35. People vs. Bacang, 260 SCRA 44 which did not state any reason therefor.

On March 22,
Facts:
From the judgment of the RTC of Negros Oriental, in
Criminal Case No. 397-B, finding them and co-accused
Palacios guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and
sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and pay, severally, Php 200,000.00 and Php
25,000/00 as actual damages and for the funeral expenses,
and costs, accused Casido and Alcorin appealed to the
Supreme Court by filing a supplemental notice of appeal on
December 8, 1993. Appeal was accepted on December 7,
1994.
1996, court received a 1st indorsement informing the
Court that the accused-appellants were released on
conditional pardon on January 25, 1996.
On May 20, 1996 the court directed Superintendent
Venacio Tesoro to submit the certified true copies of the
Conditional Pardon and the release/discharge order.
Tesoso submitted the copies both signed by the President
on January 19, 1996 and certificates of discharge from
prison showing they were released on January 25, 1996.
Pardons were granted by virtue of the authority conferred
upon the President by the Constitution and upon the
recommendation of the Preside

On January 11, 1996, the court received an undated urgent

motion to withdraw appeal from the accused-appellants
ntial Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release, and Pardon.

Issues:
Whether or not conditional pardons can be extended to the
accused-appellants during the pendency of their instant
appeal.

Ruling:
No. In an earlier decision, People v Hinlo, the Court
declared the practice of processing applications for pardon
or parole despite pending appeals to be in clear violation
of law. In People v Salle, the court declared grant of
pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during
the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial
court shall be prohibited. Agencies/instrumentalities must
require proof that he has not appealed from his conviction
or that he has withdrawn appeal. And that the ruling fully
bind pardons extended after January 31, 1995 during the
pendency of the grantees appeal.

Conditional pardons granted in the case are void for

having been extended on January 19, 1996 DURING THE
PENDENCY OF THEIR INSTANT APPEAL.

Dispositive:
The accused-appellants urgent motion to withdraw appeal
is denied. Bureau of Corrections is directed to effect the re-
arrest of the accused-appellants Casido and Alcorin, who
shall be re-confined at the New Bilibid Prisons in
Muntinlupa within 60 days from notice thereof.

The court further resolves to require the officers of the

Presidential committee for grant of bail, release, and
pardon to show cause within 30 days why they should not
be held in contempt of court for acting on and favorably
recommending approval of the applications for the pardon
of the accused-appellants despite the pendency of their
appeal

Page 1 of 3
G.R. No. 116512. July 30, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
LEOPOLDO BACANG @ POLDO, Gerry Brako, and Arnold,
FRANCISCO PALACIOS, @ Minggoy & Joe, TATA DOE,
WILLIAM CASIDO @ Mario, and FRANKLIN ALCORIN y
ALFARO @ Arman, and REO DOE, accused.
WILLIAM CASIDO and FRANKLIN ALCORIN, accused-
appellants.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
From the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Negros Oriental, Branch 45 (Bais City), in Criminal Case
No. 397-B promulgated on 1 December 1993, finding them
and co-accused Francisco Palacios guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing each of them
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay,
severally, P200,000.00 and P25,000.00 as actual damages
and for funeral expenses, respectively, and costs,[1]
accused WILLIAM CASIDO and FRANKLIN ALCORIN
appealed to this court by filing a supplemental notice of
appeal on 8 December 1993.[2]
This Court accepted the appeal on 7 December 1994.[3]
On 30 June 1995, counsel for accused-appellants filed the
Appellants [sic] Brief.[4]
On 28 September 1995, the Office of the Solicitor General
filed the Brief for the Appellee[5] and asked for the
affirmance in toto of the appealed decision.
On 11 January 1996, this Court received an undated
Urgent motion to Withdraw Appeal[6] from accused-
appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin which,
however, did not state any reason therefor. At the lower
portion thereof is a 1st Indorsement, dated 5 January
1996, of Venancio J. Tesoro, Superintendent IV of the
Bureau of Corrections, referring the motion to this Court
with a claim that the legal effect [thereof] has been
adequately explained to the accused-appellant/s and that
the same is/are filed on his/their own free will.
On 28 February 1996, this Court required counsel for the
accused-appellants to comment on the urgent motion to
withdraw the appeal.
On 22 March 1996, this Court received a 1st Indorsement,
dated 18 March 1996,[7] from Superintendent Venancio J.
Tesoro informing this Court that accused-appellants
William Casido and Franklin Alcorin were released on
Conditional Pardon on January 25, 1996.
On 20 May 1996, this Court directed Superintendent
Venancio J. Tesoro to submit to this Court certified true
copies of the Conditional Pardon and the release or
discharge order.
On 29 April 1996, counsel for the accused-appellants filed
the required comment[8] on the urgent motion to
withdraw the appeal and the counsel offered no objection
thereto.
In a 1st Indorsement, dated 10 June 1996 but received on
14 June 1996, Superintendent Venancio J. Tesoro
submitted certified true copies of the conditional pardons
separately granted to accused-appellants William Casido
and Franklin Alcorin[9] both signed by the President on 19
January 1996 and of their certificates of discharge from
prison[10] showing that the said accused-appellants were
released from confinement on 25 January 1996 in view of
the grant of conditional pardon. These certificates stated
that the pardons were granted:
[b]y virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the
Constitution and upon the recommendation of the
Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release and
Pardon
It is then clear that the conditional pardons separately
extended to the accused-appellants were issued during the
pendency of their instant appeal.
In the resolution of 31 January 1995 in People vs.
Hinlo,[11] this Court categorically declared the practice of
processing applications for pardon or parole despite
pending appeals to be in clear violation of law.
Earlier, in our resolution of 21 March 1991 in People vs.
Sepada,[12] this Court signified in no uncertain terms the
necessity of a final judgment before parole or pardon could
be extended.
Having observed that the pronouncements in the
aforementioned cases remained unheeded, either through
deliberate disregard or erroneous applications of the
obiter dictum in Monsanto vs. Factoran[13] or the ruling in
People vs. Crisola,[14] this Court, in its resolution of 4
December 1995 in People vs. Salle,[15] explicitly declared:
We now declare that the conviction by final judgment
limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present
Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or
conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his
appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any
application therefor, if one is made, should not be acted
upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun
unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies
or instrumentalities of the Government concerned must
require proof from the accused that he has not appealed
from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal.
Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued by
the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an
abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of
an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of
sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal
shall render those responsible therefor administratively
liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must
not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of
the accused from confinement.
Page 2 of 3
xxx

This rule shall fully bind pardons extended after 31

January 1995 during the pendency of the grantees appeal.
(emphases supplied)

It follows then that the conditional pardons granted in this

case to accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin
Alcorin are void for having been extended on 19 January
1996 during the pendency of their instant appeal.

WHEREFORE, the accused-appellants Urgent Motion To

Withdraw Appeal is hereby DENIED and the Bureau of
Corrections is DIRECTED to effect, with the support and
assistance of the Philippine National Police, the re-arrest of
accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin
who shall then, forthwith, be reconfined at the New Bilibid
Prisons in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, both within sixty
(60) days from notice hereof, and to submit a report
thereon within the same period. In the meantime, further
action on the appeal is suspended until the re-arrest of the
accused-appellants.

The Court further resolves to REQUIRE the officers of the

Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release, and
Pardon to SHOW CAUSE, within thirty (30) days from
notice hereof, why they should not be held in contempt of
court for acting on and favorably recommending approval
of the applications for the pardon of the accused-
appellants despite the pendency of their appeal.

Let copies of this Resolution be immediately furnished the

Superintendent of the Bureau of Corrections and the
Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release, and
Pardon.

SO ORDERED.

Page 3 of 3