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Form vs. Matter


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Stanford Encyclopedia Aristotle famously contends that every physical object is a compound of
matter and form. This doctrine has been dubbed hylomorphism, a
of Philosophy portmanteau of the Greek words for matter (hul) and form (eidos or
morph). Highly influential in the development of Medieval philosophy,
Aristotles hylomorphism has also enjoyed something of a renaissance in
contemporary metaphysics.

While the basic idea of hylomorphism is easy to grasp, much remains


Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen R. Lanier Anderson unclear beneath the surface. Aristotle introduces matter and form, in the
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particularly interested in explaining how substances come into existence
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even though, as he maintains, there is no generation ex nihilo, that is that
Library of Congress Catalog Data nothing comes from nothing. In this connection, he develops a general
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hylomorphic framework, which he then extends by putting it to work in a
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SEP Society and obtain authorized PDF versions of SEP entries, as the reception of form without matter; and he suggests in the Politics
please visit https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/ . that a constitution is the form of a polis and the citizens its matter, partly
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The Metaphysics Research Lab Hylomorphism thus finds a range of applications across Aristotles corpus.
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Form vs. Matter and core commitments. There is in any case already a considerable
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Thomas Ainsworth controversy at this basic level about what Aristotle means by matter and
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Form vs. Matter Thomas Ainsworth

Aristotle intends to marshal arguments in support of them, and how best to Socrates, a substance, gains the property of being blue, or the property of
deal with reasonable objections to their metaphysical consequences. We weighing twelve stone. The other main kind of change is substantial
will begin by examining how Aristotle introduces his twin notions. Then change, whereby a substance comes into, or passes out of, existence. For
we will move on to discuss some of the most important interpretative example, when Socrates dies, or is born (or perhaps conceived, or
controversies: does Aristotle believe in so-called prime matter? Does somewhere in between conception and birth), a substantial change has
matter or form serve as the principle of individuation in his metaphysics? taken place.
Do natural forms include a specification of the kind of matter that anything
of that form has to have? Matter and form are required to account for this second kind of change, if
it is to conform to Aristotles general conceptual analysis of change. In
1. Matter and form introduced any change, he contends, there must be three things: (1) something which
2. Prime matter underlies and persists through the change; (2) a lack, which is one of a
3. The principle of individuation pair of opposites, the other of which is (3) a form acquired during the
4. Matter-involving forms course of the change (Physics i 7, 190a13191a22). Thus, for example, in
Bibliography an accidental change, the underlying thing is the substance which acquires
Primary Sources a new accidental property. For instance, when Socrates learns to play the
Secondary Sources flute, he transitions from a state of being unmusical (the lack) to a state of
Academic Tools musicality (the form). But for us to be able to say that there is something
Other Internet Resources which has changed, there must be something which remains the same
Related Entries throughout the change, and in this case the obvious candidate is Socrates,
who is one and the same person throughout his musical training.

1. Matter and form introduced In accidental changes there is always a substance to underlie the change,
but this is not true for substantial changes, since these involve the coming
Aristotle introduces his notions of matter and form in the first book of his to be or passing away of a substance (see the amusing remark of Irving
Physics, his work on natural science. Natural science is concerned with Copi, quoted at the start of the entry on identity over time ). In these cases,
things that change, and Aristotle divides changes into two main types: the thing that underlies is the matter of the substance. When someone
there are accidental changes, which involve concrete particulars, or builds a house, it is the bricks which persist through the change. They
substances (ousiai) in Aristotles terminology, gaining or losing a transition from a state of not being a house to acquire the property of being
property (see Categories 15, Physics i 7). For instance, the changes a house. Aristotle often uses the example of artefacts like houses, even
whereby Socrates falls in a vat of dye and turns blue, or puts on a few though he does not regard them as substances properly-speaking
pounds from excessive feasting during the Panathenaia, count as (Metaphysics vii 17, 1041b2830), because their matter is more
accidental changes (in the categories of quality and quantity, respectively). straightforward to identify. Nevertheless, the same analysis holds in the

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case of organisms, which are the substances proper: when an organism is We need to know what the thing is made of, and the answer to this
created or destroyed, when an acorn becomes an oak tree, or a human dies, question is the things matterbricks, in the case of a house; bodily
there must be some matter which persists through the change. To say organs in the case of a human being. Next we need to know what the thing
otherwise would be to say that things can come to be out of, or vanish is, or how it is defined, and the answer to this is the things form or
into, nothing, and Aristotle understandably agrees with his predecessor essence. We also need to know what made the thing come into existence,
Parmenides that this is impossible (Physics i 8, 191a23b17). Aristotles who or what created it, and this is the things efficient or moving cause.
metaphysics takes as its starting points observed phenomena, and seeks to Lastly, we need to know what the thing is for, what its purpose or function
preserve common sense beliefs where possible. We never experience isthe final cause. Now Aristotle observes that, although these are all
anything simply appearing or disappearing at random. distinct questions, in the case of the last three very often the same thing
will serve as the answer to all of them (Physics ii 7, 198a2427). A house
The word form may misleadingly suggest that what is acquired in a case is defined as a shelter of a certain sort (De Anima i 1, 403b37;
of substantial generation is simply a shape, and this impression is Metaphysics viii 3, 1043a2936). That is what a house is, i.e., its formal
reinforced by some of the examples that Aristotle uses, especially when cause, but it is also what a house is for, its final cause, since houses, like
focusing on artefacts: plausibly the form of a bronze statue just is its all artefacts are functionally defined. Similarly, a human being is defined
shape. When we consider organisms, however, it becomes apparent that as something which lives a certain kind of rationally-directed life. But, on
having the right shape is not sufficient to possess the form. A things form Aristotles view, this is also what a human being is for. The human
is its definition or essencewhat it is to be a human being, for example. A function is to live such a life (Nicomachean Ethics i 7, 1097b221098a20;
statue may be human-shaped, but it is not a human, because it cannot cf. De Anima ii 1, 412a622). As for the efficient cause, it is qualitatively,
perform the functions characteristic of humans: thinking, perceiving, although not numerically, identical with the formal cause, at least in the
moving, desiring, eating and growing, etc. The connection between a organism case, since human beings give birth to human beings, and the
things form and its function emerges in Physics ii 3, where Aristotle same goes for all other living things. Thus, even though Aristotle admits
distinguishes his four kinds of cause: material, formal, efficient, and final, four different kinds of cause, in a sense it is only really matter and form
and suggests a special connection between the formal and final cause. that play any ineliminable explanatory role in his system.

Here one needs to proceed cautiously, however, since it is sometimes said In fact, Aristotle does not simply focus on the case of artefacts because
that Aristotles word cause (aitia) would be better translated as their pre-existing matter is easier to identify. There is a particular issue
explanation (or explanatory factor, to avoid the implication that they here with the case of organisms, which arises out of Aristotles insistence
are linguistic items, as opposed to things-in-the-world). Certainly modern that a human being, for instance, is composed of a rational soul, which is
philosophers tend to use cause in a narrower way, which approximates the form, and an organic body, which is the matter (for further discussion
to Aristotles efficient cause. Aristotles idea is that there are four kinds of of this problem, see Ackrill 1972/73). It is characteristic of the matter of
thing that need to be mentioned in order to give a full account of the artefacts that numerically the same stuff which makes up one object can
nature of an object, each corresponding to a particular kind of question. later be used as the matter of another: for instance, when one melts down a

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bronze statue, and then molds it into some jewelry, it is the same bit of 1,734b2431). It seems as though he believes that a human beings matter
bronze throughout. It is crucial that a things matter can survive such must be contingently alive, so that it can serve as the underlying thing that
changes, if it is to play the role that Aristotle needs it to play in cases of remains when the human being comes into existence, but also that it must
substantial generation and destruction, as being the thing that underlies be essentially alive, because it is functionally defined. If so, he contradicts
such changes. If an artefacts matter only contingently has the form it has, himself.
the same does not obviously seem true of organisms. Unlike in the case of
a house built from bricks, it does not seem as though ones body predates The best way to resolve this apparent contradiction in Aristotles
ones existence, and so can serve as the underlying thing in a case of hylomorphism is to point out that an organism can have more than one
substantial generation. One might think that at least the body does exist level of matter. Aristotle believes that all sensible substances can be
after death, but in fact Aristotle would disagree. Instead, he insists that a analyzed into matter and form, but such an analysis is not restricted to the
dead body is only homonymously called a bodythat it is only things he calls substances. Matter can itself be divided into matter and
described as a body by extension, because it superficially resembles a form: for instance, bricks are made of clay, shaped into cuboid blocks.
living body (De Anima ii 1, 412b1025; Metaphysics vii 10, 1035b925). Again, clay has its own mattermud, sayand so on. Eventually, if one
It is not a real body, because it is incapable of performing the functions pursues this hierarchy of matter far enough downwards, Aristotle believes
normally associated with bodies, just as a statues eye, or an eye in a that one will reach the four elements, earth, air, fire and water. He agrees
painting, is not a real eye, because it is made of stone or paint, and thus with Empedocles that everything in the sub-lunar world is ultimately made
cannot serve the function that genuine eyes exist forseeing (for further up of different ratios of these four elements. Matter then should really be
discussion, see the supplement to the entry on Aristotles psychology on a understood as a relative notionit is always the matter of something.
fundamental problem about hylomorphism). Aristotle distinguishes between a things proximate matter, the stuff it is
most immediately made of, and its less proximate matter, i.e., the matter of
It might seem that Aristotle is rather going against ordinary linguistic its matter, or even further down the hierarchy, culminating in its ultimate
usage here, since we in fact regularly do refer to dead bodies as bodies. matter, the elements. The organic body which is a human beings
Whether a dead body is really a body might seem like a trivial linguistic proximate matter is essentially alive, but this need not apply to all of the
issue, which can simply be decided by fiat. The obvious way to resolve the other matter further down the chain. Aristotle distinguishes between
problem might seem to be simply to drop the insistence that the body homoiomerous and heteromerous parts (Parts of Animals i 1, 640b2530).
cannot exist without being coupled to a living human soul. Allowing that a Homoiomerous parts are stuffs, like bronze or flesh, which Aristotle
dead body remains the same body as its living counterpart will not help believes have no internal structure. Every part of a homoiomerous stuff is
the difficulty of what to say about the matter that predates the coming to the same as every other part, containing the same ratio of elements. This
be of the organism, when there is no apparent body, living or dead. What view of homoiomerous parts is consistent with Aristotles denial of
is more, Aristotle is deeply committed to his position that the human body atomism; he believes that matter, as well as space and time, are infinitely
is essentially ensouled, because of his view that things are defined by their divisible. The bodily organs, hands, feet, eyes, hearts, etc., are
functions (Meteorologica iv 12, 390a1015; Generation of Animals ii heteromerous, since they do have internal structure, with different parts of

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them made up of different stuffs. A persons hand, for instance, is made of element is, then, a compound of this matter and a form. This prime matter
flesh, bones, blood and other such biological matter, which in turn are is usually described as pure potentiality, just as, on the form side, the
made of earth, air, fire and water. It may be that flesh too is functionally unmoved movers are said by Aristotle to be pure actuality, form without
defined, so that dead flesh is only called flesh homonymously as well. any matter (Metaphysics xii 6). What it means to call prime matter pure
Even if nothing biological can exist when not alive, it seems clear that the potentiality is that it is capable of taking on any form whatsoever, and
elements at least must be able to do so. Therefore there will be some, low- thus is completely without any essential properties of its own. It exists
level matter to serve as the thing that underlies the coming to be and eternally, since, if it were capable of being created or destroyed, there
passing away of organisms, even though an organisms proximate matter would have to be some even lower matter to underlie those changes.
exists for precisely as long as it does. Because it is the matter of the elements, which are themselves present in
all more complex bodies, it is omnipresent, and underlies not only
2. Prime matter elemental generation and destruction, but all physical changes. As a
completely indeterminate substratum, prime matter bears some similarities
One obvious question pertains to how low such underlying levels might to what modern philosophy has called a bare particular (see Sider 2006),
go. In fact there is considerable controversy concerning how to conceive although, not being a particular, it may have more in common with so-
the bottom rung of Aristotles hierarchy of matter. Aristotle believes that called gunk (see Sider 1993).
everything is made of earth, air, fire and water. These elements are defined
by their possession of one of each of the two fundamental pairs of A similar idea is to be found in Platos Timaeus, 4952, where, in addition
opposites, hot/cold and wet/dry. Aristotle also thinks that these elements to his Forms and the particulars which instantiate them, he argues for the
can change into one another (On the Heavens iii 6, 305a1435). If his existence of a third category of thing, a receptacle of all coming to be
analysis of change is correct, when some water changes into some air, (49a56):
there must be something underlying, some substrate, which persists
it must always be called by the same term. For it does not depart
through the change, initially having the essential properties of water
from its own character at all. It both continually receives all things,
(being wet and cold, on Aristotles view) and then later those of air (being
and has never taken on a form similar to any of the things that
wet and hot). The thing that underlies this kind of change cannot be any of
enter it in any way. For it is laid down by nature as a recipient of
the elements, since it must be capable of possessing the properties
impressions for everything, being changed and formed variously
characteristic of each of the elements successively, capable of being first
by the things that enter it, and because of them it appears different
cold and then hot, for example. The traditional interpretation of Aristotle,
at different times. (50b6c4)
which goes back as far as Augustine (De Genesi contra Manichaeos i 57)
and Simplicius (On Aristotles Physics i 7), and is accepted by Aquinas Plato also motivates his receptacle by appealing to the phenomenon of the
(De Principiis Naturae 13), holds that Aristotle believes in something elements changing into one another, and, although he refers to it as
called prime matter, which is the matter of the elements, where each

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space and not matter, the traditional interpretation has it that, as he general would be perhaps water, if everything that can be melted is
often does, Aristotle has adopted an idea first developed by his mentor. water). (1015a710)

More recently, opponents of attributing a doctrine of prime matter to Here Aristotle is referring to his predecessor Thales view that everything
Aristotle have complained that there is insufficient evidence for his is ultimately made of water, which he in fact rejects.
holding this kind of view, and that it is so philosophically unappealing that
principles of charity militate against it as an interpretation. Such scholars In other passages too Aristotle seems to leave the question of whether or
point out that Aristotle actually criticizes Platos account from the not there is prime matter deliberately open. In Metaphysics ix 7, he uses a
Timaeus, in On Generation and Corruption ii 1: conditional to talk about the possibility:

what Plato has written in the Timaeus is not based on any it seems that what we call not this, but that-enfor example, we
precisely-articulated conception. For he has not stated clearly call the box not wood, but wooden, nor do we call the wood earth,
whether his Omnirecipient exists in separation from the but earthen, and again earth, if it is this way, we do not call
elements; nor does he make any use of it. (329a1315) something else, but that-enthat is always potentially without
qualification the next thingBut if there is something primary,
Although Aristotle is clearly criticizing Plato here, it may be that his point which is no longer called that-en with respect to something else,
is simply that Plato was not sufficiently clear that prime matter is never to this is prime matter. For example, if earth is airy, and air is not fire
be found existing apart from the elements, and that he did not give good but firey, fire is prime matter, being a this. (1049a18222427)
enough reasons for its introduction, not that he was wrong to believe in it.
Here Aristotle uses the generic adjective that-en (ekeininon), a word that
In this connection it is appropriate to note that Aristotle does in fact use he coins, to mean made of that material. If a material could not be so
the expressions prime matter (prt hul) and primary underlying described, it would be prime matter. Again, he shows himself aware of
thing (prton hupokeimenon) several times: Physics i 9, 192a31, ii 1, prime matter as a possibility, without wanting to commit to it here.
193a10 and 193a29; Metaphysics v 4, 1014b32 and 1015a710, v 6,
1017a56, viii 4, 1044a23, ix 7, 1049a247; Generation of Animals i 20, Another key passage where Aristotle has been thought to commit himself
729a32. The mere fact that he uses the phrase is inconclusive, however, more decisively to prime matter is Metaphysics vii 3. Here we are told:
since, he makes it explicit that prime matter can refer either to a things
By matter I mean that which in itself is not called a substance
proximate matter or to whatever ultimately makes it up:
nor a quantity nor anything else by which being is categorized. For
Nature is prime matter (and this in two ways, either prime in it is something of which each of these things is predicated, whose
relation to the thing or prime in general; for example, in the case of being is different from each of its predicates (for the others are
bronze works the bronze is prime in relation to them, but prime in predicated of substance, and substance is predicated of matter).
Therefore this last is in itself neither substance nor quantity nor

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anything else. Nor is it the denials of any of these; for even denials some water vanishes into nothing, and is instantly replaced by some air
belong to things accidentally. (1029a2026) which has materialized out of nothing?

Although the word prime does not occur here, Aristotle is evidently The main philosophical objections to prime matter are that it is, at best, a
talking about prime matter. A natural way to read this passage is that he is mysterious entity that we cannot know anything about, since we never
saying there is a wholly indeterminate underlying thing, which he calls perceive it directly, but only the things it underlies. Of course, there can be
matter, and it is not a substance. Those who wish to avoid attributing a good theoretical reasons for believing in things that we never actually see.
doctrine of prime matter to Aristotle must offer a different interpretation: No one has ever seen a quark, but we can still know things about them,
that if we were to make the mistake of regarding matter, as opposed to based on the kind of theoretical work that they are required to perform.
form, as substance, we would be committed (absurdly) to the existence of Still, Aristotles theory will be more parsimonious, if he can manage
a wholly indeterminate underlying thing. without positing such theoretical entities. At worst, prime matter is said to
be outright contradictory. It is supposed to be capable of taking on any
In addition to disputing the correct interpretation of these passages where form whatsoever, and thus to have no essential properties of its own. The
Aristotle explicitly mentions prime matter, much of the debate has idea that it has no essential properties of its own seems to make it difficult
centered around, on the one hand, whether what he says about change for us to characterize it positively in any way: how can it be invisible, or
really commits him to it, on the other, whether the idea is really absurd. eternal, or the ultimate bearer of properties, if these are not properties that
Some opponents of prime matter have argued that Aristotle does not, after belong to it essentially? Moreover, if it is what ultimately underlies all
all, wish to insist that there is always something which persists through a properties, it seems that it must be able to take on properties that are
change (see Charlton 1970, Appendix, and 1983). In particular, when one inconsistent with what we would like to be able to think of as its own
of the elements changes into another, there is an underlying thingthe nature: when Socrates turns blue, there is also some prime matter that
initial elementbut in this case it does not persist. They point out that in underlies him, which also turns blue. But how can prime matter be
the key passage of Physics i 7, where Aristotle gives his account of change simultaneous invisible and blue? To get around these problems, it looks as
in general, he uses the expressions underlying thing and thing that though proponents of prime matter will have to distinguish between two
remains. While readers have usually supposed that these terms are used different kinds of property that prime matter has, or perhaps two different
interchangeably to refer to the substance, in cases of accidental change, ways in which it has properties. There are its essential properties, which
and the matter in substantial changes, this assumption can be challenged. define the kind of entity that it is, and which it has permanently, and then
In the elemental generation case, perhaps there is no thing that remains, there are its accidental properties, which it gains and loses as it underlies
just an initial elements that underlies. The worry about this interpretation different sorts of thing. A worry about this solution is, if one can
is whether it is consistent with Aristotles belief that nothing can come to distinguish between the prime matter and its essential properties, this
be out of nothing. If there is no thing that remains in a case of elemental might suggest that there is a need for a further entity to act as the
generation, how is an instance of water changing into air to be underlying thing for those properties, and then this further entity would
distinguished from the supposedly impossible sort of change whereby need to have its own nature, and something to underlie that nature, and so

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on. It seems best to try to avoid such an infinite regress by insisting that a single whole, and he is a numerically distinct individual from Callias
prime matter can underlie its own essential properties, without being a because his matter is numerically distinct from Callias matter.
compound of those properties and some further matter.
It has become conventional to call an answer to Lukasiewiczs problem a
3. The principle of individuation principle of unity, and an answer to Anscombes problem a principle of
individuation. The traditional view has been that individuation is a
Another reason that some scholars have thought that Aristotle needs metaphysical issue: what is it that makes one individual different from
something like prime matter is to serve as a so-called principle of another (of the same kind)? However, some scholars have argued that
individuation. While the predominant view has been that this role is Aristotle at no point addresses this issue, but is instead concerned with the
reserved for matter, other scholars have maintained either that Aristotle epistemological question of how we tell one individual from another (see
means it to be form, or that he does not see the need for a principle of Charlton 1972).
individuation at all. Some of this controversy seems to have resulted from
It is worth considering why one might think that the metaphysical issue is
a failure to be clear about what a principle of individuation is, or what
not worth pursuing. The obvious reason is if one thought that there was no
problem it is supposed to solve.
answer to the question what makes this individual numerically distinct
To see why this is so, one may focus on a controversy about individuation from that one?that nothing makes them distinct, they just are. An
which Popper sought to dissolve, by pointing out that it derived from a advocate of this view might point out that even if we accept that matter is
false opposition. This was a controversy begotten by a disagreement what makes this individual distinct from that one, we still have no answer
between Anscombe and Lukasiewicz regarding the principle of to the question what makes this portion of matter numerically distinct
individuation in Aristotle (see Anscombe et al. 1953). Popper points out from that one?. There will always be certain of these numerical
that their disagreement is only apparent, due to the fact that they are distinctness facts that remain unexplained on any theory. But if
answering different questions: Lukasiewicz insists that form should be explanation has to stop somewhere, why not stop at the beginning? Why
counted as the source of individuality because it explains how a thing not just say that it is a bare fact that Socrates is numerically distinct from
with many parts is a single individual and not a plurality, it accounts for Callias, and leave matter out of it?
the unity of individuals. He has in mind questions like How do all these
One might think that one could respond to this argument by insisting that
bricks constitute a single house? or What makes this collection of flesh
there is an answer to the question what makes Socrates matter
and bones Socrates?, and here Aristotle does indeed appear to make use
numerically distinct from Callias matter: it is the matter itself. If matter
of form. On the other hand, Anscombe says that it is matter which makes
can explain the distinctness of individual substances, why should it not
an individual the individual it is, numerically distinct from other
also explain its own distinctness from other matter? Whether or not this
individuals of the same (and other) species. Yet this is an issue about
move is legitimate will depend on which facts are and which facts are not
numerical distinctness rather than unity. It is perfectly consistent to say
in need of explanation but may correctly be assumed to be primitive. The
that Socrates is one man because of his form, which unifies his matter into

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problem is that this matter is distinct from that matter because it is this According to the traditional interpretation, here we have the claim that x
matter seems to be a very similar sort of explanation to Socrates is and y are numerically identical (or one in number) if, and only if, they
distinct from Callias because he is Socratesboth are cases of x have the same matter (or the matter of x is one with the matter of y). An
explaining its own distinctness from y. Either both should count as alternative reading takes this passage to be about unity rather than
adequate explanations or neither should. But the advocate of matter as individuation: Aristotle would be saying that x is numerically one if and
principle of individuation adopted this view precisely because she found only if xs matter is one, where a things matter being one means that it
this sort of explanation unsatisfactory, or not an explanation at all. is one continuous piece (of bone, for example).
Therefore this response does not seem to be open to her.
The second important passage for detecting Aristotles views about
It seems that those who are committed to there being something which individuation comes at vii 8, 1034a58:
accounts for the numerical distinctness of individuals must say that there
is nothing that accounts for the numerical distinctness of the distinctness- And when we have the whole, a form of such a kind in this flesh
makers. The only alternative would be to introduce some further thing to and in these bones, this is Callias or Socrates; and they are
account for their distinctness, and so on; but this results in an infinite different in virtue of their matter (for that is different), but the same
regress, which, as well as being ontologically bloated, appears to be in form, for their form is indivisible.
vicious, since we can never grasp the full account of what makes Socrates
According to the traditional interpretation, these lines are saying that
and Callias distinct. Both sides agree that explanation must stop
Socrates and Callias are numerically distinct because of their matter, not
somewhere, but they differ over where it is appropriate to stop: is it a
their form, and on the face of it this is the clearest example of Aristotle
basic, inexplicable fact that Socrates is numerically distinct from Callias,
affirming that matter is the principle of individuation. We can adopt an
or that their matter is distinct? (See Markosian 2008, 8, for a
alternative reading, however, if we suppose that different means not
contemporary discussion of this question.) At any rate, even if it is
numerically distinct, but qualitatively different. In that case, the passage
difficult to prove that there is an important metaphysical question here, the
could be making an epistemological claim about how we discern Socrates
traditional interpretation of Aristotle is that he thinks there is.
and Callias: suppose Callias is pale and Socrates dark; they are different,
There are two main texts which have been thought to show Aristotle but not different in form; they differ because of their matter, since pallor
advancing the view that matter is the principle of individuation: and darkness primarily qualify their skin, i.e., part of their body.
Metaphysics v 6, 1016b312, and vii 8, 1034a58. In the first of these, we
There is a difficulty for the idea that matter can act as the principle of
are told:
individuation, which arises out of the following problem that can be raised
Moreover, some things are one in number, some in form, some in for Aristotles hylomorphism (see Fine 1994). It seems that two
genus, some by analogy; in number those whose matter is one substances, e.g., Socrates and Callias, may have numerically the same
matter at different times; that it is possible (however unlikely) for all and

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only the particular elements that now compose Socrates to end up proximate matters are different. We can redescribe the situation so that not
composing Callias at some later date. In such a case, Socrates and Callias only are Socrates and Callias forms the same, but the forms of their
would have the same matter, albeit at different times. Moreover, both bodies are also the same, and the forms of the matter of their bodies, and
being human beings, they would have the same form. But they themselves so on all the way down. Although it is unclear what in general is required
are compounds of matter and form, so if their matter and form are for the matter of two things of the same form to have the same form, e.g.,
numerically the same, they must themselves be numerically the same. for Socrates and Callias bodies to have the same form, it seems
reasonable to suppose that it is sufficient for two things to have the same
Put schematically, the argument looks like this: form that they be qualitatively the same. So we can ensure that Socrates
and Callias matters have the same form, if we suppose that they are
1. It is possible that Socrates and Callias be composed of numerically
qualitatively the same. One might insist that no two things are
the same matter (albeit at different times).
qualitatively the same, but there is little reason to think that Aristotle is
2. Socrates and Callias have the same form.
committed to Leibnizs doctrine of the identity of indiscernibles. What is
3. Socrates and Callias are compounds of matter and form.
more, although strict qualitative identity, i.e., having all the same non-
4. Therefore, it is possible that Socrates and Callias are numerically the
relational and relational properties, may require demanding metaphysical
same.
assumptions such as an eternally cyclic universe, probably all that is
Of course two different people cannot be numerically the same. So, if the required is that there be no relevant qualitative difference between
argument is valid, at least one of its premises must be false. Socrates and Callias, where relevant means such as to result in them or
their matter having different forms. While one might insist that two things
One possible rejoinder to this argument is that it turns on an equivocation must be qualitatively the same to have the same form, this also does not
in the meaning of matter. As we have seen, for Aristotle matter comes in seem to be Aristotles view. So if we tailor our example to this
different levels. In the situation envisaged Socrates and Callias would requirement, we can thwart the charge of equivocation. The argument then
have the same remote or low-level matter (the same elements) but they is valid, so we must choose one of its premises to reject.
might still have different proximate matter, since the proximate matter of a
human being is his body. Since a substance is a compound of a substantial One might try to reject the first premise of the argument, on the grounds
form and some proximate matter, we are not entitled to conclude that that a persons matter is essential to them. We have seen that Aristotle
Socrates and Callias are the same. Although this may be an effective way plausibly does believe this about a persons proximate mattertheir body
of dealing with the initial problem, it can be restated so as to avoid this since a dead body is only homonymously a body. Nevertheless, he is
objection that the argument equivocates on matter. Each level of matter committed to their more remote matterthe elements that make them up,
is a compound of the matter at the level immediately below it and a form. for instancebeing capable of existing independently of them. He needs
If the proximate matter of two things is to be different, despite their lower- there to be something to underlie the change whereby a substance comes
level matter being the same, the reason must be that the forms of the into or goes out of existence, to make it consistent with his account of
change in general in Physics i 7. There seems to be no reason to deny that,

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when a tree, for instance, dies, the earth, air, fire and water that constituted A final reaction to the argument would be to reject the third premise, the
it still exist in the dead stump. But, if so, there seems no reason to think idea that anything enmattered is a compound of its matter and form at a
they could not leave the stump, and end up becoming the matter of some given time. Certainly the most straightforward way of understanding
new tree. This is all that is needed for the problem to arise. Prime matter, hylomorphism is that the compound is compounded of the things matter
if it exists, will not help: if the elements are allowed to escape the and form at a particular time, and the relation between the compound and
substances that they underlie, it seems that the prime matter that underlies the thing is identity. This way of understanding composition is not only
them should also be capable of doing so. It is supposed to be capable of problematic because it leads to the problem currently under discussion:
underlying anything; so insisting that it is confined to being the prime assuming that things can change their matter, we might well also wonder
matter of a particular sort of thing makes no sense. (a) how just one of the matters, which it has at a particular time, can yield
the whole thing, and (b) how different matters at different times can yield
A more promising option is to reject the second premise of the argument, the same thing. An alternative way to understand compounding would be
that co-specific or relevantly similar things like Socrates and Callias must to say that a thing is the compound of its form and all the various matters
have a common form. This one might reject if one were a believer in that it has at different times: X = F(m1, m2 , mn), where m1 mn are
particular forms. The question of whether Aristotles forms are particular Xs proximate matters in order of temporal occurrence. This would solve
or universal has garnered a huge amount of scholarly attention (those in worries (a) and (b) above, since now all the different matter-slices are
favour of particular forms include Sellars 1957, Frede 1978, and Irwin incorporated into the one object. It does not obviously help with the
1988; those in favour of universal forms include Albritton 1957, Lewis problem at hand, however, since, if it is possible for Socrates and Callias
1991, and Loux 1991). If Aristotle believed in universal forms, he could to have the same matter at a time, there seems to be no barrier to them
have constructed particular forms out of some kind of indexed version of having exactly the same sequence of matter-slices throughout their lives
the universal (e.g., an ordered pair of the universal form and the thing (provided that they are not born at the same time, and live to exactly the
which had it); but that would make the identity of the particular form same age).
dependent on that of the substance that had it. Since it is the substances
form which is acting as principle of individuation, if the common form Finally, one could relativize the concept of a compound to a time:
premise is rejected, particular forms cannot be individuated by the enmattered objects are absolutely identical to compounds, but a compound
substances that have them, on pain of circularity: what makes Socrates is not absolutely a compound of matter and form, but only relative to a
different from Callias is that they have different forms; and what makes particular time. X = Ft (m) , where m is the proximate matter of X at t; or,
their forms different is that one belongs to Socrates, the other to Callias. combining this idea with the previous one, X = Ft (m1 mn ) , where t is
To play this role, particular forms would have to be defined independently the period of time for which X exists, and m1 mn are its matters in order
of the things that have them. It would be a particular form which combines of occurrence. This solution does deal with the problem directly, since
with a things matter to make it the thing that it is. Some scholars find this Socrates and Callias can have the same form and matter, and yet be
conception of particular forms problematic. different compounds because the times are different. There may also be a
modal version of the puzzle: Socrates is such that his matter and form

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could be identical with those of Callias at a certain time. This puzzle might improbably) be composed of the numerically same stuff at different times.
be solved by also relativizing compounds to worlds. It is not so obvious that Aristotle sees the need to address the second
question, but, if his forms are particular, not universal, he is in a good
There is an exegetical problem with ascribing this final way of position to do so.
understanding composition to Aristotle, and that is that it apparently
conflicts with the view that he expresses in Metaphysics viii 6, 1045a710, 4. Matter-involving forms
and vii 17, 1041a26, that a form is what unifies a compound. The problem
is how to understand the role of the time in the unification of the As we have seen, Aristotle introduces matter and form as contrasting
compound by the form: it cannot be just another element to be unified, for notions, distinct causes, which together make up every ordinary object. It
the time at which the matter exists does not figure as a part of the resulting may come as a surprise, then, to find that he makes comments which
unity. If we try to make the form unify a given portion of matter into many suggest that matter and form are more intimately intertwined than is
different things, depending on what time the unifying takes place at, we obviously required by the manner of their introduction. It is worth noting
also run into the difficulty that such a process no longer seems worthy of in this regard that he is eager to distance himself from Platos theory of
the title unification, since the result is many objects, not just one. Indeed Forms, which exist quite apart from the material world. He does so in part
we can reformulate the problem without mentioning composition at all: if by insisting that his own forms are somehow enmeshed in matter
a common form must unify common matter into one and the same thing, (Metaphysics vi 1 and vii 11, and De Anima i 1). He also maintains that all
and Socrates and Callias have the same form and the same matter, they are natural forms are like something which is snub, where something is snub
one and the same. Since Aristotle (and many neo-Aristotelians) would only if it is concavity-realized-in-a-nose (Physics ii 2; cf. Sophistical
surely be unwilling to give up the unifying role of form, this does not look Refutations 13 and 31). The purport seems to be that all natural forms are
like a viable solution. such that they are themselves somehow material beings, or at least that
one must mention matter in their specification. Consequently, some
We have seen that there are some textual reasons to think Aristotle makes
scholars have been inclined to suppose that a things form itself contains a
matter his principle of individuation; but in fact particular forms are better
specification of the matter which anything with that form has to have (see
suited to play this role. We need to distinguish between two different
Balme 1984, Charles 2008, Peramatzis 2011). If so, rather than being
questions, one about unification, the other about individuation: (i) what
contrasted with matter, forms will be themselves somehow intrinsically
makes this giraffe (or this giraffe-matter) one and the same giraffe (over
material. Other scholars have been disinclined to draw this inference, not
time)? (ii) what makes this giraffe distinct from that one? The first
least because it seems to result in an unhappy conflation of the separate
question seems to be the one which Aristotle addresses in Metaphysics vii
roles that matter and form are meant to play in Aristotles metaphysics
17, and does not obviously require an answer that is unique to the giraffe
(see Frede 1990).
in question. Giraffeness in general may well suffice. The answer to the
second question, however, cannot be the universal species, since it is The passage in the Metaphysics where Aristotle most obviously addresses
common to both giraffes, nor can it be their matter, since they could (albeit this question is vii 11. He begins the chapter by asking what sorts of thing

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are parts of the form, and which are not, but are parts of the compound We might hope that Aristotles view about whether flesh and bones are
(1036a267). He first discusses the case of things which are realized in part of the form of man will become clearer later in the chapter.
multiple different sorts of matter: a circle may be realized in bronze or Unfortunately, the relevant passage is also open to multiple interpretations.
stone; so it is clear that its matter, bronze or stone, is not part of the form The chapter goes on to describe how
of the circle, since it is separate from them (1036a334). We are then told
that, in the case of things which are not seen to be separate, nothing some people are in doubt even in the case of the circle and the
prevents the same considerations from applying to them, even if all the triangle, on the grounds that it is not right to define them in terms
circles that had been seen were bronze (1036b1). of lines and continuity, but that these too should all be spoken of in
the same way as flesh and bones of man and bronze and stone of
Having considered the case of circles, Aristotle moves on to consider the statue. (1036b812)
form of a man, and to ask of flesh and bones, Are these too parts of the
form and definition? (1036b5). Some interpreters understand the next Presumably these thinkers object to lines and continuity being parts of the
sentence to contain Aristotles answer: definitions of circle and triangle on the grounds that they are matter,
comparing them to other sorts of matter that are obviously inadmissible in
In truth no, they are the matter; but, because the form is not also definitions. Aristotle criticizes this line of thought, which suggests that
in other sorts of matter, we are unable to separate them. (1036b5 maybe he does think that certain sorts of matter or at least matter-like
7) concepts are admissible in definitions. However, the fact that he groups
flesh and bones with bronze and stone as the sort of matter that is
Rendered thus, the text suggests that, as in the circle case, flesh and bones obviously inadmissible suggests that he does not think that they are parts
are not part of the form of man. However, other editors, especially those of the form of man.
friendly to matter-involving forms, print this sentence as a question, so
that it reads The impression so far is seemingly contradicted a bit later, when we are
told:
Or are they rather matter; but because the form is not also in
other sorts of matter, we are unable to separate them? And therefore to reduce everything in this way and to take away
the matter is futile: for surely some things are this form in this
This second way of understanding the sentence, though it does not require matter or these things is this state; and the comparison in the case
it, leaves open the possibility that Aristotles answer will be that, unlike in of animal, which Socrates the Younger used to make, is not a good
the circle case, flesh and bones are indeed part of the form of a man. Since one; for it leads away from the truth, and makes one think that it is
punctuation marks are a later invention, it is impossible to be certain possible for man to exist without his parts, as the circle can without
which reading Aristotle intended. The sentence, as it stands, is bronze. (1036b228)
inconclusive.

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Here Aristotle would seem to be referring back to the earlier comparison undergone by natural compounds, the claim is that they must themselves
between the flesh and bones of a man and the bronze or stone of a statue at be matter-involving. For example, the property of falling downwards
1036b11, and claiming that the comparison misleadingly suggests that when unsupported is one had by all human beings. Aristotle would explain
flesh and bones are not part of the form of a man, when in fact they are. this propensity as being due to their being made of a preponderance of the
heavier elements, earth and water. If the form of a human being is to
That anyway is how those in favour of matter-involving forms take this account for this fact, plausibly it will have to make mention of the material
passage, but there is another possible reading. Instead of failing to realize constitution of human beings that results in this sort of characteristic
that human beings, unlike circles, are essentially realized in flesh and behaviour.
bones, and as such these must be included in their form, Socrates the
Youngers mistake might have been his paying insufficient attention to the In assessing this argument, a lot seems to depend on how extensive an
fact that circles, being mathematical objects, need not be instantiated in explanatory role can be assigned to hypothetical necessity (cf. Physics ii
any specific kind of matter at all, whereas human beings always are. If this 9). All human beings have a tendency to fall, necessarily, at least in a
is the mistake that Aristotle is identifying, this passage would not support world with laws of physics like ours. However, it is not so clear whether
any sort of matter-involving forms, but only the view that natural forms, this characteristic sort of change is one which must be explained by the
like the form of a man, are always instantiated in matter of certain sorts. form or essence of a human being, as opposed to his matter. After all,
Even if the forms were necessarily so instantiated, this would not require there are lots of other sorts of thing, both living and inanimate, which
that the matter be included in the specification of the things form. share this particular characteristic. Supposing there was a characteristic
sort of change peculiar to all and only human beings, even then it is not
There are other texts, which have been used to argue directly for the view obvious (a) that this fact has to be explained by the essence of a human
that Aristotle embraces matter-involving forms: De Anima i 1, where being, and (b) that its explanation will require the essence to be matter-
Aristotle describes anger as desire for retaliation manifested in boiling of involving. To be sure, we would like some explanation of why this sort of
the blood around the heart; or Physics ii 2, where he says that natural change is peculiar to this sort of creature, but it might simply be a fact
forms are analogous to snubness, i.e., concavity realized in a nose. about the world that anything with an essence of this sort has to change in
Defenders of pure forms can attempt to deal with these passages by this sort of way, without that change being something that is specified
distinguishing between a pure form, and a broader definition (logos, within the essence itself.
horos, horismos) which brings in other causes.
In this connection it is important to notice that Aristotle recognizes the
As well as purely textual arguments, several more philosophical existence of idia, that is of properties that apply to all and only instances
motivations have been proffered in favour of matter-involving forms. One of a given species, which an instance of that species has necessarily, but
such argument relies on the fact that natural things, unlike mathematical which are not part of its essence: e.g., all and only human beings are
ones, are subject to change. Only things with matter are capable of change, capable of laughter (cf. Categories 5, 3a21, 4a10; Topics i 5, 102a1830,
and, if natural forms are to account for the characteristic changes and v 5, 134a5135b6). The essence of a human being is rationality, and

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the fact that we all (apparently) have a sense of humour follows from the A serious objection to position (4) is that it apparently leads to a vicious
essence together with how the world is. Many characteristic changes of infinite regress: if a compounds essence or form is itself a compound of
organisms may be best explained in a similar way: all ducks waddle, but matter and form, and this second form has an essence or form which is
waddling is not part of their function. Rather anything that fulfils the also a hylomorphic compound, etc., every compound will have an infinite
functional requirements of a duck must (in a world like ours) walk series of essences or forms associated with it. Socrates is (essentially) a
inelegantly. compound of matter and form, so is his form, so is its form, etc. Note that
this regress only applies if all forms are held to be matter-involving. It
The question of whether or not Aristotelian forms are essentially matter- does not afflict the more moderate matter-involving position, (2), since it
involving is further complicated by some unclarity about what this holds that the form of the compound is matter-involving, and hence has
description precisely amounts to. In particular, it is unclear whether it is both material and formal parts, but that this second form, the form of the
supposed to be a things form, which is also its essence, which is matter- form, is pure, and has itself as a form, e.g., the form of a computer may be
involving, or the essence of the form (or both). Aristotle identifies a computing functions in certain suitable matter, but the formal part of that
things form with its essence at Metaphysics vii 7, 1032b12: by form I form (computing functions) would be pure. The regress is not merely
mean the essence of each thing and its primary substance. (He makes unattractively bloated and otiose. If a full explanation of what something
the same identity claim at vii 10, 1035b32, cf. also viii 4, 1044a36.) With is requires one to list an infinite series of forms, such explanations will not
this in mind, we can divide the possible views about matter-involving be viable for finite beings like us.
forms into the following four positions, with ascending degrees of matter-
involvement: A different way to avoid the regress which plagues (4) would be to deny
the assumption that anything that is matter-involving must be a compound
1. Pure forms: natural compounds (and their forms) have forms or of matter and form. Form is matter-involving, but that is not to say that it
essences that are not matter-involving. has its own form or essence and its own matter. Form and matter are
2. Compounds have forms or essences that involve matter, i.e., matter is introduced to explain certain facts about ordinary objects of perception,
part of the compounds essence or form. The form that is part of the such as this man or this horse. Once those facts have been accounted for,
compounds form, however, itself has a further form or essence that there is no need to look for the same explanations of the theoretical
is not matter-involving. entities which have been introduced to provide the original explanation.
3. As in (2), compounds have forms or essences that involve matter; but This way out of the regress involves denying that forms have essences,
forms themselves have no essences or forms. i.e., it reverts to position (3). This position faces a number of textual
4. As in (2) and (3), compounds have forms or essences that involve obstacles. For instance, at the beginning of De Anima i 1, Aristotle
matter; and so do forms, i.e., not only are the forms or essences of announces that our aim is to grasp and understand [the souls] nature and
compounds themselves in some sense compounds of matter and form, essence, and secondly its properties (402a78). In Metaphysics vii 11, he
as in (2) and (3), but they themselves have further essences or forms refers to the account (logos) of the essence (1037a223), and claims that
that are compounds of matter and form. the account of the soul is [the account] of the man (1037a289) (cf. also

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Physics ii 2, 194a13). For these textual reasons it would be preferable for a involving. On position (1), a thing has only one form, which is pure in
proponent of (3) to be able to say that forms do have essences or the sense that it contains no matter. However, the defender of pure forms
definitions in a sense, but they are identical with these (as snubness = must admit that there is also a broader definition of a thing, which does
concavity in a nose). Their essences are not some further thing, distinct include its matter, as well as its other causes. Superficially, the only
from them. difference seems to be whether or not this definition gets to be classified
as a form, and this might appear to be a merely verbal disagreement. In
The difficulty with this is that it is not clear that the defender of (3) can fact, more is at stake here: although, definition, form and essence
claim that forms have definitions of any sort and still maintain a doctrine are often treated as though they were interchangeable, a definition is
that is distinct from both (2), on the one hand, and (4) on the other. Given strictly-speaking something linguistic, whereas an essence or form may
that forms are definitions, they must have a structure that approximates to have a structure that corresponds to something linguistic, but it is still a
that of a linguistic entity. Whatever else one says about them then, it thing in the world. For example, the essence or form of a human being is a
seems clear that they must be divisible (in thought) into component parts, soul. A commitment to two essences or forms per compound substance is
as complex predicates are divisible into words. We may ask of these an additional metaphysical commitment in a way that a broader linguistic
component parts whether or not they are matter-involving, i.e., the definition of a thing that mentions both its form and its matter need not be.
question which the proponent of (3) answers in the affirmative with If important theoretical work cannot be found for matter-involving forms,
respect to the form or essence of the compounddoes it have parts which then, pure forms are the more ontologically parsimonious choice.
correspond to material terms like flesh or hand or matter? If some
parts of the forms definition are matter-involving, and others are not, this In any event, one can see that Aristotles initial contrast between matter
seems to make the definition in some sense a compound of material and and form grows quickly complex once hylomorphism leaves the domain
formal parts. We can then identify the formal parts, and ask if there is a of change. Although introduced as contrastive notions suited to explicate
definition of them, and, if the answer is yes, a matter-involving one, we change and substantial generation in the absence of generation ex nihilo,
are stuck once again with the regress which afflicted (4). On the other any easy contrast between form and matter turns out to be difficult to
hand, if no part of the forms definition is matter-involving, the proponent sustain once it finds employment in its further applications. Even so, as
of (3) must hold that, while compounds have essences which are matter- Aristotle implies, and as many of his followers have affirmed,
involving, these essences have definitions which are not, and this seems to hylomorphism proves no less elastic than explanatorily powerful across a
make his view intolerably similar to (2). wide range of explanatory roles.

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