school in the poblacion area would no longer admit high school freshmen
starting school year 2002-2003. On how to solve the classroom shortage, the mayor consulted Salumbides who suggested that the construction of the
two-classroom building be charged to the account of the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses/ Repair and Maintenance of Facilities
(MOOE/RMF) and implemented by administration, as had been done in a previous classroom building project of the former mayor.

Upon consultation, Glenda advised Salumbides in December 2001, that there were no more available funds that could be taken from the
MOOE/RMF, but the savings of the municipal government were adequate to fund the projects. She added, however, that the approval by
the Sangguniang Bayan of a proposed supplemental budget must be secured.

The members of the Sangguniang Bayan having already gone on recess for the Christmas holidays, Glenda and Salumbides advised the
mayor to source the funds from the P1,000,000 MOOE/RMF allocation in the approved Municipal Annual Budget for 2002.[3]

The mayor thus ordered on January 8, 2002 Municipal Engineer Jose Aquino (Aquino) to proceed with the construction of the projects based
on the program of work and bill of materials he (Aquino) prepared with a total cost estimate of P222,000.

Upon advice of Municipal Planning and Development Officer Hernan Jason (Jason), the mayor included the projects in the list of local
government projects scheduled for bidding on January 25, 2002which, together with the January 31, 2002 public bidding, failed.

The mayor was to admit later his expectation or assumption of risk on reimbursement:

x x x It was my thinking that even if a bidder emerges and gets these 2 projects which were at the time on-going (although it
was also my thinking then that no bidder would possibly bid for these 2 projects as these were cost-estimated very low-P150,000 for the
2-room school building P72,000 for the fencing) he (bidder) would be reasonable enough to reimburse what I had so far spen[t] for
the project. I said I because up to the time of the failed 2 biddings I have shouldered the vale of the laborers and I requisitioned some
materials on credit on my own personal account, and not a single centavo was at the time disbursed by our municipal treasury until
all requirements for negotiated purchase of the materials for the project had been accomplished. As a matter of fact, payments for
the expenses on these 2 projects have been made only starting 19 March 2002. x x x[4] (underscoring supplied)

The construction of the projects commenced without any approved appropriation and ahead of the public bidding. Salumbides was of the
opinion that the projects were regular and legal, based on an earlier project that was implemented in the same manner, using the same source of fund
and for the same reason of urgency which was allowed because the building was considered merely temporary as the TMHS is set to be transferred to
an 8-hectare lot which the municipal government is presently negotiating to buy.[5]
Meanwhile, Aquino suggested to the Sangguniang Bayan the adoption of model guidelines in the implementation of infrastructure projects to
be executed by administration, while Councilor Coleta Sandro (Coleta) sponsored a Resolution to ratify the projects and to authorize the mayor to
enter into a negotiated procurement. Both actions did not merit the approval of the Sangguniang Bayan.
 On May 13, 2002, herein respondents Ricardo Agon, Ramon Villasanta, Elmer Dizon, Salvador Adul and Agnes Fabian, all members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Tagkawayan, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint[6] against Salumbides and Glenda (hereafter petitioners),
the mayor, Coleta, Jason and Aquino.

The administrative aspect of the case, docketed as Case No. OMB-L-A-02-0276-E, charged petitioners et al. with Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and violation of the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and
the Local Government Code.

By Order of June 14, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman, denied the prayer to place petitioners et al. under preventive suspension pending
investigation. By Order dated February 1, 2005, approved on April 11, 2005, it denied the motion for reconsideration but dropped the mayor and
Coleta, both elective officials, as respondents in the administrative case, the 2004 elections having mooted the case. The parties were thereupon
directed to submit their respective verified position papers to which petitioners, Jason and Aquino complied by submitting a consolidated position
paper on May 19, 2005.
Meanwhile, in response to the subpoena duces tecum issued by the Office of the Ombudsman on February 18, 2005 requiring the regional officer of the
COA to submit the post-audit report on the projects, Celerino Alviar, COA State Auditor II claimed by Affidavit of May 23, 2005 that the required
documents were among those razed by fire on April 14, 2004 that hit the Office of the Municipal Accountant where they were temporarily stored due
to lack of space at the Provincial Auditors Office.

On October 17, 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman approved the September 9, 2005 Memorandum absolving Jason and Aquino, and finding
petitioners guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty, for which they were meted the penalty of suspension from office for a maximum period of six months with a
stern warning against a similar repetition. It also approved on November 2, 2006 the March 27, 2006 Order[7] denying the motion for reconsideration.

Their recourse to the appellate court having failed, petitioners come before this Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

For non-compliance with the rule on certification against forum shopping, the petition merits outright dismissal. The verification portion of the
petition does not carry a certification against forum shopping.[8]

The Court has distinguished the effects of non-compliance with the requirement of verification and that of certification against forum
shopping. A defective verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleadingand thus produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to
allow the deficiency to be remedied, while the failure to certify against forum shopping shall be cause for dismissal without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, and is not curable by amendment of the initiatory pleading.[9]
Petitioners disregard of the rules was not the first. Their motion for extension of time to file petition was previously denied by Resolution
of January 15, 2008[10] for non-compliance with the required showing of competent proof of identity in the Affidavit of Service. The Court, by Resolution
of March 4, 2008,[11] later granted their motion for reconsideration with motion to admit appeal (Motion with Appeal) that was filed on February 18,
2008 or the last day of filing within the extended period.

Moreover, in their Manifestation/Motion[12] filed a day later, petitioners prayed only for the admission of nine additional copies of the Motion with
Appeal due to honest inadvertence in earlier filing an insufficient number of copies. Petitioners were less than candid when they surreptitiously
submitted a Motion with Appeal which is different from the first set they had submitted. The second set of Appeal includes specific Assignment of
Errors[13] and already contains a certification against forum shopping[14] embedded in the Verification. The two different Verifications were notarized by
the same notary public and bear the same date and document number.[15] The rectified verification with certification, however, was filed beyond the
reglementary period.

Its lapses aside, the petition just the same merits denial.

Petitioners urge this Court to expand the settled doctrine of condonation[16] to cover coterminous appointive officials who were administratively
charged along with the reelected official/appointing authority with infractions allegedly committed during their preceding term.

The Court rejects petitioners thesis.

More than 60 years ago, the Court in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija [17] issued the landmark ruling that prohibits the disciplining of an
elective official for a wrongful act committed during his immediately preceding term of office. The Court explained that [t]he underlying theory is that
each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent
of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.[18]

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive
the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people elect[e]d a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is
not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct[,] to practically overrule the will of the people.[19] (underscoring supplied)

Lizares v. Hechanova, et al.[20] replicated the doctrine. The Court dismissed the petition in that case for being moot, the therein petitioner
having been duly reelected, is no longer amenable to administrative sanctions.[21]

Ingco v. Sanchez, et al.[22] clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case.[23] Luciano v. The Provincial Governor, et
al.,[24]
Olivarez v. Judge Villaluz,[25] and Aguinaldo v. Santos[26] echoed the qualified rule that reelection of a public official does not bar prosecution for
crimes committed by him prior thereto.
 Consistently, the Court has reiterated the doctrine in a string of recent jurisprudence including two cases involving a Senator and a Member of
the House of Representatives.[27]

Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.[28] and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica[29] reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was applied even if the administrative
complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged misconduct occurred four days before the elections,
respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing of the administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was committed
during the prior term, the precise timing or period of which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the public
officials culpability was committed prior to the date of reelection.

Petitioners theory is not novel.

A parallel question was involved in Civil Service Commission v. Sojor[30] where the Court found no basis to broaden the scope of the doctrine of
condonation:

Lastly, We do not agree with respondents contention that his appointment to the position of president of NORSU, despite the
pending administrative cases against him, served as a condonation by the BOR of the alleged acts imputed to him. The doctrine this
Court laid down in Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Aguinaldo v. Santos are inapplicable to the present circumstances. Respondents in
the mentioned cases are elective officials, unlike respondent here who is an appointed official. Indeed, election expresses the
sovereign will of the people. Under the principle of vox populi est suprema lex, the re-election of a public official may, indeed,
supersede a pending administrative case. The same cannot be said of a re-appointment to a non-career position. There is no
sovereign will of the people to speak of when the BOR re-appointed respondent Sojor to the post of university president.[31] (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Contrary to petitioners asseveration, the non-application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not violate the right to equal
protection of the law.

In the recent case of Quinto v. Commission on Elections,[32] the Court applied the four-fold test in an equal protection challenge[33] against the resign-to-
run provision, wherein it discussed the material and substantive distinctions between elective and appointive officials that could well apply to the
doctrine of condonation:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory
within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is
not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing
authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve
at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

xxxx
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. It involves the
choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their
constituents for a definite term, x x x complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials
until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are
concerned. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The electorates condonation of the previous administrative infractions of the reelected official cannot be extended to that of the reappointed
coterminous employees, the underlying basis of the rule being to uphold the will of the people expressed through the ballot. In other words, there is
neither subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of, in the case of reappointed coterminous employees.

It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person who happens to be the appointing authority, that could extinguish an administrative
liability. Since petitioners hold appointive positions, they cannot claim the mandate of the electorate. The people cannot be charged with the
presumption of full knowledge of the life and character of each and every probable appointee of the elective official ahead of the latters actual
reelection.

Moreover, the unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine would set a dangerous precedent as it would, as respondents posit, provide civil
servants, particularly local government employees, with blanket immunity from administrative liability that would spawn and breed abuse in the
bureaucracy.
Asserting want of conspiracy, petitioners implore this Court to sift through the evidence and re-assess the factual findings. This the Court cannot do, for
being improper and immaterial.

Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised, since the Court is not a trier of facts. [34] As a rule, the Court is not to review
evidence on record and assess the probative weight thereof. In the present case, the appellate court affirmed the factual findings of the Office of the
Ombudsman, which rendered the factual questions beyond the province of the Court.

Moreover, as correctly observed by respondents, the lack of conspiracy cannot be appreciated in favor of petitioners who were found guilty of simple
neglect of duty, for if they conspired to act negligently, their infraction becomes intentional.[35] There can hardly be conspiracy to commit
negligence.[36]
Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a task expected from an employee resulting from either carelessness or
indifference.[37] In the present case, petitioners fell short of the reasonable diligence required of them, for failing to exercise due care and prudence in
ascertaining the legal requirements and fiscal soundness of the projects before stamping their imprimatur and giving their advice to their superior.

The appellate court correctly ruled that as municipal legal officer, petitioner Salumbides failed to uphold the law and provide a sound legal assistance
and support to the mayor in carrying out the delivery of basic services and provisions of adequate facilities when he advised [the mayor] to proceed
with the construction of the subject projects without prior competitive bidding.[38] As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, to absolve
Salumbides is tantamount to allowing with impunity the giving of erroneous or illegal advice, when by law he is precisely tasked to advise the mayor on
matters related to upholding the rule of law.[39] Indeed, a legal officer who renders a legal opinion on a course of action without any legal basis
becomes no different from a lay person who may approve the same because it appears justified.

As regards petitioner Glenda, the appellate court held that the improper use of government funds upon the direction of the mayor and prior advice by
the municipal legal officer did not relieve her of liability for willingly cooperating rather than registering her written objection[40] as municipal budget
officer.

Aside from the lack of competitive bidding, the appellate court, pointing to the improper itemization of the expense, held that the funding for the
projects should have been taken from the capital outlays that refer to the appropriations for the purchase of goods and services, the benefits of which
extend beyond the fiscal year and which add to the assets of the local government unit. It added that current operating expenditures like MOOE/RMF
refer to appropriations for the purchase of goods and services for the conduct of normal local government operations within the fiscal year.[41]

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Tongson,[42] the Court reminded the therein respondents, who were guilty of simple neglect of duty, that government
funds must be disbursed only upon compliance with the requirements provided by law and pertinent rules.

Simple neglect of duty is classified as a less grave offense punishable by suspension without pay for one month and one day to six months. Finding no
alleged or established circumstance to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty of six months, the Court finds the imposition of suspension
without pay for three months justified.

When a public officer takes an oath of office, he or she binds himself or herself to faithfully perform the duties of the office and use reasonable skill and
diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of duties, a public officer is to use that prudence, caution, and
attention which careful persons use in the management of their affairs.[43]

Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public servants must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and dedication to
duty. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, public officers and employees must faithfully adhere to hold sacred and render inviolate the
constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust; and must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency.[44]

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96889 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that
petitioners, Vicente Salumbides, Jr. and Glenda Araa, are suspended from office for three (3) months without pay.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 164785 March 15, 2010

ELISEO F. SORIANO, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, in her capacity as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, MOVIE AND TELEVISION
REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE
S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 165636

ELISEO F. SORIANO, Petitioner,

vs.
MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, ZOSIMO G. ALEGRE, JACKIE AQUINO-GAVINO, NOEL R. DEL PRADO, EMMANUEL BORLAZA,
JOSE E. ROMERO IV, and FLORIMONDO C. ROUS, in their capacity as members of the Hearing and Adjudication Committee of the MTRCB, JESSIE L.
GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and
ROLDAN A. GAVINO, in their capacity as complainants before the MTRCB, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Before us is this motion of petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court dated April 29, 2009, modifying that of the Movie
and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) by imposing the penalty of three-month suspension on the television show Ang Dating Daan,
instead of on petitioner Soriano, as host of that program.

Petitioner seeks reconsideration on the following grounds or issues: (1) the suspension thus meted out to the program constitutes prior restraint; (2) the
Court erred in ruling that his utterances1 did not constitute exercise of religion; (3) the Court erred in finding the language used as offensive and
obscene; (4) the Court should have applied its policy of non-interference in cases of conflict between religious groups; and (5) the Court erred in
penalizing the television program for the acts of petitioner.

The motion has no merit.

Petitioners threshold posture that the suspension thus imposed constitutes prior restraint and an abridgement of his exercise of religion and freedom of
expression is a mere rehash of the position he articulated in the underlying petitions for certiorari and expounded in his memorandum.2 So are the
supportive arguments and some of the citations of decisional law, Philippine and American, holding it together. They have been considered, sufficiently
discussed in some detail, and found to be without merit in our Decision. It would, thus, make little sense to embark on another lengthy discussion of the
same issues and arguments.

Suffice it to reiterate that the sanction imposed on the TV program in question does not, under the factual milieu of the case, constitute prior restraint,
but partakes of the nature of subsequent punishment for past violation committed by petitioner in the course of the broadcast of the program on
August 10, 2004. To be sure, petitioner has not contested the fact of his having made statements on the air that were contextually violative of the
programs "G" rating. To merit a "G" rating, the program must be "suitable for all ages," which, in turn, means that the "material for television [does not], in
the judgment of the [MTRCB], x x x contain anything unsuitable for children and minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision."3 As
previously discussed by the Court, the vulgar language petitioner used on prime-time television can in no way be characterized as suitable for all ages,
and is wholly inappropriate for children.

Petitioner next harps on the primacy of his freedoms, referring particularly to the exercise of his religious beliefs and profession, as presiding minister of his
flock, over the right and duty of the state as parens patriae. Petitioners position may be accorded some cogency, but for the fact that it fails to
consider that the medium he used to make his statements was a television broadcast, which is accessible to children of virtually all ages. As already laid
down in the Decision subject of this recourse, the interest of the government in protecting children who may be subjected to petitioners invectives
must take precedence over his desire to air publicly his dirty laundry. The public soapbox that is television must be guarded by the state, which purpose
the MTRCB serves, and has served, in suspending Ang Dating Daan for petitioners statements. As emphasized in Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak,4 the
freedom of broadcast media is, in terms of degree of protection it deserves, lesser in scope, especially as regards television, which reaches every home
where there is a set, and where children will likely be among the avid viewers of the programs shown. The same case also laid the basis for the
classification system of the MTRCB when it stated, "It cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of
caring for the welfare of the young."5

The penalty of suspension imposed on petitioner has driven him to liken the Court to "a blind man who was asked to describe an elephant, and by his
description he stubbornly believed that an elephant is just the same as a Meralco post after touching one if its legs." 6 Petitioner makes this comparison
with the view that the factual backdrop against which his statements were made was purportedly not considered by the Court. As he presently argues:
The Honorable Court should have rendered its decision in light of the surrounding circumstances why and what prompted herein petitioner to utter
those words. Clearly, he was provoked because of the malicious and blatant splicing by the INC ministers of his recorded voice. Verily, Petitioner
submits that the choice of words he used has been harsh but strongly maintains that the same was consistent with his constitutional right of freedom of
speech and religion.

Contrary to petitioners impression, the Court has, in fact, considered the factual antecedents of and his motive in making his utterances, and has
found those circumstances wanting as defense for violating the programs "G" rating. Consider the following excerpts from the Courts Decision:

There is nothing in petitioners statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical
mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a
religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioners attempts
to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its
veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul
language used in retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as
they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group. They simply illustrate that petitioner had
descended to the level of name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to contradict and disprove his detractors, but
opted for the low road.

And just to set things straight, the penalty imposed is on the program, not on petitioner.

Petitioner would next have the Court adopt a hands-off approach to the conflict between him and the Iglesia Ni Cristo. In support of his urging, he cites
Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals.7

Petitioners invocation of Iglesia ni Cristo to support his hands-off thesis is erroneous. Obviously, he fails to appreciate what the Court stated in that
particular case when it rejected the argument that a religious program is beyond MTRCBs review and regulatory authority. We reproduce what the
Court pertinently wrote in Iglesia ni Cristo:

We thus reject petitioners postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent [MTRCB]. Its public broadcast on TV of its
religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates
the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive
evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e. serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A
laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is
and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. Across the sea and in our shore, the bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by men
were caused by irreconcilable religious differences. Our country is still not safe from the recurrence of this stultifying strife considering our warring
religious beliefs and the fanaticism with which some of us cling and claw to these beliefs. x x x For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the
State should not stand still.8 (Emphasis added.)

Lastly, petitioner claims that there was violation of due process of law, alleging that the registered producer of the program is not a party to the
proceedings. Hence, the program cannot, so petitioner asserts, be penalized.

We will let the records speak for themselves to refute that argument.

As per petitioners admission in his petition for certiorari filed with the Court, he is "the Executive Producer of Ang Dating Daan, a televised bible
exposition program produced by the Philippine-based religious organization, Church of God International."9 It is unclear, then, which producer the
movant is referring to in claiming that there was no representation before the MTRCB. He was and is the representative of Ang Dating Daan, and the
claim that there was no due process of law is simply bereft of merit.

Even as the foregoing disquisitions would suffice to write finis to the instant motion, certain relevant issues have been raised by some members of the
Court that ought to be addressed if only to put things in their proper perspective. We refer to the matter of obscenity.

As stressed at every possible turn in the challenged Courts Decision, the defining standards to be employed in judging the harmful effects of the
statements petitioner used would be those for the average child, not those for the average adult. We note that the ratings and regulation of television
broadcasts take into account the protection of the child, and it is from the childs narrow viewpoint that the utterances must be considered, if not
measured. The ratings "G," "PG" (parental guidance), "PG-13," and "R" (restricted or for adults only) suggest as much. The concern was then, as now, that
the program petitioner hosted and produced would reach an unintended audience, the average child, and so it is how this audience would view his
words that matters. The average child would not be concerned with colorful speech, but, instead, focus on the literal, everyday meaning of words
used. It was this literal approach that rendered petitioners utterances obscene.1avvphi1

The Court has taken stock of Action for Childrens Television v. FCC,10 but finds this U.S. case not to be of governing application to this jurisdiction under
the present state of things. The so-called "safe harbor" of 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., adverted to in Action for Childrens Television as the time wherein
broadcast of indecent material may be permitted, is believed inapplicable here. As it were, there is no legislative enactment or executive issuance
setting a similar period in the Philippines wherein indecent material may be broadcast. Rather than fix a period for allowing indecent programming,
what is used in this jurisdiction is the system of classification of television programs, which the petitioner violated. His program was rated "G," purported to
be suitable for all ages. We cannot lose sight of the violation of his programs classification that carried with it the producers implied assurance that the
program did not contain anything unsuitable for children and minors. The hour at which it was broadcasted was of little moment in light of the
guarantee that the program was safe for childrens viewing.

The suspension of the program has not been arrived at lightly. Taking into account all the factors involved and the arguments pressed on the Court, the
suspension of the program is a sufficiently limited disciplinary action, both to address the violation and to serve as an object lesson for the future. The
likelihood is great that any disciplinary action imposed on petitioner would be met with an equally energetic defense as has been put up here. The
simple but stubborn fact is that there has been a violation of government regulations that have been put in place with a laudable purpose, and this
violation must accordingly be dealt with. We are not unmindful of the concerns on the restriction of freedoms that may occur in imposing sanctions
upon erring individuals and institutions, but it cannot be over-emphasized that the freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights are far from absolute. Each has
its own limits, responsibilities, and obligations. Everyone is expected to bear the burden implicit in the exercise of these freedoms. So it must be here.

WHEREFORE, petitioners motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case. Let entry of judgment be made in due course.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in
behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million adhering to
the teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and gave himself
up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of Filipino
Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and violence and more
than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners."3

Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004.4

R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's
intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common
child.5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the
duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care providers, and other local
government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.

A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, and
an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.

The Factual Antecedents

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition 6 (Civil Case No. 06-
797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia
(petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. 7

Private respondent's claims

Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children,
namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years
old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8

Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around her husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of
Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to
pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and even when she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner
trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of
some men, at one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed.9

Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of
their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household help about his
sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was just using the woman because of their accounts with
the bank.10

Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner
grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private
respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text
messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. When
private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even
the small boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because of his
cruelty to private respondent.11

All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted
suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital. Private
respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then,
private respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant medications.12
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges against the bank manager, petitioner got
angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even
told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, that private respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is
not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with her.13

Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her children from her and deprive her of financial
support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.14

Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is the President of three corporations 326 Realty Holdings,
Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation of which he and private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to the
absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly salary of 20,000.00 from one corporation only, the
Negros Rotadrill Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than 200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent through the use
of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation together with the bills for utilities.15

On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of 60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other
benefits in hundreds of thousands of pesos from the corporations.16 After private respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner forbade her to
hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full
information about said businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an accounting of the businesses the
value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos.17

Action of the RTC of Bacolod City

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur,
the RTC issued a TPO18 on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family home within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable
notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is to
allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Respondent.

After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to
remove things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.

The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will
attempt to take her children from her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.

b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall
not enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.

c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or
contact directly or indirectly her children, mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation rights to the
children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.

d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and
Explosives Unit and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also be ordered to surrender
any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.

e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a house for them, and educational and medical
expenses.

f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.

g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to
31 March 2006, which himself and as President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than 2 April 2006.
Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days
of the month, under pain of Indirect Contempt of Court.

h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and considering the financial resources of the Respondent
and his threat that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in
the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.

On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included
the following additional provisions:

i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in
Negros Occidental.
 j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Paraaque, the continued use of the Starex van in Metro
Manila, whenever they go to Manila.

k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient sureties.

l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus
rental expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could be finally resolved.

Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the denial of the
renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that
the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading
Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from 5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at 100,000.00.

Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children.

On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the following modifications prayed for by private respondent:

a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings of Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-
counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect
Contempt of Court;

b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision,
Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;

c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within
eight (8) hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48 hours after the petitioners
have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can remove things from the conjugal home and make an inventory of the
household furniture, equipment and other things in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.

d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of Court;

e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel;

f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon presentation of proof of payment of such expenses.23

Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of
harassment against her and their children, private respondent filed another application 24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter

alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end
in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon private
respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25

While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy
resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened
her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also
known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."

Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working at the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and
illegal detention against private respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her
children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case for
qualified theft against Jamola.27

On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, acts of violence against the offended party;

2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating in any form with the offended party, either
directly or indirectly;

3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her
children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman
Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other household helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not
enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the three children; Furthermore,
 that respondent shall not contact the schools of the children directly or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or
other fees directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through the schools and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;

4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to the Court;

5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to September
6, 2006; and support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;

6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;

7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the
respondent fail to deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by J Bros
Tading;

8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of
Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an
interest in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are
conjugal assets or those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an interest in and
listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;

9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served a copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and
are ordered not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties to any person, entity or corporation
without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the
fear of petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud her or the
conjugal partnership of gains.

In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5)
days within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation, 30 however, that he has
not received a copy of private respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order 31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner
be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO dated August
23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:

xxxx

x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby
renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and
subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.

After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to private respondent's motion for renewal
of the TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility."33

Proceedings before the CA

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698),
with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and
the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."

On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order36 (TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and
other orders pursuant thereto.

Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed36 the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his
pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity

of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.

His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the Resolution 37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us
alleging that

The Issues

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.

II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL
INSTITUTION.

V.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38

The Ruling of the Court

Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal
by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be
raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it.40

In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited
authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality." 41

We disagree.

Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as
the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women and
children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court
in each of several key cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts
designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:

SEC. 7. Venue. The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against
women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)

Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon
all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.44 It is settled that
RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to
determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law." 46The Constitution vests the power of judicial
review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution
contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of
final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part
as follows:

SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition
to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of this Court.

Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the
respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer.49 Thus:

SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the
affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.

(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of action which could be the
subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from
the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a
defending party may have against an opposing party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. 51Finally, a third-party complaint is a
claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.52As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a
cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in
the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the right of private respondent to a protection order is
founded solely on the very statute the validity of which is being attacked 53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.

That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The
question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence. 54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of
A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz:

SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it may issue an order containing the following:

(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;

(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;

(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be presented;

(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of affidavits; and

(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period
of the effectivity of the temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)

To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides
that if a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time
until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of
the parties. With the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily
running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary procedure.

In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order
(CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted an
injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against
any interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of the TPO,
the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course in an expeditious
and summary manner.

As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting
permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time,56 should not be
enjoined.

The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v.
Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus:

Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted
as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for
his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for
relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that
protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will
defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.

Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching
implications. We have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view of private
respondent's plea in her Comment59 to the instant Petition that we should put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.

Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.

Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very well be committed by either the
husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.60

A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-
Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized measure" 62 an amalgamation of two measures,
namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act"63 providing protection to "all family members,
leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence and abuse,64 nonetheless, it was
eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same measure. We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:

Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups have expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to
me that if we are to include domestic violence apart from against women as well as other members of the household, including children or the
husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the
wives, the spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind of
observation?

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include
men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the family,
prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those
related with the family.65

xxx

Wednesday, January 14, 2004

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. x x x

Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to women and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR
group. The understanding that I have is that we would be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.

As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.

I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.

Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to protect
women's rights especially in the domestic environment.

As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in
partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by
the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.

I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure that the men in this Chamber who love their women in
their lives so dearly will agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how
empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in the domestic environment where the macho Filipino man would always
feel that he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill because the family members have been included in this
proposed measure since the other members of the family other than women are also possible victims of violence. While women are most likely the
intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be
victimized and that children are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection extended to
other family members particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses the special needs
of abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said law.

I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, fearing that they may use this law to justify their abusive
behavior against women. However, we should also recognize that there are established procedures and standards in our courts which give credence
to evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.

Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as the basic social institution. Though I recognize the
unequal power relations between men and women in our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both
husband and wife and their immediate family members, particularly children.

While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a critical input arrived at after a series of
consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.

Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.

Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would be removing the "men and children" in this particular
bill and focus specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the
distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined to accept the proposed amendment of Senator
Legarda.

I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I will propose an amendment to the amendment rather
than object to the amendment, Mr. President.

xxxx

Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?

xxxx

Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.

The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to
agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang
iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular measure.

So, if I may propose an amendment

The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.

Senator Sotto. more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to
seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find
out about these things.

Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will update that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse
of children and not only women.

SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS

Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.

The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment, as amended, is approved. 66

It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real
motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children
only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to
supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the
legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any
law.68 We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.

R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive:

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore,
a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a
statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or
practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should
be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification
or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)

Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and,
as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection.

I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the
widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre
succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality."70

A. Unequal power relationship between men and women

According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence against
women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based
violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while
women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power
over women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling women to retain
power.71

The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence
Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men
and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women,
and that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with
men."72

Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate
VAW, in his remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which
are quoted hereunder:

History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force on
members of the family under his control. I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy the institutional rule of men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be
naturally inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of
men. In law, they were treated as property.

The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his property right over her. Judaism,
Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of society.

English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying
husband and wife were one and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to
limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a
rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.

In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the
preservation of the family was given more importance than preventing violence to women.

The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama
became the first appellate court to strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his wife:

The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict
upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that the husband can
invoke for himself.

As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple
focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their
husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation movement's agenda.
They fought for women's right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.

The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue into an
important public concern. No less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:

In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the victims of severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985
survey, women reported that nearly one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The [American Medical Association]
views these figures as "marked underestimates," because the nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting them, and because surveys
typically exclude the very poor, those who do not speak English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is
conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double the above
estimates; or four million severely assaulted women per year."

Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime...
Thus on an average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of these incidents involve sexual
assault... In families where wife beating takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.

Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social
and economic isolation of women, is also common.

Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no superior alternative...Many abused women who find
temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part because they have no other source of income... Returning to one's abuser can be
dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United States are killed by their
spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are killed by their male partners.

Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.

In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights affirmed the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women. World conferences on the role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself
established a Commission on the Status of Women.

The Philippines has been in cadence with the half and full steps of all these women's movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987
Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on
March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations omitted)

B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"

victims of violence.

At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against women and children show that
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total cases reported (9,903). And for the first semester of
2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in especially difficult circumstances
served by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of the
total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003. Female violence comprised
more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such
as their husbands and live-in partners.73

Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to
August of 2011 with violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its implementation in 2004,74 thus:

Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*

Reported
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Cases

Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832

Incestuous
38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
Rape

Attempted
194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
Rape

Acts of
580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
Lasciviousness

Physical
3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018 1,588
Injuries

Sexual
53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
Harassment

RA 9262 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974 9,021

Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213

Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15

Concubinage 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128

RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62

Abduction
16 34 23 28 18 25 22
/Kidnapping 29

Unjust Vexation 90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155

Total 6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,104 12,948

*2011 report covers only from January to August

Source: Philippine National Police Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)

On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence against men in the Philippines because incidents thereof
are relatively low and, perhaps, because many men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had ever
experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of men who had ever experienced
domestic violence; and women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic violence.75Statistics in Canada show
that spousal violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury than the other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who
experience violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to experience
sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical or
emotional abuse.76

While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262
invalid.

In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the
manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was challenged
as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those
animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets.

The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be non-vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads,
"but their number must be negligible and their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a
menace to the health of the community."77 The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to
equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby
rendered invalid.78

C. Gender bias and prejudices

From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against women are often treated differently and less seriously than
other crimes. This was argued by then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He
stressed that the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of rape or domestic violence, subjecting
them to "double victimization" first at the hands of the offender and then of the legal system.79

Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that "(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat
it as a private matter and advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter is
hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution
reinforces the escalating, recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence." 80

Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.

In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and
irreverent language in reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner" and presenting
her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being motivated
by "insatiable greed" and of absconding with the contested property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.

The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused on women
does not discriminate against men.82Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing,"
and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures "to
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all
other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women."84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public
offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges." 85

II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and
children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human
rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a
party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the
CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with men
before the law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations on the basis of equality of men and women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two
protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.

III. The classification is not limited to existing

conditions only, and apply equally to all members

Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as
the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.

R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:

x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has
or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually
suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and
indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover
to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or
threat of physical or other harm or coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to
intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or
allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common
children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the
Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or
property owned in common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.

It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to research that has exposed the dimensions and
dynamics of battery. The acts described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the
argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is
tenuous.

There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are
easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application.91 Yet,
petitioner insists92that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or
common money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of
spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld
not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long
as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its
wordings or detailed in its provisions.93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be
committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person"
who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the
offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of
the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-
Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had
community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the
family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.

R.A. 9262 is not violative of the

due process clause of the Constitution.

Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family, property, guns,
money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened."95

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or household members, and to
grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate
the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.96

"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail
access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family
or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and
support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their
abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."97

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner 98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or
civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," 99 the court is authorized to issue
ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to
believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about
to recur.100

There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations
in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.101

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is
issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of
his property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly
even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests,103among which is protection of women and
children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing
him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served
immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.104

Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him
to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be
indicated on the notice.105

The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a
temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.106

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded
an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and
reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard"
does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.107

It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only
two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his
children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be
renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that
the renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if
he can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was denied due process of law.

Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of
the residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It states:

SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

xxxx

(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for
the purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects
from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent
has gathered his things and escort him from the residence;

xxxx

Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the private respondent
just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?

The non-referral of a VAWC case

to a mediator is justified.

Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the
avowed policy of the State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution." 109

Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-
explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows:110

This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which
parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for
compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues
in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person against
whom the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)

There is no undue delegation of

judicial power to barangay officials.

Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and
such other lower courts as may be established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection orders.111 The
pertinent provision reads, as follows:

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the
Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act.1wphi1 A Punong Barangay who
receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the
application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the
Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of
an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay
official to effect its personal service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is
the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance."113

As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay
Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman
or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local
Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay." 114

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order
to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers."115

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to believe that
an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe that
an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of a
BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies are required to extend
assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal
are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to
maintain peace and order.

Conclusion

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful
or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity
must be beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to
warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal
executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges
of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the
majority.

We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement against domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult
struggles was the fight against the violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for equality
but will be its fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 124360 November 5, 1997
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.
G.R. No. 127867 November 5, 1997
EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOKER P. ARROYO, ENRIQUE GARCIA, WIGBERTO TANADA, FLAG HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, INC., FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION
(FDC), SANLAKAS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RUBEN TORRES in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, HON. FRANCISCO VIRAY, in his capacity as the Secretary of Energy, CALTEX Philippines,
Inc., PETRON Corporation and PILIPINAS SHELL Corporation, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other
Purposes".1 R.A. No. 8180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation of the downstream oil industry. Few cases carry a surpassing importance
on the life of every Filipino as these petitions for the upswing and downswing of our economy materially depend on the oscillation of oil.

First, the facts without the fat. Prior to 1971, there was no government agency regulating the oil industry other than those dealing with ordinary
commodities. Oil companies were free to enter and exit the market without any government interference. There were four (4) refining companies (Shell,
Caltex, Bataan Refining Company and Filoil Refining) and six (6) petroleum marketing companies (Esso, Filoil, Caltex, Getty, Mobil and Shell), then
operating in the country.2

In 1971, the country was driven to its knees by a crippling oil crisis. The government, realizing that petroleum and its products are vital to national security
and that their continued supply at reasonable prices is essential to the general welfare, enacted the Oil Industry Commission Act.3 It created the Oil
Industry Commission (OIC) to regulate the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining, storing, distributing,
marketing and selling crude oil, gasoline, kerosene, gas and other refined petroleum products. The OIC was vested with the power to fix the
market prices of petroleum products, to regulate the capacities of refineries, to license new refineries and to regulate the operations and trade
practices of the industry.4

In addition to the creation of the OIC, the government saw the imperious need for a more active role of Filipinos in the oil industry. Until the early
seventies, the downstream oil industry was controlled by multinational companies. All the oil refineries and marketing companies were owned
by foreigners whose economic interests did not always coincide with the interest of the Filipino. Crude oil was transported to the country by foreign-
controlled tankers. Crude processing was done locally by foreign-owned refineries and petroleum products were marketed through foreign-owned
retail outlets. On November 9, 1973, President Ferdinand E. Marcos boldly created the Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) to break the control
by foreigners of our oil industry.5 PNOC engaged in the business of refining, marketing, shipping, transporting, and storing petroleum. It acquired
ownership of ESSO Philippines and Filoil to serve as its marketing arm. It bought the controlling shares of Bataan Refining Corporation, the largest refinery
in the country.6 PNOC later put up its own marketing subsidiary Petrophil. PNOC operated under the business name PETRON Corporation. For the first
time, there was a Filipino presence in the Philippine oil market.

In 1984, President Marcos through Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1956, created the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) to cushion the effects of
frequent changes in the price of oil caused by exchange rate adjustments or increase in the world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum
products. The fund is used (1) to reimburse the oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange
rate adjustment and/or increase in world market prices of crude oil, and (2) to reimburse oil companies for cost underrecovery incurred as a result of
the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products. Under the law, the OPSF may be sourced from:

1. any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed on petroleum products subject to tax under P.D.
No. 1956 arising from exchange rate adjustment,

2. any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of government corporations, as may be determined by
the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy,

3. any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the resources of the fund through an appropriate order
that may be issued by the Board of Energy requiring payment of persons or companies engaged in the business of importing,
manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products, or

4. any resulting peso costs differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil companies in the importation of crude oil and
petroleum products is less than the peso costs computed using the reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the Board of Energy.7

By 1985, only three (3) oil companies were operating in the country Caltex, Shell and the government-owned PNOC.

In May, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed Executive Order No. 172 creating the Energy Regulatory Boardto regulate the business of importing,
exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining, marketing and distributing energy resources "when warranted and only when public
necessity requires." The Board had the following powers and functions:

1. Fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products;

2. Fix and regulate the rate schedule or prices of piped gas to be charged by duly franchised gas
companies which distribute gas by means of underground pipe system;
 3. Fix and regulate the rates of pipeline concessionaries under the provisions of R.A. No. 387, as amended
...;

4. Regulate the capacities of new refineries or additional capacities of existing refineries and license
refineries that may be organized after the issuance of (E.O. No. 172) under such terms and conditions as
are consistent with the national interest; and

5. Whenever the Board has determined that there is a shortage of any petroleum product, or when
public interest so requires, it may take such steps as it may consider necessary, including the temporary
adjustment of the levels of prices of petroleum products and the payment to the Oil Price Stabilization
Fund . . . by persons or entities engaged in the petroleum industry of such amounts as may be
determined by the Board, which may enable the importer to recover its cost of importation.8

On December 9, 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department of Energy to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and
control all plans, programs, projects, and activities of the government in relation to energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and
conservation.9 The thrust of the Philippine energy program under the law was toward privatization of government agencies related to
energy, deregulation of the power and energy industry and reduction of dependency on oil-fired plants.10 The law also aimed to encourage free and
active participation and investment by the private sector in all energy activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4) years from the
effectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President, institute the programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate energy
projects and activities of the energy industry."

Pursuant to the policies enunciated in R.A. No. 7638, the government approved the privatization of Petron Corporation in 1993. On December 16, 1993,
PNOC sold 40% of its equity in Petron Corporation to the Aramco Overseas Company.

In March 1996, Congress took the audacious step of deregulating the downstream oil industry. It enacted R.A. No.8180, entitled the "Downstream Oil
Industry Deregulation Act of 1996." Under the deregulated environment, "any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and
petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude
oil or use the same for his own requirement," subject only to monitoring by the Department of
Energy.11

The deregulation process has two phases: the transition phase and the full deregulation phase. During the transition phase, controls of the non-pricing
aspects of the oil industry were to be lifted. The following were to be accomplished: (1) liberalization of oil importation, exportation, manufacturing,
marketing and distribution, (2) implementation of an automatic pricing mechanism, (3) implementation of an automatic formula to set margins of
dealers and rates of haulers, water transport operators and pipeline concessionaires, and (4) restructuring of oil taxes. Upon full deregulation, controls
on the price of oil and the foreign exchange cover were to be lifted and the OPSF was to be abolished.

The first phase of deregulation commenced on August 12, 1996.

On February 8, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry through E.O.No. 372.

The petitions at bar assail the constitutionality of various provisions of R.A No. 8180 and E.O. No. 372.

In G.R. No. 124360, petitioner Francisco S. Tatad seeks the annulment of section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180. Section 5(b) provides:

b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported
crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and
LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on
imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same: Provided, further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of
Congress.

The petition is anchored on three arguments:

First, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause.
Petitioner contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the
downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.

Second, that the imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the downstream oil industry but instead controls the oil industry, contrary to the
avowed policy of the law. Petitioner avers that the tariff differential between imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products bars the
entry of other players in the oil industry because it effectively protects the interest of oil companies with existing refineries. Thus, it runs counter to the
objective of the law "to foster a truly competitive market."

Third, that the inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates Section 26(1) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to
have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. Petitioner contends that the imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign
to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

In G.R. No. 127867, petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Joker P. Arroyo, Enrique Garcia, Wigberto Tanada, Flag Human Rights Foundation, Inc., Freedom from
Debt Coalition (FDC) and Sanlakas contest the constitutionality of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. Section 15 provides:
 Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation. Pursuant to Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon approval of the
President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time
the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of
the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Upon the implementation of the full deregulation as provided herein, the transition phase is
deemed terminated and the following laws are deemed repealed:

xxx xxx xxx

E.O. No. 372 states in full, viz.:

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7638, otherwise known as the "Department of Energy Act of 1992," provides that, at the end of four years from its
effectivity last December 1992, "the Department (of Energy) shall, upon approval of the President, institute the programs and time table of
deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy sector;"

WHEREAS, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180, otherwise known as the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996," provides that "the
DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March, 1997. As far as
practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining
and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable;"

WHEREAS, pursuant to the recommendation of the Department of Energy, there is an imperative need to implement the full deregulation of
the downstream oil industry because of the following recent developments: (i) depletion of the buffer fund on or about 7 February 1997
pursuant to the Energy Regulatory Board's Order dated 16 January 1997; (ii) the prices of crude oil had been stable at $21-$23 per barrel since
October 1996 while prices of petroleum products in the world market had been stable since mid-December of last year. Moreover, crude oil
prices are beginning to soften for the last few days while prices of some petroleum products had already declined; and (iii) the exchange rate
of the peso in relation to the US dollar has been stable for the past twelve (12) months, averaging at around P26.20 to one US dollar;

WHEREAS, Executive Order No. 377 dated 31 October 1996 provides for an institutional framework for the administration of the deregulated
industry by defining the functions and responsibilities of various government agencies;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8180, the deregulation of the industry will foster a truly competitive market which can better achieve
the social policy objectives of fair prices and adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high quality petroleum products;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by the powers vested in me by law, do hereby declare the
full deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

In assailing section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392, petitioners offer the following submissions:

First, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not
provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry. Petitioners contend that the law does not define when it is practicable for the Secretary of Energy to recommend to the
President the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry or when the President may consider it practicable to declare full deregulation. Also, the
law does not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the
exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.

Second, petitioners aver that E.O. No. 392 implementing the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry is arbitrary and unreasonable because it
was enacted due to the alleged depletion of the OPSF fund a condition not found in R.A. No. 8180.

Third, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow the formation of a de facto cartel among the three existing oil companies Petron, Caltex
and Shell in violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

Respondents, on the other hand, fervently defend the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. In addition, respondents contend that the
issues raised by the petitions are not justiciable as they pertain to the wisdom of the law. Respondents further aver that petitioners have no locus
standi as they did not sustain nor will they sustain direct injury as a result of the implementation of R.A. No. 8180.

The petitions were heard by the Court on September 30, 1997. On October 7, 1997, the Court ordered the private respondents oil companies "to
maintain the status quo and to cease and desist from increasing the prices of gasoline and other petroleum fuel products for a period of thirty (30) days
. . . subject to further orders as conditions may warrant."

We shall now resolve the petitions on the merit. The petitions raise procedural and substantive issues bearing on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and
E.O. No. 392. The procedural issues are: (1) whether or not the petitions raise a justiciable controversy, and (2) whether or not the petitioners have the
standing to assail the validity of the subject law and executive order. The substantive issues are: (1) whether or not section 5 (b) violates the one title
one subject requirement of the Constitution; (2) whether or not the same section violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution; (3) whether or
not section 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power; (4) whether or not E.O. No. 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable; and
(5) whether or not R.A. No. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

We shall first tackle the procedural issues. Respondents claim that the avalanche of arguments of the petitioners assail the wisdom of R.A. No. 8180.
They aver that deregulation of the downstream oil industry is a policy decision made by Congress and it cannot be reviewed, much less be reversed by
this Court. In constitutional parlance, respondents contend that the petitions failed to raise a justiciable controversy.
Respondents' joint stance is unnoteworthy. Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.12 The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent
authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where a statute violates the
Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void.13 We held in the recent case of Tanada
v. Angara:14

xxx xxx xxx

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but
in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty to adjudicate remains to
assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision
is raised before this Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.

Even a sideglance at the petitions will reveal that petitioners have raised constitutional issues which deserve the resolution of this Court in view of their
seriousness and their value as precedents. Our statement of facts and definition of issues clearly show that petitioners are assailing R.A. No. 8180
because its provisions infringe the Constitution and not because the law lacks wisdom. The principle of separation of power mandates that challenges
on the constitutionality of a law should be resolved in our courts of justice while doubts on the wisdom of a law should be debated in the halls of
Congress. Every now and then, a law may be denounced in court both as bereft of wisdom and constitutionally infirmed. Such denunciation will not
deny this Court of its jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of the said law while prudentially refusing to pass on its wisdom.

The effort of respondents to question the locus standi of petitioners must also fall on barren ground. In language too lucid to be misunderstood, this
Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner's locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people.15 In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,16 we stressed:

xxx xxx xxx

Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are, however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the
importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not
the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.

There is not a dot of disagreement between the petitioners and the respondents on the far reaching importance of the validity of RA No. 8180
deregulating our downstream oil industry. Thus, there is no good sense in being hypertechnical on the standing of petitioners for they pose issues which
are significant to our people and which deserve our forthright resolution.

We shall now track down the substantive issues. In G.R. No. 124360 where petitioner is Senator Tatad, it is contended that section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180
on tariff differential violates the provision17 of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. We do
not concur with this contention. As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title one subject rule. We have consistently
ruled18 that the title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in
the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.19 We hold
that section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The
section is supposed to sway prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum.20 We shall,
however, return to the validity of this provision when we examine its blocking effect on new entrants to the oil market.

We shall now slide to the substantive issues in G.R. No. 127867. Petitioners assail section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 which fixes the time frame for the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry. We restate its pertinent portion for emphasis, viz.:

Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation Pursuant to section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon approval of the
President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time
the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of
the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable . . .

Petitioners urge that the phrases "as far as practicable," "decline of crude oil prices in the world market" and "stability of the peso exchange rate to the
US dollar" are ambivalent, unclear and inconcrete in meaning. They submit that they do not provide the "determinate or determinable standards"
which can guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil industry. In addition, they contend that E.O. No. 392 which
advanced the date of full deregulation is void for it illegally considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor.

The power of Congress to delegate the execution of laws has long been settled by this Court. As early as 1916 in Compania General de Tabacos de
Filipinas vs. The Board of Public Utility Commissioners,21 this Court thru, Mr. Justice Moreland, held that "the true distinction is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." Over the years, as the legal
engineering of men's relationship became more difficult, Congress has to rely more on the practice of delegating the execution of laws to the
executive and other administrative agencies. Two tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to execute laws does
not involve the abdication of the power to make law itself. We delineated the metes and bounds of these tests in Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. VS. POEA,22 thus:
 There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that
when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both
tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional landscape. As sagely observed, delegation of legislative power has
become an inevitability in light of the increasing complexity of the task of government. Thus, courts bend as far back as possible to sustain the
constitutionality of laws which are assailed as unduly delegating legislative powers. Citing Hirabayashi v. United States23 as authority, Mr. Justice Isagani
A. Cruz states "that even if the law does not expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend over backward to locate the same elsewhere in order
to spare the statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity."24

Given the groove of the Court's rulings, the attempt of petitioners to strike down section 15 on the ground of undue delegation of legislative power
cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in
R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March
1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final
date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays
down the standard to guide the judgment of the President he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products
in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

Petitioners contend that the words "as far as practicable," "declining" and "stable" should have been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set
determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn submission deserves scant consideration. The dictionary meanings of these words are well settled
and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines "practicable" as meaning possible to practice or perform, "decline" as meaning
to take a downward direction, and "stable" as meaning firmly established.25 The fear of petitioners that these words will result in the exercise of executive
discretion that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not more general standards in other cases.26

It ought to follow that the argument that E.O. No. 392 is null and void as it was based on indeterminate standards set by R.A. 8180 must likewise fail. If
that were all to the attack against the validity of E.O. No. 392, the issue need not further detain our discourse. But petitioners further posit the thesis that
the Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in
February 1997. A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be considered by the Department of
Energy and the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining, and (2)
the time when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor
to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. On the contrary, the debates in Congress will show that some of our legislators
wanted to impose as a pre-condition to deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund must not be in deficit.27 We therefore hold that the Executive
department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The
misappreciation of this extra factor cannot be justified on the ground that the Executive department considered anyway the stability of the prices of
crude oil in the world market and the stability of the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar. By considering another factor to hasten full deregulation,
the Executive department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the
standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no power to make laws. To cede to the Executive the power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to
transgress the principle of separation of powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere agent
whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency. In the cases at bar, the Executive co-mingled the factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with the
factors of decline of the price of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is
impossible to determine the weight given by the Executive department to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It could well be the principal consideration
for the early deregulation. It could have been accorded an equal significance. Or its importance could be nil. In light of this uncertainty, we rule that
the early deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.

We now come to grips with the contention that some provisions of R.A. No. 8180 violate section 19 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions
are:

(1) Section 5 (b) which states "Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be
imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven
percent (7%) except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil. Provided, that beginning on January
1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same. Provided, further, that this provision may be
amended only by an Act of Congress."

(2) Section 6 which states "To ensure the security and continuity of petroleum crude and products supply, the DOE shall require the refiners
and importers to maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their respective annual sales volume or forty (40) days of
supply, whichever is lower," and

(3) Section 9 (b) which states "To ensure fair competition and prevent cartels and monopolies in the downstream oil industry, the following
acts shall be prohibited:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below the industry
average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors.

On the other hand, section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated by the aforestated provisions of R.A. No. 8180 mandates: "The State
shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed."
A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies, consisting in the exclusive right or power to carry on a
particular business or trade, manufacture a particular article, or control the sale or the whole supply of a particular commodity. It is a form of market
structure in which one or only a few firms dominate the total sales of a product or service.28 On the other hand, a combination in restraint of trade is an
agreement or understanding between two or more persons, in the form of a contract, trust, pool, holding company, or other form of association, for the
purpose of unduly restricting competition, monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain commodity, controlling its, production, distribution and price,
or otherwise interfering with freedom of trade without statutory authority.29 Combination in restraint of trade refers to the means while monopoly refers
to the end.30

Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code and Article 28 of the New Civil Code breathe life to this constitutional policy. Article 186 of the Revised Penal
Code penalizes monopolization and creation of combinations in restraint of
trade, 31 while Article 28 of the New Civil Code makes any person who shall engage in unfair competition liable for damages. 32

Respondents aver that sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) implement the policies and objectives of R.A. No. 8180. They explain that the 4% tariff differential is
designed to encourage new entrants to invest in refineries. They stress that the inventory requirement is meant to guaranty continuous domestic supply
of petroleum and to discourage fly-by-night operators. They also submit that the prohibition against predatory pricing is intended to protect prospective
entrants. Respondents manifested to the Court that new players have entered the Philippines after deregulation and have now captured 3% 5% of
the oil market.

The validity of the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 8180 has to be decided in light of the letter and spirit of our Constitution, especially section 19, Article
XII. Beyond doubt, the Constitution committed us to the free enterprise system but it is a system impressed with its own distinctness. Thus, while the
Constitution embraced free enterprise as an economic creed, it did not prohibit per se the operation of monopolies which can, however, be regulated
in the public interest.33 Thus too, our free enterprise system is not based on a market of pure and unadulterated competition where the State pursues a
strict hands-off policy and follows the let-the-devil devour the hindmost rule. Combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competitions are absolutely
proscribed and the proscription is directed both against the State as well as the private sector.34 This distinct free enterprise system is dictated by the
need to achieve the goals of our national economy as defined by section 1, Article XII of the Constitution which are: more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and
an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged. It also calls for the State to protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair competition and trade practices.

Section 19, Article XII of our Constitution is anti-trust in history and in spirit. It espouses competition. The desirability of competition is the reason for the
prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason for regulation of unmitigated monopolies.
Competition is thus the underlying principle of section 19, Article XII of our Constitution which cannot be violated by R.A. No. 8180. We subscribe to the
observation of Prof. Gellhorn that the objective of anti-trust law is "to assure a competitive economy, based upon the belief that through competition
producers will strive to satisfy consumer wants at the lowest price with the sacrifice of the fewest resources. Competition among producers allows
consumers to bid for goods and services, and thus matches their desires with society's opportunity costs." 35 He adds with appropriateness that there is a
reliance upon "the operation of the 'market' system (free enterprise) to decide what shall be produced, how resources shall be allocated in the
production process, and to whom the various products will be distributed. The market system relies on the consumer to decide what and how much
shall be produced, and on competition, among producers to determine who will manufacture it."

Again, we underline in scarlet that the fundamental principle espoused by section 19, Article XII of the Constitution is competition for it alone can
release the creative forces of the market. But the competition that can unleash these creative forces is competition that is fighting yet is fair. Ideally, this
kind of competition requires the presence of not one, not just a few but several players. A market controlled by one player (monopoly) or dominated
by a handful of players (oligopoly) is hardly the market where honest-to-goodness competition will prevail. Monopolistic or oligopolistic markets deserve
our careful scrutiny and laws which barricade the entry points of new players in the market should be viewed with suspicion.

Prescinding from these baseline propositions, we shall proceed to examine whether the provisions of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential, inventory
reserves, and predatory prices imposed substantial barriers to the entry and exit of new players in our downstream oil industry. If they do, they have to
be struck down for they will necessarily inhibit the formation of a truly competitive market. Contrariwise, if they are insignificant impediments, they need
not be stricken down.

In the cases at bar, it cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron,
Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players,
Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is
only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new
players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of
pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be
competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries
puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives.
Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.

The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can
easily comply with the inventory requirement of R.A. No. 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors again will find
compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost. The construction cost of storage facilities and the cost of inventory can thus
scare prospective players. Their net effect is to further occlude the entry points of new players, dampen competition and enhance the control of the
market by the three (3) existing oil companies.

Finally, we come to the provision on predatory pricing which is defined as ". . . selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below the
industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors." Respondents contend that this provision works against Petron, Shell
and Caltex and protects new entrants. The ban on predatory pricing cannot be analyzed in isolation. Its validity is interlocked with the barriers imposed
by R.A. No. 8180 on the entry of new players. The inquiry should be to determine whether predatory pricing on the part of the dominant oil companies is
encouraged by the provisions in the law blocking the entry of new players. Text-writer
Hovenkamp,36 gives the authoritative answer and we quote:
 xxx xxx xxx

The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will give a firm monopoly profits in the future. The monopoly profits will
never materialize, however, if the market is flooded with new entrants as soon as the successful predator attempts to raise its price. Predatory
pricing will be profitable only if the market contains significant barriers to new entry.

As aforediscsussed, the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement are significant barriers which discourage new players to enter the market.
Considering these significant barriers established by R.A. No. 8180 and the lack of players with the comparable clout of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX, the
temptation for a dominant player to engage in predatory pricing and succeed is a chilling reality. Petitioners' charge that this provision on predatory
pricing is anti-competitive is not without reason.

Respondents belittle these barriers with the allegation that new players have entered the market since deregulation. A scrutiny of the list of the alleged
new players will, however, reveal that not one belongs to the class and category of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX. Indeed, there is no showing that any of
these new players intends to install any refinery and effectively compete with these dominant oil companies. In any event, it cannot be gainsaid that
the new players could have been more in number and more impressive in might if the illegal entry barriers in R.A. No. 8180 were not erected.

We come to the final point. We now resolve the total effect of the untimely deregulation, the imposition of 4% tariff differential on imported crude oil
and refined petroleum products, the requirement of inventory and the prohibition on predatory pricing on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180. The
question is whether these offending provisions can be individually struck down without invalidating the entire R.A. No. 8180. The ruling case law is well
stated by author Agpalo,37 viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if
separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the
legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of
the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not
constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent.
...

The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will
vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended the statute
to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other
provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.

R.A. No. 8180 contains a separability clause. Section 23 provides that "if for any reason, any section or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or
invalid, such parts not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect." This separability clause notwithstanding, we hold that the offending
provisions of R.A. No. 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck down. The provisions on tariff differential, inventory and
predatory pricing are among the principal props of R.A. No. 8180. Congress could not have deregulated the downstream oil industry without these
provisions. Unfortunately, contrary to their intent, these provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition,
encourage monopolistic power and interfere with the free interaction of market forces. R.A. No. 8180 needs provisions to vouchsafe free and fair
competition. The need for these vouchsafing provisions cannot be overstated. Before deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX had no real competitors
but did not have a free run of the market because government controls both the pricing and non-pricing aspects of the oil industry. After deregulation,
PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX remain unthreatened by real competition yet are no longer subject to control by government with respect to their pricing
and non-pricing decisions. The aftermath of R.A. No. 8180 is a deregulated market where competition can be corrupted and where market forces can
be manipulated by oligopolies.

The fall out effects of the defects of R.A. No. 8180 on our people have not escaped Congress. A lot of our leading legislators have come out openly
with bills seeking the repeal of these odious and offensive provisions in R.A. No. 8180. In the Senate, Senator Freddie Webb has filed S.B. No. 2133 which is
the result of the hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on Energy. The hearings revealed that (1) there was a need to level the playing field for
the new entrants in the downstream oil industry, and (2) there was no law punishing a person for selling petroleum products at unreasonable
prices. Senator Alberto G. Romulo also filed S.B. No. 2209 abolishing the tariff differential beginning January 1, 1998. He declared that the amendment ".
. . would mean that instead of just three (3) big oil companies there will be other major oil companies to provide more competitive prices for the market
and the consuming public." Senator Heherson T . Alvarez, one of the principal proponents of R.A. No. 8180, also filed S.B. No. 2290 increasing the penalty
for violation of its section 9. It is his opinion as expressed in the explanatory note of the bill that the present oil companies are engaged in cartelization
despite R.A. No. 8180, viz,:

xxx xxx xxx

Since the downstream oil industry was fully deregulated in February 1997, there have been eight (8) fuel price adjustments made by the three
oil majors, namely: Caltex Philippines, Inc.; Petron Corporation; and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. Very noticeable in the price
adjustments made, however, is the uniformity in the pump prices of practically all petroleum products of the three oil companies. This, despite
the fact, that their selling rates should be determined by a combination of any of the following factors: the prevailing peso-dollar exchange
rate at the time payment is made for crude purchases, sources of crude, and inventory levels of both crude and refined petroleum products.
The abovestated factors should have resulted in different, rather than identical prices.

The fact that the three (3) oil companies' petroleum products are uniformly priced suggests collusion, amounting to cartelization, among
Caltex Philippines, Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation to fix the prices of petroleum products in violation of
paragraph (a), Section 9 of R.A. No. 8180.
 To deter this pernicious practice and to assure that present and prospective players in the downstream oil industry conduct their business with
conscience and propriety, cartel-like activities ought to be severely penalized.

Senator Francisco S. Tatad also filed S.B. No. 2307 providing for a uniform tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products. In the
explanatory note of the bill, he declared in no uncertain terms that ". . . the present set-up has raised serious public concern over the way the three oil
companies have uniformly adjusted the prices of oil in the country, an indication of a possible existence of a cartel or a cartel-like situation within the
downstream oil industry. This situation is mostly attributed to the foregoing provision on tariff differential, which has effectively discouraged the entry of
new players in the downstream oil industry."

In the House of Representatives, the moves to rehabilitate R.A. No. 8180 are equally feverish. Representative Leopoldo E. San Buenaventura has filed
H.B. No. 9826 removing the tariff differential for imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products. In the explanatory note of the bill, Rep.
Buenaventura explained:

xxx xxx xxx

As we now experience, this difference in tariff rates between imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products, unwittingly
provided a built-in-advantage for the three existing oil refineries in the country and eliminating competition which is a must in a free enterprise
economy. Moreover, it created a disincentive for other players to engage even initially in the importation and distribution of refined petroleum
products and ultimately in the putting up of refineries. This tariff differential virtually created a monopoly of the downstream oil industry by the
existing three oil companies as shown by their uniform and capricious pricing of their products since this law took effect, to the great
disadvantage of the consuming public.

Thus, instead of achieving the desired effects of deregulation, that of free enterprise and a level playing field in the downstream oil industry,
R.A. 8180 has created an environment conducive to cartelization, unfavorable, increased, unrealistic prices of petroleum products in the
country by the three existing refineries.

Representative Marcial C. Punzalan, Jr., filed H.B. No. 9981 to prevent collusion among the present oil companies by strengthening the oversight
function of the government, particularly its ability to subject to a review any adjustment in the prices of gasoline and other petroleum products. In the
explanatory note of the bill, Rep. Punzalan, Jr., said:

xxx xxx xxx

To avoid this, the proposed bill seeks to strengthen the oversight function of government, particularly its ability to review the prices set for
gasoline and other petroleum products. It grants the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) the authority to review prices of oil and other petroleum
products, as may be petitioned by a person, group or any entity, and to subsequently compel any entity in the industry to submit any and all
documents relevant to the imposition of new prices. In cases where the Board determines that there exist collusion, economic conspiracy,
unfair trade practice, profiteering and/or overpricing, it may take any step necessary to protect the public, including the readjustment of the
prices of petroleum products. Further, the Board may also impose the fine and penalty of imprisonment, as prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. 8180,
on any person or entity from the oil industry who is found guilty of such prohibited acts.

By doing all of the above, the measure will effectively provide Filipino consumers with a venue where their grievances can be heard and
immediately acted upon by government.

Thus, this bill stands to benefit the Filipino consumer by making the price-setting process more transparent and making it easier to prosecute
those who perpetrate such prohibited acts as collusion, overpricing, economic conspiracy and unfair trade.

Representative Sergio A.F . Apostol filed H.B. No. 10039 to remedy an omission in R.A. No. 8180 where there is no agency in government that determines
what is "reasonable" increase in the prices of oil products. Representative Dente O. Tinga, one of the principal sponsors of R.A. No. 8180, filed H.B. No.
10057 to strengthen its anti-trust provisions. He elucidated in its explanatory note:

xxx xxx xxx

The definition of predatory pricing, however, needs to be tightened up particularly with respect to the definitive benchmark price and the
specific anti-competitive intent. The definition in the bill at hand which was taken from the Areeda-Turner test in the United States on predatory
pricing resolves the questions. The definition reads, "Predatory pricing means selling or offering to sell any oil product at a price below the
average variable cost for the purpose of destroying competition, eliminating a competitor or discouraging a competitor from entering the
market."

The appropriate actions which may be resorted to under the Rules of Court in conjunction with the oil deregulation law are adequate. But to
stress their availability and dynamism, it is a good move to incorporate all the remedies in the law itself. Thus, the present bill formalizes the
concept of government intervention and private suits to address the problem of antitrust violations. Specifically, the government may file an
action to prevent or restrain any act of cartelization or predatory pricing, and if it has suffered any loss or damage by reason of the antitrust
violation it may recover damages. Likewise, a private person or entity may sue to prevent or restrain any such violation which will result in
damage to his business or property, and if he has already suffered damage he shall recover treble damages. A class suit may also be allowed.

To make the DOE Secretary more effective in the enforcement of the law, he shall be given additional powers to gather information and to
require reports.
Representative Erasmo B. Damasing filed H.B. No. 7885 and has a more unforgiving view of R.A. No. 8180. He wants it completely repealed. He
explained:

xxx xxx xxx

Contrary to the projections at the time the bill on the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation was discussed and debated upon in the plenary
session prior to its approval into law, there aren't any new players or investors in the oil industry. Thus, resulting in practically a cartel or
monopoly in the oil industry by the three (3) big oil companies, Caltex, Shell and Petron. So much so, that with the deregulation now being
partially implemented, the said oil companies have succeeded in increasing the prices of most of their petroleum products with little or no
interference at all from the government. In the month of August, there was an increase of Fifty centavos (50) per liter by subsidizing the same
with the OPSF, this is only temporary as in March 1997, or a few months from now, there will be full deregulation (Phase II) whereby the increase
in the prices of petroleum products will be fully absorbed by the consumers since OPSF will already be abolished by then. Certainly, this would
make the lives of our people, especially the unemployed ones, doubly difficult and unbearable.

The much ballyhooed coming in of new players in the oil industry is quite remote considering that these prospective investors cannot fight the
existing and well established oil companies in the country today, namely, Caltex, Shell and Petron. Even if these new players will come in, they
will still have no chance to compete with the said three (3) existing big oil companies considering that there is an imposition of oil tariff
differential of 4% between importation of crude oil by the said oil refineries paying only 3% tariff rate for the said importation and 7% tariff rate
to be paid by businessmen who have no oil refineries in the Philippines but will import finished petroleum/oil products which is being taxed with
7% tariff rates.

So, if only to help the many who are poor from further suffering as a result of unmitigated increase in oil products due to deregulation, it is a
must that the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996, or R.A.8180 be repealed completely.

Various resolutions have also been filed in the Senate calling for an immediate and comprehensive review of R.A. No. 8180 to prevent the downpour of
its ill effects on the people. Thus, S. Res. No. 574 was filed by Senator Gloria M. Macapagal entitled Resolution "Directing the Committee on Energy to
Inquire Into The Proper Implementation of the Deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry and Oil Tax Restructuring As Mandated Under R.A. Nos. 8180
and 8184, In Order to Make The Necessary Corrections In the Apparent Misinterpretation Of The Intent And Provision Of The Laws And Curb The Rising
Tide Of Disenchantment Among The Filipino Consumers And Bring About The Real Intentions And Benefits Of The Said Law." Senator Blas P. Ople filed S.
Res. No. 664 entitled resolution "Directing the Committee on Energy To Conduct An Inquiry In Aid Of Legislation To Review The Government's Oil
Deregulation Policy In Light Of The Successive Increases In Transportation, Electricity And Power Rates, As well As Of Food And Other Prime Commodities
And Recommend Appropriate Amendments To Protect The Consuming Public." Senator Ople observed:

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, since the passage of R.A. No. 8180, the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) has imposed successive increases in oil prices which has
triggered increases in electricity and power rates, transportation fares, as well as in prices of food and other prime commodities to the
detriment of our people, particularly the poor;

WHEREAS, the new players that were expected to compete with the oil cartel-Shell, Caltex and Petron-have not come in;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that a review of the oil deregulation policy be made to consider appropriate amendments to the existing law such
as an extension of the transition phase before full deregulation in order to give the competitive market enough time to develop;

WHEREAS, the review can include the advisability of providing some incentives in order to attract the entry of new oil companies to effect a
dynamic competitive market;

WHEREAS, it may also be necessary to defer the setting up of the institutional framework for full deregulation of the oil industry as mandated
under Executive Order No. 377 issued by President Ramos last October 31, 1996 . . .

Senator Alberto G. Romulo filed S. Res. No. 769 entitled resolution "Directing the Committees on Energy and Public Services In Aid Of Legislation To Assess
The Immediate Medium And Long Term Impact of Oil Deregulation On Oil Prices And The Economy." Among the reasons for the resolution is the finding
that "the requirement of a 40-day stock inventory effectively limits the entry of other oil firms in the market with the consequence that instead of going
down oil prices will rise."

Parallel resolutions have been filed in the House of Representatives. Representative Dante O. Tinga filed H. Res. No. 1311 "Directing The Committee on
Energy To Conduct An Inquiry, In Aid of Legislation, Into The Pricing Policies And Decisions Of The Oil Companies Since The Implementation of Full
Deregulation Under the Oil Deregulation Act (R.A. No. 8180) For the Purpose of Determining In the Context Of The Oversight Functions Of Congress
Whether The Conduct Of The Oil Companies, Whether Singly Or Collectively, Constitutes Cartelization Which Is A Prohibited Act Under R.A. No. 8180,
And What Measures Should Be Taken To Help Ensure The Successful Implementation Of The Law In Accordance With Its Letter And Spirit, Including
Recommending Criminal Prosecution Of the Officers Concerned Of the Oil Companies If Warranted By The Evidence, And For Other
Purposes." Representatives Marcial C. Punzalan, Jr. Dante O. Tinga and Antonio E. Bengzon III filed H.R. No. 894 directing the House Committee on
Energy to inquire into the proper implementation of the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. House Resolution No. 1013 was also filed
by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Enrique T . Garcia, Jr. and Joker P.Arroyo urging the President to immediately suspend the implementation of E.O.
No. 392.

In recent memory there is no law enacted by the legislature afflicted with so much constitutional deformities as R.A. No. 8180. Yet, R.A. No. 8180 deals
with oil, a commodity whose supply and price affect the ebb and flow of the lifeblood of the nation. Its shortage of supply or a slight, upward spiral in its
price shakes our economic foundation. Studies show that the areas most impacted by the movement of oil are food manufacture, land transport,
trade, electricity and water.38 At a time when our economy is in a dangerous downspin, the perpetuation of R.A. No. 8180 threatens to multiply the
number of our people with bent backs and begging bowls. R.A. No. 8180 with its anti-competition provisions cannot be allowed by this Court to stand
even while Congress is working to remedy its defects.

The Court, however, takes note of the plea of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX to lift our restraining order to enable them to adjust upward the price of
petroleum and petroleum products in view of the plummeting value of the peso. Their plea, however, will now have to be addressed to the Energy
Regulatory Board as the effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 is to revive the former laws it repealed.39 The length of our return
to the regime of regulation depends on Congress which can fasttrack the writing of a new law on oil deregulation in accord with the Constitution.

With this Decision, some circles will chide the Court for interfering with an economic decision of Congress. Such criticism is charmless for the Court is
annulling R.A. No. 8180 not because it disagrees with deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled by Congress in its present form, the
law violates the Constitution. The right call therefor should be for Congress to write a new oil deregulation law that conforms with the Constitution and
not for this Court to shirk its duty of striking down a law that offends the Constitution. Striking down R.A. No. 8180 may cost losses in quantifiable terms to
the oil oligopolists. But the loss in tolerating the tampering of our Constitution is not quantifiable in pesos and centavos. More worthy of protection than
the supra-normal profits of private corporations is the sanctity of the fundamental principles of the Constitution. Indeed when confronted by a law
violating the Constitution, the Court has no option but to strike it down dead. Lest it is missed, the Constitution is a covenant that grants and
guarantees both the political and economic rights of the people. The Constitution mandates this Court to be the guardian not only of the people's
political rights but their economic rights as well. The protection of the economic rights of the poor and the powerless is of greater importance to them
for they are concerned more with the exoterics of living and less with the esoterics of liberty. Hence, for as long as the Constitution reigns supreme so
long will this Court be vigilant in upholding the economic rights of our people especially from the onslaught of the powerful. Our defense of the people's
economic rights may appear heartless because it cannot be half-hearted.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are granted. R.A. No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Mendoza, J., concurs in the result.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

PANGANIBAN, J., concurring:

I concur with the lucid and convincing ponencia of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I write to stress two points:

1. The Issue Is Whether Oil Companies May Unilaterally

Fix Prices, Not Whether This Court May
Interfere in Economic Questions

With the issuance of the status quo order on October 7, 1997 requiring the three respondent oil companies Petron, Shell and Caltex "to
cease and desist from increasing the prices of gasoline and other petroleum fuel products for a period of thirty (30) days," the Court has been
accused of interfering in purely economic policy matters1 or, worse, of arrogating unto itself price-regulatory powers.2 Let it be emphasized
that we have no desire nay, we have no power to intervene in, to change or to repeal the laws of economics, in the same manner that
we cannot and will not nullify or invalidate the laws of physics or chemistry.

The issue here is not whether the Supreme Court may fix the retail prices of petroleum products, Rather, the issue is whether RA 8180, the law
allowing the oil companies to unilaterally set, increase or decrease their prices, is valid or constitutional.

Under the Constitution,3 this Court has in appropriate cases the DUTY, not just the power, to determine whether a law or a part thereof
offends the Constitution and, if so, to annul and set it aside.4 Because a serious challenge has been hurled against the validity of one such law,
namely RA 8180 its criticality having been preliminarily determined from the petition, comments, reply and, most tellingly, the oral argument
on September 30, 1997 this Court, in the exercise of its mandated judicial discretion, issued the status quo order to prevent the continued
enforcement and implementation of a law that was prima facie found to be constitutionally infirm. Indeed, after careful final deliberation, said
law is now ruled to be constitutionally defective thereby disabling respondent oil companies from exercising their erstwhile power, granted by
such defective statute, to determine prices by themselves.

Concededly, this Court has no power to pass upon the wisdom, merits and propriety of the acts of its co-equal branches in government.
However, it does have the prerogative to uphold the Constitution and to strike down and annul a law that contravenes the Charter.5 From
such duty and prerogative, it shall never shirk or shy away.

By annulling RA 8180, this Court is not making a policy statement against deregulation. Quite the contrary, it is simply invalidating
a pseudo deregulation law which in reality restrains free trade and perpetuates a cartel, an oligopoly. The Court is merely upholding
constitutional adherence to a truly competitive economy that releases the creative energy of free enterprise. It leaves to Congress, as the
policy-setting agency of the government, the speedy crafting of a genuine, constitutionally justified oil deregulation law.
 2. Everyone, Rich or Poor, Must Share
in the Burdens of Economic Dislocation

Much has been said and will be said about the alleged negative effect of this Court's holding on the oil giants' profit and loss statements. We
are not unaware of the disruptive impact of the depreciating peso on the retail prices of refined petroleum products. But such price-
escalating consequence adversely affects not merely these oil companies which occupy hallowed places among the most profitable
corporate behemoths in our country. In these critical times of widespread economic dislocations, abetted by currency fluctuations not entirely
of domestic origin, all sectors of society agonize and suffer. Thus, everyone, rich or poor, must share in the burdens of such economic
aberrations.

I can understand foreign investors who see these price adjustments as necessary consequences of the country's adherence to the free
market, for that, in the first place, is the magnet for their presence here. Understandably, their concern is limited to bottom lines and market
share. But in all these mega companies, there are also Filipino entrepreneurs and managers. I am sure there are patriots among them who
realize that, in times of economic turmoil, the poor and the underprivileged proportionately suffer more than any other sector of society. There
is a certain threshold of pain beyond which the disadvantaged cannot endure. Indeed, it has been wisely said that "if the rich who are few will
not help the poor who are many, there will come a time when the few who are filled cannot escape the wrath of the many who are
hungry." Kaya't sa mga kababayan nating kapitalista at may kapangyarihan, nararapat lamang na makiisa tayo sa mga walang palad at
mahihirap sa mga araw ng pangangailangan. Huwag na nating ipagdiinan ang kawalan ng tubo, o maging and panandaliang
pagkalugi. At sa mga mangangalakal na ganid at walang puso: hirap na hirap na po ang ating mga kababayan. Makonsiyensya naman
kayo!

KAPUNAN, J., separate opinion:

Lately, the Court has been perceived (albeit erroneously) to be an unwelcome interloper in affairs and concerns best left to legislators and
policy-makers. Admittedly, the wisdom of political and economic decisions are outside the scrutiny of the Court. However, the political
question doctrine is not some mantra that will automatically cloak executive orders and laws (or provisions thereof) with legitimacy. It is this
Court's bounden duty under Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution to decide all cases involving the constitutionality of laws and under Sec.
1 of the same article, "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

In the instant case, petitioners assail the constitutionality of certain provisions found in R.A. No 8180, otherwise known as the "Downstream Oil
Industry Deregulation Act of 1996" To avoid accusations of undue interference with the workings of the two other branches of government, this
discussion is limited to the issue of whether or not the assailed provisions are germane to the law or serve the purpose for which it was enacted.

The objective of the deregulation law is quite simple. As aptly enunciated in Sec. 2 thereof, it is to "foster a truly competitive market which can
better achieve the social policy objectives of fair prices and adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high quality
petroleum products." The key, therefore, is free competition which is commonly defined as:

The act or action of seeking to gain what another is seeking to gain at the same time and usually under or as if under fair or
equitable rules and circumstances: a common struggle for the same object especially among individuals of relatively equal standing
. . . a market condition in which a large number of independent buyers and sellers compete for identical commodity, deal freely with
each other, and retain the right of entry and exit from the market. (Webster's Third International Dictionary.)

and in a landscape where our oil industry is dominated by only three major oil firms, this translates primarily into the establishment of a free
market conducive to the entry of new and several and oil companies in the business. Corollarily, it means the removal of any and all barriers
that will hinder the influx of prospective players. It is a truism in economics that if there are many players in the market, healthy competition will
ensue and in order to survive and profit the competitors will try to outdo each other in terms of quality and price. The result: better quality
products and competitive prices. In the end, it will be the public that benefits (which is ultimately the most important goal of the law). Thus, it is
within this framework that we must determine the validity of the assailed provisions.

The 4% Tariff Differential

Sec. 5. Liberalization of Downstream Oil Industry and Tariff Treatment.

xxx xxx xxx

b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on
imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%),
except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1,
2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same: Provided, further, That this provision may
be amended only by an Act of Congress;

Respondents are one in asserting that the 4% tariff differential between imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products is
intended to encourage the new entrants to put up their own refineries in the country. The advantages of domestic refining cannot be
discounted, but we must view this intent in the proper perspective. The primary purpose of the deregulation law is to open up the market and
establish free competition. The priority of the deregulation law, therefore, is to encourage new oil companies to come in first. Incentives to
encourage the building of local refineries should be provided after the new oil companies have entered the Philippine market and are
actively participating therein.
The threshold question therefore is, is the 4% tariff differential a barrier to the entry of new oil companies in the Philippine market?

It is. Since the prospective oil companies do not (as yet) have local refineries, they would have to import refined petroleum products, on which
a 7% tariff duty is imposed. On the other hand, the existing oil companies already have domestic refineries and, therefore, only import crude
oil which is taxed at a lower rate of 3%. Tariffs are part of the costs of production. Hence, this means that with the 4% tariff differential (which
becomes an added cost) the prospective players would have higher production costs compared to the existing oil companies and it is
precisely this factor which could seriously affect its decision to enter the market.

Viewed in this light, the tariff differential between imported crude oil and refined petroleum products becomes an obstacle to the entry of
new players in the Philippine oil market. It defeats the purpose of the law and should thus be struck down.

Public respondents contend that ". . . a higher tariff rate is not the overriding factor confronting a prospective trader/importer but, rather, his
ability to generate the desired internal rate of return (IRR) and net present value (NPV). In other words, if said trader/importer, after some
calculation, finds that he can match the price of locally refined petroleum products and still earn the desired profit margin, despite a higher
tariff rate, he will be attracted to embark in such business. A tariff differential does not per se make the business of importing refined petroleum
product a losing proposition."1

The problem with this rationale, however, is that it is highly speculative. The opposite may well hold true. The point is to make the prospect of
engaging in the oil business in the Philippines appealing, so why create a barrier in the first place?

There is likewise no merit in the argument that the removal of the tariff differential will revive the 10% (for crude oil) and 20% (for refined
petroleum products) tariff rates that prevailed before the enactment of R.A. No. 8180. What petitioners are assailing is the tariff differential.
Phrased differently, why is the tariff duty imposed on imported petroleum products not the same as that imposed on imported crude oil?
Declaring the tariff differential void is not equivalent to declaring the tariff itself void. The obvious consequence thereof would be that
imported refined petroleum products would now be taxed at the same rate as imported crude oil which R.A. No. 8180 has specifically set at
3%. The old rates have effectively been repealed by Sec. 24 of the same law.2

II

The Minimum Inventory Requirement

and the Prohibition Against Predatory Pricing

Sec. 6. Security of Supply. To ensure the security and continuity of petroleum crude and products supply, the DOE shall require the
refiners and importers to maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their respective annual sales volume or
forty (40) days of supply, whichever is lower.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 9. Prohibited Acts. To ensure fair competition and prevent cartels and monopolies in the downstream oil industry, the
following acts are hereby prohibited:

xxx xxx xxx

b) Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so
as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors.

The same rationale holds true for the two other assailed provisions in the Oil Deregulation law. The primordial purpose of the law, I reiterate, is
to create a truly free and competitive market. To achieve this goal, provisions that show the possibility, or even the merest hint, of deterring or
impeding the ingress of new blood in the market should be eliminated outright. I am confident that our lawmakers can formulate other
measures that would accomplish the same purpose (insure security and continuity of petroleum crude products supply and prevent fly by
night operators, in the case of the minimum inventory requirement, for instance) but would not have on the downside the effect of seriously
hindering the entry of prospective traders in the market.

The overriding consideration, which is the public interest and public benefit, calls for the levelling of the playing fields for the existing oil
companies and the prospective new entrants. Only when there are many players in the market will free competition reign and economic
development begin.

Consequently, Section 6 and Section 9(b) of R. A. No. 8180 should similarly be struck down.

III

Conclusion

Respondent oil companies vehemently deny the "cartelization" of the oil industry. Their parallel business behaviour and uniform pricing are the
result of competition, they say, in order to keep their share of the market. This rationale fares well when oil prices are lowered, i.e. when one oil
company rolls back its prices, the others follow suit so as not to lose its market. But how come when one increases its prices the others likewise
follow? Is this competition at work?
 Respondent oil companies repeatedly assert that due to the devaluation of the peso, they had to increase the prices of their oil products,
otherwise, they would lose, as they have allegedly been losing specially with the issuance of a temporary restraining order by the Court.
However, what we have on record are only the self-serving lamentations of respondent oil companies. Not one has presented hard data,
independently verified, to attest to these losses. Mere allegations are not sufficient but must be accompanied by supporting evidence. What
probably is nearer the truth is that respondent oil companies will not make as much profits as they have in the past if they are not allowed to
increase the prices of their products everytime the value of the peso slumps. But in the midst of worsening economic difficulties and hardships
suffered by the people, the very customers who have given them tremendous profits throughout the years, is it fair and decent for said
companies not to bear a bit of the burden by forgoing a little of their profits?

PREMISES CONSIDERED, I vote that Section 5(b), Section 6 and Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 8180 be declared unconstitutional.

MELO, J., dissenting:

With all due respect to my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Puno, who has, as usual, prepared a well-written and comprehensive ponencia, I
regret I cannot share the view that Republic Act No. 8180 should be struck down as violative of the Constitution.

The law in question, Republic Act No. 8180, otherwise known as the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996, contains, inter alia, the following
provisions which have become the subject of the present controversy, to wit:

Sec. 5. Liberalization of Downstream Oil Industry and Tariff Treatment.

xxx xxx xxx

(b). Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected
on imported crude oil at the rate of (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil
and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude
oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the
same: Provided, further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress. . .

Sec. 6. Security of Supply. To ensure the security and continuity of petroleum crude and products supply, the DOE shall require the
refiners and importers to maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their respective annual sales volume or
forty (40) days of supply, whichever is lower.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 9. Prohibited Acts. To ensure fair competition and prevent cartels and monopolies in the downstream oil industry, the
following acts are hereby prohibited:

xxx xxx xxx

b) Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so
as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation. Pursuant to Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE [Department of Energy]
shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far
as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are
declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US Dollar is stable. . .

In G. R. No. 124360, petitioners therein pray that the aforequoted Section 5(b) be declared null and void. However, despite its pendency,
President Ramos, pursuant to the above-cited Section 15 of the assailed law, issued Executive Order No. 392 on 22 January 1997 declaring the
full deregulation of the downstream oil industry effective February 8, 1997. A few days after the implementation of said Executive Order, the
second consolidated petition was filed (G.R. No. 127867), seeking, inter alia, the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 15 of the law
on various grounds.

I submit that the instant consolidated petitions should be denied. In support of my view, I shall discuss the arguments of the parties point by
point.

1. The instant petitions do not raise a justiciable controversy as the issues raised therein pertain to the wisdom and reasonableness of the
provisions of the assailed law. The contentions made by petitioners, that the "imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and
imported refined petroleum products will not foster a truly competitive market, nor will it level the playing fields" and that said imposition "does
not deregulate the downstream oil industry, instead, it controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the law," are clearly policy
matters which are within the province of the political departments of the government. These submissions require a review of issues that are in
the nature of political questions, hence, clearly beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry.

A political question refers to a question of policy or to issues which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
Generally, political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular measure (Taada vs.
Cuenco, 100 Phil 101 [1957]).

Notwithstanding the expanded judicial power of this Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, an inquiry on the above-stated
policy matters would delve on matters of wisdom which are exclusively within the legislative powers of Congress.

2. The petitioners do not have the necessary locus standi to file the instant consolidated petitions. Petitioners Lagman, Arroyo, Garcia, Tanada,
and Tatad assail the constitutionality of the above-stated laws through the instant consolidated petitions in their capacity as members of
Congress, and as taxpayers and concerned citizens. However, the existence of a constitutional issue in a case does not per se confer or
clothe a legislator with locus standi to bring suit. In Phil. Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) v. Enriquez (235 SCRA 506 [1994]), we held that
members of Congress may properly challenge the validity of an official act of any department of the government only upon showing that the
assailed official act affects or impairs their rights and prerogatives as legislators. In Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. vs. Morato, et al. (246 SCRA 540
[1995]), this Court further clarified that "if the complaint is not grounded on the impairment of the power of Congress, legislators do not have
standing to question the validity of any law or official action."

Republic Act No. 8180 clearly does not violate or impair prerogatives, powers, and rights of Congress, or the individual members thereof,
considering that the assailed official act is the very act of Congress itself authorizing the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

Neither can petitioners sue as taxpayers or concerned citizens. A condition sine qua non for the institution of a taxpayer's suit is an allegation
that the assailed action is an unconstitutional exercise of the spending powers of Congress or that it constitutes an illegal disbursement of
public funds. The instant consolidated petitions do not allege that the assailed provisions of the law amount to an illegal disbursement of
public money. Hence, petitioners cannot, even as taxpayers or concerned citizens, invoke this Court's power of judicial review.

Further, petitioners, including Flag, FDC, and Sanlakas, can not be deemed proper parties for lack of a particularized interest or elemental
substantial injury necessary to confer on them locus standi. The interest of the person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct
and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the jaw is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person
complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to
some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of Petitioners have not established such kind of interest.

3. Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 8180 is not violative of the "one title-one subject" rule under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution. It is
not required that a provision of law be expressed in the title thereof as long as the provision in question is embraced within the subject
expressed in the title of the law. The "title of a bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in
the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title." (Association of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. vs. Sec. of Agrarian
Reform, 175 SCRA 343 [1989]) An "act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of
such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object." (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 11th ed., p. 225).

The questioned tariff provision in Section 5 (b) was provided as a means to implement the deregulation of the downstream oil industry and
hence, is germane to the purpose of the assailed law. The general subject of Republic Act No. 8180, as expressed in its title, "An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry, and for the Other Purposes", necessarily implies that the law provides for the means for such
deregulation. One such means is the imposition of the differential tariff rates which are provided to encourage new investors as well as existing
players to put up new refineries. The aforesaid provision is thus germane to, and in furtherance of, the object of deregulation. The trend of
jurisprudence, ever since Sumulong vs. COMELEC (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), is to give the above-stated constitutional requirement a liberal
interpretation. Hence, there is indeed substantial compliance with said requirement.

Petitioners claim that because the House version of the assailed law did not impose any tariff rates but merely set the policy of "zero
differential" and that the Senate version did not set or fix any tariff, the tariff changes being imposed by the assailed law was never subject of
any deliberations in both houses nor the Bicameral Conference Committee. I believe that this argument is bereft of merit.

The report of the Bicameral Conference Committee, which was precisely formed to settle differences between the two houses of Congress,
was approved by members thereof only after a full deliberation on the conflicting provisions of the Senate version and the House version of
the assailed law. Moreover, the joint explanatory statement of said Committee which was submitted to both houses, explicitly states that
"while sub-paragraph (b) is a modification, its thrust and style were patterned after the House's original sub-paragraph (b)." Thus, it cannot be
denied that both houses were informed of the changes in the aforestated provision of the assailed law. No legislator can validly state that he
was not apprised of the purposes, nature, and scope of the provisions of the law since the inclusion of the tariff differential was clearly
mentioned in the Bicameral Conference Committee's explanatory note.

As regards the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is neither found in the
House bill or Senate bill, this Court already upheld such power in Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance (235 SCRA 630 [1994]), where we ruled that the
conference committee can even include an amendment in the nature of a substitute so long as such amendment is germane to the subject
of the bill before it.

Lastly, in view of the "enrolled bill theory" pronounced by this Court as early as 1947 in the case of Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil. 1 [1947]),
the duly authenticated copy of the bill, signed by the proper officers of each house, and approved by the President, is conclusive upon the
courts not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment.

4. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180 does not constitute undue delegation of legislative power. Petitioners themselves admit that said
section provides the Secretary of Energy and the President with the bases of (1) "practicability", (2) "the decline of crude oil prices in the world
market", and (3) "the stability of the Peso exchange rate in relation to the US Dollar", in determining the effectivity of full deregulation. To my
mind, said bases are determinate and determinable guidelines, when examined in the light of the tests for permissible delegation.
The assailed law satisfies the completeness test as it is complete and leaves nothing more for the Executive Branch to do but to enforce the
same. Section 2 thereof expressly provides that "it shall be the policy of the State to deregulate the downstream oil industry to foster a truly
competitive market which can better achieve the social policy objectives of fair prices and adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-
clean and high-quality petroleum products." This provision manifestly declares the policy to be achieved through the delegate, that is, the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry toward the end of full and free competition. Section 15 further provides for all the basic terms and
conditions for its execution and thus belies the argument that the Executive Branch is given complete liberty to determine whether or not to
implement the law. Indeed, Congress did not only make full deregulation mandatory, but likewise set a deadline (that is, not later than March
1997), within which full deregulation should be achieved.

Congress may validly provide that a statute shall take effect or its operation shall be revived or suspended or shall terminate upon the
occurrence of certain events or contingencies the ascertainment of which may be left to some official agency. In effect, contingent
legislation may be issued by the Executive Branch pursuant to a delegation of authority to determine some fact or state of things upon which
the enforcement of a law depends (Cruz, Phil. Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 96; Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234 [1931]). This is a valid delegation
since what the delegate performs is a matter of detail whereas the statute remains complete in all essential matters. Section 15 falls under this
kind of delegated authority. Notably, the only aspect with respect to which the President can exercise "discretion" is the determination of
whether deregulation may be implemented on or before March, 1997, the deadline set by Congress. If he so decides, however, certain
conditions must first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining, and (2) the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US Dollar is stable. Significantly, the so-called "discretion" pertains only to the ascertainment of the
existence of conditions which are necessary for the effectivity of the law and not a discretion as to what the law shall be.

In the same vein, I submit that the President's issuance of Executive Order No. 392 last January 22, 1997 is valid as contingent legislation. All the
Chief Executive did was to exercise his delegated authority to ascertain and recognize certain events or contingencies which prompted him
to advance the deregulation to a date earlier than March, 1997. Anyway, the law does not prohibit him from implementing the deregulation
prior to March, 1997, as long as the standards of the law are met.

Further, the law satisfies the sufficient standards test. The words "practicable", "declining", and "stable", as used in Section 15 of the assailed law
are sufficient standards that saliently "map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority by defining the legislative policy and indicating the
circumstances under which it is to be pursued and effected." (Cruz, Phil. Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 98). Considering the normal and ordinary
definitions of these standards, I believe that the factors to be considered by the President and/or Secretary of Energy in implementing full
deregulation are, as mentioned, determinate and determinable.

It is likewise noteworthy that the above-mentioned factors laid down by the subject law are not solely dependent on Congress. Verily, oil
pricing and the peso-dollar exchange rate are dependent on the various forces working within the consumer market. Accordingly, it would
have been unreasonable, or even impossible, for the legislature to have provided for fixed and specific oil prices and exchange rates. To
require Congress to set forth specifics in the law would effectively deprive the legislature of the flexibility and practicability which subordinate
legislation is ultimately designed to provide. Besides, said specifics are precisely the details which are beyond the competence of Congress,
and thus, are properly delegated to appropriate administrative agencies and executive officials to "fill in". It cannot be gainsaid that the detail
of the timing of full deregulation has been "filled in" by the President, upon the recommendation of the DOE, when he issued Executive Order
No. 329.

5. Republic Act No. 8180 is not violative of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade, and unfair
competition. The three provisions relied upon by petitioners (Section 5 [b] on tariff differential; Section 6 on the 40-day minimum inventory
requirement; and Section 9 [b] on the prohibited act of predatory pricing) actually promote, rather than restrain, free trade and competition.

The tariff differential provided in the assailed law does not necessarily make the business of importing refined petroleum products a losing
proposition for new players. First, the decision of a prospective trader/importer (subjected to the 7% tariff rate) to compete in the downstream
oil industry as a new player is based solely on whether he can, based on his computations, generate the desired internal rate of return (IRR)
and net present value (NPV) notwithstanding the imposition of a higher tariff rate. Second, such a difference in tax treatment does not
necessarily provide refiners of imported crude oil with a significant level of economic advantage considering the huge amount of investments
required in putting up refinery plants which will then have to be added to said refiners' production cost. It is not unreasonable to suppose that
the additional cost imputed by higher tariff can anyway be overcome by a new player in the business of importation due to lower operating
costs, lower capital infusion, and lower capital carrying costs. Consequently, the resultant cost of imported finished petroleum and that of
locally refined petroleum products may turn out to be approximately the same.

The existence of a tariff differential with regard to imported crude oil and imported finished products is nothing new or novel. In fact, prior to
the passage of Republic Act No. 8180, there existed a 10% tariff differential resulting from the imposition of a 20% tariff rate on imported
finished petroleum products and 10% on imported crude oil (based on Executive Order No. 115). Significantly, Section 5 (b) of the assailed law
effectively lowered the tariff rates from 20% to 7% for imported refined petroleum products, and 10% to 3% for imported crude oil, or a
reduction of the differential from 10% to 4%. This provision is certainly favorable to all in the downstream oil industry, whether they be existing or
new players. It thus follows that the 4% tariff differential aims to ensure the stable supply of petroleum products by encouraging new entrants
to put up oil refineries in the Philippines and to discourage fly-by-night importers.

Further, the assailed tariff differential is likewise not violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. It is germane to the declared
policy of Republic Act No. 8180 which is to achieve (1) fair prices; and (2) adequate and continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high
quality petroleum products. Said adequate and continuous supply of petroleum products will be achieved if new investors or players are
enticed to engage in the business of refining crude oil in the country. Existing refining companies, are similarly encouraged to put up
additional refining companies. All of this can be made possible in view of the lower tariff duty on imported crude oil than that levied on
imported refined petroleum products. In effect, the lower tariff rates will enable the refiners to recoup their investments considering that they
will be investing billions of pesos in putting up their refineries in the Philippines. That incidentally the existing refineries will be benefited by the
tariff differential does not negate the fact that the intended effect of the law is really to encourage the construction of new refineries, whether
by existing players or by new players.
 As regards the 40-day inventory requirement, it must be emphasized that the 10% minimum requirement is based on the refiners' and importers'
annual sales volume, and hence, obviously inapplicable to new entrants as they do not have an annual sales volume yet. Contrary to
petitioners' argument, this requirement is not intended to discourage new or prospective players in the downstream oil industry. Rather, it
guarantees "security and continuity of petroleum crude and products supply." (Section 6, Republic Act No. 8180) This legal requirement is
meant to weed out entities not sufficiently qualified to participate in the local downstream oil industry. Consequently, it is meant to protect the
industry from fly-by-night business operators whose sole interest would be to make quick profits and who may prove unrealiable in the effort to
provide an adequate and steady supply of petroleum products in the country. In effect, the aforestated provision benefits not only the three
respondent oil companies but all entities serious and committed to put up storage facilities and to participate as serious players in the local oil
industry. Moreover, it benefits the entire consuming public by its guarantee of an "adequate continuous supply of environmentally-clean and
high quality petroleum products." It ensures that all companies in the downstream oil industry operate according to the same high standards,
that the necessary storage and distribution facilities are in place to support the level of business activities involved, and that operations are
conducted in a safe and environmentally sound manner for the benefit of the consuming public.

Regarding the prohibition against predatory pricing, I believe that petitioners' argument is quite misplaced. The provision actually protects new
players by preventing, under pain of criminal sanction, the more established oil firms from driving away any potential or actual competitor by
taking undue advantage of their size and relative financial stability. Obviously, the new players are the ones susceptible to closing down on
account of intolerable losses which will be brought about by fierce competition with rival firms. The petitioners are merely working under the
presumption that it is the new players which would succumb to predatory pricing, and not the more established oil firms. This is not a factual
assertion but a rather baseless and conjectural assumption.

As to the alleged cartel among the three respondent oil companies, much as we suspect the same, its existence calls for a finding of fact
which this Court is not in the position to make. We cannot be called to try facts and resolve factual issues such as this (Trade Unions of the Phils.
vs. Laguesma, 236 SCRA 586 [1994]); Ledesma vs. NLRC, 246 SCRA 247 [1995]).

With respect to the amendatory bills filed by various Congressmen aimed to modify the alleged defects of Republic Act No. 8180, I submit that
such bills are the correct remedial steps to pursue, instead of the instant petitions to set aside the statute sought to be amended. The proper
forum is Congress, not this Court.

Finally, as to the ponencia's endnote which cites the plea of respondent oil companies for the lifting of the restraining order against them to
enable them to adjust the prices of petroleum and petroleum products in view of the devaluation of our currency, I am pensive as to how the
matter can be addressed to the obviously defunct Energy Regulatory Board. There has been a number of price increase in the meantime. Too
much water has passed under the bridge. It is too difficult to turn back the hands of time.

For all the foregoing reasons, I, therefore, vote for the outright dismissal of the instant consolidated petitions for lack of merit.

FRANCISCO, J., dissenting:

The continuing peso devaluation and the spiraling cost of commodities have become hard facts of life nowadays. And the wearies are
compounded by the ominous prospects of very unstable oil prices. Thus, with the goal of rationalizing the oil scheme, Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 8180, otherwise known as the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996, the policy of which is "to foster a truly competitive
market which can better achieve the social policy objectives of fair prices and adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-clean and
high quality petroleum products".1 But if the noble and laudable objective of this enactment is not accomplished, as to date oil prices
continue to rise, can this Court be called upon to declare the statute unconstitutional or must the Court desist from interfering in a matter
which is best left to the other branch/es of government?

The apparent thrust of the consolidated petitions is to declare, not the entirety, but only some isolated portions of Republic Act No. 8180
unconstitutional. This is clear from the grounds enumerated by the petitioners, to wit:

G.R. No. 124360

4.0. Grounds:

4.1.

THE IMPOSITION OF DIFFERENT TARIFF RATES ON IMPORTED CRUDE OIL AND IMPORTED REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS VIOLATES THE
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

4.2.

THE IMPOSITION OF DIFFERENT TARIFF RATES DOES NOT DEREGULATE THE DOWNSTREAM OIL INDUSTRY, INSTEAD, IT CONTROLS THE OIL
INDUSTRY, CONTRARY TO THE AVOWED POLICY OF THE LAW.

4.3.

THE INCLUSION OF A TARIFF PROVISION IN SECTION 5(b) OF THE DOWNSTREAM OIL INDUSTRY DEREGULATION LAW VIOLATES THE "ONE
SUBJECT-ONE TITLE" RULE EMBODIED IN ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26 (1) OF THE CONSTITUTION.2

G.R. No. 127867

 GROUNDS

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FULL DEREGULATION PRIOR TO THE EXISTENCE OF A TRULY COMPETITIVE MARKET VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION
PROHIBITING MONOPOLIES, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND PRACTICES IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.

R.A. No. 8180 CONTAINS DISGUISED REGULATIONS IN A SUPPOSEDLY DEREGULATED INDUSTRY WHICH CREATE OR PROMOTE
MONOPOLY OF THE INDUSTRY BY THE THREE EXISTING OIL COMPANIES.

THE REGULATORY AND PENAL PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 8180 VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS, DUE PROCESS OF LAW
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM. 3

And culled from petitioners' arguments in support of the above grounds the provisions of Republic Act No. 8180 which they now impugn are:

A. Section 5(b) on the imposition of tariff which provides: "Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of
this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%), and imported refined
petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPB, the rate for which shall be the same as that for
imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products
shall be the same: Provided further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress." [Emphasis added].

B. Section 6 on the minimum inventory requirement, thus: "Security of Supply. To ensure the security and continuity of petroleum
crude and products supply, the DOE shall require the refiners and importers to maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of their respective annual sales volume or forty (40) days of supply, whichever is lower."

C. Section 9(b) on predatory pricing: "Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably
below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors.

Any person, including but not limited to the chief operating officer or chief executive officer of the corporation involved, who is
found guilty of any of the said prohibited acts shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment for three (3) years and fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) to One million pesos (P1,000,000).

D. Section 10 on the other prohibited acts which states: "Other Prohibited Acts. To ensure compliance with the provisions of this
Act, the failure to comply with any of the following shall likewise be prohibited: 1) submission of any reportorial requirements; 2)
maintenance of the minimum inventory; and, 3) use of clean and safe (environment and worker-benign) technologies.

Any person, including but not limited to the chief operating officer or chief executive officer of the corporation involved, who is
found guilty of any of the said prohibited acts shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years and fine ranging from Two
hundred fifty thousand pesos (P250,000) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000).

E. Section 15 on the implementation of full deregulation, thus: "Implementation of Full Deregulation. Pursuant to Section 5(e) of
Republic Act No. 7683, the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry not later than March, 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
Upon the implementation of the full deregulation as provided herein, the transition phase is deemed terminated and the following
laws are deemed repealed: . . . [Emphasis added].

F. Section 20 on the imposition of administrative fine: "Administrative Fine. The DOE may, after due notice and hearing impose a
fine in the amount of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) but not more than One million pesos (P1,000,000) upon
any person or entity who violates any of its reportorial and minimum inventory requirements, without prejudice to criminal sanctions."

Executive Order No. 392, entitled "Declaring Full Deregulation Of The Downstream Oil Industry" which declared the full deregulation effective
February 8, 1997, is also sought to be declared unconstitutional.

A careful scrutiny of the arguments proffered against the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 betrays the petitioners' underlying motive
of calling upon this Court to determine the wisdom and efficacy of the enactment rather than its adherence to the Constitution. Nevertheless,
I shall address the issues raised if only to settle the alleged constitutional defects afflicting some provisions of Republic Act No. 8180. To
elaborate:

A. On the imposition of tariff . Petitioners argue that the existence of a tariff provision violated the "one subject-one title"4 rule under Article VI,
Section 26 (1) as the imposition of tariff rates is "inconsistent with"5and not at all germane to the deregulation of the oil industry. They also stress
that the variance between the seven percent (7%) duty on imported gasoline and other refined petroleum products and three percent (3%)
duty on crude oil gives a "4% tariff protection in favor of Petron, Shell and Caltex which own and operate refineries here".6 The provision,
petitioners insist, "inhibits prospective oil players to do business here because it will unnecessarily increase their product cost by 4%."7 In other
words, the tariff rates "does not foster 'a truly competitive market'."8 Also petitioners claim that both Houses of Congress never envisioned
imposing the seven percent (7%) and three percent (3%) tariff on refined and crude oil products as both Houses advocated, prior to the
holding of the bicameral conference committee, a "zero differential". Moreover, petitioners insist that the tariff rates violate "the equal
protection of the laws enshrined in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution" 9 since the rates and their classification are not relevant in attaining
the avowed policy of the law, not based on substantial distinctions and limited to the existing condition.
The Constitution mandates that "every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof".10 The object sought to be accomplished by this mandatory requirement has been explained by the Court in the vintage case
of Central Capiz v. Ramirez,11 thus:

The object sought to be accomplished and the mischief proposed to be remedied by this provision are well known. Legislative
assemblies, for the dispatch of business, often pass bills by their titles only without requiring them to be read. A specious title
sometimes covers legislation which, if its real character had been disclosed, would not have commanded assent. To prevent surprise
and fraud on the legislature is one of the purposes this provision was intended to accomplish. Before the adoption of this provision
the title of a statute was often no indication of its subject or contents.

An evil this constitutional requirement was intended to correct was the blending in one and the same statute of such things as were
diverse in their nature, and were connected only to combine in favor of all the advocates of each, thus often securing the passage
of several measures no one of which could have succeeded on its own merits. Mr. Cooley thus sums up in his review of the authorities
defining the objects of this provision: "It may therefore be assumed as settled that the purpose of this provision was: First, to
prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills
of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted;
and, third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of
legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they
shall so desire." (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 143).12

The interpretation of "one subject-one title" rule, however, is never intended to impede or stifle legislation. The requirement is to be given a
practical rather than a technical construction and it would be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions of the enactment are germane and material to the general subject.13 Congress is not required to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. 14 All that is
required is that the title should not cover legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as having a
necessary or proper connection.15 Hence, the title "An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act Numbered One Thousand One
Hundred Ninety-Nine, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines" was declared by the Court sufficient to contain a
provision empowering the Secretary of Justice, acting through a tenancy mediation division, to carry out a national enforcement program,
including the mediation of tenancy disputes.16 The title "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" was similarly declared valid and
sufficient to embrace a regulatory tax provision, i.e., the imposition of a thirty percent (30%) tax on the purchase price or rental rate, as the
case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program with
fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected accruing to the province and the other fifty percent (50%) to the municipality where
the tax is collected.17 Likewise, the title "An Act To Further Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Twenty, as amended by
Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and Forty One" was declared sufficient to cover a provision limiting the allowable margin of profit
to not more than twelve percent (12%) annually of its investments plus two-month operating expenses for franchise holder receiving at least
fifty percent (50%) of its power from the National Power Corporation.18

In the case at bar, the title "An Act Deregulating The Downstream Oil Industry, And For Other Purposes" is adequate and comprehensive to
cover the imposition of tariff rates. The tariff provision under Section 5 (b) is one of the means of effecting deregulation. It must be observed
that even prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 8180 oil products have always been subject to tariff and surely Congress is cognizant of
such fact. The imposition of the seven percent (7%) and three percent (3%) duties on imported gasoline and refined petroleum products and
on crude oil, respectively, are germane to the deregulation of the oil industry. The title, in fact, even included the broad and all-encompassing
phrase "And For Other Purposes" thereby indicating the legislative intent to cover anything that has some relation to or connection with the
deregulation of the oil industry. The tax provision is a mere tool and mechanism considered essential by Congress to fulfill Republic Act No.
8180's objective of fostering a competitive market and achieving the social policy objectives of a fair prices. To curtail any adverse impact
which the tariff treatment may cause by its application, and perhaps in answer to petitioners' apprehension Congress included under the
assailed section a proviso that will effectively eradicate the tariff difference in the treatment of refined petroleum products and crude oil by
stipulating "that beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same."

The contention that tariff "does not foster a truly competitive market"19 and therefore restrains trade and does not help achieve the purpose of
deregulation is an issue not within the power of the Court to resolve. Nonetheless, the Court's pronouncement in Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory
Board appears to be worth reiterating:

Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is harsh and oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint of trade.
However, it is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even
definitely deters the activities taxed. The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts
scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority which
exercise it. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and
oppressive taxation.20 [Emphasis added]

Anent petitioners' claim that both House Bill No. 5264 and Senate Bill No. 1253, [the precursor bills of Republic Act No. 8180], "did not impose
any tariff rates but merely set the policy of 'zero differential' in the House version, and nothing in the Senate version" 21 is inconsequential. Suffice
it to state that the bicameral conference committee report was approved by the conferees thereof only "after full and free conference" on
the disagreeing provisions of Senate Bill No. 1253 and House Bill No. 5264. Indeed, the "zero differential" on the tariff rates imposed in the House
version was embodied in the law, save for a slight delay in its implementation to January 1, 2004. Moreover, any objection on the validity of
provisions inserted by the legislative bicameral conference committee has
been passed upon by the Court in the recent case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,22 which, in my view, laid to rest any doubt as to the
validity of the bill emerging out of a Conference Committee. The Court in that case, speaking through Mr. Justice Mendoza, said:

As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emerging out of a Conference Committee, it has been explained:
 Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to make any material change in the measure at
issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult
provision to enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a proposal originating in either house by striking out everything
following the enacting clause and substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are now altogether different,
permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a new bill. . .

The result is a third version, which is considered an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only requirement for which being
that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills:

Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision
that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two
provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a
substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final
but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in
this case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis.

xxx xxx xxx

To be sure, nothing in the Rules [of the Senate and the House of Representatives] limits a conference committee to a consideration
of conflicting provisions. But Rule XLVI, (Sec.) 112 of the Rules of the Senate is cited to the effect that "If there is no Rule applicable to
a specific case the precedents of the Legislative Department of the Philippines shall be resorted to, and as a supplement of these,
the Rules contained in Jefferson's Manual." The following is then quoted from the Jefferson's Manual:

The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed to them . . . and may not include subjects not
within disagreements, even though germane to a question in issue.

Note that, according to Rule XLIX, (Sec.) 112, in case there is no specific rule applicable, resort must be to the legislative practice. The
Jefferson's Manual is resorted to only as supplement. It is common place in Congress that conference committee reports include new
matters which, though germane, have not been committed to the committee. This practice was admitted by Senator Raul S. Roco,
petitioner in G.R. No. 115543, during the oral argument in these cases. Whatever, then, may be provided in the Jefferson's Manual
must be considered to have been modified by the legislative practice. If a change is desired in the practice it must be sought in
Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each house. Thus, Art. VI,
(Sec.) 16(3) of the Constitution provides that "Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings . . ."

This observation applies to the other contention that the Rules of the two chambers were likewise disregarded in the preparation of
the Conference Committee Report because the Report did not contain a "detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of changes in,
or amendments to, the subject measure." The Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is a standard
practice in bill-drafting. We cannot say that in using these marks and symbols the Committee violated the Rules of the Senate and
the House. Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have
already ruled, "parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern." Our concern is
with the procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are
satisfied that they have been faithfully observed in these cases.23

The other contention of petitioners that Section 5(b) "violates the equal protection of the laws enshrined in Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution"24 deserves a short shrift for the equal protection clause does not forbid reasonable classification based upon substantial
distinctions where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies equally to all the members of the class. The imposition of
three percent (3%) tariff on crude oil, which is four percent (4%) lower than those imposed on refined oil products, as persuasively argued by
the Office of the Solicitor General, is based on the substantial distinction that importers of crude oil, by necessity, have to establish and
maintain refinery plants to process and refine the crude oil thereby adding to their production costs. To encourage these importers to set up
refineries involving huge expenditures and investments which peddlers and importers of refined petroleum products do not shoulder, Congress
deemed it appropriate to give a lower tariff rate to foster the entry of new "players" and investors in line with the law's policy to create a
competitive market. The residual contention that there is no substantial distinction in the imposition of seven percent (7%) and three percent
(3%) tariff since the law itself will level the tariff rates between the imported crude oil and refined petroleum products come January 1, 2004, to
my mind, is addressed more to the legislative's prerogative to provide for the duration and period of effectivity of the imposition. If Congress,
after consultation, analysis of material data and due deliberations, is convinced that by January 1, 2004, the investors and importers of crude
oil would have already recovered their huge investments and expenditures in establishing refineries and plants then it is within its prerogative
to lift the tariff differential. Such matter is well within the pale of legislative power which the Court may not fetter. Besides, this again is in line
with Republic Act No. 8180's avowed policy to foster a truly competitive market which can achieve the social policy objectives of fair, if not
lower, prices.

B. On the minimum inventory requirement. Petitioners' attack on Section 6 is premised upon their belief that the inventory requirement is hostile
and not conducive for new oil companies to operate here, and unduly favors Petron, Shell and Caltex, companies which according to them
can easily hurdle the requirement. I fail to see any legal or constitutional issue here more so as it is not raised by a party with legal standing for
petitioners do not claim to be the owners or operators of new oil companies affected by the requirement. Whether or not the requirement is
advantageous, disadvantageous or conducive for new oil companies hinges on presumptions and speculations which is not within the realm
of judicial adjudication. It may not be amiss to mention here that according to the Office of the Solicitor General "there are about thirty (30)
new entrants in the downstream activities . . . , fourteen (14) of which have started operation . . . , eight (8) having commenced operation last
March 1997, and the rest to operate between the second quarter of 1997 and the year 2000" 25. Petitioners did not controvert this averment
which thereby cast serious doubt over their claim of "hostile" environment.

C. On predatory pricing. What petitioners bewail the most in Section 9(b) is "the definition of 'predatory pricing' [which] is too broad in scope
and indefinite in meaning"26 and the penal sanction imposed for its violation. Petitioners maintain that it would be the new oil companies or
"players" which would lower their prices to gain a foothold on the market and not Petron, Shell or Caltex, an occasion for these three big oil
"companies" to control the prices by keeping their average cost at a level which will ensure their desired profit margin.27 Worse, the penal
sanction, they add, deters new "players" from entering the oil market and the practice of lowering prices is now condemned as a criminal act.

Petitioners' contentions are nebulous if not speculative. In the absence of any concrete proof or evidence, the assertion that it will only be the
new oil companies which will lower oil prices remains a mere guess or suspicion. And then again petitioners are not the proper party to raise
the issue. The query on why lowering of prices should be penalized and the broad scope of predatory pricing is not for this Court to traverse
the same being reserved for Congress. The Court should not lose sight of the fact that its duty under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code is not
to determine, define and legislate what act or acts should be penalized, but simply to report to the Chief Executive the reasons why it believes
an act should be penalized, as well as why it considers a penalty excessive, thus:

Art. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are nor covered by the law, and in cases of
excessive penalties. Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not
punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the
reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation.

In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be
deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would
result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense.

Furthermore, in the absence of an actual conviction for violation of Section 9 (b) and the appropriate appeal to this Court, I fail to see the
need to discuss any longer the issue as it is not ripe for judicial adjudication. Any pronouncement on the legality of the sanction will only be
advisory.

D. On other prohibited acts. In discussing their objection to Section 10, together with Section 20, petitioners assert that these sanctions "even
provide stiff criminal and administrative penalties for failure to maintain said minimum requirement and other regulations" and posed this
query: "Are these provisions consistent with the policy objective to level the playing [field] in a truly competitive answer?"28 A more
circumspect analysis of petitioners' grievance, however, does not present any legal controversy. At best, their objection deals on policy
considerations that can be more appropriately and effectively addressed not by this Court but by Congress itself.

E. On the implementation of full deregulation under Section 15, and the validity of Executive Order No. 392. Petitioners stress that "Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8180 delegates to the Secretary of Energy and to the President of the Philippines the power to determine when to fully
deregulate the downstream oil industry"29without providing for any standards "to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market
are considered to be
'declining'"30 and when may the exchange rate be considered "stable" for purposes of determining when it is "practicable" to declare full
deregulation.31 In the absence of standards, Executive Order No. 392 which implemented Section 15 constitute "executive
lawmaking,"32 hence the same should likewise be struck down as invalid. Petitioners additionally decry the brief seven (7) month transition
period under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180. The premature full deregulation declared in Executive Order No. 392 allowed Caltex,
Petron, and Shell oil companies "to define the conditions under which any 'new players' will have to adhere to in order to become competitive
in the new deregulated market even before such a market has been created."33 Petitioners are emphatic that Section 15 and Executive Order
No. 392 "have effectively legislated a cartel among respondent oil companies, directly violating the Constitutional prohibition against unfair
trade practices and combinations in restraint of trade".34

Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180 provides for the implementation of full deregulation. It states:

Section 15 on the implementation of full deregulation, thus: "Implementation of Full Deregulation. Pursuant to Section 5(e) of
Republic Act No. 7683, the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry not later than March, 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
Upon the implementation of the full deregulation as provided herein, the transition phase is deemed terminated and the following
laws are deemed repealed: . . . [Emphasis added].

It appears from the foregoing that deregulation has to be implemented "not later than March 1997." The provision is unequivocal, i.e.,
deregulation must be implemented on or before March 1997. The Secretary of Energy and the President is devoid of any discretion to move
the date of full deregulation to any day later than March 1997. The second sentence which provides that "[a]s far as practicable, the DOE
shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable" did not modify or reset to any other date the full deregulation of downstream
oil industry. Not later than March 1997 is a complete and definite period for full deregulation. What is conferred to the Department of Energy in
the implementation of full deregulation, with the approval of the President, is not the power and discretion on what the law should be. The
provision of Section 15 gave the President the authority to proceed with deregulation on or before, but not after, March 1997, and if
implementation is made before March, 1997, to execute the same, if possible, when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the
world market are declining and the peso-dollar exchange rate is stable. But if the implementation is made on March, 1997, the President has
no option but to implement the law regardless of the conditions of the prices of oil in the world market and the exchange rates.

The settled rule is that the legislative department may not delegate its power. Any attempt to abdicate it is unconstitutional and void, based
on the principle of potestas delegata non delegare potest. In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislative so that
nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.35 An enactment is said to be incomplete and invalid if
it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary
powers delegated to it.36 In People v. Vera,37 the Court laid down a guideline on how to distinguish which power may or may not be
delegated by Congress, to wit:
 "The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z.R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs.
[1852]; 1 Ohio St., 77, 88 See also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 68.)

Applying these parameters, I fail to see any taint of unconstitutionality that could vitiate the validity of Section 15. The discretion to ascertain
when may the prices of crude oil in the world market be deemed "declining" or when may the peso-dollar exchange rate be considered
"stable" relates to the assessment and appreciation of facts. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or
conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a
law38 so as to make the provision an undue delegation of legislative power. The alleged lack of definitions of the terms employed in the statute
does not give rise to undue delegation either for the words of the statute, as a rule, must be given its literal meaning.39 Petitioners' contentions
are concerned with the details of execution by the executive officials tasked to implement deregulation. No proviso in Section 15 may be
construed as objectionable for the legislature has the latitude to provide that a law may take effect upon the happening of future specified
contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the specified contingency has arisen.40 The instant petition
is similarly situated with the past cases, as summarized in the case of People v. Vera, where the Court ruled for the validity of several assailed
statutes, to wit:

To the same effect are decisions of this court in Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binangonan([1917], 36 Phil. 547); Rubi
vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919], 39 Phil. 660), and Cruz vs.Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil. 234). In the first of these cases, this court
sustained the validity of a law conferring upon the Governor-General authority to adjust provincial and municipal boundaries. In the
second case, this court held it lawful for the legislature to direct non-Christian inhabitants to take up their habitation on unoccupied
lands to be selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. In the third case, it was held proper for the
legislature to vest in the Governor-General authority to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition of the importation of foreign
cattle, such prohibition to be raised "if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if disease among foreign cattle has
ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands."41

If the Governor-General in the case of Cruz v. Youngberg42 can "suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition of the importation of cattle,
such prohibition to be raised 'if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if disease among foreign cattles has ceased to be a
menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands" then with more reason that Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180 can pass the
constitutional challenge as it has mandatorily fixed the effectivity date of full deregulation to not later than March 1997, with or without the
occurrence of stable peso-dollar exchange rate and declining oil prices. Contrary to petitioners' protestations, therefore, Section 15 is
complete and contains the basic conditions and terms for its execution.

To restate, the policy of Republic Act No. 8180 is to deregulate the downstream oil industry and to foster a truly competitive market which
could lead to fair prices and adequate supply of environmentally clean and high-quality petroleum products. This is the guiding principle
installed by Congress upon which the executive department of the government must conform. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180 sufficiently
supplied the metes and bounds for the execution of full deregulation. In fact, a cursory reading of Executive Order No. 39243 which advanced
deregulation to February 8, 1997 convincingly shows the determinable factors or standards, enumerated under Section 15, which were taken
into account by the Chief Executive in declaring full deregulation. I cannot see my way clear on how or why Executive Order No. 392, as
professed by petitioners, may be declared unconstitutional for adding the "depletion of buffer fund" as one of the grounds for advancing the
deregulation. The enumeration of factors to be considered for full deregulation under Section 15 did not proscribe the Chief Executive from
acknowledging other instances that can equally assuage deregulation. What is important is that the Chief Executive complied with and met
the minimum standards supplied by the law. Executive Order No. 392 may not, therefore, be branded as unconstitutional.

Petitioners' vehement objections on the short seven (7) month transition period under Section 15 and the alleged resultant de facto formation
of cartel are matters which fundamentally strike at the wisdom of the law and the policy adopted by Congress. These are outside the power
of the courts to settle; thus I fail to see the need to digress any further.

F . On the imposition of administrative fine. The administrative fine under Section 20 is claimed to be inconsistent with deregulation. The
imposition of administrative fine for failure to meet the reportorial and minimum inventory requirements, far from petitioners' submission, are
geared towards accomplishing the noble purpose of the law. The inventory requirement ensures the security and continuity of petroleum
crude and products supply,44 while the reportorial requirement is a mere devise for the Department of Energy to monitor compliance with the
law. In any event, the issue pertains to the efficacy of incorporating in the law the administrative sanctions which lies outside the Court's
sphere and competence.

In fine, it seems to me that the petitions dwell on the insistent and recurrent arguments that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported
crude oil and imported petroleum products is violative of the equal protection clause of the constitution; is not germane to the purpose of the
law; does not foster a truly competitive market; extends undue advantage to the existing oil refineries or companies; and creates a cartel or a
monopoly of sort among Shell, Caltex and Petron in clear contravention of the Constitutional proscription against unfair trade practices and
combinations in restraint of trade. Unfortunately, this Court, in my view, is not at liberty to tread upon or even begin to discuss the merits and
demerits of petitioners' stance if it is to be faithful to the time honored doctrine of separation of powers the underlying principle of our
republican state.45 Nothing is so fundamental in our system of government than its division into three distinct and independent branches, the
executive, the legislative and the judiciary, each branch having exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and supreme within its
own sphere. It is true that there is sometimes an inevitable overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between these departments.
But this elementary tenet remains: the legislative is vested with the power to make law, the judiciary to apply and interpret it. In cases like this,
"the judicial branch of the government has only one duty-to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is
challenged and to decide whether the letter squares with the former."46 This having been done and finding no constitutional infirmity therein,
the Court's task is finished. Now whether or not the law fails to achieve its avowed policy because Congress did not carefully evaluate the
long term effects of some of its provisions is a matter clearly beyond this Court's domain.

Perhaps it bears reiterating that the question of validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government,
and the courts will resolve every presumption in favor of its validity. The courts will assume that the validity of the statute was fully considered by
 the legislature when adopted. The wisdom or advisability of a particular statute is not a question for the courts to determine. If a particular
statute is within the constitutional power of the legislature to enact, it should be sustained whether the courts agree or not in the wisdom of its
enactment.47 This Court continues to recognize that in the determination of actual cases and controversies, it must reflect the wisdom and
justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative branches of government. Thus, the
presumption is always in favor of constitutionality for it is likewise always presumed that in the enactment of a law or the adoption of a policy it
is the people who speak through their representatives. This principle is one of caution and circumspection in the exercise of the grave and
delicate function of judicial review 48. Explaining this principle Thayer said,

It can only disregard the Act when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very
clear one-so clear that it is not open to rational question. That is the standard of duty to which the courts bring legislative acts; that is
the test which they apply-not merely their own judgment as to constitutionality, but their conclusion as to what judgment is
permissible to another department which the constitution has charged with the duty of making it. This rule recognizes that, having to
the great, complex, ever-unfolding exigencies of regard government, much will seem unconstitutional to one man, or body of men,
may reasonably not seem so to another; that the constitution often admits of different interpretations; that there is often a range of
choice and judgment; that in such cases the constitution does not impose upon the legislature any one specific opinion, but leaves
open their range of choice; and that whatever choice is rational is constitutional.49

The petitions discuss rather extensively the adverse economic implications of Republic Act No. 8180. They put forward more than anything
else, an assertion that an error of policy has been committed. Reviewing the wisdom of the policies adopted by the executive and legislative
departments is not within the province of the Court.

It is safe to assume that the legislative branch of the government has taken into consideration and has carefully weighed all points pertinent to
the law in question. We cannot doubt that these matters have been the object of intensive research and study nor that they have been
subject of comprehensive consultations with experts and debates in both houses of Congress. Judicial review at this juncture will at best be
limited and myopic. For admittedly, this Court cannot ponder on the points raised in the petitions with the same technical competence as
that of the economic experts who have contributed valuable hours of study and deliberation in the passage of this law.

I realize that to invoke the doctrine of separation of powers at this crucial time may be viewed by some as an act of shirking from our duty to
uphold the Constitution at all cost. Let it be remembered, however, that the doctrine of separation of powers is likewise enshrined in our
Constitution and deserves the same degree of fealty. In fact, it carries more significance now in the face of an onslaught of similar cases
brought before this Court by the opponents of almost every enacted law of major importance. It is true that this Court is the last bulwark of
justice and it is our task to preserve the integrity of our fundamental law. But we cannot become, wittingly or unwittingly, instruments of every
aggrieved minority and losing legislator. While the laudable objectives of the law are put on hold, this Court is faced with the unnecessary
burden of disposing of issues merely contrived to fall within the ambit of judicial review. All that is achieved is delay which is perhaps, sad to
say, all that may have been intended in the first place.

Indeed, whether Republic Act No. 8180 or portions thereof are declared unconstitutional, oil prices may continue to rise, as they depend not
on any law but on the volatile market and economic forces. It is therefore the political departments of government that should address the
issues raised herein for the discretion to allow a deregulated oil industry and to determine its viability is lodged with the people in their primary
political capacity, which as things stand, has been delegated to Congress.

In the end, petitioners are not devoid of a remedy. To paraphrase the words of Justice Padilla in Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng
Pilipinas v. Tan,50 if petitioners seriously believe that the adoption and continued application of Republic Act No. 8180 are prejudicial to the general
welfare or the interests of the majority of the people, they should seek recourse and relief from the political branches of government, as they are now
doing by moving for an amendment of the assailed provisions in the correct forum which is Congress or for the exercise of the people's power of
initiative on legislation. The Court following the time honored doctrine of separation of powers, cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Congress as
to the wisdom, justice and advisability of Republic Act No. 8180.51

ACCORDINGLY, finding no merit in the instant petitions I vote for their outright dismissal.

Separate Opinions

PANGANIBAN, J., concurring:

I concur with the lucid and convincing ponencia of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I write to stress two points:

1. The Issue Is Whether Oil Companies May Unilaterally

Fix Prices, Not Whether This Court May
Interfere in Economic Questions

With the issuance of the status quo order on October 7, 1997 requiring the three respondent oil companies Petron, Shell and Caltex "to
cease and desist from increasing the prices of gasoline and other petroleum fuel products for a period of thirty (30) days," the Court has been
accused of interfering in purely economic policy matters1 or, worse, of arrogating unto itself price-regulatory powers.2 Let it be emphasized
that we have no desire nay, we have no power to intervene in, to change or to repeal the laws of economics, in the same manner that
we cannot and will not nullify or invalidate the laws of physics or chemistry.

The issue here is not whether the Supreme Court may fix the retail prices of petroleum products, Rather, the issue is whether RA 8180, the law
allowing the oil companies to unilaterally set, increase or decrease their prices, is valid or constitutional.
 Under the Constitution,3 this Court has in appropriate cases the DUTY, not just the power, to determine whether a law or a part thereof
offends the Constitution and, if so, to annul and set it aside.4 Because a serious challenge has been hurled against the validity of one such law,
namely RA 8180 its criticality having been preliminarily determined from the petition, comments, reply and, most tellingly, the oral argument
on September 30, 1997 this Court, in the exercise of its mandated judicial discretion, issued the status quo order to prevent the continued
enforcement and implementation of a law that was prima facie found to be constitutionally infirm. Indeed, after careful final deliberation, said
law is now ruled to be constitutionally defective thereby disabling respondent oil companies from exercising their erstwhile power, granted by
such defective statute, to determine prices by themselves.

Concededly, this Court has no power to pass upon the wisdom, merits and propriety of the acts of its co-equal branches in government.
However, it does have the prerogative to uphold the Constitution and to strike down and annul a law that contravenes the Charter.5 From
such duty and prerogative, it shall never shirk or shy away.

By annulling RA 8180, this Court is not making a policy statement against deregulation. Quite the contrary, it is simply invalidating
a pseudo deregulation law which in reality restrains free trade and perpetuates a cartel, an oligopoly. The Court is merely upholding
constitutional adherence to a truly competitive economy that releases the creative energy of free enterprise. It leaves to Congress, as the
policy-setting agency of the government, the speedy crafting of a genuine, constitutionally justified oil deregulation law.

2. Everyone, Rich or Poor, Must Share

in the Burdens of Economic Dislocation

Much has been said and will be said about the alleged negative effect of this Court's holding on the oil giants' profit and loss statements. We
are not unaware of the disruptive impact of the depreciating peso on the retail prices of refined petroleum products. But such price-
escalating consequence adversely affects not merely these oil companies which occupy hallowed places among the most profitable
corporate behemoths in our country. In these critical times of widespread economic dislocations, abetted by currency fluctuations not entirely
of domestic origin, all sectors of society agonize and suffer. Thus, everyone, rich or poor, must share in the burdens of such economic
aberrations.

I can understand foreign investors who see these price adjustments as necessary consequences of the country's adherence to the free
market, for that, in the first place, is the magnet for their presence here. Understandably, their concern is limited to bottom lines and market
share. But in all these mega companies, there are also Filipino entrepreneurs and managers. I am sure there are patriots among them who
realize that, in times of economic turmoil, the poor and the underprivileged proportionately suffer more than any other sector of society. There
is a certain threshold of pain beyond which the disadvantaged cannot endure. Indeed, it has been wisely said that "if the rich who are few will
not help the poor who are many, there will come a time when the few who are filled cannot escape the wrath of the many who are
hungry." Kaya't sa mga kababayan nating kapitalista at may kapangyarihan, nararapat lamang na makiisa tayo sa mga walang palad at
mahihirap sa mga araw ng pangangailangan. Huwag na nating ipagdiinan ang kawalan ng tubo, o maging and panandaliang
pagkalugi. At sa mga mangangalakal na ganid at walang puso: hirap na hirap na po ang ating mga kababayan. Makonsiyensya naman
kayo!

KAPUNAN, J., separate opinion:

Lately, the Court has been perceived (albeit erroneously) to be an unwelcome interloper in affairs and concerns best left to legislators and
policy-makers. Admittedly, the wisdom of political and economic decisions are outside the scrutiny of the Court. However, the political
question doctrine is not some mantra that will automatically cloak executive orders and laws (or provisions thereof) with legitimacy. It is this
Court's bounden duty under Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution to decide all cases involving the constitutionality of laws and under Sec.
1 of the same article, "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

In the instant case, petitioners assail the constitutionality of certain provisions found in R.A. No 8180, otherwise known as the "Downstream Oil
Industry Deregulation Act of 1996" To avoid accusations of undue interference with the workings of the two other branches of government, this
discussion is limited to the issue of whether or not the assailed provisions are germane to the law or serve the purpose for which it was enacted.

The objective of the deregulation law is quite simple. As aptly enunciated in Sec. 2 thereof, it is to "foster a truly competitive market which can
better achieve the social policy objectives of fair prices and adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high quality
petroleum products." The key, therefore, is free competition which is commonly defined as:

The act or action of seeking to gain what another is seeking to gain at the same time and usually under or as if under fair or
equitable rules and circumstances: a common struggle for the same object especially among individuals of relatively equal standing
. . . a market condition in which a large number of independent buyers and sellers compete for identical commodity, deal freely with
each other, and retain the right of entry and exit from the market. (Webster's Third International Dictionary.)

and in a landscape where our oil industry is dominated by only three major oil firms, this translates primarily into the establishment of a free
market conducive to the entry of new and several and oil companies in the business. Corollarily, it means the removal of any and all barriers
that will hinder the influx of prospective players. It is a truism in economics that if there are many players in the market, healthy competition will
ensue and in order to survive and profit the competitors will try to outdo each other in terms of quality and price. The result: better quality
products and competitive prices. In the end, it will be the public that benefits (which is ultimately the most important goal of the law). Thus, it is
within this framework that we must determine the validity of the assailed provisions.

The 4% Tariff Differential

 Sec. 5. Liberalization of Downstream Oil Industry and Tariff Treatment.

xxx xxx xxx

b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on
imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%),
except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1,
2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same: Provided, further, That this provision may
be amended only by an Act of Congress;

Respondents are one in asserting that the 4% tariff differential between imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products is
intended to encourage the new entrants to put up their own refineries in the country. The advantages of domestic refining cannot be
discounted, but we must view this intent in the proper perspective. The primary purpose of the deregulation law is to open up the market and
establish free competition. The priority of the deregulation law, therefore, is to encourage new oil companies to come in first. Incentives to
encourage the building of local refineries should be provided after the new oil companies have entered the Philippine market and are
actively participating therein.

The threshold question therefore is, is the 4% tariff differential a barrier to the entry of new oil companies in the Philippine market?

It is. Since the prospective oil companies do not (as yet) have local refineries, they would have to import refined petroleum products, on which
a 7% tariff duty is imposed. On the other hand, the existing oil companies already have domestic refineries and, therefore, only import crude
oil which is taxed at a lower rate of 3%. Tariffs are part of the costs of production. Hence, this means that with the 4% tariff differential (which
becomes an added cost) the prospective players would have higher production costs compared to the existing oil companies and it is
precisely this factor which could seriously affect its decision to enter the market.

Viewed in this light, the tariff differential between imported crude oil and refined petroleum products becomes an obstacle to the entry of
new players in the Philippine oil market. It defeats the purpose of the law and should thus be struck down.

Public respondents contend that ". . . a higher tariff rate is not the overriding factor confronting a prospective trader/importer but, rather, his
ability to generate the desired internal rate of return (IRR) and net present value (NPV). In other words, if said trader/importer, after some
calculation, finds that he can match the price of locally refined petroleum products and still earn the desired profit margin, despite a higher
tariff rate, he will be attracted to embark in such business. A tariff differential does not per se make the business of importing refined petroleum
product a losing proposition."1

The problem with this rationale, however, is that it is highly speculative. The opposite may well hold true. The point is to make the prospect of
engaging in the oil business in the Philippines appealing, so why create a barrier in the first place?

There is likewise no merit in the argument that the removal of the tariff differential will revive the 10% (for crude oil) and 20% (for refined
petroleum products) tariff rates that prevailed before the enactment of R.A. No. 8180. What petitioners are assailing is the tariff differential.
Phrased differently, why is the tariff duty imposed on imported petroleum products not the same as that imposed on imported crude oil?
Declaring the tariff differential void is not equivalent to declaring the tariff itself void. The obvious consequence thereof would be that
imported refined petroleum products would now be taxed at the same rate as imported crude oil which R.A. No. 8180 has specifically set at
3%. The old rates have effectively been repealed by Sec. 24 of the same law.2

II

The Minimum Inventory Requirement

and the Prohibition Against Predatory Pricing

Sec. 6. Security of Supply. To ensure the security and continuity of petroleum crude and products supply, the DOE shall require the
refiners and importers to maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their respective annual sales volume or
forty (40) days of supply, whichever is lower.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 9. Prohibited Acts. To ensure fair competition and prevent cartels and monopolies in the downstream oil industry, the
following acts are hereby prohibited:

xxx xxx xxx

b) Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so
as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors.

The same rationale holds true for the two other assailed provisions in the Oil Deregulation law. The primordial purpose of the law, I reiterate, is
to create a truly free and competitive market. To achieve this goal, provisions that show the possibility, or even the merest hint, of deterring or
impeding the ingress of new blood in the market should be eliminated outright. I am confident that our lawmakers can formulate other
measures that would accomplish the same purpose (insure security and continuity of petroleum crude products supply and prevent fly by
night operators, in the case of the minimum inventory requirement, for instance) but would not have on the downside the effect of seriously
hindering the entry of prospective traders in the market.
 The overriding consideration, which is the public interest and public benefit, calls for the levelling of the playing fields for the existing oil
companies and the prospective new entrants. Only when there are many players in the market will free competition reign and economic
development begin.

Consequently, Section 6 and Section 9(b) of R. A. No. 8180 should similarly be struck down.

III

Conclusion

Respondent oil companies vehemently deny the "cartelization" of the oil industry. Their parallel business behaviour and uniform pricing are the
result of competition, they say, in order to keep their share of the market. This rationale fares well when oil prices are lowered, i.e. when one oil
company rolls back its prices, the others follow suit so as not to lose its market. But how come when one increases its prices the others likewise
follow? Is this competition at work?

Respondent oil companies repeatedly assert that due to the devaluation of the peso, they had to increase the prices of their oil products,
otherwise, they would lose, as they have allegedly been losing specially with the issuance of a temporary restraining order by the Court.
However, what we have on record are only the self-serving lamentations of respondent oil companies. Not one has presented hard data,
independently verified, to attest to these losses. Mere allegations are not sufficient but must be accompanied by supporting evidence. What
probably is nearer the truth is that respondent oil companies will not make as much profits as they have in the past if they are not allowed to
increase the prices of their products everytime the value of the peso slumps. But in the midst of worsening economic difficulties and hardships
suffered by the people, the very customers who have given them tremendous profits throughout the years, is it fair and decent for said
companies not to bear a bit of the burden by forgoing a little of their profits?

PREMISES CONSIDERED, I vote that Section 5(b), Section 6 and Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 8180 be declared unconstitutional.

MELO, J., dissenting:

With all due respect to my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Puno, who has, as usual, prepared a well-written and comprehensive ponencia, I
regret I cannot share the view that Republic Act No. 8180 should be struck down as violative of the Constitution.

The law in question, Republic Act No. 8180, otherwise known as the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996, contains, inter alia, the following
provisions which have become the subject of the present controversy, to wit:

Sec. 5. Liberalization of Downstream Oil Industry and Tariff Treatment.

xxx xxx xxx

(b). Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected
on imported crude oil at the rate of (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil
and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude
oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the
same: Provided, further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress. . .

Sec. 6. Security of Supply. To ensure the security and continuity of petroleum crude and products supply, the DOE shall require the
refiners and importers to maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their respective annual sales volume or
forty (40) days of supply, whichever is lower.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 9. Prohibited Acts. To ensure fair competition and prevent cartels and monopolies in the downstream oil industry, the
following acts are hereby prohibited:

xxx xxx xxx

b) Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so
as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation. Pursuant to Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE [Department of Energy]
shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far
as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are
declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US Dollar is stable. . .

In G. R. No. 124360, petitioners therein pray that the aforequoted Section 5(b) be declared null and void. However, despite its pendency,
President Ramos, pursuant to the above-cited Section 15 of the assailed law, issued Executive Order No. 392 on 22 January 1997 declaring the
full deregulation of the downstream oil industry effective February 8, 1997. A few days after the implementation of said Executive Order, the
second consolidated petition was filed (G.R. No. 127867), seeking, inter alia, the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 15 of the law
on various grounds.

I submit that the instant consolidated petitions should be denied. In support of my view, I shall discuss the arguments of the parties point by
point.

1. The instant petitions do not raise a justiciable controversy as the issues raised therein pertain to the wisdom and reasonableness of the
provisions of the assailed law. The contentions made by petitioners, that the "imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and
imported refined petroleum products will not foster a truly competitive market, nor will it level the playing fields" and that said imposition "does
not deregulate the downstream oil industry, instead, it controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the law," are clearly policy
matters which are within the province of the political departments of the government. These submissions require a review of issues that are in
the nature of political questions, hence, clearly beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry.

A political question refers to a question of policy or to issues which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
Generally, political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular measure (Taada vs.
Cuenco, 100 Phil 101 [1957]).

Notwithstanding the expanded judicial power of this Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, an inquiry on the above-stated
policy matters would delve on matters of wisdom which are exclusively within the legislative powers of Congress.

2. The petitioners do not have the necessary locus standi to file the instant consolidated petitions. Petitioners Lagman, Arroyo, Garcia, Tanada,
and Tatad assail the constitutionality of the above-stated laws through the instant consolidated petitions in their capacity as members of
Congress, and as taxpayers and concerned citizens. However, the existence of a constitutional issue in a case does not per se confer or
clothe a legislator with locus standi to bring suit. In Phil. Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) v. Enriquez (235 SCRA 506 [1994]), we held that
members of Congress may properly challenge the validity of an official act of any department of the government only upon showing that the
assailed official act affects or impairs their rights and prerogatives as legislators. In Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. vs. Morato, et al. (246 SCRA 540
[1995]), this Court further clarified that "if the complaint is not grounded on the impairment of the power of Congress, legislators do not have
standing to question the validity of any law or official action."

Republic Act No. 8180 clearly does not violate or impair prerogatives, powers, and rights of Congress, or the individual members thereof,
considering that the assailed official act is the very act of Congress itself authorizing the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

Neither can petitioners sue as taxpayers or concerned citizens. A condition sine qua non for the institution of a taxpayer's suit is an allegation
that the assailed action is an unconstitutional exercise of the spending powers of Congress or that it constitutes an illegal disbursement of
public funds. The instant consolidated petitions do not allege that the assailed provisions of the law amount to an illegal disbursement of
public money. Hence, petitioners cannot, even as taxpayers or concerned citizens, invoke this Court's power of judicial review.

Further, petitioners, including Flag, FDC, and Sanlakas, can not be deemed proper parties for lack of a particularized interest or elemental
substantial injury necessary to confer on them locus standi. The interest of the person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct
and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the jaw is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person
complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to
some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of Petitioners have not established such kind of interest.

3. Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 8180 is not violative of the "one title-one subject" rule under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution. It is
not required that a provision of law be expressed in the title thereof as long as the provision in question is embraced within the subject
expressed in the title of the law. The "title of a bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in
the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title." (Association of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. vs. Sec. of Agrarian
Reform, 175 SCRA 343 [1989]) An "act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of
such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object." (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 11th ed., p. 225).

The questioned tariff provision in Section 5 (b) was provided as a means to implement the deregulation of the downstream oil industry and
hence, is germane to the purpose of the assailed law. The general subject of Republic Act No. 8180, as expressed in its title, "An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry, and for the Other Purposes", necessarily implies that the law provides for the means for such
deregulation. One such means is the imposition of the differential tariff rates which are provided to encourage new investors as well as existing
players to put up new refineries. The aforesaid provision is thus germane to, and in furtherance of, the object of deregulation. The trend of
jurisprudence, ever since Sumulong vs. COMELEC (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), is to give the above-stated constitutional requirement a liberal
interpretation. Hence, there is indeed substantial compliance with said requirement.

Petitioners claim that because the House version of the assailed law did not impose any tariff rates but merely set the policy of "zero
differential" and that the Senate version did not set or fix any tariff, the tariff changes being imposed by the assailed law was never subject of
any deliberations in both houses nor the Bicameral Conference Committee. I believe that this argument is bereft of merit.

The report of the Bicameral Conference Committee, which was precisely formed to settle differences between the two houses of Congress,
was approved by members thereof only after a full deliberation on the conflicting provisions of the Senate version and the House version of
the assailed law. Moreover, the joint explanatory statement of said Committee which was submitted to both houses, explicitly states that
"while sub-paragraph (b) is a modification, its thrust and style were patterned after the House's original sub-paragraph (b)." Thus, it cannot be
denied that both houses were informed of the changes in the aforestated provision of the assailed law. No legislator can validly state that he
was not apprised of the purposes, nature, and scope of the provisions of the law since the inclusion of the tariff differential was clearly
mentioned in the Bicameral Conference Committee's explanatory note.

As regards the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is neither found in the
House bill or Senate bill, this Court already upheld such power in Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance (235 SCRA 630 [1994]), where we ruled that the
conference committee can even include an amendment in the nature of a substitute so long as such amendment is germane to the subject
of the bill before it.

Lastly, in view of the "enrolled bill theory" pronounced by this Court as early as 1947 in the case of Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil. 1 [1947]),
the duly authenticated copy of the bill, signed by the proper officers of each house, and approved by the President, is conclusive upon the
courts not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment.

4. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180 does not constitute undue delegation of legislative power. Petitioners themselves admit that said
section provides the Secretary of Energy and the President with the bases of (1) "practicability", (2) "the decline of crude oil prices in the world
market", and (3) "the stability of the Peso exchange rate in relation to the US Dollar", in determining the effectivity of full deregulation. To my
mind, said bases are determinate and determinable guidelines, when examined in the light of the tests for permissible delegation.

The assailed law satisfies the completeness test as it is complete and leaves nothing more for the Executive Branch to do but to enforce the
same. Section 2 thereof expressly provides that "it shall be the policy of the State to deregulate the downstream oil industry to foster a truly
competitive market which can better achieve the social policy objectives of fair prices and adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-
clean and high-quality petroleum products." This provision manifestly declares the policy to be achieved through the delegate, that is, the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry toward the end of full and free competition. Section 15 further provides for all the basic terms and
conditions for its execution and thus belies the argument that the Executive Branch is given complete liberty to determine whether or not to
implement the law. Indeed, Congress did not only make full deregulation mandatory, but likewise set a deadline (that is, not later than March
1997), within which full deregulation should be achieved.

Congress may validly provide that a statute shall take effect or its operation shall be revived or suspended or shall terminate upon the
occurrence of certain events or contingencies the ascertainment of which may be left to some official agency. In effect, contingent
legislation may be issued by the Executive Branch pursuant to a delegation of authority to determine some fact or state of things upon which
the enforcement of a law depends (Cruz, Phil. Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 96; Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234 [1931]). This is a valid delegation
since what the delegate performs is a matter of detail whereas the statute remains complete in all essential matters. Section 15 falls under this
kind of delegated authority. Notably, the only aspect with respect to which the President can exercise "discretion" is the determination of
whether deregulation may be implemented on or before March, 1997, the deadline set by Congress. If he so decides, however, certain
conditions must first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining, and (2) the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US Dollar is stable. Significantly, the so-called "discretion" pertains only to the ascertainment of the
existence of conditions which are necessary for the effectivity of the law and not a discretion as to what the law shall be.

In the same vein, I submit that the President's issuance of Executive Order No. 392 last January 22, 1997 is valid as contingent legislation. All the
Chief Executive did was to exercise his delegated authority to ascertain and recognize certain events or contingencies which prompted him
to advance the deregulation to a date earlier than March, 1997. Anyway, the law does not prohibit him from implementing the deregulation
prior to March, 1997, as long as the standards of the law are met.

Further, the law satisfies the sufficient standards test. The words "practicable", "declining", and "stable", as used in Section 15 of the assailed law
are sufficient standards that saliently "map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority by defining the legislative policy and indicating the
circumstances under which it is to be pursued and effected." (Cruz, Phil. Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 98). Considering the normal and ordinary
definitions of these standards, I believe that the factors to be considered by the President and/or Secretary of Energy in implementing full
deregulation are, as mentioned, determinate and determinable.

It is likewise noteworthy that the above-mentioned factors laid down by the subject law are not solely dependent on Congress. Verily, oil
pricing and the peso-dollar exchange rate are dependent on the various forces working within the consumer market. Accordingly, it would
have been unreasonable, or even impossible, for the legislature to have provided for fixed and specific oil prices and exchange rates. To
require Congress to set forth specifics in the law would effectively deprive the legislature of the flexibility and practicability which subordinate
legislation is ultimately designed to provide. Besides, said specifics are precisely the details which are beyond the competence of Congress,
and thus, are properly delegated to appropriate administrative agencies and executive officials to "fill in". It cannot be gainsaid that the detail
of the timing of full deregulation has been "filled in" by the President, upon the recommendation of the DOE, when he issued Executive Order
No. 329.

5. Republic Act No. 8180 is not violative of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade, and unfair
competition. The three provisions relied upon by petitioners (Section 5 [b] on tariff differential; Section 6 on the 40-day minimum inventory
requirement; and Section 9 [b] on the prohibited act of predatory pricing) actually promote, rather than restrain, free trade and competition.

The tariff differential provided in the assailed law does not necessarily make the business of importing refined petroleum products a losing
proposition for new players. First, the decision of a prospective trader/importer (subjected to the 7% tariff rate) to compete in the downstream
oil industry as a new player is based solely on whether he can, based on his computations, generate the desired internal rate of return (IRR)
and net present value (NPV) notwithstanding the imposition of a higher tariff rate. Second, such a difference in tax treatment does not
necessarily provide refiners of imported crude oil with a significant level of economic advantage considering the huge amount of investments
required in putting up refinery plants which will then have to be added to said refiners' production cost. It is not unreasonable to suppose that
the additional cost imputed by higher tariff can anyway be overcome by a new player in the business of importation due to lower operating
costs, lower capital infusion, and lower capital carrying costs. Consequently, the resultant cost of imported finished petroleum and that of
locally refined petroleum products may turn out to be approximately the same.
 The existence of a tariff differential with regard to imported crude oil and imported finished products is nothing new or novel. In fact, prior to
the passage of Republic Act No. 8180, there existed a 10% tariff differential resulting from the imposition of a 20% tariff rate on imported
finished petroleum products and 10% on imported crude oil (based on Executive Order No. 115). Significantly, Section 5 (b) of the assailed law
effectively lowered the tariff rates from 20% to 7% for imported refined petroleum products, and 10% to 3% for imported crude oil, or a
reduction of the differential from 10% to 4%. This provision is certainly favorable to all in the downstream oil industry, whether they be existing or
new players. It thus follows that the 4% tariff differential aims to ensure the stable supply of petroleum products by encouraging new entrants
to put up oil refineries in the Philippines and to discourage fly-by-night importers.

Further, the assailed tariff differential is likewise not violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. It is germane to the declared
policy of Republic Act No. 8180 which is to achieve (1) fair prices; and (2) adequate and continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high
quality petroleum products. Said adequate and continuous supply of petroleum products will be achieved if new investors or players are
enticed to engage in the business of refining crude oil in the country. Existing refining companies, are similarly encouraged to put up
additional refining companies. All of this can be made possible in view of the lower tariff duty on imported crude oil than that levied on
imported refined petroleum products. In effect, the lower tariff rates will enable the refiners to recoup their investments considering that they
will be investing billions of pesos in putting up their refineries in the Philippines. That incidentally the existing refineries will be benefited by the
tariff differential does not negate the fact that the intended effect of the law is really to encourage the construction of new refineries, whether
by existing players or by new players.

As regards the 40-day inventory requirement, it must be emphasized that the 10% minimum requirement is based on the refiners' and importers'
annual sales volume, and hence, obviously inapplicable to new entrants as they do not have an annual sales volume yet. Contrary to
petitioners' argument, this requirement is not intended to discourage new or prospective players in the downstream oil industry. Rather, it
guarantees "security and continuity of petroleum crude and products supply." (Section 6, Republic Act No. 8180) This legal requirement is
meant to weed out entities not sufficiently qualified to participate in the local downstream oil industry. Consequently, it is meant to protect the
industry from fly-by-night business operators whose sole interest would be to make quick profits and who may prove unrealiable in the effort to
provide an adequate and steady supply of petroleum products in the country. In effect, the aforestated provision benefits not only the three
respondent oil companies but all entities serious and committed to put up storage facilities and to participate as serious players in the local oil
industry. Moreover, it benefits the entire consuming public by its guarantee of an "adequate continuous supply of environmentally-clean and
high quality petroleum products." It ensures that all companies in the downstream oil industry operate according to the same high standards,
that the necessary storage and distribution facilities are in place to support the level of business activities involved, and that operations are
conducted in a safe and environmentally sound manner for the benefit of the consuming public.

Regarding the prohibition against predatory pricing, I believe that petitioners' argument is quite misplaced. The provision actually protects new
players by preventing, under pain of criminal sanction, the more established oil firms from driving away any potential or actual competitor by
taking undue advantage of their size and relative financial stability. Obviously, the new players are the ones susceptible to closing down on
account of intolerable losses which will be brought about by fierce competition with rival firms. The petitioners are merely working under the
presumption that it is the new players which would succumb to predatory pricing, and not the more established oil firms. This is not a factual
assertion but a rather baseless and conjectural assumption.

As to the alleged cartel among the three respondent oil companies, much as we suspect the same, its existence calls for a finding of fact
which this Court is not in the position to make. We cannot be called to try facts and resolve factual issues such as this (Trade Unions of the Phils.
vs. Laguesma, 236 SCRA 586 [1994]); Ledesma vs. NLRC, 246 SCRA 247 [1995]).

With respect to the amendatory bills filed by various Congressmen aimed to modify the alleged defects of Republic Act No. 8180, I submit that
such bills are the correct remedial steps to pursue, instead of the instant petitions to set aside the statute sought to be amended. The proper
forum is Congress, not this Court.

Finally, as to the ponencia's endnote which cites the plea of respondent oil companies for the lifting of the restraining order against them to
enable them to adjust the prices of petroleum and petroleum products in view of the devaluation of our currency, I am pensive as to how the
matter can be addressed to the obviously defunct Energy Regulatory Board. There has been a number of price increase in the meantime. Too
much water has passed under the bridge. It is too difficult to turn back the hands of time.

For all the foregoing reasons, I, therefore, vote for the outright dismissal of the instant consolidated petitions for lack of merit.

FRANCISCO, J., dissenting:

The continuing peso devaluation and the spiraling cost of commodities have become hard facts of life nowadays. And the wearies are
compounded by the ominous prospects of very unstable oil prices. Thus, with the goal of rationalizing the oil scheme, Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 8180, otherwise known as the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996, the policy of which is "to foster a truly competitive
market which can better achieve the social policy objectives of fair prices and adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-clean and
high quality petroleum products".1 But if the noble and laudable objective of this enactment is not accomplished, as to date oil prices
continue to rise, can this Court be called upon to declare the statute unconstitutional or must the Court desist from interfering in a matter
which is best left to the other branch/es of government?

The apparent thrust of the consolidated petitions is to declare, not the entirety, but only some isolated portions of Republic Act No. 8180
unconstitutional. This is clear from the grounds enumerated by the petitioners, to wit:

G.R. No. 124360

4.0. Grounds:
 4.1.

THE IMPOSITION OF DIFFERENT TARIFF RATES ON IMPORTED CRUDE OIL AND IMPORTED REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS VIOLATES THE
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

4.2.

THE IMPOSITION OF DIFFERENT TARIFF RATES DOES NOT DEREGULATE THE DOWNSTREAM OIL INDUSTRY, INSTEAD, IT CONTROLS THE OIL
INDUSTRY, CONTRARY TO THE AVOWED POLICY OF THE LAW.

4.3.

THE INCLUSION OF A TARIFF PROVISION IN SECTION 5(b) OF THE DOWNSTREAM OIL INDUSTRY DEREGULATION LAW VIOLATES THE "ONE
SUBJECT-ONE TITLE" RULE EMBODIED IN ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26 (1) OF THE CONSTITUTION.2

G.R. No. 127867

GROUNDS

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FULL DEREGULATION PRIOR TO THE EXISTENCE OF A TRULY COMPETITIVE MARKET VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION
PROHIBITING MONOPOLIES, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND PRACTICES IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.

R.A. No. 8180 CONTAINS DISGUISED REGULATIONS IN A SUPPOSEDLY DEREGULATED INDUSTRY WHICH CREATE OR PROMOTE
MONOPOLY OF THE INDUSTRY BY THE THREE EXISTING OIL COMPANIES.

THE REGULATORY AND PENAL PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 8180 VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS, DUE PROCESS OF LAW
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM. 3

And culled from petitioners' arguments in support of the above grounds the provisions of Republic Act No. 8180 which they now impugn are:

A. Section 5(b) on the imposition of tariff which provides: "Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of
this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%), and imported refined
petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPB, the rate for which shall be the same as that for
imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products
shall be the same: Provided further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress." [Emphasis added].

B. Section 6 on the minimum inventory requirement, thus: "Security of Supply. To ensure the security and continuity of petroleum
crude and products supply, the DOE shall require the refiners and importers to maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of their respective annual sales volume or forty (40) days of supply, whichever is lower."

C. Section 9(b) on predatory pricing: "Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably
below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors.

Any person, including but not limited to the chief operating officer or chief executive officer of the corporation involved, who is
found guilty of any of the said prohibited acts shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment for three (3) years and fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) to One million pesos (P1,000,000).

D. Section 10 on the other prohibited acts which states: "Other Prohibited Acts. To ensure compliance with the provisions of this
Act, the failure to comply with any of the following shall likewise be prohibited: 1) submission of any reportorial requirements; 2)
maintenance of the minimum inventory; and, 3) use of clean and safe (environment and worker-benign) technologies.

Any person, including but not limited to the chief operating officer or chief executive officer of the corporation involved, who is
found guilty of any of the said prohibited acts shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years and fine ranging from Two
hundred fifty thousand pesos (P250,000) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000).

E. Section 15 on the implementation of full deregulation, thus: "Implementation of Full Deregulation. Pursuant to Section 5(e) of
Republic Act No. 7683, the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry not later than March, 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
Upon the implementation of the full deregulation as provided herein, the transition phase is deemed terminated and the following
laws are deemed repealed: . . . [Emphasis added].

F. Section 20 on the imposition of administrative fine: "Administrative Fine. The DOE may, after due notice and hearing impose a
fine in the amount of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) but not more than One million pesos (P1,000,000) upon
any person or entity who violates any of its reportorial and minimum inventory requirements, without prejudice to criminal sanctions."
Executive Order No. 392, entitled "Declaring Full Deregulation Of The Downstream Oil Industry" which declared the full deregulation effective
February 8, 1997, is also sought to be declared unconstitutional.

A careful scrutiny of the arguments proffered against the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 betrays the petitioners' underlying motive
of calling upon this Court to determine the wisdom and efficacy of the enactment rather than its adherence to the Constitution. Nevertheless,
I shall address the issues raised if only to settle the alleged constitutional defects afflicting some provisions of Republic Act No. 8180. To
elaborate:

A. On the imposition of tariff . Petitioners argue that the existence of a tariff provision violated the "one subject-one title"4 rule under Article VI,
Section 26 (1) as the imposition of tariff rates is "inconsistent with"5and not at all germane to the deregulation of the oil industry. They also stress
that the variance between the seven percent (7%) duty on imported gasoline and other refined petroleum products and three percent (3%)
duty on crude oil gives a "4% tariff protection in favor of Petron, Shell and Caltex which own and operate refineries here".6 The provision,
petitioners insist, "inhibits prospective oil players to do business here because it will unnecessarily increase their product cost by 4%."7 In other
words, the tariff rates "does not foster 'a truly competitive market'."8 Also petitioners claim that both Houses of Congress never envisioned
imposing the seven percent (7%) and three percent (3%) tariff on refined and crude oil products as both Houses advocated, prior to the
holding of the bicameral conference committee, a "zero differential". Moreover, petitioners insist that the tariff rates violate "the equal
protection of the laws enshrined in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution" 9 since the rates and their classification are not relevant in attaining
the avowed policy of the law, not based on substantial distinctions and limited to the existing condition.

The Constitution mandates that "every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof".10 The object sought to be accomplished by this mandatory requirement has been explained by the Court in the vintage case
of Central Capiz v. Ramirez,11 thus:

The object sought to be accomplished and the mischief proposed to be remedied by this provision are well known. Legislative
assemblies, for the dispatch of business, often pass bills by their titles only without requiring them to be read. A specious title
sometimes covers legislation which, if its real character had been disclosed, would not have commanded assent. To prevent surprise
and fraud on the legislature is one of the purposes this provision was intended to accomplish. Before the adoption of this provision
the title of a statute was often no indication of its subject or contents.

An evil this constitutional requirement was intended to correct was the blending in one and the same statute of such things as were
diverse in their nature, and were connected only to combine in favor of all the advocates of each, thus often securing the passage
of several measures no one of which could have succeeded on its own merits. Mr. Cooley thus sums up in his review of the authorities
defining the objects of this provision: "It may therefore be assumed as settled that the purpose of this provision was: First, to
prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills
of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted;
and, third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of
legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they
shall so desire." (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 143).12

The interpretation of "one subject-one title" rule, however, is never intended to impede or stifle legislation. The requirement is to be given a
practical rather than a technical construction and it would be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions of the enactment are germane and material to the general subject.13 Congress is not required to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. 14 All that is
required is that the title should not cover legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as having a
necessary or proper connection.15 Hence, the title "An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act Numbered One Thousand One
Hundred Ninety-Nine, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines" was declared by the Court sufficient to contain a
provision empowering the Secretary of Justice, acting through a tenancy mediation division, to carry out a national enforcement program,
including the mediation of tenancy disputes.16 The title "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" was similarly declared valid and
sufficient to embrace a regulatory tax provision, i.e., the imposition of a thirty percent (30%) tax on the purchase price or rental rate, as the
case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program with
fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected accruing to the province and the other fifty percent (50%) to the municipality where
the tax is collected.17 Likewise, the title "An Act To Further Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Twenty, as amended by
Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and Forty One" was declared sufficient to cover a provision limiting the allowable margin of profit
to not more than twelve percent (12%) annually of its investments plus two-month operating expenses for franchise holder receiving at least
fifty percent (50%) of its power from the National Power Corporation.18

In the case at bar, the title "An Act Deregulating The Downstream Oil Industry, And For Other Purposes" is adequate and comprehensive to
cover the imposition of tariff rates. The tariff provision under Section 5 (b) is one of the means of effecting deregulation. It must be observed
that even prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 8180 oil products have always been subject to tariff and surely Congress is cognizant of
such fact. The imposition of the seven percent (7%) and three percent (3%) duties on imported gasoline and refined petroleum products and
on crude oil, respectively, are germane to the deregulation of the oil industry. The title, in fact, even included the broad and all-encompassing
phrase "And For Other Purposes" thereby indicating the legislative intent to cover anything that has some relation to or connection with the
deregulation of the oil industry. The tax provision is a mere tool and mechanism considered essential by Congress to fulfill Republic Act No.
8180's objective of fostering a competitive market and achieving the social policy objectives of a fair prices. To curtail any adverse impact
which the tariff treatment may cause by its application, and perhaps in answer to petitioners' apprehension Congress included under the
assailed section a proviso that will effectively eradicate the tariff difference in the treatment of refined petroleum products and crude oil by
stipulating "that beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same."

The contention that tariff "does not foster a truly competitive market"19 and therefore restrains trade and does not help achieve the purpose of
deregulation is an issue not within the power of the Court to resolve. Nonetheless, the Court's pronouncement in Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory
Board appears to be worth reiterating:
 Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is harsh and oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint of trade.
However, it is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even
definitely deters the activities taxed. The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts
scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority which
exercise it. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and
oppressive taxation.20 [Emphasis added]

Anent petitioners' claim that both House Bill No. 5264 and Senate Bill No. 1253, [the precursor bills of Republic Act No. 8180], "did not impose
any tariff rates but merely set the policy of 'zero differential' in the House version, and nothing in the Senate version" 21 is inconsequential. Suffice
it to state that the bicameral conference committee report was approved by the conferees thereof only "after full and free conference" on
the disagreeing provisions of Senate Bill No. 1253 and House Bill No. 5264. Indeed, the "zero differential" on the tariff rates imposed in the House
version was embodied in the law, save for a slight delay in its implementation to January 1, 2004. Moreover, any objection on the validity of
provisions inserted by the legislative bicameral conference committee has
been passed upon by the Court in the recent case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,22 which, in my view, laid to rest any doubt as to the
validity of the bill emerging out of a Conference Committee. The Court in that case, speaking through Mr. Justice Mendoza, said:

As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emerging out of a Conference Committee, it has been explained:

Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to make any material change in the measure at
issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult
provision to enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a proposal originating in either house by striking out everything
following the enacting clause and substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are now altogether different,
permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a new bill. . .

The result is a third version, which is considered an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only requirement for which being
that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills:

Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision
that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two
provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a
substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final
but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in
this case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis.

xxx xxx xxx

To be sure, nothing in the Rules [of the Senate and the House of Representatives] limits a conference committee to a consideration
of conflicting provisions. But Rule XLVI, (Sec.) 112 of the Rules of the Senate is cited to the effect that "If there is no Rule applicable to
a specific case the precedents of the Legislative Department of the Philippines shall be resorted to, and as a supplement of these,
the Rules contained in Jefferson's Manual." The following is then quoted from the Jefferson's Manual:

The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed to them . . . and may not include subjects not
within disagreements, even though germane to a question in issue.

Note that, according to Rule XLIX, (Sec.) 112, in case there is no specific rule applicable, resort must be to the legislative practice. The
Jefferson's Manual is resorted to only as supplement. It is common place in Congress that conference committee reports include new
matters which, though germane, have not been committed to the committee. This practice was admitted by Senator Raul S. Roco,
petitioner in G.R. No. 115543, during the oral argument in these cases. Whatever, then, may be provided in the Jefferson's Manual
must be considered to have been modified by the legislative practice. If a change is desired in the practice it must be sought in
Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each house. Thus, Art. VI,
(Sec.) 16(3) of the Constitution provides that "Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings . . ."

This observation applies to the other contention that the Rules of the two chambers were likewise disregarded in the preparation of
the Conference Committee Report because the Report did not contain a "detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of changes in,
or amendments to, the subject measure." The Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is a standard
practice in bill-drafting. We cannot say that in using these marks and symbols the Committee violated the Rules of the Senate and
the House. Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have
already ruled, "parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern." Our concern is
with the procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are
satisfied that they have been faithfully observed in these cases.23

The other contention of petitioners that Section 5(b) "violates the equal protection of the laws enshrined in Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution"24 deserves a short shrift for the equal protection clause does not forbid reasonable classification based upon substantial
distinctions where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies equally to all the members of the class. The imposition of
three percent (3%) tariff on crude oil, which is four percent (4%) lower than those imposed on refined oil products, as persuasively argued by
the Office of the Solicitor General, is based on the substantial distinction that importers of crude oil, by necessity, have to establish and
maintain refinery plants to process and refine the crude oil thereby adding to their production costs. To encourage these importers to set up
refineries involving huge expenditures and investments which peddlers and importers of refined petroleum products do not shoulder, Congress
deemed it appropriate to give a lower tariff rate to foster the entry of new "players" and investors in line with the law's policy to create a
competitive market. The residual contention that there is no substantial distinction in the imposition of seven percent (7%) and three percent
(3%) tariff since the law itself will level the tariff rates between the imported crude oil and refined petroleum products come January 1, 2004, to
my mind, is addressed more to the legislative's prerogative to provide for the duration and period of effectivity of the imposition. If Congress,
after consultation, analysis of material data and due deliberations, is convinced that by January 1, 2004, the investors and importers of crude
oil would have already recovered their huge investments and expenditures in establishing refineries and plants then it is within its prerogative
to lift the tariff differential. Such matter is well within the pale of legislative power which the Court may not fetter. Besides, this again is in line
with Republic Act No. 8180's avowed policy to foster a truly competitive market which can achieve the social policy objectives of fair, if not
lower, prices.

B. On the minimum inventory requirement. Petitioners' attack on Section 6 is premised upon their belief that the inventory requirement is hostile
and not conducive for new oil companies to operate here, and unduly favors Petron, Shell and Caltex, companies which according to them
can easily hurdle the requirement. I fail to see any legal or constitutional issue here more so as it is not raised by a party with legal standing for
petitioners do not claim to be the owners or operators of new oil companies affected by the requirement. Whether or not the requirement is
advantageous, disadvantageous or conducive for new oil companies hinges on presumptions and speculations which is not within the realm
of judicial adjudication. It may not be amiss to mention here that according to the Office of the Solicitor General "there are about thirty (30)
new entrants in the downstream activities . . . , fourteen (14) of which have started operation . . . , eight (8) having commenced operation last
March 1997, and the rest to operate between the second quarter of 1997 and the year 2000" 25. Petitioners did not controvert this averment
which thereby cast serious doubt over their claim of "hostile" environment.

C. On predatory pricing. What petitioners bewail the most in Section 9(b) is "the definition of 'predatory pricing' [which] is too broad in scope
and indefinite in meaning"26 and the penal sanction imposed for its violation. Petitioners maintain that it would be the new oil companies or
"players" which would lower their prices to gain a foothold on the market and not Petron, Shell or Caltex, an occasion for these three big oil
"companies" to control the prices by keeping their average cost at a level which will ensure their desired profit margin.27 Worse, the penal
sanction, they add, deters new "players" from entering the oil market and the practice of lowering prices is now condemned as a criminal act.

Petitioners' contentions are nebulous if not speculative. In the absence of any concrete proof or evidence, the assertion that it will only be the
new oil companies which will lower oil prices remains a mere guess or suspicion. And then again petitioners are not the proper party to raise
the issue. The query on why lowering of prices should be penalized and the broad scope of predatory pricing is not for this Court to traverse
the same being reserved for Congress. The Court should not lose sight of the fact that its duty under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code is not
to determine, define and legislate what act or acts should be penalized, but simply to report to the Chief Executive the reasons why it believes
an act should be penalized, as well as why it considers a penalty excessive, thus:

Art. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are nor covered by the law, and in cases of
excessive penalties. Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not
punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the
reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation.

In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be
deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would
result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense.

Furthermore, in the absence of an actual conviction for violation of Section 9 (b) and the appropriate appeal to this Court, I fail to see the
need to discuss any longer the issue as it is not ripe for judicial adjudication. Any pronouncement on the legality of the sanction will only be
advisory.

D. On other prohibited acts. In discussing their objection to Section 10, together with Section 20, petitioners assert that these sanctions "even
provide stiff criminal and administrative penalties for failure to maintain said minimum requirement and other regulations" and posed this
query: "Are these provisions consistent with the policy objective to level the playing [field] in a truly competitive answer?"28 A more
circumspect analysis of petitioners' grievance, however, does not present any legal controversy. At best, their objection deals on policy
considerations that can be more appropriately and effectively addressed not by this Court but by Congress itself.

E. On the implementation of full deregulation under Section 15, and the validity of Executive Order No. 392. Petitioners stress that "Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8180 delegates to the Secretary of Energy and to the President of the Philippines the power to determine when to fully
deregulate the downstream oil industry"29without providing for any standards "to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market
are considered to be
'declining'"30 and when may the exchange rate be considered "stable" for purposes of determining when it is "practicable" to declare full
deregulation.31 In the absence of standards, Executive Order No. 392 which implemented Section 15 constitute "executive
lawmaking,"32 hence the same should likewise be struck down as invalid. Petitioners additionally decry the brief seven (7) month transition
period under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180. The premature full deregulation declared in Executive Order No. 392 allowed Caltex,
Petron, and Shell oil companies "to define the conditions under which any 'new players' will have to adhere to in order to become competitive
in the new deregulated market even before such a market has been created."33 Petitioners are emphatic that Section 15 and Executive Order
No. 392 "have effectively legislated a cartel among respondent oil companies, directly violating the Constitutional prohibition against unfair
trade practices and combinations in restraint of trade".34

Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180 provides for the implementation of full deregulation. It states:

Section 15 on the implementation of full deregulation, thus: "Implementation of Full Deregulation. Pursuant to Section 5(e) of
Republic Act No. 7683, the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry not later than March, 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
Upon the implementation of the full deregulation as provided herein, the transition phase is deemed terminated and the following
laws are deemed repealed: . . . [Emphasis added].
It appears from the foregoing that deregulation has to be implemented "not later than March 1997." The provision is unequivocal, i.e.,
deregulation must be implemented on or before March 1997. The Secretary of Energy and the President is devoid of any discretion to move
the date of full deregulation to any day later than March 1997. The second sentence which provides that "[a]s far as practicable, the DOE
shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable" did not modify or reset to any other date the full deregulation of downstream
oil industry. Not later than March 1997 is a complete and definite period for full deregulation. What is conferred to the Department of Energy in
the implementation of full deregulation, with the approval of the President, is not the power and discretion on what the law should be. The
provision of Section 15 gave the President the authority to proceed with deregulation on or before, but not after, March 1997, and if
implementation is made before March, 1997, to execute the same, if possible, when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the
world market are declining and the peso-dollar exchange rate is stable. But if the implementation is made on March, 1997, the President has
no option but to implement the law regardless of the conditions of the prices of oil in the world market and the exchange rates.

The settled rule is that the legislative department may not delegate its power. Any attempt to abdicate it is unconstitutional and void, based
on the principle of potestas delegata non delegare potest. In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislative so that
nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.35 An enactment is said to be incomplete and invalid if
it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary
powers delegated to it.36 In People v. Vera,37 the Court laid down a guideline on how to distinguish which power may or may not be
delegated by Congress, to wit:

"The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z.R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs.
[1852]; 1 Ohio St., 77, 88 See also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 68.)

Applying these parameters, I fail to see any taint of unconstitutionality that could vitiate the validity of Section 15. The discretion to ascertain
when may the prices of crude oil in the world market be deemed "declining" or when may the peso-dollar exchange rate be considered
"stable" relates to the assessment and appreciation of facts. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or
conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a
law38 so as to make the provision an undue delegation of legislative power. The alleged lack of definitions of the terms employed in the statute
does not give rise to undue delegation either for the words of the statute, as a rule, must be given its literal meaning.39 Petitioners' contentions
are concerned with the details of execution by the executive officials tasked to implement deregulation. No proviso in Section 15 may be
construed as objectionable for the legislature has the latitude to provide that a law may take effect upon the happening of future specified
contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the specified contingency has arisen.40 The instant petition
is similarly situated with the past cases, as summarized in the case of People v. Vera, where the Court ruled for the validity of several assailed
statutes, to wit:

To the same effect are decisions of this court in Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binangonan([1917], 36 Phil. 547); Rubi
vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919], 39 Phil. 660), and Cruz vs.Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil. 234). In the first of these cases, this court
sustained the validity of a law conferring upon the Governor-General authority to adjust provincial and municipal boundaries. In the
second case, this court held it lawful for the legislature to direct non-Christian inhabitants to take up their habitation on unoccupied
lands to be selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. In the third case, it was held proper for the
legislature to vest in the Governor-General authority to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition of the importation of foreign
cattle, such prohibition to be raised "if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if disease among foreign cattle has
ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands."41

If the Governor-General in the case of Cruz v. Youngberg42 can "suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition of the importation of cattle,
such prohibition to be raised 'if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if disease among foreign cattles has ceased to be a
menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands" then with more reason that Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180 can pass the
constitutional challenge as it has mandatorily fixed the effectivity date of full deregulation to not later than March 1997, with or without the
occurrence of stable peso-dollar exchange rate and declining oil prices. Contrary to petitioners' protestations, therefore, Section 15 is
complete and contains the basic conditions and terms for its execution.

To restate, the policy of Republic Act No. 8180 is to deregulate the downstream oil industry and to foster a truly competitive market which
could lead to fair prices and adequate supply of environmentally clean and high-quality petroleum products. This is the guiding principle
installed by Congress upon which the executive department of the government must conform. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180 sufficiently
supplied the metes and bounds for the execution of full deregulation. In fact, a cursory reading of Executive Order No. 39243 which advanced
deregulation to February 8, 1997 convincingly shows the determinable factors or standards, enumerated under Section 15, which were taken
into account by the Chief Executive in declaring full deregulation. I cannot see my way clear on how or why Executive Order No. 392, as
professed by petitioners, may be declared unconstitutional for adding the "depletion of buffer fund" as one of the grounds for advancing the
deregulation. The enumeration of factors to be considered for full deregulation under Section 15 did not proscribe the Chief Executive from
acknowledging other instances that can equally assuage deregulation. What is important is that the Chief Executive complied with and met
the minimum standards supplied by the law. Executive Order No. 392 may not, therefore, be branded as unconstitutional.

Petitioners' vehement objections on the short seven (7) month transition period under Section 15 and the alleged resultant de facto formation
of cartel are matters which fundamentally strike at the wisdom of the law and the policy adopted by Congress. These are outside the power
of the courts to settle; thus I fail to see the need to digress any further.

F . On the imposition of administrative fine. The administrative fine under Section 20 is claimed to be inconsistent with deregulation. The
imposition of administrative fine for failure to meet the reportorial and minimum inventory requirements, far from petitioners' submission, are
geared towards accomplishing the noble purpose of the law. The inventory requirement ensures the security and continuity of petroleum
crude and products supply,44 while the reportorial requirement is a mere devise for the Department of Energy to monitor compliance with the
 law. In any event, the issue pertains to the efficacy of incorporating in the law the administrative sanctions which lies outside the Court's
sphere and competence.

In fine, it seems to me that the petitions dwell on the insistent and recurrent arguments that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported
crude oil and imported petroleum products is violative of the equal protection clause of the constitution; is not germane to the purpose of the
law; does not foster a truly competitive market; extends undue advantage to the existing oil refineries or companies; and creates a cartel or a
monopoly of sort among Shell, Caltex and Petron in clear contravention of the Constitutional proscription against unfair trade practices and
combinations in restraint of trade. Unfortunately, this Court, in my view, is not at liberty to tread upon or even begin to discuss the merits and
demerits of petitioners' stance if it is to be faithful to the time honored doctrine of separation of powers the underlying principle of our
republican state.45 Nothing is so fundamental in our system of government than its division into three distinct and independent branches, the
executive, the legislative and the judiciary, each branch having exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and supreme within its
own sphere. It is true that there is sometimes an inevitable overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between these departments.
But this elementary tenet remains: the legislative is vested with the power to make law, the judiciary to apply and interpret it. In cases like this,
"the judicial branch of the government has only one duty-to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is
challenged and to decide whether the letter squares with the former." 46 This having been done and finding no constitutional infirmity therein,
the Court's task is finished. Now whether or not the law fails to achieve its avowed policy because Congress did not carefully evaluate the
long term effects of some of its provisions is a matter clearly beyond this Court's domain.

Perhaps it bears reiterating that the question of validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government,
and the courts will resolve every presumption in favor of its validity. The courts will assume that the validity of the statute was fully considered by
the legislature when adopted. The wisdom or advisability of a particular statute is not a question for the courts to determine. If a particular
statute is within the constitutional power of the legislature to enact, it should be sustained whether the courts agree or not in the wisdom of its
enactment.47 This Court continues to recognize that in the determination of actual cases and controversies, it must reflect the wisdom and
justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative branches of government. Thus, the
presumption is always in favor of constitutionality for it is likewise always presumed that in the enactment of a law or the adoption of a policy it
is the people who speak through their representatives. This principle is one of caution and circumspection in the exercise of the grave and
delicate function of judicial review 48. Explaining this principle Thayer said,

It can only disregard the Act when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very
clear one-so clear that it is not open to rational question. That is the standard of duty to which the courts bring legislative acts; that is
the test which they apply-not merely their own judgment as to constitutionality, but their conclusion as to what judgment is
permissible to another department which the constitution has charged with the duty of making it. This rule recognizes that, having to
the great, complex, ever-unfolding exigencies of regard government, much will seem unconstitutional to one man, or body of men,
may reasonably not seem so to another; that the constitution often admits of different interpretations; that there is often a range of
choice and judgment; that in such cases the constitution does not impose upon the legislature any one specific opinion, but leaves
open their range of choice; and that whatever choice is rational is constitutional.49

The petitions discuss rather extensively the adverse economic implications of Republic Act No. 8180. They put forward more than anything
else, an assertion that an error of policy has been committed. Reviewing the wisdom of the policies adopted by the executive and legislative
departments is not within the province of the Court.

It is safe to assume that the legislative branch of the government has taken into consideration and has carefully weighed all points pertinent to
the law in question. We cannot doubt that these matters have been the object of intensive research and study nor that they have been
subject of comprehensive consultations with experts and debates in both houses of Congress. Judicial review at this juncture will at best be
limited and myopic. For admittedly, this Court cannot ponder on the points raised in the petitions with the same technical competence as
that of the economic experts who have contributed valuable hours of study and deliberation in the passage of this law.

I realize that to invoke the doctrine of separation of powers at this crucial time may be viewed by some as an act of shirking from our duty to
uphold the Constitution at all cost. Let it be remembered, however, that the doctrine of separation of powers is likewise enshrined in our
Constitution and deserves the same degree of fealty. In fact, it carries more significance now in the face of an onslaught of similar cases
brought before this Court by the opponents of almost every enacted law of major importance. It is true that this Court is the last bulwark of
justice and it is our task to preserve the integrity of our fundamental law. But we cannot become, wittingly or unwittingly, instruments of every
aggrieved minority and losing legislator. While the laudable objectives of the law are put on hold, this Court is faced with the unnecessary
burden of disposing of issues merely contrived to fall within the ambit of judicial review. All that is achieved is delay which is perhaps, sad to
say, all that may have been intended in the first place.

Indeed, whether Republic Act No. 8180 or portions thereof are declared unconstitutional, oil prices may continue to rise, as they depend not
on any law but on the volatile market and economic forces. It is therefore the political departments of government that should address the
issues raised herein for the discretion to allow a deregulated oil industry and to determine its viability is lodged with the people in their primary
political capacity, which as things stand, has been delegated to Congress.

In the end, petitioners are not devoid of a remedy. To paraphrase the words of Justice Padilla in Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng
Pilipinas v. Tan,50 if petitioners seriously believe that the adoption and continued application of Republic Act No. 8180 are prejudicial to the general
welfare or the interests of the majority of the people, they should seek recourse and relief from the political branches of government, as they are now
doing by moving for an amendment of the assailed provisions in the correct forum which is Congress or for the exercise of the people's power of
initiative on legislation. The Court following the time honored doctrine of separation of powers, cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Congress as
to the wisdom, justice and advisability of Republic Act No. 8180.51

ACCORDINGLY, finding no merit in the instant petitions I vote for their outright dismissal.
 [G.R. No. 148208. December 15, 2004]

CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Can a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that its continued operation would violate the equal
protection of the law? We hold that with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial
institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes invidious
discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).

I.The Case

First the facts.

On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.

On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a
petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the
last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:

Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal
of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with
sound principles of management.

A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an
integral component of the Bangko Sentrals human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own
system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided,
however, That compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance
with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758.[emphasis supplied]

The thrust of petitioners challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1)
the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade
[SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification is a classic case of
class legislation, allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnels position.
Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP.[1] Petitioner offers the following sub-set of arguments:

a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does not appear in the original and amended versions of House
Bill No. 7037, nor in the original version of Senate Bill No. 1235; [2]

b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed by the SSL actually defeats the purpose of the
law[3] of establishing professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP; [4] (emphasis supplied)

c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its
relevance to the objectives of the law, and even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried employees of the BSP;[5]

d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus within the class of rank-and-file personnel of
government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon;[6]and

e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and resulted in the gross disparity between their
compensation and that of the BSP officers.[7]

In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.[8] Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of
the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file
employees have been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso has no
force and effect of law, respondents implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which this Court should take cognizance of, considering the
transcendental importance of the legal issue involved.[9]

Respondent BSP, in its comment,[10] contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test,
provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP, and the mandate of the
Monetary Board to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the validity of the provision. Quite simplistically, he argues that
the classification is based on actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish professionalism
and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national government.[11]
 II.Issue

Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs
afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the laws."[12]

III.Ruling

A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL

PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653
IS VALID.

Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the classification created by the questioned proviso, on its face
and in its operation, bears no constitutional infirmities.

It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or
objects upon which different rules shall operate - so long as the classification is not unreasonable. As held in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers
Union,[13] and reiterated in a long line of cases:[14]

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore,
a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a
statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or
practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should
be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification
or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying
a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it
necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow
distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to
evils as they may appear. (citations omitted)

Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification.[15] The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class.[16] If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class
may be treated and regulated differently from another.[17] The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all
those belonging to the same class.[18]

In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address
the BSPs lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file.
If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination
or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. [19]

That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of the Senate Bill does not detract from its validity. As early as
1947 and reiterated in subsequent cases,[20] this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a provision of law, on
the ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both
Houses.

Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a
statute.[21] An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. [22] To justify the nullification of a law,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach.[23]

B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS -

EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES

OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED
APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION
A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislatures power, we hold that the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all
rank-and-file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso.

1. The concept of relative constitutionality.

The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the
Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another.[24]
 A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances.[25] Thus, if a statute in its practical operation
becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light
of changed conditions.[26]

Demonstrative of this doctrine is Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon,[27] where the Court of Appeals of New York declared as unreasonable
and arbitrary a zoning ordinance which placed the plaintiff's property in a residential district, although it was located in the center of a business area.
Later amendments to the ordinance then prohibited the use of the property except for parking and storage of automobiles, and service station within a
parking area. The Court found the ordinance to constitute an invasion of property rights which was contrary to constitutional due process. It ruled:

While the common council has the unquestioned right to enact zoning laws respecting the use of property in accordance with a well-considered and
comprehensive plan designed to promote public health, safety and general welfare, such power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may
not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably and this is so whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the use of the property for any purpose for which it is
reasonably adapted. By the same token, an ordinance valid when adopted will nevertheless be stricken down as invalid when, at a later time, its
operation under changed conditions proves confiscatory such, for instance, as when the greater part of its value is destroyed, for which the courts will
afford relief in an appropriate case.[28] (citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid law as unconstitutional as a consequence of significant
changes in circumstances. Rutter v. Esteban[29] upheld the constitutionality of the moratorium law - its enactment and operation being a valid exercise
by the State of its police power[30] - but also ruled that the continued enforcement of the otherwise valid law would be unreasonable and oppressive. It
noted the subsequent changes in the countrys business, industry and agriculture. Thus, the law was set aside because its continued operation would be
grossly discriminatory and lead to the oppression of the creditors. The landmark ruling states:[31]

The question now to be determined is, is the period of eight (8) years which Republic Act No. 342 grants to debtors of a monetary obligation
contracted before the last global war and who is a war sufferer with a claim duly approved by the Philippine War Damage Commission reasonable
under the present circumstances?

It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief to debtors of prewar obligations who suffered from the ravages of the last war and who
filed a claim for their losses with the Philippine War Damage Commission. It is therein provided that said obligation shall not be due and demandable for
a period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the claim filed by the debtor with said Commission. The purpose of the law is to afford to prewar
debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving them a reasonable time within which to pay their prewar debts so as to prevent them from
being victimized by their creditors. While it is admitted in said law that since liberation conditions have gradually returned to normal, this is not so with
regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war and so it was therein declared as a policy that as to them the debt moratorium should be
continued in force (Section 1).

But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and
32 and at present their enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable
during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language means that
the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as
1941. his period seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be commended, the relief
accorded works injustice to creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote,
more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the
operation of the relief, unlike similar statutes in the United States.

xxx xxx xxx

In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness,
we feel that the only way open to us under the present circumstances is to declare that the continued operation and enforcement of Republic Act No.
342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared
null and void and without effect. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

2. Applicability of the equal protection clause.

In the realm of equal protection, the U.S. case of Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey[32] is illuminating. The Supreme Court of Florida ruled against the
continued application of statutes authorizing the recovery of double damages plus attorney's fees against railroad companies, for animals killed on
unfenced railroad right of way without proof of negligence. Competitive motor carriers, though creating greater hazards, were not subjected to similar
liability because they were not yet in existence when the statutes were enacted. The Court ruled that the statutes became invalid as denying equal
protection of the law, in view of changed conditions since their enactment.

In another U.S. case, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Faulkner,[33] the Court of Appeals of Kentucky declared unconstitutional a provision of a statute which
imposed a duty upon a railroad company of proving that it was free from negligence in the killing or injury of cattle by its engine or cars. This,
notwithstanding that the constitutionality of the statute, enacted in 1893, had been previously sustained. Ruled the Court:

The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained because it applied to all similar corporations and had for its object the safety of persons on a train
and the protection of property. Of course, there were no automobiles in those days. The subsequent inauguration and development of transportation
by motor vehicles on the public highways by common carriers of freight and passengers created even greater risks to the safety of occupants of the
vehicles and of danger of injury and death of domestic animals. Yet, under the law the operators of that mode of competitive transportation are not
subject to the same extraordinary legal responsibility for killing such animals on the public roads as are railroad companies for killing them on their
private rights of way.

The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 488, 79 L.Ed. 949, stated, A
statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is applied. The police power is subject to the constitutional
limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably. A number of prior opinions of that court are cited in support of the statement. The State
of Florida for many years had a statute, F.S.A. 356.01 et seq. imposing extraordinary and special duties upon railroad companies, among which was that
a railroad company was liable for double damages and an attorney's fee for killing livestock by a train without the owner having to prove any act of
negligence on the part of the carrier in the operation of its train. In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Ivey, it was held that the changed conditions
brought about by motor vehicle transportation rendered the statute unconstitutional since if a common carrier by motor vehicle had killed the same
animal, the owner would have been required to prove negligence in the operation of its equipment. Said the court, This certainly is not equal
protection of the law.[34] (emphasis supplied)

Echoes of these rulings resonate in our case law, viz:

[C]ourts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining whether that statute has any discriminatory effect. A statute
nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if
it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations
between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.[35] (emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

[W]e see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face
and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition.. In other words, statutes may be
adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional.
.[36] (emphasis supplied, citations omitted

3. Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 + 8523 + 8763

+ 9302 = consequential unconstitutionality of challenged proviso.

According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is also violative of the equal protection clause because after it
was enacted, the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of the latter GFIs were all exempted from the coverage
of the SSL.[37] Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon.

Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also undertook the amendment of the charters of
the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs, from 1995 to 2004, viz:

1. R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);

2. R.A. No. 8282 (1997) for Social Security System (SSS);

3. R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation, (SBGFC);

4. R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service Insurance System (GSIS);

5. R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP);

6. R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC);[38] and

7. R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).

It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs share this common proviso: a blanket exemption
of all their employees from the coverage of the SSL, expressly or impliedly, as illustrated below:

1. LBP (R.A. No. 7907)

Section 10. Section 90 of [R.A. No. 3844] is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 90. Personnel. -

xxx xxx xxx

All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Banks Board
of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with
the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years
without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability. The Bank shall therefore be exempt from existing laws,
rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as
closely as possible with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758. (emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

2. SSS (R.A. No. 8282)

Section 1. [Amending R.A. No. 1161, Section 3(c)]:

xxx xxx xxx

(c)The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS President, shall appoint an actuary and such other personnel as may [be] deemed
necessary; fix their reasonable compensation, allowances and other benefits; prescribe their duties and establish such methods and procedures as may
be necessary to insure the efficient, honest and economical administration of the provisions and purposes of this Act: Provided, however, That the
personnel of the SSS below the rank of Vice President shall be appointed by the SSS President: Provided, further, That the personnel appointed by the
SSS President, except those below the rank of assistant manager, shall be subject to the confirmation by the Commission; Provided further, That the
personnel of the SSS shall be selected only from civil service eligibles and be subject to civil service rules and regulations: Provided, finally, That the SSS
shall be exempt from the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758 and Republic Act No. 7430. (emphasis supplied)

3. SBGFC (R.A. No. 8289)

Section 8. [Amending R.A. No. 6977, Section 11]:

xxx xxx xxx

The Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758, and Compensation Circular No. 10, series of 1989 issued by the Department of Budget and
Management, the Board of Directors of SBGFC shall have the authority to extend to the employees and personnel thereof the allowance and fringe
benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other government financial institutions. (emphases
supplied)

4. GSIS (R.A. No. 8291)

Section 1. [Amending Section 43(d)].

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 43. Powers and Functions of the Board of Trustees. - The Board of Trustees shall have the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) upon the recommendation of the President and General Manager, to approve the GSIS organizational and administrative structures and staffing
pattern, and to establish, fix, review, revise and adjust the appropriate compensation package for the officers and employees of the GSIS with
reasonable allowances, incentives, bonuses, privileges and other benefits as may be necessary or proper for the effective management, operation
and administration of the GSIS, which shall be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law and Republic Act
No. 7430, otherwise known as the Attrition Law.(emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

5. DBP (R.A. No. 8523)

Section 6. [Amending E.O. No. 81, Section 13]:

Section 13. Other Officers and Employees. - The Board of Directors shall provide for an organization and staff of officers and employees of the Bank and
upon recommendation of the President of the Bank, fix their remunerations and other emoluments. All positions in the Bank shall be governed by the
compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis of
actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be
subject to periodic review by the Board of Directors once every two (2) years, without prejudice to yearly merit or increases based on the Banks
productivity and profitability. The Bank shall, therefore, be exempt from existing laws, rules, and regulations on compensation, position classification and
qualification standards. The Bank shall however, endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758, as amended). (emphasis supplied)

6. HGC (R.A. No. 8763)

Section 9. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Board of Directors. - The Board shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) To create offices or positions necessary for the efficient management, operation and administration of the Corporation: Provided, That all positions
in the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) shall be governed by a compensation and position classification system and qualifications standards
approved by the Corporations Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities: Provided,
further, That the compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and which shall be exempt from
Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, and from other laws, rules and regulations on salaries and
compensations; and to establish a Provident Fund and determine the Corporations and the employees contributions to the Fund; (emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

 7. PDIC (R.A. No. 9302)

Section 2. Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 3591, as amended] is hereby further amended to read:

xxx xxx xxx

3.

xxx xxx xxx

A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral
component of the Corporations human resource development program: Provided, That all positions in the Corporation shall be governed by a
compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of
actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans of other government financial
institutions and shall be subject to review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases
based on productivity and profitability. The Corporation shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position
classification and qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Republic
Act No. 6758, as amended. (emphases supplied)

Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file of seven other GFIs were granted the exemption that was specifically
denied to the rank-and-file of the BSP. And as if to add insult to petitioners injury, even the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was granted the
same blanket exemption from the SSL in 2000![39]

The prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification between the rank-and-file and the officers
of the BSP, found reasonable because there were substantial distinctions that made real differences between the two classes.

The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability
of the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to more serious
scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the classification - albeit made indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight
other laws - between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally
to all members of the class. Theproviso may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as
practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are without differences.[40]

Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions: Given that Congress chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP)
from the coverage of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that
Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress power to classify so unbridled as to sanction unequal and
discriminatory treatment, simply because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but gradually and progressively, through
seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal protection of the law bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can only be invoked against
a classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed to a discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several other acts; and (b)
is the legal analysis confined to determining the validity within the parameters of the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is
articulated), thereby proscribing any evaluation vis--vis the grouping, or the lack thereof, among several similar enactments made over a period of
time?

In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption (granted to the seven
other GFIs) rests on a policy determination by the legislature. All legislative enactments necessarily rest on a policy determination - even those that
have been declared to contravene the Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a magic wand to sustain the validity of a statute, then no due process
and equal protection challenges would ever prosper. There is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination made by Congress or by the
Executive; it cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection of the Constitution.

In fine, the policy determination argument may support the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it
cannot justify the inequality of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs who are similarly situated. It fails to appreciate that what is at issue in
the second level of scrutiny is not the declared policy of each law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress inconsistent and unequal
policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven other GFIs. At bottom, the second challenge to the constitutionality of Section 15(c), Article
II of Republic Act No. 7653 is premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of persons similarly
situated. In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws includes the prohibition against
enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law, or permits such
denial, it is unconstitutional.[41]

It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the other GFIs cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as regards the
exemption from the coverage of the SSL, there exist no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file of
the seven GFIs. On the contrary, our legal history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as comprising one distinct class, separate from other
governmental entities.

Before the SSL, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 985 (1976) declared it as a State policy (1) to provide equal pay for substantially equal work, and (2)
to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. P.D. No. 985 was
passed to address disparities in pay among similar or comparable positions which had given rise to dissension among government employees. But even
then, GFIs and government-owned and/or controlled corporations (GOCCs) were already identified as a distinct class among government
employees. Thus, Section 2 also provided, [t]hat notwithstanding a standardized salary system established for all employees, additional financial
incentives may be established by government corporation and financial institutions for their employees to be supported fully from their corporate funds
and for such technical positions as may be approved by the President in critical government agencies.[42]

The same favored treatment is made for the GFIs and the GOCCs under the SSL. Section 3(b) provides that one of the principles governing the
Compensation and Position Classification System of the Government is that: [b]asic compensation for all personnel in the government and
government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions shall generally be comparable with those in the private sector doing
comparable work, and must be in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages.
 Thus, the BSP and all other GFIs and GOCCs were under the unified Compensation and Position Classification System of the SSL, [43] but rates of pay
under the SSL were determined on the basis of, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work. Notably, the Compensation
and Position Classification System was to be governed by the following principles: (a) just and equitable wages, with the ratio of compensation
between pay distinctions maintained at equitable levels;[44] and (b) basic compensation generally comparable with the private sector, in accordance
with prevailing laws on minimum wages.[45] Also, the Department of Budget and Management was directed to use, as guide for preparing the Index of
Occupational Services, the Benchmark Position Schedule, and the following factors:[46]

(1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the positions;

(2) the nature and complexity of the work to be performed;

(3) the kind of supervision received;

(4) mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work;

(5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships;

(6) kind of supervision exercised;

(7) decision-making responsibility;

(8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;

(9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and

(10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.

The Benchmark Position Schedule enumerates the position titles that fall within Salary Grades 1 to 20.

Clearly, under R.A. No. 6758, the rank-and-file of all GFIs were similarly situated in all aspects pertaining to compensation and position
classification, in consonance with Section 5, Article IX-B of the 1997 Constitution.[47]

Then came the enactment of the amended charter of the BSP, implicitly exempting the Monetary Board from the SSL by giving it express authority
to determine and institute its own compensation and wage structure. However, employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and below were
specifically limited to the rates prescribed under the SSL.

Subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs followed. Significantly, each government financial institution (GFI) was not only expressly
authorized to determine and institute its own compensation and wage structure, but also explicitly exempted - without distinction as to salary grade or
position - all employees of the GFI from the SSL.

It has been proffered that legislative deliberations justify the grant or withdrawal of exemption from the SSL, based on the perceived need to fulfill
the mandate of the institution concerned considering, among others, that: (1) the GOCC or GFI is essentially proprietary in character; (2) the GOCC or
GFI is in direct competition with their [sic] counterparts in the private sector, not only in terms of the provisions of goods or services, but also in terms of
hiring and retaining competent personnel; and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or were [sic] experiencing difficulties filling up plantilla positions with competent
personnel and/or retaining these personnel. The need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each
institution, and the corresponding variance in the benefits received by the employees is merely incidental.

The fragility of this argument is manifest. First, the BSP is the central monetary authority,[48] and the banker of the government and all its political
subdivisions.[49] It has the sole power and authority to issue currency;[50] provide policy directions in the areas of money, banking, and credit; and
supervise banks and regulate finance companies and non-bank financial institutions performing quasi-banking functions, including theexempted
GFIs.[51] Hence, the argument that the rank-and-file employees of the seven GFIs were exempted because of the importance of their institutions
mandate cannot stand any more than an empty sack can stand.

Second, it is certainly misleading to say that the need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each
institution. Nowhere in the deliberations is there a cogent basis for the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file from the exemption which was granted to the
rank-and-file of the other GFIs and the SEC. As point in fact, the BSP and the seven GFIs are similarly situated in so far as Congress deemed it necessary
for these institutions to be exempted from the SSL. True, the SSL-exemption of the BSP and the seven GFIs was granted in the amended charters of each
GFI, enacted separately and over a period of time. But it bears emphasis that, while each GFI has a mandate different and distinct from that of
another, the deliberations show that the raison dtre of the SSL-exemption was inextricably linked to and for the most part based on factors common to
the eight GFIs, i.e., (1) the pivotal role they play in the economy; (2) the necessity of hiring and retaining qualified and effective personnel to carry out
the GFIs mandate; and (3) the recognition that the compensation package of these GFIs is not competitive, and fall substantially below industry
standards. Considering further that (a) the BSP was the first GFI granted SSL exemption; and (b) the subsequent exemptions of other GFIs did not
distinguish between the officers and the rank-and-file; it is patent that the classification made between the BSP rank-and-file and those of the other
seven GFIs was inadvertent, and NOT intended, i.e., it was not based on any substantial distinction vis--vis the particular circumstances of each GFI.
Moreover, the exemption granted to two GFIs makes express reference to allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently
enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other GFIs,[52] underscoring that GFIs are a particular class within the realm of government entities.

It is precisely this unpremeditated discrepancy in treatment of the rank-and-file of the BSP - made manifest and glaring with each and every
consequential grant of blanket exemption from the SSL to the other GFIs - that cannot be rationalized or justified. Even more so, when the SEC - which is
not a GFI - was given leave to have a compensation plan that shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plan in the [BSP] and other
[GFIs],[53] then granted a blanket exemption from the SSL, and its rank-and-file endowed a more preferred treatment than the rank-and-file of the BSP.

The violation to the equal protection clause becomes even more pronounced when we are faced with this undeniable truth: that if Congress had
enacted a law for the sole purpose of exempting the eight GFIs from the coverage of the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file employees would
have been devoid of any substantial or material basis. It bears no moment, therefore, that the unlawful discrimination was not a direct result arising from
one law. Nemo potest facere per alium quod non potest facere per directum. No one is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly.

It has also been proffered that similarities alone are not sufficient to support the conclusion that rank-and-file employees of the BSP may be
lumped together with similar employees of the other GOCCs for purposes of compensation, position classification and qualification standards. The fact
that certain persons have some attributes in common does not automatically make them members of the same class with respect to a legislative
classification. Cited is the ruling in Johnson v. Robinson:[54] this finding of similarity ignores that a common characteristic shared by beneficiaries and
nonbeneficiaries alike, is not sufficient to invalidate a statute when other characteristics peculiar to only one group rationally explain the statutes
different treatment of the two groups.

The reference to Johnson is inapropos. In Johnson, the US Court sustained the validity of the classification as there were quantitative and
qualitative distinctions, expressly recognized by Congress, which formed a rational basis for the classification limiting educational benefits to military
service veterans as a means of helping them readjust to civilian life. The Court listed the peculiar characteristics as follows:

First, the disruption caused by military service is quantitatively greater than that caused by alternative civilian service. A conscientious
objector performing alternative service is obligated to work for two years. Service in the Armed Forces, on the other hand, involves a six-year
commitment

xxx xxx xxx

Second, the disruptions suffered by military veterans and alternative service performers are qualitatively different. Military veterans suffer a far greater
loss of personal freedom during their service careers. Uprooted from civilian life, the military veteran becomes part of the military establishment, subject
to its discipline and potentially hazardous duty. Congress was acutely aware of the peculiar disabilities caused by military service, in consequence of
which military servicemen have a special need for readjustment benefits[55] (citations omitted)

In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or
their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one).
The distinction made by the law is not only superficial,[56] but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between
the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.

Moreover, the issue in this case is not - as the dissenting opinion of Mme. Justice Carpio-Morales would put it - whether being an employee of a
GOCC or GFI is reasonable and sufficient basis for exemption from R.A. No. 6758. It is Congress itself that distinguished the GFIs from other government
agencies, not once but eight times, through the enactment of R.A. Nos. 7653, 7907, 8282, 8289, 8291, 8523, 8763, and 9302. These laws may have
created a preferred sub-class within government employees, but the present challenge is not directed at the wisdom of these laws. Rather, it is a legal
conundrum involving the exercise of legislative power, the validity of which must be measured not only by looking at the specific exercise in and by
itself (R.A. No. 7653), but also as to the legal effects brought about by seven separate exercises - albeit indirectly and without intent.

Thus, even if petitioner had not alleged a comparable change in the factual milieu as regards the compensation, position classification and
qualification standards of the employees of the BSP (whether of the executive level or of the rank-and-file) since the enactment of the new Central
Bank Act is of no moment. In GSIS v. Montesclaros,[57] this Court resolved the issue of constitutionality notwithstanding that claimant had manifested that
she was no longer interested in pursuing the case, and even when the constitutionality of the said provision was not squarely raised as an issue,
because the issue involved not only the claimant but also others similarly situated and whose claims GSIS would also deny based on the
challenged proviso. The Court held that social justice and public interest demanded the resolution of the constitutionality of the proviso. And so it is with
the challenged proviso in the case at bar.

It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is a privilege fully within the legislative prerogative to give or deny. However, its subsequent grant
to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees breached the latters right to equal protection. In
other words, while the granting of a privilege per se is a matter of policy exclusively within the domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or
legality of the exercise of this prerogative is subject to judicial review.[58] So when the distinction made is superficial, and not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between those included and excluded, it becomes a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and the
power to correct.[59] As held in the United Kingdom case of Hooper v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,[60] once the State has chosen to confer
benefits, discrimination contrary to law may occur where favorable treatment already afforded to one group is refused to another, even though the
State is under no obligation to provide that favorable treatment. [61]

The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of
invidious discrimination - no one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total exemption of the
seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes without any rational basis.

Again, it must be emphasized that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are
analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion; whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group is equally binding on the rest.[62]

In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment between the rank-and-file of BSP from the seven
other GFIs, it is clear that the enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the
challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared as an outlaw.

IV.

Equal Protection Under

International Lens

In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a
deferential attitude to legislative classifications[63] and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution. [64]

A. Equal Protection
in the United States

In contrast, jurisprudence in the U.S. has gone beyond the static rational basis test. Professor Gunther highlights the development in equal
protection jurisprudential analysis, to wit: [65]
Traditionally, equal protection supported only minimal judicial intervention in most contexts. Ordinarily, the command of equal protection was only that
government must not impose differences in treatment except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation. The old
variety of equal protection scrutiny focused solely on the means used by the legislature: it insisted merely that the classification in the
statute reasonably relates to the legislative purpose. Unlike substantive due process, equal protection scrutiny was not typically concerned with
identifying fundamental values and restraining legislative ends. And usually the rational classification requirement was readily satisfied: the courts did
not demand a tight fit between classification and purpose; perfect congruence between means and ends was not required.

xxx xxx xxx

[From marginal intervention to major cutting edge: The Warren Courts new equal protection and the two-tier approach.]

From its traditional modest role, equal protection burgeoned into a major intervention tool during the Warren era, especially in the 1960s. The Warren
Court did not abandon the deferential ingredients of the old equal protection: in most areas of economic and social legislation, the demands imposed
by equal protection remained as minimal as everBut the Court launched an equal protection revolution by finding large new areas for strict rather than
deferential scrutiny. A sharply differentiated two-tier approach evolved by the late 1960s: in addition to the deferential old equal protection, a new
equal protection, connoting strict scrutiny, arose. The intensive review associated with the new equal protection imposed two demands - a demand
not only as to means but also one as to ends. Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far closer fit between classification and statutory purpose
than the rough and ready flexibility traditionally tolerated by the old equal protection: means had to be shown necessary to achieve statutory ends, not
merely reasonably related ones. Moreover, equal protection became a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the areas of the new equal
protection had to be justified by compelling state interests, not merely the wide spectrum of legitimate state ends.

The Warren Court identified the areas appropriate for strict scrutiny by searching for two characteristics: the presence of a suspect classification; or an
impact on fundamental rights or interests. In the category of suspect classifications, the Warren Courts major contribution was to intensify the strict
scrutiny in the traditionally interventionist area of racial classifications. But other cases also suggested that there might be more other suspect categories
as well: illegitimacy and wealth for example. But it was the fundamental interests ingredient of the new equal protection that proved particularly
dynamic, open-ended, and amorphous.. [Other fundamental interests included voting, criminal appeals, and the right of interstate travel .]

xxx xxx xxx

The Burger Court and Equal Protection.

The Burger Court was reluctant to expand the scope of the new equal protection, although its best established ingredient retains vitality. There was also
mounting discontent with the rigid two-tier formulations of the Warren Courts equal protection doctrine. It was prepared to use the clause as an
interventionist tool without resorting to the strict language of the new equal protection. [Among the fundamental interests identified during this time
were voting and access to the ballot, while suspect classifications included sex, alienage and illegitimacy.]

xxx xxx xxx

Even while the two-tier scheme has often been adhered to in form, there has also been an increasingly noticeable resistance to the sharp difference
between deferential old and interventionist new equal protection. A number of justices sought formulations that would blur the sharp distinctions of the
two-tiered approach or that would narrow the gap between strict scrutiny and deferential review. The most elaborate attack came from Justice
Marshall, whose frequently stated position was developed most elaborately in his dissent in the Rodriguez case: [66]

The Court apparently seeks to establish [that] equal protection cases fall into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of
review - strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this (sic) Courts [decisions] defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has done
reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the equal protection clause. This spectrum clearly
comprehends variations in the degree of care with which Court will scrutinize particular classification, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and
societal importance of the interests adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.

Justice Marshalls sliding scale approach describes many of the modern decisions, although it is a formulation that the majority refused to embrace. But
the Burger Courts results indicate at least two significant changes in equal protection law: First, invocation of the old equal protection formula no longer
signals, as it did with the Warren Court, an extreme deference to legislative classifications and a virtually automatic validation of challenged statutes.
Instead, several cases, even while voicing the minimal rationality hands-off standards of the old equal protection, proceed to find the statute
unconstitutional. Second, in some areas the modern Court has put forth standards for equal protection review that, while clearly more intensive than the
deference of the old equal protection, are less demanding than the strictness of the new equal protection. Sex discrimination is the best established
example of an intermediate level of review. Thus, in one case, the Court said that classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. That standard is intermediate with respect to both ends and means:
where ends must be compelling to survive strict scrutiny and merely legitimate under the old mode, important objectives are required here; and where
means must be necessary under the new equal protection, and merely rationally related under the old equal protection, they must be substantially
related to survive the intermediate level of review. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

B. Equal Protection
in Europe

The United Kingdom and other members of the European Community have also gone forward in discriminatory legislation and jurisprudence.
Within the United Kingdom domestic law, the most extensive list of protected grounds can be found in Article 14 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). It prohibits discrimination on grounds such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. This list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Discrimination on the basis of race, sex and
religion is regarded as grounds that require strict scrutiny. A further indication that certain forms of discrimination are regarded as particularly
suspect under the Covenant can be gleaned from Article 4, which, while allowing states to derogate from certain Covenant articles in times of national
emergency, prohibits derogation by measures that discriminate solely on the grounds of race, colour, language, religion or social origin.[67]

Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a test of justification which varies with the ground of discrimination. In the Belgian
Linguistics case[68] the European Court set the standard of justification at a low level: discrimination would contravene the Convention only if it had no
legitimate aim, or there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.[69] But over
the years, the European Court has developed a hierarchy of grounds covered by Article 14 of the ECHR, a much higher level of justification being
required in respect of those regarded as suspect (sex, race, nationality, illegitimacy, or sexual orientation) than of others. Thus, in Abdulaziz, [70] the
European Court declared that:

. . . [t]he advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member States of the Council of Europe. This means that very weighty
reasons would have to be advanced before a difference of treatment on the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with the Convention.

And in Gaygusuz v. Austria,[71] the European Court held that very weighty reasons would have to be put forward before the Court could regard a
difference of treatment based exclusively on the ground of nationality as compatible with the Convention.[72] The European Court will then permit States
a very much narrower margin of appreciation in relation to discrimination on grounds of sex, race, etc., in the application of the Convention rights than
it will in relation to distinctions drawn by states between, for example, large and small land-owners. [73]

C. Equality under
International Law

The principle of equality has long been recognized under international law. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims
that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal protection of
the law without any discrimination, constitutes basic principles in the protection of human rights. [74]

Most, if not all, international human rights instruments include some prohibition on discrimination and/or provisions about equality.[75] The general
international provisions pertinent to discrimination and/or equality are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);[76] the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD);[77] the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child (CRC).

In the broader international context, equality is also enshrined in regional instruments such as the American Convention on Human Rights;[78] the
African Charter on Human and People's Rights;[79] the European Convention on Human Rights;[80] the European Social Charter of 1961 and revised Social
Charter of 1996; and the European Union Charter of Rights (of particular importance to European states). Even the Council of the League of Arab States
has adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994, although it has yet to be ratified by the Member States of the League. [81]

The equality provisions in these instruments do not merely function as traditional "first generation" rights, commonly viewed as concerned only with
constraining rather than requiring State action.Article 26 of the ICCPR requires guarantee[s] of equal and effective protection against discrimination
while Articles 1 and 14 of the American and European Conventions oblige States Parties to ensure ... the full and free exercise of [the rights guaranteed]
... without any discrimination and to secure without discrimination the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed.[82] These provisions impose a measure
of positive obligation on States Parties to take steps to eradicate discrimination.

In the employment field, basic detailed minimum standards ensuring equality and prevention of discrimination, are laid down in the ICESCR [83] and
in a very large number of Conventions administered by the International Labour Organisation, a United Nations body. [84] Additionally, many of the other
international and regional human rights instruments have specific provisions relating to employment.[85]

The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also gone beyond the earlier tendency to view the prohibition against discrimination (Article 26)
as confined to the ICCPR rights.[86] In Broeks[87] and Zwaan-de Vries,[88] the issue before the Committee was whether discriminatory provisions in the
Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV) fell within the scope of Article 26. The Dutch government submitted that discrimination in social security
benefit provision was not within the scope of Article 26, as the right was contained in the ICESCR and not the ICCPR. They accepted that Article 26
could go beyond the rights contained in the Covenant to other civil and political rights, such as discrimination in the field of taxation, but contended
that Article 26 did not extend to the social, economic, and cultural rights contained in ICESCR. The Committee rejected this argument. In its view, Article
26 applied to rights beyond the Covenant including the rights in other international treaties such as the right to social security found in ICESCR:

Although Article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it does not of itself contain any obligation with respect to the matters that may
be provided for by legislation. Thus it does not, for example, require any state to enact legislation to provide for social security. However, when such
legislation is adopted in the exercise of a State's sovereign power, then such legislation must comply with Article 26 of the Covenant.[89]

Breaches of the right to equal protection occur directly or indirectly. A classification may be struck down if it has the purpose or effect of violating
the right to equal protection. International law recognizes that discrimination may occur indirectly, as the Human Rights Committee[90] took into
account the definitions of discrimination adopted by CERD and CEDAW in declaring that:

. . . discrimination as used in the [ICCPR] should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has
the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and
freedoms. [91] (emphasis supplied)

Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and its conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation,
are in cadence and in consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international law. There should be no hesitation in using the
equal protection clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice
imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special status and protection afforded to labor, compel this approach. [92]

Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and international law, we held in International School Alliance of
Educators v. Quisumbing: [93]
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The
Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code
requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith."

International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include principles of
equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation -
all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has
incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.

In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer
are all the more reprehensible.

The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace
- the factory, the office or the field - but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.

The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall
"ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in
spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and
conditions of employment.

xxx xxx xxx

Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in Article 7 thereof, provides:

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and [favorable] conditions of work, which ensure, in
particular:

a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:

i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being
guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. (citations omitted)

Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts
of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution.[94] The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices
persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of
constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.

Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution requires a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support
in American or English jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are
persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions.[95] We should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as
indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments. We live in a
different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a
people, and always with our own concept of law and justice.[96] Our laws must be construed in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers
and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they
must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest
is distinct and different from others.[97]

In the 2003 case of Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court has stated that: [A]merican jurisprudence and authorities, much less the
American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar
as Philippine constitutional law is concerned....[I]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of
which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs. [98] Indeed, although the Philippine
Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. [99]

Further, the quest for a better and more equal world calls for the use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention.

Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims equality as an ideal precisely in protest
against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in all phases of national development,
further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality. [T]here is thus in the
Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.[100]

Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including
labor.[101] Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane
justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in law.[102] And the obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on the
legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality.[103] Social justice calls for the humanization of
laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated.[104]

V.

A Final Word

Finally, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged provision. It has been proffered that the remedy of
petitioner is not with this Court, but with Congress, which alone has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill
proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has supposedly been filed.

Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given
to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the rational basis test, and the legislative discretion would be given
deferential treatment. [105]

But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the
Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this
Courts solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the
unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the
character or nature of the actor. [106]

Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on whether or not the prescribed qualifications or
conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the
contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations - particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution -
would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the
Presidential form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a
consequence, We have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation - made
particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution - to settle
it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson, it was held that courts have a "duty, rather than a power", to determine whether another branch of the
government has "kept within constitutional limits." Not satisfied with this postulate, the court went farther and stressed that, if the Constitution provides
how it may be amended - as it is in our 1935 Constitution - "then, unless the manner is followed, the judiciary as the interpreter of that constitution, will
declare the amendment invalid." In fact, this very Court - speaking through Justice Laurel, an outstanding authority on Philippine Constitutional Law, as
well as one of the highly respected and foremost leaders of the Convention that drafted the 1935 Constitution - declared, as early as July 15, 1936, that
"(i)n times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation
of powers between the several departments" of the government.[107] (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on
economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive
higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by
the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in
rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them
to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in
terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment This is in accord with the
policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve
the quality of life for all.[108] Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can
pass muster.

To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They represent the more impotent rank-and-file government
employees who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms
and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they impotent as a labor unit, but their
efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated them from the other GFI rank-and-file in compensation. These BSP rank-
and-file employees represent the politically powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and iniquitous
treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be
given any waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Courts duty to save them from reasonless
discrimination.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No.
7653 is unconstitutional.
Pepole vs cayat
68 Phil. 12 (1939)

Facts/Issue: Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a member of the non-Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating
sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for having acquired and possessed one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine. The law
made it unlawful for any native of the Philippines who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his
possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the
members of such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage of the law. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds
that it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an improper exercise of police power.

Held: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification. (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical distinctions. It is not based upon
accident of birth or parentage, as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The term non-Christian tribes
refers, not to religious belief but in a way, to the geographical area and more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization,
usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindora, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably
reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.

The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to insure peace and order in and among non-Christian tribes. It applies equally to all members of the
class evident from perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture,
is not an argument against the equality of its application.
ISAE v Quisimbing
G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000

Facts: The ISM, under Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel
and other temporary residents.
The local-hires union of the ISM were crying foul over the disparity in wages that they got compared to that of their foreign teaching counterparts.
These questions are asked to qualify a teacher into a local or foreign hire.
a.....What is one's domicile?
b.....Where is one's home economy?
c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?
Should any answer point to Philippines, the person is a local hire. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits to the foreign hires such as housing,
transportation, and 25% more pay than locals under the theory of (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The first was grounded on leaving
his home country, the second was on the lack of tenure when he returns home.
The negotiations between the school and the union caused a deadlock between the parties.
The DOLE resolved in favor of the school, while Dole Secretary Quisimbing denied the unions mfr.
He said, The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A classification is
reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign
hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a
good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School.
The union appealed to the Supreme Court.
The petitioner called the hiring system discriminatory and racist.
The school alleged that some local hires were in fact of foreign origin. They were paid local salaries.

Issue:
Whether or not the hiring system is violative of the equal protection clause

Held: Yes, Petition granted

Ratio:
Public policy abhors discrimination. The Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity
The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
International law prohibits discrimination, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights. The latter promises Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer
are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall
"ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in
regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
In this jurisdiction, there is the term equal pay for equal work, pertaining to persons being paid with equal salaries and have similar skills and similar
conditions. There was no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires.
The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.[
For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The
dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed
by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local
hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.
Obiter:
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires. It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention
to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collectivebargaining history in the School also shows that these
groups were always treated separately. The housing and other benefits accorded foreign hires were not given to local hires, thereby such admixture will
nbot assure any group the power to exercise bargaining rights.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the
employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests
Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status.
 G.R. No. 148208 December 15, 2004
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.
Puno. J.,
Facts:
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition
for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the
last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:
(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all
personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of
management.
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral
component of the Bangko Sentral's human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as
closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act].Provided, however, That compensation and
wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act
No. 6758. [emphasis supplied]
The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the
BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG]
19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification is "a classic case of class
legislation," allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner
also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism
and excellence at all levels in the BSP.
Petitioner contends that the classifications is not reasonable, arbitrary and violates the equal protection clause. The said proviso has been prejudicial to
some 2994 rank- and file BSP employees. Respondent on the other hand contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause,
provided that it is construed together with other provisions of the same law such as the fiscal and administrative autonomy of the Bangko Sentral and
the mandate of its monetary board. The Solicitor General, as counsel of the Executive Secretary defends the provision, that the classification of
employees is based on real and actual differentiation and it adheres to the policy of RA 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence within the
BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the government.

Issue: Whether or not the contended proviso if RA 7653 violates the equal protection of laws, hence unconstitutional.
Held:
Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate on the salary grade or the officer employee status, it distinguishes between economic class and status
with the higher salary grade recipients are of greater benefit above the law than those of mandated by the Salary Standardization Act. Officers of the
BSP receive higher wages that those of rank-and-file employees because the former are not covered by the salary standardization act as provided by
the proviso.
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on
economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive
higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by
the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in
rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them
to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in
terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment This is in accord with the
policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve
the quality of life for all."108 Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can
pass muster.
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They represent the more impotent rank-and-file government
employees who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms
and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they impotent as a labor unit, but their
efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated them from the other GFI rank-and-file in compensation. These BSP rank-
and-file employees represent the politically powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and iniquitous
treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be
given any waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court's duty to save them from reasonless
discrimination.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is
unconstitutional.
ATTY. VICENTE E. SALUMBIDES, JR., and GLENDA ARAA, Petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, RICARDO AGON, RAMON VILLASANTA, ELMER
DIZON, SALVADOR ADUL, and AGNES FABIAN, Respondents,

GR No. 180917 April 20, 2010

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Vicente Jr. (Salumbides) and Glenda (Arana), Municipal Legal Officer/Administrator and Municipal Budget Officer, respectively, of
Tagkaywayan, Quezon, along with Mayor Vicente III (Salumbides) were charged administratively in connection with the construction of a two-
classroom building for the Tagkawayan Municipal High School, without the required appropriation of the Sangguniang Bayan, and without public
bidding, the funds for which they sourced from the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses/Repair and Maintenance of Facilities (MOOE/RMF) for
the year 2002, as was allegedly done by the previous administration. Construction proceeded, and even after the project was included in the list of
projects to be bidder, no bidders participated. The other members of the Sangguniang Bayan then filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an
administrative case for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and violation of the
Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and the Local Government Code. By order of June 14, 2002, the OMB denied the prayer for issuance of preventive
suspension order, and on February 1, 2005, approved on April 11, 2005, denied the motion for reconsideration but dropped Mayor Vicente and
Councilor Coleta from the charges in view of their reelection in the 2004 elections. The OMB later found Vicente Jr. And Glenda liable for Simple
Neglect of Duty and imposed a six-month suspension upon them. Their motion for reconsideration denied, they elevated their case to the Supreme
Court after their petition for certiorari was denied by the CA. They argue that the principle of condonation should be expanded to cover coterminous
appointive officials who were administratively charged along with the reelected official/appointing authority with infractions allegedly committed
during their preceding term.

RESOLUTION OF THE CASE:

For non-compliance with the rule on certification against forum shopping, the petition merits outright dismissal. The verification portion of the
petition does not carry a certification against forum shopping[1].

The Court has distinguished the effects of non-compliance with the requirement of verification and that of certification against forum
shopping. A defective verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading and thus produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to
allow the deficiency to be remedied, while the failure to certify against forum shopping shall be cause for dismissal without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, and is not curable by amendment of the initiatory pleading[2].

Petitioners disregard of the rules was not the first. Their motion for extension of time to file petition was previously denied by Resolution of
January 15, 2008[3] for non-compliance with the required showing of competent proof of identity in the Affidavit of Service. The Court, by Resolution of
March 4, 2008,[4] later granted their motion for reconsideration with motion to admit appeal (Motion with Appeal) that was filed on February 18, 2008 or
the last day of filing within the extended period.

Moreover, in their Manifestation/Motion[5] filed a day later, petitioners prayed only for the admission of nine additional copies of the Motion
with Appeal due to honest inadvertence in earlier filing an insufficient number of copies. Petitioners were less than candid when they surreptitiously
submitted a Motion with Appeal which is different from the first set they had submitted. The second set of Appeal includes specific Assignment of
Errors[6] and already contains a certification against forum shoppin[7] embedded in the Verification. The two different Verifications were notarized by
the same notary public and bear the same date and document number[8]. The rectified verification with certification, however, was filed beyond the
reglementary period.
Its lapses aside, the petition just the same merits denial.

Petitioners urge this Court to expand the settled doctrine of condonation[9] to cover coterminous appointive officials who were
administratively charged along with the reelected official/appointing authority with infractions allegedly committed during their preceding term.

The Court rejects petitioners thesis.

More than 60 years ago, the Court in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija[10] issued the landmark ruling that prohibits the
disciplining of an elective official for a wrongful act committed during his immediately preceding term of office. The Court explained that [t]he
underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor[11].

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the
people of their right to elect their officers. When the people elect[e]d a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life
and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults
or misconduct[,] to practically overrule the will of the people[12]. (underscoring supplied)

Lizares v. Hechanova, et al[13]l. replicated the doctrine. The Court dismissed the petition in that case for being moot, the therein petitioner
having been duly reelected, is no longer amenable to administrative sanctions[14].

Ingco v. Sanchez, et al[15]. clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case[16]. Luciano v. The Provincial Governor,
et al[17]., Olivarez v. Judge Villaluz,[18] and Aguinaldo v. Santos[19] echoed the qualified rule that reelection of a public official does not bar
prosecution for crimes committed by him prior thereto.

Consistently, the Court has reiterated the doctrine in a string of recent jurisprudence including two cases involving a Senator and a Member of
the House of Representatives[20].

Salalima v. Guingona, Jr[21]. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica[22]a reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was applied even if the
administrative complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged misconduct occurred four days before the
elections, respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing of the administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was
committed during the prior term, the precise timing or period of which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the
public officials culpability was committed prior to the date of reelection.
 Petitioners theory is not novel.

A parallel question was involved in Civil Service Commission v. Sojor[23] where the Court found no basis to broaden the scope of the doctrine
of condonation:

Lastly, We do not agree with respondents contention that his appointment to the position of president of NORSU, despite the pending
administrative cases against him, served as a condonation by the BOR of the alleged acts imputed to him. The doctrine this Court laid down in Salalima
v. Guingona, Jr. and Aguinaldo v. Santos are inapplicable to the present circumstances. Respondents in the mentioned cases are elective officials,
unlike respondent here who is an appointed official. Indeed, election expresses the sovereign will of the people. Under the principle of vox populi est
suprema lex, the re-election of a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending administrative case. The same cannot be said of a re-appointment
to a non-career position. There is no sovereign will of the people to speak of when the BOR re-appointed respondent Sojor to the post of university
president[24]. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)lawph!l

Contrary to petitioners asseveration, the non-application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not violate the right to
equal protection of the law.

In the recent case of Quinto v. Commission on Elections[25], the Court applied the four-fold test in an equal protection challenge[26] against
the resign-to-run provision, wherein it discussed the material and substantive distinctions between elective and appointive officials that could well apply
to the doctrine of condonation:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is
to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to
those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate
of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

xxxx

An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice
or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, x
x x complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were
elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The electorates condonation of the previous administrative infractions of the reelected official cannot be extended to that of the
reappointed coterminous employees, the underlying basis of the rule being to uphold the will of the people expressed through the ballot. In other
words, there is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of, in the case of reappointed coterminous
employees.

It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person who happens to be the appointing authority, that could extinguish an administrative
liability. Since petitioners hold appointive positions, they cannot claim the mandate of the electorate. The people cannot be charged with the
presumption of full knowledge of the life and character of each and every probable appointee of the elective official ahead of the latters actual
reelection.

Moreover, the unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine would set a dangerous precedent as it would, as respondents posit, provide
civil servants, particularly local government employees, with blanket immunity from administrative liability that would spawn and breed abuse in the
bureaucracy.

Asserting want of conspiracy, petitioners implore this Court to sift through the evidence and re-assess the factual findings. This the Court
cannot do, for being improper and immaterial.

Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised, since the Court is not a trier of facts[27]. As a rule, the Court is not to
review evidence on record and assess the probative weight thereof. In the present case, the appellate court affirmed the factual findings of the Office
of the Ombudsman, which rendered the factual questions beyond the province of the Court.

Moreover, as correctly observed by respondents, the lack of conspiracy cannot be appreciated in favor of petitioners who were found guilty
of simple neglect of duty, for if they conspired to act negligently, their infraction becomes intentiona[28]l. There can hardly be conspiracy to commit
negligence[29].

Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a task expected from an employee resulting from either carelessness
or indifference[30]. In the present case, petitioners fell short of the reasonable diligence required of them, for failing to exercise due care and prudence
in ascertaining the legal requirements and fiscal soundness of the projects before stamping their imprimatur and giving their advice to their superior.

The appellate court correctly ruled that as municipal legal officer, petitioner Salumbides failed to uphold the law and provide a sound legal
assistance and support to the mayor in carrying out the delivery of basic services and provisions of adequate facilities when he advised [the mayor] to
proceed with the construction of the subject projects without prior competitive bidding[31]. As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, to
absolve Salumbides is tantamount to allowing with impunity the giving of erroneous or illegal advice, when by law he is precisely tasked to advise the
mayor on matters related to upholding the rule of law.[32] Indeed, a legal officer who renders a legal opinion on a course of action without any legal
basis becomes no different from a lay person who may approve the same because it appears justified.
 As regards petitioner Glenda, the appellate court held that the improper use of government funds upon the direction of the mayor and prior
advice by the municipal legal officer did not relieve her of liability for willingly cooperating rather than registering her written objection[33] as municipal
budget officer.

Aside from the lack of competitive bidding, the appellate court, pointing to the improper itemization of the expense, held that the funding for
the projects should have been taken from the capital outlays that refer to the appropriations for the purchase of goods and services, the benefits of
which extend beyond the fiscal year and which add to the assets of the local government unit. It added that current operating expenditures like
MOOE/RMF refer to appropriations for the purchase of goods and services for the conduct of normal local government operations within the fiscal
year.[34]

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Tongson[35], the Court reminded the therein respondents, who were guilty of simple neglect of duty, that
government funds must be disbursed only upon compliance with the requirements provided by law and pertinent rules.
Simple neglect of duty is classified as a less grave offense punishable by suspension without pay for one month and one day to six months. Finding no
alleged or established circumstance to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty of six months, the Court finds the imposition of suspension
without pay for three months justified.

When a public officer takes an oath of office, he or she binds himself or herself to faithfully perform the duties of the office and use reasonable
skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of duties, a public officer is to use that prudence, caution,
and attention which careful persons use in the management of their affairs[36].

Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public servants must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and
dedication to duty. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, public officers and employees must faithfully adhere to hold sacred and render
inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust; and must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency[37].

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96889 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that
petitioners, Vicente Salumbides, Jr. and Glenda Araa, are suspended from office for three (3) months without pay.
GARCIA v. DRILON
G.R. No. 179267
June 25, 2013
699 SCRA 352

FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent which
spawned several quarrels that left respondent wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away their children and deprive her of financial
support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade
her to hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against respondent and her children and issued a series of
Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA 9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by
women's intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING: No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification. The non-identical
treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to
ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves
the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification
and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such
objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not
violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
 TATAD VS DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
G.R. No. 124360 and 127867. November 5, 1997
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.

Facts:
The petitioner question the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes. The deregulation process has two phases:
(a) the transition phase and the (b) full deregulation phase through EO No. 372.
The petitioner claims that Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a
determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and the law does not
provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is
considered stable.
Issues:

1. Whether or not Sec 5(b) of R.A. 8180 violates the one title one subject requirement of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power.
3. Whether or not R.A. No. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition

Discussions:

1. The Court consistently ruled that the title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the
title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered
in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
2. Adopting the ruling from Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA, the Court states that:

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test,
the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the
sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative.

3. A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies, consisting in the exclusive right or power to carry on a particular business or trade,
manufacture a particular article, or control the sale or the whole supply of a particular commodity. It is a form of market structure in which one or only a few firms dominate the
total sales of a product or service. On the other hand, a combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or understanding between two or more persons, in the form of a contract,
trust, pool, holding company, or other form of association, for the purpose of unduly restricting competition, monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain commodity,
controlling its production, distribution and price, or otherwise interfering with freedom of trade without statutory authority. Combination in restraint of trade refers to the means
while monopoly refers to the end.

Rulings:

1. The Court does not concur with this contention. The Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title one subject rule. The Court hold that section 5(b) providing for
tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective investors to put
up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum.[i][20] We shall, however, return to the validity of this provision when we examine its blocking effect
on new entrants to the oil market.
2. Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full
deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no
discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to
advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President. He is to time it as far as practicable
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
3. Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated by the aforestated provisions of R.A. No. 8180 mandates: The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when
the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.