46

CHAPTER-II

INDIAN STRATEGIC THOUGHT

India is a civilisational entity that has shown remarkable resilience and survivability. India's

strategic culture has been absorptive, defensive and inward looking rather than aggressive, directed or

expansionist. ...... Sandy Gordon

Ancient History
-Cultural Heritage, Indian Strengths and Psyche. 46
Medieval Period
-Resurgence, Downfall, British Doctrine. 50
Independent India
- Strategic Thought, Policies and Perceptions 58
- Pattern of Strategic Relationship 59

Background

1. The genesis of Indian concern and general attitude towards strategic thinking lies in the
historical background. To understand the current response and background to India's present
nature of strategy and doctrine, one has to peep into the past. Indias psyche lies in its cultural
heritage and the ancient history. 1 Why did India opt for democracy? Why are the policies of

non-aggression, mutual respect, coexistence, compassion and thoughtful rational approach the
main backdrop of their diplomacy? Why did they bargain for the lives of 145 innocent people in
lieu of three hard-core terrorists? What would be the likely course India may adopt in the future
in response to any challenge? Is it going to be a 'soft*, 'mild' or a 'harsh reprieve' type? Answers
to many questions are found in this concept because the philosophy, attitudes, and national
character are identified from the roots. 2 It is a matter of debate whether India had any strategic
culture or not. Many historians believe that India does possess strategic culture where as analysts
like George Tanham feel otherwise.

Ancient History and Cultural Heritage

2. At over 5000 years the India civilisation is the oldest surviving culture in the world. Its
historical past extends to days of Mahabharata and the Vedic period. 3 The two main epics of
her culture, Ramayana and Mahabharata illustrate the highest moral principles enunciated in the
scriptures, the sruti and smriti. The Ramayana depicts the ideal man, the ideal wife, the ideal
brother and ideal servant and Rama is held up as a high image of Dharma. Bhagwad Gita, the
gem set in the jewel of Mahabharata is explicit about moral principles, of virtues and vices.
Virtues imply fairness, purity of mind, non-violence, forgiveness, self-control, sacrifice, truth,
and freedom from anger. The vices include lust, greed, self-conceit, excessive pride, force,
ignorance, harshness and stubbornness. 4
 47
3. Professor A A Athale has noted that India is not a mere political entity; it is a civilisation
state. In contemporary Greece of Egypt there may be only traces. Of Athens of Pharaohs of old,
but in India the origins of the daily rituals, the hymns and, it times, the habits, can be traced to
the distant past spanning nearly 5,000 years. The icons discovered in Mohenjodaro (dating to
3,500 BC) are of Gods and Goddesses who are still worshipped in India. 5 The vast
subcontinent of India with its millions has always been a world unto itself. The Himalayan wall
and the seas served to sharply enclose this region and give it an insular and self-sufficient
orientation. This Indocentric view has been primarily responsible for restricting our historical
field of vision. Within the subcontinent itself, the diversity of ethnic and linguistic forms is so
amazing that India can hardly be described as a country. And yet India as a civilisation entity has
got a strange and indefinable unity. It has age. There is a marked strand of continuity between
the ancient civilisation of the Indus Valley and the present day Indian culture. The Indian culture
is an amalgamation of diverse influences, peoples ideologies and religious influences. And yet
the keynote of the Indian civilisations has been its tolerance and its wonderful assimilative
quality. What Professor Mukherjee and other eminent historians have identified as this
assimilative quality is actually the overpowering urge for a creative synthesis that ahs always
been paramount in this civilisation. Synthesis is symbolised by the worship of the Sun, where
hydrogen atoms fuse into helium every second. So the Indian civilisation entity represents a
melting pot of diverse cultures. 6

4. Cultural Heritage of India. Historians like Jagdish Narayan Sarkar in Some Aspects of
Military Thinking and Practice in Medieval India, feel that being one of the oldest civilisations
in the world, India's posses a rich cultural heritage which encompasses a variety of fields
including strategic culture. It includes Indian philosophy, Vedas, epics, Upanishads, Puranas and
Dharma Shastra. It is the essence of Hinduism, religion and culture, unity and spirit, sciences
and literature and their impact of the society. It is the wealth derived from her Philosophers,
Saints, Renaissance and national leaders, and Scientists. The Indian society is based on
Vamadharma and the caste system. 7

5. Culture. Hie outstanding facts of Indian culture8 are as under: -

Tradition of tolerance

Sense of synthesis reflected in racial harmony

Universal outlook- world is one family

Philosophical out look- belief in unity of creation

Respect for the individual

 48
6. Philosophy. Indian philosophy is based on astika and nastika, philosophy takes its stand on
the spirit which is above mere logic, and holds that culture based on mere logic or science may
be efficient but not inspiring. 9 One of the most vital factor of Indian culture us her religious

strength. Hinduism signifies ahimsa and spiritual realisation. India is known for 'unity of all
religions'. It is the only civilisation in which maximum numbers of religions have taken birth and
have flourished. Besides Hinduism which itself has many philosophies, other religions like
Sikhism, Islam, Jainism, Buddhism, Christianity are all practised on this 'holy' land.10

7. Foreign scholars have been highly impressed by India and her glorious past. Will Durant,
American Philosopher writes, "An impressive continuity of development and civilisation from
Mohan-jo-Daro 2900 BC or earlier, to Gandhi, Raman and Tagore; faiths encompassing every
stage from barbarous idolatry to the most subtle and spiritual pantheism; philosophers playing a
thousand variations to one mosaic theme from the Upanishads, eight centuries before Christ;
scientists developing astronomy three thousands years ago, and winning Nobel prizes in our
time; a democratic constitution of untraceable antiquity in the villages, and wise and beneficent
rulers like Ashoka and Akbar in the capitals. This is India that patient scholarship is now opening
up, like a new intellectual continent, to the Western mind which only yesterday thought
civilisation an exclusively European thing." Max Mueller describes. "India has a strange genius
of converting what it borrows and assimilating it." German Indologist, E B Havell states, "
Upanishads teaching the fruit of the highest human knowledge and wisdom." Dr. Arnold
Toynbee, British historian has said, "attitude and spirit to grow together as one family in this
atomic age, on the principle of non violence and harmony of religions. 11 India has been
known as 'the treasure house of the world'. Nicholas Counti, an Italian traveller described
Hamphi, the capital of Vijaynagar, as more prosperous and beautiful than Rome. Cholas had
their influence as far as South East Asian states. Ankorvat temple in Cambodia is testimony of
Pioneering spirit of Indians who ventured across the seas and carved out empires. 12

Art of War in Ancient India

8. Indian ancient experience of war is enshrined in Dhanurveda and the epics and the
redoubtable Kaitilyas Arthashastra. Notwithstanding the fundamentals of ancient Indian culture,
it would be foolish to assume that there was little progress on the art of war, strategy and
organisation for defence. Many Vedic scholars who, though not directly interested in the military
aspect of the Vedic Aryans' lives, have made valuable contribution about warfare and other
related matters in the course of their writings. A noted scholar, S T Das writes, The Art of war
has existed all time and strategy was the same under Rama, Krishna and Caesar as under
Napoleon. Indians have not taken to the science of warfare recently and their fighting traditions
are not only 200 years old. There are glorious examples of large-scale operations undertaken in
ancient times backed by a definite military science on strategy and tactics. 13
 49
8. Das further adds that warfare is an organised sophisticated business requiring specially
trained bodies of men called armies, special tool called weapons and specials operations called
strategy and tactics; therefore no war means no civilisation. 14 Moreover, the tenets of peace,
should not lead anyone to think that Indians did not concern themselves with art of war or
armies. Ever since antiquity, the central theme of Indian home and foreign policy has been peace.
Peace at home and peace all around. It is therefore, not very surprising that Indian military
history lacks completely the so-called 'romantic and colourful story of wars of aggression and
deeds of gallantry on foreign soils'.

9. The ancient warfare was based on the Infantry, the horse and chariots, arms and armour,
forts and fortifications, order and organisation, archery and ethics of war. The earliest forms of
Indian warfare had the domestication of the horse and the elephant and their use for military
purposes; the invention of the wheeled vehicles and the battle-chariot; the use of metals for the
manufacture of weapons; the nature of ancient arms and ammunition, forts and fortifications,
military order and organization; and the uneasy birth of a moral consciousness evidenced in the
development of a code of war. 15

10. Fairly early in the story of India's past, men began to organize themselves for purpose of
defence. The nomadic horse-riding herdsmen of Rana-Ghundai domesticated the horse as early
as the fourth millennium B.C. As settlements grew in size, fortifications came into being even
before the advent of Indus civilization. With the bloom of Harappa and Mohan-jo-daro the Indus
valley witnessed the rise of mighty fortification proclaiming the authority of the state and the
organisation of defence, the real form of which remains an illusive enigma of the historian.
Weapons of copper and bronze wee used ". The Harappan civilization was fully organised of
three-wheeled vehicle. The Aryans also rode horses both in peace and war and used the lance the
sword as their chief weapons on horseback. The Aryans made friends with the elephants soon
after their arrival in India The later Samahitas, Brahamanas and the Upanishads give evidence
of growth and use of elephants in war, before the end of Vedic period Indian army became
fourfold including infantry chariots elephants and cavalry.16

11. There existed a well-set pattern of organisation for defence. The importance of armed forces
in relation to the State, has always been recognised, is evident from the fact that the ancient India
regarded the King as the root of the tree of the state; the military as its trunk; the military chief as
the branches; the army as the leaves; prosperity of the country its fruit and the whole country as
the final seed. The address and approach of the Indian people to the subject of 'the defenders of
their freedom and their way of life' has not changed. They also had the knowledge of
encampment and the various necessities of maintaining and provisioning of forts and armour
with a degree of perfection. Espionage was widely practised. 17

12. Vedic Period. The kings in then Vedic period had no standing armies. The Hindu Monarch
State of the period was essentially a civil and never became a military polity. In the time of war,
 50
the kings depended upon local levies who brought their arms and weapons and who were led by
their own chiefs. They had offensive and defensive weapons as well.

13. Sea. Indians of the periods had the knowledge of sea navigation. Their spirit of adventure,
so beautifully reflected in the Jatakas, and other texts enabled them to undertake sea voyage to
distant shores across the seas and establish commercial contacts with other countries. There is no
evidence, however, to show that they had ' fighting ships and that they never fought any naval
battles. 18

14. The Epic and Puranic Period. The original epics of ancient India are the Ramayana and
the Mahabharata. The original portions of these two great books represent the Heroic Age of
Ancient India. Mahabharata saw the biggest of battles fought but amongst brothers.
Dronacharya, Bishma and Sri Krishna are recognised as the greatest strategists till date. While
other civilisations after great struggles, gave the world the great strategists and tacticians like
Sun Tsu, Claudswitz and captain Liddell Heart. India gave Chanakya (Kautilya) the only
contemporary in the modern period who could match them all. 27

15. Training. Considerable attention was paid to the training of soldiers. This is evident from
the address from Ramayana. It is said 'When the Army is well trained, it does fighting quite well.
Untrained soldiers are worthless. Considerate people, therefore, train them properly. Ravana's
address to his Commander -in- Chief on the subject is more significant. " 'Hero' order my four
limbed army which is well trained in the military arts to defend the city carefully against the
enemy". In the Mahabharata there is reference to military tournaments in which their teacher,
Drona, tested the military skills of the Kaurava and Pandava brothers. Dhritarastras speech on
the qualities of his armies shows many facets of their training. 19

Medieval Period

16. Magadhan Periods. During this period the tribal monarchies and confederations, formed
for defence and offence in the early stage, were replaced by territorial monarchies. Empires came
in to existence with them, the question of national or territorial defence as opposed to tribal
defence. As a result of this standing armies came into existence.

17. Alexander's invasion. At the time of Alexander's invasion there were eight principal
states in India and their combined strength was, 1,068,000 infantry, 26,000 elephants and 17,000
chariots. Undoubtedly, the fate of Alexander would have been different if all the eight states had
committed their armed forces to battle against the invader. Unfortunately, there was no mutual
link for defensive purposes. On the other hand, there was a lot of mutual ill will, hatred and
jealousy. Alexander's march into India was rendered easy a result of surrender and joining hands
by Ambit, the king of Axial. Puru, (Greek: Porus), the king of the tract of land lying between the
Jhelum and Chinab offered resistance single- handed. The battle took place at Hydaspes.
 51 > '-------------

18. Chandragupta Maurva. He has been regarded as national hero king o^P'atiiputr^*i?/44h^
the help of Chanakya, also known as Kautilya, the military genius of the period, whoIjMMagMV1
11 s, 1
dominated organisation and administration of the armed forces during this and th^ fplJowingj
periods, and who is held in the highest esteem by Indians even today, he overthrew tlie* NanMl!*

dynasty and ascended the throne of Patliputra in about 321 B.C. \ .

VC 1 *
19. Military system in Kautilya. No account of India's ancient histoiy, be it political, social
or economic or military, is complete without reference to the Arthashastra, generally described
as Chanakya, the prime - minister of Chandragupta Maurya. It is considered to be the most
comprehensive work on statecraft, law, and a military system. It contains some military matters
and a good deal of theoretical discussion on the methods of warfare, diplomacy and military
organisations as a whole. 20

20. Armed Forces. According to Megasthenes, the standing army of Chandragupta

comprised 60,000 infantry, 9,000 elephants and a large number of chariots. This huge army was
administered by a well-organised war -office in charge of a commission of thirty, divided into six
boards, each board served by five members. Arthashastra speaks of an officer called
Audhagaradhyaksa or superintendent of Armoury. It is admitted that Mauryas built and
commanded a Navy. The aspect of defence is evident in the military architecture as well where
cities and towns were well defended by surrounding walls; in some cases strong fortified citadels
were built in most secure comers.

21. The Mauryan Military Machine. The historical precursor to the modern-day Indian
Armed Forces is the large standing forces of the Mauryan period, the impartial Mauryan Army
and the Navy. India then had a large standing Army that comprised over 650,000 men. It was one
of the largest standing armies of that period. It comprised four arms (chaturangi). According to a
Roman write called Pliny, it had:

The Infantry- 600,000,

The Cavalry - 30,000,
The Chariot Corps- 8000 and
The Elephant Corps- 9000

22. As per Maghasthenes, the Mauryans also maintained a Navy. The administration of the
armed forces was carried out by a board of 30 officers divided into five committees of five
members each. The Infantry, the Elephant Corps, the Chariots, the Navy and the transport
commissariat were each assigned to the care of a separate committee. Hoe did the Mauryans
generate the finances foyer such a huge standing Army? It was easily the largest standing army
of the ancient period and had one of the largest corps of officers. As per Kautilyas Arthashastra,
the state controlled all the economic activities in the realm. The state brought new Land under
cultivation with the help of cultivators of Sudra labourers. Taxes levied on peasants varied from
 52
one-forth to one-sixth of the produce. Moreover the state enjoyed a monopoly in manufacture of
arms, mining and sale of liquor. 21

23. Perhaps the greatest Indian military victory was the defeat of Selukos Nikator by
Chandragupta Maurya. This extended the reach of Mauryan power as far as Afghanistan. The
Greeks were forced to cede Baluchistan and Selukos gave his daughter in marriage to
Chandraguptas (so much for the Greek conquest). The event stands as a historical landmark in
the Indian military history.

24. Espionage. Scholars have noted that espionage was considered an important factor of
warfare. It was practised as widely as possible. The best example of espionage is the great work
Mudrarakshas by Kautilya. In the work of espionage all methods were admissible: sam, dam,
dand and bhed (spying, bribing, women's wiles and assassins knife respectively). For diplomatic
service, the appointment of ambassadors was the rule. An ambassador in ancient India, like his
modem prototype, was nothing more than a honourable spy acting under the protection of
customary laws. 22

25. Ashoka the Great. Ashoka was the last of the Maurays. During his time, the biggest
military offensive was launched and won.... That was Kalingha. The inscription at the site of the
battle states that "1,50, 000 were carried away (as captives), 1,00,000 were slain and many times
as many died." Ashoka was deeply moved by the death and destruction at Kalingha and he
abandoned war as an instrument of state policy in settling disputes. He, however did not disband
or weaken the mighty war machine which remained intact. It seems to be very much due the
presence of his armed forces 'in fighting trim' that there was no further rebellion or revolt. 23

After the decline of Maurya Empire, during the period of The Sungas and Satavahana
Dynasties, there started a period of invasion and forcible intrusions and of general insurrection
from within. The period lasted for full four hundred years is described as one long chapter of
fierce warfare between the foreigners stationed in India and the Indian princes themselves.

26. Golden Age. Chandragupta I of Gupta dynasty (Second Maghadhan Empire) assumed
the title of Maharajadhiraja as his kingdom grew in all directions. The Gupta dynasty not only
maintained the frontiers but also expanded it further. These years were truly the 'Golden Age' of
India when trade and commerce flourished and it was at the peak of peace and prosperity.

27. Invasions. Treasure, like beauty, has invariably attracted thieves and dacoits. India has
been no exception. From the time of Alexander the great, India has suffered a series of invasions.
Then there was Mohamud of Ghazni from central Asia eyeing for India. He came , he
conquered ,he looted and went away; but he left behind his men who made India their home.
Mohammad Ghori was another plunderer who had the audacity to come all the way down to
Somnath temple in Gujarat more than once in the lust for gold. It will never be known how
much wealth actually flowed out of India as a result of such invasions.
 53
TheMarathas

28. The power that came closest to imperial pretensions was that of the Marathas. Starting from
scratch, the non-Brahmin castes in the Maharashtra region had been organised into a fighting
force by their legendary leader, Shivaji. Diminutive in height, clever beyond his enemy's
imagination, Shivaji led everyday of his life like a drama in which he was always a step ahead of
his adversaries. The Marathas moved like lightning and appeared in areas where least expected,
at times hundreds of miles away from their home. They always went back with their hands full of
plunder. This was an ideal form of Guerrilla Warfare.

29. Gradually, states began to pay them vast amounts in "protection money," as insurance
against their plundering raids. By the third quarter of the 18th century, the Marathas had under
their direct administration or indirect subjugation enough Indian territory to justify use of the
term "the Maratha Empire", though it never came near the dimensions of the Mughal empire.
The Marathas also never sought to formally substitute themselves for the Mughals; they often
kept the emperor under their thumb but paid him formal obeisanee.39 24

30. Shivaji and the Marathas did provide a ray of Hope in the dark period. Rise of Nationalism
was evident which reformers like Tuakaram and others supported. This nationalism brought in
awareness, motivation and a new spirit in minds of the people. Some scholars have described it
as the beginning of strategic thinking in India. Marathas had their own Navy under Kanhoji
Angre. They adopted the appropriate tactics and strategy of forts, cavalry, and guerrilla tactics to
match a strong enemy especially the Moghuls. Baji Rao I identified the Moghuls as the main
enemy. He decided to cut the trunk to fell the tree and marched to Delhi. But his successors
diluted the kingdoms in the race for political supremacy and religious divide. Three Maratha
wars finally saw the decline because there was no combined resistance. When Nadir Shah of
Persia attacked Delhi in 1739, the declining Mughals were even further weakened, but the
expansion of the Maratha power came to an abrupt halt in 1761 at Panipat. Chanakya policy and
his doctrine seemed forgotten. Subsequent rulers like the Peshwas failed to carry on the legacy of
Shivaji due to the narrow selfish interest of other Marathas. 25 When Nadir Shah of Persia
attacked Delhi in 1739, the declining Mughals were even further weakened, but the expansion of
the Maratha power came to an abrupt halt in 1761 at Panipat. Ahmad Shah Durrani from
Afghanistan defeated the Marathas in this battle. Their expansion to the west halted, they
nevertheless consolidated their control over central India and their region known as Malwa.
Soon, however, they were to fall to India's final imperial power, the British. 26

Dark Age

31. Militarily the Indian record after the Maurayn period went steadily downhill till it reached
its nadir in the tenth century. That is the time foreign invasions started from the North-West.
India way subjugated t by foreign conquerors. By the fifteenth century they were largely
 54
Indianised or assimilated. The Mughal period represented a new consensus, which gave India
political unity once again. Akbar practiced and propagated Indian virtues of tolerance and
synthesis and was able to politically reunify the state. He also raised a very large standing Army
for military consolidation. This consensus however broke down in the time of Aurangzeb who
regressed back to fundamentalism and intolerance. He short-sighted and oppressive policies led
to a strong reaction from the indigenous people. The rise of the Marathas in the South and the
Sikhs in the North marked an Indian military renaissance of sorts in the Seventeenth century.
This led to the destruction of Moghul Empire. 27

32. Causes of Defeat. It has been admitted by the historians of the invaders themselves, that
militarily, the soldier sons of India were not weak or lacking in dare and courage. Invaders were
successful because of their well founded expeditions and the help they got from treachery of a
few Indians. Some of them were fortunate commanders who were helped by luck of an unusual
season or perhaps huge tribal movements careless of loss of life that could encompass the
perilous passage through formidable Indian defences. 28 There emerged a large number of

deficiencies after the fall of Gupta Empire and the death of Harshvardhana. Rulers after the 7th
Century could not keep the empire together. It started breaking up into smaller principalities and
kingdoms. These smaller states got involved so badly with their neighbourhood rivalries that that
lost the sight of impending external threats. Their ego and false pride was the starting point of
their downfall. Their jealousy saw no bounds when some rulers went to the extent of sending
invitation to foreign rulers to come and defeat their local enemy. These principalities could never
look beyond their local affairs and thus were never united, Most of the times they were fighting
amongst themselves and trying to settle the scores of ancestral rivalry or fight over a princess.
This proved to be their biggest weakness. They were to pay heavily for their petty rivalries,
enmities and jealousy. Some even went to the extent of providing all the assistance to the foreign
invaders with guides, information and weaknesses. 29

33. However, there were a few cases of giving a tough fight to the foreign aggressors like
Maharana Pratap and Rana Sanga but they could not succeed due to lack of support from other
kings. There were kings like Prithviraj Chauhan who cold defeat a foreign aggressor and forgive
him more than once. However, no efforts made to jointly defend or offer any kind of resistance.
There was total lack of strategic thinking. When Babur invaded India in 1526 AD, invasions
followed thereafter and dynasty rules came in to existence, subjecting the country to 600 year of
foreign rule.

34. The Psyche. Moreover, Strategic Analysis in Indian Security: A Historical Perspective,
has written, Indian history could well be called a chronicle of military disasters. Yet,
paradoxically, except during the time of active conflict, security issues do not enjoy primacy on
the Indian agenda. On the normative basis the justification probably is that since India does not
 55
threaten any other country, there is no reason for others to pose a threat to her. Even in 400 AD,
when Rome was tottering under the Hun onslaught, Samudragupta with a powerful navy at his
command, did not intervene There are many such instances. 30 The roots of this perception

thus go far back into antiquity. They can be liked to the factor of geographic isolation and
abundance of means of livelihood. Prior to the advent of sea power, the over-land access to India
was limited to a few passes in the modem day Afghanistan. The northern mountain barrier and
the jungles of east were a formidable barrier to large-scale movements.

35. The major period of Indian history, from around 4,000 BC to 1300 AD, saw the main
threat come from within the internecine conflicts between various kingdoms of the subcontinent.
The Indian intellectuals (Rishis or Sages) evolved various methods of peaceful resolution of
conflicts. They were woven into the fabric of Indian society through philosophy and religion.
The basic value of universal humanism was given concrete shape through tradition, ritual and
myth. The remarkable absence of conflicts over economic issues, right up to the present day, can
only be understood through appreciation of the philosophical underpinnings of human affairs.
The concept of Swa-Dharma (one's own duty) in life took the place of force to seep peace
between competing individuals or groups.
t
36. The conflict resolution methods that become part of Indian psyche, while managing to
limit the internal conflicts, had a devastating on 'total' war, faced the Indians fighting with the
'intent' of limited war, With this difference in intent, of a fundamental started. Even the one time
aggressor, one settled in India, fell victim to this 'India effect' and lost to the subsequent invader
8 Several hypotheses attempt to explain the successive military defeats suffered by the Indians.

According to one, Indian backwardness in military technology is to be blamed. It is undoubted

true that gun power was first used by the Seljuk Turk- Babar. The long use of war elephants,
despite their obviously disastrous performance, is a case in point. This raises another question,
and that is given the by now acknowledged fact of Indian advances in fields as diverse as
metallurgy, surgery and astronomy, what prevented a comparable advance in technology of war?
The Indians were also not slow to copy the new technologies as can be gauge' from the accounts
of the new technologies as can be gauge' from the accounts of the third battle of Panipat in 1761,
when the Marathas against the Afghan cavalry. Thus the hypothesis of Indian technological
backwardness is only partially true.

37. Lack of political unity amongst Indians is another favourite explanation. It is

undoubtedly true every invader, right from Alexander, always found a local ally and
collaborator. The fact however remains that many Indian states were individually equal in
resources and population to the invader. The emergence of modem day mega-states is a much
later phenomenon. This hypothesis thus lacks validity.

38. Sociological explanation focuses on the ills of the caste system which are said to have
prevented total mobilisation of society against the invaders. It is said to have impeded resistance.
 56
It is worth noting that caste in some form or the other has been in existence the world over and
the odds were thus shared. Egalitarian society is a recent phenomenon, not applicable to past. On
the other hand the caste system along with the division of life in four Ashrams led to
specialisation. The caste system also divided power among the three top groups. (The still
survically caste system has given birth to the longest surviving, genetically evolved,, elitism). It
has also given a degree of legitimacy to ruling elites and produced a large pool of qualified
manpower, despite generally low levels of literacy. The purely sociological factor therefore may
not by the only reason for lack of battlefield success. 31

39. The British often attributed Indian battlefield defeats to lack of love of freedom. A value
judgement that finds an eloquent testimony in the inscription on the north and south blocks of the
presidential place complex, was originally built by the British. Many historians to long
subjugation of Indian first by the Muslims and later, the British, in turn attribute this. The view is
based on the fallacy that equated the conquest of northern plains with conquest of the whole of
India. South as well as east remained largely free. Mughal emperor Aurangzeb did try to conquer
the south, but failed in his Marathas. The first time the whole of India came under foreign
domination was in the 19th century; and even then direct rule was limited. Within decades, in

1857 the British faced the first Indian revolt. The value judgement about Indian lack of
love of freedom thus lacks reliability.32

The British Era

40. The British stepped in to fill the vacuum. Once again this effected a political reunification
of the subcontinent. The main plank of their success was their ability to nativise their colonial
wars of expansion. They conquered India with the help of a native Indian Army organised for the
first time on European lines.

41. The British Indian Army was subsequently fielded in all the battlefields of the world. In the
First World War, it fought the Turks and Germans in various theatres with distinction. In the
Second World War, India contributed a record volunteer force of 2.5 million men that fought and
prevailed over the Germans, Italians, and above all the fanatical Japanese Armies in Burma. 33

The Advent of British.

42. The decline of the Maratha power and the Muslims created a vacuum that paved way for
British empire who exploited the weaknesses of disunity, jealousy and inter state rivalry. This
was the weakest link in the Indian history that made the task of British easier. British who came
as traders, later exploited India to make it a colony of the Crown. They made India participate in
both world wars and bear the burden in terms of finance as well as manpower and war efforts.
Unlike other foreign rulers, they never made India their home. They squeezed India to
maximum and left India an economically impoverished nation. 34 Prior to independence,
British had cut off land connections and kept sea routes open. There was clear demarcation of
 57
territory with neighbouring countries. Frontiers or zones were key areas for British strategy.
They also served as buffer' zones. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Tibet and Afghanistan served as
frontiers. British Indian Army had a land power orientation primarily. 35 Defence Policy of

British India- The period of Crown rule in India extended from Queen Victorias Royal
Proclamation on 1 November 1958 to the formal withdrawal of British authority from the
subcontinent on 15 Aug 1947. During this era, the Indian people lived united under one
paramount rule in unexampled security from internal disorder and external aggression. The price
of such security imposed considerable burden on Indias meagre financial resources but must
necessarily be viewed wit reference to chaotic state of pre- British India and the turmoil which
afflicted other parts of the world during the period 1857-1947. The foreign policy of British
rulers of India was directed towards securing an alliance, integrity,, or neutralisation of the
borderlands and minor states covering the land approaches to the Indian empire. Ring fence
system. 36

Post Independence Era

43. Indian ancient experience of war is enshrined in Dhanurveda and the epics and the
redoubtable Kaitilyas Arthashastra. However, to be more meaningful there is a need to
concentrate upon recent past and in particular the post - independence military experience. At
the time of Independence in 1947, India inherited backwardness, poverty and misery of mind and
polity after centuries of slavery and subjugation. When the world moved towards
industrialisation and development, India remained where it were. In these years India lost the
opportunity to be with the world and got left at least three centuries behind the developed
nations of the world who benefited from the renaissance and the industrial revolution.

44. Nehru Era. For Independent India, Nehru was predominant in foreign affairs and was a
premier spokesman in foreign policy and in decision-making including military affairs. He
exposed a number of attitudes which retarded the growth of Indian military effectiveness. He
relied more on economic and political measures for seeking peace. Thus land and sea power
suffered a severe blow under Nehru.37 The public postures of the government as a result of keen
international interest in Indian affairs and the ambitious policy characterised Nehrus tenure. His
government saw no threat from the Communist bloc. New Delhi fostered the attitude that Indian
policy represented a fresh approach to interstate relationship in which moral force was superior
to physical force. Nehru claimed innl960 that Indias policy was rooted in a line of thinking
which opposed to the purely military line of thinking. 'Panchsheel' - peaceful coexistence,
disarmament, and peaceful settlement of disputes and nonalignment were put forward as the
Indian formula for the world peace.

45. Indian defence expenditure during 1947-62 was only Rs. 3000 cores or between 21 and
46 % of the current expenditure (1965 base). Nehru claimed as late as 1963 that his government
 58
preoccupied with internal problems of poverty and illiteracy had made it content to assign a
relatively low priority to defence requirements of the country in the conventional sense.

46. Superiority over Pakistan. Pakistans receipt of US military aid from 1954 onwards was
thus widely viewed both inside and outside as provoking significant increases in Indian defence
expenditure, No amount of expense and effort is, therefore, regarded as too much if that helps
maintain the superiority we hitherto enjoyed and apparently still enjoy over Pakistan. V.
K.Krisna Menon appeal largely built on extreme anti- Pakistani stance.

Pattern of Strategy

47. Ever since independence in 1947, India has been confronted with dilemmas regarding the
strategic requirements, goals and the nature of external relationships. India was initially faced
with two options. Firstly, to look inwards by putting the country into shape by strengthening
political and economic base and possess limited air and land power for defence of territorial
frontiers. Alternately, to have an outward projection by building a naval power.

48. India has completed 53 years of independence recently. It has managed to develop a
pattern of policy and relationship with the neighbours and other external and internal
circumstances and in a short period. This was in response to recurring internal policy debates. At
the time of independence, India had world's lowest economic, social and scientific level. The
country had missed the industrial revolution and had been looted of spiritual and economic
wealth by the invaders, and foreign rulers over the past three centuries.

49. India's land power debate got settled by 1962 India- China war when Nehru-Menon line
of Indian defence was severely condemned and choice of land and air power to face the threats
from China and Pakistan. Other issues under debate since then have been the need to have India
as sea power or nuclear/ missile power and its orientation towards only Pakistan or China as
well.

Pattern of Indian Dilemma

50. Historically speaking, Indian society and polity has undergone a series of dilemmas
regarding its diplomatic and military in the past half-century. Firstly, morality verses force
debate was in the forefront. 44 Nehru government rejected Gandhian policy of non-, violence,
recognizing resorting to use of force as the basis of defence policy but was ambient about
military affairs. Nehru emphasised that India was protected by external circumstances and felt
it unnecessary to join a military alliance. The financial factor of such build up was also evident.
The armed forces saw limited development. Initiatives for defence planning and development of
defence and science infrastructure including atomic energy. Nehru advocated moral force in
diplomatic posture with nonalignment, peaceful coexistence, disarmament and peaceful
 59
settlement of disputes as mantras of Nehru India. However, limited force theme existed at the
level of defence policy. This dilemma got solved as reaction to external threat in 1962.

ILLUSTRATION 2.1

PATTERNdNDIAN DILEMMA

Nature of Enmity

>
Morality Vs Force

INDIAN
>
STRATEGIC Guns Vs Butter
DILEMMAS >
Military Strength
>
Nuclear

51. The second debate was about guns verses butter. Butter development and guns denoted
military impulse in international relations. Could India afford a costly defence when millions of
people were starving? This issue was settled again in 1962 China war. Reactive policy rather
than pro-active policy was style of policy. This forced the recognition of belief that military
security was a must to ensure internal modernisation an economic security.

52. The third issue was concerning the nature of enmity. Who was the most dangerous
enemy of India? Sardar Patel had categorically identified and cautioned against both Pakistan
and China as long term security threats and need to contain these threats.

53. Nehru saw Pakistan as a limited and temporary problem while Menon overplayed
Pakistan problem and underplayed China problem. The two front, these gained ground
following 1962 debacle. In historical perspective, Pakistan is considered only a part of Indian
security equation. In the broader sense of security, Pakistan has been ideological and territorial
threat, China has been a territorial and systemic threat whereas America is the biggest systemic
threat for India because of its preference for India- Pakistan parity and pressurises India to accept
policies which marginalize its international ambitions and interests leaving it in a position of
permanent military and diplomatic inferiority.
 60
54. The forth dilemma is regarding its military strength. Should India peruse a policy for
'conventional defence or should it seek deterrence? Late professor Sisir Gupta in 1966
advocated that Indian policy must not seek to win wars; it must seek to make war impossible.
India should be able to deter aggression rather than defend oneself against it. In 1965 war, Lai
Bahadur Shastri escalated the Kashmir war by attacking the Pakistan's heartland sending a
deterrence message ' start a fight in Kashmir and we will punish you elsewhere. This prevented
Pakistan from re-opening Kashmir front in 1971 war. Again in mid eighties when Pakistan was
bent upon balkanising Indian border provinces (Punjab and Kashmir), another deterrent message
was sent by India through massive Brasstacks exercise. If you create a dangerous situation,
India has the capacity to hold its own in the northern and Western sectors and simultaneously
attack Sind and strategic Karachi port." 38

55. India's nuclear dilemma has persisted through out. On one hand India's atomic energy
policy strived for self-sufficiency and no foreign interference, on the other hand India insisted on
policy against nuclear proliferation and towards disarmament. The third dimension of Nehru
policy was to keep the option open on producing a bomb should the need arise. 39 This partially

got settled in 1998 (Pokharan II) when the Vajpayee government carried out explosion at
Pokhran and declared India a nuclear power state. 40

56. The fifth concern was India's desire to participate in arrangements to stabilise Asian
international relations. U S, China, Pakistan preferred Indo-Pakistan parity and sought to contain
Indian ambition, prestige and power to subcontinent affairs. Nehru exhibited Indian ambition
greater than its capacity to exert its power as means end dilemma. 50 This led to India's
containment by the US and the two neighbours. The other dilemma is 'systemic- structural'
which stems from classical balance of power arrangements. However, Indian assessment differs
from western thinking owing to the fact that geo-political and economic conditions are different.
India chose to develop Indian economic and military strength to frustrate US, Pakistani and
Chinese attempts to contain India when west refused to get convinced on Indias concerns.
Nehru's India was a 'weak status quo ' where as Mrs. Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi sought a strong
status quo power position. 51 41

57. India did resolve various issues on practical political and military problems through a
reactive decision making process. 'Ad-hochism' prevailed in the Indian security policies due to
its dilemmas and not simply a consequence of limited resources and organisational defects.
42

Problems of Indian Power Development

58. Christ Smith has made two important findings in the context of Indian Power development.
Firstly, India had pro- active defence policy in the case of arms acquisition during 1947-1954
period, before US- Pak militaiy pact was formed. India also maintained a pattern of arms
 61
acquisition and indigenes development after 1954. Second observation is that India failed to
systematically link its foreign policy with its military strategy and furthermore there were
organisational deficiencies, Lack of coordination or compartmentalisation among security
planners, as well as diplomatic, military and domestic intelligence services. 43

59. Ad-hochism. The ad-hoc mix of weapon systems created problems of coordinating the
military missions. The possible reasons for possessions of ad-hoc arsenal are Nehru's
misjudgement of role of force in environment, miscalculation of Chinese intentions, absence of
public debate on security matters and failure to think clearly about defence problems. Nehru
government aware of the danger from China but it took limited action to counter the danger. It
sought political solution to a military problem. Indian ad-hoc arsenal purchase was due to
resource problem, bureaucratic and international politics. This constituted satisfying rather than
maximising choices. India lacks integrated organisational set up which systematically and
routinely factors in threat perceptions, choices, intelligence inputs, mission statements as the case
in US type Presidential decision memorandums. Also important defence decisions were ad-hoc
and hence short sighted decisions. Most of the dilemmas got resolved after 1962 war, however,
the 'half-policies' emerged due to the on going debate on deterrence, nuclear and missile
programs. Indian armed forces secure territorial integrity and also deter hostile action.
Similarly, military exercises, missile development, naval build up serve dual purpose of this
policy.

Pattern of India's Strategic Relationship

60. Indian Approach. How did India approach the issues of national security during the first
two decades of country existence as an independent state? What was its conception of the
national interest? From what sources did it perceive; of possible hostile action? What precautions
did it take against the various contingencies of conflict? Although long time has passed since the
humiliation defeat inflicted by Chinese Military forces, the manner in which the Nehru
administration sought to secure India, against attack is still subject to extensive speculation,
largely unsupported by factual evidence. Manner in which policy formulated- Nehru was,
philosopher, the architect, the engineer and the voice of countrys policy towards outside
world 44

61. George K Tanham explaining Indian Strategic thought reveals that influence of Kautilyan
thought is seen on Indian strategic thinking. Indian defence policymaking does have its roots in
Indian Strategic culture. India's strategic culture has been described by Sandy Gordon as
absorptive, defensive and inward looking rather than aggressive, directed and expansionist. In
addressing this tangible and difficult area of strategic culture, however, we should also consider a
society's capability to alter its strategic thinking and organisational capacities in response to the
challenges it faces. It would be a mistake to underestimate the power of dialogue that is
constantly being conducted between the strategic cultures exercised with in a nation and the
 62
present day circumstances in which it finds itself. A Pattern of India's Strategic Relationship has
emerged over the past decades. In the due course India has emerged as a power of substance in
region, which no country in the world can afford to ignore. John Malot has contented that India
has the human and natural resources to become a major player in the world.

Pattern of India's Strategic Relationship

60. Despite India's security dilemmas and adhocism in the development of power, India has
been successful in developing a stable, predictable but non-crisis free pattern of relations in the
context of its enemies. Indian diplomatic and military policies emerged in a threefold context in
cold war era; an international system which was dominated by US-Soviet, Sino-Soviet and Sinn-
American rivalries, a regional pattern of conflict with Pakistan and finally, a weak India
economically and politically. Five major relationships emerged :

India and Pakistan- where relationship was mostly conflictual with few areas of
cooperation,

US and Pakistan - mostly a cooperative relationship with a few areas of conflict,

US and India -which showed convergence with regard to India's economic and
political development but a divergence in military an d diplomatic issues,

China and India - had many areas of divergence and conflict and a few areas of
cooperation and finally

China and Pakistan- an especially cooperative relationship.

 63
ILLUSTRATION 2.2

The Structure-Indian Power Development.

 64

61. Now, India is no longer a subordinate actor as it was during 1950 and 1960s though the
pattern and structure of diplomatic and military alignments still influence Indian policies but
there are major differences. Indian military an economic strength has grown, along with its
capacity to resist pressure of hostile neighbours and external powers with increase in India's
capacity to exert pressure on hostile neighbours and external powers. The tone of India- China
relations has improved but still there are shadows in the relationship which inhibit local trust.
India-Pakistan relations are poor because of Kashmir insurgency and there are attempts to
develop a new Indo- Pakistan bargain. They touched lowest ebb during Kargil conflict in 1999.
As a sole super power, US remains a thorn in the Indian side because of the pre- occupation
nuclear and missile controls. 45

62. Thus, an overview of structure and pattern of developments of India strategic thought and
behaviour reveals that it was a consequence of interactive nature of enmities, the consequent
dilemmas, the nature of power and patter of relationships. The debate about enmities has
progressed from an attitude or an intuitive sense that a security problem did not exist or that it
was a local and a management problem (1947-49), to an awareness that the problem arose
because nature of US-Pakistan coalition (1954), to a recognition that India had a problem with an
aggressive China (1962). The process of assessment of external threats was deliberate and
reactive but progressive as a result of internal debates. On the other hand, the debate simulated
policy resolution in the form of development of Indian military power and strategic posture; at
times, these were ambiguous ones. Today, the defence-deterrence-disarmament debate is still
alive; it is the basis of Indian diplomatic and military 'half- policies'. The matter of Indian power
i.e., the mix of land, air and naval and nuclear/ missile power reflect the context of this debate; it
is dynamic. The duality of two tracks of engagements and containment is clear in the Indian
strategic thinking and behaviour. Both tracks are necessary, but the weight to be attached to each
depends on external and domestic circumstances. India and other states( US, China, Russia)
should start a dialogue that would enable India to establish a more constructive set of ties with
these great powers than it has now. 46

63. Geo-strategic Considerations. The geo-strategic structure of South Asia does much to
shape the range of Indian strategic thought about these countries. In South Asia, India is the only
country that shares borders, or land or sea proximity, with all the other South Asian states and
region. Since 1971, no other South Asian state could hope to overmatch India's military strength,
but smaller states can each be threatened by Indian power and policies. They are therefore, likely
to tie themselves diplomatically and militarily to outside source of support. India can feel
threatened by such arrangements. India is very sensitive to any weapons and technology transfer
that Pakistan, long perceived as a major security threat primarily because of the Kashmir issue,
may receive from American or Chinese governments. China, an extra-regional nuclear power has
 65
itself directly threatened Indian security in the past, primarily due to Sino-Indian boundary
dispute. India has maintained an independent and self-reliant foreign policy over the long term.
She maintains conviction that India is "destined to be a great power, dominating South Asia
while representing the region to rest of the world." India perceived responsibility to challenge
certain super power incursions in the region rather than becoming its client.

64. Four Factors that Influence Indian Strategy. How has Indias past shaped present-day
conceptions of military power and national security? Through what prisms do Indian elites view
their strategic position vis-a-vis their neighbours, the Indian Ocean, and great power alignments?
Four factors have had a particularly important influence on Indian strategic behaviour today:
geography, culture the discovery of Indias history and the British Raj.

65. Geography has had a profound influence on Indian strategic concepts. The Himalayan
mountains in the North, the Arabian Sea in the West, and the Bay of Bengal in the East have
created a largely enclosed, natural geographic unit often referred to as the Indian subcontinent.
The mountains and seas have long been perceived as protective barriers and have given the
Indians a sense of security, but they fully recognize that much of the time it has been a false
sense of security.

Indias strategic culture

66. India's strategic culture has been described as absorptive, defensive and inward looking
rather than aggressive, directed or expansionist. In addressing this tangible and difficult area of
strategic culture, however, we should also consider a society's capability to alter its strategic
thinking and organizational capacities in response to the challenges it faces. It would be a
mistake to underestimate the power of dialogue that is constantly being conducted between the
strategic cultures exercised with in a nation and the present day circumstances in which it finds
itself. 47

67. Brahma Chellaney considers Strategic Culture as widely shared beliefs, worldviews,
traditions, attitudes, symbols, myths, self- image and identity (in terms of self-representation and
its proper role in world politics). Moreover, the way a countrys interests are conceptualised,
defined and defended is influenced by its unique culture/historical experiences. 48 Yitzhak
Klein has noted, Political and military elites socialised in different cultural contexts may behave
in different ways and make different choices even when placed in similar circumstances. 49
India and China are the two oldest continuing civilisations, each with the quality of resilience,
which has permitted them to survive and prosper through the ages against all odds. Both have a
long rich strategic tradition : Kautilyas Arthashsatra - a treatise on war, diplomacy, statecraft
and empire - in India and Sun Tzus treatise on art of war Sun Tzu- Bingfa -in China were
written over 2000 thousand years ago. 50
 66
68. George Tanham, the most prominent analyst on Indian culture notes, The emperors and
lesser leaders undoubtedly had their strategies and strategic concepts, but these were largely
built around themselves and the political entities they ruled. They were more concerned with
their own immediate ambitions and narrower goals. 51 On Indian unity, he says, Indians

believe that there has always been an India and in fact a great one; this concept can only be in
their minds as no such political reality or entity existed during most of their history. The few
periods of imperial unity and splendour cannot eclipse the very long periods of political disunity
and turmoil. For much of Indias history, the subcontinent has been divided into hundreds of
small states that were often at war with each other and that were the very forces that broke up the
few periods of unity in that history. The India, these nationalists have visualised, is the cultural
India, evolving over the centuries, permanent and unfailing in their eyes, although declining and
renewing itself many times. This cultural India is not a strategic entity; it can have no strategic
problems or strategy, but it can mobilise a people searching for identity and past greatness and
eager to play a world role in the future. 52

69. George Tanham, on Universal Humanism concept feels, Here is an enduring dichotomy;
what Indians perceive as tolerance springing from the Indian philosophy of universal humanism
may well be thought by the external world as lack of will. This perception, in turn, influences
security policies towards India. This perception of History finds an echo in modern times as well.
In 1947 itself, while India declared herself a secular democratic state, she nevertheless agreed to
the partition on the basis of religion. On the one hand this could be explained as be construed as
weakness of will. Abraham Lincoln when similarly placed with a choice between break up or a
civil war, chose the latter course. The subsequent Indian behaviour in the face of Chinese
nuclear test in 1964 or move if USS Enterprise in Bay of Bengal in 1971, tends to reinforce the
earlier held notions about India's lack of will power. 53

70. On Indias strategic future, he notes, The British developed a reasonably well-articulated
strategy for India. It evolved over the years and was never really carefully thought out. When
Indians gained their independence, they had no experience of strategic thinking and not even
much desire to pursue it. Furthermore, Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, both strong prime
ministers, continued the British tradition and made their own foreign policy and strategic
decisions. These were shared and discussed with only a few confidants, and no government
institutions were created to examine strategic alternatives. 54 Many Indians today complain
about the lack of strategic planning, the inadequacy of governments general unwillingness,
which is perhaps just lack of interest, to undertake systematic and reasoned strategic planning. A
National Security Council was created in 1990, but it still has no full-time staff, and as one
Indian cynically remarked, it was stillborn The need is recognized by the Delhi elite. Research
centres and academia conduct strategic studies and analyses, but they are outside the government
and have only extremely limited influence. With their natural talents for analysis and
conceptualisation and acquired capabilities in the use of computers and modem technology,
 67
Indians seem admirably qualified to undertake strategic studies and analysis. They are beginning
to and are likely to increase their efforts in the future. As India assumes a more prominent place
in the international community, it is seeking to define and articulate a more coherent strategic
identity. Indias self-conception is of broad international interest, not just because of its size and
weight in the international system, but also because of the growing military power at its disposal.
Indias future strategic role and power potential are indeed of both regional and global import.
55

71. Survival of India as a single political entity continues to baffle the world. Europeans fail to
understand how India remains united, when European unification is still a dream, despite her
diversities being far greater than those among the Europeans. Different languages, religions,
races, cultures for disintegration. The standard explanation is to attribute Indian unity to the
British. They are often credited with having brought India under one rule. A doubtful proposition
in light of the fact that no less than 500 odd princely states existed right up to 1947. Some also
argue that the British provided a convenient 'target' for the Indians, in opposition to whom they
could unite. Inherent in this was the expectation that once the cement of anti-British feeling was
gone, India would disintegrate. In the early years after 1947, the Indian unity was also being
credited to the presence of charismatic leaders of the freedom struggle. Their eventual demise
was expected to lead to disunity. Authors and scholars ranging from George Orwell, Taya zinkin,
Selig Harrison, Sir John Hacket to Jean Kirkpatrick, at one time or the other predicted the
disintegration of India. 56

72. However, Strategic Analysis asserts, Its unity is more ideological and intangible. Only
on rare occasions in Indian history has this cultural unity been converted into a genuine political
unity. India is a civilisational entity that has shown remarkable resilience and survivability. Its
three major political unifications under the Mauryas, the Mughals and the British (who laid the
foundations of the present republic) have all left behind an imperial legacy of continental reach.
Ideologically, however, India has dominated ali of Asia, including China and Japan through the
religio-cultural ideology of Buddhism. The Universalistic and regional planks therefore have
been two distinct stands in Indian history. The Universalistic trend has been marked by the
propagation of ideologies by 'Dharma Vijay, the regional strand by military conquest or 'Dig
Vijay' (e.g. Chandragupta's defeat of Selukos and acquisition of Baluchistan). This theme is
important in analysing the current Indian condition.

73. One possible explanation is the durability of the idea of India. If nations are to be
understood as an idea in people's mind, then surely India is an ancient nation. Cultural bonds,
common world view, way of life and a cluster of common belief and values moored in universal
humanism-offers one explanation. The most enduring division in India is probably between the
north and the south. The roots of this go back to the ancient period of Indian history. The Indian
sages, in a system of carefully devised ritual of pilgrimages, attempted to reinforce the unifying
 63
factors. It is no accident that the major shrines of a favourite southern deity, Shiva, are in the
north and that of Vishnu, in the south. 57

74. In the British as well as pre-British era, the language, caste sectarian and economic ties
always transcended the political divisions. All these factors combined to form a complex web of
interconnections that led to durable ties promoting unity. The remarkable fact is that right up to
the 1960's the political boundaries did not follow any legitimate division like race or language or
religion.58 Throughout Indian history, the political boundaries between various kingdoms were a

barrier only to soldiers. Free flow of ideas and men continued through these porous boundaries.
Historian Arnold Toynbee has recognised the crucial role of freely moving sages in the
integrating process of India. The division of India into nearly 500 odd princely states for nearly
150 years failed to crystallise into independent nations; because, with some exceptions, most
were revenue appropriating agencies with minimal popular legitimacy or support. The case
with which they were absorbed in the Indian Republic in post 1947 era, proves the point. Thus
Indian unity has a fair degree of structural strength that continues today.59

75. Since most factors that help Indian unity have a continued relevance even today, except for
the linguistic division of the state, Indian unity continues to rest on sound foundations. This
makes it unlikely that she will easily fall prey to centrifugal forces. As a collective memory it is
deeply ingrained in most Indians that their past misfortunes were mainly due to lack of political
unity. It can be seen from the extraordinary unity displayed unity. It can be seen from the
extraordinary unity displayed by the Indians at times of external dangers/conflicts. In this sense
modem India could well be called a national security state. The world at large however continues
to harbour doubts on this score, giving rise to the gap between perception and reality. Perception
of likely disintegration of India exists side by side with the reality of unity that is based on
unchanged structural and behavioural factors.

76. ' Ideology. Referring to Indian ideology, Aditya Chibber says, "With an electorate of a
staggering half a billion people, Indian is the world's largest democracy. The size and scope of
the Indian electoral process make the American system pale by contrast. Democracy is not a
foreign transplant in the Indian soil. It is deeply rooted in Indian history and tradition. Republics
existed here even before the times of Lord Buddha. To the Third World countries therefore India
is a shining example- a rival model of development to that of China and even the authoritarian,
economic-miracle countries of the Asia-Pacific rim (Korea and Taiwan). 60

77. A national security doctrine therefore must start with the values that we as a nation
cherish, such as democracy personal freedom, secularism and socialism. Democracy is a
universal ideology complete in itself. It reflects the Indian ethos of the ancient Panchayati Raj
system of truly representative village or grassroots democracy. India should therefore become an
aggressive and persuasive promoter of this system of governance -to start with in South Asia and
subsequently in the entire Third World. The non-alignment and anti-colonialism plank gave
 69
India a natural leadership role in the Third World for all these years. Both these issues have now
receded into the background. The winding up of the cold war will soon lead to new alignments in
Europe.

78. National Aim. All the structures and organization for security stem from a clearly
perceived national aim. India, therefore, needs to crystallize her interests and policies in the
National Aim. This must be evolved after detailed consideration and reviewed periodically. In
January 1988, the white House had released such a national security strategy for the USA. This
spelt out four broad objectives for national security strategy. Similarity the national aim for
Indian security may be defined in the following terms :

To defend the country from external invasion and preserve the Indian
democratic way of life from all external and internal threats.
To deter potential adversaries from resorting to nuclear or conventional attack or
from initiating low-intensity conflict to destabilize the Indian nation state.
To prevent external interference/intervention in the south Asian region.

National aim can de achieved by learning from Indian history which teaches us the existence of
the nations depend on the following factors- 61

Centralised control and direction of defence policy;

Defusing of internal stresses through political adjustments;
Sufficient forces in being to deter aggression;
Constant vigilance.

79. Indian military history gives us the sanction for maintaining large, standing Armed
Forces. Without a major ideological reorientation India cannot switch to the reservist system or
to conscription. The Indian nation state has no option but to go in for a huge standing Army of
approximately 45 to 48 divisions. This will give it the ability to field three counter strike corps
for the Western theatre and two for the Northern. Experts feel that it would be difficult to
maintain such large standing armies for a very long time. Hence there is a crying need to
restructure the security environment in the next decade itself.

Impact on Defence Forces

80. Analysing the Universal vs. Regional Approach: The Mauryan Analogy, Adity Chibber
feels, The emblem of modern Indian republic is the lions of Ashok. Clearly, Jawaharlal Nehru,
the first prime minister of free India, had the historical vision to identify the Indian Republic
with the imperial Mauryan entity. So, if we must search for the roots of our military historical
experience, they will be found in the Mauryan period. At that time the Mauryan civilisation,
having consolidated its empire, had launched upon the propagation of a universalistic ideology-
the doctrine of Buddha. The present -day Indian nation state also embarked upon the
propagation of a universalistic political ideology, of peaceful co-existence, non-alignment and
 70
anti-colonialism. Indias tragedy has been that she embarked upon this universal proselytization
without a proper regional military consolidation. The Nehruvian period of our post-independence
history was marked by its universalistic conkers and pretensions that lacked a base of economic
and military power. The moralist stress on universal peace and disarmament was undercut
viciously when China humiliated India militarily in 1962. It rudely shook the Nehruvian
worldview in which India had played a leading diplomatic role in world affairs without the
military or economic power to sustain it. The regime of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, therefore, gave up
this universal plank and concentrated upon regional military and economic consolidation. It was
pre-eminently successful and established its regional predominance in the 1971 war by
dismembering Pakistan. Indira Gandhi s leadership of the Non-Aligned movement was based
upon this regional pre-eminence. 62

81. The first casually of the policy of peace and international issues in the post-independence
period was the Indian Army. It seems to have gone to seed in this period. Starved of resources a
steadily deprived of status and importance it began to slip in the national scheme of things. In the
flux of change it clung with amazing fanaticism to its British colonial lineage. Its messianic zeal
for the trivia of mess rituals and affectations of British manners and dress assumed ridiculous
proportions a produced an era of comical Colonel Blimps. One of the great tragedies of post
independence history is the failure to truly nationalize the Indian Army. Tragically General
Kaul, one of the most controversial Indian Generals, spearheaded the nationalisation process. He
was seen as a political manipulator and a peacetime soldier. His championing of nationalism
provided and undeserved setback to this essential process and gave it a bad name. Nationalism
was equated with politicisation and identified with a nom-professional coterie that thrived on
political patronage. 63

82. The culmination of this confused period was a disaster of 1962. Incapable generals to force-
march an unwilling Army into a confrontation with China misled a confused political leadership
with no exposure in security matters. Paradoxically, it also served as a national challenge that
unleashed the synergetic response of the Indian people. The 1962 humiliation demolished the
Nehruvian worldview and forced India to face military realities. Without a genuine military
economic power base India could not hope to play a leading role in world affairs. The Chinese
had pricked the idealistic Indian bubble. As Toyanbee says, a challenge from the social or natural
environment unleashes the creative energies of a people. It acts as a sour to growth. The credit
for the post -1962 reconstruction of the Indian Army must go to General J N Chaudhary. It must
be borne in mind however that the military industrial bases for it had already been established by
the much maligned and controversial minister, Krishna Menon. 64

83. In Ashoka, we had an archetypal Indian leader who abjured the use of violence after taking
India to the crest of her military power. In Nehru we had another great visionary and world-class
statesman. He put India on the road to modernity, he nurtured and laid the foundation of a
 71
vibrant democracy. Unfortunately he had been nurtured in the peculiar circumstances if the
Indian freedom struggles. He abjured violence without any Ashokah experience of its large-
scale employment . His reliance on personalized diplomacy and charisma left us with an
awkward legacy of peaceful rhetoric that tied us in knots. Nehravian idealism could not survive
the 1962 invasion.

84. 1965 war caught the Indian armed Forces half way in their reconstruction and expansion
process. A number of green and newly raised formations were thrown into combat. What was
heartening to note was a resolute exhibition of political will by the Indian political leadership.
What Pakistan had thought would be confines to a local clash in Kashmir escalated into an all
out conflict over international borders. The war is widely regarded as a stalemate. The handling
of armour by both sides was dull and unimaginative. Both sides seemed to show a preference for
a static defensive operations. Indian attacks were on a broad front and lacked depth and the
agility to exploit fleeting opportunities. The Indian Air Force concentrated on the Pakistani air
bases in a costly, long-term interdiction programme aimed attaining a total mastery of the sky in
a classical air battle format. The war got over much before such results could be achieved. In the
meanwhile the Indian Army went without adequate air support and was biter and vociferous in
its complaints. The Indian Navy was caught by surprise with its sole aircraft carrier in the dry
dock. The Pakistan Navy managed a sneak attack on the Gujarat coast. There were loud
complaints of a failure of intelligence, which subsequently led to the establishment of the
Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Indian foreign intelligence agency.

85. The most important gain of the 1965 war was a crucial on-the -job experience for the higher
commanders. Pakistans last historical gamble had failed to pay off. Time and tide would
thereafter always favour India. The processes of Indian military build-up thereafter was
accelerated and received extensive Soviet support. The Indian military juggernaut acquired an
inexorable and unstoppable momentum.

86. The 1971 campaign was a model tri-service campaign that can serve as a classic for all
countries. In Chandraguptas defeating Selukos Nikators Greek is one high water mark of Indian
military history, the next real high water mark is the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971. The circle
was complete. Once aging a unified Indian nation state had demonstrated the aggressive military
potential that she was capable of generating. It showed the political leadership at its best. No less
a practitioner of statecraft than Dr Henry Kissinger paid Mrs Gandhi the complaint that in the
ruthless and cold-blooded pursuit of national interests Mrs Gandhi has no peers. On the military
plane, inter-services harmonisation was at its best. Clausewitz said, it is far better to study one
campaign in minute detail than to acquire vague knowledge of a dozen wars. The 1971 war is
one such story, which needs to be studied in minutest detail. It is a model campaign that all
military and political leaders should set before themselves as an example of supreme excellence.
One school of thought of higher military echelons holds that Bangladesh was a one -time
 72
exception. It can never be repeated . However one section of defence experts feel that, If the
politico-military strategy is well harmonised and draws up a long term blueprint there is no
reason why Bangladesh cannot be repeated, say, in Sind, or Baluchistan if that suits the interests
of the Indian nation state. 65

87. The three major political unifications of the Indian subcontinent were undertaken by the
Mauryas, the Mughals and the British. The present Indian Republic directly inherited the British
legacy. Along with the inheritance of parliamentary democratic institutions, administrative,
judicial and police norms and organizations came as the direct inheritance of the British military
system. The organizational structure and military philosophy of the Indian Armed Forces, and
especially the Indian Army, is very much a legacy of the Raj. This Anglo-American school of
war has attracted considerable criticism in recent times from military analysts all over the world.
It has been seen as overtly attrition oriented, rigid and rather wasteful of resources.

88. The Indian Army therefore has inherited all the shortcomings of the British way of war.
It is mentally primed 'to conduct careful campaigns with limited objectives'. It is more suited to
defence than the offensive. Fortunately the same is also true of the Pakistan Army, except that
there the American influence has been far stronger. In recent times the Indian Army has also
tried to assimilate American doctrinaires. However, 1971 provides a freak case when the Indian
Army unconsciously adopted the German style of war with resounding success. We need to
adopt this style of war with resounding success. We need to adopt this style of war on a
permanent basis.

Economic Independence and Military Dependency

89. India, for a period of nearly 90 years, formed a part of the British Empire. Indian security
was thus a concern of the empire and was handled from London. A noted Indian philosopher
observed, nearly 50 years ago, that the Indian elites had only dim awareness of 'that dark thing
called power'.28 This historical and other factors that prompted neglect of security dimensions
have already been dealt with in some detail earlier.

90. The neglect of security got further accentuated due to the non-availability of trained
personnel in the post-1947 period. The armed forces were officered by individuals who at best
had experience of handling small tactical units and therefore the prerogative of defence planning
devolved on the generalist administrator who had only a nodding acquaintance with matters
concerning national security.29 The passive defence policy, small size of the armed forces and the
appreciation that the major threat was internal and not external, all contributed to a policy or de
facto situation of general neglect. Amongst the political elite, notwithstanding some notable
exceptions, there was inadequate understanding of inter-linkages between power and
independence and between economic and political independence. The leadership also put greater
faith in diplomacy as a tool to achieve national security. While India produced many an
 73
economist, scientist or administrator of note, she failed to produce a strategic analyst. To some
extent this indicated the national priorities. 66

91. The Indian armed forces, due to historical reasons, have no formal role in decision-making
on matters concerning national security unlike their counterparts in the US, USSR, China or
France. There exists no institutional framework to take an integrated view of national security.30

The accumulation of all these factors has resulted in either crisis management by amateurs or
neglect of this dimension of the state policy. The situation did get somewhat rectified in the
aftermath of 196 clash with the Chinese. In the subsequent period, the military capability build
up did get a somewhat higher priority. However the weakness of decision making structure has
led to increased dependency on imported wares, imitative tactics and strategy and adhocism. The
short tenures of service chiefs also played a role. Long term planning got introduced in the
service headquarters only in 1985.67 Table IV, given below, shows the 17-year trend.

TABLE 2.1

Foreign Dependency: Major Equipment of Indian Armed Forces

(As percentage)

1970 1974 1979 1985 1987

36.6 52 40 49 59.5

Source: Relevant issues ofMilitary Balance published by ILSS, London.

a) All imported equipment is taken as foreign dependent but excludes domestic
production including the one under foreign licence.
(b) The data includes guns, tanks, aircraft and ships.

92. The huge territory and population of India was also thought to afford her natural
protection against external threat. It is no accident that 'Elephant' is the most commonly see
animal on Indian buildings, be they in east, west, north or south. At a deeper subconscious level
the Indians probably identify their country with elephant The behavioural traits are similar. Both
are vegetarian, non-aggressive and considered as powerful as the super powers of the animal
world, the lion and the tiger, yet never aspire for the king status. In the animal world as well, due
to its sheer size the elephant is feared-irrespective of its 'intent'. Mrs Indira Gandhi, a former PM,
when accused by western media of having become a Soviet puppet, often asserted that nobody
kept an elephant as pet. Mrs Gandhi, forever a 'realist', echoed the commonly held Indian
sentiment. 68

93. Desperate poverty of 1947 also led India to accord higher priority to socio-economic
development. The first Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, declared on the eve of independence
that the national goal was to wipe every tear from every eye. The primacy given to economic
 74
issues was also due to the them prevalent nation of guns versus butter dilemma', in resource
allocation. It was also thought that in due time, as India developed her economic muscle, it
would automatically provide the where withal for defence. The delicately poised super-power
balance and India's strategy of non-alignment, all led to reliance on diplomacy that was not
necessarily backed by strength and force.

94. The greater external threat was assessed to be 'neo-imperialism' effort went into attaining
economic independence. This has resulted in India becoming largely independent of external
markets. The table II, given below, shows the extent to which the India economy is free from the
vagaries of world market. 69

TABLE 2.2

India: Levels of Economic Independence

1960 1970 1980

Trade as % of GNP. /
(Imports + Exports) 13 9 15
Foreign Aid as % of GNP 1 2.8 1

Source : UN Book ofInternational Trade Statistics 1980-81.

94. There have been only marginal changes in recent times. In terms of independence, the
Indian economy is comparable with the other largely independent ones, i.e., China, USSR and
the US. By comparing these tables, it can be seen that while the defence dependency hovers
around 40 per cent, the economic dependency seldom exceeds 10 per cent.

95. Post Cold War Era. The fail of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War came as a
shock to an international system that had grown used to assessing a nation's strength in terms of
ships, tanks and nuclear warheads. The analysts had assumed that India's rise as a regional power
in the Indian Ocean was simply a manifestation of its gathering arsenal of sophisticated weapons.
Thus even pentagon predicted a near certain rise of India to power in the Indian Ocean region.
Indian polity was under stress, that India's traditional macroeconomic stability was being
dangerously eroded. Twenty Year Naval plan of 1978 for a 100 major vessels become
impossible to implement even in most favourable economic circumstances. China is one
emerging force in the Asia pacific region. India has been burdened by political chaos, economic
crisis and regional instability over the past decades. It was perceived by some that it was in the
danger of breaking up India stands mix of chance to assess its power wart, geopolitical and geo
strategy, quality of leadership, reservoirs national will, resource issues, societal pressures. These
are the only tools of 'strategic studies'. In today's fast moving world, only current analysis can
work. 70
 75
India as a Regional Power

96. India as a regional power - India lies at the heart of the subcontinent region , which in the
British period had been part of what Lao Rose had called' an integrated Foreign Policy System"
Rose argues that the primary purpose of India's policy has been to' to extract in some form or the
another, recognition of India's hegemonistic status in the region from both the major external
powers, and its neighbours in the region. However, although India ha undoubtedly sought a pre
eminent leadership position in South Asia, its ultimate objective has been self-protection rather
than aggressive or territorial expansionism. India's Foreign Policy with respect its immediate
neighbours has pursued almo9st entirely political rather than economic interests.

97. Selig S Harrison noted, "Despite its colossal economic development challenges and the
built-in political problems resulting from its distinctive character as a sub continent, multi
lingual Union, India has steadily consolidated its industrial and military power since winning
independence In 1947. India has largest industrial economy in the world and third largest pool of
engineers and scientists, makes own consumer good as well as industrial machinery. It exports a
wide range of industrial products form machine tools to power generation equipment, and builds
steel mills, oil refineries and fertilizer plants in third world countries. She has nuclear capability,
space satellite with own launch vehicle. She has forth largest armed forces in the world and has
integrated much of its military establishment with rapidly growing defence industries that have
achieved a significant degree of technology and self sufficiency. 71

98. . The current perception of Indian potential held by most Westerners is however in direct
contrast to the one held in 1942, on the eve of Japanese invasion of India. Kate Mitchell, alerted
the Allies to the danger of huge Indian potential falling in the Japanese hands: Nearly 3 billion
tonnes of very high grade iron ore, 30-60 billion. Tonnes of coal and huge skilled manpower.
She clearly brought home that the then current low level of industrialization in India had come
about due o the deliberate policy of de-industrialisation followed by the British. 26 The current

fashion of discounting Indian potential is probably due to a need to justify the current low power
status accorded to India as well as to influence Indian thinking about its own role in the world.

99. The marked Indian inability to convert this huge potential due to social, political and
structural causes is also a fact to reckon with. Steel industry in India symbolizes this vividly, In
spite of all the requisite raw material being available, India is not likely to be self-sufficient in
this strategic commodity even by the turn of the 20th century. In many other sectors of Indian
industry as well as agriculture a similar gap exists between huge untapped potential and meagre
capability. This further reinforces the external world's perception of Indian lack of will to power.

100. Destined to be a Power. Nehru said at the time of Independence, India has potential
to be a significant power which nations with smaller population do not. It has vast resources and
population which will always make a difference in the world. Fate has marked us fir big things'
 76
said. 72 But, 35 years after Nehru's death 'big things' have not eventuated. In military terms
India is not yet truly powerful beyond its immediate sphere of South Asia, and even its power in
that venue is contested. Nor is India a kind of global influence through soft power that might
be expected of such a large country. In terms of economic performance, many other Asian
nations, such as China, other mega-population of power, have been drawing away from India.
Thus, the more immediate question about India's rise to power tends to relate to the nature of
restraint on its power rather than to its potential.

101. Role of the US. US Moves were aimed at the Emasculation of India. After attaining
independence, India had fondly hoped that with US blessings, she could be allowed to proceed
on her chosen path of national development and regional prosperity. But .instead of that, she
was being confronted with an emerging nuclear threat on her Western frontier and a growing
strategic link-up with China that threatened to circumscribe India and subvert its territorial
integrity by constant nibbling.

102. China. Experts feel that the pressure from an important segment of the Indian strategic
milieu to come to terms with China is hardly congenial to bargaining. It is not without
calculation that Beijing has been indicating that it would want some concessions in the Eastern
sector as well as a departure from earlier package where it was understood that India would
relinquish or accept the Me Mohan line as the boundary in the East. 74 India's dilemma is how

to steer a course which will not come into direct conflict with China is westward expansion of
influence into gulf region, Also if India is to achieve its own destiny and if in the attainment of it
, conflict becomes inevitable, she must know how to handle the fallout of US- PAK- China
strategic consensus with in which Pak- China special relations have if anything, become more
important given China's modus vivendus with Iran. Does India knuckle under these growing
external compulsions and accept the status quo in which her territory, grabbed by aggression,
will remain in the hands of aggressors. That is hardly the way to attain respectability in the
community of the nations. Conversely, even while pursuing the path of negotiated settlement of
border disputes, India should be able to handle the major politico- military operations like the
externally supported Khalistan terrorism in Punjab and the Pak military encroachment in the
Siachin with out investing in their adventurous legitimacy by negotiating with Pak.

103. Pakistan. Analysts feel that Pakistan has a typical mindset of superiority over India. It is
obsessed with Kashmir and constantly looks for opportunities to teach India a lesson. Some
experts describe Pakistan as a failed state that could not reconcile to partition, for whom
partition is not yet complete since it got one third of what it initially bargained for. It has been
trying for parity with India, has built a national psyche to anti India, and longs to defeat India,
more so after 1971 war to avenge the humiliating defeat and dismemberment . Kashmir has
remained a sore issue which has been predicted the hottest flashpoint. It has improved its military
capability. There is a weaponisation of its society, the Islamic state of Pakistan has a serious
 77
problem of ethnic sub nationalism. The Pakistani society comprises of the dominant Punjabis,
the Sindhis, the Baluchis, Pashtuns and Mohajirs. The last four have destabilisation potential in
the order listed. The fundamentalist Talliban of Afghanistan could be another destabilising
factor. At times Karachi is predicted to be Beruit of ht subcontinent. Sind and possibly
Baluchistan could prove to be the Achilles heel of Pakistan. Pakistan has good relationship
with Afghanistan, Iran, US and China.

Indian Foreign Policy

104. In pre-independence era, India did not see any role in world politics. She has no goals and
no outlook towards global politics. India started with a more solid domestic foundation under
Nehru. Indira had no grand designs, no world vision that India should take. But she brought a
new measure of' pragmatism and flexibility ' to Indian foreign policy. There was emphasis on
security, territory and prestige in national interest. India showed the need of militaiy power and
the capability to use in 1971 war.75 Indira Gandhi's pragmatism and flexibility must be regarded

as her greatest contribution to India's Foreign Policy. She allied to grasp of tangible attributes of
power including military power. Her recognition of power as a crucial determinant in
international relations, was her main contribution in Indian foreign policy, Her government
acquired the military and economic sinews of modernisation, often equated with power. 77

105. India made discernible efforts to have its own superior position in the region recognised by
all other states concerned. In order to pursue these goals India tried to enhance its diplomatic and
economic capabilities. During Mrs. Gandhi's first term in office, Indian armed forced were
expanded in number and deployment, their equipment was increased and improved in terms of
quality and diversity of weapon systems. Indian Ocean exploration was undertaken in a big way.
Gradually, India became military power of consequence. In past 52 yrs India has had
faced four wars in first 25 yrs. Thereafter there has been a longer spell of peace. That is the
reason which enabled India to progress and emergence as a formidable power 80 Modernisation
and expansion of Indian army and Air Force was undertaken at a modest pace to make up for
their neglect during the 1950s and to deter China or Pakistan from repeating their respective
attacks of 1962 & 1965. 81

106. Kanti Bajpai outlines the future strategies for the new millennium. 82 How could this
country of nearly one billion people and one fifth of humanity conduct itself in the next several
decades? Emmanuel Kant insisted that it was vital to construct a preferred vision of the future
and to advance reasoned arguments about how the future might be attained. He advocates
cooperative security arrangements for ensuring peace. 83 In the 21st century, Indian leaders will
have to cultivate power with the long- term vision of a Nehru so that India's defences are
adequate, this will constitute an investment not only in Indian security but also in the
international system. Defence preparedness by itself is inadequate for the rigors of the new
balance of power inn the contest in international politics. Beyond non-alignment India will have
to exert herself in the Asia pacific to help manage the security dilemma. One way of monitoring
security dilemmas is through co-operative security arrangements. Co-operative security refers
minimally to a consensciously arrived at commitment on the art of the militarily most significant
states in the international system to regulate the size technical composition investment patterns
and the operational practices of their armed forces such that surprise attack and extended

offensive operations are implacable.

107. Track one and track two efforts important ASEAN regional forum in the most important
and active kernel of a cooperative security system for Asia pacific . India can encourage such a
system in the Asia Pacific by playing a vigorous role in ARF . Unfortunately its participation in
the groupings thus far appears passive and reactive this could be a mistake . India must use its,
presence in the forum to articulate its strategic perceptions and promote an agenda for
cooperative security in the extended region . If it doesn't do so the politics of vital area may
evolve in directions inimical to India's interest and to the stability of global system . Weapons of
mass destructions (WMD) threat persist. There is no seriousness regarding disarmament in the
international arena. India is a part of world capitalist system. India as fourth largest capital
economy will have an interest in an open trading and investment system which nevertheless
remains sensitive to time and circumstances. It will have to deal with WTO regime. Justifying
nuclear tests, Week said, India needs a nuclear deterrent so long as potential opponents,
regardless of their declared or perceived intentions, have a capability against this country. 84

India can no longer subsist as a reactive and invert looking power. It must stride back onto the
world stage and play its role fully and creatively. Varun Sahani feels that India has capacity to
become a global power. She has to avail the opportunities with appropriate strategy after
systematically evaluating threats and in consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of the
nation and its adversaries. 85

108. In keeping with change in emphasis towards competition worldwide, the Indian economy
f

is also being liberalised. With have a considerable effect on our thinking on defence and security,
on our arms procurement policies and co-operation with other countries. It is imperative that not
only the military establishment, but also the public at large, is kept informed of whatever steps
we take to ensure that our defence preparedness keeps pace with our economic progress.

109. Prior to Independence, the British in India had suffered from a mutiny syndrome. This
was a hand over from the 1857 Uprising. They had developed their counterpoise policy which
was reflected I their martial race theory, mixed class composition of combat units, resistance to
the process of Indianisation of the Armys officer cadre, counter-deployment of British troops
and so on. After Independence the decision makers at Delhi appear to be under the influence of a
coup syndrome. The civilian bureaucracy has taken advantage of the politicians baseless fears in
this regard and has been over active in isolating the Defence Services from decision-making.
This has led to grave distortions in our higher defence organisation. This is indeed a great irony.
 79
Over two millennia ago, India had the worlds first known higher defence organisation with
some very laudable features in it which obtaining in India is most irrational and inefficient. The
present higher defence organisation needs to be immediately restructured to provide for
integrated functioning, effective professional coordination and proper national security planning.
This brooks no delay. 86

110. India has now acquired considerable military and economic power. In the Rajiv Gandhi
era India had therefore witnessed a return to the universalistic, Nehruvian worldview. India has
once again started concentrating on global peace initiatives and larger international issues.
Unfortunately, in the meantime, the military consolidation in the subcontinent has been undone
by the revival of Pakistani as military power of regional consequence. It has acquired strategic
depth by its alignment with the Middle-Eastern fundamentalist states. It has adopted a highly
aggressive stance by supporting the Mujahideen insurgency in Afghanistan and aiding Sikh
terrorism in Punjab and subversive activities in Kashmir. Therefore, the moot question that must
be asked is, is it time for another military consolidation in the subcontinent, or is India strong
enough to ignore the geopolitical change in and around the subcontinent and adopt a
universalistic or internationalist platform once more? 87 India had achieved giant strides in

agriculture. It has changes from seasonal to three crops a year. The green and white
revolutions have made a definite economic impact. Earlier even a pin was imported, now
everything is being manufactured here- tanks, missiles and satellites. Indias technological base
has widened with her advanced nuclear programme, and indigenisation. It has made significant
progress in the field of oil exploration, educational and the latest information technology. Her
foreign policy of non-alignment was her own and she refused to be intimidated by big powers.
India has held independent view and followed with actions; and has survived. Her defence forces
are best in the world and are the most battle tasted having successfully fought world's highest
battlegrounds like Siachin. India has brighter prospects in future with a vast potential market,
vibrant democracy and sustained growth despite various constraints.

111. Conclusion. Two of unshakable realities of international politics are the primacy of
national self-interest and the importance of military power as a factor in international relations.
No government, however pacific-minded, has ever been able to rely solely upon the political
ethics of other states or upon its own diplomacy to deter direct attack or interference with its
external interests. Armies, therefore, have been a feature of every state in recorded history. It,
thus, becomes clear that ancient India had a rich cultural heritage with fundamental emphasis on
peace. Notwithstanding, they had organisation for defence, knew the art of war, tactics and
strategy. There was bravery, loyalty, and courage in abundance. Chanakya was the first to spell it
out clearly in the medieval era. However, his doctrines' were lost sight of in the years that
followed which allowed invasions to be successful. This led to foreign rule, in the later part of
the twentieth century. These are the darkest periods of our civilisation. 88
 80
112. The chapter traces out India's strategic thought, ancient past, pre independence and post
independence policies and patterns relating to security aspects and national defence. Indian
civilisation is the oldest surviving civilisation in the world, which is more than 1500 years old.
Indian cultural history dated back to the pre-Vedic period. India has a rich heritage which
includes besides all a strategies and defence heritage. India is known to have the largest known
standing army in the ancient times during the times of Chandragupta Maurya. The written
literature on this by Kautilyas Arhtashastra is considered a masterpiece Religions mainly
Hinduism and Buddhism had an impact on the Indian psyche to lead a righteous path and the
path of peace, mutual coexistence, tolerance and humility. In the later years and in the medieval
period India saw the downfall due to infighting, jealousy and disunity, which was exploited by
invaders, plunders. India was thus subjugated to Mughal rule and became a slave nation under
the British.
 81
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1 Tandon and Sahni, Military System in Ancient India, Macmillan and Co Ltd.
Madras, 1959, pp. 34-42.
2 Indra, Ideologies of War and Peace in Ancient India, Asia Publishing House, New
Delhi, 1960, pp. 78.
3 Jagdish Narayan Sarkar, Some Aspects of Military Thinking and Practice in Medieval
India, Ratna Prakashan, Calcutta, 1974, pp.45.
4 V Sivaramakrishnan, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan's, Cultural Heritage of India,
Mumbai, 1991, pp. 11
5 A A Athale An Enigma that is India: A Holistic view of National Security in Strategic
Analysis, April 1989, pp. 43.
6 Aditya Chibber, National Security Doctrine- An Indian Imperative, Lancer
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7 Jagdish Narayan Sarkar, op.cit. No. 3. pp.43.
8 Sardar Panikkar, Problems of Indian Defence, Asia Publishing House, New Delhi,
1960, pp.96
9 V R Ramchandra Dishtikar, War in Ancient India, Macmillan and Co Ltd. Madras,
1948, pp.31.
10 Ibid, pp. 33.
11 Ibid, pp.178.
12 CSR Year Book, 1989, Role of Armed Forces, Competition Success Review, New Delhi, S K
Sachdeva, 1989 , pp. 131.
13 Das S T, History ofAncient India, The World Press Ltd., 1955, New Delhi, pp. 33.
14 Ibid, pp. 33.
15 Sarva Daman Singh EJ Brill, EJB Tuta SUB Aegide Pallas, Ancient Indian Warfare
with Special Reference to The Vedic Period, 1965, pp.l and 169 .
is Ibid, pp. 39.
17 B K Majumdar, The Military System in Ancient India, The World Press Ltd., 1955,

New Delhi, pp. 65.

is Ibid , pp. 23.
19 CSR Year Book, op.cit. No. 14. pp. 131.
20 Rangrajan L N ed. Kautilya, The Arthashatra, Penguin Books, New Delhi, 1992,pp.
675-735.
21 Apurba Kundu, Militarism in India, The army and Civil Society in Consensus, Viva
Books Private Ltd, New Delhi, 1998, pp. 33.
22 Ibid, pp. 23.
23 Ibid, pp. 24.
24 Ibid , pp. 26.
 82

25 B K Majumdar, The Military System in Ancient India, The World Press Ltd., 1955. ,
pp. 33.
26 SN Sen, Military System of the Maratha, The World Press Ltd., 1955, New Delhi,
pp. 83.
27 Aditya Chibber, op.cit. No. 6. pp.45.
28 CSR Year Book , op.cit. No. 14. pp. 37.
29 Ibid, pp. 38
30 Strategic Analysis, Indian Security: A Historical Perspective, March 1989, pp. 1398.
31 Ibid, pp. 1400.
32 Ibid, pp. 1456.
33 Aditya Chibber, op.cit. No. 6. pp. pp. 93.
34 Ibid, pp. 13.
35 Ashok Kapoor, 50 Year of Democracy and Development, A P H Publishing, New
Delhi, 1998, university of waterloop. , pp. 33.
36 Lome J Kavic, Indias Quest for Security: Defence Policies, 1947-65, University of
California Press, Los Angeles, 1967, pp. 8 .
37 Ashok Kapoor, op.cit. No. 37. pp 50.
38 M S Raj an and S Ganguly ed., Sisir Gupta, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi,
1981,pp. 256.
39 V K Khanna, Foreign Policy of India, Vikas Publishing House PVT. Ltd., New Delhi
pp. 48.
Ibid, pp. 13.
41 Ibid, pp. 51
42 Ibid pp.43.
43 Ibid pp. 51.
44 Michel Brecher (Nehrus Biographer)- Indias foreign Policy; An interpretation,
Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1957, pp.45-76.
45 Suijit Mansingh, Indias Search for Power, Indira Gandhis Foreign Policy 1966-
1982, Sage Publications, New Delhi 1984, pp. 11.
46 Ibid, pp. 32.
47 Sandy Gordon, Indias Rise to Power, St. Martins press, Inc, New York, 1995, pp.
49.
48 Brahma Chellaney ed Securing Indias Future in the New Millennium under auspices
of Center for Policy Research, New Delhi, 1999, pp. 33.
49 Yitzhak Klein, Theory of Strategic Culture, Comparative Strategy, vol. 10, no 2, Jan-
Mar 1991, pp. 5.
50 Peter J Ketzenstein ed , The Culture of National Security : Norms and identity of
world politics, New York, Columbia university press, 1996, pp.56 .
 83

51 George Tanham, Indias Strategic Culture, The Washington Quarterly, Center for
Strategic Studies, 1991- Essay in New India Digest, no 75, vol. v/2, mar Apr 2000,
Pune, pp. 40 .
52
Ibid, pp.41.
53
Indian Strategic Thought. An Interpretive essay, Rand Corporation, R4207- USDP,
pp, 48 .
54
George Tanham, op.cit. No. pp.36.
55
Rodney W. Jones, Old Quarrels and New Realities: Security in Southern Asia After
the Cold War, The Washington Quarterly, 1992 , pp. 13.
56
Strategic Analysis, March 1989, pp. 1402.
57
Ibid, pp. 1435.
58
Ibid, pp. 1437.
59
A A Athale, op.cit. No. 5. pp. 1403.
60
Aditya Clubber, op.cit. No.6,_gp. 67.
61
Maj Gen Satinder Singh, PVSM, Strategy for Indian Defence, Lancer International,
New Delhi, 1986, pp.90.
62
Aditya Clubber, op.cit. No.6, pp. 123.
63
Ibid, pp 131.
64
Ibid, pp, 132.
65
Ibid, pp. 156.
66
Ibid , pp 45.
67
Strategic Analysis, March 1989, pp 1407.
68
Ibid, pp.1408.
69
Ibid, pp. 1409.
70
Surjit Mansingh, op.cit. No.46, pp.xix.
71
Ibid, pp. ix.
72
Ibid, pp.l.
73
Ibid, pp.3.
74
Ibid, pp.ll.
75
Iqbal Singh, Between Two Fires: Jawaharlal Nehru's Foreign Policy, Orient
Longman. New Delhi, 1970,jpp.70.
76
Ibid, pp.26.
77
Ibid, pp. 29.
78
S S Bhattachaiya, in Strategic Analysis, Oct 1991, Geo- Political Importance of
Indian Ocean, pp.802.
79
Ibid, pp 803.
80
Ibid ,pp 803.
81
R K Jasbir Singh, PVSM, India Defence Yearbook, Natraj Publishers, Dehradun, 01
Jan 1999, pp. 38.
 84

82 Lalit Mansingh, India's Foreign Policy - Agenda for the 21st Century, pp. 447 and
interview with K Bajpai.
83 Kanti Bajpai and Stiphen Cohen, Co-operative Security and South Asian Security in
Jannne Enolan ed. Global Engagement Co-operation and security in the 21st Century
, Washington D.C. the Brookings institutions 1994 page pp, 447.
The Week, Februaiy 7, 1999.
85 Ross Babbage & Sandy Gordon Ed, Indias Strategic Future: Regional State or
Global Power? St.Martins press, Inc, New York ,pp. 21.
86 Apurba Kundu, op.cit. No.23, pp. 80.
87 Adilya Chibber, op.cit. No.6, pp. 27.
88
Lome J Kavic, op.cit. No.38, pp. 8.